Copyright Trapeze Networks 2007. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
MX-200R-GS/MX-216R-GS Mobility
Exchange WLAN Controllers
Security Policy
Trapeze Networks
August 14, 2009
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. MODULE OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................................................3
2. SECURITY LEVEL................................................................................................................................................4
3. MODES OF OPERATION.....................................................................................................................................5
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES .................................................................................................................................5
5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY................................................................................6
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY..............................................................................................................................7
ROLES AND SERVICES................................................................................................................................................7
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)........................................................................................7
DEFINITION OF CSPS MODES OF ACCESS ..................................................................................................................8
7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................................................................................10
8. SECURITY RULES .............................................................................................................................................10
9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ......................................................................................................................11
PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS.........................................................................................................................11
OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS ..............................................................................................................................11
10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY...........................................................................................12
11. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS...................................................................................................................13
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1. Module Overview
The Trapeze Networks MX-200R-GS/MX-216R-GS Mobility Exchange WLAN Controllers
(MX switches) HW P/Ns MX-200R-GS/MX-216R-GS Rev. A, FW Versions MSS 6.1.1.2.0,
6.1.0.3 and 6.1.0.4 are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules, whose primary purpose is
to provide secure wireless network communication. The diagram below illustrates the
cryptographic boundary, which is defined as the outer perimeter of the enclosure. The power
supplies (left sides) and power supply connectors are, for the purposes of FIPS 140-2, excluded
from the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 – MX-200R-GS Front Panel Control View
Figure 2 – MX-216R-GS Front Panel Control View
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2. Security Level
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of
FIPS 140-2.
Table 1 – Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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3. Modes of Operation
Approved mode of operation
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports FIPS Approved algorithms as follows:
• AES CCM (Cert. # 642)
• AES (Cert. #642)
• TDES (Cert. #594)
• SHA-1 (Cert. #677)
• HMAC SHA-1 (Cert. #331)
• RNG (Cert. #365)
• RSA Sign/Verify (Cert. #293)
The module also supports the following non-Approved algorithms:
• RSA Key Transport (key establishment; key wrapping with 1024 bit and 2048 bit keys
has an effective strength of 80 bits and 112 bits respectively)
• DES (Not used to provide cryptographic strength)
• MD5 (Not used to provide cryptographic strength)
• NDRNG
The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS mode via execution of “set FIPS-mode
enable” through the System Configuration service. The user can determine if the cryptographic
module is running in FIPS vs. non-FIPS mode via execution of the “Show System” service.
4. Ports and Interfaces
The cryptographic modules provide the following physical ports and logical
interfaces:
• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet (Qty. 1): Control In, Data In/Out, Status Out
• Gigabit Ethernet (Qty. 2): Data In/Out, Status Out
• Serial Console (Qty. 1): Control In, Status Out
• LEDs: Status Out
• Power plugs (Qty. 2): Power In
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The MX 216 provides the following additional ports:
• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet (Qty. 16): Control In, Data In/Out, Status Out, Power(PoE)
out
5. Identification and Authentication Policy
Assumption of roles
The cryptographic module shall support three distinct operator roles (User, Cryptographic-
Officer, and RADIUS Server). The User and CO authenticate through the use of alphanumeric
passwords of eight (minimum) characters randomly chosen from the 95 printable and human-
readable characters. The RADIUS Server authenticates to the module by means of proving
knowledge of a shared secret. Upon power cycling the module, all previous authentications are
cleared.
Table 2 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
User Identity-based authentication Username and Password
Cryptographic-Officer Role-based authentication Password
RADIUS Server Role-based authentication Knowledge of a shared
secret (RADIUS Secret)
Table 3 – Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Password (min length 8-
characters)
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/95^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module restricts the number of failed authentication attempts
to six. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is also 6/95^8 which is less than
1/100,000.
Knowledge of a Shared
Secret/Fingerprint
verification
The shared secret is at least 16-bytes. The probability that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is at
least 1/2^128 which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module will only allow a max of one attempt per minute. The
probability of successfully authenticating to the module within
one minute is also 1/2^128 which is less than 1/100,000.
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6. Access Control Policy
Roles and Services
Table 4 – Services Authorized for Roles
Role Authorized Services
User: Show System Status – Display status and configuration
information.
Cryptographic-Officer: Show System Status – Display status and configuration
information.
System Configuration – Manage the general system and network
settings.
AAA Management – Configure the module’s account settings,
authentication parameters, and Access Control Lists (ACL).
Key Management – Provides the facility to modify encryption
settings, generate keys, and manage certificates.
MP Access Point Management: Manage an attached MP Access
Point.
Radius Server Facilitate Authentication
Unauthenticated Services:
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
• Show Status: This service provides operational status of the cryptographic module
through the LEDs.
• Self-Tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2.
Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following are CSPs contained in the module:
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Table 5 – CSP Descriptions
CSPs Description
User password Authenticates the User
Crypto officer (C.O.)
password
Authenticates the C.O.
DRNG state Used to generate random values for the ANSI X9.31 approved DRNG.
RADIUS secret Authenticates the RADIUS server.
TLS session key Provides data confidentiality for HTTPS traffic.
TLS HMAC integrity key Provides data integrity for HTTPS.
TLS Pre-master secret Used during TLS to establish session keys.
HTTPS TLS private key Used during TLS to unwrap the pre-master secret; 1024-2048 bits in
length.
EAP-TLS private key Used during EAP-TLS to unwrap the pre-master secret; 1024 to 2048
bits in length.
MX secret HMAC-SHA-1 key used to authenticate the MX to the Access Point
(AP).
