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Fortinet, Inc.
FortiAP 7.4
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.7
Publication Date: May 6, 2026
Firmware Version: FortiAP 7.4 (FIPS-CC-74-3)
Description:
Documents FIPS 140-3 Level 1 Security Policy issues,
compliance and requirements for FIPS
compliant operation.
Page 2 of 52
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Email: techdoc@fortinet.com
FortiAP 7.4 Security Policy
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last page of this document.
Page 3 of 52
Table of Contents
1 General ......................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................6
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................6
1.3 Additional Information..........................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..........................................................................................7
2.1 Description ..........................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .........................................8
2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................9
2.4 Modes of Operation.............................................................................................................9
2.5 Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................9
2.6 Security Function Implementations ...................................................................................12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information...........................................................................................17
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..............................................................................................................17
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................18
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................18
2.11 Industry Protocols............................................................................................................18
2.12 Additional Information......................................................................................................19
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.............................................................................................19
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................19
3.2 Additional Information........................................................................................................19
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................19
4.1 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................19
4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................20
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................21
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................32
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .................................................................................32
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status .........................................................................32
5 Software/Firmware Security.....................................................................................................33
5.1 Integrity Techniques..........................................................................................................33
5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................33
6 Operational Environment .........................................................................................................33
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...........................................................33
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ............................................................................33
Page 4 of 52
7 Physical Security......................................................................................................................33
8 Non-Invasive Security..............................................................................................................34
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...........................................................................34
9.1 Storage Areas ...................................................................................................................34
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...............................................................................................34
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................34
9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................35
10 Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................45
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................45
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................45
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information .........................................................................................47
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................49
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.......................................................................................49
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................49
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................49
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................50
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ...........................................................................................50
11.6 End of Life .......................................................................................................................51
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.....................................................................................................51
Page 5 of 52
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).....8
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid....................................8
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ....................9
Table 5: Modes List and Description.............................................................................................9
Table 6: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................11
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms..........................................................................................11
Table 8: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................16
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.......................................................................................................18
Table 10: Entropy Sources .........................................................................................................18
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................19
Table 12: Authentication Methods ..............................................................................................20
Table 13: Roles...........................................................................................................................21
Table 14: Approved Services......................................................................................................32
Table 15: Storage Areas.............................................................................................................34
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................34
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................35
Table 18: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................40
Table 19: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................45
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................45
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................47
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..........................................................................47
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information .................................................................................49
Table 24: Error States.................................................................................................................49
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Boundary and TOEPP..........................................................................8
Page 6 of 52
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is a FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Fortinet's FortiAP family of WiFi access points. This policy
describes how the FortiAP 7.4 (hereafter referred to as the ‘module’) meets the FIPS 140-3 security
requirements and how to operate the modules in a FIPS compliant manner. This policy was created as part of
the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 validation of the modules. The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Equipment (FIPS 140-3) details the United States Federal
Government requirements for cryptographic equipment. Detailed information about the FIPS 140-3 standard
and validation program is available on the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
This policy deals specifically with operation and implementation of the modules in the technical terms of the
FIPS 140-3 standard and the associated validation program. Other Fortinet product manuals, guides and
technical notes can be found at the Fortinet technical documentation website at https://docs.fortinet.com.
Additional information on the entire Fortinet product line can be obtained from the following sources:
• Find general product information in the product section of the Fortinet corporate website at
https://www.fortinet.com/products.
• Find on-line product support for registered products in the technical support section of the Fortinet
corporate website at https://support.fortinet.com/.
• Find contact information for technical or sales related questions in the contacts section of the Fortinet
corporate website at https://www.fortinet.com/contact.
• Find security information and bulletins in the FortiGuard Center of the Fortinet corporate website at
https://wwww.fortiguard.com.
Page 7 of 52
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The FortiAP 7.4 contains an operating system and cryptographic firmware that runs exclusively on Fortinet
access points, enabling seamless integration with various Fortinet products across the network.
Module Type: Firmware
Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary of the FortiAP firmware module.
Fortinet Access Point - TOEPP
Operating System
Status Output
Control Input
Data I/O
TOEPP
Cryptographic Boundary
Host Platform
FortiAP 7.4
Firmware Module
(Entropy Source)
Boot
Device
CPU Network
RAM
Power
Supply
Page 8 of 52
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Boundary and TOEPP
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The physical chassis of the Fortinet access point provides the physical perimeter. See the TOEPP in Figure 1.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
FAP_233G-v7.4.5-
FIPS-CC-74-3-
build4405-
FORTINET.out
FortiAP 7.4 (FIPS-
CC-74-3)
RSA with SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
FortiAP
OS
FortiAP-
233G
Qualcomm IPQ6010 ARM
Quad Cortex A53
No 7.4
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
FortiAP OS FortiAP-231F
FortiAP OS FortiAP-231G
FortiAP OS FortiAP-234F
FortiAP OS FortiAP-234G
FortiAP OS FortiAP-23JF
FortiAP OS FortiAP-431F
FortiAP OS FortiAP-432G
Page 9 of 52
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
FortiAP OS FortiAP-433G
FortiAP OS FortiAP-831F
FortiAP OS FortiAP-441K
FortiAP OS FortiAP-443K
FortiAP OS FortiAP-23JK
FortiAP OS FortiAP-243K
FortiAP OS FortiAP-432F
FortiAP OS FortiAP-241K
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
None.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
Approved mode can only be
enabled via console access. The
approved mode only consists of
FIPS 140-3 compliant
cryptography.
Approved "Approved" FIPS-CC indicator
on CLI/GUI i.e. Global Indicator.
