Avaya, Inc.
Secure Router 4134
Hardware Version: SR4134; Firmware Version: 10.3.0.100
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 1.6
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Avaya, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
211 Mt. Airy Road
Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
USA USA
Phone: +1 (866) 462-8292 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
http://www.avaya.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Policy, Version 1.6 February 3, 2012
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................3
2 SECURE ROUTER 4134..........................................................................................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................6
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES.........................................................................................................................................11
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................13
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................14
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................14
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................18
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................18
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................................18
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................18
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................19
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................19
3.2 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................20
3.2.1 Initialization...........................................................................................................................................................20
3.2.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................................20
3.2.3 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................21
3.3 USER GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................21
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................22
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – SR4134 ROUTER...................................................................................................................................................4
FIGURE 2 – SR4134 DEPLOYED AS A BRANCH OFFICE ROUTER........................................................................................5
FIGURE 3 – SR4134 ROUTER FRONT PANEL (WITH CARD SLOT COVERS INSTALLED)..................................................7
FIGURE 4 – SR4134 REAR PANEL............................................................................................................................................8
FIGURE 5 – REAR-END TAMPER EVIDENT LABELS-1, 2, 3.................................................................................................. 19
FIGURE 6 – FRONT-END TAMPER EVIDENT LABELS ........................................................................................................... 20
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 – SR4134 FRONT PANEL PORTS AND INTERFACES ..............................................................................................7
TABLE 3 – SR4134 REAR PANEL PORTS AND INTERFACES..................................................................................................8
TABLE 4 – SR4134 REAR PANEL LED STATUS INDICATIONS.............................................................................................9
TABLE 5 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS ................................................................................................... 10
TABLE 6 – OPERATOR SERVICES........................................................................................................................................... 11
TABLE 7 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM........................................................................................................................ 13
TABLE 8 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 14
TABLE 9 – CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS............................................... 16
TABLE 10 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 22
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Secure Router 4134 from Avaya,
Inc.. This Security Policy describes how the Secure Router 4134 meets the security requirements of
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian
Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard
and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Secure Router 4134 is
referred to in this document as the SR4134, the router, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
 The Avaya website (http://www.avaya.com/usa/products/products-a-z) contains information on the
full line of products from Avaya.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model document
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to Avaya. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2
Submission Package is proprietary to Avaya and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Avaya.
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2 Secure Router 4134
2.1 Overview
The Avaya Secure Router 4134 (or SR4134), a unified communications integrated branch solution, is a
powerful modular system offering high-end performance and capacity. The Secure Router 4134 integrates
multiple networking functions in a single device. Functions include IP1
v4/IPv6 routing, wide area
networking, high-density Ethernet switching, power over Ethernet, voice media gateway, application
hosting, and security.
The SR4134 can address the routing and connectivity needs of large enterprise branches as well as regional
or even headquarter sites. The major features of SR4134 are:
 Connectivity: The SR4134 supports a wide range LAN2
, WAN3
, voice gateway, and application
options for converged branch and remote sites. WAN connectivity options include T1/E1, serial,
ISDN4
, ADSL5
2+, channelized DS3/T3, and HSSI6
.
 Security: Integrated security, including a stateful firewall and high-speed VPN7
encryption allows
for secure connections to the Internet or IP network.
 Maximum Up-time: Hot-swappable cards, redundant power and port/platform resilience features
deliver maximum reliability and resiliency.
The module is a 2U rack-mountable appliance. A picture of the SR4134 is shown in below in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – SR4134 Router
The Secure Router 4134 is primarily intended to act as branch office router that securely communicates
with the central office and remote offices. As depicted in Figure 2, the SR4134 is intended to be deployed
as the connection between a branch or regional office and a public internet. The SR4134 can connect with
other Avaya Secure Router products, or any other compatible VPN devices.
1
IP – Internet Protocol
2
LAN – Local Area Network
3
WAN – Wide Area Network
4
ISDN – Integrated Services Digital Network
5
ADSL – Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
6
HSSI – High Speed Serial Interface
7
VPN – Virtual Private Network
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Figure 2 – SR4134 Deployed as a Branch Office Router
The SR4134 allows users to create IP VPNs using Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) or IPsec8
.
