© 2021 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]
Ultrastar®
He10
and Ultrastar®
DC HC510 TCG Enterprise
HDD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Version: 2.9
2021-07-22
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DC HC510 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 2 of 19
CONTENTS
1. Cryptographic Module Overview.............................................................................................................4
1.1 Models......................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Level..........................................................................................................................................................................6
2. Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................................6
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation..................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Approved Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................................................6
3. Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................7
4. Identification and Authentication Policy.................................................................................................7
4.1 Cryptographic Officer...........................................................................................................................................................7
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority ......................................................................................................................................7
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority .............................................................................................................................................7
4.2 BandMaster (User).................................................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Anybody ..................................................................................................................................................................................8
4.4 Maker .......................................................................................................................................................................................8
5. Access Control Policy ................................................................................................................................9
5.1 Roles and Services .................................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Unauthenticated Services....................................................................................................................................................10
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) .........................................................................................................10
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters........................................................................................................................11
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations.......................................................................................................11
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access ................................................................................................................................11
6. Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................13
7. Security Rules ............................................................................................................................................13
7.1 Invariant Rules......................................................................................................................................................................13
7.2 Initialization Rules ...............................................................................................................................................................14
7.3 Zeroization Rules.................................................................................................................................................................14
8. Physical Security Policy............................................................................................................................14
8.1 Mechanisms ..........................................................................................................................................................................14
8.2 Operator Responsibility......................................................................................................................................................15
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy........................................................................................................15
10. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................15
11. Acronyms...................................................................................................................................................17
12. References..................................................................................................................................................18
12.1 NIST Specifications.............................................................................................................................................................18
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications ......................................................................................................................18
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards ...........18
12.4 Corporate Documents ........................................................................................................................................................18
12.5 SCSI Commands..................................................................................................................................................................19
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 3 of 19
Tables
Table 1 - Cryptographic Module Models.......................................................................................................5
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification..............................................................................................6
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms ............................................................................................................7
Table 4 - Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces............................................................7
Table 5 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...............................................................8
Table 6 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths............................................................................................8
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services .............................................................................................................9
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services...............................................................................................................10
Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys...................................................................................................................11
Table 10 - Public Security Parameters..........................................................................................................11
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services.............................................................................12
Table 12 - SCSI Commands...........................................................................................................................19
Figures
Figure 1: Ultrastar He10
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1...................................................4
Figure 2: Ultrastar He10
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2...................................................4
Figure 3: Ultrastar DC HC510 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1 ......................................4
Figure 4: Ultrastar DC HC510 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2 ......................................5
Figure 3: Tamper Evident Seal ......................................................................................................................15
Figure 4: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal...............................................................................................15
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1. Cryptographic Module Overview
The self-encrypting Ultrastar® He10 and Ultrastar® DC HC510 TCG Enterprise HDD, hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar
He10”, “Ultrastar DC HC510” or “the Cryptographic Module” is a multiple chip embedded module that complies
with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. The Ultrastar DC HC510 is a rebranded version of the Ultrastar He10. The
Cryptographic Module complies with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The enclosure of
the Cryptographic Module defines the cryptographic boundary. See Figures 1 through 4. When operating in
Approved Mode, the Cryptographic Module disables the serial port pins shown to the left of the SAS connector, in
Figure 2 and Figure 4. Except for the four-conductor motor control cable, all components within this boundary
comply the FIPS 140-2 requirements. The four-conductor motor control cable is not security relevant and therefore
excluded from the FIPS 140-2 validation.
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 1: Ultrastar He10 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 2: Ultrastar He10 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 3: Ultrastar DC HC510 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1
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Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 4: Ultrastar DC HC510 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2
1.1 Models
The Cryptographic Module is available in several models that vary by storage capacity and block size. The
validated models listed below utilize the listed base version of Cryptographic Module firmware and associated
security library. The hardware version of each model is enclosed in the parenthesis that follow each part
number.
