Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API
Cryptographic Module
version rhel7.20190718,
version rhel7.20200812
and
version rhel7.20210526
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.4
Last update: 2021-10-04
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 Cryptographic Module Specification.......................................................................................4
1.1 Module Overview..........................................................................................................4
1.2 FIPS 140-2 validation....................................................................................................6
1.3 Modes of Operations.....................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces............................................................................8
3 Roles, Services and Authentication........................................................................................9
3.1 Roles.............................................................................................................................9
3.2 Services........................................................................................................................9
3.3 Authentication............................................................................................................12
4 Physical Security..................................................................................................................13
5 Operational Environment.....................................................................................................14
5.1 Applicability................................................................................................................14
5.2 Policy..........................................................................................................................14
6 Cryptographic Key Management..........................................................................................15
6.1 Random Number Generation......................................................................................15
6.2 Key establishment / Key Transport..............................................................................16
6.3 Key / Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access...........................................................16
6.4 Key / CSP Storage.......................................................................................................16
6.5 Key / CSP Zeroization..................................................................................................17
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)..............................18
8 Self-Tests..............................................................................................................................19
8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests.....................................................................................................19
8.1.1 Integrity Tests....................................................................................................19
8.2 Conditional Tests.........................................................................................................20
9 Guidance..............................................................................................................................21
9.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance..................................................................................21
9.1.1 Secure Installation and Startup.........................................................................21
9.1.2 FIPS 140-2 and AES NI Support..........................................................................21
9.2 User Guidance............................................................................................................22
9.2.1 XTS Usage.........................................................................................................22
9.2.2 GCM Usage........................................................................................................22
9.2.3 Triple-DES Usage...............................................................................................22
9.3 Handling Self Test Errors.............................................................................................22
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations..................................................................................24
Appendix B References...........................................................................................................26
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel
Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190718, version rhel7.20200812 and
version rhel7.20210526. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate
and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2
(Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1 Cryptographic Module Specification
1.1 Module Overview
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to
as the “Module”) is a software only cryptographic module that provides general-purpose
cryptographic services to the remainder of the Linux kernel. The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module is software only, security level 1 cryptographic
module, running on a multi-chip standalone platform.
The module is implemented as a set of shared libraries / binary files.
Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Logical Boundary
The module is aimed to run on a general purpose computer; the physical boundary is the
surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below:
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The following list of packages is required for the module to operate:
For Red Hat linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190718 the
following files are required:
• the kernel-3.10.0-1062.el7 package, which contains the binary files, integrity check
HMAC files and Man Pages for the kernel
• the dracut-fips-033-564.el7 and the dracut-fips-aesni-033-564.el7 packages, which
provide the configuration of the FIPS mode
For Red Hat linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20200812 the
following files are required:
• the kernel-3.10.0-1127.19.1.el7 package, which contains the binary files, integrity
check HMAC files and Man Pages for the kernel
• the dracut-fips-033-568.el7 and the dracut-fips-aesni-033-568.el7 packages, which
provide the configuration of the FIPS mode
For Red Hat linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20210526 the
following files are required:
• the kernel-3.10.0-1160.31.el7 package, which contains the binary files, integrity check
HMAC files and Man Pages for the kernel
• the dracut-fips-033-572.el7and the dracut-fips-aesni-033-572.el7 packages, which
provide the configuration of the FIPS mode
For Red Hat linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190718, version
rhel7.20200812 and version rhel7.20210526 the following file is required:
• the hmaccalc-0.9.13-4.el7 package.
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Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Physical Boundary
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The module is made of the following files:
• kernel loadable components /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/kernel/crypto/*.ko
• kernel loadable components /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/kernel/arch/x86/crypto/*.ko
• static kernel binary (vmlinuz): /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
• static kernel binary (vmlinuz) HMAC file: /boot/.vmlinuz-$(uname -r).hmac
• sha512hmac binary file for performing the integrity checks: usr/bin/sha512hmac
• sha512hmac binary HMAC file: /usr/lib64/hmaccalc/sha512hmac.hmac
The Red Hat linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190718, version
rhel7.20200812 and version rhel7.20210526 are bound to the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 NSS
Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190606 with FIPS 140-2 Certificate #3860 (hereafter
referred to as the “NSS bound module” or “NSS module”) provides the HMAC-SHA-512
algorithm used by the sha512hmac binary file to verify the integrity of both the sha512hmac
file and the vmlinuz (static kernel binary) file.
