Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip Deneb
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Date: July 18, 2025
Document Version: 1.0
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Revision History
Version Change
1.0 Initial Version
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 4
1.1. SCOPE 4
1.2. ACRONYMS 4
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION 5
2.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY 5
2.2. VERSION INFORMATION 6
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY 6
2.3.1. APPROVED ALGORITHM 6
2.3.2. NON-APPROVED ALGORITHM 7
2.4. APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION 8
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES 9
4. ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION 10
4.1. ROLE 10
4.2. SERVICE 11
4.2.1. APPROVED SERVICES 11
4.2.2. NON-APPROVED SERVICES 16
4.3. AUTHENTICATION 16
5. SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY 18
6. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 19
7. PHYSICAL SECURITY 20
8. NON-INVASIVE SECURITY 21
9. SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER MANAGEMENT 22
10. SELF-TESTS 26
10.1. PRE-OPERATIONAL TEST 26
10.2. CONDITIONAL TEST 26
11. LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE 28
11.1. SECURE INITIALIZATION 28
11.2. OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION OF MODULE 28
11.3. ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE 28
11.4. NON-ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE 28
12. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS 29
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
1. Introduction
1.1. Scope
This document describes the security policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip Deneb, herein after
referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module” in compliance with IG 2.3.B, satisfies all applicable FIPS 140-3 Security
Level 2 requirements. This module is dedicated to be embedded Samsung SED to support cryptographic algorithms and
robust key management design. The module is integrated in a SoC and used as FIPS 140-3 validated Sub-Chip subsystem
module to provide approved security functions subject to various SSD products’ configuration.
ISO/IEC 24759
Section 6.
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title
Security
Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Table 1. Security Levels
1.2. Acronyms
Acronym Description
CPK Credential Protection Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDH CK Common Key, shared secret for key agreement
ECDH PK Public key for key agreement
ECDH SK Secret key for key agreement
GRK Grant Key derived from shared secret
HMI Hardware Module Interface the Mailbox and DMA are physical ports
of the sub-chip
KAS-ECC-SSC Key Agreement Scheme (Shared Secret Computation)
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
KPK Key Protection Key
LBA Logical Block Address
MEK Media Encryption Key
NAND NAND Flash Memory
NVMe Non-Volatile Memory Host Controller Interface Specification
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SSC Security Subsystem Class
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TCG Trusted Computing Group
Table 2. Acronyms
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
2. Cryptographic module specification
2.1. Cryptographic boundary
The following photographs show explicitly defined perimeter of the cryptographic module’s physical boundary. A single IC
chip package serves as the single-chip physical boundary of the module. Set of hard circuitry cores of Sub-Chip
cryptographic subsystem are contained in this physical boundary.
Figure 1. External view of the Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
The Sub-Chip cryptographic subsystem boundary (i.e. HMI) is essentially composed of dedicated isolated security processor
and cryptographic hardware subsystems. The associated firmware that loaded into the HMI provides the required approved
mode of operation.
• Module type: Hardware
• Module embodiment: Single Chip
• Module Characteristics: The sub-chip is contained within the Samsung S4LY011A01 SoC implemented within a TCG
Opal SED.
