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Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Kamakura Works
CRYP CARD
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................10
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................10
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................11
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................11
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................11
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................12
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................15
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................15
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................15
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................15
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................16
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................16
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................16
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................16
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................16
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................17
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................17
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................17
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................18
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................18
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9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................18
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................20
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................20
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................20
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................21
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................21
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................22
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................22
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................22
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................23
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................24
Appendix A. Glossary................................................................................................................25
Appendix B. References ...........................................................................................................25
Page 4 of 25
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Security Function Implementations............................................................................... 9
Table 6: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................11
Table 7: Authentication Methods...............................................................................................11
Table 8: Roles...........................................................................................................................11
Table 9: Approved Services ......................................................................................................15
Table 10: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................16
Table 11: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................17
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................18
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................18
Table 14: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................19
Table 15: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................20
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................21
Table 17: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................21
Table 18: Error States...............................................................................................................21
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2: Module View ............................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3: Tamper seals .............................................................................................................17
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document defines the FIPS140-3 non-proprietary security policy of Mitsubishi Electric
FIPS140-3 CRYP CARD (hereinafter, referred to as “CRYP CARD” or “this module”). CRYP
CARD provides various services which enable the operators to encrypt/decrypt or authenticate
data with properly managed and protected keys.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security N/A
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
CRYP CARD is designed to be used as an important building block in an embedded equipment.
Operators can operate this module mainly via SpaceWire (SpW) [1] Interface. The primary
functions are:
⚫ Approved Security Functions
⚫ Key Installation and Protection
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
Cryptographic Boundary:
Figure 1 shows the block diagram and the cryptographic boundary of CRYP CARD. All the
components of this module are included within the cryptographic boundary. CRYP CARD is
entirely contained within a metal enclosure that serves as a physical cryptographic boundary.
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This module is equipped with four types of physical interfaces shown below. Four types of
physical interfaces are provided by the connector.
⚫ SpaceWire ch0 Interface
⚫ SpaceWire ch1 Interface
⚫ POWER Interface
⚫ EIA-422 Interface
Most services are implemented by two FPGAs.
⚫ CTRL FPGA: controls of the CALC FPGA, interfaces and SSPs.
⚫ CALC FPGA: calculation of security functions.
Detailed specifications of logical interfaces and services are explained in Section 3 and 4.
Note: the CALC FPGA is the OE for the approved algorithms. The OE on the CAVP is labeled
"CRYP CARD FPGA".
Figure 1: Block Diagram
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Figure 2: Module View
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Table 2 shows tested module configurations. The Module identifier and version of this module
can be checked in the status register of RMAP registers.
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
F7P4788-G03 1.0 N/A N/A N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
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2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
All services are
operated in this
mode.
Approved The successful completion of a service is
an implicit indicator for the use of an
approved service.
Table 3: Modes List and Description
As shown in Table 3, CRYP CARD has only the approved mode. All services in this module are
performed in the approved mode.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-
CMAC
A7719,
A7720
Direction - Generation
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A7719,
A7720
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A7719,
A7720
Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7719,
A7720
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
SHA2-256 A7719,
A7720
Message Length - Message Length: 0-8192
Increment 256
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KTS-UNWRAP KTS-Unwrap Unwrap a
wrapped key
Standard:N/A
IG
D.G:Approved
method from IG
D.G
AES-GCM:
(A7719)
Direction:
Decrypt
AES-GCM BC-Auth Authenticated
AES Encryption
and AES
Decryption
AES-GCM:
(A7719, A7720)
AES-CTR BC-UnAuth AES-CTR
Encryption and
AES-CTR
Decryption
AES-CTR:
(A7719, A7720)
AES-ECB BC-UnAuth AES-ECB
Encryption and
AES-ECB
Decryption
AES-ECB:
(A7719, A7720)
AES-CMAC MAC CMAC Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
AES-CMAC:
(A7719, A7720)
SHA2-256 SHA Message Digest
Generation
SHA2-256:
(A7719, A7720)
Password
Installation
BC-AuthDecrypt
SHA
Password
Installation
SHA2-256:
(A7719)
AES-GCM:
(A7719)
Direction:
Decrypt
Role-based
Authentication
SHA Role-based
Authentication
SHA2-256:
(A7719)
Table 5: Security Function Implementations
All the algorithms shown in Table 5 are implemented as security function and can be performed
by operators.
