TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 1 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### Table of Contents | 1 General | ................................................................................................................................... 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................ | 7 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 7 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .......................................21 | | | 2.3 Excluded Components .....................................................................................................22 | | | 2.4 Modes of Operation | .........................................................................................................22 | | 2.5 Algorithms | .......................................................................................................................22 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................25 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information | .........................................................................................27 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................27 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................27 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment .........................................................................................................27 | | | 2.11 Industry Protocols ..........................................................................................................28 | | | 2.12 Additional Information | ....................................................................................................28 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................29 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................29 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................31 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................31 | | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................32 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................32 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services | ...................................................................................................37 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded | ................................................................................37 | | 4.8 Additional Information | ......................................................................................................38 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security | ...................................................................................................40 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................40 | | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................40 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................40 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ..........................................................40 | | 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................40 | | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................41 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................41 | | | 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals | ..............................................................................................41 | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................43 | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 2 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | 8.1 Mitigation Techniques ......................................................................................................43 | | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................43 | | | 9.1 Storage Areas | .................................................................................................................43 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ..............................................................................................43 | | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................45 | | | 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................45 | | | 10 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................49 | | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................49 | | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................49 | | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................49 | | | 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................50 | | | 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................50 | | | 10.6 Additional Information ....................................................................................................50 | | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................51 | | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................51 | | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................52 | | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................52 | | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................52 | | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 3 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy #### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels | ............................................................................................................. 6 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | ....................................................................21 | | Table 3: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................22 | | | Table 4: Approved Algorithms | ...................................................................................................23 | | Table 5: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed | .....................................25 | | Table 6: Security Function Implementations ..............................................................................27 | | | Table 7: Ports and Interfaces | ....................................................................................................30 | | Table 8: Authentication Methods | ...............................................................................................31 | | Table 9: Roles | ...........................................................................................................................32 | | Table 10: Approved Services | ....................................................................................................37 | | Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required | ...........................................................................41 | | Table 12: Required Locations and Number for Tamper Evidence per Module Type | ..................41 | | Table 13: Storage Areas | ...........................................................................................................43 | | Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods | ........................................................................................44 | | Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods | ..........................................................................................45 | | Table 16: SSP Table 1 | ..............................................................................................................47 | | Table 17: SSP Table 2 | ..............................................................................................................48 | | Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | ........................................................................................49 | | Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests | ...............................................................................................49 | | Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................49 | | | Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................50 | | | Table 22: Error States ...............................................................................................................50 | | | List of Figures | | | Figure 0-1: TW-950-F TSM Shadow Module .............................................................................. | 8 | | Figure 0-2: TW-900-F TSM Shadow Module | .............................................................................. 