Administrators can then locally or remotely manage the SR4134 with a management Command Line
Interface (CLI) via the serial console or via Secure Shell (SSH) version 2 (SSH2). The serial console is
accessed through an RJ459
port on the front of the SR4134.
The Secure Router 4134 is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels listed in Table 1 below. The overall
security level of the module is 2.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A10
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC11
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
14 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2
8
IPsec – Internet Protocol Security
9
RJ45 – a registered jack connector type used in telephone/networking installations
10
N/A – Not Applicable
11
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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2.2 Module Specification
The Secure Router 4134 is a hardware module Hardware Version: SR4134; Firmware Version:
10.3.0.100 with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The cryptographic boundary of the Secure Router
4134 is defined by the chassis of the router.
The boundary includes three medium card interfaces and four small card interfaces. A list of cards that can
be placed in the small card interface slots is given below:
 2-port T1/E1 Small Card (Part Number: 333-70225-01 Rev 4)
 2-port Serial Small Card (Part Number: 333-70240-01 Rev 02.0011)
 1-port ADSL2+ Annex A Small Card (Part Number: 333-70260-01 Rev 01)
A list of cards that can be placed in any one of the medium card interface slots is given below:
 1-port HSSI Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70290-01 Rev 9)
 1-port Channelized / Clear Channel T3 Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70280-01 Rev 8)
 8-port T1/E1 Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70275-01 Rev 01.0012)
 10-port Gigabit Ethernet (GbE) Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70330-01 Rev 01.0023)
 24-port Fast Ethernet (FE) Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70325-01 Rev 15)
 24-port Fast Ethernet/Power over Ethernet (FE/PoE) Medium Card (Part Number: 333-70325-02
Rev 01.0017)
The SR4134 contains a security internal card, which is required for VPN acceleration and IPsec. The
SR4134 comes installed with a HiFn 7855 chip as a hardware cryptographic accelerator providing packet
protocol layer data encryption/decryption as well as asymmetric key operations.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The SR4134 consists of Ethernet ports, a console port, an external compact flash port, external card
interface slots and status LED12
s. The external compact flash port is disabled. The USB port is disabled.
The three medium card interface slots are backplane connectors connecting the external large or medium
cards to the router microprocessor via various bus architectures such as local bus, PCI13
bus or TDM14
bus.
The four small card interface slots (external card interface) are 68-pin PCMCIA15
-style connectors, which
can be used to add/replace networking or communication cards. The two horizontal medium slots can be
combined to form a large slot by removing the chassis partition.
The physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
Data input/output are the packets utilizing the services provided by the module. These packets enter and
exit the module through the network ports (Ethernet ports). Control input consists of Configuration or
Administration data entered into the module through the Command Line Interface (CLI) management
interface. Any user can be given administrative permissions by the Crypto Officer (CO). Status output
consists of the status provided displayed via the LEDs and log information.
12
LED – Light Emitting Diode
13
PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect
14
TDM – Time Division Multiplexing
15
PCMCIA – Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
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The front panel of the SR4134 is shown in Figure 3. Descriptions of all ports present in the front panel are
given in Table 2.
Figure 3 – SR4134 Router Front Panel (with Card Slot Covers Installed)
Table 2 – SR4134 Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
Item Description
1 Three Medium Card slots with slot covers installed
2 Four Small Card slots with slot covers installed
3 GE16
0/1 and GE 0/2 ports are 10/100/1000Base-T ports. The lower
port is GE 0/1. The upper port is GE 0/2. LEDs are embedded on
port GE 0/2. The LED on the left of the port is a link status LED for
port GE 0/1. The LED on the right of the port is a link status LED for
port GE 0/2.
4 GE 0/3 port status LED
5 Two GbE (GE 0/3 and GE 0/4) SFP17
ports
6 GE 0/4 port status LED
7 Slot numbering legend
8 Ground lug location
The rear panel of the SR4134 is shown in Figure 4. Descriptions of all ports present in rear panel are given
in Table 3.
16
GE – Gigabit Ethernet
17
SFP – Small Form-factor Pluggable
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Figure 4 – SR4134 Rear Panel
Table 3 – SR4134 Rear Panel Ports and Interfaces
Item Description
1 Fan tray
2 Compact Flash ejector button
3 Compact Flash slot (CF1)
4 Status LEDs: The upper LED indicates system status. The lower LED
indicates the fan status.
5 Status LEDs: The upper LED indicates the status of installed Small
Cards (SM).