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-GCM encryption supports only the internal IV mode. The IV consists of concatenation of a
32-bit name field and a 64-bit counter field. The internal IV is stored in non-volatile memory
(MRAM) and managed by this module so that it is incremented by 1 every time AES-GCM
encryption is performed. Since data link rate of SpW between this module and user module is
up to 20 [Mbps], the counter part of the IV never exhausts the maximum number of possible
values.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
The module does not have or use an entropy source.
2.9 Key Generation
N/A for this module.
2.10 Key Establishment
The Key Transport Scheme (KTS) as specified in IG D.G implemented by the module is listed in
Section 2.5 and 2.6.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
SpaceWire
ch0
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Plain or encrypted SSPs and data. Module Status data.
Control data.
SpaceWire
ch1
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Plain or encrypted SSPs and data. Module Status data.
Control data.
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
POWER Status
Output
Power
Power monitor. DC 5V +/- 0.25V Power.
EIA-422 Control Input Reset.
Table 6: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not have any external input or output devices that can be used for data input,
data output, status output, or control input.
The module does not implement control output interface.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Password
Authentication
128-bit PIN
(Memorized secret)
SHA2-256 2^128<
1.0×10^12
3×2^128<
1.0×10^11
Table 7: Authentication Methods
CRYP CARD authenticates operators with role-based authentication. CRYP CARD takes as
input a password from a purported operator, computes its HASH value, and compares it with the
one which has been installed as legitimate. The strength of authentication mechanism that an
illegitimate operator succeeds in impersonation is 1.0 × 10^-12 for each attempt and 1.0 × 10^-
11 for multi attempt during a one-minute period, because CRYP CARD takes a preventive
approach that it allows no more than three attempts in one minute.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO Password Authentication
User Role User Password Authentication
Table 8: Roles
CRYP CARD accepts two roles: Crypto Officer, and User. Table 8 shows the details of the roles
and corresponding service commands that operators can input and output from CRYP CARD.
Operators cannot take both roles simultaneously. After Power ON or reset, operators need to be
authenticated with their role solely identified to proceed to perform applicable services. The role
cannot be changed by any methods except for Power OFF or reset.
Operators can change their PINs using the password installation service. The default password
shall be changed prior to the actual operation of CRYP CARD. Otherwise, the approved security
function services (SHA2-256, AES-CMAC, AES-GCM, AES-CTR, and AES-ECB services), and
the key services (Key Installation and Key Setting services) cannot be performed.
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4.3 Approved Services
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
SHA2-256 Used to
generate a
SHA2-256
message
digest
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Messag
e
Message
digest
SHA2-256 Crypto
Officer
User
AES-CMAC
Generation
Used to
generation
a MAC
using
AES-
CMAC
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Messag
e
MAC AES-
CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
User
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
AES-GCM ENC Used to
perform
authentica
ted
symmetric
encryption
with AES-
GCM
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
AAD,
Plaintex
t
Ciphertex
t, Tag,
AES
GCM IV
AES-GCM Crypto
Officer
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
- AES GCM
IV: G,R,W,E
User
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
- AES GCM
IV: G,R,W,E
AES-GCM DEC Used to
perform
authentica
ted
symmetric
decryption
with AES-
GCM
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Ciphert
ext, IV,
AAD,
Tag
Plaintext AES-GCM Crypto
Officer
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
User
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
AES-CTR ENC Used to
perform
Security
Function
Plaintex
t, IV
Ciphertex
t
AES-CTR Crypto
Officer
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
symmetric
encryption
with AES-
CTR
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
User
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
AES-CTR DEC Used to
perform
symmetric
decryption
with AES-
CTR
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Ciphert
ext, IV
Plaintext AES-CTR Crypto
Officer
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
User
- AES Key:
E
- Temporary
AES Key: E
AES-ECB ENC Used to
perform
symmetric
encryption
with AES-
ECB
Security
Function
output
result of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Plaintex
t
Ciphertex
t
AES-ECB Crypto
Officer
- Temporary
AES Key: E
User
- Temporary
AES Key: E
Key
Installation(KEK)
Installation
of the
KEK.