9 | | Figure 0-3: TW-880-F Ghost Embedded Module | .......................................................................10 | | Figure 0-4: TW-875-F TSM Ghost Module | ................................................................................11 | | Figure 0-5: TW-870-F TSM Ghost Module | ................................................................................12 | | Figure 0-6: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Front) | ..............................................13 | | Figure 0-7: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Top) | ................................................13 | | Figure 0-8: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Rear) | ..............................................14 | | Figure 0-9: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Bottom) | ...........................................15 | | Figure 0-10: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Right and Left sides) | .....................16 | | Figure 0-11: TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow Module Block Diagram .........................................17 | | | Figure 0-12: TW-880-F Ghost Module Block Diagram | ...............................................................18 | | Figure 0-13: TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost Module Block Diagram ............................................19 | | | Figure 0-14: TW-135-F Shadow High-Power Module Block Diagram | ........................................20 | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 4 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview The TrellisWare Technologies, Inc Cryptographic module(s) covered by this Security Policy document are shown in the table below. | Product Ordering Number | Catalog Description | FW Version | Non-Security Features | Primary Use- Case | Env Rating | |---------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------| | TW-950-F | TSM Shadow Radio | 6.2.1-b74 | Display, keypad, rotary knob, LED | Handheld or body-worn | IP68 | | TW-900-F | TSM Shadow Radio | 6.2.1-b74 | Rotary knob, buttons, LED | Handheld or body-worn | IP68 | | TW-880-F | TSM Ghost Module | 6.2.1-b74 | Control by discrete inputs | Un-crewed platforms or fixed location | IP41 | | TW-875-F | TSM Ghost Radio | 6.2.1-b74 | Display, buttons, LED, Int battery | Fixed location | IP68 | | TW-870-F | TSM Ghost Radio | 6.2.1-b74 | Buttons, LED | Fixed location | IP68 | | TW-135-F | TSM Shadow High-Power Radio | 6.2.1-b74 | Display, keypad, rotary knob, LED | Manpack or Vehicle mounted | IP68 | The module(s) are multi-chip standalone cryptographic module(s) designed to convert Plaintext Data to/from Ciphertext data using AES256-CTR mode. The module(s) also authenticate Crypto Officer access using a RSA2048/SHA256 Certificate. The module(s) support distinct operator roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. Additionally, the module supports an unauthenticated Human Operator role. These are discussed further below. ### 1.2 Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 5 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 6 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ###### Purpose and Use: The module(s) covered by this Security Policy act as nodes ('radios') on a Wireless network with a minimum of two (2) nodes or up to hundreds of nodes. Each node can produce data on the Wireless network and act as a relay, re-broadcasting data from nearby nodes. The Wireless network implements TrellisWare's TSM waveform. The TSM waveform enables a self-forming, self-healing, infrastructure-less Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) that provides wireless coverage in challenging environments or during critical situations. The TSM mobile ad-hoc network is not dependent on a fixed infrastructure. No towers are required. No central control points, programmed routes or tables, access points, or directional antennas. All data on the Wireless network is Ciphertext created with the approved Algorithm listed in this Security Policy. One or more Wired Plaintext data interfaces are provided on the module(s) to input or output the data passing through the Wireless Ciphertext network. The flow of Plaintext to/from Ciphertext data is defined as the 'User mode'. Only Plaintext data is present on the Wired interface(s). Only Ciphertext data is present on the Wireless interface. Local Plaintext data is also created on each module and passed to/from the Wireless network as Ciphertext using the approved Algorithm. Local data includes Position-Location-Information (PLI), Voice, Video and Status. ###### Module Type : Hardware ###### Module Embodiment : Multi-Chip Standalone ###### Cryptographic Boundary: For the module(s) covered by this Security Policy, the physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the module case. The physical cryptographic boundary does not require any caps or covers on connectors. ###### Module Images: - Figure 0-1 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-950-F TSM Shadow. - Figure 0-2 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-900-F TSM Shadow. - Figure 0-3 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-880-F TSM Ghost. - Figure 0-4 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-875-F TSM Ghost. - Figure 0-5 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-870-F TSM Ghost. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 7 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - Figure 0-6 to 0-10 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-135-F TSM HPSR. Figure 0-1: TW-950-F TSM Shadow Module This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 8 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-2: TW-900-F TSM Shadow Module This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 9 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-3: TW-880-F Ghost Embedded Module This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 10 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-4: TW-875-F TSM Ghost Module This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 11 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-5: TW-870-F TSM Ghost Module This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 12 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-6: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Front) Figure 0-7: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Top) This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 13 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-8: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Rear) This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 14 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-9: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Bottom) This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 15 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-10: TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power Module (Right and Left sides) The cryptographic boundary is further identified in the following block diagrams . The figures below shows a simplified block diagram depicting major hardware components of the cryptographic modules, component interconnections, Plaintext data paths, Ciphertext data paths, Non-security Human Operator features and Crypto Officer control paths. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 16 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-11: TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow Module Block Diagram This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 17 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-12: TW-880-F Ghost Module Block Diagram This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 18 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-13: TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost Module Block Diagram This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 19 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 0-14: TW-135-F Shadow High-Power Module Block Diagram ###### Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): For the module(s) covered by this Security Policy, the TOEPP is equal to the module case because the physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the module case. The Red and Blue arrows in Figure 0-1 to 0-10 show the locations of the Tamper Evidence and are discussed in more detail in Section 7.2 below. