F5, Inc.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
Prepared for:
F5, Inc.
801 Fifth Ave
Seattle, WA 98104
www.f5.com
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Table of Contents
1 General.......................................................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................................................7
1.3 Additional Information......................................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................................................8
2.1 Description .........................................................................................................................................................8
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.................................................................11
2.3 Excluded Components .....................................................................................................................................13
2.4 Modes of Operation..........................................................................................................................................13
2.5 Algorithms........................................................................................................................................................13
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................................................17
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ......................................................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................................................20
2.9 Key Generation.................................................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment..........................................................................................................................................21
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................................................21
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...........................................................................................................................22
3.1 Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................................................................................22
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................................................23
4.1 Authentication Methods..................................................................................................................................23
4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................................24
4.3 Approved Services............................................................................................................................................26
4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................66
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded...............................................................................................................67
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................................................68
5.1 Integrity Techniques........................................................................................................................................68
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................................................68
6 Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................................69
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .......................................................................................69
7 Physical Security .....................................................................................................................................................70
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required .................................................................................................................70
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals ................................................................................................................................70
7.3 Filler Panels ......................................................................................................................................................74
8 Non-Invasive Security.............................................................................................................................................75
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................................................76
9.1 Storage Areas ....................................................................................................................................................76
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods .............................................................................................................................76
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.................................................................................................................................76
9.4 SSPs ...................................................................................................................................................................77
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9.5 Transitions ........................................................................................................................................................83
10 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................................84
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................84
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................84
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ......................................................................................................................86
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................................................87
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests....................................................................................................................87
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................................................89
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures......................................................................................89
11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................................................90
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................................................90
11.4 Design and Rules ............................................................................................................................................90
11.5 End of Life ......................................................................................................................................................90
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................................................................................91
Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations .............................................................................................................92
Appendix B. References.........................................................................................................................................93
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) .............................12
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ............................................................13
Table 4: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................................................13
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................................................15
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms......................................................................................................................15
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms...................................................................................................16
Table 8: Security Function Implementations............................................................................................................19
Table 9: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................................................20
Table 10: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................................................20
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................22
Table 12: Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................................24
Table 13: Roles............................................................................................................................................................26
Table 14: Approved Services......................................................................................................................................65
Table 15: Non-Approved Services .............................................................................................................................66
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................................................70
Table 17: Storage Areas ..............................................................................................................................................76
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods .......................................................................................................................76
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods...........................................................................................................................77
Table 20: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................................80
Table 21: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................................82
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................84
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................86
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information......................................................................................................86
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information .............................................................................................................87
Table 26: Error States .................................................................................................................................................87
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram...............................................................................................................................................8
Figure 2 – r4800............................................................................................................................................................9
Figure 3 – r5900............................................................................................................................................................9
Figure 4 – r5920-DF .....................................................................................................................................................9
Figure 5 – r10900, r10920-DF and r12900 ................................................................................................................10
Figure 6 – VELOS CX410-BX110...............................................................................................................................10
Figure 7 – VELOS CX1610-BX520 tested blade (in blade slot #1-2)........................................................................11
Figure 8 – VELOS CX410-BX520 tested blade (in blade slot #1-2)..........................................................................11
Figure 9 - Tamper labels on r4800.............................................................................................................................71
Figure 10 – Tamper labels on r5900...........................................................................................................................71
Figure 11 – Tamper labels on r5920-DF....................................................................................................................72
Figure 12 – Tamper labels on r10900, r10920-DF and r12900.................................................................................72
Figure 13 – Tamper labels on VELOS CX410-BX110 blade mounted on chassis....................................................73
Figure 14 – Tamper labels on VELOS CX410-BX520 blade mounted on chassis....................................................73
Figure 15 – Tamper labels VELOS CX1610-BX520 blade mounted on chassis .......................................................74
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Copyrights and Trademarks
F5®
, BIG-IP®, TMOS® are Registered trademarks of F5, Inc.
Intel®
Xeon®
and Intel®
Atom®
processors are Registered trademarks of Intel Corporation.
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy that contains the security rules under which
the BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements
as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an Overall
Security Level 2 module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for
consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security
Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing. The vendor reviewed the
intermediate and final Security Policy and approved all of its content.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
The BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a smart evolution of F5’s
market leading Application Delivery Controller (ADC) technology. Solutions built on this platform are load
balancers. They are full proxies that give visibility into, and the power to control—inspect and encrypt or
decrypt—all the traffic that passes through your network.
Purpose and Use:
The BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module is specifically designed for F5 hardware and the underlying platform
layer. Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS) is the foundation and architecture for F5’s ADCs running
on the BIG-IP platform. BIG-IP hardware and the firmware components form a highly optimized system
providing control over the acceleration, security, and management through purpose-built hardware and
software systems. F5OS platform layer is tightly integrated with F5’s TMOS firmware. In the following
documentation TMOS and BIG-IP are interchangeably used where system and feature modules are concerned.
The Control (or Management) Plane refers to the connection from an administrator to the BIG-IP for system
management. The Data Plane refers to the traffic passed between external entities and internal servers.
Module Type: Firmware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined by the red dotted line in Figure
1. The block diagram below shows the module, its interfaces with the operational environment and the
delimitation of its cryptographic boundary. Figure 1 also depicts the flow of status output (SO), control input
(CI), data input (DI) and data output (DO). Description of the ports and interfaces can be found in Table- Ports
and Interfaces.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
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The TOEPP defined by the tested platforms listed in Table 2 is delineated by the black rectangle in Figure -
Block Diagram. The TOEPP is represented by the enclosure of each of the tested platforms pictured below.
The entropy source located within the module’s physical perimeter is outside of the module’s cryptographic
boundary (see Figure 1).
Figure 2 – r4800
Figure 3 – r5900
Figure 4 – r5920-DF
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Figure 5 – r10900, r10920-DF and r12900
(same chassis for the test three platforms)
Figure 6 – VELOS CX410-BX110
with 7 filler panels and one blade. The tested blade VELOS CX410-BX110 in slot #1 delineated with red rectangle.
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Figure 7 – VELOS CX1610-BX520 tested blade (in blade slot #1-2)
-delineated with a red rectangle- mounted on the chassis equipped with 30 blanks/ filler panels.