Key
Installation
status of
RMAP
register:
'd2
KEK, IV N/A KTS-
UNWRAP
Crypto
Officer
- KEK: W
- Default
KEK: E
Key
Installation(AES
Key)
Installation
of the AES
key.
Key
Installation
status of
RMAP
register:
'd2
AES
Key, IV
N/A KTS-
UNWRAP
Crypto
Officer
- KEK: E
- AES Key:
W
Key
Installation(Tem
porary AES Key)
Installation
of the
Temporary
AES Key.
Key
Installation
status of
RMAP
register:
'd2
Tempor
ary AES
Key
N/A None Crypto
Officer
- Temporary
AES Key: W
User
- Temporary
AES Key: W
Key Setting(AES
Key)
Decryption
and
Key
Setting
Key
number
N/A KTS-
UNWRAP
Crypto
Officer
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
activation
of AES
Key for
using in
the
approved
security
function
service
related to
AES.
status of
RMAP
register:
'd2
- KEK: E
- AES Key:
R
User
- KEK: E
- AES Key:
R
Password
Installation
Installation
of its own
role's
password.
Password
setting
status of
RMAP
register:
'd2
PIN, IV N/A Password
Installation
Crypto
Officer
- PIN: W
- KEK: E
User
- PIN: W
- KEK: E
Role-based
Authentication
Authentica
tion for
Crypto
Officer or
User
Password
Authentica
tion status
of RMAP
register:
'd2
Role,
PIN
N/A Role-
based
Authentica
tion
Unauthentic
ated
- PIN: E
Self-test Execution
of the self-
test by the
device
reset.
N/A N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
User
Unauthentic
ated
Reset Zeroisatio
n of
Temporary
AES by
the device
reset.
zeroize
status of
RMAP
register:
'b1
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
- Temporary
AES Key: Z
User
- Temporary
AES Key: Z
Unauthentic
ated
- Temporary
AES Key: Z
Plain CSP
Initialization
Zeroisatio
n of KEK
and PIN.
zeroize
status of
RMAP
register:
'b1
zeroizat
ion
code
N/A None Crypto
Officer
- KEK: Z
- PIN: Z
Unauthentic
ated
- KEK: Z
- PIN: Z
Page 15 of 25
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show status Output
CRYP
CARD's
status,
informatio
n, and
indicators.
N/A N/A CRYP
CARD's
status,
informati
on
None Crypto
Officer
User
Unauthentic
ated
Show version Output
CRYP
CARD's
versioning
informatio
n
N/A N/A Module
Identificat
ion and
Version
Informati
on
None Crypto
Officer
User
Unauthentic
ated
Table 9: Approved Services
Details of the approved services are shown in Table 9. Operators are provided with all services
excluding Self-test and Reset by RMAP access. The Self-test services are performed after
Power OFF/ON via Power Interface or reset via EIA-422 or RMAP access.
If an unauthenticated operator performs the Plain CSP Initialization service, the entire MRAM
area excluding the encrypted CSPs is zeroized. In contrast, if a CO operator performs the Plain
CSP Initialization service, it is possible to specify the target CSP for zeroizing.
Table 9 uses acronyms defined below.
