#### Motorola Solutions Inc. Motorola P25 KVL 7000 HSM #### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## Document Version: 1.0 Date: July 16, 2026 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 1 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). #### Table of Contents | 1 General | ................................................................................................................................... 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................ | 5 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ........................................ | 8 | | 2.3 Excluded Components ...................................................................................................... | 9 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation .......................................................................................................... | 9 | | 2.5 Algorithms | .......................................................................................................................10 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................11 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information | .........................................................................................14 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................14 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................14 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment .........................................................................................................14 | | | 2.11 Industry Protocols | ..........................................................................................................14 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................14 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................14 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................15 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................15 | | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................16 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................16 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................24 | | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................24 | | | 5 Software/Firmware Security | ...................................................................................................25 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques | ........................................................................................................25 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................25 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................25 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ..........................................................25 | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................25 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................25 | | | 7.2 EFP/EFT Information | .......................................................................................................26 | | 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................26 | | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................26 | | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................26 | | | 9.1 Storage Areas | .................................................................................................................26 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 2 of 44 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ..............................................................................................27 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................27 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................28 10 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................34 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................34 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................34 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................38 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................40 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................41 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................41 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................41 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................41 11.4 End of Life .....................................................................................................................41 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................41 References and Definitions .......................................................................................................42 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 3 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ##### List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels ............................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware ..................................................................... 8 Table 3: Approved Drop-In Algorithms ....................................................................................... 8 Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9 Table 5: Approved Algorithms ...................................................................................................11 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11 Table 7: Security Function Implementations ..............................................................................13 Table 8: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................14 Table 9: Entropy Sources ..........................................................................................................14 Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................15 Table 11: Authentication Methods .............................................................................................16 Table 12: Roles .........................................................................................................................16 Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................24 Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................26 Table 15: EFP/EFT Information .................................................................................................26 Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................26 Table 17: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................27 Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................27 Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ..........................................................................................28 