Figure 8 – VELOS CX410-BX520 tested blade (in blade slot #1-2)
-delineated with a red rectangle- mounted on the chassis equipped with 6 blanks/ filler panels.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
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Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
BIGIP-17.5-0.0.15.ALL-
F5OS.qcow2.zip.bundle
17.5.0 EHF N/A HMAC-SHA-2-384
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
The executable code is defined by the firmware version indicated in the table -Tested Module Identification – Software,
Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets). All code belonging to this firmware version is the executable code of the module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating System Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.5.3)
r4800 Intel® Atom® P5342
Snow Ridge NS
No F5OS-A
1.5.3
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r4800 Intel® Atom® P5342
Snow Ridge NS
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.5.3)
r5900 Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.5.3
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r5900 Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.5.3)
r5920-DF Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.5.3
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r5920-DF Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.5.3)
r10900 Intel® Xeon® Gold 6312U
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.5.3
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r10900 Intel® Xeon® Gold 6312U
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.5.3)
r10920-DF Intel® Xeon® Gold 6312U
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.5.3
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r10920-DF Intel® Xeon® Gold 6312U
Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-A 1.8.0)
r12900 Intel® Xeon® Platinum
8351N Ice Lake-SP
No F5OS-A
1.8.0
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-C 1.8.1)
VELOS CX410-
BX110
Intel® Xeon® D-2177NT
Skylake-D
No F5OS-C
1.8.1
17.5.0
EHF
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Operating System Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-C 1.8.1)
VELOS CX410-
BX520
Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330N
Ice Lake
No F5OS-C
1.8.1
17.5.0
EHF
BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
(Host OS F5OS-C 1.8.1)
VELOS CX1610-
BX520
Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330N
Ice Lake
No F5OS-C
1.8.1
17.5.0
EHF
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
None
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved mode Automatically entered whenever an approved
service is requested
Approved Service Indicator :
Approved
Non-Approved
mode
Only non-approved security functions can be used Non-
Approved
Service Indicator : Not
Approved
Table 4: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module enters the Approved Mode after the pre-operational self-tests and conditional algorithms self-tests
(CASTs) have completed successfully.
The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services
requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the
service that was requested.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7017 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7018 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A7017 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CCM A7018 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CTR A7017 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7017 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A7018 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A7017 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
Counter DRBG A7018 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7017,
A7018
Curve - P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7017,
A7018
Curve - P-256, P-384 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7017,
A7018
Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7017,
A7018
Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A7017 Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128, 1024 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7017,
A7018
Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128, 1024 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7017,
A7018
Key Length - Key Length: 8, 16, 64, 128, 1024 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7017,
A7018
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7017,
A7018
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SSH (CVL) A7017 Cipher - AES-128, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7017 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7017 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7018 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7017 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7018 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A7017,
A7018
Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A7017,
A7018
Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA2-256 A7017,
A7018
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7017,
A7018
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
(CVL)
A7017,
A7018
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG)
Key
Type:asymmetric
N/A Random bit strings required for generating the
cryptographic keys is compliant with section 4
example 1 of SP800-133r2
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-512 Message authentication TLS (not CAVP tested)
Triple-DES, Camellia, SEED Symmetric encryption and decryption TLS
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512, AES-GCM Message authentication in IPsec/ IKEv2
protocol
PKCS #1 v1.5 scheme with modulus other than 2048, 3072 or
4096 bits, for all SHA sizes; PKCS #1 v1.5 and PSS schema
with modulus size 2048, 3072, 4096 bits with SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-512; with ANS X9.31 standard;
RSA signature generation and verification (not
CAVP tested)
ECDSA with curves P-256/ P-384 with SHA-1/SHA2-224,
ECDSA using curves other than P-256 and P-384 with all
SHA sizes
ECDSA signature generation and verification
(not CAVP tested)
RSA with modulus sizes up to 16384 bits RSA encrypt / decrypt (not CAVP tested)
DSA with all key and SHA sizes DSA domain parameter generation, domain
parameter verification, key pair generation,
signature generation and verification (not
compliant with FIPS 186-5)
Diffie-Hellman using MODP1024, MODP2048 groups Shared secret computation in IPsec/IKE
protocol
MD5/ SHA-1/ SHA2-224 / SHA2-512 Key Derivation function in the context of TLS
KDF (not CAVP tested)
EdDSA with Ed25519 EdDSA digital signature (not CAVP tested)
SHA-1, AES-ECB, RSA- signature verification SNMP
TLS ciphersuites implemented by f5-rest-node TLS used in SSL Orchestrator (SSLO)
RSA keypair with 2048, 3072 and 4096 (REST API) iControl representation state transfer (REST)
access
EC Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Unified with curves other than
P-256, P-384. EC Diffie-Hellman using onePassDH /
StaticUnified schemes. Diffie-Hellman using groups other
than ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
Shared secret computation (not compliant with
SP800-56Ar3)
Triple-DES, AES-GCM-128, AES-192, AES-256 Symmetric encryption and decryption in IPsec
/IKEv2
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key
Wrapping/Unwrapping
with encryption
followed by
authentication and
authenticated
encryption in TLS
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping, Key
Unwrapping in the
context of TLS
Standard:SP 800-38F,
FIPS 197
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
AES-CBC: (A7017,
A7018)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7017, A7018)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7017, A7018)
AES-CCM: (A7017,
A7018)
AES-GCM: (A7017,
A7018)
Key
Wrapping/Unwrapping
with encryption and
authentication in SSH
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Wrapping, Key
Unwrapping in the
context of SSH
Standard:SP 800-38F,
FIPS 197
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
AES-CTR: (A7017)
AES-CBC: (A7017)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A7017)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7017)
Random Number
Generation in Control
Plane
DRBG Generate random
bytes
Compliance:Compliant
with SP800-90ARev1
Properties:with /
without derivation
function, prediction
resistance disabled /
enabled
Counter DRBG:
(A7017)
Signature generation DigSig-SigGen Generate a digital
signature
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
Signature verification DigSig-SigVer Verify a digital
signature
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
Key pair generation AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Generate an
ECDSA, ECDH, DH
or RSA key pair
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A7018,
A7017)
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key Type:
asymmetric
Key pair verification AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Verify an ECDSA or
ECDH or DH key
pair
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7017, A7018)
Safe Primes Key
Verification:
(A7017, A7018)
Message Digest SHA Compute a message
digest
SHA2-256: (A7017,
A7018)
SHA2-384: (A7017,
A7018)
TLS Handshake (ECC) KAS-Full Key agreement IG:D.F Scenario 2
(path 2), split
Key confirmation:no
Key derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-135rev1
CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 192
bits of security
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7017, A7018)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A7017,
A7018)
SSH Handshake KAS-Full Key agreement IG:D.F Scenario 2
(path 2), split
Key confirmation:no
Key derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-135rev1
CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 192
bits of key strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7017)
KDF SSH: (A7017)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Random Number
Generation in Data
Plane
DRBG Generate random
bytes
Compliance:Compliant
with SP800-90ARev1
Properties:AES 256 in
CTR mode, with
derivation function,
prediction resistance
disabled
Counter DRBG:
(A7018)
TLS Handshake (FFC) KAS-Full Key agreement IG:D.F Scenario 2
(path 2), split
Key confirmation:no
Key derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-135rev1
CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology provides
between 112 to 150-
bits of security
strength
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7017, A7018)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A7017,
A7018)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-GCM: The IV for AES-GCM is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1a (TLS 1.2).
