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Non-Proprietary Security Policy
for the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Validated
AirFortress®
Wireless Security Gateways
Hardware Models AF7500 and AF2100
(Document Version 2.3)
February 2008
Prepared by the Fortress Technologies, Inc.,
Government Technology Group
4023 Tampa Rd. Suite 2000. Oldsmar, FL 34677
Page 2 of 26
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Contents
SUMMARY.................................................................................................................................... 4
1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 5
1.1 IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................................ 5
2.0 SECURITY FEATURES ................................................................................................... 7
2.1 THE AF WIRELESS SECURITY GATEWAYS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE............................ 7
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................... 8
3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY............................................ 9
3.1 ROLES................................................................................................................................ 9
3.1.1 Authentication............................................................................................................ 9
3.1.2 Strength Of Authentication ........................................................................................ 9
3.2 SERVICES......................................................................................................................... 10
4.0 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT................................................................ 11
4.1 KEY GENERATION........................................................................................................... 11
4.2 KEY STORAGE................................................................................................................. 11
4.3 ZEROIZATION OF KEYS ................................................................................................... 11
4.4 PROTOCOL SUPPORT ....................................................................................................... 11
4.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ...................................................................................... 11
5.0 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY....................................................................................... 13
6.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ................................................................................. 22
7.0 SOFTWARE SECURITY POLICY ............................................................................... 25
8.0 OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY............................................................................. 25
9.0 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY........................................................ 25
10.0 EMI/EMC.......................................................................................................................... 26
11.0 CUSTOMER SECURITY POLICY ISSUES ................................................................ 26
11.1 FIPS MODE ..................................................................................................................... 26
12.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES............................................................................................... 26
List of Figures
Figure 1: Example Configuration of AirFortress® Security Gateways in a WAN......................... 6
Figure 2: AirFortress® Security Gateways Communication Layout .............................................. 7
Figure 3: Front View of the AF7500 Hardware ............................................................................ 23
Figure 4: Top and Front View of the AF7500 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker........ 23
Figure 5: Front View of the AF2100 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker...................... 24
Figure 6: Back View of the AF2100 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker....................... 24
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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List of Tables
Table 1: FIPS Approved Security Functions................................................................................. 12
Table 2: Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................ 12
Table 3: Excluded Security Functions........................................................................................... 12
Table 4: Role of Administrator (WFWeb Cryptographic Officer)................................................ 14
Table 5: Role of Operator (WFWeb Cryptographic Officer)........................................................ 15
Table 6: Role of the System Administrator (FISH Cryptographic Officer) .................................. 16
Table 7: Role of the Administrator (Crypto Officer using SNMP-V3)......................................... 17