Thus an implicit indication via
the successful completion of a
service is sufficient
Table 5: Modes List and Description
The current operation mode is displayed on the web-based manager status page and in the output of the fap-
get-status CLI command.
Any firmware version that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6064 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
Page 10 of 52
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CTR A6064 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6064 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A6064 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits, testing
candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A6064 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6064 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6064 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6064 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6064 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6064 Domain Parameter Generation Methods -
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-
4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1
(CVL)
A6064 Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-
shared Key, Public Key Encryption
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192
Increment 8
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 8-
8192 Increment 8
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Page 11 of 52
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A6064 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192
Increment 8
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying
Material Length: 160-16384 Increment 8
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH
(CVL)
A6064 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6064 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
A6064 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048,
MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-
8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes
Key
Verification
A6064 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048,
MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-
8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A6064 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6064 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6064 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6064 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A4291 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(CVL)
A6064 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF
(CVL)
A6064 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Name:Symmetric Key Generation FortiAP Section 4 NIST SP800-133r2
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Page 12 of 52
None.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
None.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
None.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
None.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
User
authentication
SHA Generates a hash
of the user
password
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
Establish TLS KAS-Full Establishes a TLS
connection with a
remote device
AES-CTR:
(A6064)
Counter DRBG:
(A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Page 13 of 52
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key
Verification:
(A6064)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A6064)
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6064)
SHA3-256:
(A4291)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
AES-GCM:
(A6064)
SHA2-384:
(A6064)
Establish SSH KAS-Full Establishes an SSH
connection with a
remote device
Counter DRBG:
(A6064)
AES-CTR:
(A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
Page 14 of 52
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Key
Verification:
(A6064)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
KDF SSH:
(A6064)
SHA3-256:
(A4291)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
SHA2-384:
(A6064)
SHA2-512:
(A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
Establishes a
CAPWAP Tunnel
Counter DRBG:
(A6064)
AES-CBC:
(A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
Page 15 of 52
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6064)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Key
Verification:
(A6064)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
SHA3-256:
(A4291)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
SHA2-384:
(A6064)
Establish IPsec KAS-Full Establishes an
IPSec connection
with a remote
device
Counter DRBG:
(A6064)
AES-CTR:
(A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Page 16 of 52
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key
Generation:
(A6064)
Safe Primes
Key
Verification:
(A6064)
KDF IKEv1:
(A6064)
KDF IKEv2:
(A6064)
SHA3-256:
(A4291)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
SHA2-384:
(A6064)
SHA2-512:
(A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6064)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6064)
SHA-1: (A6064)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6064)
Transfer data BC-Auth Transfers data
using authenticated
encryption
AES-GCM:
(A6064)
AES-CBC:
(A6064)
Configuration MAC Calculates MAC of
a configuration file
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
FW Auth DigSig-SigVer Verifies the
signature on
firmware
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6064)
SHA2-256:
(A6064)
WPA
Handshake
BC-UnAuth Used to protect the
confidentiality and
the
authenticity/integrity
of cryptographic
keys
AES-CBC:
(A6064)
AES-GCM:
(A6064)
Secure 802.11
Wireless
Connection
BC-Auth Secure Wifi Client
Access
AES-CBC:
(A6064)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
Page 17 of 52
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-GCM
FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Scenario 1
TLS 1.2/1.3: The Module is compliant with TLS v1.2 and SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The Module supports
TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS, as described in RFCs 5116, 5246, 5288 and 5289 and shall only be used
for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, scenario 1a. For TLS v1.3, the
mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 8446.
During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave
correctly.
The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.
The nonce_explicit part of the IV is incremented each time an AES GCM computation is performed. The
Module establishes a new session key when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number
of possible values (232
-1).
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be established.
SHA-1:
Per NIST SP 800-131A rev3, usage of the SHA-1 service as part of Digital Signature Generation is disallowed
in the approved mode of operation. SHA-1 is only Approved for legacy use with Digital Signature Verification.
For non-digital signature applications, SHA-1 is disallowed for applying protection after 2030 and allowed only
for legacy use for processing already protected information after 2030. SHA-1 is disallowed for HMAC
Generation (≥ 112 bits) after 2030 and allowed only for legacy use for HMAC Verification (≥ 112 bits) after
2030.
WPA2:
If WPA2 is used in the network infrastructure implementation, please ensure the latest WPA2 updates are
applied to all applicable infrastructure/endpoint equipment to help mitigate known vulnerabilities in the WPA2
standard. For new infrastructure installations, consider implementing the latest WPA3 protocol and ensure all
updates are installed.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module’s entropy source adopts IG 9.3.A Entropy Caveats, scenario 1b), which uses the Fortinet CPU
Jitter Entropy Library 1.0 to seed the DRBG during the modules’ boot process and to periodically reseed the
DRBG.
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E84 Fortinet
Page 18 of 52
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
The entropy loaded into the approved AES-256 bit DRBG is 256 bits. The entropy source is over-sampled and
then an SHA3-256 post-conditioning component is applied.
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Fortinet CPU Jitter
Entropy
Non-
Physical
FortiAP OS 64 bits full
entropy
SHA3-256 (Cert.
#A4291)
Table 10: Entropy Sources
The reseed interval (number of requests between reseeds) of CTR_DRBG in FortiAP 7.4 Linux kernel is
100000 (within the maximum reseed interval of 2^48 specified for this CTR_DRBG as per SP800-90Arev1).
Here the reseed interval is a counter. Every time random bytes (up to 32 bytes at a time) are requested from
"nist_ctr_drbg_generate" function, the counter is incremented by 1.