The lower LED indicates the status of installed Medium Cards (MM)
and Large Cards.
6 Status LEDs: The upper LED indicates the status of the power supply
installed in power supply slot 1. The lower LED indicates the status of
the power supply installed in power supply slot 0. Green indicates the
Secure Router 4134 has power. Off indicates the router is not
powered.
7 USB port
8 Management port (FE 0/0) with embedded LED
9 Auxiliary port
10 Two power supply slots. The lower power supply slot is identified as
slot 0. The upper power supply slot is identified as slot 1. This chassis
contains two 250W AC18
power supplies.
11 On/off switches
12 AC power connectors
13 Service access panel
18
AC – Alternating Current
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Item Description
14 Console port
Each Ethernet port has a LED associated with it, which indicates the status of the port. For GE ports, the
LED is OFF if the cable is not connected and link is not established; the LED turns GREEN if a cable is
connected and a link is established. For the FE management port, the LED is OFF if the cable is not
connected and link is not established; the LED turns GREEN if a cable is connected and a link is
established; the LED blinks and turns AMBER if data collisions are occurring on the port.
The rear panel LED status indications are described in Table 4.
Table 4 – SR4134 Rear Panel LED Status Indications
LED Color Definition
System Status LED
(SYS)
OFF The Secure Router 4134 is not powered.
GREEN The Secure Router 4134 is powered and is
operating normally.
RED The Secure Router 4134 is powered, but one or
more tasks have failed.
Fan Status LED
(FAN)
OFF The Secure Router 4134 is not powered.
GREEN The fan tray is installed and is functioning
normally.
RED A fan tray is not installed, or a fan tray is installed
but one or more fans are malfunctioning.
Small Card Status
LED (SM)
OFF If the Secure Router 4134 is powered, and the
LED is off, no Small Cards are installed.
GREEN Small Cards are installed and functioning
normally.
RED Small Cards are installed, but one or more are
malfunctioning.
Medium Card
Status LED (MM)
OFF If the Secure Router 4134 is powered, and the
LED is off, no Medium or Large Cards are
installed.
GREEN Medium or Large Cards are installed and
functioning normally.
RED Medium or Large Cards are installed, but one or
more are malfunctioning.
Power Supply (Slot
1) Status LED
OFF The Secure Router 4134 is not powered, or no
power supply is present in slot 1.
GREEN A power supply is installed in slot 1, is functioning
normally, and is activated (power-up testing is
complete).
RED A power supply is installed in slot 1, but is
malfunctioning.
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LED Color Definition
Power Supply (Slot
0) Status LED
OFF The Secure Router 4134 is not powered, or no
power supply is present in slot 0.
GREEN A power supply is installed in slot 0, is functioning
normally, and is activated (power-up testing is
complete).
RED A power supply is installed in slot 0, but is
malfunctioning.
Fast Ethernet port
(FE 0/0)
GREEN A cable is connected and the link is up.
Blinking AMBER Data collisions are occurring on the port.
All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in
Table 5 below.
Table 5 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Gigabit Ethernet 2  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
SFP ports 2  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
Management Port (Fast
Ethernet)
1  Control Input
 Status Output
Small Card Interface
slots
4  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
Medium Card Interface
slots
3  Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
Auxiliary port 1  Control Input
 Status Output
Console 1  Control Input
 Status Output
Status LEDs 11  Status Output
Removable Power
Supplies
1 or 2  Power Input
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Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Power ON/OFF switch 1 or 2  Control Input
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. Each operator is associated with a specific role. There are
two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may be assigned: a Crypto Officer role
and a User role.
The Crypto Officer (CO) role is the administrator for the router and can perform the setup, module
maintenance, and new User management tasks. The User role has the ability to perform configuring and
monitoring tasks.
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer and User roles are provided in the Table 6
below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in the table indicate the
type of access required using the following notation:
 R – Read: The CSP is read.
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Table 6 – Operator Services
Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Commissio
n the
module

Commission the
module by following
the Security Policy
guidelines
None None None
Create
users 
Create, edit; and delete
users; define user
accounts and assign
permissions.
Command
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Change
CO
Password

Change the Crypto
Officer password
Command
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Change
User
Password

Change the User
password
Command
Command
response and
status output
User password – W

Note: For the list of non-approved services, please refer to section 3.2.1 below.