Table 8: Role of User/Client.......................................................................................................... 19
Table 9: Module Security Relevant Data Items............................................................................. 19
Table 10: SRDI/Role/Service Policy............................................................................................. 21
Table 11: Recommended Physical Security Activities.................................................................. 22
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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SUMMARY
This security policy of Fortress Technologies, Inc., for the FIPS 140-2 validated AirFortress®
Wireless Security Gateways, defines general rules, regulations, and practices under which the
module was designed and developed and for its correct operation. These rules and regulations
have been and must be followed in all phases of security projects, including the design,
development, manufacture service, delivery and distribution, and operation of products.
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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1.0 Introduction
This security policy defines all security rules under which the AirFortress®
Wireless Security
Gateways cryptographic module must operate and which it must enforce, including rules from
relevant standards such as FIPS. The module complies with all FIPS 140-2 level 2 requirements.
1.1 Identification
Hardware Model Number: AF2100, AF7500
Firmware Version: V3.1
The AirFortress®
Wireless Security Gateways (AF7500 and AF2100 hardware models) are
referred to as the AF Wireless Security Gateways or gateways or module, in this document. The
module is a hardware cryptographic module, comprising a multi-chip standalone electronic
cryptographic encryption module. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the hardware
enclosure which contains the self-contained compiled code that is installed at the point of
manufacturing. This module operates as an electronic encryption device designed to prevent
unauthorized access to data transferred across a wireless network. The AF Wireless cryptographic
module is designed to prevent unauthorized access to data transferred across a wireless network.
It provides strong encryption (Triple-DES and AES) and advanced security protocols. DES
encryption can no longer be used in FIPS mode.
The module encrypts and decrypts traffic transmitted on that network in FIPS mode, protecting
all clients “behind” it on a protected network. Only authorized personnel, the administrator,
system administrator and operator (cryptographic officers) can log into the module.
The module operates at the datalink layer of the OSI model. Most of the security protocols are
implemented without human intervention to prevent any chance of human error.
The module requires no special configuration for different network applications. Its security
protocols are implemented without human intervention to prevent any chance of human error;
therefore, the cryptographic modules operate with minimal intervention from the user. It secures
communication within LANs, WANs, and WLANs.
The module offers point-to-point-encrypted communication for the computer and Local Area
Network (LAN) or Wireless LAN (WLAN) it protects. The cryptographic modules encrypt
outgoing data from a client device and decrypts incoming data from networked computers located
at different sites. Two or more modules can also communicate with each other directly. A typical
application of the module is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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Figure 1: Example Configuration of AirFortress® Security Gateways in a WAN
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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Figure 2: AirFortress® Security Gateways Communication Layout
2.0 Security Features
The module provides true datalink layer security. To accomplish this, it was designed with the
security features described in the following sections.
2.1 The AF Wireless Security Gateways Cryptographic Module
The following security design concepts were applied to the AF Wireless Security Gateways:
1. Use strong, proven encryption solutions, Triple DES (TDES) and AES.
2. Minimize the human intervention to the module operation with a high degree of
automation to prevent human error and to ease the use and management of a security
solution.
3. Secure all points where a LAN, WLAN, or WAN can be accessed by using a unique
access ID, defined by the customer, to identify authorized devices and authenticate them
when also using an AirFortress® Management and Policy Server (MaPS).
4. The module firmware is installed only in production grade, AF7500 or AF2100, FCC-
compliant computer hardware at the at Fortress Technologies’ production facilities or as
an upgrade at the customer’s site. This hardware meets all FIPS 140-2 Level 2
requirements.
The underlying Wireless Link Layer Security
®
(wLLS) technology ensures that cryptographic
processing is secure on a wireless network, automating most of the security operations to prevent
