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Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR
FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version: R1.2
Date: November 3, 2014
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CHANGE RECORD
Revision Date Author Description of Change
R1.0 April 16, 2014 Motorola Solutions Initial release
R1.1 May 16, 2014 Motorola Solutions Updates from lab review
R1.2 November 3, 2014 Motorola Solutions Updates from lab review
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................5
1.1 Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR Physical, Ports and Interfaces............................................7
2 Cryptographic Functionality.............................................................................................9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 11
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................ 13
3.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 15
4 Self‐test ......................................................................................................................... 18
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 18
4.2 Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 19
4.3 Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 19
5 Physical Security Policy.................................................................................................. 20
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 21
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................. 21
8 Security Rules and Guidance.......................................................................................... 21
9 References..................................................................................................................... 22
10 Acronyms and Definitions.............................................................................................. 22
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table ......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements....................................................................................... 5
Table 3 – Wireless Access Point AP 7131N‐GR Ports and Interfaces............................................................8
Table 4 –Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................................ 9
Table 5 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................10
Table 6 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality .............................................10
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 11
Table 8 – Public Keys...................................................................................................................................12
Table 9 – Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 – Authentication Methods and Strengths....................................................................................14
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 15
Table 12 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services......................................................................15
Table 13 – Admin Role Services .................................................................................................................. 16
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services ............................................................................................. 17
Table 15 – Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 18
Table 16 – Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 19
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 19
Table 18 – References.................................................................................................................................22
Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 22
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Operational Context..................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Top View ...........................................................................7
Figure 3 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Front Side..........................................................................7
Figure 4 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Back Side ...........................................................................8
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, hereafter
denoted the Module. The Module, validated to FIPS 140‐2 overall Level 2, that supports multi‐cell
802.11a/b/g/n wireless deployments. The Module incorporates an integrated router, gateway, firewall,
DHCP and AAA RADIUS server, VPN, and hot‐spot gateway.
For the purposes of FIPS 140‐2, the Module is classified as a multi‐chip standalone embodiment with
configuration as shown in Table 1.
HW P/N FW Version
AP7131N‐GR 4.0.4.0‐046GRN
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table
The Module firmware, license and secure installation instructions are delivered as an option for
installation on the hardware part number listed in Table 1. Once the firmware is installed, the resulting
Module supports only the FIPS‐Approved mode of operation. The FIPS‐Approved mode of operation is
explicitly indicated in the banner message.
AP‐713x Access Point 4.0.4.0‐046GRN
Copyright (c) 2006‐2011 Motorola Solutions, Inc.
This Device Is Running In Common Criteria Mode
Attention:
This is a protected and private wireless system. No un‐authorized access is allowed.
You must have proper rights to access and manage this system from authorized personnel.
Do you want to proceed (y/n)?
The cryptographic boundary for this configuration is the enclosure that encloses all hardware and
firmware components not including external antennas. The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the Module are
as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self‐Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
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Figure 1 – Operational Context
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1.1 Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR Physical, Ports and Interfaces
Figures 2 through 4 depict the Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR. The antennas are not shown but
connect to the three (3) antenna ports on both the front side and back side of the Module. Table 3
describes the Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR ports and interfaces.
Figure 2 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Top View
Figure 3 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Front Side
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Figure 4 ‐ Wireless Access Point AP‐7131N‐GR, Back Side
Port Description Logical Interface Type
PWR 36‐57V DC Power
GE1/POE LAN port (Gigabit Ethernet/Power Over
Ethernet)
Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out;
Power (optional)
GE2 WAN port (Gigabit Ethernet) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
CONSOLE RJ45 Console Port (serial) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
R1/2‐A/B/C 2‐6 antennas for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz radios Control in; Data in; Data out; Status out
LEDs Six (6) LEDs (via light tubes) providing status
indicators for:
1) boot/ normal operation
2) GE1 operation
3) GE2 operation
4) 5 GHz radio operation
5) 2.4 GHz radio operation
6) Unused in this model
Status out
Table 3 – Wireless Access Point AP 7131N‐GR Ports and Interfaces
The convention “R1/2‐A/B/C” indicates multiple antenna connections for multiple radios. For example,
“R1‐A” is radio one antenna A; “R2‐C” is radio two antenna C.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Tables 6 and 7 below.