AP-MX Master Key Used to provide data confidentiality using AES CCM 128. This key
acts as the Master and Session Key.
MX-MX RSA Private key Used during MX-MX key exchange to decrypt session key; key size is
2048 bits
MX-MX session key Used for encrypting control traffic between MX and another MX
through AES; key size is 256 bits
Software integrity key Used to verify integrity of MX software image using HMAC-SHA1.
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Used as Pairwise Master Key for 802.11i; 32 bytes long
Master Key Used to derive PMK for 802.1li
Pairwise Master Key (PMK) Used to derive PTK for 802.11i; 32 bytes long
Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Used to derive KCK, KEK, and TK for 802.11i.
Key Confirmation Key (KCK) Used as Key Integrity key; AES 128 bits
Key Encryption Key (KEK) Used as Key encryption key to encrypt group key; AES 128 bits
Temporal Key Used as data encryption key; AES 128 bits
Group Master Key (GMK) Used to derive Group Transient Key; AES 128 bits
Group Transient Key (GTK) Used for encrypting broadcast and multicast traffic; AES 128 bits
Definition of CSPs Modes of Access
Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The
modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows:
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• R - Read
• W- Write
• Z - Zeroize
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
CSPs\Services Show
System
Status
System
Configur
ation
AAA
Manag
ement
Key
Manage
ment
MP
Access
Point
Manage
ment
Facilitate
Authenti
cation
Show
Status
Self-
Tests
User password N/A N/A RWZ N/A R N/A N/A
Crypto officer
(C.O.) password
N/A N/A RWZ N/A R N/A N/A
DRNG state N/A RW N/A RWZ N/A N/A N/A
RADIUS secret N/A RW RWZ R N/A N/A
TLS session key N/A RW N/A RWZ N/A N/A N/A
TLS HMAC
integrity key
N/A RW N/A RWZ N/A N/A N/A
TLS Pre-master
secret
N/A RW N/A RWZ N/A N/A N/A
HTTPS TLS
private key
N/A RW N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
EAP-TLS
private key
N/A RW N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
MX secret N/A W N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
AP-MX Master
Key
N/A N/A N/A Z RW N/A N/A N/A
MX-MX RSA
Private key
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
MX-MX session
key
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Software
integrity key
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A R
Pre-Shared Key
(PSK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Master Key N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Pairwise Master
Key (PMK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
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Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Key
Confirmation
Key (KCK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Key Encryption
Key (KEK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Temporal Key N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Group Master
Key (GMK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
Group Transient
Key (GTK)
N/A N/A Z N/A N/A N/A
7. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
module does not contain a modifiable operational environment.
8. Security Rules
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules.
This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement
the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide three distinct operator roles. These are the User
role, the Cryptographic-Officer role, and the RADIUS Server role.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide role-based authentication for the CO and
RADIUS Server, but identity-based authentication for the User.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to
any cryptographic services.
4. The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests:
Power up Self-Tests:
1. Cryptographic algorithm tests:
• TDES Known Answer Test
• AES Known Answer Tests
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test (Tested as part of the HMAC SHA-1 KAT)
• HMAC SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign/Verify Known Answer Test (SW)
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• RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Known Answer Test (SW & HW)
• DRNG Known Answer Test
2. Software Integrity Test (HMAC SHA-1 Verification)
3. Critical Functions Tests: N/A
Conditional Self-Tests:
1. Continuous Random Number Generator Test (DRNG and NDRNG)
2. RSA Pairwise Consistency Test (Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt)
5. Data output shall be logically disconnected or inhibited during key generation, self-tests,
zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. The cryptographic module does not support a bypass capability or a maintenance mode.
9. Physical Security Policy
Physical Security Mechanisms
The cryptographic modules include the following physical security mechanisms:
• Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with tamper
evident seals.
Operator Required Actions
The operator is required to periodically inspect tamper evident seals and install in the locations
dictated below.
Table 7 – Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Tamper Evident Seals Three tamper evident labels
should be applied to the
module. The placement is as
follows:
1. Top-front (Figure 3)
2. Rear Left
3. Rear right rear (Figure
4)
4.
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Figure 3 – MX-216R-GS Label Placement (Top-Front)
Figure 4 – Label Placement (Rear-Right)
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
Wireless Intrusion Detection and Protection
Trapeze has always built in core intrusion prevention capabilities as part of the Trapeze Mobility
System, which includes detection of common WLAN attacks like address masquerading, RF
jamming, weak WEP IV detection, and rogue detection and disablement. It also detects and
alerts IT about denial of service (DoS) attacks, flood attacks, unauthorized SSIDs,
deauthentication attacks, null probes, decryption errors and spoofed APs. It can also detect
devices using wireless bridging and notify IT. In response to a detected attack, Trapeze Smart
Mobile generates messages and SNMP traps and can perform countermeasures if policy dictates.
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11. Definitions and Acronyms
• AAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
• ACL Access Control Lists
• AES CCM Advaced Encryption Standard
• AP Access Point
• CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
• DES Data Encryption Standard
• EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
• GMK Group Master Key
• GTK Group Transient Key
• HMAC Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code
• IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
• KCK Key Confirmation Key
• KEK Key Encryption Key
• MD5 Message Digest Algorithm 5
• NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
• PMK Pairwise Master Key
• PSK Pre-Shared Key
• PTK Pairwise Transient Key
• RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
• RNG Random Number Generator
• RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
• SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
• STP Spanning Tree Protocol
• TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
• TLS Transport Layer Security
• VLAN Virtual Local Area Network