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iPASOLINK
AES MODEM Card
（MODEM-AEH）
Security Policy
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2
Document Number: GVT-029406-001
Document Version: 01.46
Revision Date: Sep. 11th
, 2017
NEC Corporation
http://www.nec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE...................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................3
2 iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card SECURITY POLICY .................................................................4
2.1 MODULE OVERVIEW...................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION............................................................................................6
2.3 PORTS AND INTERFACES ............................................................................................8
2.3.1 PHYSICAL PORTS.................................................................................................8
2.3.2 LOGICAL INTERFACES ..........................................................................................9
2.4 SECURITY LEVELS ......................................................................................................9
2.5 APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ............................................................................. 10
2.5.1 APPROVED SECURITY FUNCTION ........................................................................ 10
2.5.2 NON-APPROVED SECURITY FUNCTION ................................................................ 10
2.6 OPERATORS AND ROLES........................................................................................... 10
2.6.1 Crypto Officer Authentication Strength ................................................................ 11
2.6.2 User Authentication Strength .............................................................................. 11
2.7 SELF TESTS ............................................................................................................. 12
2.7.1 POWER-UP SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................... 12
2.7.2 ON-DEMMAND SELF-TESTS................................................................................. 12
2.8 SERVICES................................................................................................................ 13
2.8.1 SETTING OF KEYS AND CSPs .............................................................................. 14
2.9 KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS ............................................................ 15
2.9.1 DEFINED KEYS AND CSPs ................................................................................... 15
2.9.2 KEY AND CSP ACCESS ........................................................................................ 16
2.10 ZEROIZATION.......................................................................................................... 18
2.11 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ....................................... 18
3 USER GUIDANCE ............................................................................................................ 19
3.1 PORTS, INTERFACES AND SERVICES.......................................................................... 19
3.2 USER RESPONSIBILITIES.......................................................................................... 19
4 CRYPTO OFFICER (CO) GUIDANCE................................................................................... 19
4.1 PORTS, INTERFACES AND SERVICES.......................................................................... 19
4.2 MODULE INSTALLATION AND STARTUP...................................................................... 19
4.3 MODULE INITIALIZATION ......................................................................................... 20
5 Revision History ............................................................................................................. 21
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card
(MODEM-AEH) module from NEC Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the module meets
the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS 140-2) Publication
140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules.
More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2-Approved mode of
operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module.
The following is a target cryptographic module.
Module Name: iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card (MODEM-AEH)
Table 1-1 Description of Target Cryptographic Module
Module Code Type FIPS 140-2
Compliance
Remark
NWA-086220 004 Level-2
1.2 REFERENCES
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the AES MODEM Card module in the
technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. For more information, please
contact NEC Corporation.
・
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2 iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card SECURITY POLICY
2.1 MODULE OVERVIEW
iPASOLINK is NEC’s most advanced and comprehensive optical and radio converged transport
product family, providing solution for backhaul optimization and transformation to help you achieve
your business objectives such as cost efficient integration of both TDM and carrier-class Ethernet
network and versatile and smooth migration from TDM to IP next generation network.
The traffic interface of iPASOLINK is a basic Drop and Insert interface card and has up to two front
access universal card slots which are connected to TDM cross connect interfaces and packet switch
interfaces with interface buses. These card slots are provided for radio interface (AES MODEM Card
module) and additional interface to satisfy various D/I or interface and topology requirements.
Network
iPASOLINK
RADIUS Server NMS1
iPASOLINK
Network
The encrypted data is directly transmitted
between iPASOLINKs by wireless.
Network
traffic
Network
traffic
Figure 2-1 iPASOLINK System
iPASOLINK
Main Card
iPASOLINK
AES MODEM
Card
Back Plane
iPASOLINK
Equipment
LCT2
ODU3 Antenna
Controlling
Terminal
Figure 2-2 IPASOLINK Standard composition
1NMS - Network Management System
2
LCT - Local Craft Terminal
3
ODU - Out Door Units
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iPASOLINK can provide the functionality of AES4
cipher transceiver of radio data as security function.
The standard composition of iPASOLINK for the security function consists of AES MODEM Card
module, iPASOLINK Main Card (Main Card), Antenna and ODU.
The network traffic is forwarded to the module through the Main Card. The module encrypts and
modulates the network traffic. The traffic encrypted and modulated by the module is transmitted to
another iPASOLINK through ODU/Antenna.
To the contrary, the encrypted traffic that the ODU/Antenna received is forwarded to the module.
The module decrypts and demodulates the traffic. The traffic decrypted by the module is transmitted
to the Main Card.