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Access the
CLI  
Access the CLI via
Console or Ethernet
port to configure or
monitor status of the
system
Command
and
parameters
Command
response and
status output
Crypto Officer
password – W
Preshared key – X
IKE19
Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
SSH Session key – W
DSA20
private keys –
X
DH21
private keys – X
Configure
routing
services
 
Configure IP stack and
firewall related features
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
Preshared key – X
IKE Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
SSH Session key – W
DSA private keys – X
DH private keys – X
Employ
SSH service
 
Manage the module
using SSH2 protocol.
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
SSH Session key – W
DSA private keys – X
Employ
VPN
service
 
Establish VPN session,
authenticate and use
VPN services
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
Preshared key – X
IKE Phase 1 Session
key – W
IPSec Phase 2 Session
key – W
DSA private keys – X
DH private keys – X
Zeroize
Keys  
Zeroize unprotected
keys and CSPs
Command
and
parameters
such as
“reboot”,
“password”
or file
delete
commands
Command
response
Crypto Officer
password – W
User password – W
Perform
Self Tests  
Perform Power-up Self
Tests on demand.
Command
Command
response
None
19
IKE – Internet Key Exchange
20
DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm
21
DH – Diffie Hellman
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
CO User
Show
Status  
Facilitates the user to
check whether the
module is in FIPS-
Approved mode or not
None None None
All services provided by the module require the operator to assume a role, and the module authenticates the
role before providing any services. The module performs role-based authentication.
Operators authenticate to the module using a username and password. When authenticating with a Crypto
Officer role credential, the operator explicitly assumes both the Crypto Officer and User roles. When
authenticating with a User role credential, the operator explicitly assumes the User role. Table 7 lists the
authentication mechanisms used by the module. A Crypto Officer or a User communicating via SSH client
can be authenticated via public-key authentication or password based authentication.
Table 7 – Authentication Mechanism
Authentication Type Strength
Password The minimum length of the password is eight, with 62 different case-
sensitive alphanumeric characters and symbols possible for usage. The
chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1:628
, or
1:218,340,105,584,896. The fastest network connection supported by the
module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 109
=)
6,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore,
the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance
will occur in one minute is less than 1: (628
/ 6×109
), or 1: 291,120, which
is less than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Public key certificates The module supports RSA and DSA digital certificate authentication of
users during IPsec/IKE. Using conservative estimates and equating a 1024
bit RSA or DSA key to an 80 bit symmetric key, the probability for a
random attempt to succeed is 1:280
or 1:
1,208,925,819,614,629,174,706,176. The fastest network connection
supported by the module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6
× 109
=) 6,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute.
Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur in one minute is less than 1: (280
/ 6×109
), or 1:
201,487,636,602,438, which is less than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) services are provided without authentication. An
unauthenticated operator uses a community string to access the SNMP services. The SNMP implemented in
the routers only allows the unauthenticated operator to get non-security-relevant system condition
information. The SNMP services do not affect the security of the module.
2.5 Physical Security
The Secure Router 4134 is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. It is enclosed in a hard and
opaque metal case that completely encloses all of its internal components. There are only a limited set of
vent holes provided in the case, and the view of the internal components of the module is obscured by the
baffling provided by the power supply unit, rack mount bracket (on the left hand side), the Fan unit (on the
right hand side) and sheet metal baffling within the router. Tamper-evident labels are applied to the case as
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well as all removable cards and covers to provide physical evidence of attempts to gain access to the
module’s internal components. All of the module’s components are production grade. The placement of
tamper-evident labels can be found in Section 3.1 of this document.
The module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15,
Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Secure Router 4134, because the module
does not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS) to the user. The Secure Router 4134 employs a
VxWorks-based kernel; it is a non-modifiable OS that provides only a limited operational environment, and
only the module’s custom written image can be run on the system. All firmware updates are digitally-
signed using RSA and a self-test is performed during each update.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 8 below.