1.2 FIPS 140-2 validation
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module validated at security level 1. The table below shows the
security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:
FIPS 140-2 Section Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1: Security Levels
The module has been tested on the following platforms with the following configuration:
Hardware Platform Processor Operating System Tested
With PAA (AES-
NI)
Without PAA
(AES-NI)
Dell PowerEdge R630 Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5 Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 7
yes yes
Table 2: Tested Platforms
The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary
is depicted in Figure 1.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor Algorithm Acceleration
(PAA) functions provided by the different processors supported, as shown in the following
table:
Processor Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA)
function
Algorithm
Intel Xeon E5 AES-NI AES
Table 3: PAA function implementations
Note: Per [FIPS 140-2_IG] G.5, the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes
no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not
listed on the validation certificate.
1.3 Modes of Operations
The module supports two modes of operation: the FIPS approved and non-approved modes.
Section 9.1.1 describes the Secure Installation and Startup to correctly install and configure
the module. The module turns to FIPS approved mode after correct initialization, successful
completion of power-on self-tests.
Invoking a non-Approved algorithm or a non-Approved key size with an Approved algorithm as
listed in Table 7 will result in the module implicitly entering the non-FIPS mode of operation.
The approved services available in FIPS mode can be found in section 3.2, Table 5.
The non-approved services not available in FIPS mode can be found in section 3.2, Table 7.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the
FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the
hardware platform on which it runs.
The logical interfaces are the application program interface (API) through which applications
request services. The following table summarizes the four logical interfaces:
Logical
interfaces
Description Physical ports mapping the
logical interfaces
Command In API function calls, kernel command
line
Keyboard
Status Out API return codes, kernel logs Display
Data In API input parameters Keyboard
Data Out API output parameters Display
Power Input PC Power Port Physical Power Connector
Table 4: Ports and Logical Interfaces
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3 Roles, Services and Authentication
3.1 Roles
The module supports the following roles:
⚫ User role: performs symmetric encryption/decryption, keyed hash, message digest,
random number generation, show status
⚫ Crypto Officer role: performs the module installation and configuration, module's
initialization, self-tests, zeroization and signature verification
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module
services.
3.2 Services
The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are
described in detail in the user documentation.
The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed, the Critical Security
Parameters involved and how they are accessed in the FIPS mode. 'R' stands for Read
permission, 'W' stands for write permission and 'EX' stands for executable permission of the
module:
Service Algorithms Note(s) / Mode(s) CAVS
Cert(s).
Role CSPs Access
Symmetric
encryption/
decryption
Triple-DES CBC, CTR, ECB C1404 User 192 bits
Triple-DES
keys
R, EX
AES CBC, CCM, CTR,
ECB, GCM, GMAC,
XTS
C1395
C1398
C1399
128, 192
and 256 bits
AES keys
Note: XTS
mode only
with 128
and 256 bits
keys
CBC, CTR, ECB, GCM C1396
C1397
C1401
C1402
CBC, CTR, ECB,
GCM, XTS
C1400
Keyed hash
(HMAC)
HMAC SHA-1,
HMAC SHA-224,
HMAC SHA-256,
HMAC SHA-384,
HMAC SHA-512
BS < KS, KS = BS,
KS > BS
C1405
C1406
User at least 112
bits HMAC
keys
R, EX
HMAC SHA-1,
HMAC SHA-256,
HMAC SHA-512
C1403
C1407
Message digest
(SHS)
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384
SHA-512
N/A C1405
C1406
User N/A N/A
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-512
C1403
C1407
Authenticated Triple-DES CBC, AES Encrypt-then-MAC See AES User 128, 192 R, EX
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Service Algorithms Note(s) / Mode(s) CAVS
Cert(s).