The module uses CTR_DRBG as per section 10.2.1 of SP 800-90Arev1 to generate random numbers.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with FIPS 186-5 to generate RSA and
ECDSA keys using a DRBG compliant with SP800-90Arev1. The module also implements symmetric key
generation compliant with SP 800-133r2.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements the following approved key agreement methods (per 140-3 IG D.F):
Elliptic curves
The module establishes EC DH shared secrets compliant to SP 800-56Arev3, using elliptic-curves specified in
Appendix D of SP 800-186.
Finite fields
The module establishes DH shared secrets compliant to SP 800-56Arev3, using safe prime groups listed in
Appendix D of SP 800-56Arev3.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module implements compliant Key derivation functions (KDFs) as part of its implementation of the
following protocols:
1. TLS v1.2, and 1.3.
2. SSH v2.0.
3. IKEv1 and IKEv2.
Note: No parts of the TLS, SSH, and IKE protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or
CMVP.
Page 19 of 52
2.12 Additional Information
FortiAP 7.4 can be used to centrally manage networks and Security policies for Fortinet products.
Refer to section 11.1 start up procedure for installation process.
Please refer to the data sheet for more use cases.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters
N/A Data Output API output parameters
N/A Control Input API function calls
N/A Status Output API return values
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
FortiAP 7.4 logical interfaces and physical interfaces are described above. Please note that the module does
not implement a control output interface.
3.2 Additional Information
The FortiAP 7.4 Command Line Interface (CLI) is a full-featured, text-based management tool for the module.
The CLI provides access to all the possible services and configuration options in the module. The CLI uses a
console connection or a network (Ethernet) connection between the FortiAP 7.4 unit and the management
computer. The console connection is a direct serial connection. Terminal emulation software is required on the
management computer using either method. For network access, a Telnet or SSH client that supports the SSH
v2.0 protocol is required (SSH v1.0 is not supported in approved mode). Telnet access to the CLI is not allowed
in approved mode and is disabled. Data can be passed to the module using CLI as well as GUI.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Authentication
over Console
Obfuscated
password entry
Memorized
Secret
Not subjected to
failed attempts, but
the number of
attempts per minute
1/(94^8/108,000)
which is less than
1/100,000.
Page 20 of 52
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
is limited by baud
rate of serial port,
which is a maximum
of 115,200 bps which
is 6,912,000 bits per
minute
Authentication
over HTTPS
No information
provided for
guessing
Memorized
Secret
Subject to a limit of 4
failed auth attempts
with lockout time of 3
minutes Settings can
be modified
4/(3*94^8), which
is less than
1/100000.
Authentication
over SSH
Authentication
over SSH
Memorized
Secret
Subject to a limit of 4
failed auth attempts
with lockout time of 3
minutes Settings can
be modified.
4/(3*94^8), which
is less than
1/100000.
WPA2/WPA3
Pre-Shared
Keys
Obfuscated
password entry
Memorized
Secret
Table 12: Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer (CO) uses identity-based authentication and must authenticate with a username and password
combination to access the module. The username/password can be stored in the local database or in a remote
LDAP database. CO can authenticate himself over three channels: HTTPS, SSH or console.
Password entry is obfuscated using asterisks. The feedback mechanism does not provide information that
could be used to guess or determine the authentication data. The minimum password length is 8 characters
when in approved mode (maximum password length is 32 characters) chosen from the set of ninety-four (94)
characters. New passwords are required to include 1 uppercase character, 1 lowercase character, 1 numeric
character, and 1 special character.
Note that Crypto Officer authentication over HTTPS/SSH is subject to a limit of 3 failed authentication attempts
in 1 minute; thus, the maximum number of attempts in one minute is 3. Therefore, the probability of success
with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 3 in {94^8} which is less than 1/100,000. Crypto
Officer authentication using the console is not subject to a failed authentication limit, but the number of
authentication attempts per minute is limited by the bandwidth available over the serial connection which is a
maximum of 115,200 bps which is 6,912,000 bits per minute.
The Network User (Wireless clients) uses role-based authentication.
4.2 Roles
The module provides the following roles:
Page 21 of 52
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO Authentication over
Console
Authentication over
HTTPS
Authentication over SSH
Network User Role NU WPA2/WPA3 Pre-Shared
Keys
Table 13: Roles
The 'Admin' operator is initially assigned to the Crypto-officer role. A Crypto Officer has read-write-execute
access to all the module’s administrative services. The initial Crypto Officer can create accounts for additional
operators.