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Certificate Number
Firmware Hardware
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in CBC22
mode (128, 192, 256-bit
keys)
1605 173
Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) in CBC mode (Three-Key) 1050 275
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 1418 N/A
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) using SHA-1 941 N/A
RSA23
signature verification (PKCS24
#1 v1.5) (2048, 3072, 4096-bits) 787 N/A
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) key generation, signature
generation/verification
496 501
SP25
800-90 Hash-Based DRBG26
(SHA-256) 79 N/A
SHA-256 for DRBG 1418 N/A
The module uses the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90 Hash DRBG to generate cryptographic keys. It uses a
DRBG implementation from Network Security Services (NSS), release version 3.12.8. The module does
not receive a seed value for PRNG from outside; rather, it is seeded via a Non-Deterministic Random
Number Generator (NDRNG), which is generated from cryptographic hardware accelerator chip, HiFn
7855. The SHA-256 is used only for DRBG implementation and it is not accessible for any other purposes.
Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations:
 MD527
used in TACACS+28
, VoIP29
, and routing services
22
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
23
RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman
24
PKCS – Public-Key Cryptography Standards
25
SP – Special Publication
26
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
27
MD5 – Message Digest 5
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 Hardware random number generator – for seeding the FIPS-Approved DRBG
 Blowfish
 DES
 RSA key-pair generation
 RSA signature generation
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during IPsec: 1024, 1536, 2048 or 3072-bit keys (provides 80,
96, 112 or 128 bits of security, respectively).
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during SSH: 1024-bit key (provides 80 bits of security).
The module utilizes the following algorithm implementations that are FIPS-Allowed but deprecated (the
user must accept some risks). For further details regarding deprecation please refer to NIST special
publication, SP 800-131A.
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during IPsec (1024 and 1536-bit keys).
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement during SSH (1024-bit key).
 SHA-1 for digital signature generation and verification.
 HMAC (with key length >= 80-bits but < 112-bits)
 DSA (1024-bit).
28
TACACS – Terminal Access Controller Access Control Systems Plus
29
VoIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
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The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) listed below in Table 9.
Table 9 – Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
IKE Preshared key Shared secret Entered by the CO or
User
Can be exported
by the CO or
User in plaintext
over the console
port
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM30
File deletion using
CLI commands
Peer Authentication
of IKE session
IKE Phase 1
Symmetric key
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits symmetric
keys generated via DH
key agreement
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM
Reboot or session
termination
Exchanging shared
secret during IKE
IPsec Phase 2
Symmetric key
AES-128, 192, 256 or
TDES key
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in internal
NVRAM
Reboot or session
termination
Encryption or
decryption of IPSec
packets
SSH Symmetric key 1024-bit Symmetric
key generated via DH
key agreement
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Encryption or
decryption during
SSH
HMAC key Shared key generated
via DH key agreement
Generated internally
during IKE negotiation
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
IKE negotiation and
support isakmp
messages
DRBG seed C value Random value Generated internally by
the hardware NDRNG.
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generate random
number
DRBG seed V value Random value Generated internally by
the hardware NDRNG.
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generate random
number
Password for Private-
key file
Passphrase used to
obscure the DSA
private-key files
Entered by the CO or
User
Never exit the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
To obscure the DSA
private key files
using AES-128
30
NVRAM – Non Volatile Random Access Memory
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA public key 1024, 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Enters the module in
plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM File deletion using
CLI commands
Keys used during
SSH authentication
and Firmware load
tests
DSA public key 1024 bits The module’s Public key is
generated internally for
PKI authentication, IKE
authentication and SSH key
negotiation; while public
key of a peer enters the
module in plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM File deletion using
CLI commands
Keys used for PKI
authentication and
during IPsec/IKE and
SSH key negotiation
DSA private key 1024 bits Generated internally for
PKI authentication, IKE
authentication and SSH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Plaintext or
encrypted in NVRAM
File deletion using
CLI commands
Private key used for
PKI authentication ,
and during IPsec/IKE
and SSH key
negotiation
DH public key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits
The module’s Public key is
generated internally; while
public key of a peer enters
the module in plaintext.
The module’s
Public key exits
the module in
plaintext.