For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1a of IG C.H.
The module is compliant with SP800-52r2 section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with
RFC5288.
The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is compliant to IG C.H option i) where module implements TLS
protocol. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV)
does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In the event the module’s
power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES-GCM
key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established.
RSA module sizes (IG C.F): In compliance with FIPS 186-5, the RSA Signature Generation uses module sizes
greater than or equal to 2048 bits. All the modulus sizes supported by the module have been ACVP tested.
SP800-56Ar3 Assurances: To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the keys for
KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC must be generated using the approved key generation services specified in
section 2.9. The module performs full public key validation on the generated public keys. Additionally, the
module performs full public key validation on the received public keys.
HMAC (IG C.L): In order to comply with IG C.L, the user shall make sure that HMAC keys are generated as
specified in SP800-133r2.
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2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E74 F5, Inc.
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
The entropy source used by the module specified in Table Entropy Sources uses jitter variations caused by
executing instructions and memory accessed. The operator does not have the ability to modify the F5 entropy
source (ES) configuration settings (see details in Public Use Document referenced in section 11.2.
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
CPU Jitter Entropy
Source for F5
cryptographic
module (SHA_3)
version 3.4.0
Non-
Physical
* BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant with F5OS-A 1.5.3
on Intel Ice Lake 4314 * BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF
Tenant with F5OS-A 1.5.3 on Intel Ice Lake
6312U * BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant with F5OS-
A 1.5.3 on Intel Snow Ridge P5342 * BIG-IP
17.5.0 EHF Tenant with F5OS-A 1.8.0 on Intel
Ice Lake 4314 * BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant with
F5OS-A 1.8.0 on Intel Ice Lake 6312U * BIG-IP
17.5.0 EHF Tenant with F5OS-A 1.8.0 on Intel
Ice Lake 8351N * BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant
with F5OS-A 1.8.0 on Intel Snow Ridge P5342
* BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF Tenant with F5OS-C 1.8.1
on Intel Ice Lake 6330N * BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF
Tenant with F5OS-C 1.8.1 on Intel Skylake-D
D-2177NT
256
bits
Full
Entropy
SHA3-256
(CAVP cert.
#A2621)
Table 10: Entropy Sources
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Ar1] for the
generation of random values used in asymmetric keys, and for providing a RNG service to calling applications.
The approved DRBG provided by the module is the CTR_DRBG with AES-256.
The output of entropy source provides full entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90Ar1 DRBG during initialization
(seed) and reseeding (reseed).
In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.L, the 'Entropy input string', 'seed', 'DRBG internal state (V and key
values)' are considered CSPs by the module.
No non-DRBG functions or instances are able to access the DRBG internal state.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements asymmetric key generation methods according to SP 800-133r2 section 5. The key
generation methods are specified in the Security Function Implementations table.
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2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements SSP agreement, compliant with IG D.F scenario 2 (path 2). Additionally, the module
implements SSP transport, compliant with IG D.G. The Key Establishment methods are specified in the
Security Function Implementations table.
2.11 Industry Protocols
GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is compliant with version 1.2 of the TLS protocol (RFC
5288) and shall only be used in conjunction with the TLS protocol.
Additionally, the module implements the TLS 1.2 and SSH key derivation functions for use in the TLS protocol
and SSH protocol (RFC 4253 updated by RFC 6668).
No parts of the TLS 1.2 and SSHv2 protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input TLS/SSH protocol input messages; Configuration commands for interface management
N/A Data Output TLS/SSH protocol output messages; Status log
N/A Control Input API which control system state (e.g. reset system, power-off system)
N/A Status Output API which provides system status information
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The logical interfaces are the commands through which the users of the module request services. There are no
external input or output devices to the module can be used for data input, data output, status output or control
input.
The physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.
The module does not implement Control Output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Role-based
authentication
with Password
(CLI or WebUI)
The password must consist of a minimum of
8 characters with at least one from each of
the three-character classes. Character classes
are defined as: digits (0-9), ASCII lowercase
letters (a-z), ASCII uppercase letters (A-Z).
Assuming a worst-case scenario where the
password contains six numerical digits, one
ASCII lowercase letter and one ASCII
uppercase letter. The probability of guessing
every character successfully is (1/10)^6 *
(1/26)^1 * (1/26)^1 = 1/676,000,000. Note: this
is less than 1/1,000,000. The maximum
number of login attempts is limited to 3 after
which the account is locked. This means that,
in the worst case, an attacker has the
probability of guessing the password in one
minute as 3/676,000,000. Note: This is less
than 1/100,000.
Password-based
authentication
1/676,000,000 3/676,000,000
Role-based
authentication
with SSH ECDSA
key-pair (CLI
only)
The ECDSA using P-256 or P-384 curves for
key based authentication yields a minimum
security-strength of 128 bits. The chance of a
random authentication attempt falsely
succeeding is at most 1/(2^128) that is less
than 1/1,000,000. The maximum number of
login attempts is limited to 1 after which the
account switches to password authentication.
Then the attacker's probability to establish
the connection depends on the probability of
guessing the password and it is, as above,
3/676,000,000 less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA SigVer 1/(2^128) 3/676,000,000
Role-based
authentication
with SSH RSA
key-pair (CLI
only)
The RSA using 2048, 3092 or 4096 moduli for
key based authentication yields a minimum
security-strength of 112 bits. The chance of a
random authentication attempt falsely
succeeding is at most 1/(2^112) that is less
than 1/1,000,000. The maximum number of
login attempts is limited to 1 after which the
account switches to password authentication.
Then the attacker's probability to establish
the connection depends on the probability of
RSA SigVer 1/(2^112) 3/676,000,000
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Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per
Minute
guessing the password and it is, as above,
3/676,000,000 less than 1/100,000.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
The module supports different roles (one CO role and one User role) which create different authenticated
sessions, while achieving the separation between the concurrent operators. Two interfaces can be used to access
the module:
• Command Line Interface (CLI): The module offers a CLI called traffic management shell (tmsh)
which is accessed remotely using the SSHv2 secured session over the Ethernet connection.
• Web Interface (WebUI): The Web interface consists of HTTPS over TLS-enabled web browser
which provides a graphical interface for system management tools.
The User role can access the module through CLI or WebUI. However, the CO can restrict User role access to
have the User accessing through WebUI only.
The module does not maintain authenticated sessions upon power cycling. Power-cycling the system requires
the authentication credentials to be re-entered. When entering password authentication data through the Web
interface, any character entered will be obfuscated (i.e. replace the character entered with a dot on the entry
box). When entering password authentication data through the CLI, the module does not display any character
entered by the operator in stdin (e.g. keyboard).