The User role is fulfilled by wireless clients. The module does not provide a Maintenance role.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authenticate to
module
Crypto Officer
authenticates to
the module over
CLI/GUI
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
User
authentica
tion
Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
W,E
Add/delete crypto
Officer
The module
offers service to
add or delete CO
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
None Crypto
Officer
Backup/restore
configuration file
The module
offers service to
backup/restore
config file
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
None Crypto
Officer
-
Configurati
on
Integrity
key: R
Traffic over
CAPWAP
Establishment
and subsequent
data transfer of a
CAPWAP
session for use
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
Establish
CAPWAP
Crypto
Officer
-
CAPWAP
Page 22 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
between the
module and an
access point
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Session
Key: E
Connect the
module to
FortiGate for
transferring
module's local
logs to
FortiAnalyzer
The module
offers service to
connect to
FortiAnalyzer for
log transfer via
OFTP over TLS
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
Establish
CAPWAP
Crypto
Officer
-
CAPWAP
Session
Key: E
DTLS Data
Encrypt
Enabling
optional DTLS
data path
encryption for
AP
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
Establish
CAPWAP
Crypto
Officer
- DTLS
Pre-
Master
Secret:
R,E
-
CAPWAP
Session
Key: R,E
- DTLS
Integrity
Key: R,E
- DTLS
Master
Secret:
R,E
Delete log data Logs are sent to
FortiGate and
can be deleted
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI
/web
GUI
Via
CLI
/web
GUI
None Crypto
Officer
Enable approved
mode of
operation
The module can
be enable
approved mode
only via CLI
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI Via
CLI
Configurat
ion
Crypto
Officer
-
Configurati
on
Integrity
key: E
Establish IPsec
connection
Establish IPsec
connection
Succes
sful
completi
Comma
nd
Status Establish
TLS
Crypto
Officer
- IKE Pre-
Page 23 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Establish
IPsec
Shared
Key: E
- RSA
Public
Keys : E
- RSA
Private
Keys: R,E
- IKE RSA
peer public
key: W,E
- IKE
ECDSA
private
Key: E
- IKE
ECDSA
public key:
R,E
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key:
G
- IKE RSA
private
Key: R
- IKE RSA
public key:
R
- IKE
ECDSA
peer public
key: R
- IKE
Session
Encryption
Key: R
- DRBG v :
R
- DRBG
Key: R
- DH
Public key
: G,R
- EC DH
Private
Key: R
- EC DH
Public
Page 24 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: R
- ECDSA
Private
Key : R
- ECDSA
Public
Key: R
- Entropy
Input: R
- HMAC
keys: R
Execute factory
reset (disable
approved mode,
console/CLI only)
The module
offers service to
execute factory
reset
System
reboot
Via CLI Via
CLI
None Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
Z
-
Configurati
on
Integrity
key: Z
-
Configurati
on
Encryption
Key: Z
-
Configurati
on Backup
Key: Z
- DRBG
output: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DTLS
Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- DTLS
Master
Secret: Z
-
CAPWAP
Session
Key: Z
- DTLS
Integrity
Key: Z
Page 25 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- DTLS
Public
Key: Z
- DTLS
Private
Key: Z
- Firmware
Update
key: Z
- Firmware
Integrity
key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S
Server/Ho
st key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S pre-
master
Secret: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Master
Secret: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Authentica
tion Key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- DH
Private
Key: Z
- SSH
Server/Ho
st key: Z
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Key: Z
- SSH
Session
Encryption
Page 26 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: Z
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key: Z
- IKE Pre-
Shared
Key: Z
- IKE
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- IKE RSA
private
Key: Z
- IKE RSA
public key:
Z
- IKE RSA
peer public
key: Z
- IKE
ECDSA
private
Key: Z
- IKE
ECDSA
public key:
Z
- IKE
ECDSA
peer public
key: Z
- AES
Keys: Z
- DRBG v :
Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
- HMAC
keys: Z
Execute FIPS-CC
on-demand self-
tests (console
only)
The module
offers service to
execute self
tests manually
Executi
on
availabl
e only in
approve
d mode.
Result
is
displaye
Via CLI Via
CLI
FW Auth Crypto
Officer
Page 27 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
d via
console
and
system
logs.
Execute firmware
update
The module
offers service to
execute firmware
update
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI Via
CLI
FW Auth Crypto
Officer
- Firmware
Update
key: E
Format log disk
(console/CLI
only)
The module
offers service to
format log disk
hard drive
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI Via
CLI
None Crypto
Officer
Key zeroization The module
offers service to
zeroize keys via
CLI
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI Via
CLI
None Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
Z
-
Configurati
on
Integrity
key: E
-
Configurati
on
Encryption
Key: E
-
Configurati
on Backup
Key: Z
- DRBG
output: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DTLS
Pre-
Master
Page 28 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secret: E
- DTLS
Master
Secret: Z
-
CAPWAP
Session
Key: Z
- DTLS
Integrity
Key: Z
- DTLS
Public
Key: Z
- DTLS
Private
Key: Z
- Firmware
Integrity
key: Z
- Firmware
Update
key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S
Server/Ho
st key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S pre-
master
Secret: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Master
Secret: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Authentica
tion Key: Z
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- SSH
Server/Ho
Page 29 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
st key: Z
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Key: Z
- SSH
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- IKE Pre-
Shared
Key: Z
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key: Z
- IKE
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- IKE RSA
private
Key: Z
- IKE RSA
public key:
Z
- IKE
ECDSA
private
Key: Z
- IKE
ECDSA
public key:
Z
- IKE RSA
peer public
key: Z
- IKE
ECDSA
peer public
key: Z
- AES
Keys: Z
- HMAC
keys: Z
Modify user
preferences
The module
offers service to
modify CO
preferences
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
- - None Crypto
Officer
Page 30 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Read/set/delete/
modify module
configuration
The module
offers service to
read/set/delete/
modify
configuration
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
- - None Crypto
Officer
Read log data The module
offers service to
read log data
CLI/GUI
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
- - None Crypto
Officer
Show status The module
shows system
status over CLI
and GUI
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI/
GUI
Via
CLI/
GUI
None Crypto
Officer
Show approved
mode
enabled/disabled
(console/CLI
only)
The module
shows approved
mode
Succes
sful
completi
on of
service
IG 2.4.C
Scenari
o 2
Via CLI/
GUI
Via
CLI/
GUI
None Crypto
Officer
Set/reset crypto
officer
The module
offers service to
set/reset CO
System
Logs
Via CLI Via
CLI
None Crypto
Officer
Traffic over
HTTPS
Traffic over
HTTPS
System
Logs
HTTPS
request
HTTP
S data
Transfer
data
Crypto
Officer
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Authentica
tion Key: E
-
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Encryption
Key: E
Page 31 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Traffic over SSH Traffic over SSH System
Logs
SSH
Comma
nd
Status Establish
SSH
Transfer
data
Crypto
Officer
- SSH
Session
Encryption
Key: E
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Key: E
Wireless
connection
Wireless
connection
System
Logs
Via CLI/
GUI
Via
CLI/
GUI
WPA
Handshak
e
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Keys: E
Show Version Show version CLI
output /
System
Logs
Via
CLI/GU
I
Via
CLI /
GUI
shows
"FIPS-
CC-
74-3".
