Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client
Cryptographic Module
version rhel7.20190626
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.2
Last update: 2021-03-29
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table of Contents
1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.....................................................................................4
2.1 Module Overview..........................................................................................................4
2.2 FIPS 140-2 validation....................................................................................................5
2.3 Modes of Operations.....................................................................................................6
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................8
4 Roles, Services and Authentication......................................................................................9
4.1 Roles.............................................................................................................................9
4.2 Services........................................................................................................................9
4.3 Authentication............................................................................................................10
5 Physical Security................................................................................................................11
6 Operational Environment...................................................................................................12
6.1 Applicability................................................................................................................12
6.2 Policy..........................................................................................................................12
7 Cryptographic Key Management........................................................................................13
7.1 Random Number Generation......................................................................................13
7.2 Key / CSP Storage.......................................................................................................13
7.3 Key / CSP Zeroization..................................................................................................14
8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)............................15
8.1 Statement of compliance............................................................................................15
9 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................16
9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests.....................................................................................................16
9.1.1 Integrity Tests....................................................................................................16
9.1.2 Cryptographic algorithm tests...........................................................................16
10 Guidance..........................................................................................................................17
10.1 Crypto Officer Guidance............................................................................................17
10.1.1 Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode............................................18
10.1.2 OpenSSH Configuration...................................................................................18
10.2 User Guidance..........................................................................................................18
10.2.1 Handling Self-Test Errors..................................................................................19
10.2.2 AES-GCM.........................................................................................................19
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations................................................................................20
Appendix B References.........................................................................................................21
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1 Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version rhel7.20190626. It contains the security rules
under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the
requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Overview
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version
rhel7.20190626 (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software library implementing the
cryptographic support for the SSH protocol in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux user space.
The module is implemented as a set of binary files.
Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Logical Boundary
The module is aimed to run on a general purpose computer; the physical boundary is the
surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below:
Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Physical Boundary
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The module will use the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSL Module (FIPS 140-2 Certificate
#3867) as a bound module which provides the underlying cryptographic algorithms
necessary for establishing and maintaining the SSH session. In addition the integrity check
uses the cryptographic services provided by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSL Module
as used by the utility application of fipscheck using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm.
This requires a copy of a Cert. #3867 validated version of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
OpenSSL Module to be installed on the system for the current module to operate.
The cryptographic module combines a vertical stack of Linux components intended to limit
the external interface each separate component may provide. The following software need to
be installed for the module to operate:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module with the version of
the OpenSSH Client RPM file 7.4p1-21.el7
• The bound module of OpenSSL with FIPS 140-2 Certificate #3867
• The contents of the fipscheck RPM package (version 1.4.1-6.el7)
• The contents of the fipscheck-lib RPM package (version 1.4.1-6.el7).
The OpenSSH client RPM package of the Module includes the binary files, integrity check
HMAC files and Man Pages. Any application other than the OpenSSH client application
(/usr/bin/ssh) delivered with the aforementioned OpenSSH RPM package is not part of the
Module. The FIPS certificate for this module does not apply to these other applications.
The files comprising the module are the following:
• /usr/sbin/ssh
• /usr/bin/fipscheck
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/ssh.hmac
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/fipscheck.hmac
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/libfipscheck.so.1.2.1.hmac
• /usr/lib64/libfipscheck.so.1.2.1
2.2 FIPS 140-2 validation
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module validated at Security Level 1. The table below shows the
security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:
FIPS 140-2 Section Security
Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 1: Security Levels
The module has been tested on the following platforms with the following configuration:
Construct
or
Hardware Processor Operating System
Dell PowerEdge R630 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
Table 2: Tested Platforms
The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary
is depicted in Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Logical Boundary.
The bound OpenSSL module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor
Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) functions provided by the processors.
2.3 Modes of Operations
The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS approved and non-approved modes.
The Module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest
operation and compares the value with the build time pre-computed value. If the digests
match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-tests are successful,
the Module turns to the FIPS Approved mode.
The following table shows algorithms available in FIPS mode and the services are listed in
section 4.2, Table 6.
The OpenSSH and the bound OpenSSL module together provide the Diffie Hellman and EC
Diffie Hellman key agreement. The OpenSSH module only implements the KDF portion of the
key agreement and the bound OpenSSL module provides the shared secret computation.
• Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385 and #C1386 with CVL Certs.
#C1423, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and
202 bits of encryption strength);
• EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385 and #C1386 with CVL Certs.