Part Number
(Hardware Version)
Firmware Description
HUH721010AL5205 (1)
HUH721010AL5205 (2)
R308, R328, R32A, R32G, R384, R3RE,
R3RF, R3RM, R610, R640, LE02, LM10,
NA00, NA01, NA03, NE00, NE02, NE03
10TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM,
12 Gb/s, SAS
HUH721010AL4205 (1)
HUH721010AL4205 (2)
R308, R328, R32A, R32G, R384, R3C0,
R3R0, R3RF, R3RM, R3X8, R610, R614,
R640, LM10, NA00, NA01, NA02, NA03,
NE00, NE01, NE03
10TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM,
12 Gb/s, SAS
HUH721008AL5205 (1)
HUH721008AL5205 (2)
R308, R328, R32A, R32G, R384, R610,
LM10, NA00, NA01, NE00
8TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM,
12 Gb/s, SAS
HUH721008AL4205 (1)
HUH721008AL4205 (2)
R308, R328, R32A, R32G, R384, R610, R614,
LM10, NA00, NA01, NE00
8TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM,
12 Gb/s, SAS
Table 1 - Cryptographic Module Models
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1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
FIPS 140-2
Security Requirements Section
FIPS 140-2
Security Level Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module enters FIPS
Approved Mode after successful completion of the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions. The FIPS mode bit
is set to 1 after the Cryptographic Officer executes the Set Makers.Enabled = FALSE instruction. The Cryptographic
Officer shall not enable the Maker Authority after the Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved mode. If the
Cryptographic Officer enables the Maker Authority after the module enters FIPS Approved mode the Cryptographic
Officer must also zeroize the module by executing the TCG Revert Method. The Cryptographic Officer shall not
exercise the Disable Zeroize service after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with NIST SP 800-131A.
FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP Certificate
ASIC AES ECB-128, AES ECB-256 3881
ASIC AES XTS-128, AES XTS-2561
Note: XTS is only used for storage applications.
AES XTS-128 was tested but not used.
3881
AES ECB-256 (Firmware) 3880
RSA 2048 PSS Verify using SHA-256 (Cert. #3203 or Cert.
#3204)
1978
SHA-256 (Firmware) 3203
1
The length of the XTS-AES data unit does not exceed 220
blocks.
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP Certificate
SHA-256 (Hardware & Firmware) 3204
HMAC-SHA-256
Used in SP 800-132 PBKDF
2522
SP 800-132 PBKDF Vendor Affirmed
SP 800-38F AES-256 Key Wrap 3880
SP 800-90A CTR DRBG 1108
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but Allowed algorithm:
• Hardware NDRNG for seeding the Approved SP800-90A DRBG
3. Ports and Interfaces
Table 4 below identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The Cryptographic Module does not provide
a maintenance access interface.
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Ports
Power Power connector [SAS]
Control Input SAS connector [SAS]
Status Output SAS connector [SAS]
Data Input SAS connector [SAS]
Data Output SAS connector [SAS]
Table 4 - Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator roles. Table 5 maps TCG authorities to FIPS
140-2 roles.
4.1 Cryptographic Officer
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority
This TCG authority initializes the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.3.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem
Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role.
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority
This TCG authority can selectively zeroize bands within the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG
Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role. The TCG EraseMaster authority can
disable Users and erase LBA bands (user data regions).
4.2 BandMaster (User)
User roles correspond to Bandmaster Authorities. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class:
Enterprise Specification provides a definition. Users have the authority to lock, unlock, and configure LBA bands
(user data regions) and to issue read and write commands to the SED.
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4.3 Anybody
Services are provided that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not disclose, modify, or
substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the security of the
Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output from an
instance of the SP800-90A DRBG.
4.4 Maker
For failure analysis purposes, out of scope services are available to the vendor to configure and perform failure
analysis within the vendor’s facilities after the cryptographic module exits FIPS Approved mode. The Maker authority
is disabled when the Cryptographic Officer invokes the Initialize Cryptographic Module service.
TCG Authority Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID Authority
The SID Authority is a Cryptographic
Officer role that initializes the
Cryptographic Module and authorizes
Firmware download.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (TCG
SID Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
Authority
The EraseMaster Authority is a
Cryptographic Officer role that zeroizes
Media Encryption keys and disables
Users.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG
EraseMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG EraseMaster PIN)
BandMaster N
(N = 0 to 15)
BandMaster is User role that controls
read/write access to LBA Bands. Role-based
User Identity (TCG
BandMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
Anybody is a role that does not require
authentication.