Figure 2. HMI of the Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
2.2. Version information
Tested Configuration Hardware Version Firmware Version
S4LY011A011
S02 SS0200
Table 3. Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
2.3. Cryptographic functionality
2.3.1. Approved algorithm
The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage:
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/
Method
Description/
Key Size(s)/
Key Strength(s)
Use/Function
A4353 AES / FIPS 197, SP 800-
38D
GCM 256 bits Key Encryption / Decryption
A4353 KTS AES-GCM 256 bits Key Transport as per SP 800-38F
A4352 DRBG /
SP 800-90Arev1
CTR_ DRBG
(AES-256)
N/A All Cryptographic Key Generation
A4351 SHS / FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 N/A Message Digest
SHS / FIPS 180-4 SHA-384 N/A Message Digest
KBKDF / SP 800-
108rev1
HMAC-SHA-256 256 bits Key Derivation
HMAC / FIPS 198-1 SHA-256 256 bits Message Authentication
ECDSA /
FIPS 186-4
Curve P-384 with SHA-
384
P-384 / 192 bits Key Generation and Digital
Signature Verification
KAS-ECC-SSC / SP 800-
56Ar3
staticUnified P-384 / 192 bits2
Shared secret computation
KDA /
SP 800-56C Rev2
OnestepNoCounterKdf
with SHA2-256
256 bits Key Derivation for GRK from ECDH
CK
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG /
SP 800-133r2
Section 5.2 and 6.1 N/A As per SP 800-133rev2 Section 5.2
and 6.1, key generation is
performed for "Key Pairs for Key
Establishment" and "Direct
Generation: of Symmetric Keys"
which are Approved key generation
methods.
The list of CSPs generated by the
module: KDK_CPK, KDK_KPK, MEK,
KEK, ECDH SK, Root Key
E83 ENT (P) /
SP800-90B
N/A N/A ENT (P) provides a minimum of 256
bits of entropy for approved DRBG
seed construction in key
generation.
Table 4. Approved Algorithms
NOTE: There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVP tested but not used by the module. Only the algorithms,
modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by the module.
1
The “S4LY011A01” version number is NOT the cryptographic boundary of the module, it references the SoC on which it operates on.
2
key establishment methodology provides 192 bits of encryption strength
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
# Name Type Description SF Properties Algorithms
1 Key
Transport
KTS SP 800-38D and SP 800-38F.
KTS (key wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
256-bit keys providing 256
bits of encryption strength
AES GCM Cert. #A4353
2 Key
Agreement
KAS SP 800-56Arev3. KASECC per
IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).
Key establishment
methodology provides 192 bits
of encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC / SP 800-
56Ar3 Cert. #A4351
KDA / SP 800-56C Rev2
Cert. #A4351
Cert. SHS / FIPS 180-4
#A4351
Table 5. Security Function Implementations
2.3.2. Non-Approved Algorithm
Algorithm Use / Function
AES-XTS /
FIPS 197, SP 800-38E
Encryption for Dump data
RSA / SP 800-56B Encryption for dump encryption Key
HKDF/ SP 800-56C Rev2 Key Derivation
Table 6. Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
Following algorithm is not intended to be used as a security function in this module, and not used whatsoever to meet
any FIPS 140-3 requirements. The algorithm below is not provided through executable approved service to an operator.
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
AES-XTS /
FIPS 197, SP 800-38E
No Security Claimed; AES-XTS is only used for proprietary
firmware decryption during ROM initialization; as per FIPS
140-3 IG 2.4.A this cryptographic operation is applied for
good measure.
Firmware Decryption
Table 7. Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
2.4. Approved mode of operation
The cryptographic module supports an approved and non-approved mode of operation. The module defaults to the
approved mode of operation as long as the guidance outlined in Section 11 is followed, and operator can verify that the
module enters the default approved mode by confirming that the version is consistent with the version information
described in this Security Policy. The module will transition between the approved and non-approved modes depending on
the services requested by the operator. The operator can check whether the module is in the approved mode or the non-
approved mode via status response from each service. The module zeroises SSPs when completing a service as described
in Table 10, however it is recommended for the Crypto Officer (CO) via procedural guidance set forth in this Security Policy
to also perform a power reset to zeroise all SSPs of the module when switching between modes of operation.