Role CSPs Access
encryption CBC mode and
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-512
cipher (authenc)
used for IPsec
and
HMAC
certs
and 256 bits
AES keys,
HMAC keys
Random
number
generation (SP
800-90A DRBG)
CTR DRBG With derivation
function, with and
without prediction
resistance function
using AES-128, AES-
192 and AES-256
C1395
C1398
C1399
User Entropy
input string,
V and Key
R, W, EX
Hash DRBG With derivation
function, with and
without prediction
resistance function
using SHA-1, SHA-
256 and SHA-512
C1403
C1407
Entropy
input string,
V, C values
and Key
With derivation
function, with and
without prediction
resistance function
using SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512
C1405
C1406
HMAC DRBG With and without
prediction
resistance function
using SHA-1, SHA-
256 and SHA-512
C1403
C1407
Entropy
input string,
V and Key
With and without
prediction
resistance function
using SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512
C1405
C1406
Signature
verification
RSA 2048 and 3072 bits
signature
verification
according to
PKCS#1 v1.5, using
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-512
C1403
C1407
Crypto
Officer
N/A N/A
2048 and 3072 bits
signature
verification
according to
PKCS#1 v1.5, using
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
C1405
C1406
Module
initialization
N/A N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A N/A
Self-tests HMAC-SHA-512,
RSA Signature
Verification
Integrity test of the
kernel static binary
performed by the
sha512hmac binary
provided by the
bound NSS module.
NSS
HMAC:
C1387
C1420
Crypto
officer
HMAC-SHA-
512 key
R, EX
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Service Algorithms Note(s) / Mode(s) CAVS
Cert(s).
Role CSPs Access
RSA signature
verification
performs the
signature
verification of the
kernel loadable
components
Show status N/A Via verbose mode,
exit codes and
kernel logs (dmesg)
N/A User N/A N/A
Zeroize N/A N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A N/A
Installation and
configuration
N/A N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A N/A
Table 5: Available Cryptographic Module's Services in FIPS mode
The following Key Establishment methods are claimed for this module:
KTS (AES Certs. #C1395, #C1396, #C1397, #C1398, #C1399, #C1400, #C1401 and
#C1402, key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength)
KTS (AES Certs. #C1395, #C1396, #C1397, #C1398, #C1399, #C1400, #C1401 and #C1402
and HMAC Certs. #C1403, #C1405, #C1406 and #C1407, key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
KTS (Triple-DES Certs. #C1404 and HMAC Certs. #C1403, #C1405, #C1406 and #C1407 key
wrapping, key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
In the FIPS Approved mode the Module supports the following non-FIPS Approved but allowed
algorithms and/or services, which can be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation:
Service Algorithms Note(s) /
Mode(s)
Role CSPs Access
Non Deterministic Random
Number Generation
NDRNG N/A User seed R
Table 6: Non-Approved but Allowed Service Details for the FIPS Approved mode
In non-Approved mode the Module supports the following non-FIPS Approved algorithms,
which shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation:
Service Algorithms Note(s) / Mode(s) Role Keys Access
Symmetric
encryption/
decryption
AES XTS with 192-bit keys User 192 bits AES keys R, EX
DES ECB 56 bits DES keys
Message
digest
SHA-1 (multiple-
buffer
implementation)
N/A User N/A N/A
Keyed hash HMAC Keys smaller than 112 bits User HMAC keys with size
less than 112 bits
R, EX
Random
number
generation
ansi_cprng N/A User seed R, W, EX
Shared
secret
computation
Diffie-Hellman Shared secret
computation
User Diffie-Hellman
private keys (1536
bits and larger)
R, W, EX
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Service Algorithms Note(s) / Mode(s) Role Keys Access
EC Diffie-Hellman EC Diffie-hellman
private keys (P-192
and P-256)
Table 7: Service Details for the non-FIPS mode
3.3 Authentication
The module is a Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement
authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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5 Operational Environment
5.1 Applicability
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which
include but are not limited to:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host
• Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
• Red Hat OpenStack Platform
• OpenShift Container Platform
• Red Hat Gluster Storage
• Red Hat Ceph Storage
• Red Hat CloudForms
• Red Hat Satellite.
Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1
specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating
system executing on the hardware specified in section 1.2.
5.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the
module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In FIPS Approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall
be not used.