Unauthenticated N/A
Maker (Disabled)
Maker is a TCG Authority that is not
available upon completion of the
Initialize Cryptographic Module service
Role-based
User Identity (TCG Maker
Authority) and PIN (Maker
PIN)
Table 5 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN).
Authentication Mechanism Mechanism Strength
TCG Credential (PIN)
TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides 2256 possible values. The
probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in 2256 (approximately
(8.64 x 10-78) which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one at a
time) and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not exceed
the associated TriesLimit value. Any authentication attempt consumes at least
approximately 750 microseconds. Hence, at most, approximately 80,000
authentication attempts are possible in one minute. Thus, the probability that a
false acceptance occurs a one-minute interval is approximately 6.91 x 10-73 which
is significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Table 6 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths
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5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Service Description Role(s)
Initialize Cryptographic
Module2
Cryptographic Officer provisions the Cryptographic Module from
organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
Authenticate Input a TCG Credential for authentication
CO, Users, Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download service
CO
(SID Authority)
Firmware Download
Load and utilize RSA2048 PSS and SHA-256 to verify the entire
firmware image. If the new self-tests complete successfully, the
SED executes the new code. Unlocking the Firmware Download
Control enables the downloading of firmware.
CO
(SID Authority)
Disable Zeroize
Disable TCG Revert method (Not allowed in the FIPS Approved
mode)
CO
(SID Authority)
Set
Write data structures; access control enforcement occurs per data
structure field. PINs can be changed using this service.
CO, Users, Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Set LBA Band
Set the starting location, size, and
attributes of a set of contiguous Logical Blocks
Users
(BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band
Users
(BandMasters)
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data to ciphertext and write in a LBA
band
Users
(BandMasters)
Read Data Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output user plaintext data
Users
(BandMasters)
Set Data Store Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage
Users
(BandMasters)
Erase LBA Band
Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA band encryption
keys to new values. Erasing an LBA band with EraseMaster sets
the TCG Credential to the default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services
2
See Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning within the Ultrastar He10 SAS OEM Specification
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5.2 Unauthenticated Services
The Cryptographic Module provides these unauthenticated services via the Anybody role:
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Get FIPS Mode TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic Module.
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
Zeroize TCG Revert method to return the Cryptographic Module to its original manufactured
state. The PSID authentication data is printed on the external label
SCSI [SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage device. See
Table 12 - SCSI Commands
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor3
This service reports the FIPS 140 revision as well as the cryptographic module’s overall
security level, hardware revision, firmware revision and module name.
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the following CSPs:
Key Name Type Description
Cryptographic Officer PIN - TCG
Credential (2 total)
256-bit authentication data Authenticates the Cryptographic Officer
roles
User PIN –TCG Credential (16 total) 256-bit authentication data Authenticates the User roles
MEK - Media Encryption Key4
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
XTS-AES-256 (512 bits) Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. This
key is only associated with one key scope.
KEK – Key Encrypting Key (16 total) SP 800-132 PBKDF (256 bits) Keys derived from User PINs that wrap
the MEKs. Keys protected by this SP 800-
132 PBKDF derived key shall not leave the
module.
NDRNG 256-byte Entropy output Entropy source for DRBG
3
See Compliance Descriptor Overview within the Ultrastar He10 SAS OEM Specification
4
A concatenation of XTS-AES Key1 (256 bits) and XTS-AES Key2 (256 bits)
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Key Name Type Description
DRBG Internal CTR_DRBG state
(384 bits)
All properties and state associated with the
SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit
Generator
Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module contains the following public key:
Key Name Type Description
RSAPublicKey[0] RSA 2048 public key Primary key used to verify firmware downloads
RSAPublicKey[1] RSA 2048 public key Secondary key used to verify firmware downloads
Table 10 - Public Security Parameters
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF).
• The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Key Derivation Function (KDF). The Cryptographic
Module tracks TCG Credentials (PINs) by hashing a 256-bit salt and User PIN and storing the SHA256
digest in the Reserved Area. The digest is the CSP labeled AUTH.
• The cryptographic module complies with SP800-132 Option 2a.
• KEKs (SP800-132 Master Keys) derive from passing a User PIN (SP800-132 Password) and 256-bit salt
though an SP800-132 KDF. The cryptographic module creates a unique KEK for each LBA Band.