Table 20: SSP Table 1 ..............................................................................................................31 Table 21: SSP Table 2 ..............................................................................................................33 Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ........................................................................................34 Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................38 Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................38 Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................40 Table 26: Error States ...............................................................................................................40 Table 27: References ................................................................................................................42 Table 28: Acronyms and Definitions ..........................................................................................44 ##### List of Figures Figure 1: P25 Key Variable Loader (KVL) 7000 .......................................................................... 6 Figure 2: P25 KVL 7000 HSM (Top) ........................................................................................... 7 Figure 3: P25 KVL 7000 HSM (Interfaces) ................................................................................. 7 Figure 4: P25 KVL 7000 Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................... 8 | Version | Date | Author | Description | |-----------|------------|--------------------|-----------------| | 1.0 | 03/25/2026 | Motorola Solutions | Initial release | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 4 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola P25 Key Variable Loader (KVL) 7000 HSM, manufactured by Motorola Solutions, Inc. (hereafter referred to as 'the Module'). The Motorola P25 KVL 7000 is a portable key distribution device comprising two primary components: the KVL Host Application and the P25 KVL 7000 HSM. The Module itself is a single-chip cryptographic engine designed to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 3 physical security requirements. ### 1.2 Security Levels Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 3 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 3 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 3 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 3 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ####### Purpose and Use: The Module securely generates, loads, and manages encryption and authentication keys for communication products. Through the P25 KVL 7000, it integrates with the Key Management Facility (KMF) to provision radios and consoles for centralized key management. The Module is designed for the Motorola P25 Key Variable Loader (KVL) 7000 and is intended for US Federal agencies or other markets requiring FIPS 140-3 Overall Security Level 2 validation. Module Type : Hardware Module Embodiment : Single Chip Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 5 of 44 ####### Cryptographic Boundary: Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the physical form of the module. The Module is a single-chip embodiment, with its cryptographic boundary illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 1: P25 Key Variable Loader (KVL) 7000 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 6 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 2: P25 KVL 7000 HSM (Top) Figure 3: P25 KVL 7000 HSM (Interfaces) Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 7 of 44 Figure 4: P25 KVL 7000 Cryptographic Boundary ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ####### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: The Module is tested on the following operational environment: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------| | 5185912T05 | 5185912 | R70.01.01 | MACE #5185912 family | | The Module supports the following approved algorithms that may be installed separately from the Module's base firmware using the Program Update service. While the installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation, the Module includes this firmware. Table 3: Approved Drop-In Algorithms | Algorithm* | Algorithm FW Version | Base FW Version | Cert. # | |--------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------| | AES128 | R01.00.06 | R70.01.01 | A7817 | | AES256 | R01.00.09 | R70.01.01 | A7818 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 8 of 44 ####### Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. ####### Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. ####### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. ### 2.3 Excluded Components The module does not exclude any components from the cryptographic boundary. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ####### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Types of Services | Status Indicator | |-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| | Approved Mode 2 | Operating in approved mode | Approved | Approved mode: level 2 (Standard) FIPS Status: Compliant | | Approved Mode 3 | Operating in approved mode | Approved | Approved mode: legacy level 3 (High) FIPS status: Compliant | The P25 KVL 7000 HSM Module is initially non-compliant and must be configured by the Crypto Officer (CO) to operate in the approved FIPS 140-3 mode at overall Security Level 2. To operate in the approved mode, the Crypto Officer must ensure the Module is: - Properly installed, initialized, and configured. Initialization steps are listed in Section 11.1 of this document. - Secured by creating passwords for both the Crypto Officer (CO) and User roles. The operational status of the P25 KVL 7000 is determined via the settings menu of the P25 KVL 7000 Host application graphical user interface. When operating in the approved mode, the display will indicate: - FIPS mode: Level 2 (Standard) or Legacy level 3 (High) - FIPS Status: Compliant When the module is in the approved operating mode, the ' Module Info ' service can be used to verify that the firmware version matches an approved version listed on NIST's website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Motorola Solutions Public Material - Document Version 1.0 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 9 of 44 ####### Mode Change Instructions and Status: In order to configure the Module for an approved mode at overall Security Level 2, the P25 KVL 7000 operator must log in as CO and set the FIPS mode in the settings menu as follows - FIPS mode: Level 2 (Standard) or Legacy level 3 (High) Only Approved algorithms may be loaded into the Module. At a minimum, one of the ' Drop-In A lgorithms' listed in Table 