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: ECB, CBC; Key sizes: 128, 192, 256
bits and CFB 128 mode Key size 128 bits
Encryption and decryption used for RADIUS, SSHv2, SNMP, IPsec
and TLS.
2751
CCM [IG 7.2, SP 800‐38C] Key sizes: 128 bits
AES‐CCM generation and verification used for 802.11i wireless
communications.
861
HMAC [FIPS 198‐1] HMAC‐SHA‐1 and HMAC‐SHA‐256 Generation and
Verification.
1725
KDF (802.11i) [IG 7.2, IG 7.10, SP 800‐108] 802.11i shared key derivation. 20
TLS KDF [SP 800‐135] TLS key derivation function. 186
SSH KDF [SP 800‐135] SSHv2 key derivation function. 189
IKE KDF [SP 800‐135] IKEv1 key derivation function. 187
SNMP KDF [SP 800‐135] SNMP key derivation function. 188
RNG [ANSI X9.31‐1998] Random number generation. 1267
RSA [FIPS 186‐4, ANSI X9.31‐1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, and Signature
Verification used for IKE, TLS, SSHv2.
1442
SHA [FIPS 180‐4] SHA sizes: SHA‐1 and SHA‐256
Secure hashing used for firmware integrity checking, RADIUS,
SSHv2, TLS and IKEv1.
2320
Triple‐DES [SP 800‐20] Modes: TECB, TCBC; Key sizes: 3‐Key
Encryption and decryption used for PEAP‐TLS.
1655
Table 4 –Approved Cryptographic Functions
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Algorithm Description
Non‐Compliant SP
800‐56A
[IG D.2] Diffie‐Hellman (group 14). Key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
Non‐ Compliant
SP 800‐56B
[IG D.2] 2048‐bit RSA Key Transport. Key wrapping; key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
NDRNG
[Annex C] Hardware Non‐Deterministic RNG; 64 bits per access, used only to seed
the FIPS Approved RNG.
MD5 [IG D.8] Used during TLS handshake.
Table 5 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
IKEv1 [IG D.2] IKEv1 and IPsec supported cryptography:
AES‐CBC‐128, AES‐ CBC‐192, AES‐ CBC‐256, SHA‐256, DH (2048)
SSHv2 [IG D.2] The SSHv2 Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
Cipher: aes128‐cbc, aes192‐cbc and aes256‐cbc
MAC: hmac‐sha1, hmac‐sha1‐96
KEX: diffie‐hellman‐group14‐sha1
Hostkey‐algorithms: ssh‐rsa
TLS [IG D.2] The TLS Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
RADIUS EAP‐TLS, EAP‐TTLS, PEAP‐TLS
Table 6 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module is
described in the services detailed in Section 4.
CSP Description / Usage
RNG‐SM
RNG Seed Material: 128‐bit seed; AES‐256 seed key for the Approved RNG. The Module
ensures that the seed and seed key are not equal.
RNG‐STATE The current values of the Approved X9.31 (AES‐256) RNG instance.
DH‐KEK
Diffie‐Hellman Key Establishment Key: DH Group 14 (2048 bit) private key for TLS, IKE
and SSH key establishment.
DEV‐PRI
Device Private key: RSA 2048 private keys used for TLS, SSH, and EAP authentication
methods.
IKE‐PSS IKE Pre‐Shared Secret: 64 byte secret value used for IKEv1 authentication.
IPS‐SDEK
IPsec Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/192/256 key used to encrypt and decrypt
IPsec messages.
IPS‐SAK
IPsec Session Authentication Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) key used for IPsec message
authentication.
RAD‐SEC
Radius Secret: 8 byte minimum, 32 byte maximum secret value used for RADIUS server
authentication.
SNMP‐SEC
SNMP Secret: 8 byte minimum (no maximum) secret value used for SNMP
authentication.