None Crypto
Officer
Client Wifi
Access
In all Approved
modes, the links
between the
module and
wireless client
are secured with
WPA2/WPA3.
System
Logs
Via
CLI/GU
I
Via
CLI/G
UI
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
Network
User
-
WPA2/WP
A3 Pre-
shared
Key: E
-
WPA2/WP
A3 Pair-
Wise
Master
Key
(PMK): E
-
WPA2/WP
A3
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK):
G,E
-
WPA2/WP
A3
Session
Key: G,E
-
Page 32 of 52
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
WPA2/WP
A3 Group
Master
Key
(GMK):
G,E
-
WPA2/WP
A3 Group
Transient
Key
(GTK):
G,E
Table 14: Approved Services
The following tables detail the types of approved services available to each role in each mode of operation, the
types of access for each role and the Keys or CSPs they affect.
The access types are abbreviated as follows:
G – Generate - The module generates or derives the SSP.
R – Read - The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W – Write - The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E – Execute - The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z – Zeroise - The module zeroizes the SSP
When the approved mode of operation is enabled, the use of FIPS 140-3 approved services and security
functions is enforced. Therefore, the indicator for FIPS 140-3 compliant operation, for all services and security
functions, is the approved mode of operation being enabled.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
The module does not provide any non-approved services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
FortiAP 7.4 supports firmware loading via GUI as well as CLI. In the approved mode, the system will perform
the firmware integrity test on the inflated image file. The image file is verified using a hardcoded RSA public
key. If the integrity test fails, the firmware upgrade process will stop.
Note: FortiAP 7.4 can only load the FortiAP 7.4 OS. i.e. external firmware load is not supported.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
Page 33 of 52
After FortiAP 7.4 connects to a FortiGate controller, a CAPWAP tunnel is established between the FortiGate
and FortiAP. There are two channels inside the CAPWAP tunnel:
 the control channel for managing traffic, which is always encrypted by DTLS.
 the data channel for carrying client data packets, which can be configured to be encrypted or not.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
FortiAP 7.4 uses RSA 2048-bit digital signature as an approved integrity technique for firmware integrity. The
integrity test is invoked automatically on boot and can also be run manually.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
To verify, run the command: fap-fips kat firmware-integrity on CLI. If the tests pass successfully, the
results are output to the CLI. If the tests fail, the module will log the failure and enter the error mode. See
Section 10.4 (Error States) and Section 10.5 (Operator Initiated Self-test) for more information.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module constitutes the entire firmware operating system for a FortiAP 7.4 unit. The module provides a
proprietary and non-modifiable operating system and does not provide a programming environment.
The modules consist of the combination of the FortiAP-OS operating system and the FortiAP appliances. The
FortiAP operating system can only be installed, and run, on a FortiAP appliance. The FortiAP-OS operating
system provides a proprietary and non-modifiable operating system. For specific information regarding the
operational environment, please refer to section 2.3. Please refer to section 11.1 for more information on the
installation process.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
1. There is no limit to concurrent users.
2. There is no limit to the number of network connections.
3. The module can only be installed and run on a FortiAP unit.
4. There are no requirements on the processor.
5. The module does not require any Trusted Platform Module.
7 Physical Security
Not Applicable as this is a level 1 firmware module.
Page 34 of 52
8 Non-Invasive Security
Not applicable. There is currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques described in ISO/IEC
19790:2021 Annex F.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
FortiAP 7.4 implements the Storage Areas listed in the table below.
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
RAM SDRAM Dynamic
Boot Device Flash Memory Static
External Network Device External Network Device Dynamic
Entropy Source (Jitter Entropy) Entropy Source (Jitter Entropy) Dynamic
Manufacturer Manufacturer Static
CM Firmware CM Firmware Static
RAM via Ethernet ports RAM via Ethernet ports Dynamic
Table 15: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Password External
Network
Device
RAM via
Ethernet
ports
Plaintext Manual Direct
Pre-loaded Manufacturer RAM Plaintext N/A N/A
Public Key
import
External
Network
Device
RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
Public Key
export
RAM External
Network
Device
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module does not support manual SSP entry or intermediate key generation output. The module does not
support entry and output of SSPs beyond the physical perimeter of the operational environment.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 35 of 52
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroisation
Service
After erasing the module's boot
device and then power cycling
the FortiAP unit
On reboot, the
system is set to
default settings.
CLI command:
factoryreset
Power Cycle Power Cycle device On reboot, the
system is set to
default settings.
Power Cycle
device
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods
All keys and CSPs are zeroized by erasing the module’s boot device and then power cycling the FortiAP unit.