The LCT is connected to the Main Card. An operator can control the functionality of AES cipher
transceiver implemented in the module using LCT.
An AES cryptographic key is not generated in the module but in the Main Card.
4
AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
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2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION
The AES MODEM Card module is a hardware module with a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The
overall security level of the module is 2. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined by all
the hardware components which are mounted on printed circuit board, including front cover and
printed circuit board. The Figures 2-3 to 2-5 depict the cryptographic module, of which Figure 2-5
provides the module's block diagram; the following components are the components of the module
and surrounded with red dashed lines in the Figure 2-3 and 2-4. The other components on the circuit
board are explicitly excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-2 as they are non-security relevant
and have no impact on the overall security of the module.
- FPGA
- Two Flash Memories
- CPLD
- EEPROM
- Crystal oscillators
- BWB Connector
- Heat sink
- The screws to fix the heat sink
- FPGA firmware
Figure 2-3 iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card Top View
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Figure 2-4 iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card Bottom View
The FPGA implements AES encryption / decryption functions, CO / User pass codes management
function, modulator / demodulator functions, and control interface. The CPLD downloads the FPGA
firmware to the FPGA from the flash memory when power is provided to the module. The flash
memory holds the FPGA firmware. The EEPROM holds all operation parameters of the module, such
as CO/User pass codes.
Figure 2-5 iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card Cryptographic boundary
Tamper Evident
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2.3 PORTS AND INTERFACES
2.3.1 PHYSICAL PORTS
The AES MODEM Card module implements the following physical ports:
Table 2-1 FIPS 140-2 Physical Ports
FIPS 140-2 Physical Ports Description
IF5
Interface Port The IF Interface Port transmits and receives IF signals from the
ODU.
Power Switch The Power Switch turns the module and the ODU on or off.
XIF6
Input Port The XIF Input Port is an IF signal input port for XPIC8
.
XIF Output Port The XIF Output Port is an IF signal output port for XPIC.
BWB7
Interface Port The BWB Interface Port consists of a bidirectional data interface,
control data inputs, status data outputs and power input.
ALM LED9
The ALM LED provides alarm status indications for the module.
PWR LED10
The PWR LED provides power status indications for the module.
ONLINE LED The ONLINE LED provides online status indications for the
module.
RX LED11
The RX LED provides status indications of data receiving.
TX LED12
The TX LED provides status indications of data transmitting.
5
IF Interface - Intermediate Frequency Interface
6
XIF - XPIC Interface
7
BWB - Back Wiring Board
8
XPIC - Cross Polarization Interference Canceller
9
ALM LED -Alarm Light Emitting Diode
10
PWR LED -Power Light Emitting Diode
11
RX LED - Receiver Light Emitting Diode
12
TX LED - Transmitter Light Emitting Diode
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2.3.2 LOGICAL INTERFACES
The physical ports can be mapped to the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
・ Data Input Interface
・ Data Output Interface
・ Control Input Interface
・ Status Output Interface
The AES MODEM Card module implements the following logical interfaces, which are mapped to the
physical ports as indicated in Table 2-2:
Table 2-2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Description
Data Input Interface IF Interface Port, XIF Input Port, BWB Interface Port
Data Output Interface IF Interface Port, XIF Output Port, BWB Interface Port
Control Input Interface
XIF Input Port, BWB Interface Port,
Power Switch
Status Output Interface
IF Interface Port, XIF Output Port, BWB Interface Port,
ALM LED、PWR LED、ONLINE LED、RXLED、TXLED
Power Interface IF Interface Port, BWB Interface Port
2.4 SECURITY LEVELS
The AES MODEM Card module meets the following security levels, as defined in FIPS140-2:
Table 2-3 Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC13 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
13EMI/EMC - Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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2.5 APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
The AES MODEM Card module implements only AES-CTR14
mode that is the approved security
function. When the power is on, the module is always in the approved mode of operation. No other
mode of operation is implemented in the module.
The following manually-operated steps are required to start the approved mode of operation.
1) Turn on the iPASOLINK equipment
2) Turn on the module
In addition the module does not implement a bypass mode.
2.5.1 APPROVED SECURITY FUNCTION
The following approved security function is available in the approved mode of operation:
Table 2-4 FIPS 140-2 Approved Security Function
Security Function Purpose Validation Certificate Key Size
AES CTR Encrypt or Decrypt the radio
transmission signal
Advanced Encryption Standard
Algorithm Validation #4546
128bits
192bits
256bits
No other security function is implemented.
2.5.2 NON-APPROVED SECURITY FUNCTION
The AES MODEM Card module does not implement any non-approved security function.