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6 Cryptographic Key Management
6.1 Random Number Generation
The module employs the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A]
for the creation of random numbers.
The DRBG is initialized during module initialization. The module loads by default the DRBG
using HMAC DRBG with SHA-512, with derivation function, without prediction resistance. The
DRBG is seeded during initialization with a seed obtained from get_random_bytes( ) of length
3/2 times the DRBG strength. The NDRNG is provided by the Linux RNG and is located within
the module's physical boundary but outside its logical boundary. The NDRNG provides 128
bits of entropy.
The module implements the health checks defined by SP 800-90A, section 11.3. The noise
source implements continuous tests for the NDRNG.
Here are listed the CSPs/keys details concerning storage, input, output, generation and
zeroization:
Type Keys/CSP
s
CSP
Size/Mod
es
Key
Generation
Key
Storage
Key
Entry/Outpu
t
Key Zeroization
Symme
tric
keys
AES CBC, CCM,
CTR, ECB,
GCM,
GMAC,
XTS
128, 192,
256 bit
keys.
Note: XTS
mode only
with 128
and 256
bit keys.
N/A Protected
kernel
memory
API allows
caller on the
same GPC to
supply key
Memory is automatically
overwritten by zeroes when
freeing the cipher handler
Triple-DES CBC, CTR,
ECB
192 bits
Triple-DES
keys
N/A Protected
kernel
memory
API allows
caller on the
same GPC to
supply key
Memory is automatically
overwritten by zeroes when
freeing the cipher handler
DRBG
SP800-
90A
entropy
string
SP 800-
90A DRBG
seed and
Entropy
string for
HMAC and
CTR DRBG
According
to SP 800-
90A
The seed
data
obtained
from
get_random_
bytes ()
Module’s
applicatio
n memory
N/A Automatic zeroization when
seeding operation
completes
SP 800-
90A DRBG
seed and
Entropy
string for
HASH
DRBG
SP 800- SP 800- According Based on Protected N/A Memory is automatically
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
90A
DRBG
internal
state
90A DRBG
Seed and
internal
state
values V,
and K for
HMAC and
CTR DRBG
to SP 800-
90A
entropy
string as
defined in SP
800-90A
kernel
memory
overwritten by zeroes when
freeing the cipher handler
SP 800-
90A DRBG
internal
state
values V,
and C for
Hash
DRBG
HMAC
keys
HMAC keys BS < KS,
KS = BS,
KS > BS
At least
112 bits
HMAC
keys
N/A Protected
kernel
memory
HMAC key
can be
supplied by
calling
application
Memory is automatically
overwritten by zeroes when
freeing the cipher handler
Table 8: Keys/CSPs
As defined in SP800-90A, the DRBG obtains the entropy string and nonce from the Linux
kernel non-deterministic random number generator during:
a. initialization of a DRBG instance
b. after 2⁴⁸ requests for random numbers
The module does not provide any key generation service or perform key generation for any of
its Approved algorithms. Keys are passed in from calling application via API parameters.
Caveat: The module generates random strings whose strengths are modified by available
entropy.
6.2 Key establishment / Key Transport
The module provides SP 800-38F compliant key wrapping using AES with GCM and CCM block
chaining modes, as well as a combination of AES-CBC for encryption/decryption and HMAC for
authentication. The module also provides SP 800-38F compliant key wrapping using a
combination of Triple-DES-CBC for encryption/decryption and HMAC for authentication.
According to “Table 2: Comparable strengths” in [SP 800-57], the key sizes of AES provides
the following security strength in FIPS mode of operation:
• AES: key wrapping provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Triple-DES: key wrapping provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
6.3 Key / Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access
An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during
the operation of the module. Moreover, the module does not support the output of
intermediate key generation values during the key generation process.
6.4 Key / CSP Storage
Symmetric keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed when
released by the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
storage of keys. The RSA public key used for signature verification of the kernel loadable
components is stored outside of the module’s boundary, in a keyring file in /proc/keys/.
6.5 Key / CSP Zeroization
When a calling kernel components calls the appropriate API function that operation overwrites
memory with 0s and then frees that memory (please see the API document for full details).