any chance of human error. wLLS builds upon the proven security architecture of Fortress
Technologies Secure Packet Shield™ protocol, with several enhancements to support wireless
security needs. Because wLLS operates at the datalink layer, header information is less likely to
be intercepted. In addition to applying standard strong encryption algorithms, wLLS also
compresses data; disguising the length of the data to prevent analytical attacks and yielding a
significant performance gain on network throughput.
The module requires no special configuration for different network applications, although
customers are encouraged to change certain security settings, such as the system administrator
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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password and the access ID for the device, to ensure that each customer has unique parameters
that must be met for access. The module allows role-based access to user interfaces that access
the appropriate set of management and status monitoring tools. Direct console access supports the
majority of system administrator (cryptographic officer) tasks and a browser-based interface
supports administrator access.
2.2 Module Interfaces
Physical Interfaces AF2100
1. 2 RJ-45 10/100 Mbps Ethernet ports
a. Encrypted
b. Unencrypted
2. 1 RJ-45 10/100 Aux Ethernet Port
3. 1 DB-9 Console Port
4. +V 5 DC Power Port
5. eight front-panel system LEDs
a. Power - G
b. Status Failover (Fail) - G
c. Unencrypted Link - G
d. Unencrypted Act - Y
e. Encrypted Link - G
f. Encrypted Act -Y
g. Aux Link- G
h. Aux Act – Y
Physical Interfaces AF7500
1. 2 RJ-45 10/100 Mbps Ethernet ports
a. Encrypted
b. Unencrypted
2. 1 RJ-45 10/100 Aux Ethernet Port
3. 1 DB-9 Console Port
4. 110/220 AC Power Port
5. eight front-panel system LEDs
c. Power - G
d. Status Failover (Fail) - G
e. Unencrypted Link - G
f. Unencrypted Act - Y
g. Encrypted Link - G
h. Encrypted Act -Y
i. Aux Link- G
j. Aux Act – Y
Logical Interfaces
1. Control Input
a. WFWeb using SSL WEB Browser over an IP network through the Ethernet Port
Encrypted or Unencrypted1
1
Communications over WFWeb are not considered encrypted from a FIPS perspective.
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®
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b. FISH using a directly connected terminal through the DB-9 serial port
c. Fortress Interface Shell (FISH) using SSH over an IP network through the
Ethernet Port Encrypted or Unencrypted2
2. Data Input/Output
a. Encrypted
b. Unencrypted
3. Status Output
a. LED indicators as listed.
b. Internal Audio buzzer (w/ software controllable volume possible),
c. WFWeb with the attached browser.
d. FISH in the attached monitor
Bypass mode is indicated as follows (over the status output):
AF2100: momentary off from the Status LED every few seconds.
AF7500: momentary off from the Status LED every few second accompanied by a double chirp
from the module speaker every 20 seconds.
3.0 Identification and Authentication Policy
3.1 Roles
The module employs role-based authentication.
The module supports the following cryptographic officer roles:
• Administrator: Uses the wfWeb or MAPS to configure, monitor and perform diagnostics
on the module.
• Operator: Uses the wfWeb to monitor and perform diagnostics on the module.
• System Administrator: Uses the FISH command line interface to configure, monitor and
perform diagnostics on the module
The module support one user:
• End Users: This user benefits from the cryptographic processing without manual
intervention, thus eliminating any direct interaction with the module; the module secures
data transparently to users.
All tasks for the roles are summarized in table 4 through table 8.
3.1.1 Authentication
User authentication is by a 32 hexadecimal digit Access ID (128-bit). All Crypto-Officer role
authentication is by 8-character password selectable from 72 keyboard characters.
3.1.2 Strength Of Authentication
The probability of a random false acceptance is:
2
Communications through SSH are not considered encrypted from a FIPS perspective.
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®
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1. Crypto-Officer Role: The minimum character length for passwords is 8. Password
characters can be either upper or lower-case letters, numbers, or some special characters
(totaling 72 possible characters). Thus, the probability of random false acceptance is one
in 72^8.
2. User Role: The AccessID is a 128-bit binary value. Thus, the probability of random false
acceptance is one in 2^128.
Both of these probabilities exceed the one in 1,000,000 requirement.
For Crypto Officer authentication, the cycle time between authentication attempts is 8 seconds,
allowing only 7.5 authentication attempts per minute. Given this cycle time and number of
possible combinations (72^8), the requirement of one in 100,000 is met.
Similarly, for user authentication, an operator is allowed 8 attempts to establish a connection with
Access ID. Given this and the number of possible combinations (128^8), the requirement of one
in 100,000 is met
3.2 Services
The following services3
are provided in the module:
• Show Status
o Show status by LED located on the front of the AF2100 and AF7500
o wfWeb