2.6 OPERATORS AND ROLES
The AES MODEM Card module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 2 requirements for Roles and Services,
implementing both a Crypto Officer role and a User role. The module implements role-based
authentication which is accompanied by a pass code entry. Additionally, the module does not support
a maintenance role or any other role.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for installing, configuring, and monitoring the module. The User
role is capable of performing monitoring the module.
14
AES-CTR - Advanced Encryption Standard Counter Mode
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2.6.1 Crypto Officer Authentication Strength
A Crypto Officer is required to be properly authenticated by a pass code entry. A three words (96
bits) pass code shall be used for the authentication process. Since this pass code has a strength of 96
bits, the number of possible pass codes is 296
≒ 7.92E28. The probability that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(7.92E28) that is less than 1/1,000,000.
The fastest control bus supported by the AES MODEM Card module is 24.448MHz. Hence at most
24.448x106
bits/second x 60 seconds = 1,466,880,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute.
The pass code is 96 bits; meaning 15,280,000 pass codes can be passed to the module (assuming no
overhead) in a one minute period. Therefore, the probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 15,280,000/296
≒ 1/(5.18E21) that is less than 1/100,000.
2.6.2 User Authentication Strength
A User is required to be properly authenticated by a pass code. A two words (64 bits) pass code shall
be used for the authentication process. Since this pass code has a strength of 64 bits, the number of
possible pass codes is 264
≒ 1.84E19. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/(1.84E19) that is less than 1/1,000,000.
The fastest control bus supported by the AES MODEM Card module is 24.448MHz. Hence at most
24.448x106
bits/second x 60 seconds = 1,466,880,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute.
The pass code is 64 bits; meaning 22,920,000 pass codes can be passed to the module (assuming no
overhead) in a one minute period. Therefore, the probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 22,920,000/264 ≒ 1/(8.04E11) that is less than 1/100,000.
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2.7 SELF TESTS
The AES MODEM Card module performs power-up self-tests. In the case of any self-test failure, the
module enters a critical error state and issues a critical error indication to the ALM LED and the Main
Card which is the external device and illustrated in Figure 2-2. In the critical error state, the module
cannot invoke any cryptographic functions.
2.7.1 POWER-UP SELF-TESTS
Power-up self-tests are performed automatically under the following condition:
・ When power is provided to the AES MODEM Card module.
The Power-up self-tests consist of the following tests:
・ Cryptographic algorithm tests using known answer tests of AES-CTR encrypt and decrypt
・ Firmware integrity tests of FPGA firmware
2.7.2 ON-DEMMAND SELF-TESTS
On-demand self-tests are performed automatically under the following condition:
・ When power is provided to the AES MODEM Card module.
On-demand self-tests consist of the following tests:
・ Cryptographic algorithm tests using known answer tests of AES-CTR encrypt and decrypt
・ Firmware integrity tests of FPGA firmware
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2.8 SERVICES
Table 2-5 presents the mapping between the services and the roles.
Setting method of keys and CSPs is indicated in 2.8.1
Table 2-5 Summary of Roles and Services (1/2)
Role Services Description
Crypto Officer
(CO)
Set common key Setting a common key for AES-CTR encryption
Setting a common key for AES-CTR decryption
Set pre-shared key Setting a pre-shared key for AES-CTR encryption
Setting a pre-shared key for AES-CTR decryption
Set AES-CTR default
counter value15
Setting a default counter value
Monitor common key Monitoring a common key for AES-CTR encryption
Monitoring a common key for AES-CTR decryption
Monitor pre-shared key Monitoring a pre-shared key for AES-CTR encryption
Monitoring a pre-shared key for AES-CTR decryption
Monitor AES-CTR default
counter value
Monitoring a default counter value
Change Crypto Officer
pass code
Changing the current Crypto Officer pass code
Set AES key size Setting the key size (128bit, 192bit and 256bit) of
the common key and pre-shared key
User Monitor common key Monitoring a common key for AES-CTR encryption
Monitoring a common key for AES-CTR decryption
Monitor pre-shared key Monitoring a pre-shared key for AES-CTR encryption
Monitoring a pre-shared key for AES-CTR decryption
Monitor AES-CTR default
counter value
Monitoring a default counter value
Change User pass code Changing the current User pass code
15 AES-CTR default counter value - Default counter value for Advanced Encryption Standard Counter
Mode
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Table 2-5 Summary of Roles and Services (2/2)
Role Services Description
no
authentication
required
On-demand self-test Performing the self-test for checking the AES-CTR
operation
Zeroization of CSPs Zeroization of CSPs other than CO/User pass codes
Crypt Officer
authentication
Authenticating of the Crypt Officer
User authentication Authenticating of the User
AES-CTR encryption AES-CTR encrypts user data. Radio transmits the
encrypted data.