3 must be added from the Module independent of the base firmware via the Program Update service. The loading of non-validated base firmware or Drop-In-Algorithms within the validated cryptographic module invalidates the module's validation. ### 2.5 Algorithms ####### Approved Algorithms: The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC, AES-CFB128, AES-CFB8, AES-CTR, AES- ECB, AES-OFB | A7818, A7819 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES- ECB, AES-OFB | A7817 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM, AES-GMAC | A7817 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2 Key Length - 128 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GCM, AES-GMAC | A7818, A7819 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2 Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-KW | A8087 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38F | | Counter DRBG | A8088 | Prediction Resistance - No Supports Reseed - No Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes Additional Input - Additional Input: 0 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256, 1024 Nonce - Nonce: 128, 512 Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 256, 512 Returned Bits - 128 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 10 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 5: Approved Algorithms | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A8089 | Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5253 | Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 | FIPS 186-5 | | SHA2-256 | SHS 817 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256, SHA2-384 | A8090 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-2048 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | ####### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key Type :AES 128 Symmetric Key Type :AES 256 Symmetric | N/A | SP800-133rev2 Section4, example 1 and IG D.H | ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations The following table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements: | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | A7817 Authenticated | BC-Auth | Authenticated Encrypt, Authenticated Decrypt | IG C.H:Scenario 2 | AES-GCM: (A7817) AES-GMAC: (A7817) AES-ECB: (A7817) | | A7817 Decryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A7817) | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 11 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms AES-ECB: (A7817) AES-OFB: (A7817) | |---------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | A7817 Encryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | AES-CTR: (A7817) AES-CBC: (A7817) AES-ECB: (A7817) AES-OFB: (A7817) AES-CTR: (A7817) | | A7818 Authenticated | BC-Auth | Authenticated Encrypt, Authenticated Decrypt | IG C.H:Scenario 2 | AES-GCM: (A7818) AES-GMAC: (A7818) AES-ECB: (A7818) | | A7818 Decryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A7818) AES-ECB: (A7818) AES-OFB: (A7818) AES-CTR: (A7818) | | A7818 Encryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A7818) AES-ECB: (A7818) AES-OFB: (A7818) AES-CTR: (A7818) AES-CFB128: (A7818) | | A7819 Authenticated | BC-Auth | Authenticated Encrypt, Authenticated Decrypt, Message Authentication | IG C.H:Scenario 2 | AES-GCM: (A7819) AES-GMAC: (A7819) AES-ECB: (A7819) | | A7819 Decryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A7819) AES-CFB8: (A7819) AES-ECB: | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 12 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 7: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms (A7819) AES-OFB: | |------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | A7819 Encryption | BC- UnAuth | Block Cipher | | (A7819) AES-CBC: (A7819) AES-CFB8: (A7819) AES-ECB: (A7819) AES-OFB: (A7819) | | Common- SHA2 | SHA | Secure Hash Standard | | SHA2-256: (A8090) SHA2-384: (A8090) | | Entropy | ENT- ESV | Entropy source | | | | KeyGen | CKG | Symmetric Key Generation | | Counter DRBG: (A8088) | | KTS-GCM | KTS- Unwrap KTS- Wrap | Key Transport - Wrapping and Unwrapping | caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of security strength | AES-GCM: (A7819) AES-ECB: (A7819) | | KTS-KW | KTS- Wrap | Key Transport - Wrapping | caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of security strength | AES-KW: (A8087) AES-ECB: (A7819) | | RNG | DRBG | AES-256 CTR Deterministic RBG | | Counter DRBG: (A8088) AES-ECB: (A7819) | | SHA | SHA | Secure Hash Standard | | SHA2-256: (SHS 817) | | SigVer1 | DigSig- SigVer | Digital Signature Verification | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5253) SHA2-256: (SHS 817) | | SigVer2 | DigSig- SigVer | Digital Signature Verification | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A8089) SHA2-384: (A8090) | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 13 of 44 ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information AES GCM IV Generation: Per IG C.H Scenario 2, the Module internally generates a 96-bit GCM IV internally as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using an approved DRBG (Cert. #A8088). ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy Table 8: Entropy Certificates | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|--------------------| | E132 | Motorola Solutions | The Module uses the following entropy sources: Table 9: Entropy Sources | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) Entropy Source | Physical | Atmel 5186912 | 1 bit | 0.138262 | | ### 2.9 Key Generation For Key Generation methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above. ### 2.10 Key Establishment For Key Establishment methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols N/A, This module does not implement industry protocols. ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The Module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below. | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Synchronous Serial Interface (SSI) | Data Input Data Output | This is the interface to the KVL 7000 Host Application. All SSPs exchanged over this interface are always encrypted. | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 14 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 10: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |--------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Control Input Status Output | | | KYLD (Keyload) Interface | Data Input Data Output Control Input | This is the interface to external devices. All SSPs exchanged over this interface are either encrypted or in plaintext when operating in approved mode. | | Clock | Control Input | Clock input. | | Power | Power | This interface powers all circuitry. | Note: The module does not support Control Output. ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods The Module supports two authenticated operator roles - Crypto Officer (CO) and User - as well as services that do not require authentication (UA). The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module. | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AM | Identity-based. The password length is a minimum of 15 characters using any combination of ASCII printable characters and is padded to a 30-byte long hexadecimal number. After authenticating, the KVL user may change it any time through the SSI Port. | SHA2-256 (A8090) | Since the password length is a minimum of 15 characters using any combination of ASCII printable characters and is padded to a 30- byte long hexadecimal number; the probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in 95^15 | The Module limits the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts to a configurable number (Minimum 3, maximum 20). Upon exceeding the maximum number of login attempts, the module can be configured to either lock the device from further login attempts for a specified amount of time (configurable by the CO between 1- 30 minutes), or execute the Factory Reset service. The minimum probability of a successful random attempt during a one- | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - Page 15 of 44 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 11: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------| | | | | | minute period is 20 in 95^15 | ### 4.2 Roles Table 12: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |----------------|----------|-----------------|--------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Identity | CO | AM | | User | Identity | User | AM | ### 4.3 Approved Services All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as: - G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input). - E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Change CO Passwor d | Change current Crypto- Officer password. | Succes s or Fail | Password | Successful change the password will allow access to the services allowed for CO role. | Common- SHA2 KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - CO PWD (AM): W,E,Z - IEK: E,Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: G,E,Z | | Change User Passwor d | Change current User password. | Succes s or Fail | Password | Successful change the password will allow access to the services allowed for User role. | Common- SHA2 KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - IEK: E,Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: G,E,Z - User PWD (AM): W,E,Z | | Configur e and Query Target Device | Configure target device and retrieve key | Succes s or Fail | Command In | Target device information or failure | A7819 Encryption A7819 Authenticat | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 16 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | metadata and versions from the target device. | | | | ed RNG | Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E | | Configur e KVL | Configure the module. | Succes s or Fail | Configurati on parameters | Updated module configuratio n, or failure. | Common- SHA2 KTS-GCM RNG | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - CO PWD (AM): W,E,Z - IEK: W,E,Z - KPK: G,Z - PWD Hash: G,E,Z - User PWD (AM): W,E,Z | | Decrypt | Decrypt Ciphertext data | Succes s or Fail | Ciphertext | Plaintext (success) or failure | A7817 Authenticat ed A7817 Decryption A7818 Authenticat ed A7818 Decryption A7819 Authenticat ed A7819 | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - KEK: W,E,Z - KPK: E - TEK: W,E,Z User - AES-GCM IV : E - KEK: W,E,Z - KPK: E - TEK: W,E,Z | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 17 of 44 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Decryption KTS-GCM | | | Encrypt | Encrypt plaintext data | Succes s or Fail | Plaintext | Ciphertext (success) or failure | A7817 Encryption A7817 Authenticat ed A7818 Encryption A7818 Authenticat ed A7819 Encryption A7819 Authenticat ed RNG KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: W,E,Z - KPK: E - TEK: W,E,Z User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: W,E,Z - KPK: E - TEK: W,E,Z | | Factory Reset | Reset the module to factory default | Succes s or Fail | Command In. | Success or Fail | None | Crypto Officer - BKK: Z - CO PWD (AM): Z - IEK: Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - User PWD (AM): Z Unauthenticat ed - BKK: Z - CO PWD (AM): Z | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 18 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------|------------------|------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - IEK: Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - User PWD (AM): Z User - BKK: Z - CO PWD (AM): Z - IEK: Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - User PWD (AM): Z | | Generat e Key | Generate TEK/KEK | Succes s or Fail | Command In | Encrypted keys (Success) or failure | RNG KeyGen KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: G,R - KPK: E - TEK: G,R User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: G,R - KPK: E - TEK: G,R | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 19 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Generat e Random Number | Generate random number | Succes s or Fail | Command In | Random number or failure | RNG Entropy | Crypto Officer - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: G,E - DRBG- nonce: G,E Unauthenticat ed - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: G,E - DRBG- nonce: G,E User - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: G,E - DRBG- | | Key Check | Check the validity of a given key | Succes s or Fail | Encrypted key | Success or failure | KTS-GCM | nonce: G,E Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - KPK: E - KEK: W - TEK: W User - AES-GCM IV : E - KPK: E - KEK: W - TEK: W | | Key Sharing | Combinati on of receive | Succes s or Fail | Command In | Success or failure | RNG KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 20 of 44 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | and transfer TEK/KEK between two KVLs. | | | | | - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: R,W - KPK: E - TEK: R,W User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: R,W - KPK: E - TEK: R,W | | Login CO | Validate current Crypto- Office passwords . | Succes s or Fail | Password | Successful authenticati on will allow access to the services allowed for CO role. | Common- SHA2 KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - CO PWD (AM): W,E,Z - IEK: E,Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: G,E,Z | | Login User | Validate current User passwords . | Succes s or Fail | Password | Successful authenticati on will allow access to the services allowed for User role. | Common- SHA2 KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - IEK: E,Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: G,E,Z - User PWD (AM): W,E,Z | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 21 of 44 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Module Info | Query module firmware, hardware version. | Succes s or Fail | Command In. | HSM Firmware version; Hardware information and FIPS status | None | Crypto Officer Unauthenticat ed User | | Power On | Power on the module | Succes s or Fail | N/A | Module is powered on | SigVer1 | Unauthenticat ed - RSA FW-LD- Pub: E | | Program Update | Update the module firmware. | Succes s or Fail | Firmware image | The module is upgraded to new firmware | SHA SigVer2 | Crypto Officer - CO PWD (AM): Z - ECC FW-LD- Pub: E - IEK: Z - KPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - User PWD (AM): Z | | Receive Key | Receive TEK/KEK from KVL or KVL Host | Succes s or Fail | TEK/KEK | Encrypted keys (Success) or failure | KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : E - IEK: E - KEK: W - KPK: E - TEK: W User - AES-GCM IV : E - IEK: E - KEK: W - KPK: E - TEK: W | | Store and Forward | Receive TEK/KEK from the KMF into the module (store), and then transfer them to the target device (forward). | Succes s or Fail | TEK/KEK | Encrypted TEK/KEK (Success) or failure | A7819 Encryption RNG KTS-GCM KTS-KW | Crypto Officer - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: G,E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 22 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------|---------------------------------|------------------|----------|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - KEK: R,W - KPK: E - TEK: R,W User - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: G,E - DRBG- nonce: G,E - KEK: R,W - KPK: E - TEK: R,W | | Transfer Key | Transfer keys to target device. | Succes s or Fail | TEK/KEK | Success or failure | A7819 Encryption RNG KTS-GCM | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E - KEK: R - KPK: E - TEK: R User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: G,E - DRBG Internal State - V: G,E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 23 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 13: Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - KEK: R - KPK: E - TEK: R | | Zeroize Key | Zeroize keys in the target device | Succes s or Fail | Command In | Success or failure | A7819 Authenticat ed A7819 Encryption RNG | Crypto Officer - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: E - DRBG Internal State - V: E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E User - AES-GCM IV : G,E - BKK: E - DRBG Internal State - Key: E - DRBG Internal State - V: E - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG- nonce: E | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded This module supports the loading of external firmware via the Program Update service. The module supports the firmware load test by using ECDSA P-384. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. Execution of the successfully loaded firmware is only effective after the next reset of the security module. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 24 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Any firmware loaded into the module other than that listed in section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification, is outside the scope of this Security Policy and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module validates the integrity of the components listed in section 5.1 during firmware load. ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The Module is composed of the following firmware components: - Component 1: Executable - binary - Component 2: Drop-In-Algorithms - binary The firmware components are protected with the RSA FW-LD-Pub key described in section 9.4 SSPs. The RSA FW-LD-Pub key is loaded into the module at manufacturing. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module. ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment : Limited ## 7 Physical Security The Module is a production-grade, single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-3, designed to meet Level 3 physical security requirements. The information below applies to Hardware Revision Number 5185912T05. ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The P25 KVL 7000 HSM (MACE) is covered with a hard, opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of tampering. The security provided by the hardness of this epoxy encapsulant is claimed for the temperature range of -40°C to 85°C. No assurance of hardness is claimed outside this range. The Module does not contain any doors, removable covers, ventilation holes, or slits, and no maintenance access interface is available. Therefore, no special procedures are required to maintain physical security during delivery to operators. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - Page 25 of 44 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper with the KVL 7000 HSM (MACE) | Periodically | Look for signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found. | ### 7.2 EFP/EFT Information Table 15: EFP/EFT Information | Temp/Voltage Type | Temperature or Voltage | EFP or EFT | Result | |---------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | LowTemperature | -38.1°C | EFP | Shutdown - A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset of the product is triggered. | | HighTemperature | 101.4°C | EFP | Shutdown - A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset of the product is triggered. | | LowVoltage | 1.65V - VDDCORE : 1.350V - VVDBU | EFP | Shutdown - A general reset of the chip is asserted. | | HighVoltage | 2.04V - VDDCORE : 2.292V - VVDBU | EFP | Shutdown- A tamper flag is raised, a wake-up reset of the product is triggered. | ### 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures | Temperature Type | Temperature | |--------------------|---------------| | LowTemperature | -40°C | | HighTemperature | 85°C | Notes: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's intended temperature range of operation. ## 8 Non-Invasive Security The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 26 of 44 Table 17: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | Flash Memory (S2) | Stored in the flash in plaintext, associated by memory location (pointer). | Static | | System Memory (S1) | Stored in the volatile memory (RAM). | Dynamic | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | Input encrypted on KPK (I2) | Flash Memory (S2) | Host Software (outside) | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | KTS-GCM | | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) | Host Software (outside) | Flash Memory (S2) | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | KTS-GCM | | Input in plaintext (I3) | Another