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
3. Cryptographic module interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Type Data that passes over port/interface
Mailbox
Data Input
Signature Data
DMA
Firmware Data
Signature Data
Key Data
DMA Data Output
Plaintext data that has been decrypted by
the cryptographic module
Mailbox
Control Input Commands input logically via an API;
Status Output Status information
Power planes Power Input Power input
Table 8. Ports and Interfaces
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
4. Roles, services, and authentication
4.1. Role
The following table defines the roles, authority, associated services, and inputs/outputs supported by the cryptographic
module:
Table 9. Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role Authority Service Input Output
Crypto Officer (CO)
SysID
CreateNamespace
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
DeleteNamespace
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
WriteProtection
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Sanitize Authority Index, Password Status
CryptoErase Authority Index, Password Status
FormatNVM Authority Index, Password Status
RevertWithPSID Authority Index, Password Status
TPER Reset Authority Index, Password Status
Revoke Root
Encryption Key
Authority Index, Password Status
AdminSP.SID
AdminSP.Admin1
LockingSP.Admin1~4
Revert Authority Index, Password Status
Activate Authority Index, Password Status
Reactivate Authority Index, Password Status
Assign
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Deassign
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Set CPIN Authority Index, Password Status
GenKey Authority Index, Password Status
Erase Authority Index, Password Status
Grant
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
SetRange
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
User LockingSP.User1~33
Reactivate Authority Index, Password Status
Assign
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Deassign
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Set CPIN Authority Index, Password Status
GenKey Authority Index, Password Status
Erase Authority Index, Password Status
Grant
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
SetRange
Authority Index, Password,
Authority List
Status
Firmware Loader (FL) Bootloader VerifyFW
Signature Data,
Firmware Data
Status
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
4.2. Service
4.2.1. Approved Services
The following table shows all approved services which is implemented by the cryptographic module.
E: EXECUTE; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROISE
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
Show Status
Show status of the
module and show
module’s versioning
information
- - -
Return value
MESSAGE_RESPONSE.
bApprovedMode: 1
// 1: Approved Mode,
0: Non-Approved
Mode
Perform self-tests
Perform all pre-
operational and
conditional self-tests
by power-cycling the
module
- - -
Get Random
Number
Provide a random
number generated by
the CM
CTR_ DRBG
(AES-256)
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
- O O O
Authentication4
Load the KPK for
authority and decrypt
related encryption
keys
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, SHA,
HMAC
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
- O O O
Unauthentication
5
Zeroise the KPK for
authority and zeroise
related encryption
keys
- KPK - O
Hash Operation Hash operation SHA - -
VerifyFW
Verify firmware
signature
ECDSA
FW
Verification
Key
FL O
RevertWithPSID
NVMe Command,
Erase user data in all
Range by changing
the data
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KBKDF,
SHA, HMAC
PIN
CO
O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KEK, KPK,
MEK, CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O O
ECDH SK,
ECDH PK
O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
TPER Reset
Abort all TCG
Communications and
Reset TCG protocol
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM, HMAC KPK, KEK, O O O
3
It means that “Write” and “Zeroise” perform in each storage of SSPs that is described in table10.
4
This does not mean to use to comply with Section 7.4.4 of ISO/IEC 19790, but is a service used to support the part of TCG authenticate
command.
5
This does not mean to use to comply with Section 7.4.4 of ISO/IEC 19790, but is a service used to support the part of TCG deauthenticate
command.