 Allows the Monitoring of Partners

 Show Log messages
o FISH

 Display Access Points connected

 Display Clients

 Display Partners

 Display Roam
o MAPS

 Access the Fortress Only MIB (communications are plaintext)
• Perform Self Test
o Power-Up Tests

 Cryptographic Algorithm Test: AES KAT, Triple-DES KAT, HMAC-
SHA-1 KAT, HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, and RNG KAT

 Software/Firmware Integrity Test: HMAC-SHA-256

 Critical Functions Test: None
o Conditional Test

 Continuous Random Number Generator test

 Bypass Test

 Firmware Load Test
• Perform Approved Security Functions
o Encrypts and Decryptes packets:

 Triple-DES (192 bit key)

 AES (128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit keys)
o Create the module’s keys
3
This list just gives an overview of some of the services. Please refer to tables 4 through 8 for a
complete list of services.
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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o PRNG X9.31
o HMAC-SHA1
o HMAC-SHA256
o Creating and maintaining tables
o Reinitiating key exchange at user-specified intervals
o Zeroizing keys if power to the module is turned off
• Other
o Packet Compression
4.0 Cryptographic Key Management
The module automatically performs all cryptographic processing and key management functions.
4.1 Key Generation
The following values are generated using the module’s ANSI X9.31 RNG:
• D-H Static Private Key 512-bits, 1024-bits and 2048-bits
• D-H Dynamic Private Key 512-bits, 1024-bits and 2048-bits
Notes:
• The public and private keys above refer to those used in the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol.
An ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 pseudo-random number generator generates random numbers used for
keying the key establishment algorithm.
4.2 Key Storage
Only the module’s HardKey is stored across power cycles. It is stored in the module’s FLASH.
Public, private and session keys are stored in RAM.
4.3 Zeroization of Keys
The encrypted session keys are automatically zeroized when the system is turned off and
regenerated at every boot-up of the host hardware. All other information can be zeroized
manually by entering ‘reset default’ in FISH. Zeroization of the HardKey is performed by
upgrading the firmware of the module.
4.4 Protocol Support
The module supports the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and automatic rekeying.
4.5 Cryptographic Algorithms
The AF Wireless Security Gateways applies the following cryptographic algorithms:
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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Table 1: FIPS Approved Security Functions
Algorithms NIST-FIPS Validation
Number
AES (CBC, encrypt/decrypt; 128,
192, 256)
550
Triple-DES (CBC, encrypt/decrypt) 546
SHA-1 (Byte) 615
SHA-256 615
HMAC-SHA-1 291
HMAC-SHA-256 291
RNG (X9.31) 318
Table 2: Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
Algorithm Comments
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key
establishment methodology provides
80 or 112 bits of encryption strength;
non-compliant less than 80 bits of
encryption strength)
Only 1024 or 2048 Diffie-
Hellman can be used in FIPS
mode.
Table 3: Excluded Security Functions
Algorithms Comments
MD5, RSA Not allowed in FIPS mode
DES No longer accepted by FIPS as
an approved security function
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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5.0 Access Control Policy
The module allows role-based access to user interfaces that access to the appropriate set of
management and status monitoring tools. Browser-based interface and Direct console access
supports the system tasks.
The administrator and system administrator (cryptographic officer roles) manages the
cryptographic configuration of the module. The Operator (limited role cryptographic officer role)
can review module status and manage system settings where appropriate but not cryptographic
settings when the modules are operating in FIPS mode. Because of the module automates
cryptographic processing, end users do not have to actively initiate cryptographic processing; the
module encrypts and decrypts data sent or received by users operating authenticated devices
connected to the module.
The following tables, defined by Fortress Technologies’ Access Control Policy, show the
authorized access and services tasks supported and allowed to each role within each product.
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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Table 4: Role of Administrator (WFWeb Cryptographic Officer)
Function/Service
Show
Select
Enable/
Disable
Enter/
Clear
Add/
Edit/
Delete
Entry
System properties
Network Properties X X
Manage Gateways using MaPS X X
System date and time X X
Security Settings
Security X X X X
Change Access ID X X
GUI access X X X
CLU access X X
Authentication X X X
Failover
Failover Setup X X
Manual override X X
SNMP
Enable SNMP X X X
Configure SNMP traps X X
AP/TD Management
Access Management Rules X X X
Access Point X X
VLAN Settings
VLAN mode X X X
VLAN map record X X
Archive Settings
Archive System Settings X
Restore System Settings X X
Upgrade
Upgrade System X X
View Log X
Ping X
Trace Route X
Restart Gateways X
Reset Connections X
Reset to Default Settings X
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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Generate File X
Table 5: Role of Operator (WFWeb Cryptographic Officer)