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Administrator Role Crypto Officer (CO) Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Auditor Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Certificate Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Firewall Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
User Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
iRule Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Operator Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Resource Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Guest Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Log Manager Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Application Editor Role User Role-based authentication with
Password (CLI or WebUI)
Role-based authentication with
SSH ECDSA key-pair (CLI only)
Role-based authentication with
SSH RSA key-pair (CLI only)
Table 13: Roles
At initialization of the module, the CO is the only available role. Only the CO can create the user roles.
4.3 Approved Services
The service indicator gets recorded in the high speed logging /var/log remote.log file after the service is
executed. For approved services, the indicator is identified with the log message 'Service Indicator: Approved'
and for non-approved services the log message includes 'Service Indicator: Not Approved'.
For SSH service the service indicator is implicit: when the SSH connection is established the service with the
cipher selected is approved.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
List users Display all User
accounts
None None List of all user
accounts
including self
None Administrato
r
User
Manager
Resource
Manager
Auditor
Create
additional
User
Create additional
User
None Username /
password
Confirmation
of account
creation
None Administrato
r
- Password:
W
User
Manager
- Password:
W
Modify
existing
Users
Modify existing
Users
None Username Confirmation
of account
modification
None Administrato
r
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
User
Manager
Delete User Delete User None Username Confirmation
of deletion
None Administrato
r
User
Manager
Unlock User Remove lock
from user who
has exceeded
login attempts
None Username Confirmation
of unlock
None Administrato
r
User
Manager
Update own
password
Update own
password
None Own password Confirmation
of update of
password
None Administrato
r
- Password:
W
Auditor
- Password:
W
Application
Editor
- Password:
W
Guest
- Password:
W
Log Manager
- Password:
W
Manager
- Password:
W
Certificate
Manager
- Password:
W
Firewall
Manager
- Password:
W
iRule
Manager
- Password:
W
Operator
- Password:
W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Resource
Manager
- Password:
W
User
Manager
- Password:
W
Update
others
password
Update others
password
None Username /
password
Confirmation
of update
None Administrato
r
- Password:
W
User
Manager
- Password:
W
Configure
Password
Policy
Set password
policy features
None New password
policy
Confirmation
of
configuration
change
None Administrato
r
Create TLS
Certificate
Self-signed
certificate
creation
Service
Indicator:
Approved
Certificate
identification
information
Confirmation
of certificate
creation
Signature generation Administrato
r
- TLS RSA
private key:
E
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
E
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
E
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
E
Resource
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
E
- TLS
ECDSA
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
private key:
E
Create TLS
Key
Used for the SSL
Certificate key
file
Service
Indicator:
Approved
Key
identification
information
Confirmation
of key
creation
Key pair generation
Random Number
Generation in
Control Plane
Random Number
Generation in Data
Plane
Administrato
r
- TLS RSA
private key:
G
- TLS RSA
public key: G
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
G
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: G
- DRBG seed
: E
- DRBG
internal state
(V and key
values) : E,W
- Entropy
input string:
E
Resource
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
G
- TLS RSA
public key: G
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
G
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: G
- DRBG seed
: E
- DRBG
internal state
(V and key
values) : E,W
- Entropy
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
input string:
E
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
G
- TLS RSA
public key: G
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
G
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: G
- DRBG seed
: E
- DRBG
internal state
(V and key
values) : E,W
- Entropy
input string:
E
Delete TLS
Certificate
/Key
Self-signed
certificate / key
deletion
None Key
identification
information
Confirmation
of key /
certificate
deletion
None Administrato
r
- TLS RSA
private key:
Z
- TLS RSA
public key: Z
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: Z
Resource
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
Z
- TLS RSA
public key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: Z
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
private key:
Z
- TLS RSA
public key: Z
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: Z
List
Certificate
Display
expiration/creatio
n dates,
certificate key
size, generator of
installed
certificates
None List of
certificates to
display
Certificate
expiration
information
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Log Manager
Resource
Manager
List Private
Keys
List private key
information
(name, size, type)
None List of private
keys to display
TLS private
key
information
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Log Manager
Resource
Manager
Establish
SSH session
SSH session Key
authentication,
Key Exchange
SSH
connectio
n
successful
User / address /
password /
algorithms /
key sizes / key
derivation
Confirmation
of SSH session
authenticatio
n,
Confirmation
of SSH session
key exchange
Signature generation
Signature verification
SSH Handshake
Administrato
r
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Auditor
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Certificate
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Firewall
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
iRule
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Operator
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
session key :
E
Resource
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
User
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: E
- SSH RSA
public key: E
- Password:
W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
G,R,W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SSH shared
secret: G
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Maintain
SSH Session
SSH data
encryption,
decryption,
integrity
SSH
connectio
n
successful
SSH Derived
Session key
SSH session
information
Key
Wrapping/Unwrappi
ng with encryption
and authentication in
SSH
Administrato
r
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Auditor
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Certificate
Manager
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Firewall
Manager
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
iRule
Manager
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Operator
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Resource
Manager
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 37 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
User
Manager
- SSH
derived
session key :
E
Establish
TLS Session
TLS session
signature
generation and
verification, key
exchange
Service
Indicator:
Approved
Address /
algorithms/
keys
Confirmation
of digital
signature
verification of
TLS session,
Confirmation
of
establishment
of TLS session
Message Digest
Signature verification
TLS Handshake
(ECC)
TLS Handshake (FFC)
Administrato
r
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Auditor
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 38 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 39 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Firewall
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 40 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
iRule
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Operator
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 41 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Guest
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 42 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Log Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 43 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Application
Editor
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 44 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Resource
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 45 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
User
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
E
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : E,G
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 46 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS
derived
session key:
G
- TLS
primary
secret: G
Maintain
TLS Session
TLS data
encryption,
authentication
Service
Indicator:
Approved
TLS Derived
Session key
TLS session
information
Key
Wrapping/Unwrappi
ng with encryption
followed by
authentication and
authenticated
encryption in TLS
Administrato
r
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Auditor
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Certificate
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Firewall
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
iRule
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Operator
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Guest
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 47 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Log Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Application
Editor
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Resource
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
User
Manager
- TLS