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
MEK
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
CreateNamespace
Allocate key to the
specified Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM, KAS-
ECC-SSC,
CTR_DRBG, SHA,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
ECDH CK,
ECDH PK,
ECDH SK
O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
DeleteNamespace
Delete key for the
specified Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
MEK O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
WriteProtection
Remove key from TCG
boundary on the
specified Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM, HMAC
KPK, KEK O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Sanitize
Cryptographically
erase user data
(Delete key)
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
MEK O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
CryptoErase
Cryptographically
erase user data
(Delete key)
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
O O O
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
Seed
MEK O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
FormatNVM
Delete the Key
corresponding to the
specified Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
MEK O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Activate
Ready to TCG Locking
operation
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, SHA,
HMAC
PIN, KEK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O O
ECDH SK,
ECDH PK
O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Revert
Reset CPINs of all
authorities and range
information
KBKDF
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
PIN O O
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KBKDF,
SHA, HMAC
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KEK, KPK,
MEK, CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O O
ECDH SK,
ECDH PK
O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Revoke Root
Encryption Key
Revoke and zeroise
REK
KBKDF
PIN
CO
O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
CTR_DRBG,
KBKDF
REK, SMK,
KMK
O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
O O O
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
Seed
Root Key O O
Reactivate Revert and Activate
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, SHA,
HMAC
KEK
CO,
USER
O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O O
ECDH SK,
ECDH PK
O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Set CPIN
Set TCG authority’s
password
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, SHA,
HMAC
KEK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O O
ECDH SK,
ECDH PK
O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Assign
Assign locking object
to the specified
Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG, KAS-
ECC-SSC, SHA,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
MEK, ECDH
CK, ECDH
PK, ECDH SK
O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Deassign
Deassign locking
object to the specified
Namespace
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG, KAS-
ECC-SSC, SHA,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
O O O
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
Seed
MEK, ECDH
CK, ECDH
PK, ECDH SK
O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Grant
Grant Key to the
specified Authority
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM, KAS-
ECC-SSC,
CTR_DRBG, SHA,
HMAC, KDA
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
ECDH CK,
ECDH PK,
ECDH SK,
GRK
O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
GenKey
Generate key
materials
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
KEK, KPK O O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
MEK O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
Erase
Cryptographically
erase user data within
a specific LBA Range
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
CTR_DRBG, AES-
GCM. KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, SHA,
HMAC
PIN O O
DRBG
Internal
State, DRBG
Seed
O O O
KEK, KPK O O O
MEK, CPK,
KDK_KPK,
ECDH PK,
ECDH SK
O O O O
REK, SMK,
KMK
O
SetRange
Lock or Unlock the
specified Range
KBKDF
PIN O O
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
O O O
CPK O O O
AES-GCM, HMAC
KPK, KEK,
MEK
O O O
REK, SMK, O
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Service Description
Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs3 Indicator
E W G Z
KMK
Table 10. Approved Services
4.2.2. Non-Approved Services
The services in this non-Approved mode of operation are non-security relevant, and do not expose/utilize any critical security
parameters. The operator can distinguish these via response value; ApprovedMode return 0.
Service Description Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator
GetDumpKey Return Dump Key CTR_ DRBG (AES-256)
N/A
Return value
MESSAGE_RESPONSE.bAppr
ovedMode: 0
// 1: Approved Mode, 0: Non-
Approved Mode
DumpEncryption Encrypt Dump Data RSA (Non-approved algorithm)
FWDecryption
Decrypt encrypted Firmware
binary
AES-XTS (Non-approved
algorithm)
FWVerifyNDecryption
Verify and Decrypt encrypted
Firmware binary
AES-XTS (Non-approved
algorithm)
GetCSR
Output the public key and
signature for certification
SHA
ECDSA Sig Gen
VerifyCert Verity the chain of certification
SHA
AES-GCM
KeyExchange ECDH agreement
SHA
CTR_ DRBG (AES-256)
ECDSA SigGen, KeyGen
ECDH
HKDF(HMAC) (Non-approved
algorithm)
GetDigest
Output the hashed certification
chain
SHA
Challenge
Generate the signature with
transcript
SHA
CTR_ DRBG (AES-256)
ECDSA SigGen
Finish
Output the signature, mac and
enc for checking the common
secret
SHA
HMAC
GetMeasurements
Output the hashed and signed
with firmware and configuration
CTR_ DRBG (AES-256)
ECDSA SigGen
KeyUpdate Update the common secret
HKDF(HMAC) (Non-approved
algorithm)
Table 11. Non-Approved Services
4.3. Authentication
The module supports role-based authentication that requires authentication to assume for the authorization of each role.
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
CO
Password
(Min: 8 bytes, Max: 44 bytes)
Probability of 1/264
in a single random attempt.