• Security policy rules set the minimum User PIN length at 32 bytes. The cryptographic module allows values
from 0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of the User PIN.
• Each salt is a random number generated using the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
• The KEK generation process utilizes the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm to generate the keys.
• Each KEK has a security strength of 128-bits against a collision attack.
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing a User PIN is 1/2256.
• The difficulty of guessing the User PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
• The sole use of the KEKs is to wrap and unwrap the Media Encryption Keys (MEKs).
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 11 defines the relationship between access to Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and the different
Cryptographic Module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the SP800-90A DRBG, derives a CSP with
the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The Cryptographic Module writes a CSP. The write access is performed after the Cryptographic
Module generates a CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP.
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Service CSPs and Keys Type of CSP Access
Initialize Cryptographic Module
CO PIN
User PIN
DRBG, NDRNG
KEK
MEK
E, W
E, W
E
G
G, W
Authenticate
CO PIN
User PIN
E
E
Lock/Unlock Firmware Download Control CO PIN E
Firmware Download
CO PIN
RSAFW
E
E
Disable Zeroize CO PIN E
Set
CO PIN
User PIN
E
E
Set LBA Band User PIN E
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
User PIN
KEK
MEK
E
G
E
Write Data
User PIN
MEK
E
E
Read Data
User PIN
MEK
E
E
Set Data Store User PIN E
Erase LBA Band
CO PIN
User PIN
KEK
MEK
E
Z
G
Z, G, W
Self-Test
NDRNG
DRBG
E
W
Reset Module None None
Status Output None None
Get FIPS mode None None
Start Session None None
End Session None None
Generate Random DRBG E
Get None None
Get Data Store None None
Zeroize
CO PIN
User PIN
DRBG
KEK
MEK
W
W
G
G
Z, G, W
SCSI None None
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor None None
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
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6. Operational Environment
When the Cryptographic Module is operational, the environment cannot be modified. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2
operational environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the code working set
cannot be added, deleted or modified; however, firmware can be upgraded (replaced in entirety) with an authenticated
download service. If the download operation is successfully authorized and verified, the Cryptographic Module will
begin operating with the new code working set.
7. Security Rules
Cryptographic Module enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents the
security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Cryptographic Officer and User. The
module also supports an additional role, the Maker role. Initialization disables the Maker role.
2. Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
3. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access to
any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
4. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic Module
enters a soft error state; the error condition is reported via the [SCSI] protocol. Functional commands are
not permitted until a reset or power on reset occurs.
A. Power up Self-Tests
1) Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC
2) AES Encrypt KAT, Cert #3880
3) AES Decrypt KAT, Cert #3880
4) RSA 2048 PSS Verify KAT
5) DRBG KAT
6) DRBG Health Test
7) SHA-256 KAT, Cert #3203
8) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
9) ASIC AES Encrypt KAT, Cert #3881
10) ASIC AES Decrypt KAT, Cert #3881
11) HW/FW SHA-256 KAT, Cert #3204
B. Conditional Tests
1) Continuous Random Number Generator test is performed on the DRBG and the hardware
NDRNG entropy source.
2) Firmware Download Test, RSA 2048 PSS (Cert#1978), SHA-256 (Cert#3204 or Cert#3203)
5. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the
device.
6. If a power-up self-tests fails, the drive will report a UEC that shows which test failed. After reporting the
failure data, the drive will transition to a soft error state.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the
Cryptographic Module.
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10. The zeroization service can delete any plaintext key or CSP.
11. The Cryptographic Module does not support a maintenance interface or maintenance role.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
17. The End Session service deletes the current operator authentication. The Cryptographic Module
requires operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
18. The Cryptographic Officer shall not enable the Maker Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS
Approved mode.
19. The Cryptographic Officer shall not exercise the Disable Zeroize service after the cryptographic module
enters FIPS Approved mode.
20. The Crypto Officer shall assure that all host issued User PINs are 32-bytes in length.
21. The host shall authenticate to LBA Bands after a power cycle.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Cryptographic Officer shall follow the instructions in Section 11.17.4 Cryptographic Module Acceptance
and Provisioning of the Ultrastar He10
Product Specification for acceptance and provisioning procedures.