KVL (outside) | Flash Memory (S2) | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | | Output encrypted on BKK (O1) | Flash Memory (S2) | Target device (outside) | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | KTS-GCM | | Output encrypted on BKK (O2) | Flash Memory (S2) | Target device (outside) | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | A7819 Encryption | | Output encrypted on KPK (O3) | Flash Memory (S2) | KVL Host (outside) | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | KTS-GCM | | Output in plaintext (O4) | Flash Memory (S2) | Target device (outside) | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Z1 | Zeroized by module power cycle or hard reset. | SSPs in volatile memory zeroized. | Yes | | Z2 | Zeroized by the "Program Update" service. | SSPs zeroized upon loading of new firmware. | Yes | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 27 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Z3 | Zeroized by the "Configure KVL" service. | CO zeroizes the module when configuring into an Approved mode. | Yes | | Z4 | Zeroized by the "Login CO Password" service. | CO password zeroized after too many failed login attempts. | Yes | | Z5 | Zeroized by the "Change CO Password" service. | CO password zeroized after too many failed attempts. | Yes | | Z6 | Zeroized by the "Login User Password" service. | User password zeroized after too many failed login attempts. | Yes | | Z7 | Zeroized by the "Change User Password" service. | User password zeroized after too many failed attempts. | Yes | | Z8 | Zeroized by the "Factory Reset" service. | CO or User performs factory reset of the module. | Yes | Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ### 9.4 SSPs All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in section 4.3 Approved Services. | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES- GCM IV | AES-GCM encryption is used for data encryption | 96 bits - 96 bits | PSP - PSP | RNG | | A7817 Authenticate d A7818 Authenticate d A7819 Authenticate d KTS-GCM | | BKK | A 256-bit AES GCM or OFB (A7819) key used for encrypting keys exported over KYLD port. | 256 bits - 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre- loaded | | A7819 Authenticate d A7819 Encryption KTS-GCM KTS-KW | | CO PWD (AM) | A 30-byte long hexadecimal number to authenticate the CO role | N/A - N/A | Authenticatio n - CSP | N/A | | Common- SHA2 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 28 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG Internal State - Key | AES-256 CTR DRBG state Key used in the generation of a random values | 256 bits - 256 bits | DRBG Key - CSP | RNG | | RNG KeyGen | | DRBG Internal State - V | AES-256 CTR DRBG state V value used in the generation of a random values | 128 bit - 128 bits | DRBG V value - CSP | RNG | | RNG KeyGen | | DRBG- EI/See d | Internally generated by the HWRNG | 1856 bit - 256.6 bits | DRBG CSP - CSP | Entropy | | RNG KeyGen | | DRBG- nonce | Internally generated by the HWRNG | 960 bits - 132.7 bits | DRBG CSP - CSP | Entropy | | RNG KeyGen | | ECC FW- LD- Pub | An ECDSA P- 384 public key is used to validate the signature of the upgrade image. | 384 bits - 192 bits | Asymmetric Public Key - PSP | Generate d outside of the module | | SigVer2 | | IEK | A 256-bit AES GCM (A7819) key used for decrypting keys and passwords entered over SSI port. | 256 bits - 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | Generate d outside to the module | | KTS-GCM | | KEK | 128, 256-bit AES key used for encryption of keys in the Store and Forward | 128 bits or 256 bits - 128 bits or 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | KeyGen | | A7817 Authenticate d A7817 Decryption A7817 Encryption A7818 Authenticate d A7818 Decryption A7818 Encryption | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 29 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | A7819 Authenticate d A7819 Decryption A7819 Encryption | | KPK | A 256-bit AES GCM key used to encrypt and decrypt keys entered over SSI port. | 256 bits - 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | KeyGen | | KTS-GCM | | PWD Hash | A 256-bit password hash | 256 bits - 128 bits | Authenticatio n - CSP | SHA2-256 (A8090) | | | | RSA FW- LD- Pub | A 2048-bit RSA key is used to validate the firmware image signature during the integrity check and loading process, ensuring only authenticated code is executed. | 2048 bits - 112 bits | Asymmetric Public Key - PSP | Generate d outside of the module | | SigVer1 | | TEK | 128,256 -bit AES key used for enabling secure communicatio n in target devices. | 128 bits or 256 bits - 128 bits or 256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | KeyGen | | A7817 Authenticate d A7817 Decryption A7817 Encryption A7818 Authenticate d A7818 Decryption A7818 Encryption A7819 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 30 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Authenticate d A7819 Decryption A7819 Encryption | | User PWD (AM) | A 30-byte long hexadecimal number to authenticate the User role | N/A - N/A | Authenticatio n - CSP | N/A | | Common- SHA2 | Table 20: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES-GCM IV | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | | | BKK | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | TEK:Encrypts, Wraps KEK:Encrypts, Wraps | | CO PWD (AM) | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z8 | IEK:Unwraps PWD Hash:Hash of password | | DRBG Internal State - Key | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | DRBG- EI/Seed:Derived From DRBG- nonce:Derived From DRBG Internal State - V:Paired With | | DRBG Internal State - V | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | DRBG- EI/Seed:Derived From DRBG- nonce:Derived From DRBG Internal | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 31 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | State - Key:Paired With | | DRBG- EI/Seed | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | DRBG- nonce:Paired With DRBG Internal State - Key:Dervies DRBG Internal State - V:Derives | | DRBG- nonce | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | DRBG- EI/Seed:Paired With DRBG Internal State - Key:Derives DRBG Internal State - V:Derives | | ECC FW- LD-Pub | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | | | IEK | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z8 | TEK: Unwraps KEK:Unwraps CO PWD (AM):Unwraps User PWD (AM):Unwraps IEK:Unwraps | | KEK | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) Input encrypted on KPK (I2) Input in plaintext (I3) Output encrypted on BKK (O1) Output encrypted on BKK (O2) Output encrypted on KPK (O3) Output in plaintext (O4) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z8 | KPK:Wrapped by , Unwrapped by BKK:Wrapped by IEK:Wrapped