Probability of 80/264
in a multiple random attempts in a one-minute.
User
Password
(Min: 8 bytes, Max: 44 bytes)
Probability of 1/264
in a single random attempt.
Probability of 80/264
in a multiple random attempts in a one-minute.
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FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
FL ECDSA signature verification
Probability of 1/2192
in a single random attempt.
Probability of 1250/2192
in multiple random attempts in a one-minute.
Table 12. Roles and Authentication
Table 9 shows each authentication method and strength for a single and multiple attempts.
The CO role requires password-based authentication, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF. Each password
authentication failure holds the cryptographic module for 750ms. This restricts the maximum attempts for a one-minute to
less than 80 attempts (60,000ms/750ms).
The User role requires password-based authentication, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF. Each password
authentication failure holds the cryptographic module for 750ms. This restricts the maximum attempts for a one-minute to
less than 80 attempts (60,000ms/750ms).
The FL role is limited to authenticate functions that verifies 2 steps of ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 digital signature of firmware
to complete a login. The firmware signed6
by Samsung is authenticated by verifying the ECDSA signature which has 192
security strength in every power-on. Each signature verification attempt takes at least 48ms. This can be enforced with up to
1,250 attempts in a minute.
6
The signing key is securely stored in HSM which is under Samsung internal development management.
Page 18 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
5. Software/Firmware security
- The module applies digital signature verification using ECDSA-384 with SHA-384 for firmware integrity test.
- The firmware integrity test is performed every power on reset.
Page 19 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
6. Operational environment
- The cryptographic module operates in limited operational environment that consists of the module’s firmware. This
operational environment does not require any specific security rules, settings/configurations or restrictions to be set.
- The cryptographic module does not provide any general-purpose operating system to the operator.
- Firmware loading is allowed only for CMVP validated firmware versions. Unauthorized modification of the firmware is
prevented by the pre-operational firmware integrity test and conditional firmware load test.
Page 20 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
7. Physical security
The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module itself:
• All components are manufactured to production-grade with standard passivation.
• Encased in opaque package within the visible spectrum.
• Apply strong removal-resistant and penetration resistant IC packaging technique.
The following table summarizes the actions required by the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained:
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Opaque covering
As often as feasible
Inspect the entire perimeter whether gathering of
internal components are visible.
Stop the service if tampering is found.
Tamper evident
IC packaging
Inspect the damage such as removing epoxy
overfill, separation from the PCB of the silicon die,
solder ball deterioration (diameter, pitch)
No functioning normally if tampering is found.
Stop the service.
Table 13. Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
Page 21 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
8. Non-invasive security
- Non-invasive security is not applicable for this cryptographic module
Page 22 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
9. Sensitive security parameter management
- Temporary SSPs are zeroised when power on reset.
- Firmware integrity temporary values are zeroised after the firmware integrity test is complete.
- The zeroisation is performed before overwriting the target SSP with random value which is generated from the DRBG
- The AES-GCM IV is generated by the module and complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H technique 2. The IV is 96 bits in length,
and its generated by the SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG internal to the module’s boundary.
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Size /
Strength
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation or
Establishment
Import
/Export
Storage7
Zeroisation8
Use &
related
keys
DRBG
Internal
State9
256 bits /
256 bits
A4352
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
N/A
HW
internal10
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Revoke Root Encryption Key
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
MEK, KEK,
ECDH SK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK,
Root Key
DRBG Seed
Entropy
input:
512 bits
Nonce:
256 bits
/ 256 bits
A4352
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
ENT (P) N/A
PIN11 8-44
bytes
A4351
SHA-256
Electronic
input
N/A SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Revoke Root Encryption Key
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
CPK
KPK
7
Because there is no non-volatile storage in this module without OTP, basically, automatic zeroisation runs instantly either when temporary SSP
as well as SSPs are no longer needed after key generation/use, or every power-on-reset depending on characteristics of volatile memory.