Instructions include:
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities replacing the MSID (default PIN values).
• Establish the LBA Bands, which causes the Cryptographic Module to generate Media Encryption Keys
• Disable Maker Authority
• Lock the Firmware Download service control
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Cryptographic Officer uses the TCG Revert Method to perform the zeroization function. Revert includes
zeroization of all Critical Security Parameters:
• Operator authentication data (CO PIN, User PIN)
• Key Encryption Key
• Media Encryption Keys
• NDRNG state
• DRBG state
8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Western Digital applies one (1) Tamper-evident security seal during manufacturing.
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• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering.
• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be easily replicated.
Figure 5: Tamper Evident Seal
8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Cryptographic Officer and/or User shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering
a minimum of once a year.
Figure 6: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Cryptographic Module is not designed to mitigate any attacks beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy-use. [SP800-131A] for terms
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the cryptographic module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
1
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• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the
security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a
cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement approved security
functions contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions.
[FIPS140]
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media when the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Integrity: A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized
and undetected manner.
• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the cryptographic
module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters (e.g., authentication data) during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
• Method: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique default value that vendors assign to each SED during manufacturing.
Typically, it is printed on an external label and is readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default
value for all TCG credentials. [TCG Core]
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to authenticate
an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Unencrypted data.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for physical signals. [FIPS140]
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information whose modification can compromise the security of the
cryptographic module (e.g., a public key of a key pair).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
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• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Security Identifier (SID): A TCG authority used by the Cryptographic Officer. [TCG Core]
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services.
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
• User Data: Data transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• CO: Cryptographic Office [FIPS140]
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check
• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
• HDD: Hard Disk Drive
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard
• KDF: Key Derivation Function
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID (Manufactured Security Identifier): a public, drive-unique value that is created during manufacturing
and is used as default PIN credential values
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator that is the source of entropy for the DRBG
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): a SED unique value that is printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
and is used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SED: Self encrypting Drive
• SID: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• UEC: Universal Error Code
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• XTS: A mode of AES
12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, 2001, November
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, 2013, July
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2002 December
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, 2008, July
• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, 2015 August
• [SP800-38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, 2010 January
• [SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
2012 December
• [SP800-57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, 2016 January
• [SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, 2015 June
• [SP800-90B] Recommendation for Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST, 2018, January
• [SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths (Revision 1), NIST, 2015 November
• [SP800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, 2010 December
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00 (January 10,
2011)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version
1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical
Committee Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands-4 (SPC-4)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands-3 (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI-3 (SAS-3)
12.4 Corporate Documents
• [Product Specification] Ultrastar DC HC 510 (He10) SAS OEM Specification, Version 2.2 (May 1, 2018),
https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-dc-hc500-series-hdd
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• [D&O] Delivery & Operation (Cryptographic Officer) Manual, Version: 0.8 (February 26, 2016)
12.5 SCSI Commands
Description Code Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h RESERVE 16h
INQUIRY 12h RESERVE 56h
LOG SELECT 4Ch REZERO UNIT 01h
LOG SENSE 4Dh SANITIZE 48h
MODE SELECT 15h SEEK (6) 0Bh
MODE SELECT 55h SEEK (10) 2Bh
MODE SENSE 1Ah SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
MODE SENSE 5Ah SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh START STOP UNIT 1Bh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h TEST UNIT READY 00h
READ (6) 08h UNMAP 42h
READ (10) 28h VERIFY (10) 2Fh
READ (12) A8h VERIFY (12) AFh
READ (16) 88h VERIFY (16) 8Fh
READ (32) 7Fh/09h VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
READ BUFFER 3Ch WRITE (6) 0Ah
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h WRITE (10) 2Ah
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h WRITE (12) AAh
READ DEFECT DATA 37h WRITE (16) 8Ah
READ DEFECT DATA B7h WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
READ LONG 3Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS
RESULTS
1Ch WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
RELEASE 17h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
RELEASE 57h WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
REPORT LUNS A0h WRITE SAME (10) 41h
REPORT SUPPORTED
OPERATION CODES
A3h/0Ch WRITE SAME (16) 93h
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h
Table 12 - SCSI Commands