#C1423, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and
256 bits of encryption strength);
Algorithm CAVS Certificates
Provided by OpenSSH Module
SP 800-135 SSH KDF with SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
CVL Cert. #C1423
Provided by bound OpenSSL
Module
AES (CBC, CTR, GCM)
(128, 192, 256-bit keys)
Note: OpenSSH only supports
128 and 256 bit keys for GCM
Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1380, #C1381, #C1382, #C1383,
#C1384, #C1385, #C1386, #C1419
Triple-DES (CBC)
(168-bit keys)
Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385, #C1386
HMAC
(SHA-1/224/256/384/512)
Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1380, #C1381, #C1382, #C1383,
#C1384, #C1385, #C1386, #C1419
SHA
(SHA-1/224/256/384/512)
Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1380, #C1381,#C1382, #C1383,
#C1384, #C1385, #C1386, #C1419
RSA
(2048, 3072-bit keys)
Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385, #C1386
ECDSA Cert. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385, #C1386
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Algorithm CAVS Certificates
(P-224/256/384/521)
SP 800-56A DLC primitive Diffie-
Hellman with public key sizes
between 2048 and 8192 bits
CVL Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385, #C1386
SP 800-56A DLC primitive EC
Diffie-Hellman
(P-256/384/521)
CVL Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1385, #C1386
DRBG (Hash, HMAC, and CTR) Certs. #C1378, #C1379, #C1380, #C1381, #C1382, #C1383,
#C1384, #C1385, #C1386, #C1419
NDRNG Non-approved but allowed used for seeding DRBG
Table 3: Approved or Allowed Algorithms
The following table lists the non-approved algorithms, use of any of these algorithm will put
the module in non FIPS mode.
Algorithm Notes
RSA Using Keys less than 2048 bit
DSA OpenSSH only supports 1024-bit keys
Table 4: Non Approved Algorithms from bound OpenSSL module
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the
FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the
hardware platform on which it runs.
The following table summarizes the four logical interfaces:
Logical
interfaces
Description Physical ports mapping the
logical interfaces
Command In Invocation of the ssh command on
the command line or via the
configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config
and ~./.ssh/config
Environment variable
SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
Keyboard, Ethernet port
Status Out Status messages returned after the
command execution
Display, Ethernet port
Data In Input parameters of the ssh
command on the command line with
configuration file
~/.ssh/known_hosts,
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, key files
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa*, ~/.ssh/id_rsa*,
data via SSHv2 channel, data via
local or remote port-forwarding port,
data via TUN device
Keyboard, Ethernet port
Data Out Output data returned by the ssh
command
Display, Ethernet port
Table 5: Ports and Logical Interfaces
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The module supports the following roles:
⚫ User role: performs Key Derivation Function, Establish & Maintain SSH Session, Close
SSH Session and Show Status
⚫ Crypto Officer role: performs module installation and configuration, perform the
selftests and terminate SSH Application
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module
services.
4.2 Services
The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are
described in detail in the user documentation.
The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed, the Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) involved and how they are accessed in the FIPS mode.
'R' stands for Read permission, 'W' stands for write permission and 'EX' stands for executable
permission of the module:
Service Algo(s). Note(s) / Mode(s) Role CSPs Access
Establish &
Maintain
SSH
Session
SP 800-135 Key
Derivation
Function in the
SSH protocol
version 2
N/A User RSA or ECDSA client
private key
Diffie-Hellman or EC
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret,
derived keys
Derived session
encryption keys and
derived data
authentication
(HMAC) keys
R, W, EX
Close SSH
Session
N/A Zeroize User Derived session
encryption key and
derived data
authentication
(HMAC) keys
Shared secret
W
Terminate
SSH
Application
N/A Zeroize Crypto
officer
Derived session
encryption key and
data authentication
(HMAC) keys
Shared secret
W
Self-Tests HMAC-SHA-256
(uses the
cryptographic
services provided
by the bound
OpenSSL
module)
Integrity test invoked by
restarting the module
Crypto
officer
HMAC integrity key R, EX
Zeroize N/A N/A User All aforementioned W
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Service Algo(s). Note(s) / Mode(s) Role CSPs Access
CSP’s
Show
Status
N/A Via verbose mode and
exit codes
User N/A R, EX
Configure
SSH Client
N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A R, EX
Installation N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A R, EX
Table 6: Available Cryptographic Module's Services in FIPS mode
Note: The SSH protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Only the SP
800-135 Key Derivation Function has been validated by CAVP.
Service Algo(s). Note(s) Role CSPs Access
Establish &
Maintain
SSH
Session
SP 800-135 Key
Derivation
Function in the
SSH protocol
version 2
N/A User Using RSA or DSA
keys listed Table 4.
R, W, EX
Table 7: Available Cryptographic Module's services in Non-FIPS mode
4.3 Authentication
The module is a Security Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement
authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.