⚫ G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
⚫ R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
⚫ W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
⚫ E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
⚫ Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
N/A for this module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
Software/Firmware Security requirement is not applicable to this module because it incorporates
NO software, firmware, or FPGA configuration data within its memory chips. This module is
equipped with antifuse-based FPGAs whose circuits are programmed during manufacturing at
the vender’s factory and never reprogrammed again.
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5.2 Initiate on Demand
N/A for this module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Metal removable
cover
Periodically compare the current condition of the
enclosures with the previous record.
Tamper seals Periodically compare the current condition of the tamper
seals with the previous record.
Table 10: Mechanisms and Actions Required
CRYP CARD is multiple-chip embedded hardware module contained within a metal removable
cover sealed with tamper-evident seals. Figure 3 indicates the precise placement of tamper
seals.
Page 17 of 25
Figure 3: Tamper seals
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
MRAM Non-volatile memory that is zeroised by the plain
CSP initialization service.
Static
Registers or BRAMs in
FPGA
Volatile memory that is zeroised by the reset service. Dynamic
OTP in FPGA Hardcoded in FPGA. Static
Table 11: Storage Areas
Page 18 of 25
As shown in Table 11, SSPs (excluding the default KEK) are stored in MRAM memory. Also,
they are stored temporarily in registers or BRAMs of FPGA. The default KEK is hard-coded into
the anti-fuse FPGA, i.e. it is stored in the OTP in the FPGA.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Key
Installation
Outside the
module
MRAM Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS-
UNWRAP
Password
Installation
Outside the
module
MRAM Encrypted Manual Electronic Password
Installation
Temporary
Key
Installation
Outside the
module
Registers
or BRAMs
in FPGA
Plaintext Manual Electronic
AES GCM
IV output
Registers
or BRAMs
in FPGA
Outside the
module
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods
This module does not support CSP output methods.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Plain CSP
Initialization
0x00 is written to each
memory to cell three
times.
The SSPs are
overwritten by 0x00.
By calling the Plain CSP
Initialization service(input
the zeroisation code by
RMAP Write Commands).
Reset Electrically reset and
overwritten by default
value of each register
or BRAM in FPGAs.
Volatile memory used
by the module is
zeroised when power
is removed or reset.
By performing the device
reset by Power OFF/ON,
EIA-422, or RMAP access.
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
KEK Key
encryption
key
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KTS-
UNWRAP
KTS-
UNWRAP
AES Key AES key
used for
encryption,
decryption,
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KTS-
UNWRAP
AES-GCM
AES-CTR
AES-CMAC
Page 19 of 25
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
and
computing
MAC.
Temporar
y AES
Key
Temporary
AES key
used for
encryption,
decryption,
and
computing
MAC.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-GCM
AES-CTR
AES-ECB
AES-CMAC
Default
KEK
Default KEK
used for
installation of
the operator's
KEK and PIN.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KTS-
UNWRAP
PIN authentication
data for role-
based
authentication
128 bits
- 128
bits
Authenticatio
n data - CSP
Role-based
Authenticatio
n
AES
GCM IV
IV((Initializati
on vector)
used in AES-
GCM ENC
service
96 bits -
N/A
IV - PSP AES-GCM
Table 14: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
KEK Key
Installation
MRAM:Plaintext Plain CSP
Initialization
AES
Key:Wraps
AES
Key:Unwraps
Default
KEK:Wrapped
by
AES Key Key
Installation
MRAM:Encrypted N/A KEK:Wrapped
by
Temporary
AES Key
Temporary
Key
Installation
Registers or
BRAMs in
FPGA:Plaintext
From input
to
zeroization.
Reset
Default
KEK
OTP in
FPGA:Plaintext
N/A KEK:Unwraps
PIN Password
Installation
MRAM:Obfuscated Plain CSP
Initialization
AES GCM
IV
AES GCM
IV output
MRAM:Plaintext Plain CSP
Initialization
Page 20 of 25
Table 15: SSP Table 2
Table 14 and Table 15 show Keys and other SSPs in this module. Zeroisation is not applicable
to AES Keys because they are encrypted and authenticated with KEK and are protected CSPs.