8
List only methods by running the approved service in 10 of the operator.
9
The values of V and Key are the critical values of the internal state.
10
Approved DRBG SSPs reside only inside the hardware DRBG IP and there is no way for operator to access and handle.
11
The PIN is also known as a Password in the context of this document. The terms are interchangeable.
Page 23 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Size /
Strength
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation or
Establishment
Import
/Export
Storage7
Zeroisation8
Use &
related
keys
Erase
SetRange
CPK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
KBKDF
SP 800-
108rev1
KBKDF
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Revoke Root Encryption Key
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
Password
KDK_CPK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
KBKDF
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM CPK
KPK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4353
AES-GCM
SP 800-
108rev1
KBKDF
N/A SRAM
Unauthentication
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
KEK
KDK_KPK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
KBKDF
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Revoke Root Encryption Key
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
KPK
Page 24 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Size /
Strength
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation or
Establishment
Import
/Export
Storage7
Zeroisation8
Use &
related
keys
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
ECDH SK
P-384 /
192-bit
A4351 KAS-
ECC-SSC
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM
RevertWithPSID
CreateNamespace
Activate
Revert
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
Erase
GRK
ECDH PK
P-384 /
192-bit
A4351 KAS-
ECC-SSC
SP 800-56Ar3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM GRK
ECDH CK
P-384 /
192-bit
A4351
KAS-ECC-SSC
SP 800-56Ar3
KAS-ECC-SSC
N/A SRAM
CreateNamespace
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GRK
GRK
256-bit /
256-bit
A4353
AES-GCM
SP 800-56Cr2
KDA
N/A SRAM Grant ECDH CK
KEK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4353
AES-GCM
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
Import /
Export
(Encrypt
ed)
SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
MEK
MEK12 256 bits /
256 bits
N/A
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
Import
(Encrypt
ed)/
Export
(Plaintext
13
&
Encrypte
d)
SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
DeleteNamespace
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Reactivate
KEK
12
Please note this is a SSP generated by the module to be used by the consuming application (outside of the boundary)
13
FIPS 140-3 IG 2.3.B states Transferring SSPs between a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem and an intervening functional subsystem for
Security Level 2 on the same single chip is considered as not having Sensitive Security Parameter Establishment crossing the HMI of the sub-chip
module per IG 9.5.A.
Page 25 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Size /
Strength
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation or
Establishment
Import
/Export
Storage7
Zeroisation8
Use &
related
keys
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
SMK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
HMAC
SP 800-
108rev1
KBKDF
N/A SRAM
RevertWithPSID
TPER Reset
CreateNamespace
DeleteNamespace
WriteProtection
Sanitize
CryptoErase
FormatNVM
Activate
Revert
Revoke Root Encryption Key
Reactivate
Set CPIN
Assign
Deassign
Grant
GenKey
Erase
SetRange
Root Key
KMK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
HMAC
SP 800-
108rev1
KBKDF
N/A SRAM Root Key
REK
256 bits /
256 bits
A4353
AES-GCM
SP 800-
108rev1
KBKDF
N/A SRAM Root Key
Root Key
256 bits /
256 bits
A4351
KBKDF
SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256)
N/A OTP
Revoke Root Encryption
Key
REK
Firmware
Verificatio
n Key14
P-384 /
192-bit
A4351
ECDSA
Manufacturing N/A ROM
Physically protected PSP
stored in the ROM
N/A
Table 14. SSPs
The cryptographic module contains an entropy source compliant with SP800-90B.
Entropy sources Minimum number of bits of entropy Details
Cert #E83
ENT (P)
- 0.5 entropy per bit15
- Minimum of 256 bits of entropy for DRBG seed
(Total seed length of 512 bits)
Provides entropy input and nonce
to construct a seed for CTR_DRBG
Table 15. Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
14
The Firmware Verification key is not an SSP per ISO/IEC 19790 Section 7.5.