SNMP‐DEK
SNMP Data Encryption Key: AES‐128 bit key used to encrypt and decrypt SNMP
messages.
SSH‐DEK SSH Encryption Key: AES‐128/192/256 key used to encrypt and decrypt SSH messages.
SSH‐HMAC SSH HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA1, HMAC‐SHA1‐96 key used to protect SSH message integrity.
TLS‐SDEK
TLS Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/256 used to encrypt and decrypt TLS
messages.
TLS‐HKEK
TLS Handshake Key Encryption Key: RSA‐2048 private key establishment key, used in the
TLS and EAP handshakes.
TLS‐HMAC TLS HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) key used for TLS message authentication.
WL‐PSK 64 byte pre‐shared key for use in 802.11i (SP 800‐108) Key Derivation.
WL‐TK 802.11i Temporal Key: AES‐128 key for unicast wireless data encryption/decryption.
WL‐GTK
802.11i Group Temporal Key: AES‐128 key for multicast wireless data
encryption/decryption.
WL‐KCK 802.11i Key Confirmation Key: AES‐128 key used for authentication / key confirmation.
WL‐KEK 802.11i Key Encryption Key: AES‐128 key used for sensitive data encryption.
PW 8 byte minimum value used for local user authentication.
FW‐PUB 40 digits HMAC key (hex) used for firmware load.
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters
2.2 Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
CA‐PUB Certificate authority RSA‐1024 or RSA‐2048 public key, used for path validation.
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Key Description / Usage
DEV‐PUB Device RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
PC‐PUB Peer or client RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
Table 8 – Public Keys
The Module zeroizes all plaintext CSPs by overwriting the storage area three (3) times with three (3)
different patterns. After zeroization, the Module assumes factory default settings on reboot.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles
Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Admin and User roles are human operator
roles; the remaining roles are for machine to machine interaction. The Module does not support a
maintenance role, state or interface.
ID Role Description Authentication
Method
Admin
An administrative user, inclusive of the following defined groups with
varying levels of access to Module functionality:
Regular Administrative user (Management user): Full access including halt
and delete startup configuration; and all SYS role services.
Admin Super User: Full access including halt and delete startup
configuration; and all SYS role services. In addition to regular
administrative user privileges, the default ‘admin’ account has the
following special privileges
 The ability to Add/Delete/Edit other administrator accounts. Other
administrative users can only view the list of other users.
 The ability to change other administrative users’ passwords. Other
administrative users can only edit their own password.
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Officer role requirement.
Passphrase
verification
User
Wireless User (FIPS 140‐2 “User” role): Engage the wireless cryptographic
services provided by the module.
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 User role requirement.
Passphrase
verification
MP Mesh Peer: Connect wirelessly to another AP in a mesh 802.11i Auth
NMSU
An SNMP Network Management System User, inclusive of the following:
SNMP Manager: Non‐security related configuration, status monitoring.
SNMP Operator: Read only access and status monitoring
SNMP Trap: Read only access and status monitoring through SNMP trap
messages
Passphrase
verification
TLSC
TLS Client entity, inclusive of the following:
https client for Web GUI administration; Air Defense Services Platform
(ADSP) communications. (Uses RSA authentication exclusively)
RSA
IPSP
IPsec Peer (uses IKEv1 and the shared secret authentication method
exclusively)
Passphrase
verification
SSHC SSHv2 Client (Uses RSA authentication exclusively) RSA
WC Wireless Client 802.11i Auth
Table 9 – Roles Description
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The Module enforces the separation of roles using an internal access control and groups for associating
specific operator credentials with operator roles.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements the following authentication methods. Probability of false authentication and
probability of false authentication in a one (1) minute period are shown along with derivation
information.
Authentication
Method
Probability of false authentication
(1.0E‐06 required)
Probability of false authentication
in a one‐minute period
(1.0E‐05 required)
Passphrase
verification
Minimum length: 8 characters
Character set: ASCII printable (95)
1/(95^8) = 1.5E‐16
Failed authentication imposes 1
second delay (60
attempts/minute).