AES-CTR decryption AES-CTR decrypts user data. Decrypt encrypted
radio transmissions data.
Security status monitor Monitoring the AES-CTR operation status via LED
indication and status output
Transmission status
monitor
Monitoring the radio transmission status and the
module status via LED indication and status output
Radio control Setting of radio transmission parameter
Modulation and
demodulation
User data modulation and demodulation for radio
transmission
Analog-digital and
digital-analog
User data analog-digital and digital-analog
conversion for radio transmission
XPIC modulation and
demodulation
User data modulation and demodulation for radio
transmission by XPIC mode
Power supply Supply power through iPASOLINK PS Card16 to the
AES MODEM Card module and ODU.
Implement DC-DC converter17.
2.8.1 SETTING OF KEYS AND CSPs
All keys and CSPs (common keys, pre-shared keys and AES-CTR default counter value and CO/User
pass codes shown in Table 2-6 in Section 2.9.1) are input to the AES MODEM Card module in
plaintext from the Main Card which is the external device and illustrated in Figure 2-2.
The Crypto Officer role authentication is required to input all keys and CSPs except for the User pass
code. Also, the User role authentication is required to input the User pass code.
All keys and CSPs except for CO/User pass codes are written in a volatile memory inside the module.
The CO/User pass codes are written in an EEPROM inside the module.
16
PS Card – Power Supply Card
17
DC-DC converter – Direct Current to Direct Current converter
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2.9 KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS
2.9.1 DEFINED KEYS AND CSPs
The AES MODEM Card module supports the following Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).
The module can register four kinds of keys; a common key for encryption, a common key for
decryption, a pre-shared key for encryption and a pre-shared key for decryption. The common key is
used to encrypt or decrypt the radio transmission data. The pre-shared key is used to the first key
exchange. The CO/User pass codes are used for operator authentication in the module.
Table 2-6 Keys used by iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card (1/2)
CSP Purpose Input Output Storage Zeroization
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(common key)
A common key used
to encrypt the radio
transmission signal.
Externally
generated
and input
Output by the
CO/User role
after the two
independent
internal actions
Volatile
memory
within the
FPGA
Turning–off or
resetting the
module
AES-CTR decrypt
key
(common key)
A common key used
to decrypt the radio
transmission signal.
Externally
generated
and input
Output by the
CO/User role
after the two
independent
internal actions
Volatile
memory
within the
FPGA
Turning-off or
resetting the
module
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(pre-shared key)
A pre-shared key
used to encrypt the
radio transmission
for pre-shared
key-exchange.
Externally
generated
and input
Output by the
CO/User role
after the two
independent
internal actions
Volatile
memory
within the
FPGA
Turning-off or
resetting the
module
AES-CTR decrypt
key
(pre-shared key)
A pre-shared key
used to decrypt the
radio transmission
for pre-shared
key-exchange.
Externally
generated
and input
Output by the
CO/User role
after the two
independent
internal actions
Volatile
memory
within the
FPGA
Turning-off or
resetting the
module
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Table 2-6 Keys used by iPASOLINK AES MODEM Card (2/2)
CSP Purpose Input Output Storage Zeroization
AES-CTR default
counter value
(including nonce
and initialization
vector)
AES-CTR default
counter value used
to AES-CTR
encryption and
decryption.
Externally
generated
and input
Output by the
CO/User role
after the two
independent
internal actions
Volatile
memory
within the
FPGA
Turning-off or
resetting the
module
CO pass code The Crypto Officer
role authentication
Externally
generated
and input
N/A Non-volatil
e memory
EEPROM
Change Crypto
Officer pass
code
User pass code The User role
authentication
Externally
generated
and input
N/A Non-volatil
e memory
EEPROM
Change User
pass code
2.9.2 KEY AND CSP ACCESS
The following tables define how services access Keys and CSPs. The following terminology is used:
・ R : Read, the AES MODEM Card module uses the CSP without modifying it.
・ W : Write, the module modifies or deletes the CSP.