derived
session key:
E
Delete ssh-
keyswap
Utility service
delete ssh keys
None SSH key to
delete
Confirmation
of SSH key
deletion
None Administrato
r
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: Z
- SSH
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- SSH RSA
public key: Z
- SSH RSA
private key:
Z
Resource
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 48 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
public key: Z
- SSH
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- SSH RSA
public key: Z
- SSH RSA
private key:
Z
Reboot
System
Restart the
cryptographic
module
Module
reboots
None Confirmation
of system
reboot
None Administrato
r
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
Zeroization Full system
zeroization
Module
end of life
Selection
option
Confirmation
of full system
zeroization
None Administrato
r
- SSH RSA
private key:
Z
- SSH
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: Z
- SSH RSA
public key: Z
- TLS RSA
private key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
private key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: Z
- TLS RSA
public key: Z
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 49 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- Password:
Z
Show
version
Return the HW
and FW versions
and the module's
name
N/A N/A Module name
and version
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
Show Status Return the
module status
N/A N/A Module status None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
Close TLS /
SSH session
Closing TLS / SSH
session
N/A N/A Confirmation
of TLS/SSH
session
closure
None Administrato
r
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 50 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
Auditor
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 51 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Certificate
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 52 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Firewall
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 53 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
iRule
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 54 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Operator
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 55 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Guest
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 56 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Log Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 57 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Application
Editor
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 58 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 59 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
Resource
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH shared
secret: Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 60 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Hellman
private key:
Z
User
Manager
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS pre-
primary
secret : Z
- TLS
primary
secret: Z
- TLS
derived
session key:
Z
- SSH
derived
session key :
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
- SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key: Z
- TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key:
Z
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 61 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Self-tests Execute integrity
test. Execute the
CASTs
Integrity
test,
CASTs
from
section 10
N/A Pass or fail Random Number
Generation in
Control Plane
Signature generation
Signature verification
Key pair verification
Random Number
Generation in Data
Plane
Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
Show
license
Return license
indication
N/A N/A FIPS license
information
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
Import TLS
Certificate
Import TLS
Certificate
None Certificate to
import
Confirmation
of import of
certificate
None Administrato
r
- TLS RSA
public key:
W
- TLS
ECDSA
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 62 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
public key:
W
Resource
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key:
W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
W
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key:
W
- TLS
ECDSA
public key:
W
Export
Certificate
File
Export Certificate
File
None Certificate to
export
Exported
Certificate file
None Administrato
r
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS RSA
public key: R
Resource
Manager
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
- TLS RSA
public key: R
Certificate
Manager
- TLS RSA
public key: R
- TLS
ECDSA
public key: R
Create ssh-
keyswap
Utility service
create ssh keys
Service
Indicator:
Approved
SSH key to
create
Confirmation
of SSH key
creation
Key pair generation Administrato
r
- SSH
ECDSA
BIG-IP Tenant Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 F5, Inc.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 63 of 95
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
private key:
G
- SSH RSA
private key:
G
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: G
- SSH RSA
public key: G
Resource
Manager
- SSH
ECDSA
private key:
G
- SSH RSA
private key:
G
- SSH
ECDSA
public key: G
- SSH RSA
public key: G
Configure
Firewall
Set policy rules,
and address lists
for use by
firewall rules
None Policy rules,
address lists
Confirmation
of policy
configuration
None Administrato
r
Firewall
Manager
Resource
Manager
Configure
Firewall
Users
Set firewall user None Firewall user
and
configuration
information
Confirmation
of
configuration
None Administrato
r
Firewall
Manager
User
Manager
Show
firewall
state
Display the
current system-
wide state of
firewall rules
None N/A Display the
current
system wide
state of the
firewall rules.
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
Shows
statistics
Shows statistics of
firewall rules on
the BIG-IP
system
None N/A List of
statistics of
firewall rules
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Certificate
Manager
Firewall
Manager
iRule
Manager
Operator
Guest
Log Manager
Manager
Application
Editor
Resource
Manager
User
Manager
View
System
Audit Log
Display logs/files
of configuration
changes
None N/A Display of
system audit
logs
None Administrato
r
Auditor
Manager
Log Manager
iRule
Manager
Resource
Manager
Export
Analytics
Logs System
Export Analytics
Logs System
None N/A Display
System
Analytics
Logs
None Administrato
r
User
Manager
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Enable/
Disable
Audit
Enable/ Disable
Audit
None N/A Confirmation
of enabling or
disabling of
audit
None Administrato
r
Resource
Manager
Configure
Boot
Options
Enable Quiet
boot, Manage
boot locations
None Boot options Confirmation
of
configuration
of boot
options
None Administrato
r
Resource
Manager
Configure
SSH access
options
Enable / Disable
SSH access,
Configure IP
address allow list
None SSH access / IP
address list
Confirmation
of
configuration
of SSH access
options
None Administrato
r
Resource
Manager
Configure
SSH user
configuratio
n
Update ssh/
authorized_keys
file for user
authentication
None ssh/
authorized_ke
ys file
Confirmation
of
configuration
of SSH user
configuration
None Administrato
r
- SSH
ECDSA
public key:
W
- SSH RSA
public key:
W
Modify
nodes and
pool
members
Enable / Disable
nodes and pool
members
None Which nodes
and pool
members to
modify
Confirmation
of
modification
of nodes and
pool members
None Administrato
r
Manager
Resource
Manager
Configure
nodes
Create, delete
nodes
None List of nodes to
create / view /
delete
Confirmation
of creation /
deletion of
nodes
None Administrato
r
Manager
Resource
Manager
Configure
iRules
Create, delete,
iRules
None List of iRules
to create /
delete
Confirmation
of creation /
deletion of
iRules
None Administrato
r
iRule
Manager
Manager
Resource
Manager
Table 14: Approved Services
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For the above table, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the
service has for each SSP.
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Maintain TLS
session
Data encryption, Data
authentication
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-512
Triple-DES, Camellia, SEED
DSA with all key and SHA sizes
CO /
User
SSLO Configuration
and usage
Management of the
module protected by
iApplx authentication
TLS ciphersuites implemented by f5-rest-node CO /
User
iControl REST
access
Access to the system
through REST API
RSA keypair with 2048, 3072 and 4096 (REST API) CO /
User
IPsec /IKEv2 Protocol configuration HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512, AES-GCM
Diffie-Hellman using MODP1024, MODP2048 groups
Triple-DES, AES-GCM-128, AES-192, AES-256
CO /
User
Simple network
management
protocol (SNMP)
Protocol configuration SHA-1, AES-ECB, RSA- signature verification CO /
User
Establish TLS
session
Signature generation
and verification, Key
Exchange
PKCS #1 v1.5 scheme with modulus other than 2048,
3072 or 4096 bits, for all SHA sizes; PKCS #1 v1.5 and
PSS schema with modulus size 2048, 3072, 4096 bits with
SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-512; with ANS X9.31 standard;
ECDSA with curves P-256/ P-384 with SHA-1/SHA2-
224, ECDSA using curves other than P-256 and P-384
with all SHA sizes
RSA with modulus sizes up to 16384 bits
EdDSA with Ed25519
MD5/ SHA-1/ SHA2-224 / SHA2-512
EC Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Unified with curves other
than P-256, P-384. EC Diffie-Hellman using onePassDH
/ StaticUnified schemes. Diffie-Hellman using groups
other than ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
CO /
User
Table 15: Non-Approved Services
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4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support the loading of external software/firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The integrity of the module is using the approved integrity technique HMAC-SHA-384. The HMAC key used
for integrity check is 384 bits in length and is stored within the module.
Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The on demand integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests by rebooting the module.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment provided by F5 with a firmware version
17.5.0 EHF. The module is a firmware validated at a Security Level 2 in Physical Security. Once the module is
operational, it does not allow the loading of any additional firmware.
There are no further requirements for this security area.
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied: Once the module is operational, it does not allow the loading of any additional
firmware.
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Production grade
enclosure (SL1)
N/A N/A
Opaque
enclosure (SL2)
N/A N/A
Tamper Evident
Labels (SL2)
Once per
month
The Administrator checks the quality of the tamper evident labels for any sign
of removal, replacement, tearing, etc. If any label is found to be damaged or
missing, a kit providing 25 tamper labels is available for purchase (P/N: F5-
ADD-BIG-FIPS140).
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
Number:
Hardware Appliance # of Tamper Labels
r4800 5
r5900 4
r5920-DF 5
r10900
r10920-DF
r12900
5
VELOS CX410-BX110 1
VELOS CX410-BX520 1
VELOS CX1610-BX520 1
Placement: The pictures below show the location of all tamper evident labels for each hardware appliance.
The tamper labels are delineated with red circles in the pictures below.
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Figure 9 - Tamper labels on r4800
(5 of 5 tamper labels)
Figure 10 – Tamper labels on r5900
(4 / 4 tamper labels)
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Figure 11 – Tamper labels on r5920-DF.
(5 of 5 tamper labels). Labels are located on the lateral sides of the platform -labels 1,2,3 and 4. The tamper label 5 on the
chassis / enclosure lid is covering the ventilation fan tray that allows access to SSD.
Figure 12 – Tamper labels on r10900, r10920-DF and r12900.
(4 +1 of 5 tamper labels shown). Labels are located on the lateral sides of the platform -labels 1,2,3 and 4. The tamper label 5
on the chassis / enclosure lid is covering the ventilation fan tray that allows access to SSD.
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Figure 13 – Tamper labels on VELOS CX410-BX110 blade mounted on chassis.
The tamper label affixed between blade and chassis is positioned to provide evidence if the tested blade in slot #1 is removed
from the chassis.
Figure 14 – Tamper labels on VELOS CX410-BX520 blade mounted on chassis
(1 of 1 tamper label shown).
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Figure 15 – Tamper labels VELOS CX1610-BX520 blade mounted on chassis
(1 of 1 tamper label shown).
Surface Preparation: Before the module is installed in the production environment, tamper-evident labels must
be installed in the location identified for each test platforms below. The tamper evident labels shall be installed
for the module to operate in approved mode of operation. The following steps should be taken when installing
or replacing the tamper evident labels on the module. The instructions are also included in F5 Platforms: FIPS
Kit Installation provided with each hardware platform.
• Use the provided alcohol wipes to clean the chassis cover and components of dirt, grease, or oil before
you apply the tamper evidence seals.
• After applying the seal, run your finger over the seal multiple times using extra high pressure.
• The seals completely cure within 24 hours.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: The Crypto Officer shall be responsible for the storage of the
label kits.
Part Numbers: P/N: F5-ADD-BIG-FIPS140
7.3 Filler Panels
Hardware Appliance # of Filler Panels
r4800 1 (blank in PSU slot)
r5900 1 (blank in PSU slot)
r5920-DF 1 (blank in PSU slot)
r10900
r10920-DF
r12900
0
VELOS CX410-BX110 7 blanks in blade slot #2-8
VELOS CX1610-BX520 30 blanks in blade slot #2-32
VELOS CX410-BX520 6 blanks in blade slot #3-8
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8 Non-Invasive Security
Per IG 12.A: Until requirements of SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms fall under ISO / IEC
19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM The keys and the password hash are stored in plaintext form and are only accessible to the
authenticated operator, to which the SSPs are associated
Dynamic
SSD The keys stored in plaintext will remain on the system across power cycle and are only
accessible to the authenticated operator to which the SSPs are associated
Static
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
Public key
output during
protocol
handshake
Module User Plaintext Automated Electronic Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with
encryption and authentication in SSH
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
User Module Plaintext Automated Electronic Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with
encryption followed by authentication
and authenticated encryption in TLS
Input over
encrypted
TLS/SSH session
User Module Encrypted Automated Electronic Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with
encryption and authentication in SSH
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module only allows entry/output of public keys in plaintext from outside of the module's TOEPP as part of
protocol handshake process.
Once TLS/SSH session is established any key or data transfer performed thereafter is protected by authenticated
encryption provided by the respective protocol
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization Single pass zeroization
erasing the entire
module
All SSPs present in the module
are erased including the one in
the non-volatile memory
The Crypto Officer is calling
the Zeroization service
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Reboot System Clear the SSPs present
in RAM memory
Volatile memory used by the
module is overwritten within
nanoseconds when power is
removed.
The Crypto Officer is calling
Reboot System service
Delete SSH
keyswap
Destruction of the
selected SSH
authentication keys
Zeroization service overwrites the
memory occupied by keys with
"zeros" or pre-defined values.
The Administrator or Resource
Manager are calling the Delete
SSH keyswap service
Closing TLS
Connection / SSH
Session
Zeroization of
temporary values
SSP temporary values generated
during key generation services are
zeroized by the module
Closing TLS Connection / SSH
Session
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
TLS RSA
private key
RSA private key
used for RSA
signature generation
in TLS protocol
Modulus N: 2048
and 4096-bit keys -
112 and 150-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
generation
TLS RSA
public key
RSA public key used
for RSA signature
verification in TLS
protocol
Modulus N: 2048
and 4096-bit keys -
112 and 150-bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
verification
TLS
ECDSA
private key
ECDSA private key
used for EC
signature generation,
shared secret
computation in TLS
protocol
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
generation
TLS
ECDSA
public key
ECDSA public key
used for EC
signature
verification, shared
secret computation
in TLS protocol
Curve size:P-256, P-
384 - 128 and 192-
bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
verification
Key pair
verification
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman private key
used for EC
signature generation,
shared secret
P-256, P-384 - 128
and 192-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
computation in TLS
protocol
TLS EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
EC Diffie-Hellman
public key used for
signature
verification, shared
secret computation
in TLS protocol
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Key pair
verification
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS Diffie-
Hellman
public key
TLS Diffie-Hellman
private key used for
shared secret
computation in TLS
protocol
Curve size:
ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096 - 112 to
150-bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key
TLS Diffie-Hellman
public key used for
shared secret
computation in TLS
protocol
Curve size:
ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096 - 112 to
150-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS pre-
primary
secret
TLS pre-primary
secret used for
deriving the TLS
primary secret
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS
primary
secret
TLS primary secret
used for deriving the
TLS derived key
256-bits - 256-bits Pre-primary
secret - CSP
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS
derived
session key
TLS derived session
key from TLS
primary secret
Key length: 128 and
256-bits (AES) 112
and 256-bits
(HMAC) - 128 and
256-bits (AES) 112
and 256-bits
(HMAC)
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
TLS
Handshake
(ECC)
TLS
Handshake
(FFC)
SSH shared
secret
SSH shared secret
used for deriving the
SSH key
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SSH
Handshake
SSH
Handshake
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
SSH
derived
session key
SSH derived session
key
Key Length: 128 and
256-bits (AES) 112
and 256-bits
(HMAC) - 128 and
256-bits (AES) 112
and 256-bits
(HMAC)
Shared secret
- CSP
SSH
Handshake
SSH
Handshake
Entropy
input
string
Entropy input string
used to seed the
DRBG
384 bits - 384 bits Random
number
generation -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
in Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation
in Data Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Data Plane
DRBG seed DRBG seed derived
from entropy input
as defined in SP 800-
90Ar1
384 bits - 256 bits Random
number
generation -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
in Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation
in Data Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Data Plane
DRBG
internal
state (V
and key
values)
Internal state of
CTR_DRBG
384 bits - 256 bits Random
number
generation -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
in Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation
in Data Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Control
Plane
Random
Number
Generation in
Data Plane
SSH RSA
private key
Used for key-based
authentication in
SSH protocol
Modulus N: 2048,
3072, 4096 - 112 and
150-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
generation
SSH RSA
public key
Used for key-based
authentication in
SSH protocol
Modulus N: 2048,
3072, 4096 - 112 to
150-bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
verification
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
SSH
ECDSA
private key
Used for key-based
authentication in
SSH protocol
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
generation
SSH
ECDSA
public key
Used for key-based
authentication in
SSH protocol
Curve size:P-256, P-
384 - 128 and 192-
bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Signature
verification
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
Used for key
exchange in SSH
protocol
Curve size: P-256,
P-384 - 128 and
192-bits
Asymmetric -
CSP
Key pair
generation
SSH
Handshake
SSH EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
Used for key
exchange in SSH
protocol
Curve size:P-256, P-
384 - 128 and 192-
bits
Asymmetric -
PSP
Key pair
generation
Key pair
verification
SSH
Handshake
Password Password input by
the User or CO
during creation of a
new user or updating
an existing password
8 characters -
1/676,000,000
Password -
CSP
Table 20: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
TLS RSA
private key
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization TLS RSA public
key:Paired With
TLS RSA public
key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
Public key output
during protocol
handshake
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization TLS RSA private
key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
private key
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization TLS ECDSA public
key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
public key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
Public key output
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization TLS ECDSA private
key:Paired With
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
during protocol
handshake
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key:Paired With
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
Public key output
during protocol
handshake
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key:Paired With
TLS Diffie-
Hellman public
key
Public key output
during protocol
handshake
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS Diffie-
Hellman
private key
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS pre-
primary secret
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS primary
secret:Used With
TLS primary
secret
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS pre-primary
secret :Derived From
TLS derived
session key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
TLS primary
secret:Derived From
SSH shared
secret
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
SSH derived session
key :Used With
SSH derived
session key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
Reboot System
Closing TLS
SSH shared
secret:Derived From
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
freeing the cipher
handle
Connection /
SSH Session
Entropy input
string
RAM:Plaintext Storage duration
during the usage
of the CSP
Reboot System DRBG seed :Used
With
DRBG seed RAM:Plaintext Storage duration
during the usage
of the CSP
Reboot System DRBG internal state
(V and key values)
:Used With
DRBG internal
state (V and
key values)
RAM:Plaintext Storage duration
during the usage
of the CSP
Reboot System DRBG seed :Used
With
SSH RSA
private key
SSD:Plaintext Persistent Zeroization
Delete SSH
keyswap
SSH RSA
public key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization
Delete SSH
keyswap
SSH ECDSA
private key
SSD:Plaintext Persistent Zeroization
Delete SSH
keyswap
SSH ECDSA
public key
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
SSD:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Zeroization
Delete SSH
keyswap
SSH EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
SSH EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
Public key output
during protocol
handshake
Public key input
during protocol
handshake
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Reboot System
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
Password Input over
encrypted
TLS/SSH session
RAM:Plaintext From handle
creation until
freeing the cipher
handle
Closing TLS
Connection /
SSH Session
Table 21: SSP Table 2
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9.5 Transitions
The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1,
2031.
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10 Self-Tests
At power-up the module performs the pre-operational self-tests (the integrity test) and the conditional
cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). Both the pre-operational tests and conditional tests are performed
without operator intervention, without any external controls, externally provided test vectors, output results
and the determination of pass of fail is done by the module. Services are not available during the pre-
operational self-test and CASTs and the data output interface is inhibited.
If the module fails any of the tests, the module transitions to the error state and a corresponding error
indication is given. The module becomes inoperable, and no services are available. Data output and
cryptographic operations are inhibited while the module is in the error State.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A7017)
HMAC key:
384-bits
Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module
becomes
operational
Integrity of the module is verified by
comparing the HMAC-SHA2-384 value
calculated at runtime with the HMAC-
SHA2-384 value stored in the module
that was computed at build time
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A7018)
HMAC key:
384-bits
Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module
becomes
operational
Integrity of the module is verified by
comparing the HMAC-SHA2-384 value
calculated at runtime with the HMAC-
SHA2-384 value stored in the module
that was computed at build time
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The pre-operational self-tests are performed automatically when the module is powered on.