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5 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1
specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating
system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.2.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which
include but are not limited to:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host
• Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
• Red Hat OpenStack Platform
• OpenShift Container Platform
• Red Hat Gluster Storage
• Red Hat Ceph Storage
• Red Hat CloudForms
• Red Hat Satellite.
Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that requests cryptographic services is the single user of the
module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In operational mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall be
not used.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
7 Cryptographic Key Management
7.1 Random Number Generation
The module does not implement any random number generator nor provides key generation.
The module only provides key derivation through the implementation of the SP 800-135 KDF.
The module calls the bound OpenSSL module to obtain the shared secret which will be used
during the SSHv2 protocol initial handshake. The module derives keys from this shared secret
through the SP 800-135 KDF implementation. When the module requests
encryption/decryption services provided by the OpenSSL bound module, the resulting derived
symmetric key (i.e. the output of the SP 800-135 KDF) will be passed to the OpenSSL bound
module via API parameters.
Here are listed the CSPs/keys details concerning storage, input, output, generation and
zeroization:
Type Keys/CSPs Key Generation Key Storage Key Entry/Output Key Zeroization
Session
Encryption
Keys
Shared
secret
( 2048 bits
to 8192 bits
for Diffie-
Hellman; P-
256, P-384,
P-521 for
EC Diffie-
Hellman)
N/A Module's
memory
Entry via API
parameters
Output: N/A
Zeroized by the
ssh application
Derived
keys
(AES
128/192/25
6-bit keys;
Triple-DES
168-bit
keys; HMAC
keys larger
than 112
bits)
(Derived from the
shared secret
through the SP
800-135 KDF)
Module's
memory
Entry: N/A
Output via API
parameters
Zeroized by the
ssh application
Client
Private
Keys
RSA private
keys
(2048/3072
/4096-bit
keys)
N/A Module's
memory
Via API parameters Zeroized by the
ssh application
ECDSA
private
keys
(P-256, P-
384, P-521
keys)
N/A Module's
memory
Via API parameters Zeroized by the
ssh application
Software
Integrity
Key
HMAC Key
(128-bit
key)
N/A Module's
binary file
N/A N/A
Table 8: Keys/CSPs
7.2 Key / CSP Storage
The module does not perform persistent storage of keys. The keys and CSPs are temporarily
stored as plaintext in the RAM.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The persistently stored public keys that are associated with a client username via the use of
the files ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa in which they are both stored for each user
individually in its home directory. These files however, are not part of the module.
7.3 Key / CSP Zeroization
The destruction functions overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values
and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap
in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten
before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
MARKETING NAME......................….PowerEdge R630
REGULATORY MODEL................…..E26S
REGULATORY TYPE.....................….E26S001
EFFECTIVE DATE..........................…September 03, 2014
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS...............…Class A
8.1 Statement of compliance
This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations,
and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with
regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. Generally, Information
Technology Equipment (ITE) product compliance is based on IEC and CISPR standards and
their national equivalent such as Product Safety, IEC 60950-1 and European Norm EN 60950-1
or EMC, CISPR 22/CISPR 24 and EN 55022/55024. Dell products have been verified to comply
with the EU RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU. Dell products do not contain any of the restricted
substances in concentrations and applications not permitted by the RoHS Directive.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
9 Self-Tests
9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The module performs power-up self-tests at module initialization to ensure that the module is
not corrupted. The self-tests are automatically triggered without any user intervention.
While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available, and input or
output data is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling
application until the self-tests are completed successfully.
9.1.1 Integrity Tests
The integrity check is performed by the fipscheck application using the HMAC-SHA-256
algorithm implemented by the bound Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSL Module.
When the OpenSSH module starts, it triggers the power-on self-tests, including the software
integrity test. The software integrity test, using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm, constitutes a
known answer test for the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm.
The user space integrity verification is performed as follows: the OpenSSH Client application
links with the library libfipscheck.so which is intended to execute fipscheck to verify the
integrity of the OpenSSH Client application file using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Upon
calling the FIPSCHECK_verify() function provided with libfipscheck.so, fipscheck is loaded and
executed, and the following steps are performed:
1. OpenSSL, loaded by fipscheck, performs the integrity check of the OpenSSL library
files using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm
2. fipscheck performs the integrity check of its application file using the HMAC-SHA-256
algorithm provided by the OpenSSL Module
3. fipscheck automatically verifies the integrity of libfipscheck.so before processing
requests of calling applications
4. The fipscheck application performs the integrity check of the OpenSSH Client
application file. The fipscheck computes the HMAC-SHA-256 checksum of that and
compares the computed value with the value stored inside the
/usr/lib64/fipscheck/ssh.hmac checksum file. The fipscheck application returns the
appropriate exit value based on the comparison result: zero if the checksum is OK, an
error code otherwise (which brings the OpenSSH Module into the error state). The
libfipscheck.so library reports the result to the OpenSSH Client application.