The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and
zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and
destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with
“zeros” before it is deallocated.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
MARKETING NAME......................….PowerEdge R630
REGULATORY MODEL................…..E26S
REGULATORY TYPE.....................….E26S001
EFFECTIVE DATE..........................…September 03, 2014
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS...............…Class A
This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations,
and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with
regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. Generally, Information
Technology Equipment (ITE) product compliance is based on IEC and CISPR standards and
their national equivalent such as Product Safety, IEC 60950-1 and European Norm EN 60950-1
or EMC, CISPR 22/CISPR 24 and EN 55022/55024. Dell products have been verified to comply
with the EU RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU. Dell products do not contain any of the restricted
substances in concentrations and applications not permitted by the RoHS Directive.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the Module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the Module
and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the module
performs conditional test for DRBG.
A failure of any of the self-tests panics the Module. The only recovery is to reboot. For
persistent failures, you must reinstall the kernel. See section 9.1 for details.
No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.
8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The module performs power-up self-tests at module initialization to ensure that the module is
not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The self-tests are
performed without any user intervention.
While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available and input or
output is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling
application until the self-tests are completed successfully.
8.1.1 Integrity Tests
The Module performs power-up self tests (at module initialization). Input, output, and
cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self test or error state.
The Module is single-threaded during the self tests and will stop the boot procedure, and
therefore any subsequent operation before any other kernel component can request services
from the Module.
The Crypto Officer with physical or logical access to the Module can run the POST (Power-On
Self-Tests) on demand by power cycling the Module or by rebooting the operating system.
For Known Answer Test, HMAC SHA-512 provided by the NSS bound module is tested before
the NSS module makes itself available to the sha512hmac application. In addition, if the Intel
AES-NI support is present and the dracut-fips aesni RPM package (see section 1) is installed,
the AES-NI implementation is self-tested with the same KAT vector as the other AES
implementations.
An HMAC SHA-512 (provided by the NSS bound module) calculation is performed on the
sha512hmac utility and static Linux kernel binary to verify their integrity. The Linux kernel
crypto API kernel components, and any additional code components loaded into the Linux
kernel are checked with the RSA signature verification implementation of the Linux kernel
when loading them into the kernel to confirm their integrity.
NOTE: The fact that the kernel integrity check passed, which requires the loading of
sha512hmac with the self tests implies a successful execution of the integrity and self tests of
sha512hmac (the HMAC is stored in /usr/lib/hmaccalc/sha512hmac.hmac).
With respect to the integrity check of kernel loadable components providing the
cryptographic functionality, the fact that the self test of these cryptographic components are
displayed implies that the integrity checks of each kernel component passed successfully.
The table below summarizes the power-on self tests performed by the module, which includes
the Integrity Test of the module itself as stated above and the Known Answer Test for each
approved cryptographic algorithm.
Algorithm Test
AES (ECB, CBC, XTS, CTR, OFB, GCM,
CCM)
KAT, encryption and decryption are tested
separately
Triple-DES (CBC, CTR, ECB) KAT, encryption and decryption are tested
separately
RSA signature verification Part of the integrity test (considered as a KAT)
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DRBG (CTR, Hash, HMAC) KAT
HMAC SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512 KAT
SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512 KAT
Integrity check HMAC SHA-512
Table 9: Module Self-Tests
8.2 Conditional Tests
The module does not perform any conditional tests.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
9 Guidance
9.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
To operate the Kernel Crypto API module, the operating system must be restricted to a single
operator mode of operation. (This should not be confused with single user mode which is
runlevel 1 on RHEL. This refers to processes having access to the same cryptographic
instance which RHEL ensures cannot happen by the memory management hardware.)
9.1.1 Secure Installation and Startup
Crypto Officers use the Installation instructions to install the Module in their environment.
The version of the RPM containing the FIPS validated module is stated in section 1.1 above.
The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation and the Crypto Officer
shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.
To bring the Module into FIPS approved mode, perform the following:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the
kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition
of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the
command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string
needs to be appended to the kernel command line:
boot=/dev/sda1
9.1.2 FIPS 140-2 and AES NI Support
According to the Kernel Crypto API FIPS 140-2 Security Policy, the Kernel Crypto API module
supports the AES-NI Intel processor instruction set as an approved cipher. The AES-NI
instruction set is used by the Module.