15
Estimated amount of entropy per the source’s output bit is 0.767252 and Samsung conservatively claims to be set at 0.5 per bit.
Page 26 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
10. Self-tests
While executing the following self-tests, all data output is inhibited until the self-test is completed. To execute the pre-
operational tests on-demand, the operator may run the power-cycle of the module. If the self-test fails, the module enters
an error state. The module has two error states.
The "Rom Mode" error state is entered when the module fails the pre-operational self-test (Firmware integrity test) or the
conditional self-test (Firmware load test). The error indicator output by the module is "eSROMReturn_VerifyFail".
The "FIPS Fail Mode" error state is entered when the module fails any other conditional self-test (Cryptographic algorithm
self-test or Pair-wise consistency test). The error indicator output is "0x4C494146".
All data output is inhibited during the self-test and error states.
10.1. Pre-operational test
Algorithm Type Description Conditions
ECDSA
Firmware
integrity test
Curve P-384 with SHA-384 signature
verifications for firmware integrity
Module initialization
Table 16. List of pre-operational self-tests
10.2. Conditional test
Algorith
m
Type Description Conditions
ECDSA
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: Curve P-384 with SHA-384 signature
verification
Module initialization
AES
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: AES-256 GCM mode encryption and
decryption
Module initialization
HMAC
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: HMAC with SHA-256 Module initialization
SHS
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: SHA-256 hash digest Module initialization
SHS
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: SHA-384 hash digest Module initialization
KBKDF
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: Key based key derivation using
HMAC with SHA-256
Module initialization
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: ECDH P-384 Shared secret
computation
Module initialization
KDA
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KAT: OneStepNoCounter KDF with SHA2-
256
Module initialization
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Pair-wise
consistency
test
The module executes a PCT every time a
key is generated. Module computes dG
and compares to public key Q.
Key generation
Page 27 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
ECDSA
Firmware load
test
ECDSA signature verification is performed
if new FW is downloaded or at every
power-on-reset
Firmware load test
DRBG
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
KATs: SP 800-90Arev1 Health testing on
Instantiate, Generate and Reseed
functions
Module initialization
ENT (P)
Cryptographic
algorithm self-
test
Start up and Conditional SP800-90B
Heath tests: Repetition count test,
Adaptive proportion test
Module initialization and Continuously
Table 17. List of Conditional self-tests
Page 28 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
11. Life-cycle assurance
The followings describe the security rules for secure initialization and operation which the cryptographic module and Crypto
Officer shall be enforced under FIPS 140-3 security level 2 compliant manner:
11.1. Secure Initialization
[Step 1] Execute the firmware loading into the module
[Step 2] Execute Init and Open method
[Step 3] Replace the default password via Set_CPIN service if first-time authentication.
- Identify the status indicator via Show Status service in the Table 7.
- Identify that response information matches the versioning information in Table 3.
11.2. Operational description of module
• The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control input, control output, and
power.
• The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using ECDSA
p-384 with SHA-384.
• The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self-tests. All commands are rejected in the error state
with exception of the Show Status service. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited in the error
state.
• The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.
• Bypass capability is not applicable to the cryptographic module
• The module generates symmetric keys that are unmodified outputs from the DRBG.
11.3. Administrator Guidance
The Crypto officer shall power up the module and call the “Show Status” service to verify the following output is provided.
This confirms that the SoC is running a FIPS validated module that has booted successfully passing the pre-operational self-
tests.
• - Tested Configuration: S4LY011A01
• - Hardware Version: S02
• - Firmware Version: SS0200
11.4. Non-Administrator Guidance
The module generates GCM IV internally in compliance with scenario 2 of IG C.H. The IV length is 96 bits, and the IV value is
obtained from the SP 800-90ARev1 approved DRBG implemented by the module.
Page 29 of 29
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
12. Mitigation of other attacks
The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3
Other Attacks
Mitigation
Mechanism
Specific Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
Table 18. Mitigation of Other Attacks