Function/Service
Show
Select
Enable/
Disable
Enter/
Clear
Add/
Edit/
Delete
Entry
System properties
Network Properties X
Manage Gateways using MaPS X
System date and time X
Security Settings
Security X
Change Access ID X
GUI access X
CLU access X
Authentication X
Failover
Failover Setup X
Manual override X
SNMP
Enable SNMP X
Configure SNMP traps X
AP/TD Management
Access Management Rules X
Access Point X
VLAN Settings
VLAN mode X
VLAN map record X
Archive Settings
Archive System Settings
Restore System Settings X
Upgrade
Upgrade System X
View Log X
Ping X
Trace Route X
Restart Gateways X
Reset Connections X
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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Reset to Default Settings X
Table 6: Role of the System Administrator (FISH Cryptographic Officer)
Function/Service
Show
Set
Add/Del/Edit
Enable/Disable
Clock X X
Devices X X
Engine X X
Maps X X
Password X
Radius X
SNMP X X
VLAN X X
Uptime X
Add AP X
Add Trusted Device X
SNMP Trap X
Static Host Mac X
Traceroute X
Zero X
save X
AP X
Clients X
Mobile X
Netstat X
Partners X
Roam X
AFWeb X
FIPS mode X
MAPS X
Radius X
Silent Device X
SNMP X
SSH X
Encrypted management X
Clear text access X
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®
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Guest Access X
Table 7: Role of the Administrator (Crypto Officer using SNMP-V3)
MIB Function MIB Function
afEnableLogMessages Whether to enable the centralized
logging or not.
afDisableAlarm Setting this value to true will
disable the audible alarm.
afResetClientMACDb Setting this value to true will reset
the database tracking all connected
devices.Trying to read this object
will return false or the value 2.
afRebootGateway Setting this value to true will
reboot the Gateways. Trying
to read this object will return
zero."
afMapsTunnelEncryption The encryption type for the Maps
Tunnel.
afRemoteLoggingLevel The Remote Logging Level.
afDisconnectSessions This object has the Mac addresses
of the sessions to be
disconnected. The value
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff indicates All
sessions. Up to 10 Mac addresses
can be specified separated by
comma. The Mac address must be
specified in the format
01:02:03:ab:cd:ef.
afTimeZoneOffset The time difference between
the Gateways’ time zone and
GMT in minutes.
afGuestAccessEnabled Setting this value to true enables
Guest devices to pass cleartext
traffic after they have been
authenticated by a MaPS server.
afClearTextAcccessEnabled Setting this value to true
enables all cleartext policy
allowed, traffic to go
through the gateways.
Disabling this flag, or setting
it to false, disables all
cleartext traffic i.e. AP
management traffic, Trusted
device traffic including that
traffic required by Guests to
Authenticate.
afMODPsize The MODP size(s)
allowed to be used.
Bit location * 256 = Modp size
afNewAccess The string contains the New
Access ID to be used by the
gateways. This object is
write only; Attempt to read
this object will return
Nothing.
afOldAccessID The string contains the Old Access
ID that is used by the gateways.
This object is write only; Attempt
to read this object will return
Nothing.
afPushAccessTimeWindow The time window value in
seconds.
afPushAccessCmd Setting this object to start(1) will
push the new Access ID. The other
3 objects afNewAccessID,
afOldAccessID and
afPushAccessTimeWindow must
be set before setting this. Once this
object is set to start(1), it may be
stopped by setting this object to
afPushAccessElapsedTime This object indicates the
elapsed time since the push
access started.
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®
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stop(2).
rsNumber This object indicates the number of
rules present in the Gateways.
rsTable This table contains the rules
sent by Maps.
rsEntry A row describing a given entry in
the rules table.
rsIndex Unique value for each rule.
resident Unique global id in the Maps. rsDescr Textual description of the
rule.
rsSrcPhysAddress MAC address of the source host. rsSrcNetAddress IP address of the source host
in string format. The net
mask may be optionally
specified. For example,
12.13.14.15/24. Up to 10 IP
addresses can be specified
separated by comma.
rsSrcPortNumbers This can be a range or individual
ports of upto 10 entries separated
by commas. Range is separated by:.
Examples: '30:40,45', 'Any','10,20'
rsDstPhysAddress MAC address of the
destination host in string
format. Up to 10 MAC
addresses can be specified
separated by comma. The
address must be specified in
the format 01:02:03:ab:cd:ef.
rsDstNetAddress IP address of the destination host in
string format. The net mask may be
optionally specified. For example,
12.13.14.15/24. Up to 10 IP
addresses can be specified
separated by comma.
rsDstPortNumbers This can be a range or
individual ports of upto 10
entries separated by
commas. Range is separated
by:. Examples: '30:40,45',
'Any','10,20'
rsTimeBasedIndex A integer value that indicates
which Time based rules are to be
applied for this rule set.
rsCOSValue A integer value range
between 1-5 indicating the
class of service for the rule
set.
rsApplyInetRule This object indicates whether the
internet rule has to be applied for
this rule set or not.
rsProtocol This object indicates
whether the ICMP packets
are allowed for this device or
not.
rsConnType This object indicates the protocol. rsAllowICMP This object indicates
whether this rule set is for an