To erase the boot device, execute the following command from the CLI: factoryreset. To completely zeroize
the unit, the process must be performed under the direct control of the operator. The operator must be present
to observe that the zeroization method has been completed successfully.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Crypto
Officer
Password
Password used
by CO to
manage
cryptographic
operations
>= 8
characters -
-
Password
- CSP
Configurati
on
Integrity
key
Key used to
ensure the
integrity and
authenticity of
configuration
data
256 - 128 Authentica
tion - CSP
Configurati
on
Encryption
Key
Key used to
encrypt sensitive
configuration
data
256 - 128 Symmetric
- CSP
Configurati
on Backup
Key
Key used to
secure or
authenticate
backups of
system
configurations
256 - 128 Authentica
tion - CSP
Entropy
Input
DRBG Input
from the Entropy
Pool
256 - 256 Entropy -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
DRBG
output
Random
numbers used in
cryptographic
algorithms
256 - 256 DRBG -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Page 36 of 52
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
DRBG
Seed
256-bit seed
used by the
DRBG
256 - 256 DRBG -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
DRBG v Internal state
values for the
DRBG
256 - 256 DRBG -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
DRBG
Key
Internal state
values for the
DRBG
256 - 256 DRBG -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
DTLS Pre-
Master
Secret
Shared Secret 384 - 384 Pre-
Master
Secret -
CSP
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7
(A6064)
TLS
v1.3
KDF
(A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
DTLS
Master
Secret
Shared Secret 384 - 384 Master
Secret -
CSP
Establish
CAPWAP
CAPWAP
Session
Key
Key used to
protect
CAPWAP
control
messages.
128/256 -
128/256
Symmetric
Encryption
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
DTLS
Integrity
Key
Used to integrity
check on
CAPWAP
control
messages.
- - - Asymmetri
c - CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
DTLS
Public Key
DTLS Public
Key
- - - Asymmetri
c - PSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
DTLS
Private
Key
DTLS Private
Key
- - - Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
Firmware
Integrity
key
Asymmetric
encryption/decry
ption. Digital
signature and
verification
2048 - 112 Asymmetri
c
Authentica
tion -
Neither
Firmware
Update
key
Asymmetric
encryption/decry
ption. Digital
2048 - 112 Asymmetri
c
Page 37 of 52
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
signature and
verification
Authentica
tion - PSP
HTTPS/TL
S
Server/Ho
st key
RSA private key
used in the
HTTPS/TLS
protocols (key
establishment,
2048 or 3072
bit)
2048 - 112 Public -
PSP
HTTPS/TL
S pre-
master
Secret
Message
Hashing
384 - 384 Pre-
Master
Secret -
PSP
HTTPS/TL
S Master
Secret
Message
Authentication
384 - 384 Master
Secret -
CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Authentica
tion Key
Key used within
a secure web
session
8-1024 -
128/192/256
Symmetric
Encryption
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
HTTPS/TL
S Session
Encryption
Key
Key used to
encrypt a secure
web session
128/192/256
-
128/192/256
Symmetric
Encryption
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
SSH
Server/Ho
st key
Key pair used to
secure
communication
2048 - 112 Public -
CSP
SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Key
Key used to
verify identity of
client connecting
to server
8-1024 -
128/192/256
Authentica
tion - CSP
KDF
SSH
(A6064)
SSH
Session
Encryption
Key
Key used to
encrypt data
during SSH
session
128/192/256
-
128/192/256
Authentica
tion - CSP
KDF
SSH
(A6064)
IKE
Authentica
tion Key
IKE peer-to-peer
authentication
using HMAC
SHA-1 , -256, -
384 or -512
160 to 512 -
112 to 256
Symmetric
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
Page 38 of 52
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
IKE Pre-
Shared
Key
Used to
generate IKE
protocol keys
> 112 - >
112
Symmetric
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
IKE
Session
Encryption
Key
Encryption of
IKE peer-to-peer
key negotiation
using or AES
(128, 256 bit)
160 to 512 -
112 to 256
Symmetric
- CSP
KDF
IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF
IKEv2
(A6064)
IKE RSA
private
Key
Module
authentication
key
2048, 3072 -
112, 128
Asymmetri
c - CSP
IKE RSA
public key
Module
authentication
key
2048, 3072 -
112, 128
Asymmetri
c - PSP
IKE RSA
peer
public key
Peer
authentication
key
2048, 3072 -
112, 128
Asymmetri
c - PSP
IKE
ECDSA
private
Key
Module
authentication
key
256, 384,
512 - 128,
192, 256
Asymmetri
c - CSP
IKE
ECDSA
public key
Module
authentication
key
256, 384,
512 - 128,
192, 256
Asymmetri
c - PSP
IKE
ECDSA
peer
public key
Module
authentication
key
256, 384,
512 - 128,
192, 256
Asymmetri
c - PSP
AES Keys Symmetric key
used to encrypt
and decrypt data
128/192/256
- Between
128 and 256
bits
Symmetric
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Establish
TLS
Establish
SSH
Establish
CAPWAP
WPA
Handshak
e
DH Private
Key
Key agreement
and key
establishment
2048-8192 -
112-200 bits
Asymmetri
c Public
Key
Exchange
- CSP
Safe
Primes
Key
Generat
ion
(A6064)
DH Public
key
Key agreement
and key
establishment
2048 - 112
bits
Asymmetri
c - PSP
Safe
Primes
Key
Generat
Page 39 of 52
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
ion
(A6064)
EC DH
Private
Key
Key agreement
and key
establishment
256/384/512
-
128/192/256
Asymmetri
c - CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A6064)
Establish
TLS
Establish
SSH
EC DH
Public Key
Key agreement
and key
establishment
256/384/512
-
128/192/256
Asymmetri
c - PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A6064)
Establish
TLS
Establish
SSH
HMAC
keys
Keyed Hash 160,256,384
,512 bits -
minimum
112 bits
Authentica
tion - CSP
Configura
tion
RSA
Public
Keys
Asymmetric key
used to encrypt
and decrypt data
2048, 3072-
bits - 112 or
128 bits of
encryption
strength
Public Key
- PSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Establish
CAPWAP
RSA
Private
Keys
Asymmetric key
used to encrypt
and decrypt data
2048, 3072-
bits - 112 or
128 bits of
encryption
strength
Private
Key - CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
ECDSA
Public Key
Digital Signature P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
Between
128 and 256
bits of
encryption
strength
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
Private
Key
Digital Signature P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
Between
128 and 256
bits of
encryption
strength
Private
Key - CSP
WPA2/WP
A3 Pre-
shared
Key
Used for
WPA2/WPA3
client/server
authentication
- - - Symmetric
- CSP
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
WPA2/WP
A3 Pair-
Wise
Used to derive
the Pairwise
Transient Key
256 - 256 Symmetric
- CSP
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Page 40 of 52
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Master
Key (PMK)
(PTK) for
WPA2/WPA3
communications
.