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generation of IKE
Key Agreement key
and SSH Session key
DH private key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 bits
Generated internally Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Reboot or session
termination
Generation of IKE
Key Agreement key
and SSH Session key
Crypto Officer
password
Minimum of eight
characters of
alphanumeric string
Entered into module via a
console port or over SSH
Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
Used for
authenticating the
Crypto Officer
User password Minimum of eight
characters of
alphanumeric string
Entered into module via a
console port or over SSH
Never exits the
module
Plaintext in NVRAM Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one
Used for
authenticating the
User
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
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2.8 Self-Tests
The module implements cryptographic algorithms using firmware (OpenSSL and NSS) as well as hardware
accelerator, and the module performs various Self-Tests (Power-Up Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests)
to verify their functionality and correctness. Upon self-test failure, the module goes into “Critical Error”
state and it disables all access to cryptographic functions and CSPs. All data outputs are inhibited upon a
self-test failure. A permanent error status will be recorded to the system log file and/or event audit log file.
The task that invoked the failed self-test will be suspended. The current operation will not complete and
the module goes into “Critical Error” state, which halts the module. This error state is visible via the
console or terminal, where the module does not respond to any commands. The CO must reboot the
machine to clear the error condition and return to a normal operational state.
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The Secure Router 4134 performs the following self-tests at power-up to verify the integrity of the
firmware binaries and the correct operation of the FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations employed by
the module:
 Firmware integrity check using 32-bit CRC31
for boot ROM image
 Firmware integrity check using 32-bit CRC for run-time application image
 Cryptographic algorithm tests:
o AES-CBC-256 Known Answer Tests (KAT) for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip
implementations.
o Triple-DES32
KATs for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
o RSA sign/verify tests for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
o DSA sign/verify tests for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
o DSA pairwise consistency tests for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
o SP 800-90 DRBG KAT for NSS implementation.
o SHA-1 KATs for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
o HMAC SHA-1 KATs for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
 Critical function tests for DRBG instantiation and reseed, as specified in SP 800-90. DRBG will
go through reseed process only when its lifetime gets expired.
The CO can perform the power-up self-tests at any time by power-cycling the module or issuing a reboot
command over the module’s CLI.
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Secure Router 4134 performs the following conditional self-tests (note that each of these tests is
performed for both firmware and hardware security services):
 DSA Pairwise consistency tests for both OpenSSL and HiFn chip implementations.
 Continuous DRBG test for NSS implementation.
 Continuous RNG test for non-approved NDRNG, which is used to seed DRBG.
 Bypass mode test
 Firmware update test
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2
Level 2 requirements for this validation.
31
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
32
DES – Data Encryption Standard
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
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3 Secure Operation
The Secure Router 4134 meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to
place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The CO is responsible for commissioning the router and powering it up. Before powering-up the router,
the CO must ensure that the required tamper-evident labels (included in the FIPS kit) are correctly applied
to the router enclosures following the instructions below.
It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to apply the tamper-evident labels to the module. The
instructions for applying the tamper evident labels are as follows:
1. The surface must be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol (99%) to remove surface contaminants.
a. Rubbing alcohol is not acceptable because it may contain oils to minimize the drying
effect on skin; these oils can interfere with the adhesion.
b. Lower concentrations of alcohol (90%, 70%, etc) are not recommended, because the non-
alcohol portion is not a cleaning agent and may inhibit optimum adhesion.
2. The surface must be dried using a clean paper towel or cotton cloth (allowing to air dry is not
recommended).
3. The surface temperature must be minimum +50F.
4. The labels must be applied 72 hours before the module is placed into operation.
Nine tamper evident labels must be placed as follows to provide the required physical security.
1. Three big-sized labels must be applied on the rear end of the module as follows:
a. A label must be applied between the fan tray, removable service panel and top metal
chassis (in horizontal position) as shown in Figure 5.
b. A label must be applied between the power supply slot 1 and top metal chassis (in
horizontal position) as shown in Figure 5.
c. A label must be applied between the power supply slot 0 and bottom metal chassis (in
horizontal position) as shown in Figure 5.
2. Six small-sized labels must be applied on the front end of the module as follows:
a. Two labels must be applied (one for each medium card) between the removable medium
card and top metal chassis (in vertical position), as shown in Figure 6, represented by the
green-colored dotted lines.
b. Three labels must be applied (one for each medium or small card) between the removable
card and bottom metal chassis (in vertical position), as shown in Figure 6, represented by
the blue-colored dotted lines.
c. One label must be applied between the four removable small cards (in horizontal
position) as shown in Figure 6, represented by the red-colored dotted lines.