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 20 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ###### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TW-950- F | ASY0750270 G | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | Snap-on battery, with keypad, LCD, LED, rotary knob, Civilian GPS, Audio port, SD/HD Video port, USB x2, Ethernet, 2W RF output, IP68 | | TW-900- F | ASY0750271 G | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | Snap-on battery, no keypad, no LCD, LED, rotary knob, Civilian GPS, Audio port, SD/HD Video port, USB x2, Ethernet, 2W RF output, IP68 | | TW-880- F | ASY0750352 A | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | External power, no buttons, Civilian GPS, USB, Ethernet, GPIOs, LED, no audio, 2W RF output, IP41 | | TW-875- F | ASY0750280 K | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | Internal battery and external power, keypad, LCD, LED, Civilian GPS, USB, no Audio, 2W RF output, IP68 | | TW-870- F | ASY0750279 J | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | External power, keypad, LED, Civilian GPS, USB, no Audio, 2W RF output, IP68 | | TW-135- F | ASY0750130 J | 6.2.1-b74 | Mentor Graphics ModelSim PE 10.6c ARM Cortex A9 | External power, keypad, LCD, LED, rotary knob, Civilian GPS, Audio port x2, SD/HD Video port, USB x2, Ethernet, 20W RF output, IP68 | Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 21 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy N/A for this module. ### 2.3 Excluded Components There are two (2) additional microcontrollers within the Cryptographic Boundary which have no security functions. - The I/O Micro Controller is used to service the Human Operator controls on the module case. - The RF Micro Controller is used to control the RF Transceiver settings (e.g. Frequency, Bandwidth, Power Control, Tx/Rx switching). These controllers have no access to Plaintext, Ciphertext and CSP storage or data paths and thus cannot compromise the module's security. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ###### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Approved | Initiated by following instructions in section 11.1 of the Security Policy | Approved | Global / implicit indicator (i.e., successful completion of the approved service). | Table 3: Modes List and Description ###### Mode Change Instructions and Status: After initialization into the Approved mode, it is expected that the module(s) described in this Security Policy document will remain in the Approved mode for the remainder of the product life cycle. The instructions for initialization into the Approved mode are provided in section 11.1 below. The mode status indicators are shown in the table above. The CSP status services are accessible by the CO using TrellisWare provided tools. ### 2.5 Algorithms ###### Approved Algorithms: | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | AES-CTR | C1431 | Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5395 | Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigVer | A5395 | Hash Pair - | FIPS 186-5 | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 22 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | (FIPS186-5) | | Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 Public Exponent Mode - random | | | SHA2-256 | A5395 | Message Length - Message Length: 8- 51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | Table 4: Approved Algorithms ###### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. There are no functions within the scope of the module that rely on a non-approved cryptographic algorithm to support a claim of security. ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: | Name | Caveat | Use and Function | |--------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES | No security claimed | Used internally and separate from AES Cert # C1431. As per FIPS 140- 3 IG 2.4.A, this is used to "obfuscate" data using proprietary implementations. All obfuscated data is treated as plaintext. | | SRP | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | DH | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | ECDH | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | DSA | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | ECDSA | No | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 23 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Caveat | Use and Function | |-------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Triple- DES | security claimed No security claimed | browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications | | Camellia | No security claimed | channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | SEED | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this | | RC4 | | purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to | | MD5 | No security claimed No security | provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide | | IDEA | claimed No security claimed | end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications | | SHA-1 | No security claimed | channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | SHA2- 384 | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | | KDF | No security claimed | As per FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.A, this is used between applications/web browser and the module; however, the module's purpose is to provide end-to-end secure communications over an insecure communications channel. Module does not rely on the security of this algorithm for this purpose. | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 24 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ####### Table 5: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed ###### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. None ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Packet Creation and Forwarding | BC-UnAuth | Packet Creation and Forwarding | Keys:AES 256 bits keys with 256 of key strength | AES-CTR: (C1431) Algorithm Capabilities: AES-CTR | | Firmware load test | DigSig-SigVer | Firmware load test | Keys:2048 bits with 112 bits of key strength | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5395) Algorithm Capabilities: RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) SHA2-256: (A5395) | | Authentication of CO | DigSig-SigVer | Authentication of CO | Keys:2048 bits with 112 bits of key strength | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5395) Algorithm Capabilities: RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) SHA2-256: (A5395) | | FW Integrity Test | SHA | Verification of firmware integrity | | SHA2-256: (A5395) | | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with AES-CTR and RSA | KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap | Key wrapping, key unwrapping using AES-CTR and RSA | Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:approved "combination" method from IG D.G and SP 800-38F Caveat:Key establishment methodology | AES-CTR: (C1431) Algorithm Capabilities: AES-CTR RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5395) Algorithm Capabilities: RSA SigGen | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 25 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Type | Description | Properties provides 256 bits of security strength | Algorithms (FIPS186-5) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5395) Algorithm Capabilities: RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) SHA2-256: | |-------------|--------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Local HTTPS | UNK | HTTPS Key Loader SSP input/output | | (A5395) AES: () Algorithm Capabilities: AES SRP: () Algorithm Capabilities: SRP DH: () Algorithm Capabilities: DH ECDH: () Algorithm Capabilities: ECDH DSA: () Algorithm Capabilities: DSA ECDSA: () Algorithm Capabilities: ECDSA Triple-DES: () Algorithm Capabilities: Triple-DES Camellia: () Algorithm Capabilities: Camellia SEED: () Algorithm Capabilities: SEED RC4: () Algorithm Capabilities: RC4 MD5: () | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 26 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|--------|---------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | Algorithm Capabilities: MD5 IDEA: () Algorithm Capabilities: IDEA SHA-1: () Algorithm Capabilities: SHA-1 SHA2-384: () Algorithm Capabilities: SHA2-384 KDF: () Algorithm Capabilities: KDF | Table 6: Security Function Implementations ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information Not applicable. ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy N/A for this module. N/A for this module. There are no entropy sources or RNGs in the module(s) covered by this Security Policy document. ### 2.9 Key Generation The module(s) do not generate Keys. To generate Network Keys and CO Certificates for the module(s), a supplied Windows PC Application must be used: TrellisWare Management Tool. This tool is outside the boundary and out-of-scope of this validation. The required tool is issued to the Crypto Officer(s) only by TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. The tool will install and run on any Windows 7, 10 or 11 PC. ### 2.10 Key Establishment The module(s) support key entry from the software tools that are outside of the module(s) physical and cryptographic boundary using a key loader. Key entry from the tools is via the Plaintext wired interfaces only. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 27 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy After Keys are loaded on the module(s), network keys can be transferred over-the-air to other modules, using the Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with AES-CTR and RSA SFI. The network keys cannot be transferred to other modules via the Wired interfaces. The transfer process is referred to as Over-the-Air Cloning (OTAC) in the module(s) User Guide. The transfer is initiated by a CO. One module is placed into OTAC transmit mode, and when one or more modules have been placed into OTAC receive mode, these modules will be updated over-theair within a few seconds. To complete the process, the CO manually exits the OTAC mode on the transmit and receive modules. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The module(s) use HTTPS with TLS for the local connection. No protection of data is claimed for HTTPS with TLS. ### 2.12 Additional Information The module(s) have been tested for RF Emissions and Electromagnetic Immunity per the requirements and procedures in MIL-STD 461F. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 28 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | RF Antenna Connector | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | All data is Ciphertext. User Mode data input/output. CO Mode authenticated control input/output. Non-security status output. Module identification output. Applies to all modules covered by this Security Policy. | | GPS Antenna Connector | Data Input | Civilian GPS, plaintext data. Applies to all modules covered by this Security Policy. | | USB 2.0 OTG | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | All data is Plaintext. User Mode data input/output. CO mode authenticated control input/output. Non-security status output. Module identification output. Applies to all modules covered by this Security Policy. | | USB 2.0 Host | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | All data is Plaintext. User Mode data input/output. CO mode authenticated control input/output. Non-security status output. Module identification output. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F and TW-135-F only. | | Audio Port | Data Input Data Output Control Input | Analog voice data input/output, Push-to-talk control input. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F and TW-135-F only. | | LCD | Status Output | Non-security status output only. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900- F, TW-875-F and TW-135-F only. | | Pushbuttons | Control Input | Power on/off and non-security control input only. Applies to TW-875-F and TW-870-F only. | | Power Connector | Power | None. Applies to all modules covered by this Security Policy. | | Ethernet | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | All data is Plaintext. User Mode data input/output. CO mode authenticated control input. Non-security status output. Module identification output. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-880- F and TW-135-F only. | | SD Video | Data Input | Analog SD video data input. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F and TW-135-F only. | | HD Video | Data Input | Digital HD video data input. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F and TW-135-F only. | | Knob | Control Input | Power on/off control input. Voice talk-group control input. Emergency Zeroization control input. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900-F and TW-135-F only | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 29 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 7: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Volume Buttons | Control Input | Voice output volume control inputs. Applies to TW-950-F, TW- 900-F and TW-135-F only. | | Keypad | Control Input | Non-security control input only. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900- F and TW-135-F only. | | Status Indicator LED | Status Output | Non-security status output only. Applies to TW-950-F, TW-900- F, TW-875-F, TW-870-F and TW-135 only. | The interfaces for the cryptographic boundary include physical and logical interfaces. The physical interfaces provided by each module are mapped to FIPS 140-3 defined logical interfaces: Data Input (DI), Data Output (DO), Control Input (CI), Status Output (SO), and Power Interface (PI). This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 30 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CO Public Key Certificate | The RSA certificate contains a 2048- bit key signed with a SHA-256 hash function. An RSA 2048-bit key provides an equivalent security strength of 112-bits. | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5395) | The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/2^112, which is orders of magnitude less than the required 1/1,000,000 (ca. 1/2^20). | Each HTTPS attempt was observed to be 5,024 bytes (40,192 bits). At the module's maximum rate of 100 mbps, the maximum number of HTTPS attempts per second is 100e6/40192 bits, or 2,488 per second, ignoring packet overhead, equivalent to 149,280 (2,488x60) attempts per minute. Rounding up to the nearest power of 2, assume 2^18 attempts per minute is possible via a script or automated attack. The probability of a success with multiple attempts is 2^18/2^112 = 1/2^94, which is ca. 5.5 times better than the required 1/100,000 (ca. 1/2^17). | | Network Key | AES-256 key provides an equivalent security strength of 256-bits. | AES-CTR (C1431) | The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^256, which is orders of magnitude less than the required 1/1,000,000 (ca. 1/2^20). | AES-256 output blocks are 128-bits in length. The Ciphertext output port is capable of 16Mbps maximum, or 16M/128 = 125K blocks/sec that an attacker could analyze. Rounding up to a power of 2, results in 2^17 blocks per second. Thus, the probability of a success is 2^17/2^256=1/2^239, which is ca. 14 times better than the required 1/100,000 (ca. 1/2^17). | | None | Access to non- security relevant functionalities | None | NA | NA | Table 8: Authentication Methods The strength of each implemented authentication mechanism is described above. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 31 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 4.2 Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-----------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------| | Crypto Officer (CO) | Role | This role accesses the module via authenticated API services for initialization and configuration of the module. This role also has access to all other services offered by the module. | CO Public Key Certificate | | User | Role | This role allows the module to perform Cryptographic data encryption/ decryption using Approved algorithms. | Network Key | | Human Operator (HO, Non-security) | Role | An unauthenticated operator can control switches, dials, and other unauthenticated services of the module. | None | Table 9: Roles The module supports distinct operator roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. Additionally, the module supports an unauthenticated Human Operator (HO) role. ### 4.3 Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------| | Crypto Officer Authenticati on | Uses the CO Public Key Certificate to allow the CO to access the unit for | Managem ent app receives a result | CO Public Key Certifica te | Status of CO authenticati on | Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 32 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Security and Non- security configurati on. | | | | | - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E | | Non- Security Configurati on | Configure non- security settings and Wideband RF settings. | Managem ent app receives a result | CO Public Key Certifica te Non- security settings and Wideba nd RF settings | Status of CO authenticati on Status of Non- Security Configurati on | Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E | | Security Configurati on | Enter and select the FIPS-140 SSP's - CO Public Key Certificate and AES- 256 CTR Network Key via manual distribution electronic entry. Prior to a certificate update, the module is automatica lly zeroized. | Managem ent app receives a result | CO Public Key Certifica te FIPS- 140 SSP's - CO Public Key Certifica te and AES- 256 CTR Network Key | Status of Local HTTPS Key Loader Input/Outpu t Status of Security Configurati on | Local HTTPS | Crypto Officer (CO) - Network Key: R,W - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,W,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R | | Packet Forwarding | Provides packet transfer between the RF Ciphertext | Managem ent App shows # of nodes and network utilization | Network packets to be forward ed | Processed network packets to be forwarded | Packet Creation and Forwarding | User - Network Key: R,E | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 33 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | port and Plaintext Ethernet ports. Packets are encrypted and decrypted using the AES-256 Network Key. | | | | | | | Packet Creation | Provides Ciphertext packet creation from internal Plaintext sources (GPS, Audio, Video). Packets are encrypted using the AES-256 Network Key. Encrypted packets are transmitted via RF. | Managem ent app shows status and network utilization | Plaintex t from internal sources | Encrypted network packets | Packet Creation and Forwarding | User - Network Key: R,E | | Network Monitoring & Remote Control | Monitor network and individual radios. Remote control of radio non- security settings and stream control. | Managem ent app shows status and network data | CO Public Key Certifica te Radio non- security settings and stream control | Status of CO authenticati on Network monitoring data Status of radio non- security settings and stream configuratio | Packet Creation and Forwarding Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 34 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Firmware Upgrade | Upgrade firmware release. Note: If non-FIPS validated firmware is loaded, the module is no longer a FIPS validated module. | TSM Software Download PC app shows status | CO Public Key Certifica te Firmwar e | n Status of CO authenticati on Status of the upgrade | Firmware load test | e: R,E Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,W,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,W,E - FW Load Public Key: R,E - CO Private Key: W | | Power-on Module Self-Tests | Performs module's power-up self-tests. If failing, enters Error state. | Managem ent app shows the status of the module | None | Status of the module's power-up self-tests | Packet Creation and Forwarding Authentication of CO FW Integrity Test KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA | Human Operator (HO, Non- security) | | Module Status API | Provides CO Non- security Status API service for PC, Android and Web apps. | Managem ent app shows status of the module | CO Public Key Certifica te | Status of CO authenticati on Non- security status | Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E | | FIPS Zeroize (OTAC) | Remotely zeroize all CSPs in | Managem ent apps do not see | CO Public Key | Status of CO authenticati | Authentication of CO Packet Creation | Crypto Officer (CO) | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 35 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | the module. Once zeroized, the module must be reinitialized as described above. | the status of the module | Certifica te Request to zeroize | on Status of zeroization | and Forwarding | - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E - Network Key: Z | | Cloning of keys | Remotely clone Network Key | Managem ent app receives a result | CO Public Key Certifica te Request to clone | Status of cloning | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - CO Private Key: R,E - Network Key: W | | Manual Non- Security Configurati on (devices with LCD only) | Selection of voice channel, volume and other non- security configurati on parameter s using the manual controls on | LCD | Keypad or buttons | LCD | None | Human Operator (HO, Non- security) | | Show Status | the unit. Uses the CO Public Key Certificate to allow the CO to | Managem ent app receives the status | CO Public Key Certifica te | Status of CO authenticati on Status of the module | Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 36 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | access the unit to see the status | | | | | Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E | | Show Version | Uses the CO Public Key Certificate to allow the CO to access the unit to see the version of the module | Managem ent app receives the version | CO Public Key Certifica te | Status of CO authenticati on Version of the module | Authentication of CO | Crypto Officer (CO) - CO Public Key Certificat e: R,E - TWT CA Public Key Certificat e: R,E | Table 10: Approved Services This table describes the services provided, along with which roles can access each service. The table also defines the relationship between access to SSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: - R = Read: Role has privilege to read the SSPs. - W = Write: Role has the privilege to write the SSPs. - Z = Zeroize: Role has the privilege to zeroize the SSPs. - E = Execute: Role has the privilege to perform a cryptographic operation ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module(s) ship with the validated firmware listed in this Security Policy document. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140 - 3 validation. The Crypto Officer must use the following procedure to load the FIPS 140-3 compliant firmware: - The Crypto Officer shall be physically present and in control of the module. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 37 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - The Crypto Officer shall authenticate into the module using the CO Certificate. - Use the 'Firmware Upgrade' service. The TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool provides Crypto Officer access to the service. ### 4.8 Additional Information Switches, buttons and status LEDs exist on the outside surface of the module's enclosure and can only be used for unauthenticated non-security functions. - These functions are available to the Human Operator role. - The available non-security functions are summarized in the table below. - Not all functions are available on every module type, as shown in the table below | Non-Security Function | Applicable Modules | Access Method | Module State | Human Operator Service | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------| | Attach/Remove Power | All modules | Module Connector | Off | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach RF Antenna or Cable | All modules | Module Connector | Any | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach GPS Antenna or Cable | All modules | Module Connector | Any | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach USB OTG Data Cable | All modules | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach USB Host Data Cable | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach Ethernet Data Cable | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-880-F, TW-135-F | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach Audio Accessories | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Attach SD/HD Video Data Cable | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Power On/Off | TW-875-F, TW-870-F | Module Button | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Power On/Off | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Knob | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Power On/Off | TW-880-F | Discrete Control Inputs | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Voice Transmit (PTT) | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Connector | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Change Voice Channel | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Knob | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Change Voice Volume | TW-950-F, TW-900-F, TW-135-F | Module Buttons | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | View Battery Status | TW-950-F, | Module LCD | Operating | Manual Non- | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 38 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Non-Security Function | Applicable Modules | Access Method | Module State | Human Operator Service | |----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------------| | | TW-875-F, TW-135-F | | | Security Config | | View Battery Status | TW-900-F, TW-870-F | Module LED | Operating | Non-Security Status LED | | View RF Status | TW-950-F, TW-875-F, TW-135-F | Module LCD | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | View RF Status | TW-900-F, TW-870-F | Module LED | Operating | Non-Security Status LED | | View GPS Status | TW-950-F, TW-135-F | Module LCD | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | View Non-Security Settings | TW-950-F, TW-135-F | Module LCD | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | | Change Non-Security on-the-fly User Settings | TW-950-F, TW-135- | Module LCD and Keypad | Operating | Manual Non- Security Config | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 39 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The module(s) run the following integrity tests at startup: - File system FW Integrity test, SHA-256 - FPGA FW Integrity test, SHA-256 ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The integrity tests can be initiated on demand by running a power cycle on the module(s). ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ###### Type of Operational Environment : Limited ###### How Requirements are Satisfied : Only the validated version(s) of firmware identified in this Security Policy can be installed, while the module(s) are used in the Approved mode. Data output is inhibited prior to successful completion of the load test, self-tests and in the error state. The version of the installed firmware is indicated in the TrellisWare Management app and the TSM Software Download PC app . ### 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions The operational environment is not configurable outside of settings and commands available through the CO-authenticated API Services . TrellisWare provides customers with applications based on the API services. The API descriptions are also published to customers wanting to create custom applications. No services are provided to view or read the File System, RAM or FPGA. Only executables compiled by TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. are properly formatted for writing to the module(s). Power-on integrity tests of the executables ensures tampering has not occurred. Writing of executables and SSPs to the module(s) is done via CO-authenticated API services. The API descriptions and TrellisWare provided tools for CO services are only provided to individuals performing the CO role in the customer's organization. The Firmware will reject API commands that are not properly formatted. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 40 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 7 Physical Security ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Tamper Evident Coating | Daily | Inspect all screws and connector nuts. See figure(s) in Section 2 of the Security Policy. A magnifying glass or camera can be used as an aid for inspection. | The module is of production quality. Tamper evident coating is applied to all screws on each access panel by the Crypto Officer upon delivery. This makes it impossible to remove or move aside the access panel without resulting in damage to the tamper evident coating. If tampering is demonstrated, the local Crypto Officer is instructed to perform the zeroize operation prior to discarding the module or returning it to the manufacturer. Tamper is evident by the presence of any 'dry - joints' or gaps between the adhesive and the protected components, or other inconsistencies in the applications. Inspect screw heads and connector nuts daily for chipped adhesive material. If any damage is present, remove the device from service. ### 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals ###### Number: Refer to Figure 0-1 to 0-10 above for required locations and examples of the proper technique for applying the sealant. In the figure(s), the Red arrows indicate access screws that require sealant, and the Blue arrows indicate connector retaining nuts that require sealant. The table below summarizes the number of locations requiring sealant for access screws and connector retaining nuts per module type. Table 12: Required Locations and Number for Tamper Evidence per Module Type | Module | Number of Access Screw Sealant Locations | Number of Retaining Nut Sealant Locations | |----------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | TW-950-F | 19 | 2 | | TW-900-F | 19 | 2 | | TW-880-F | 10 | 0 | | TW-875-F | 8 | 3 | | TW-870-F | 14 | 3 | | TW-135-F | 69 | 3 | ###### Placement: This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 41 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Tamper evident coating is applied to all screws on each access panel by the Crypto Officer upon delivery. Locations of the screws are indicated in Figure 0-1 to 0-10 above. - A magnifying glass or microscope is useful for controlling the application of the sealant. - o Drying time is 20 seconds. - Excess sealant may be removed with a wipe and/or Q-tip soaked with Isopropyl Alcohol. - o Try to wipe each application within ~20 seconds for best results. - Note: When using solvents, extinguish all ignition sources. - o Excess dried sealant may also be carefully scraped off as desired for aesthetics. - Thicker sealant coverage of the fasteners is also acceptable if preferred, up to 1/8" thickness. - o However, a thicker application may become chipped and appear to be tampered when in fact no tampering has occurred. ###### Surface Preparation: Clean the application areas of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying sealant. ###### Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: One tube is sufficient for many radios, it is not included with every module. The goal is to cover the tool mating surfaces ('wells') on all access screws and a portion of the connector retaining nuts, such that it will be obvious if tampering has occurred. Standard shelf life of the sealant is 12 months from date of manufacture when stored in a refrigerator. Shelf life is reduced to 9 months when stored at 60-80°C (16-27°C). The tube of sealant must be stored tip down. The CO is responsible for storing the unused coating securely to prevent access to the coating by individuals not authorized to apply sealant to new radios. ## Part Numbers: The sealant is TrellisWare P/N 800AAA0036, 'Adhesive, Tamper-Poof Sealant, White'. Once applied by the CO, the tamper-evident coating is not meant to be replaced during the life cycle of the module(s). This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 42 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 8 Non-Invasive Security ### 8.1 Mitigation Techniques The module doesn't claim non -invasive security mitigation techniques. ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas Table 13: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | eMMC (Flash) File System - Executable Firmware | The eMMC Flash memory is organized as a File System. At power-on the ARM processor calls the Operating System at a fixed entry point in the Flash file system. The Firmware can be updated by authenticated CO services. No services exist to allow readback of Firmware from outside of the physical boundary. | Static | | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage | SSPs are also stored in the Flash file system. The stored SSPs can only be modified by authenticated CO services. Zeroization shreds and then deletes SSPs to fully prevent later recovery. | Static | | RAM | SSPs are temporarily copied to RAM to support authentication of CO mode service requests. The temporary copy is overwritten after each service request. No services exist to allow access to the RAM from outside of the physical boundary. | Dynamic | | FPGA | The FPGA implements the approved AES-CTR algorithm and provides faster processing compared to the ARM processor. AES-CTR keys are copied to FPGA to support the creation of User mode Ciphertext. No services exist to allow access to the FPGA from outside of the physical boundary. | Dynamic | The TrellisWare Management Tool is also used to download and store Keys in the module(s)' Flash memory. Keys are stored within the module as Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File System, RAM, and FPGA. The CO Public Key Certificate is used by the tool and module to verify that the transfer of keys is authenticated. If the authentication was not successful, the module will not store the new key. ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------| | Network Key Wireless | Outside the crypto | eMMC (Flash) File | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with AES-CTR and | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 43 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-----------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------| | Entry | boundary | System - SSP storage | | | | RSA | | Network Key Wireless Output | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage | Outside the crypto boundary | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrapping with AES-CTR and RSA | | Wired Entry via Key Loader | Outside the crypto boundary | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | Local HTTPS | | Wired Output via Key Loader | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage | Outside the crypto boundary | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | Local HTTPS | Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods The download occurs from the PC to any Plaintext I/O port listed in Table 6 'Ports and Interfaces' above. The PC must be connected to one Plaintext I/O port on the module. Note that all Plaintext I/O ports on the module are wired connections only. The required cables are not included with each module and must be purchased separately. - The table below is a list of the currently available cables that can be used with the TrellisWare Management Tool and TSM Software Download Tool . | Cable P/N | TW-950-F | TW-900-F | TW-880-F | TW-875-F | TW-870-F | TW-135-F | |-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| | TW-1230 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1255 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1650 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1665 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1670 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1710 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1712 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1750 | X | X | | X | X | X | | TW-1853 | | | | | | | | TW-2301 | | | | | | | | CBL0770066 | | | X | | | | | CBL0770067 | | | X | | | | | CBL0770072 | | | X | | | | When using the TrellisWare Management Tool , the module shall be on a Wired LAN with sufficient physical security controls to ensure that no other devices are analyzing or recording network traffic. It is required that the LAN have only one PC with TrellisWare tools and one or more radios to be configured. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 44 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Management Application 'Perform Clean' | External app sends an API command to the module | SSPs are stored in an industry- standard file system and temporary storage. Files containing SSPs are first zeroized by overwriting the file contents with zeroes, followed by a standard file 'remove' command. Finally, a hardware reset is commanded which erases the RAM and FPGA temporary contents. | Initiation of the CO API command can be manual or by an application outside of the physical and cryptographic boundary | | Emergency | Human operator uses a combination of button presses | SSPs are stored in an industry- standard file system and temporary storage. Files containing SSPs are first zeroized by overwriting the file contents with zeroes, followed by a standard file 'remove' command. Finally, a hardware reset is commanded which erases the RAM and FPGA temporary contents. | Fast zeroization when needed. | Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods Zeroization is done by using the supplied Management Application , available to Crypto Officer(s) only. This tool is outside the boundary and out-of-scope of this validation. The required tool is issued to the Crypto Officer(s) only by TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. The application shows a list of all module(s) connected on the RF Wireless network. Any module listed can be Zeroized by selecting 'Perform Clean', this will invoke the FIPS Zeroize service. To re-initialize the module, follow the steps described in Section 11.1 of this Security Policy. ### 9.4 SSPs | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Streng th | Type - Categor y | Generat ed By | Established By | Used By | |-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Network Key | AES-256 CTR mode encryption and decryption of network traffic. This key authenticat | 256 bits - 256 | Symmet ric key - CSP - CSP | | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA Local HTTPS | Packet Creation and Forwarding KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 45 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Streng th | Type - Categor y | Generat ed By | Established By | Used By | |--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | es the User of the module. The Crypto Officer may store up to 8 Network Keys on a crypto module, but only one key is used at a time. | | | | | | | CO Private Key | RSA 2048 bit private key used to authenticat e keys | 2048 bits - 112 | Private Key- CSP - CSP | | Local HTTPS | KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA | | CO Public Key Certifica te | CO Certificate contains an RSA 2048 bit key used to authenticat e Crypto Officer role. | 2048 bits - 112 | Public Key- PSP - PSP | | Local HTTPS | Authentication of CO KTS - Key Wrapping/Unwrap ping with AES- CTR and RSA | | TWT CA Public Key Certifica te | TrellisWare Technologi es, Inc. CA Certificate contains an RSA 2048 bit key used to authenticat e the Crypto Officer's certificate (certificate chain verification) | 2048- bits - 112 | Public Key- PSP - PSP | | Local HTTPS | Authentication of CO | | FW | . RSA 2048 | 2048- | Public | | Local HTTPS | Firmware load | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 46 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 16: SSP Table 1 | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Streng th | Type - Categor y | Generat ed By | Established By | Used By | |-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------| | Load Public Key | bit public key used to authenticat e Firmware Load. | bits - 112 | Key- PSP - PSP | | | test | | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Network Key | Network Key Wireless Entry Network Key Wireless Output Wired Entry via Key Loader Wired Output via Key Loader | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext FPGA:Plaintext | Power-on to Power- off | Management Application 'Perform Clean' Emergency | Network Key:Wraped By CO Private Key:Wrapped By Network Key:Wraps | | CO Private Key | Wired Entry via Key Loader | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext | Each API service call | Management Application 'Perform Clean' Emergency | CO Public Key Certificate:Paired With Network Key:Wraped By | | CO Public Key Certificate | Wired Entry via Key