Connectio
n
WPA2/WP
A3
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK)
WPA2/WPA3
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK) Used to
derive the
WPA2/WPA3
Session Key.
384 - - Symmetric
- CSP
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
WPA2/WP
A3
Session
Key
Used as the
WPA2/WPA3
Session Key
128,256 -
128
Symmetric
- CSP
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
WPA2/WP
A3 Group
Master
Key
(GMK)
Used to derive
WPA2/WPA3
Group Transient
Key GTK.
256 - 256 Symmetric
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
WPA2/WP
A3 Group
Transient
Key (GTK)
The GTK is the
WPA2/WPA3
session key
used for
broadcast
communications
protection
256 - 256 Symmetric
- CSP
Secure
802.11
Wireless
Connectio
n
Table 18: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Crypto Officer
Password
Password Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Configuration
Integrity key
Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Configuration
Encryption Key
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Configuration
Backup Key
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Page 41 of 52
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Power
Cycle
Entropy Input RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DRBG
Seed:Paired
With
DRBG output Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DRBG
Seed:Derived
From
DRBG v and key
values:Derived
From
Entropy
Input:Derived
From
DRBG Seed Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DRBG v Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DRBG Key RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Pre-
Master Secret
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
CAPWAP
Session Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
DTLS Integrity
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
DTLS Public
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Page 42 of 52
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DTLS Private
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Firmware
Integrity key
Password Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Firmware
Update key
Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
HTTPS/TLS
Server/Host
key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
HTTPS/TLS
pre-master
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
HTTPS/TLS
Master Secret
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS/TLS
Session
Authentication
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS/TLS
Session
Encryption Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DTLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSH
Server/Host
key
Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
SSH Session
Authentication
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
SSH
Server/Host
key:Derived
From
SSH Session
Encryption Key
RAM:Plaintext Power
Cycle
SSH
Server/Host
key:Derived
From
IKE
Authentication
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DRBG
output:Derived
From
Page 43 of 52
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
IKE Pre-
Shared Key
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE Session
Encryption Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
Diffie-Hellman
Keys:Derived
From
EC Diffie-
Hellman
Keys:Derived
From
IKE RSA
private Key
Pre-
loaded
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE RSA public
key
Pre-
loaded
Public
Key
export
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE RSA peer
public key
Public
Key
import
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE ECDSA
private Key
Pre-
loaded
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE ECDSA
public key
Pre-
loaded
Public
Key
export
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
IKE ECDSA
peer public key
Public
Key
import
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
AES Keys RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DH Private
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
DH Public key RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Page 44 of 52
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Power
Cycle
EC DH Private
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
EC DH Public
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
HMAC keys RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
RSA Public
Keys
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
RSA Private
Keys
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
Power
Cycle
ECDSA Public
Key
Boot
Device:Encrypted
Zeroisation
Service
ECDSA Private
Key :Paired With
ECDSA Private
Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
WPA2/WPA3
Pre-shared Key
Password Boot
Device:Plaintext
Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Pair-Wise
Master Key
(PMK)
Password RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK):Derives
WPA2/WPA3
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK):Derived
From
WPA2/WPA3
Group Master
Key
(GMK):Derives
WPA2/WPA3
Session Key
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK):Derived
From
WPA2/WPA3
Group Master
Page 45 of 52
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Key
(GMK):Derives
WPA2/WPA3
Group Master
Key (GMK)
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Session
Key:Derived
From
WPA2/WPA3
Group Transient
Key
(GTK):Derives
WPA2/WPA3
Group
Transient Key
(GTK)
RAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
Service
WPA2/WPA3
Group Transient
Key
(GTK):Derived
From
Table 19: SSP Table 2
The above table lists all the cryptographic keys and critical security parameters used by the modules.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
2048 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Pass Indicator /
Error Indicator
Firmware
Integrity
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module implements the above pre-operational self-tests.