60/(95^8)=9.0E‐15
RSA Client certificates using RSA‐1024 provide 80
bit equivalent strength.
1/(2^80) = 8.3E‐25
Failed authentication imposes 1
second delay (60
attempts/minute).
60/(2^80) = 5.0E‐23
802.11i Auth AES‐128 authentication of secrets derived in
802.11i handshake.
1/(2^128) = 2.9E‐39
Failed authentication imposes 1
second delay (60
attempts/minute).
60/(2^128) = 1.8E‐37
Table 10 – Authentication Methods and Strengths
The Passphrase verification method is a generalization of passwords, SNMP community strings, and IKE
shared secrets. This calculation uses the worst case scenario to describe minimum strength: 8 bytes
minimum and a restricted character set.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 13
Service Description
Local Reset Power cycle the Module.
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
IPSP
MP
SSHC
TLSC
WC
User
NMSU
Connect (IPsec)
Establish and use IPsec connection, used for VPN
connection between Motorola devices, RADIUS,
syslog, NTP server, etc.
X
Connect (Mesh)
Establish and use mesh peer connection, used for
wirelessly connecting two Motorola devices.
X
Connect (SSH)
Establish and use connection with SSH client, used
to connect Motorola device for management and
monitoring purpose.
X
Connect (TLS)
Establish and use TLS connection, used for Web
GUI, establishment of captive portal connection.
X
Connect (Wireless) Establish and use connection with wireless clients. X
Wireless Traffic 802.11 network communications by end User. X
SNMP Traffic SNMP MIB communications. X
Table 12 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services
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Service Description
Admin
Login Authentication via CLI or web GUI for administrative use. X
Configure
Configure device parameters, non‐security relevant: routing, quality of
service, radio function, etc.
X
Configure security
Configure IPsec, TLS, SSH, 802.11, operator accounts, SNMP access, and
RADIUS.
X
Monitor View intrusion detection and prevention logs. X
Show status Show status and configuration information. X
Remote reset Trigger a module reset and reboot, inclusive of Power‐On Self‐Test. X
Update firmware Load and manage a new firmware image. X
Zeroize
Destroys the Module’s CSPs and restore the module to factory settings (the
Restore Factory Setting operation).
X
Table 13 – Admin Role Services
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Table16 defines access to CSPs by Module services.
CSPs
Service
RNG‐SM
RNG‐STATE
DH‐KEK
DEV‐PRI
IKE‐PSS
IPS‐SDEK
IPS‐SAK
RAD‐SEC
SNMP‐SEC
SNMP‐DEK
SSH‐DEK
SSH‐HMAC
TLS‐SDEK
TLS‐HKEK
TLS‐HMAC
WL‐PSK
WL‐TK
WL‐GTK
WL‐KCK
WL‐KEK
PW
Configure ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Configure
Security
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
E
W
‐ ‐
E
W
E
W
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
E
W
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ W
Connect
(IPsec)
‐ W G ‐ E
G
E
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(Mesh)
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(SSH)
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(TLS)
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G
E
G
E
G
E
G
E
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Connect
(Wireless)
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
G
E
G
E
G G ‐
Wireless
Traffic
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E E ‐
SNMP
Traffic
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
G
E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Login ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
Monitor ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Show
status
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Remote
reset
G
Z
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ Z Z Z Z ‐
Update
firmware
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Zeroize ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z
Local
Reset
G
Z
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ Z Z Z ‐ ‐
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services
 ‐ = No access to the CSP by the service.
 G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The Module exports the CSP.
 E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The Module writes the CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP.
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4 Self‐test
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power‐up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self‐tests described in Table 15 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails,
the Module enters an error state. The module will output a status message to the external console
stating the module is in error state. Additionally, when an error state is entered the System LED (boot/
normal operation) will blink red.
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity SHA‐256 performed over all code stored in the Module, when the module is
initialized after power‐up or a soft‐reset.