by, Unwrapped by | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - Page 32 of 44 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 21: SSP Table 2 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KPK | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z8 | KEK:Wraps and Unwraps TEK:Wraps and Unwraps | | PWD Hash | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 | CO PWD (AM):Hash Of User PWD (AM):Hash Of | | RSA FW- LD-Pub | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 | | | TEK | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) Input encrypted on KPK (I2) Input in plaintext (I3) Output encrypted on BKK (O1) Output encrypted on BKK (O2) Output encrypted on KPK (O3) Output in plaintext (O4) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z8 | KPK:Wrapped by and Unwrapped by BKK:Wrapped by and Unwrapped by IEK:Wrapped and Unwrapped by | | User PWD (AM) | Input encrypted on the IEK (I1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8 | IEK:Unwraps PWD Hash:Hash of password | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - Page 33 of 44 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The Module performs self-tests to ensure proper operation. Per FIPS 140-3, these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Pre-operational self-tests can be initiated on demand by power cycling the Module. The Module performs the pre-operational self-tests listed in the table below: Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Firmware integrity | RSA-2048 (Cert. #A5253),SHA2- 256 (Cert. #SHS817) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Success or ES2 on failure | A digital signature is generated over the Boot Block, Base firmware, and all Drop-In Algorithms when it is built using RSA-2048 (Cert. # #A5253) SHA2-256 (Cert. #SHS817), and is stored with the code upon download into the Module. | ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below: | Algorith m or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------| | AES-128 AES- CBC Decrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- CBC Encrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- CTR Decrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or | Encrypt | Bootup | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 34 of 44 | Algorith m or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------| | CTR Encrypt | | | | ES1 on failure | | | | AES-128 AES- ECB Decrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- ECB Encrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- GCM Decrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- GCM Encrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- OFB Decrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-128 AES- OFB Encrypt | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- CBC Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- CBC Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- CTR Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- CTR Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- ECB Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 35 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorith m or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------| | AES-256 AES- ECB Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- GCM Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- GCM Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- OFB Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-256 AES- OFB Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES-Key Unwrap | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES-Key Wrap | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- CBC Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- CBC Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- CFB8 Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 36 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorith m or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |---------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | CFB8 Encrypt | | | | | | | | AES256- Internal AES- ECB Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- ECB Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- GCM Decrypti on | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- GCM Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- OFB Decrypti on | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Decrypt | Bootup | | AES256- Internal AES- OFB Encrypti on | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Encrypt | Bootup | | Counter DRBG (A8088) | AES-256 CTR | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Re seed Known Answer Tests | Bootup | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS18 6-5) | ECDSA P- 384 SigVer | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Verify | Bootup | | Entropy E132 - Start-up | Start-up RCT and APT | Fault Detecti on | Critical Functio n | Succes s or ES3 on failure | An RCT and APT as specified in [90B] section 4.4 are executed | Bootup | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 37 of 44 Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorith m or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| | RCT and APT | | | | | before generation of the DRBG entropy input | | | Firmwar e Load | ECDSA P- 384 SigVer/SHA 2-384 | KAT | SW/F W Load | Succes s or ES2 on failure | Verify the image by ECDSA P-384 upon download into the module. | loading a new firmware image | | RSA SigVer (FIPS18 6-5) | RSA-2048 SigVer | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES2 on failure | Verify | Bootup | | SHA2- 256 (A8090) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Hash | Bootup | | SHA2- 256 (SHS 817) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES2 on failure | Hash | Bootup | | SHA2- 384 (A8090) | SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Succes s or ES1 on failure | Hash | Bootup | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Firmware integrity | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On demand | Manually | | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-128 AES-CBC Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-CBC Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-CTR Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-CTR Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-ECB Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-ECB Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 38 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-128 AES-GCM Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-GCM Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-OFB Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-128 