Loader Wired Output via Key Loader | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext | Each API service call | Management Application 'Perform Clean' Emergency | CO Private Key:Paired With | | TWT CA Public Key Certificate | Wired Entry via Key Loader Wired Output via Key Loader | eMMC (Flash) File System - SSP storage:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext | Each API service call | Management Application 'Perform Clean' Emergency | | | FW Load | Wired | eMMC (Flash) File | Each FW | Management | | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 47 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 17: SSP Table 2 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------| | Public Key | Entry via Key Loader | System - SSP storage:Plaintext RAM:Plaintext | Load API service call | Application 'Perform Clean' Emergency | | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 48 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |---------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------| | SHA2-256 (A5395) | SHA2-256 | Secure Hash | SW/FW Integrity | Module becomes operational | File system FW Integrity test, FPGA FW Integrity test | ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------| | AES-CTR (C1431) | 256-bit AES key | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt KAT | CAST | Module is operational | Encryption, Decryption (Separately) | Power up | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) (A5395) | PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048 bit key and SHA2- 256 | Sign KAT | CAST | Module is operational | Sign | Power up | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) (A5395) | PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048 bit key and SHA2- 256 | Verify KAT | CAST | Module is operational | Verify | Power up | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) (A5395) | PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048 bit key and SHA2- 256 | Verify KAT | SW/FW Load | TSM Software Download PC app shows status | Verify | FW Load | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|--------------------------| | SHA2-256 (A5395) | Secure Hash | SW/FW Integrity | On demand | Power cycling the module | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 49 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------------------| | AES-CTR (C1431) | Separate Encrypt and Decrypt KAT | CAST | On demand | Power cycling the module | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5395) | Sign KAT | CAST | On demand | Power cycling the module | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5395) | Verify KAT | CAST | On demand | Power cycling the module | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5395) | Verify KAT | SW/FW Load | On FW Load | FW Load | The selftests are not repeated during module's operation. ### 10.4 Error States Table 22: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | 1st failure | All pre-operational and conditional self-tests run at power-on are not completed within 2- minutes. | At power-on reset, wait 2 minutes for tests to complete | Manually power cycle and subsequent start up without errors | Implicit: No I/O with User and CO modes | | 2nd failure | All pre-operational and conditional self-tests run at power-on are not completed within 2- minutes. | At power-on reset, wait 2 minutes for tests to complete | No recovery | Implicit: No I/O with User and CO modes | ### 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests The operator can initiate self-tests by putting the module through a power cycle. ### 10.6 Additional Information When self-test is completed with no failures, the CO and User mode data interfaces will be enabled. The CO can run the Management App to display the overall BIT results, including non-security related tests. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 50 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The module(s) ship with the validated firmware. Also, the module(s) ship from the factory with a unique, vendor supplied, operator-specific CO Certificate and Network Key credentials. Instructions are shown in the table below. To operate in the Approved mode, the following actions are required by a Crypto Officer when module(s) are received from the Factory: - Apply anti-tamper sealant, TrellisWare P/N 800AAA0036 to all access fasteners. - o The instructions for sealant application are discussed in Section 7.2 of this Security Policy The following load procedure can be used at any time it becomes necessary or desired: - Re-initialize a module after zeroization. - Upgrade to the latest validated FW version. After successful completion of this procedure, the module operates in the Approved mode. The instructions are listed below: - Setup: Plaintext physical port available on all module types. - o The Crypto Officer shall be physically present and in control of the module. - o The Crypto Officer shall inspect the module as per Section 7 in this policy to ensure the Physical Security Mechanisms are not tampered. - o For all steps in this section, the Crypto Officer shall connect directly to any Wired Interface. - o Remote access to the wired interface is a strict violation of this Security Policy. The wired interface must only be accessed locally. - Cycle power on the module: - o Using Power button - Use the 'Firmware Upgrade' service. The TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool provides Crypto Officer authenticated access to the service. - o Note that the module is shipped from the factory with the validated firmware. - o From the tool, observe that the validated firmware version identified in this Security Policy document is installed on the module. - o Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140 - 3 validation. - Power-cycle the module. The module will enter the Approved mode of operation following successful power up initialization. - o The TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool and Management App will indicate the Approved mode is enabled, FW version and CO Certificate name. - o Crypto Officer access to these tools indicates that power-on and conditional self-tests are not failing. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 51 of 52 TW-900-F/950-F TSM Shadow, TW-880-F TSM Ghost Embedded, TW-870-F/875-F TSM Ghost, TW-135-F TSM Shadow High-Power FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance - Each customer shall assign one or more persons to act as Crypto Officers. - Only Crypto Officers shall be provided access to the TrellisWare Technologies, Inc configuration tools and API documentation. - Crypto Officers and other administrators shall be familiar with this Security Policy document and follow the startup procedures in Section 11.1 above. - The following TrellisWare TNC web app command and related steps shall not be used in the Approved mode of operation: 'Certificate Update -> Generate Certificate'. - If the Generate Certificate command is accidentally performed by the CO, the module will still be in the Approved mode, as the generated certificate will not be used as a CSP without also performing the following disallowed manual steps. - o The CO shall not add 'generate.p12' to Firefox or other browser used to access the module's web apps, as the module will subsequently no longer be in the Approved mode. Note: Adding a certificate to a browser requires several manual steps and could not happen by accident. - When using the Crypto Officer role, the module shall be on a LAN with sufficient security controls to ensure that no other devices are analyzing or storing network traffic. It is required that the LAN have only one PC with TrellisWare tools and one or more radios to be configured. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance - All persons who have access to the Cryptographic module(s) covered by this Security Policy document shall take care to keep the module(s) secure from loss and tampering. - All persons who have access to the module(s) shall be trained to inspect the module(s) and shall report to administrators any evidence of tampering, damage or loss. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not mitigate other attacks This document may be freely reproduced and distributed (without revision). Page 52 of 52