If any of those steps fail, an error code is returned and the OpenSSH Module enters the error
state.
9.1.2 Cryptographic algorithm tests
The power-up self tests for the SP 800-135 KDF is covered by the SHS Known-Answer-Tests
performed by the bound Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSL Module.
9.1.3 On-demand self-tests
The user can perform on-demand self-tests by restarting the ssh service.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
10 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's
validated status while in use.
10.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 2.1 above.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSL Module referenced in section 2.1 must be installed
according to its Security Policy.
The RPM package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the
installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm,
and the RHN remote management tool).
For proper operation of the in-module integrity verification, the prelink has to be disabled.
1 Disable the prelink:
# sed -i 's/PRELINKING=yes/PRELINKING=no/g' /etc/sysconfig/prelink
2 Run following command to return binaries to a non-prelink state:
# /usr/sbin/prelink -ua
Only the cipher types listed in section 1.2 are allowed to be used.
Crypto officer should perform the following steps for Module initialization:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the
kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition
of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command
"df /boot"
or
"df /boot/efi"
respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string
needs to be appended to the kernel command line:
"boot=/dev/sda1"
Reboot to apply these settings.
The next step is to check the presence of the configuration file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
and make sure it contains value 1.
The version of the RPM containing the validated Module is the version listed in chapter 2.1.
The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation of the Module and the
Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
10.1.1 Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode
Use care whenever making configuration changes that could potentially prevent access to the
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled flag (fips=1) in the file/proc. If the module does not detect this
flag during initialization, the module is not setup to operate FIPS compatible mode.
All user space modules depend on this file for running in FIPS compatible mode.
10.1.2 OpenSSH Configuration
The user must not use DSA keys for performing key-based authentication as OpenSSH only
allows DSA keys with 1024 bit size which are disallowed as per SP800-131A.
The user must not accept DSA host keys potentially offered during the first contact of an SSH
server as OpenSSH only allows DSA keys with 1024 bit size which are disallowed as per
SP800- 131A.
When re-generating RSA host keys, the crypto officer should generate RSA keys with a size of
2048 bit or higher according to [SP800-131A]. The crypto officer should inform the user base
to not use RSA keys with key sizes smaller than 2048 bits.
In FIPS 140-2 mode, the module enforces the following restrictions. When these restrictions
are violated by configuration options or command line options, the module will not be in the
FIPS mode of operation:
• SSH protocol version 1 is not allowed
• GSSAPI is not allowed
• Only the following ciphers are allowed:
• aes128-ctr
• aes192-ctr
• aes256-ctr
• aes128-cbc
• aes192-cbc
• aes256-cbc
• aes128-gcm@openssh.com
• aes256-gcm@openssh.com
• 3des-cbc
• rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
Only the following message authentication codes are allowed:
• hmac-sha1
• hmac-sha2-256
• hmac-sha2-512
• hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
• hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
• hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
10.2 User Guidance
See the ssh(1) man page for general usage documentation of the ssh client.
When connecting to a previously unknown server, the user will be prompted to verify a
fingerprint of the server's public key. This must be done by consulting a trusted source.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
10.2.1 Handling Self-Test Errors
OpenSSL's self tests failures may prevent OpenSSH from operating. See the Guidance section
in the OpenSSL Security Policy for instructions on handling OpenSSL self test failures.
The OpenSSH self test consists of the software integrity test. If the integrity test fails,
OpenSSH enters an error state. The only recovery from this type of failure is to reinstall the
OpenSSH module.
10.2.2 AES-GCM
IV generation for AES-GCM only occurs in the context of the SSHv2 protocol. The module is
compliant with RFC4252, 4253 and 5647.
When an SSH session gets terminated for any reason, all keying material will be re-negotiated
by the module.
The module enforces a maximum of 231
packets that can be either sent or received by the
module for a given SSH session, which satisfied the 264
-1 AES-GCM encryption limit imposed
by IG A.5.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMT Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVT Component Verification Testing
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFT Derivation Function Test
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FSM Finite State Model
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
O/S Operating System
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PR Prediction Resistance
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple DES
UI User Interface
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Appendix B References
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/198/1/final
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdfNIST
Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on
Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP800-56A NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation for
Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
May 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800 56Ar2.pdf
SP800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-
Expansion
November 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56C/SP-800-56C.pdf
SP800-90A
Rev. 1
NIST Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1 - Recommendation for
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
June 2015
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90a/rev-1/final
SP800-90B NIST Draft Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the
Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90b/final
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key
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Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
October 2009
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
SP800-131A
Rev. 2
NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2 - Transitions:
Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-131a/rev-2/final
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