In case you configured a full disk encryption using AES, you may use the AES-NI support for a higher
performance compared to the software-only implementation.
To utilize the AES-NI support, the mentioned Module must be loaded during boot time by
installing a plugin.
Before you install the plugin, you MUST verify that your processor offers the AES-NI
instruction set by calling the following command:
cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep aes
If the command returns a list of properties, including the “aes” string, your CPU provides the
AES-NI instruction set. If the command returns nothing, AES-NI is not supported.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
You MUST NOT install the following plugin if your CPU does not support AES-NI because the
kernel will panic during boot.
The support for the AES-NI instruction set during boot time is enabled by installing the
following plugin (make sure that the version of the plugin RPM matches the version of the
installed RPMs!):
# install the dracut-fips-aesni package
yum install dracut-fips-aesni-*.noarch.rpm
# recreate the initramfs image
dracut -f
The changes come into effect during the next reboot.
9.2 User Guidance
CTR and RFC3686 mode must only be used for IPsec. It must not be used otherwise.
There are three implementations of AES: aes-generic, aesni-intel, and aes-x86_64 on x86_64
machines. The additional specific implementations of AES for the x86 architecture are
disallowed and not available on the test platforms.
When using the Module, the user shall utilize the Linux Kernel Crypto API provided memory
allocation mechanisms. In addition, the user shall not use the function copy_to_user() on any
portion of the data structures used to communicate with the Linux Kernel Crypto API.
Only the cryptographic mechanisms provided with the Linux Kernel Crypto API are considered
for use. The NSS bound module, although used, is only considered to support the integrity
verification and is not intended for general-purpose use with respect to this Module.
9.2.1 XTS Usage
The XTS mode must only be used for the disk encryption functionality offered by dm-crypt.
The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage
devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in
transit.
The XTS key check that key1 != key2 is done within the module, which is compliant with IG
A.9
9.2.2 GCM Usage
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES-GCM
encryption or decryption shall be redistributed.
The module generates the IV internally randomly with an approved SP 800-90B DRBG, which
is compliant with provision 2) of IG A.5.
When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the
party that performs the AES-GCM encryption therefore there is no restriction on the IV
generation.
9.2.3 Triple-DES Usage
According to IG A.13, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^16
64-bit blocks of data. It is the user’s responsibility to make sure that the module complies
with this requirement and that the module does not exceed this limit.
9.3 Handling Self Test Errors
Self test failure within the Kernel Crypto API module or the dm-crypt kernel component will
panic the kernel and the operating system will not load.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Recover from this error by trying to reboot the system. If the failure continues, you must
reinstall the software package being sure to follow all instructions. If you downloaded the
software verify the package hash to confirm a proper download. Contact Red Hat if these
steps do not resolve the problem.
The Kernel Crypto API module performs a power-on self test that includes an integrity check
and known answer tests for the available cryptographic algorithms.
The kernel dumps self test success and failure messages into the kernel message ring buffer.
Post boot, the messages are moved to /var/log/messages.
Use dmesg to read the contents of the kernel ring buffer. The format of the ringbuffer
(dmesg) output is:
alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed
Typical messages are similar to "alg: self-tests for xts(aes) (xts(aes-x86_64)) passed" for each
algorithm/sub-algorithm type.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FSM Finite State Model
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS Key Agreement Schema
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
NDF No Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
O/S Operating System
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PR Prediction Resistance
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TDES Triple DES
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Appendix B References
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198 1/FIPS-198 1_final.pdf
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding
Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality
May 2004
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated
July20_2007.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on
Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
SP800-56A
Rev. 3
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for
Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
May 2013
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-3/final
SP800-56C
Rev. 1
NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for
Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
November 2011
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
SP800-67
Rev. 2
NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 2 - Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
November 2017
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/rev-2/final
SP800-90A
Rev. 1
NIST Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1 - Recommendation for
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
June 2015
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90a/rev-1/final
SP800-90B NIST Draft Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the
Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90b/final
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
October 2009
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final
SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A - Transitions: Recommendation
for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths
March 2019
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-131a/rev-2/final
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