AES Encrypt AES‐128 ECB Encryption KAT
AES Decrypt AES‐128 ECB Decryption KAT
CCM Generate AES‐CCM Generation KAT using AES‐128
CCM Verify AES‐CCM Verification KAT using AES‐128
HMAC HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT, HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT
RNG ANSI X9.31‐1998 RNG KAT with fixed seed, seed key and date/time input.
RSA SigGen RSA 2048‐bit Signature Generation KAT
RSA SigVer RSA 2048‐bit Signature Verification KAT
SHA‐1 SHA‐1 KAT
SHA‐256 SHA‐256 KAT
Triple‐DES Encrypt 3‐Key TEBC Encryption KAT
Triple‐DES Decrypt 3‐Key TEBC Decryption KAT
SP 800‐108 KDF Power‐on KDF self‐test for 802.11i keys.
SP 800‐135 KDF (TLS) Power‐on KDF self‐test for TLS keys.
SP 800‐135 (SSH) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SSH keys.
SP 800‐135 (IKE) Power‐on KDF self‐test for IKEv1 keys.
SP 800‐135 (SNMP) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SNMP keys.
Table 15 – Power Up Self‐tests
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4.2 Conditional Self‐tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value
is requested from the NDRNG.
RNG PRNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value is
requested from the Approved RNG.
RSA PCT RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
Image integrity The Module performs a SHA‐256 test over all data storage.
Firmware Load HMAC‐SHA‐1 message authentication performed when firmware is loaded.
Table 16 – Conditional Self‐tests
4.3 Critical Function Tests
Test Target Description
Kernel space
self‐test
This test includes memory test, DRAM test, data and address bus walk and PCI test.
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests
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5 Physical Security Policy
The Module is housed in an industrial quality enclosure.
Motorola Solutions uses production grade components and materials in the manufacturing of this
product. In addition to the requirements for Level 1, the module provides evidence of tampering when
physical access to the module is attempted.
The product contains three (3) tamper‐evident seals located as depicted in Figures 5 and 6 below. The
tamper‐evident seals are applied by Motorola Solutions during the manufacturing process. The tamper
seals shall be inspected every six months. Tamper seals should be inspected along the entire seal’s
perimeter, its surface and the area immediately surrounding the seal for scratches, scrapes, gouges, cuts
and any other signs of tampering. The unit should be removed from service when any such markings are
found.
 Note: The “VOID if Seal is Broken” seal seen in Figure 3 is not a FIPS tamper evident seal.
Figure 5 ‐ Location of Two (2) Tamper‐Evident
Seals on Top Side
Figure 6 ‐ Location of One (1) Tamper‐Evident
Seal on Underside
 An example of tampered seal is depicted in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7 ‐ Tampered Seal
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6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within
the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module does not implement mitigation for any other attacks.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The following security rules are enforced by the Module:
1. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. The Module does not perform any cryptographic functions until an operator (human or proxy)
authenticates to the module, with the exception of cryptographic functions used in the
authentication process.
3. Operators can perform the power up self‐tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. The module ensures that the seed and seed key inputs to the Approved RNG are not equal.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not support manual key entry.
11. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
12. The module does not output intermediate key values.
Guidance for first time usage or post factory default reset usage of the Module is provided in the
Module’s Secure Installation Guide, and summarized below:
1. On first use after delivery from the factory, or after zeroization, an authorized administrator shall
access the Module with the default password and create a new password.
2. The Firmware version listed in Table 1 shall be loaded onto the module.
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc. 2014 Version R1.2 Page 22 of 22
Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
9 References
The following documents are referenced in this Security Policy.
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS140‐2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[RFC3268] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt
[RFC2571] SNMPv3
[RFC2574] User‐based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)
Table 18 – References
10 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
ADSP Air Defense Services Platform
Captive portal
A web page hosted by the module to authenticate wireless users. An attempt to
access the device for network access redirects the user to the login web page.
CLI Command Line Interface
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL EAP over LAN
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
IDS Intrusion Detection System
MIB Management Information Base
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
POE Power Over Ethernet
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTLS Tunneled TLS
Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions