Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Page 2 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table of Contents 1 General................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5 2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5 2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6 2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7 2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7 2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 7 2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................10 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................16 2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................16 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................17 2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................17 2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................18 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................18 3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................18 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................19 4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................19 4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................20 4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................20 4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................38 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................38 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status..............................................................................................39 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................39 5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................39 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................39 5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................39 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................40 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................40 7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................40 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................40 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals..............................................................................................40 7.3 Filler Panels.....................................................................................................................43 8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................45 Page 3 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................45 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................45 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................45 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................46 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................47 9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................61 10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................61 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................61 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................62 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................67 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................70 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................70 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................70 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................72 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................72 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................72 Page 4 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7 Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7 Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation......................... 9 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Octeon III Family Crypyto Engine ............................................. 9 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................10 Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................15 Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................16 Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................16 Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................18 Table 11: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................20 Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................20 Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................38 Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................40 Table 15: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................45 Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................46 Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................46 Table 18: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................54 Table 19: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................61 Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................62 Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................67 Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................67 Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................70 Table 24: Error States...............................................................................................................70 List of Figures Figure 1 FPR 2110 and FPR 2120............................................................................................. 6 Figure 2 FPR 2130 and FPR 2140............................................................................................. 6 Figure 3 Module front view with opacity shield .........................................................................40 Figure 4 FRP 2110/2120 back view .........................................................................................41 Figure 5 FRP 2130/2140 back view ..........................................................................................41 Figure 6 FRP 2110/2120 top view with opacity shield ..............................................................41 Figure 7 FRP 2130/2140 top view with opacity shield ...............................................................42 Figure 8 Module’s bottom view with opacity shield ...................................................................42 Figure 9 Module’s left view with opacity shield .........................................................................43 Figure 10 Module’s right view with opacity shield.....................................................................43 Figure 11 Opacity Shield Brackets ...........................................................................................45 Page 5 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 1 General 1.1 Overview This is Cisco Systems, Inc. non-proprietary security policy for the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series) (hereinafter referred to as ASA or Module), version 9.20. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 Hardware cryptographic module. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operational environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The following table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module. 1.2 Security Levels Section Title Security Level 1 General 2 2 Cryptographic module specification 2 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2 4 Roles, services, and authentication 3 5 Software/Firmware security 2 6 Operational environment N/A 7 Physical security 2 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 2 10 Self-tests 2 11 Life-cycle assurance 2 12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A Overall Level 2 Table 1: Security Levels 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module deployed under the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) with Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). The module’s operational environment is Limited. ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content Page 6 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 2110 and FPR 2120 have the same exterior features while FPR 2130 and FPR 2140 have the same exterior features. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed. Figure 1 FPR 2110 and FPR 2120 Figure 2 FPR 2130 and FPR 2140 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification Tested Module Identification – Hardware: Model and/or Part Number Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features FRP 2110 FPR-2110 9.20 Intel Xeon D-1526 (Broadwell), Octeon III Family Crypto Engine FRP 2120 FPR-2120 9.20 Intel Xeon D-1528 (Broadwell), Octeon III Family Crypto Engine Page 7 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Model and/or Part Number Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features FRP 2130 FPR-2130 9.20 Intel Xeon D-1548 (Broadwell), Octeon III Family Crypto Engine FRP 2140 FPR-2140 9.20 Intel Xeon D-1577 (Broadwell), Octeon III Family Crypto Engine Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. 2.3 Excluded Components N/A for this module. 2.4 Modes of Operation Modes List and Description: Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved Mode of Operation The module is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed. Approved Approved mode indicator: "FIPS is currently enabled." Table 3: Modes List and Description The module has one approved mode of operation and is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service indicator implemented by the module. 2.5 Algorithms Page 8 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Approved Algorithms: CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC A4446 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM A4446 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38D Counter DRBG A4446 Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes SP 800-90A Rev. 1 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4 HMAC-SHA-1 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-224 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-384 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-512 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A4446 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P- 256, P-384, P-521 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A4446 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KDF IKEv2 (CVL) A4446 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1 SP 800-135 Rev. 1 KDF SNMP (CVL) A4446 Password Length - Password Length: 256, 64 SP 800-135 Rev. 1 KDF SSH (CVL) A4446 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 SP 800-135 Rev. 1 RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4446 Key Generation Mode - B.3.4 Modulo - 2048, 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Private Key Format - Standard FIPS 186-4 Page 9 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4446 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-4 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4446 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-4 Safe Primes Key Generation A4446 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp- 4096 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 SHA-1 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-224 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) A4446 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SP 800-135 Rev. 1 Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Octeon III Family Crypyto Engine Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC AES 3301 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM AES 3301 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38D Hash DRBG DRBG 819 Prediction Resistance - No Mode - SHA2-512 SP 800-90A Rev. 1 HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC 2095 - FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC 2095 - FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- 384 HMAC 2095 - FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- 512 HMAC 2095 - FIPS 198-1 SHA-1 SHS 2737 Message Length - Message Length: 8- 51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 SHS 2737 Message Length - Message Length: 8- 51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 SHS 2737 Message Length - Message Length: 8- 102400 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 SHS 2737 Message Length - Message Length: 8- 102400 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Octeon III Family Crypyto Engine Page 10 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG Key Type:Asymmetric N/A SP 800-133r2 Section 4, Method 1 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. 2.6 Security Function Implementations Name Type Description Properties Algorithms KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS ECC keygen used in SSHv2 service Keysize:128 to 256 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) CKG: () KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS FFC keygen used in SSHv2 service Keysize:112 to 152 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: modp- 2048, modp- 3072, modp- 4096 CKG: () KAS-ECC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS ECC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service Keysize:128 to 256 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: Page 11 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Type Description Properties Algorithms (DRBG 819) CKG: () KAS-FFC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS FFC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service Keysize:112 to 152 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 CKG: () KAS-ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS ECC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service Keysize:128 to 256 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) CKG: () KAS-FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-KeyGen CKG KAS FFC keygen used in IKEv2 service Keysize:112 to 152 bits encryption strength Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: modp- 2048, modp- 3072, modp- 4096 CKG: () KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for SSHv2 service Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) KDF SSH: (A4446) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC SSHv2 service Security Strength:Provides between 112 to 152 bits of encryption strength KDF SSH: (A4446) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) Safe-Prime Groups:: modp- 2048, modp- 3072, modp- 4096 Page 12 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for TLSv1.2 service Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4446) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC for TLSv1.2 service Security Strength:Provides 112-152 bits of encryption strength TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4446) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) Safe-Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3082, ffdhe4096 KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for IKEv2 Service Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) KDF IKEv2: (A4446) KAS-FFC (IKEv2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC for IKEv2 service Security Strength:Provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) Safe-Prime Groups: modp- 2048, modp- 3072, modp- 4096 KDF IKEv2: (A4446) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS-Wrap KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES and HMAC Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446) Page 13 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM) KTS-Wrap KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES- GCM Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS-Wrap KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES and HMAC Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM) KTS-Wrap KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES-GCM Security Strength:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG RSA KeyGen for SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446) Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) CKG: () ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG ECDSA KeyGen for TLSv1.2 and IKEv2 services ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446) Counter DRBG: (A4446) Hash DRBG: (DRBG 819) CKG: () RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen for SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen for TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446) Page 14 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer for SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4446) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer for TLSv1.2 and IKEv2 services ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4446) Block Cipher (SSHv2) BC-Auth BC-UnAuth Block Cipher for SSHv2 service AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) BC-Auth BC-UnAuth Block Cipher for TLSv1.2 service AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE) BC-Auth BC-UnAuth Block Cipher for IPSec/IKEv2 service AES-CBC: (A4446, AES 3301) AES-GCM: (A4446, AES 3301) Block Cipher (SNMPv3) BC-UnAuth Block Cipher for SNMPv3 service AES-CBC: (A4446) KDF SNMP: (A4446) MAC (SSHv2) MAC MAC for SSHv2 service HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) MAC (TLSv1.2) MAC Message Authentication for TLSv1.2 services HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: Page 15 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Type Description Properties Algorithms (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446) MAC (IPSec/IKEv2) MAC Message Authentication for IPSec/IKEv2 services HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446, HMAC 2095) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A4446, HMAC 2095) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A4446, HMAC 2095) SHA2-256: (A4446, SHS 2737) SHA2-384: (A4446, SHS 2737) SHA2-512: (A4446, SHS 2737) HMAC-SHA-1: (HMAC 2095) SHA-1: (SHS 2737) MAC (SNMPv3) MAC Message Authentication for SNMPv3 service HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) KDF SNMP: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2- 224: (A4446) SHA2-224: (A4446) Firmware Load Test MAC MAC for firmware load test HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A4446) Table 7: Security Function Implementations Page 16 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information • The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. • The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. • The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186- 4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification. 2.8 RBG and Entropy Cert Number Vendor Name E3 Cisco Systems, Inc. Table 8: Entropy Certificates Name Type Operational Environment Sample Size Entropy per Sample Conditioning Component Cisco Jitter Entropy Source Non- Physical Intel Xeon D-1526 (Broadwell), Intel Xeon D-1528 (Broadwell), Intel Xeon D-1548 (Broadwell), Intel Xeon D-1577(Broadwell) 256 bits Full Entropy A2810 (SHA3- 256) Table 9: Entropy Sources The module implements two approved DRBGs based on SP800-90Arev1, including CRT_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446, and HASH_DRBG with DRBG Algo Cert. #819. Page 17 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Those two DRBGs are used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). Each DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability, and the HASH_DRBG (SHA2-512) doesn’t support Prediction Resistance. Each DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the cryptographic keys generation while in the approved mode. The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV cert #E3. 2.9 Key Generation The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.). 2.10 Key Establishment The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: • KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength. - The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC 7919 (TLS) and RFC 3526 (IKE). o SSH (RFC 4419): MODP-2048 (ID = 14) MODP-3072 (ID = 15) MODP-4096 (ID = 16) o TLS (RFC 7919): ffdhe2048 (ID = 256) ffdhe3072 (ID = 257) ffdhe4096 (ID = 258) o IKE (RFC 3526): MODP-2048 (ID = 14) MODP-3072 (ID = 15) MODP-4096 (ID = 16) Page 18 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. • KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. 2.11 Industry Protocols The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information. No parts of IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes Ethernet Port, SFP (1G) port, SFP+ (10G) port, and Console Port Data Input Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data. Ethernet Port, SFP (1G) port, SFP+ (10G) port and Console Port Data Output Data output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data. Ethernet Port, SFP (1G) port, SFP+ (10G) port, Console Port and RESET Control Input Control Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data. Ethernet Port, SFP (1G) port, SFP+ (10G) port, Console Port and LEDs Status Output Status Information output from the module. N/A Control Output N/A Power Power Provide the Power Supply to the module. Table 10: Ports and Interfaces The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by the module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above. Page 19 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods Method Name Description Security Mechanism Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute Password The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one- minute period. Password Based The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(94^8), which is less than 1/100,000. RSA- Based Certificate The modules support RSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of RSA 2048 bits, which provides 112 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112), which is less than 1/100,000. RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details ECDSA- Based Certificate The modules support ECDSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) The probability that a random attempt will succeed is the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one Page 20 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Method Name Description Security Mechanism Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute minimum of curve P- 256, which provides 128 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000. 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details Table 11: Authentication Methods The module implements identity-based authentication. The module supports Crypto Officer role and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators. 4.2 Roles Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Identity CO Password RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate User Identity User Password RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate Table 12: Roles 4.3 Approved Services Page 21 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Show Status Provide Module's current status (return codes and/or syslog messages) Global Indicator or Syslog Message Command used to show Module's Status Module's Operationa l Status None Crypto Officer User Show Version Provide Module's name and version information Console Message Command to show version Module's ID and versioning information None Crypto Officer User Perform Self-Tests Reload the module to perform Self-Tests (Pre- operational self-test and Conditional Self-Tests) Global Indicator or syslog message Command to trigger reload or Removal and reconnecti on of power supply Status of the self- tests results None Crypto Officer User Unauthentic ated Perform Zeroization Perform Zeroization Syslog message Command to zeroize the module Status of the SSPs zeroization None Crypto Officer - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): Z - DRBG Internal State (V, C): Z - User Password: Z - Crypto Officer Password: Z - RADIUS Secret: Z - TACACS+ Secret: Z Page 22 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access - Firmware Load Test Key: Z - SSH DH Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticatio Page 23 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authenticatio Page 24 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access n Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: Z - SKEYSEED: Page 25 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Z - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: Z - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Key: Z Configure Network Sets configurati on of the systems None Command s to configure the network Status of the completion of network configurati on status None Crypto Officer Crypto Officer Authenticat ion CO Role Authenticat ion N/A CO Authenticat ion Request Status of the CO authenticat ion None Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer Password: W,Z User Authenticat ion User Role Authenticat ion N/A User role authenticat ion request Status of the User role authenticat ion None User - User Password: W,Z Configure Bypass Capability Sets the Bypass capability None CLI Bypass commands Status of the completion of Bypass capability configurati on None Crypto Officer Configure SSHv2 Function Configure SSHv2 Function Global Indicator and SSHv2 configurat ion success Command s to configure SSHv2 Status of the completion of the SSHv2 configurati on KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-ECC Crypto Officer - SSH DH Private Key: W,E - SSH DH Public Key: Page 26 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access status message (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (SSHv2 with AES- GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (SSHv2) MAC (SSHv2) W,E - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: W,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal Page 27 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E - RADIUS Secret: W - TACACS+ Secret: W Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function Global Indicator and HTTPS over TLSv1.2 configurat ion success status message Command s to configure TLSv1.2 Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 configurati on KAS-ECC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES- GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: W,E - TLS DH Public Key: W,E - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: W,E - TLS RSA Private Key: W,E - TLS RSA Page 28 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) MAC (TLSv1.2) Public Key: W,E - TLS Master Secret: W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: W,E - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E Configure IPsec/IKEv 2 Function Configure IPSec/IKEv 2 Function Global Indicator with IPsec/IKE v2 configurat ion success status message Command s to configure IPsec/IKEv 2 Status of the completion of IPsec/IKEv 2 configurati on KAS-ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, Crypto Officer - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Page 29 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE ) MAC (IPSec/IKE v2) Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: W,E - SKEYSEED: W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E Page 30 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Run SSHv2 Function Execute SSHv2 Function Global Indicator and successfu l SSHv2 log message Initiate SSHv2 tunnel establishm ent Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishm ent KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (SSHv2 with AES- GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Crypto Officer - SSH DH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: W,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E Page 31 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Block Cipher (SSHv2) MAC (SSHv2) - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E - RADIUS Secret: R,E - TACACS+ Secret: R,E User - SSH DH Private Key: W,E - SSH DH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Page 32 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: W,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E - RADIUS Secret: R,E - TACACS+ Secret: R,E Run HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function Execute HTTPS over TLSv1.2 function Global Indicator and successfu l HTTPS over TLSv1.2 log message Initiate TLSv1.2 tunnel establishm ent request Status of TLSv1.2 tunnel establishm ent KAS-ECC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES- GCM) Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: W,E - TLS DH Public Key: W,E - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: Page 33 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) MAC (TLSv1.2) W,E - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: W,E - TLS RSA Private Key: W,E - TLS RSA Public Key: W,E - TLS Master Secret: W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: W,E - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E User - TLS DH Private Key: W,E Page 34 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access - TLS DH Public Key: W,E - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: W,E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: W,E - TLS RSA Private Key: W,E - TLS RSA Public Key: W,E - TLS Master Secret: W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: W,E - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E Page 35 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E Run IPSec/IKEv 2 Function Execute IPsec/IKEv 2 Function Global Indicator and succesful IPsec/IKE v2 log message Initiate IPsec/IKEv 2 tunnel establishm ent request Status of IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel establishm ent KAS-ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, Crypto Officer - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: W,E Page 36 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access and IKEv2) Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE ) MAC (IPSec/IKE v2) - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: W,E - SKEYSEED: W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E User - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Page 37 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: W,E - SKEYSEED: W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): W,E Page 38 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Descriptio n Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access - DRBG Internal State (V, C): W,E Configure SNMPv3 Function Configure SNMPv3 Function Global Indicator and SNMPv3 configurat ion success status message Command s to configure SNMPv3 Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configurati on Block Cipher (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3) Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: W,E - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Key: W,E Run SNMPv3 Function Execute SNMPv3 Function Global Indicator and successfu l SNMPv3 log message Initiate SNMPv3 tunnel establishm ent request Status of SNMPv3 tunnel establishm ent Block Cipher (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3) Crypto Officer User Firmware Update Update the existing Firmware Global indicator and successfu l Firmware Loading status message Command s to load new firmware image Outcome of the Firmware Update Firmware Load Test Crypto Officer - Firmware Load Test Key: R Table 13: Approved Services 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to complete firmware update service, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not Page 39 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status The module implements alternating Bypass service. Traffic output from the module’s data output interface can be cryptographically protected via IPSec/IKE VPN, or passed as plaintext (Bypass state), depending on the VPN tunnel establishment on the dedicated data output interface. The operator shall assume Crypto Officer role so as to configure IPSec/IKE VPN capability. If no IPSec/IKE VPN was configured, after running two independent internal actions, Module would enter the Bypass state. Before the module executes the Bypass service (sending out plaintext traffic via the data output interface), the module would conduct two independent internal actions to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error. The Crypto Officer can use commands “show access-list” and “show crypto ipsec sa” to verify the module’s Bypass status. In Bypass tests fail, the module would enter an error state, and drop the traffic. 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error. 4.8 Additional Information The module supports Unauthenticated service, where the unauthenticated users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module. 5 Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA 2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. 5.2 Initiate on Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. Page 40 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 6 Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment: Limited 7 Physical Security 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance Tamper labels (9) with Part number: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= Recommend 30 Days Visible inspection of platform for residual evidence of tampering Opacity shield (1) with Part number: FPR-2100-FIPS-KIT= Recommend 30 Days Visible inspection of platform for evidence of tampering, removal or access Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required Appling Tamper Evidence Labels Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back. 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals Number: Nine (9) Placement: Figure 3 Module front view with opacity shield Page 41 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 4 FRP 2110/2120 back view Figure 5 FRP 2130/2140 back view Figure 6 FRP 2110/2120 top view with opacity shield TEL 1 TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 5 TEL 3 TEL 1 TEL 6 TEL 1 TEL 6 Page 42 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 7 FRP 2130/2140 top view with opacity shield Figure 8 Module’s bottom view with opacity shield TEL 7 TEL 9 TEL 8 TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 5 TEL 3 TEL 1 TEL 6 Page 43 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 9 Module’s left view with opacity shield Figure 10 Module’s right view with opacity shield Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: It is recommended seals be stored in a secure location under controlled access Part Numbers: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 7.3 Filler Panels 2110, 2120, 2130 and 2140 Opacity Shield FPR-2100-FIPS-KIT= Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) TEL 3 TEL 2 TEL 6 Page 44 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2) Page 45 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 11 Opacity Shield Brackets 8 Non-Invasive Security N/A for this module. 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type DRAM Volatile Memory Dynamic Flash Non-Volatile Memory Static Table 15: Storage Areas 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Name From To Format Type Distributio n Type Entry Type SFI or Algorith m Peer Public Key Input External (Outside of the Module's Module Plaintext Automated Electroni c Page 46 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name From To Format Type Distributio n Type Entry Type SFI or Algorith m Boundary ) Module Public Key Output Module External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) Plaintext Automated Electroni c Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) Module Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS (SSHv2 with AES- GCM) Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) Module Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) Password/Secre t Input via TLS encrypted by GCM External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) Module Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES- GCM) Password/Secre t Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) Module Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Zeroization Command CO issues zeroization service the zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in the DRAM or in the Flash of the module. 'configure factory-default' Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. Page 47 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 9.4 SSPs Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By DRBG Entropy Input Used to seed the DRBG 384 bits - at least 256 bits Entropy Input - CSP Counter DRBG (A4446) Hash DRBG (DRBG 819) DRBG Seed Used in DRBG Generation 256 bits - 256 bits DRBG Seed - CSP Counter DRBG (A4446) Hash DRBG (DRBG 819) DRBG Internal State (V, Key) Used in DRBG Generation 256 bits - 256 bits DRBG Internal State - CSP Counter DRBG (A4446) DRBG Internal State (V, C) Used in DRBG Generation 256 bits - 256 bits DRBG Internal State - CSP Hash DRBG (DRBG 819) User Password User authenticati on 8-30 Characte rs - 8-30 Characte rs Authenticati on Data - CSP Crypto Officer Password Crypto Officer authenticati on 8-30 Characte rs - 8-30 Characte rs Authenticati on Data - CSP RADIUS Secret RADIUS Server Authenticati on 16 Characte rs - 16 Characte rs Authenticati on Data - CSP TACACS+ Secret TACACS+ Authenticati on 16 Characte rs - 16 Characte rs Authenticati on Data - CSP Firmware Load Test Key Used for Firmware Load Test 112 bits - 112 bits Public Key - CSP Firmware Load Test Page 48 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By SSH DH Private Key Used to derive the SSH DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- FFC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) SSH DH Public Key Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Public Key - PSP Safe Primes Key Generatio n (A4446) KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) SSH Peer DH Public Key Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) SSH DH Shared Secret Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authenticati on Keys MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) KDF SSH (A4446) SSH ECDH Private Key Used to derive the SSH ECDH Shared Secret Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- ECC- KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) SSH ECDH Public Key Used to derive SSH ECDHE Shared Secret Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) SSH Peer ECDH Public Key Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) Page 49 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By SSH ECDH Shared Secret Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authenticati on Keys Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) KDF SSH (A4446) SSH RSA Private Key Used for SSH session authenticati on Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112- 128 bits Private Key - CSP RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) SSH RSA Public Key Used for SSH sessions aiuthenticati on Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112- 128 bits Public Key - PSP RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) SSH ECDSA Private Key Used for SSH session authenticati on Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits Private Key - CSP ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) SSH ECDSA Public Key Used for SSH sessions aiuthenticati on Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits Public Key - PSP ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) SSH Session Encryption Key Used for SSH Session confidentialit y protection 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits Session Key - CSP KDF SSH (A4446) Block Cipher (SSHv2) SSH Session Authenticati on Key Used for SSH Session integrity protection At least 160 bits - At least 160 bits Session Key - CSP KDF SSH (A4446) MAC (SSHv2) TLS DH Private Key Used to Derive TLS DH Shared Secret ffdhe204 8, ffdhe307 2, ffdhe409 6 - 112- 152 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- FFC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2 ) KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS DH Public Key Used to Derive TLS ffdhe204 8, Public Key - PSP Safe Primes KAS-FFC- SSC Page 50 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By DH Shared Secret ffdhe307 2, ffdhe409 6 - 112- 152 bits Key Generatio n (A4446) Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS Peer DH Public Key Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret ffdhe204 8, ffdhe307 2, ffdhe409 6 - 112- 152 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS DH Shared Secret Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authenticati on Key ffdhe204 8, ffdhe307 2, ffdhe409 6 - 112- 152 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446) TLS ECDH Private Key Used to Derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret Curves P-256, P- 384, and P-521 - 128-256 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- ECC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2 ) KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS ECDH Public Key Used to Derive TS ECDH Shared Secret Curves P-256, P- 384, and P-521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS Peer ECDH Public Key Used to derive IKE ECDH Shared Secret Curves: P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS ECDH Shared Secret Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authenticati on Key Curves p-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446) Page 51 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By TLS ECDSA Private Key Used to support CO and Admin HTTPS interfaces Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Private Key - CSP ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) TLS ECDSA Public Key Used to support CO and User HTTPS Interfaces Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) TLS RSA Private Key Used to support CO and Admin HTTPS Interfaces Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112- 128 bits Private Key - CSP RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) TLS RSA Public Key Used to support CO and User HTTPS interfaces Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112- 128 bits Public Key - PSP RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) TLS Master Secret Used to protect HTTPS Session. Pre-master secret At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits Master Secret - CSP TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446) TLS Session Encryption Key Used to protect HTTPS Session. TLS Master secret 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits Session Key - CSP TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446) Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) TLS Session Authenticati on Key Used to protect HTTPS Session. TLS master secret at least 112 bits - at least 112 bits Session Key - CSP TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446) MAC (TLSv1.2) IPSec/IKE DH Private Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) Page 52 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By IPSec/IKE DH Public Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Public Key - PSP Safe Primes Key Generatio n (A4446) KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret Used to derive IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Keys, IPSec/IKE Authenticati on Keys MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096 - 112-152 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) KDF IKEv2 (A4446) IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Private Key - CSP KAS- ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - Shared Secret - CSP KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4446) KDF IKEv2 (A4446) Page 53 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By Shared Secrets 128-256 bits IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Private Key - CSP ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on Curves P-256, P- 384, P- 521 - 128-256 bits Public Key - PSP ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on Modulus 2048 or 3072 - 112 or 128 bits Private Key - CSP RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446) IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on Modulus 2048 or 3072 - 112 or 128 bits Public Key - PSP RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A4446) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446) IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on 16-32 bytes character s - 16-32 bytes character s shared secret - CSP KDF IKEv2 (A4446) SKEYSEED Keying material used to derive the IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key and IPSec/IKE Authenticati on Key 160 bits - 160 bits Keying Material - CSP KDF IKEv2 (A4446) IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key Used to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session confidentialit y 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits Session Key - CSP KDF IKEv2 (A4446) Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE) Page 54 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generat ed By Establish ed By Used By IPSec/IKE Authenticati on Key Used to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session integrity at least 160 bits - at least 160 bits Session Key - CSP KDF IKEv2 (A4446) MAC (IPSec/IKEv 2) SNMPv3 Shared Secret Used for SNMPv3 user authenticati on 8-32 character s - N/A Authenticati on Secret - CSP SNMPv3 Encryption Key Used to protect SNMPv3 traffic confidentialit y 128 bits - 128 bits Encryption Key - CSP KDF SNMP (A4446) Block Cipher (SNMPv3) SNMPv3 Authenticati on Key Used to secure SNMPv3 traffic integrity At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits Authenticati on Key - CSP KDF SNMP (A4446) MAC (SNMPv3) Table 18: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs DRBG Entropy Input DRAM:Plainte xt Until Reboot Zeroizatio n Command DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State (V, Key):Used With DRBG Internal State (V, C):Used With DRBG Seed DRAM:Plainte xt Until Reboot Zeroizatio n Command DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Internal State (V, Key):Used With DRBG Internal State (V, C):Used With DRBG Internal State (V, Key) DRAM:Plainte xt Until Reboot Zeroizatio n Command DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State (V, C) DRAM:Plainte xt Until Reboot Zeroizatio n Command DRBG Entropy Input:Used With Page 55 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs DRBG Seed:Used With User Password Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Flash:Encrypt ed Zeroizatio n Command Crypto Officer Password Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Flash:Encrypt ed Zeroizatio n Command RADIUS Secret Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via Flash:Encrypt ed Zeroizatio n Command Page 56 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC TACACS+ Secret Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Flash:Encrypt ed Zeroizatio n Command Firmware Load Test Key Flash:Plaintex t N/A SSH DH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH DH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer DH Public Key:Used With SSH DH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH DH Private Key:Paired With SSH Peer DH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH DH Private Key:Used With Page 57 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs SSH DH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH DH Private Key:Derived From SSH DH Public Key:Derived From SSH ECDH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With SSH ECDH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDH Private Key:Paired With SSH Peer ECDH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDH Private Key:Used With SSH ECDH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDH Private Key:Derived From SSH ECDH Public Key:Derived From SSH RSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command SSH RSA Public Key:Paired With SSH RSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command SSH RSA Private Key:Paired With SSH ECDSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDSA Public Key:Paired With SSH ECDSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command SSH ECDSA Private Key:Paired With SSH Session Encryption Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH Session Authentication Key:Used With SSH Session Authenticati on Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SSH tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SSH Session Encryption Key:Used With TLS DH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS DH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer DH Public Key:Used With Page 58 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs TLS DH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS DH Private Key:Paired With TLS Peer DH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt while TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS DH Private Key:Used With TLS DH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From TLS ECDH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With TLS ECDH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Private Key:Paired With TLS Peer ECDH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt while TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Private Key:Used With TLS ECDH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From TLS ECDSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDSA Public Key:Paired With TLS ECDSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDSA Private Key:Paired With TLS RSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command TLS RSA Public Key:Paired With TLS RSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command TLS RSA Private Key:Paired With TLS Master Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From TLS Session DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS Session Authentication Key:Used With Page 59 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs Encryption Key TLS Session Authenticati on Key DRAM:Plainte xt While TLS tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command TLS Session Encryption Key:Used With IPSec/IKE DH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE DH Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key:Used With IPSec/IKE DH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE DH Private Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt while IPSec/IKE tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPsec/IKE DH Private Key:Used With IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SKEYSEED:Used With IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Used With IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SKEYSEED:Used With IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key:Paired With Page 60 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintex t Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret Flash:Encrypt ed While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SKEYSEED:Deriv ed to SKEYSEED DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE Pre- shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE Authenticati on Key DRAM:Plainte xt While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Shared Secret Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Sec Flash:Encrypt ed While SNMPv3 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Derive To SNMPv3 Authentication Key:Derive To Page 61 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroizatio n Related SSPs ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Sec ret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC SNMPv3 Encryption Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SNMPv3 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SNMPv3 Shared Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Authenticati on Key DRAM:Plainte xt While SNMPv3 tunnel is on Zeroizatio n Command SNMPv3 Shared Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Used With Table 19: SSP Table 2 9.5 Transitions • SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this module. • FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved. 10 Self-Tests 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Page 62 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details RSA SigVer Firmware Integrity Test RSA SigVer 2048 bits with SHA2-512 KAT SW/FW Integrity Module is in normal state RSA SigVer Pre-Operational Bypass Test N/A N/A Bypass Module is in normal state N/A Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state. 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4446) 256 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Encrypt Power Up AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4446) 256 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Decrypt Power Up AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4446) 256 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Authenticated Encrypt Power Up AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4446) 256 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Authenticated Decrypt Power Up Counter DRBG Instantiate KAT (A4446) AES-128 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Instantiate KAT Power Up Counter DRBG Generate KAT (A4446) AES-128 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Generate KAT Power Up Page 63 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions Counter DRBG Reseed KAT (A4446) AES-128 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Reseed KAT Power Up ECDSA SigGen KAT (A4446) P-256 curve with SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state ECDSA SigGen KAT Power Up ECDSA SigVer KAT (A4446) P-256 curve with SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state ECDSA SigVer KAT Power Up HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4446) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA-1 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT (A4446) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 256 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 384 KAT (A4446) SHA2-384 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 384 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 512 KAT (A4446) SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 512 Power Up KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A4446) P-256 Curve KAT CAST Module is in normal state Primitive Z KAT Power Up KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A4446) MODP- 2048 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Primitive Z KAT Power Up RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446) 2048 bit modulus with SHA2- 256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state RSA SigGen KAT Power Up RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446) 2048 bit modulus with SHA2- 256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state RSA SigVer KAT Power Up KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module is in normal state N/A Power Up KDF SNMP KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module is in normal state N/A Power Up KDF SSH KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module is in normal state N/A Power Up Page 64 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module is in normal state N/A Power Up SHA-1 KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module is in normal state N/A Power Up AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (AES 3301) 128 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Encrypt KAT Power Up AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (AES 3301) 128 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Decrypt KAT Power Up AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (AES 3301) 128 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Encrypt KAT Power Up AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (AES 3301) 128 bits KAT CAST Module is in normal state Decrypt KAT Power Up Hash DRBG Instantiate KAT (DRBG 819) SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Instantiate KAT Power Up Hash DRBG Generate KAT (DRBG 819) SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Generate KAT Power Up Hash DRBG Reseed KAT (DRBG 819) SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module is in normal state Reseed KAT Power Up HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (HMAC 2095) SHA-1 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA-1 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT (HMAC 2095) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 256 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 384 KAT (HMAC 2095) SHA2-384 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 384 Power Up HMAC-SHA2- 512 KAT (HMAC 2095) SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module is in normal state HMAC-SHA2- 512 Power Up ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446) Curve P- 256 with SHA2-256 PCT PCT Module is in normal state ECDSA Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the Page 65 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions newly generated key pairs before the first operational use. RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446) 2048 bit Modulus PCT PCT Module is in normal state RSA Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use. KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A4446) Curve P- 256 with SHA2-256 PCT PCT Module is in normal state N/A Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use. KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A4446) MODP- 2048 PCT PCT Module is in normal state N/A Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use. HMAC-SHA2- 512 Firmware Load Test HMAC- SHA2-512 KAT SW/FW Load Module is in normal state N/A When firmware has been uploaded to the module Page 66 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions Conditional Bypass Test N/A N/A Bypass Module is in normal state N/A Performs conditional bypass test before first operational use of bypass service Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) Repetition Count Test RCT CAST Module is in normal state Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value for a long period of time Power Up Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) Adaptive Proportion Test APT CAST Module is in normal state Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environmental change affecting the noise source Power Up Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) Repetition Count Test RCT CAST Module is in normal state Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value for a long period of time Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuous Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) Adaptive Proportion Test APT CAST Module is in normal state Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuous Page 67 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions physical failure or environmental change affecting the noise source Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method RSA SigVer Firmware Integrity Test KAT SW/FW Integrity Recommend 60 Days Reboot Pre-Operational Bypass Test N/A Bypass Recommend 60 Days Reboot Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Counter DRBG Instantiate KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Counter DRBG Generate KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Page 68 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Counter DRBG Reseed KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot ECDSA SigGen KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot ECDSA SigVer KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 384 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 512 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot KDF SNMP KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot KDF SSH KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot SHA-1 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (AES 3301) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (AES 3301) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Page 69 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (AES 3301) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (AES 3301) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Hash DRBG Instantiate KAT (DRBG 819) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Hash DRBG Generate KAT (DRBG 819) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot Hash DRBG Reseed KAT (DRBG 819) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (HMAC 2095) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT (HMAC 2095) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 384 KAT (HMAC 2095) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 512 KAT (HMAC 2095) KAT CAST Recommend 60 Days Reboot ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446) PCT PCT Recommend 60 Days Reboot RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446) PCT PCT Recommend 60 Days Reboot KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446) PCT PCT Recommend 60 Days Reboot KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446) PCT PCT Recommend 60 Days Reboot HMAC-SHA2- 512 Firmware Load Test KAT SW/FW Load N/A N/A Conditional Bypass Test N/A Bypass N/A N/A Entropy 90B Start-up RCT CAST N/A N/A Page 70 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Repetition Count Test (RCT) Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) APT CAST N/A N/A Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) RCT CAST N/A N/A Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) APT CAST N/A N/A Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator Error State If self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state Self-test failure Reboot the module System Halt Table 24: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self- tests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. 11 Life-Cycle Assurance 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will put the module into a non-compliant state. Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section Physical Security above. Page 71 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section Physical Security above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #9. Step 4: Crypto Officer performs the following configurations: ciscoasa# configure terminal Note, the Crypto Officer needs to connect the platform to cisco.com to obtain the license for ASA from Cisco. ciscoasa(config)# license smart register idtoken [token data] ciscoasa(config)#license smart ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license all Smart Licensing Status ====================== Smart Licensing is ENABLED -OR- ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license summary Smart Licensing is ENABLED Registration: Step 5. Crypto officer shall perform zeroization operation if the module was previously used before the approved mode configuration. Step 6: Enable approved mode of operation by using the following command. ciscoasa(config)# fips enable Note: Startup operational mode will not take effect until you save configuration and reboot the device Rebooting the device will force new self-test Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running the following command. ciscoasa(config)# show version Step 8: Crypto Officer will need to issue the following commands to configure module. ciscoasa> en ciscoasa# conf t ciscoasa(config)# Step 9: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1. Step 10: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints. Page 72 of 72 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Step 11: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise skip over and proceed to next step. Step 12: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec connection by using the following commands crypto map interface access-list protocol esp encryption protocol esp integrity If IPSec secure connection is not configured, after running two internal independent actions defined in section 4.6 above, the module would enter the Bypass state. Step 13: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for all security connections (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, SNMPv3 and IPSec/IKEv2). Step 14: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. Step 15: Disable the TFTP server. Step 16: Disable HTTP for performing system management in approved mode of operation. HTTPS with TLSv1.2 should always be used for Web-based management. Step 17: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. Step 18: Save the configuration. Step 19: Reboot the module. 11.2 Administrator Guidance No specific Administrator guidance. 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance No specific Non-Administrator guidance. 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A for this module.