The results of the startup self-tests are displayed on the console during the startup process. The startup self-
tests can also be initiated on demand using the CLI command fap-fips kat all (to initiate all self-tests) or fap-fips
kat <test> (to initiate a specific self-test). If any of the self-tests fail, FortiAP 7.4 logs an "error indicator" for the
specific test(s) and enters error state. Please refer to section 10.4 for examples and more information.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A6064)
Key Size -
128 bits
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Encrypt/Decrypt Boot Up
Page 46 of 52
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Error
Indicator
AES-GCM
(A6064)
Key Size -
128 bits
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Encrypt/Decrypt Boot Up
Counter
DRBG
(A6064)
AES-256 KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Health tests-
Instantiate,
Generate, and
Reseed
Boot Up
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
P-256
Curve
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Sign Boot Up
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
P-256
Curve
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Verify Boot Up
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
P-256
Curve
PCT PCT Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Sign Boot Up
HMAC SHA2-256 KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Message
Authentication
Boot Up
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6064)
P-256v1
parameter
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Agreement Boot Up
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6064)
MODP-
2048
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Agreement Boot Up
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
Modulus
Size- 2048
KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Verify Boot Up
KDF IKEv1
(A6064)
KDF KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Derivation Boot Up
KDF IKEv2
(A6064)
KDF KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Derivation Boot Up
KDF SSH
(A6064)
KDF KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Key Derivation Boot Up
Page 47 of 52
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Error
Indicator
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC7627
(A6064)
KDF KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Derivation Boot Up
TLS v1.3
KDF (A6064)
KDF KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Derivation Boot Up
SHA3-256
(A4291)
SHA3-256 KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Message Digest Boot Up
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
(A6064)
MODP-
2048
PCT PCT Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Generation Conditional
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A6064)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Message
Authentication
Boot Up
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
2048 PCT PCT Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Key Generation Conditional
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
2048 KAT CAST Pass
Indicator /
Error
Indicator
Signature
Verification
Boot Up
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
The module executes the above conditional tests when the related service is invoked.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
KAT SW/FW Integrity On-Demand Programmatically
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Page 48 of 52
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
AES-GCM
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
Counter DRBG
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
PCT PCT On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
HMAC KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
KDF IKEv1
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
KDF IKEv2
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
KDF SSH
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
SHA3-256
(A4291)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
Safe Primes Key
Generation
(A6064)
PCT PCT
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
PCT PCT Conditional Programmatically
and Manually
Page 49 of 52
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6064)
KAT CAST On-Demand Programmatically
and Manually
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
Mode
All data output and
cryptographic
services are inhibited
in the error state.
If any of the self-
tests or conditional
tests fail, the
module enters an
error state
Power
Cycling
If any of the self-tests or
conditional tests fail, the
module enters an error
state with message
"Entering error mode...".
Table 24: Error States
If any of the self-tests or conditional tests fail, the module enters an error state as shown by the console output
below:
Self-tests failed
Entering error mode...
The system is going down NOW !!
The system is halted.
All data output and cryptographic services are inhibited in the error state.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The administrator can run self-tests manually at any time. To run all the tests, entering the following CLI
command invokes the service "Execute FIPS-CC on-demand self-tests ".
fap-fips kat all
To run an individual test, enter fap-fips kat <test_name>.
To see the list of valid test names, enter fap-fips kat?
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
There are no special startup procedures, however the Fortinet hardware is shipped in a non-FIPS 140-3
compliant configuration. The following steps must be performed to put the module into a FIPS compliant
configuration:
Page 50 of 52
• Download the model specific FIPS validated firmware image from the Fortinet Support site at
https://support.fortinet.com/
• Verify the integrity of the firmware image.
• Install the FIPS validated firmware image.
• Enable the approved mode of operation using:
o “cfg -a FIPS_CC=1”, and then confirm with “Y” to initiate approved mode.
In addition, FIPS 140-3 compliant operation requires both that you put the module in its approved mode of
operation and that you follow secure procedures for installation and operation of the FortiAP 7.4 module. When
the approved mode of operation is enabled, FortiAP will enforce FIPS approved cryptography.
You must ensure that:
• The FortiAP 7.4 module is configured in the approved mode of operation.
• The FortiAP 7.4 module is installed in a secure physical location.
• Physical access to the FortiAP 7.4 module is restricted to authorized operators.
• Administrative passwords are changed regularly.
• Administration of the module is permitted using only validated administrative methods. These are:
o Console connection
o Web-based manager via HTTPS
o Command line interface (CLI) access via SSH.
For first time login, enter “admin” and keep the password blank. Otherwise, in the “Password” field, enter the
password associated with the admin account. The Operator is then required to supply a password for the
admin account which will be assigned to the Crypto Officer role. The supplied password must be at least 8
characters long and correctly verified before the system restarts in approved mode. Upon restart, the module
will execute self-tests to ensure the correct initialization of the module’s cryptographic functions. After
restarting, the Crypto Officer can confirm that the module is running in approved mode by executing the
following command from the CLI:
admin # fap-fips status
If the module is running in approved mode, the system status output will display the line:
FIPS mode: enabled
Once the FIPS validated firmware has been installed and the module properly configured in the approved mode
of operation, the module runs in a FIPS compliant configuration.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
FortiAP 7.4 module administrator guidance is publicly available from the Fortinet Technical Documentation site.
The key administrator guidance documents are listed below:
• FortiAP Administration Guide
• FortiAP CLI guide
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
None. Non-Administrator guidance is included in the FortiAP 7.4 Administration Guide.
Page 51 of 52
11.6 End of Life
Once the module has reached its End of Life, The Crypto Officer is responsible for zeroizing the persistently
stored keys and is performed using a CLI command: factoryreset and confirmed (Y) by the user.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.
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Copyright© 2025 Fortinet, Inc. All rights reserved. Fortinet®, FortiGate®, FortiCare® and FortiGuard®, and certain other marks are registered trademarks of Fortinet, Inc., in the U.S. and other jurisdictions, and
other Fortinet names herein may also be registered and/or common law trademarks of Fortinet. All other product or company names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Performance and other metrics
contained herein were attained in internal lab tests under ideal conditions, and actual performance and other results may vary. Network variables, different network environments and other conditions may affect
performance results. Nothing herein represents any binding commitment by Fortinet, and Fortinet disclaims all warranties, whether express or implied, except to the extent Fortinet enters a binding written
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only the specific performance metrics expressly identified in such binding written contract shall be binding on Fortinet. For absolute clarity, any such warranty will be limited to performance in the same ideal
conditions as in Fortinet’s internal lab tests. In no event does Fortinet make any commitment related to future deliverables, features or development, and circumstances may change such that any forward-looking
statements herein are not accurate. Fortinet disclaims in full any covenants, representations, and guarantees pursuant hereto, whether express or implied. Fortinet reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or
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