Encrypted connection
(Secured devices and Users)
OR for a Clear
connection(Trusted devices,
Guest Users and Static).
rsFlags This is a flags field. rsStatus The status of this conceptual
row. Only createAndGo(4),
notInService(2), destroy(6)
and acive(1) are supported.
tbNumber This object indicates the number of
time based templates present in the
Gateways.
tbTable This table contains the time
based templates sent by
Maps.
tbEntry A row describing a given entry in
the time based template table.
tbIndex Unique value for each time
based template.
tbIdent Entry index for this template. tbDayofWeek The day(s) of the week.
tbStartTime The time in minutes to specify
when the rule will begin to act
tbEndTime The time in minutes to
specify when the rule will
finish.
tbStatus The status of this conceptual row.
Only createAndGo(4),
tbType The type of the time based
template.
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notInService(2), destroy(6) and
acive(1) are supported.
irNumber This object indicates the number of
internet rules present in the
Gateways.
irTable This table contains the
internet rules sent by Maps.
irEntry A row describing a given entry in
the internet rules table.
irIndex Unique value for each
internet rule.
irNetAddress Network address to be denied irNetMask Network mask.
irStatus The status of this conceptual row.
Only createAndGo(4),
notInService(2), destroy(6) and
acive(1) are supported.
Table 8: Role of User/Client
Function/Service
Show
Select
Enable/
Disable
Enter/Clear
Value
Add/Delete
Entry
Request
Use Profile X X
Create Profile X
Enable Encryption X
Type of Encryption X
Access ID X
Trusted Device X
The module contains the following security relevant data items (SRDI):
Table 9: Module Security Relevant Data Items
Security Relevant
Data Item
SRDI Description Storage
Location
AccessID A 128bit value used for authentication between the
module and a peer module or a computer connecting
with the Fortress Client software.
FLASH
Dynamic Secret
Encryption Key
A Triple-DES or AES key used to encrypt End User data
communications.
RAM
Common Static
Encryption Key
A Triple-DES or AES key used to encrypt the key
establishment process of the Dynamic Secret Encryption
Key
RAM
Diffie-Hellman
Dynamic Private
Key
The Diffie-Hellman private value used to establish the
Common Dynamic Encryption Key
RAM
Diffie-Hellman
Static Private Key
Diffie-Hellman private value used to establish the Static
Secret Encryption Key.
RAM
Static Group Key This key is used to encrypt multicast transmissions until RAM
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®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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the Dynamic Group Key becomes active
Dynamic Group
Key
This key is used to encrypt user data broadcast/multicast
transmissions.
RAM
Private Dynamic
Group Key
The Diffie-Hellman value used to establish the Dynamic
Group Key
RAM
HardKey Used to encrypt failover communications transmitted
over the "Aux" port. Also used as the HMAC key
during the firmware load test.
FLASH
Administrator
Password
The password that protects the “admin” user while
logging on to the web interface.
FLASH
FISH Password This is authentication data used to authenticate to the
command line interface.
FLASH
Operator Password This is authentication data used to authenticate to the
"operator" user of the web interface.
FLASH
MaPS Password A shared secret used for communication with a MAPS
server.
FLASH
SNMP Password The SNMP password is used for authentication to the
SNMP server.
FLASH
RADIUS Password A shared secret used for communication with a RADIUS
server.
FLASH
The module allows controlled access to the SRDIs contained within it. The following
table defines the access that an operator has to each SRDI while operating the module in
a given role performing a specific service. The permissions are categorized as a set of
four separate permissions: read, write, execute, delete. If no permission is listed, then an
operator outside the module has no access to the SRDI.
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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Table 10: SRDI/Role/Service Policy
AF Wireless Security
Gateways
SRDI/Role/Service
Access Policy
Security
Relevant
Data
Item
AccessID
Dynamic
Secret
Encryption
Key
Common
Static
Encryption
Key
Diffie-Hellman
Dynamic
Private
Key
Diffie-Hellman
Static
Private
Key
Static
Group
Key
Dynamic
Group
Key
Private
Dynamic
Group
Key
HardKey
Administrator
Password
FISH
Password
Operator
Password
MaPS
Password
SNMP
Password
RADIUS
Password
Role/Service
User role
Send Data Through the
Module
x x x x x x x x x
Crypto Officer Role
GUI module
configuration
w w w w w w
GUI Diagnostics x x x x x x x x x
FISH module
configuration
w w w w w w
FISH Diagnostics x x x x x x x x x
SNMP module
configuration
w w w w
UpgradeFirmware w w w w w w w w w
/
d
w w w w w w
Zeroize command d d d d d d d
Power cycle d d d d d d d 4
w = write
x = execute
d = delete
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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6.0 Physical Security Policy
The AF Wireless Security Gateways firmware is installed by Fortress Technologies on a
production-quality, FCC-certified AF7500 and AF2100 hardware devices, which are also define
the module’s physical boundary. The hardware is manufactured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2
requirements.
The host hardware must be located in a controlled access area. Tamper evidence is provided by