Table 2-7 Key and CSP Access (CO)
Services
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
default
counter
value
CO pass
code
User
pass
code
Set common key W - W - - - -
Set pre-shared key - W - W - - -
Set AES-CTR
default counter value
- - - - W - -
Monitor common key R - R - - - -
Monitor pre-shared
key
- R - R - - -
Monitor AES-CTR
default counter value
- - - - R - -
Change Crypto
Officer pass code
- - - - - W -
Set AES key size - - - - - - -
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Table 2-8 Key and CSP Access (User)
Services
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
default
counter
value
CO pass
code
User
pass
code
Monitor common key R - R - - - -
Monitor
pre-shared key
- R - R - - -
Monitor AES-CTR
default counter value
- - - - R - -
Change User pass
code
- - - - - - W
Table 2-9 Key and CSP Access (no authentication required)
Services
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
encrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(common
key)
AES-CTR
decrypt key
(pre-shared
key)
AES-CTR
default
counter
value
CO pass
code
User
pass
code
On-demand self-test - - - - - - -
Zeroization of CSPs W W W W W - -
Crypt Officer
authentication
- - - - - R -
User authentication - - - - - - R
AES-CTR encryption R R - - R - -
AES-CTR decryption - - R R R - -
Security status
monitor
- - - - - - -
Transmission status
monitor
- - - - - - -
Radio control - - - - - - -
Modulation and
demodulation
- - - - - - -
Analog-digital and
digital-analog
- - - - - - -
XPIC modulation and
demodulation
- - - - - - -
Power supply - - - - - - -
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2.10 ZEROIZATION
Since all CSPs except for the CO/User pass codes are stored in a volatile memory within the FPGA,
they are zeroized by turning off or resetting the AES MODEM Card module. Whereas the CO/User
pass codes are stored in a non-volatile memory EEPROM and zeroized by a pass code change service
with all zero pass code, that is, setting all zero value in the "Change Crypto Officer pass code" or
"Change User pass code" service.
Please refer to section-2.9.1.
2.11 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The AES MODEM Card module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module which utilizes
production-grade components with standard passivation techniques. All security-related components
are covered by either a heat sink (fixed by the screws with tamper evident) or conformal coating.
Removing the heat sink by an attack, it needs to break the tamper evident on the screws that fix the
heat sink on the module. The tamper-evident conformal coating covers all security-related
components. Attacking these components, it need to remove the coating. Please refer to section-2.2.
The module was not designed to mitigate other attacks outside of the specific scope of FIPS 140-2.
Therefore, the section; Mitigation of Other Attacks, is not applicable.
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3 USER GUIDANCE
3.1 PORTS, INTERFACES AND SERVICES
The following ports, interfaces and services are available to the User role of the AES MODEM Card
module.
・ Physical Ports as described in section-2.3.1
BWB Interface Port
・ Logical Interfaces as described in section -2.3.2
Control Input Interface (BWB Interface port)
Status Output Interface (BWB Interface port)
・ Services permitted to the User role as described in section -2.8
3.2 USER RESPONSIBILITIES
The User must not peel away the tamper-evident conformal coating on the circuit board or break the
tamper-evident on the screws that fix the heat sink on the AES MODEM Card module.
4 CRYPTO OFFICER (CO) GUIDANCE
4.1 PORTS, INTERFACES AND SERVICES
The following ports, interfaces and services are available to the Crypto Officer of the AES MODEM
Card module.
・ Physical Ports as described in section-2.3.1
BWB Interface Port
・ Logical Interfaces as described in section-2.3.2
Control Input Interface (BWB Interface port)
Status Output Interface (BWB Interface port)
・ Services permitted to the Crypto Officer role as described in section-2.8
4.2 MODULE INSTALLATION AND STARTUP
The Crypto Officer is required to periodically inspect the tamper evident on the screws that fix the
heat sink and on the conformal coating.
The Crypto Officer has to install the AES MODEM Card module into the iPASOLINK equipment before
starting up of the module. Therefore, the Crypto Officer must check the appropriate guidelines for
ESD18
.
For further Crypto Officer actions required to startup the iPASOLINK equipment, please refer to the
iPASOLINK manual.
18
ESD - Electro Static Discharge
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4.3 MODULE INITIALIZATION
The AES MODEM Card module is initialized with one of the following methods.
・ Resetting the module
・ Ejecting the module from the iPASOLINK equipment
・ Switching off the module
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5 Revision History
Date Revision Description
Feb. 10, 2017 01.00 Initial release.
Mar. 30, 2017 01.10 Correction
Apr. 10, 2017 01.11 Correction
Apr. 28, 2017 01.12 Correction
June. 6, 2017 01.20 Correction
June. 19, 2017 01.30 Correction
June. 21, 2017 01.40 Correction
June. 26, 2017 01.41 Correction
June. 28, 2017 01.42 Correction
Aug. 29, 2017 01.43 Correction
Sep. 5, 2017 01.44 Correction
Sep. 6, 2017 01.45 Correction
Sep.11, 2017 01.46 Correction
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 01.46
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