It is also not applicable to the default KEK, since it is only used to protect and input the KEK
when it is not stored.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
N/A for this module.
Since CRYP CARD implements none of software, firmware, bypass capabilities, and critical
functions, this module does not perform pre-operational self-tests. Instead of them, conditional
cryptographic algorithm self-tests shown in Table 16 are performed.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A7719)-
Encrypt
AES-GCM
Encryption
KAT using
256 bits key
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
AES
Encryption
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
AES-GCM
(A7719)-
Decrypt
AES-GCM
Decryption
KAT using
256 bits key
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
AES
Decryption
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
AES-GCM
(A7720)-
Encrypt
AES-GCM
Encryption
KAT using
256 bits key
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
AES
Encryption
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
AES-GCM
(A7720)-
Decrypt
AES-GCM
Decryption
KAT using
256 bits key
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
AES
Encryption
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
AES-CMAC
(A7719)
MAC
Generation
KAT
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
MAC
Generation
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
AES-CMAC
(A7720)
MAC
Generation
KAT
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
MAC
Generation
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
SHA2-256
(A7719)
SHA2-256
Message
Digest KAT
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
Message
Digest
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
Page 21 of 25
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA2-256
(A7720)
SHA2-256
Message
Digest KAT
KAT CAST self test
status of
RMAP
register: 'd2
Message
Digest
Performed
when the
module is
powered on
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests
Table 16 shows conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CAST) that this module supports.
CRYP CARD does not support any other conditional self-tests because it contains NO pair-wise
keys generation, software/firmware load, manual entry services, bypass capabilities, and critical
functions.
AES-CTR (encryption and decryption) and AES-ECB (encryption) are not included in the CAST
target list because they are significantly simpler than AES-GCM (encryption and decryption).
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
N/A for this module.
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
(A7719)-Encrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM
(A7719)-Decrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM
(A7720)-Encrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM
(A7720)-Decrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CMAC
(A7719)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CMAC
(A7720)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256
(A7719)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256
(A7720)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
Table 17: Conditional Periodic Information
Operators can manually initiate CAST on demand by the device reset.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Error
State
Cannot perform any
services except for the
status output service and
the reset service.
Failure of the
conditional self-
test
The only method to
clear this error state
is to reset the
module.
current state
of RMAP
register: 'hFF
Table 18: Error States
Page 22 of 25
Table 18 shows the error state defined in this module. When KATs returned to an error, this
module enters the error state. The indicator is the current state of RMAP register; by RMAP
Read access to the register, operators can recognize entering the error state. No services are
available in the error state except for the status output service and the reset service. Instead, by
resetting CRYP CARD, the self-tests are performed automatically after general initialization
process.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
This module accepts no additional installation of software and firmware throughout its life cycle.
Before or after integration into another embedded modules or systems, CRYP CARD can be
initiated by the steps shown below. Details are given in Section 11.2 and 11.3.
⚫ Password Installation
⚫ Key installation
11.2 Administrator Guidance
This section describes guidance for Crypto Officer (CO).
Interfaces and Services for CO:
All Interfaces shown in Table 6 are available for CO, and services for CO are listed in Table 9.
Distributing by CO:
It is necessary to maintain security when distributing this module that tamper seals and
enclosures shall be verified at least at the beginning and end of distribution.
Initialization and startup steps for CO:
Step 1: Power on.
Step 2: Before initialization, CRYP CARD is set to use the default KEK and CO’s PIN. No
KEK, AES Keys or CO’s PIN are stored in MRAM. To confirm that these SSPs are
not changed after manufacturing, CO should check the key installation information
or other configuration information by the status output service via RMAP Read
Commands after Power on.
Step 3: For installation of CO’s CSPs, the operator shall perform the role-based
authentication service via RMAP Write Commands. The Default CO’s PIN for the
first role authentication is a default value, which are separately notified by the
vender.