AES-OFB Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-CBC Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-CBC Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-CTR Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-CTR Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-ECB Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-ECB Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-GCM Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-GCM Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-OFB Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-256 AES-OFB Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-Key Unwrap | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-Key Wrap | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-CBC Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-CBC Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-CFB8 Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-CFB8 Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-ECB Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-ECB Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-GCM Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-GCM Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 39 of 44 Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES256-Internal AES-OFB Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES256-Internal AES-OFB Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | Counter DRBG (A8088) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | Entropy E132 - Start-up RCT and APT | Fault Detection | Critical Function | On Demand | Manually | | Firmware Load | KAT | SW/FW Load | N/A | N/A | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A8090) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (SHS 817) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-384 (A8090) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | ### 10.4 Error States Table 26: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ES1 | The Module fails a KAT. | The Module enters the critical error state, stores the status in non-volatile memory, and halts all further operations by entering an infinite loop. | Reboot or power cycle the Module. | The Module will not respond to any requests. | | ES2 | The Module fails a firmware loading during program upgrade and/or firmware integrity pre-operational self- test. | Following a firmware signature validation failure, the Module ceases normal operations and transitions to flash programming mode. | Reboot or power cycle the module or re-flashing a new image. | The Module will not respond to any requests. | | ES3 | The Module fails to acquire Entropy. | The Module enters the Fatal Error state. | Automatic | The Module stores the status into the internal flash memory and resets to attempt recovery. | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 40 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The Module is delivered in a non-compliant state and must be initialized to enter the Approved Mode. The Module does not support a non-Approved mode of operation. During initialization the operator shall configure the Module from the instructions below: 1. Load only approved Drop-In-Algorithms listed in Table 3: Approved Drop-In Algorithms 2. Set up the passwords for both the Crypto Officer (CO) and User roles. The Module is not initialized until the passwords for both the CO and User are set. 3. Use Configuration KVL Service, set to FIPS mode to ' Level 2 (Standard) ' or Legacy Level 3 (High)'. ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance Use the P25 KVL 7000 User Guide available on the https://www.motorolasolutions.com/ website for secure operations. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance Use the P25 KVL 7000 User Guide available on the https://www.motorolasolutions.com/ website for secure operations. ### 11.4 End of Life After the end-oflife, the operator should zeroize all SSPs using 'Factory Reset' service followed by shredding the Motorola P25 KVL 7000 HSM. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 41 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## References and Definitions Table 27: References | Abbreviatio n | Full Specification Name | |-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [FIPS140-3] | Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules , March 22, 2019 | | [ISO19790] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017 | | [ISO24759] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015 | | [IG] | Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, September 2, 2025. | | [131A] | Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019 | | [133] | NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2, June 2020 | | [186] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 3, 2023. | | [197] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 | | [180] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015 | | [38A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001 | | [38D] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007 | | [38F] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012 | | [90A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015. | | [90B] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018. | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 42 of 44 | Acronym | Definition | |-----------|------------------------------------------| | AES | Advanced Encryption Standard | | BKK | Black Keyloading Key | | CAST | Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests | | CBC | Cipher Block Chaining | | CFB | Cipher Feedback | | CKG | Cryptographic Key Generation | | CO | Crypto-Officer | | CO PWD | Crypto-Officer Password | | CSP | Critical Security Parameters | | CTR | Counter Mode | | DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator | | DRBG-EI | DRBG Entropy Input | | ECB | Electronic Code Book | | ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature | | FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standards | | FW | Firmware | | FW-LD-Pub | Firmware Load Public Key | | GCM | Galois/Counter Mode | | HSM | Hardware Security Module | | IEK | Interface Encryption Key | | IV | Initialization Vector | | KAT | Known Answer Test | | KEK | Key Encryption Key | | KPK | Key Protection Key | | KYLD | Keyload | | KMF | Key Management Facility | | KVL | Key Variable Loader | | MACE | Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine | | OFB | Output Feedback | | PWD Hash | Password Hash | | SSI | Synchronous Serial Interface | | SSP | Sensitive Security Parameter | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 43 of 44 Table 28: Acronyms and Definitions | Acronym | Definition | |-----------|-------------------------| | TEK | Traffic Encryption Key | | UA | Unauthenticated Service | | PWD | Password | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2026 Document Version 1.0 Page 44 of 44 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).