Services are not available during the pre-operational self-test and the data output interface is inhibited. On
successful completion of the pre-operational self-tests, the module enters operational mode and cryptographic
services are available.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter
DRBG
AES-256 in CTR mode,
with and without
derivation function,
prediction resistance
disabled
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
SP800-90ARev1
section 11.3 instantiate,
generate and reseed
health tests
Test runs at
power on
AES-CBC
encrypt
128-bit key KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Encryption Test runs at
power on
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
decrypt
128-bit key KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Decryption Test runs at
power on
AES-GCM
encrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Encrypt operation Test runs at
power on
AES-GCM
decrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Decrypt operation Test runs at
power on
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
2048 bit key and SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature generation Test runs at
power on
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
2048 bit key and SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature verification Test runs at
power on
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
Requested modulus size,
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Asymmetric
algorithm is
performed
Calculation and
verification of a digital
signature
Key
generation
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
P-256 and SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature generation Test runs at
power on
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
P-256 and SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature generation Test runs at
power on
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
Requested curve size,
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Asymmetric
algorithm is
performed
Calculation and
verification of a digital
signature
Key
generation
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
P-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power on
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
fdhe2048 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power on
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A7017)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
MAC Test runs at
power on
HMAC-
SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
MAC Test runs at
power on
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-
SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA-384 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
MAC Test runs at
power on
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation used in
the TLS protocol
Test runs at
power on
KDF SSH SHA-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Key derivation used in
the SSH protocol
Test runs at
power on
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
Requested curve size PCT PCT Asymmetric
algorithm is
performed
Calculation and
verification of a digital
signature
Key
generation
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7017)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity Determined by the
operator
Module is powered-
off and on
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7018)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity Determined by the
operator
Module is powered-
off and on
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Counter DRBG KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC encrypt KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC decrypt KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM encrypt KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM decrypt KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA-1
(A7017)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT CAST On Demand Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF SSH KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Safe Primes Key
Generation
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Halt
Error
Module is no longer
operational. The data
output is inhibited.
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
failure or HMAC-SHA2-
384 integrity test failure
Failure of any of the
CASTs
The module
must be re-
loaded
For integrity, CAST and health test
failures the module will not load. For
PCT failures the module will halt and
enter the error state
Table 26: Error States
The module must be re-loaded with a fresh image to clear the error condition.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
On demand and periodic self-tests are performed by powering off the module and powering it on again. This
service performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during pre-operational self-tests and CASTs.
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During the execution of the periodic and on-demand self-tests, crypto services are not available and no data
output or input is possible.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Startup Procedures: The module is distributed as a part of a BIG-IP product which includes the hardware
platform and an installed copy of firmware with a platform layer F5OS and the BIG-IP 17.5.0 EHF. The
hardware platforms are shipped directly from the hardware manufacturer/authorized subcontractor via trusted
carrier and tracked by that carrier. The hardware is shipped in a sealed box that includes a packing slip with a
list of components inside, and with labels outside printed with the product nomenclature, sales order number,
and product serial number. Upon receipt of the hardware, the customer is required to perform the following
verifications:
• Ensure that the shipping label exactly identifies the correct customer name and address as well as the
hardware model.
• Inspect the packaging for tampering or other issues.
• Ensure that the external labels match the expected delivery and the shipped product.
• Ensure that the components in the box match those on the documentation shipped with the product.
• Verify the hardware model with the model number given on the shipping label and marked on the
hardware device itself.
Installation Process: Follow the instructions in the "BIG-IP System: Initial Configuration" guide for the initial
setup and configuration of the module.
• Run the Setup wizard "appliance-setup-wizard" using the CLI with the CO account and default
credentials. The system will prompt you to change the password.
• License the system from the WebUI. Installing the FIPS license for the host system is required for
module activation. Guidance on Licensing the BIG-IP system can be found in
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K7752 and summarized as followed: Before you can activate the
license for the BIG-IP system, you must obtain a base registration key. The base registration key is pre-
installed on new BIG-IP systems. When you power up the product and connect to the Configuration
utility, the Licensing page opens and displays the registration key. After a license activation method is
selected (activation method specifies how you want the system to communicate with the F5 License
Server), the F5 product generates a dossier which is an encrypted list of key characteristics used to
identify the platform. If the automated activation method is selected, the BIG-IP system automatically
connects to the F5 License Server and activates the license. If the manual method is selected, the
Crypto Officer shall go to the F5 Product Licensing page at secure.f5.com, paste the dossier in the
“Enter Your Dossier” box which produces a license. The Crypto Officer will then copy and paste it into
the “License” box in the Configuration Utility. The BIG-IP system then reloads the configuration and is
ready for additional system configuration.
• Once the device is installed, licensed and configured, the Crypto Officer should confirm that the
system is installed and licensed correctly as follows:
Version Confirmation: The Crypto Officer should call the show version service (with command
"tmsh show sys version" and "tmsh show sys hardware"), then confirm that the provided version
matches the validated version shown in Table - Tested Module Identification. Any firmware loaded
into the module other than version 17.5.0 EHF is out of the scope of this validation and will mean
that the module is not operating as a FIPS validated module.
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License Confirmation: The FIPS validated module activation requires installation of the license
referred as ‘FIPS license’. The Crypto Officer should call the show license service (with command
"tmsh show sys license"), then verify that the list of license flags includes "FIPS 140-3”.
Additional Guidance: The Crypto Officer should verify that the following specific configuration rules
are followed in order to operate the module in the FIPS validated configuration.
• All command shells other than tmsh are not allowed. For example, bash and other user-
serviceable shells are excluded.
• Management of the module via the appliance's LCD display is not allowed.
• Usage of f5-rest-node and iAppLX and provisioning of iRulesLX is not allowed.
• Only the provisioning of AFM and LTM is included.
• Remote access to the Lights Out / Always On Management capabilities of the system are not
allowed.
• Serial port console and USB port should be disabled after the initial power on and
communications setup of the hardware.
• Use of command run util fips-util -f init is not allowed. Running this command followed by a
System Reboot service or restart will mean that the module is not operating as a FIPS
validated module.
• The Single Diffie-Hellman should be turned ON for the platform GUI.
• The server ssl profile shall be configured with "cert none" and "key none" option that disables
client authentication.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto Officer should confirm that version, license are provided according to the documentation in section
11.1. The Crypto Officer should follow the additional guidance in section 11.1 to operate the module in the
approved validated configuration.
The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for non-physical entropy source is as follows:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-validations/certificate/74
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A
11.4 Design and Rules
The operator shall consider the requirements and restrictions in above section 2.7 when using the module.
11.5 End of Life
Secure sanitization of the module consists of using the Zeroization service that will perform erasing all the SSPs
bringing the module to the factory default state. The service can only be triggered by the administrator using
“tmsh load sys config default” command via CLI and must be followed by reboot of the module.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.
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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Derivation Function
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ESV Entropy Source Validation
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS Key Agreement Schema
KAT Known Answer Test
KW AES Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
NDF No Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PR Prediction Resistance
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple-DES
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing
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Appendix B. References
FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3
FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-
announcements
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
February 2023
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
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SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption
March 2016
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf
SP800-56Ar3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3
SP800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
August 2020
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2
SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 - Recommendation for Key
Management Part 1: General
January 2016
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
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SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1
SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for
Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B
SP800-131r2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation -
Part 1: Storage Applications
December 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf
SP800-133r2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-133r2
SP800-135r1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions
December 2011
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
SP800-140Br1 NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements
Novembre 2023
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-140Br1