Step 4: After authenticating CO’s role, a new PIN shall be installed. In the installation
process, the new PIN and the default PIN are input via RMAP Write Commands.
While the default PIN is input as plaintext, the new PIN shall be encrypted and
authenticated by AES-GCM using the default KEK. Details of the encryption
procedure and the default KEK are also separately notified by the vender.
Step 5: CO’s own KEK shall be installed by the key installation service via RMAP Write
Commands. The new KEK shall be encrypted and authenticated by AES-GCM
using the default KEK.
Page 23 of 25
Step 6: (Optional) CO can install AES Keys for the approved security function services
related to AES.
. These keys shall be encrypted and authenticated by AES-GCM using the CO’s KEK. This
step is applicable even when the module is in operation.
Step 7: Power off.
Operation for CO:
After being authenticated as CO, and confirming configurations of CRYP CARD through RMAP
accesses, CO can perform any services listed in Table 9.
Sanitization for CO:
To sanitize all plain CSPs, Plain CSP Initialization service shall be performed. In case of
sanitization of all encrypted CSPs, destruction of this module is needed.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
This section describes guidance for User.
Interfaces and Services for User:
All Interfaces shown in Table 6 are available for User, and services for users are listed in Table
9.
Distributing by User:
It is necessary to maintain security when distributing this module that tamper seals and
enclosures shall be verified at least at the beginning and end of distribution.
Initialization and startup steps for User:
initialization and startup steps for User must be performed after CO’s initialization.
Step 1: Power on.
Step 2: When User first uses the module for initialization, CRYP CARD does not contain
User's operational PIN in MRAM and accepts only the User's default PIN. Prior to
initialization, User should verify the key installation state by using the status output
service provided by RMAP Read Commands.
Step 3: User shall perform the role-based authentication service by using RMAP Write
Commands to install a new PIN. The default PIN is separately notified by the
vender.
Step 4: After authenticating User’s role, installation of a new PIN shall be performed. RMAP
Write Commands takes as input both the default PIN (as plaintext) and the new PIN
(as encrypted and authenticated using AES-GCM with KEK, where KEK is installed
by CO). It depends on the operators’ standard whether CO or User encrypts the
new PIN. Note that CO needs to notify KEK when the new PIN is encrypted by
User.
Step 5: Power off.
Operation for User:
User can perform all the services in Table 9 when authentication succeeds and configurations of
CRYP CARD are verified as appropriate.
Page 24 of 25
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.
Page 25 of 25
Appendix A. Glossary
SpW Space Wire. A High-speed serial communication protocol used in spacecraft and
satellite systems.
RMAP Remote Memory Access Protocol. A Communication protocol used in embedded
systems of spacecraft to access and control remote memory locations or
registers. RMAP defines a standardized procedure for RMAP Write Command
and RMAP Read Command.
BRAM Block RAM. A type of memory embedded and used in FPGAs.
MRAM Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory. A non-volatile memory technology
that uses magnetic elements to store data.
EIA-422 Also Known as RS-422. A standard for serial communication that defines the
electrical characteristics and signaling and uses differential signaling.
PIN Personal Identification Number. A password used to authenticate CO’s or User’s
role. In this module, PINs are defined as a hex number fixed at 128-bit.
Appendix B. References
[1] ECSS, "ECSS-E-ST-50-12C Rev.1 SpaceWire - Links, nodes, routers and networks," 15
May 2019.
[2] NIST, “FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” 9 May 2023.
[3] NIST, “NIST SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC,” November 2007.
[4] NIST, “NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods
and Techniques,” December 2001.
[5] NIST, “NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC
Mode for Authentication,” 10 June 2016.
[6] NIST, “FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS),” August 2015.
[7] ECSS, “ECSS-E-ST-50-52C SpaceWire - Remote memory access protocol,” 5 February
2010.
[8] NIST, “FIPS140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” 22 March 2019.