Figure 5 – Rear-end Tamper Evident Labels-1, 2, 3
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
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Figure 6 – Front-end Tamper Evident Labels
3.2 Secure Management
The SR4134 has a non-modifiable OS and by default it is in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.2.1 Initialization
As soon as the module is powered-up, it boots, performs start-up self-tests and enters in to FIPS-Approved
mode of operation. The following features/services shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation:
 Debugging services
 Telnet
 FTP33
services
 RSA key-pair generation
 RSA signature generation
 External Compact Flash slot
 USB port
It is the Crypto Officer’s responsibility to ensure that the module boots correctly, to verify that the
services/features that are supposed to be disabled as mentioned above, are disabled, and configure the
module properly. The module is shipped with a default administrator ID and password. The CO is
required to change the default password as part of initial configuration. The Crypto Officer password must
be at least 8 characters in length. If the CO had to change any configurations to make the module FIPS
compliant, then the CO must follow the zeroization procedure as mentioned in section 3.2.3, save the
configuration and perform a reboot. Upon reboot, initialization of the module in FIPS compliant mode is
complete and the module is now configured securely. The CO should not enable any of the disabled
services mentioned previously, if any of the non-approved services are enabled then the module is not in
the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. In that case, the CO must disable the non-approved services and
perform a reboot.
3.2.2 Management
The Crypto Officer must be sure to only configure cryptographic services for the module using the FIPS-
Approved algorithms as listed in the Cryptographic Key Management section above. IPsec and SSH must
only be configured to use FIPS-Approved cipher suites, and only digital certificates generated with FIPS-
Approved algorithms may be utilized. The module implements RSA key-pair generation method that is
non-conformant to the FIPS 140-2 standard and hence shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The CO shall not import or export keys via the FTP client. The CO can modify the bypass
functionality by modifying the configuration of the IPsec tunnel and then enabling the IPsec tunnel.
If any catastrophic event (such as high power surge) results in damaging the removable cards, the module
should be sent back to the manufacturing factory or the CO is allowed to replace a removable card. The
CO must power down the module. Replace the required removable card/s, re-apply the tamper evident
label, following the procedure as described in section 3.1 and power-up the module. The CO must ensure
33
FTP – File Transfer Protocol
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
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at all times that the labels do not show any signs of tampering. Evidence of tampering can be indicated by
any of the following:
 Deformation of the label
 Label appearing broken or torn
 Missing label (in parts of full) from its expected position
 Label showing “OPENED” or “VOID” text
3.2.3 Zeroization
The module stores the preshared key and the security keys as plaintext in Flash memory.
There are many critical security parameters (CSP) within the Secure Router cryptographic boundary,
including private keys, certificate secret credentials, system configuration files and logon passwords. All
ephemeral keys used by the module are zeroized on reboot or session termination. CSPs reside in multiple
storage media including the system memory, non-volatile memory, and device private memory. These
keys are zeroized when the module is rebooted. The Crypto Officer must wait until the module has
successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed. Other keys and CSP such as public
and private keys that are stored in the Flash within a file can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer by deleting
the files using CLI commands.
3.3 User Guidance
The User is capable of making configuration changes, but configuration changes must be approved by a
Crypto Officer before implementation. The module implements RSA key-pair generation method that is
non-conformant to the FIPS 140-2 standard and hence shall not be used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The user shall not use DH with key size 768-bits. The User shall not import or export keys via
the FTP client. The User must be diligent to pick strong passwords (alphanumeric with minimum 8
characters), and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to
protect any secret/private keys in their possession, such as IPsec session keys. The User should report to
the Crypto Officer if any irregular activity is noticed.
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© 2012 Avaya, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 10 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AC Alternating Current
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CAMA Centralized Automatic Message Accounting
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DID Direct Inward Dial
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FE Fast Ethernet
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FXO Foreign Exchange Office
FXS Foreign Exchange Station
GE or GbE Gigabit Ethernet
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HSSI High-Speed Serial Interface
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
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Acronym Definition
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
KAT Known Answer Test
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
MM Medium Card
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
NVRAM Non Volatile Random Access Memory
OCS Office Communications Server
OS Operating System
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PoE Power over Ethernet
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SA Security Association
SCEP Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SFP Small Form-Factor Pluggable
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Small Card
SP Special Publication
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access Control Systems Plus
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TDM Time Division Multiplexing
USB Universal Serial Bus
VE Vendor Evidence
VoIP Voice Over Internet Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
USA
Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com