the use of an epoxy potting material covering the chassis access screws. The epoxy is applied
during the manufacturing of the product by Fortress manufacturing personnel. All screws on the
top panel are covered with the material as shown in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6. Table 11 lists
recommended physical security related activities at the user’s site.
Table 11: Recommended Physical Security Activities.
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection
Inspection Guidance
All chassis screws covered
with epoxy coating.
Daily Inspect screw heads for
chipped epoxy material. If
found tempered, remove
module from service.
Overall physical condition of
the module
Daily Inspect all cable connections
and the module’s overall
condition. If any discrepancy
found, correct and test the
system for correct operation or
remove module from service.
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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Figure 3: Front View of the AF7500 Hardware
Figure 4: Top and Front View of the AF7500 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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Figure 5: Front View of the AF2100 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker
Figure 6: Back View of the AF2100 Hardware Showing the Blue Thread Locker
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
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7.0 Software Security Policy
The firmware can be upgraded: replaceable with newer versions. A self-test validates the
authenticity of the upgraded firmware by checking the firmware’s keyed hash. If the firmware is
compromised as determined by the test, the module enters an error state in which no
cryptographic processing occurs, preventing a security breach through a malfunctioning device.
8.0 Operating System Security
The module operates automatically after power-up. The operating system is a limited non-
modifiable version of Linux 2.4.16 that is installed with the module’s firmware. User access to
standard OS functions is eliminated. The module provides no means whereby an operator could
load and execute software or firmware that was not included as part of the module’s validation.
The firmware of the Gateways can be upgraded by using the included Fortress upgrade utility that
is accessed by the Graphic User Interface (GUI).
9.0 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
No special mechanisms are built in the AirFortress® Wireless Security Gateways, however,
besides the FIPS requirements the cryptographic module is designed to mitigate several specific
attacks. Features, which mitigate attacks, are listed here:
1) The dynamic session key is changed at least once every 24 hours, with 4 hours being the
factory default duration. The Crypto Officer can define this time interval: Mitigates key
discovery efforts.
2) A second Diffie-Hellman key exchange produces a dynamic common secret key in each
of the modules by combining the other module’s dynamic public key with the module’s
own dynamic private key: Mitigates “man-in-the-middle” attacks.
3) Header information is compressed and encrypted inside of the frame, making it
impossible to guess. Use of strong encryption further protects the information. Any bit
flipping in this frame to try to change the IP address of the frame would be useless:
Mitigates active attacks from both ends.
4) Encryption happens at the datalink layer so that all network layer information is hidden:
Mitigates hacker’s access to the communication.
5) Multi-factor Authentication: The AirFortress® Wireless Security Gateways guards the
network against illicit access with “multi-factor authentication”, checking three levels of
access credentials before allowing a connection. These are:
a) Network authentication requires a connecting device to use the correct shared
identifier for the network
b) Device authentication requires a connecting device to be individually
recognized on the network, through its unique device identifier.
c) User authentication requires the user of a connecting device to enter a
recognized user name and password.
Security Policy for the AirFortress
®
Wireless Security Gateways, Hardware Models 7500 and 2100. (Doc.
Version 2.3)
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10.0 EMI/EMC
Fortress Technologies, Inc. installs the AirFortress® Wireless Security Gateways Firmware only
on computer hardware, which is FCC-compliant and certified: Part 15, Subpart J.
11.0 Customer Security Policy Issues
Fortress Technologies, Inc. expects that after the module’s installation, any potential customer
(government organization or commercial entity or division) employ its own internal security
policy covering all the rules under which the module(s) and the customer’s network(s) must
operate. In addition, the customer systems are expected to be upgraded as needed to contain
appropriate security tools to enforce the internal security policy.
11.1 FIPS Mode
Select or deselects FIPS mode by using FISH to access the console port and then selecting FIPS
enable. Once FIPS is enabled the prompt changes to “<FIPS>” and the AF Web Interface reports
“FIPS MODE ENABLED” as indicators. Additionally, the module is only in its FIPS mode of
operation when DES and 512-bit Diffie-Hellman are not used.
12.0 Maintenance Issues
The AF Wireless Security Gateways has no operator maintainable components. Inoperable
modules must be returned to the factory for repair.