Software House
iSTAR eX Controller
(Hardware Version: STAREX004W-64
Firmware Version: 4.1.1.12045)
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 0.7
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Software House Corsec Security, Inc.
70 Westview Street
Lexington, MA 02421
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (781) 466-6660 Phone: (703) 267-6050
Fax: (781)466-9550 Fax: (703) 267-6810
http://www.swhouse.com http://www.corsec.com
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
0.1 2006-11-24 Cas Stulberger Initial draft.
0.2 2007-03-12 Cas Stulberger Updated Security Policy to address lab questions.
0.3 2007-03-26 Darryl H. Johnson Updated Security Policy to address lab questions.
0.4 2007-09-04 Darryl H. Johnson Updated to address CMVP comments.
0.5 2007-10-30 Darryl H. Johnson Updated to address CMVP comments regarding roles
and services.
0.6 2007-12-14 Darryl H. Johnson Updated to address CMVP comments regarding the
definition of roles, inclusion of clusters, and use of
RSA.
0.7 2008-01-04 Darryl H. Johnson Updated to address CMVP comments regarding the
power-up integrity test.
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 2 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 3 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE .....................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION........................................................................................................................5
2 ISTAR EX CONTROLLER ...............................................................................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................................6
2.1.1 Module Components ......................................................................................................................6
2.1.2 Deployment....................................................................................................................................7
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES ...............................................................................................................................10
2.3 ROLES AND SERVICES ...............................................................................................................................12
2.3.1 Crypto Officer Role......................................................................................................................12
2.3.2 User Role .....................................................................................................................................14
2.3.3 Cluster Member Role...................................................................................................................15
2.3.4 Non-FIPS Services.......................................................................................................................16
2.4 PHYSICAL SECURITY .................................................................................................................................16
2.5 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................................16
2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................17
2.6.1 Approved Algorithms ...................................................................................................................17
2.6.2 Non-Approved Algorithms ...........................................................................................................17
2.7 SELF-TESTS...............................................................................................................................................20
2.8 DESIGN ASSURANCE .................................................................................................................................20
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS .............................................................................................................21
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................22
3.1 INSTALLATION ..........................................................................................................................................22
3.2 INITIAL SETUP...........................................................................................................................................22
3.2.1 Putting the iSTAR eX in FIPS 140-2 Mode of Operation.............................................................23
3.2.2 Setting up a Custom Certificate for FIPS Mode ..........................................................................23
3.2.3 Verifying FIPS Mode of Operation..............................................................................................24
3.3 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE ....................................................................................................................24
3.3.1 Initialization.................................................................................................................................25
3.3.2 Management.................................................................................................................................25
3.3.3 Zeroization...................................................................................................................................25
3.4 USER GUIDANCE .......................................................................................................................................26
4 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................27
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – ISTAR EX CONTROLLER LOGICAL DIAGRAM..............................................................................................7
FIGURE 2 – NETWORK TOPOLOGY..................................................................................................................................8
FIGURE 3 – SINGLE AND ALTERNATE MASTER CONFIGURATIONS..................................................................................9
FIGURE 4 – CLUSTER MEMBER COMMUNICATION PATHS ............................................................................................10
FIGURE 5 – MULTI TECHNOLOGY CARD READERS .......................................................................................................11
FIGURE 6 – RM READERS.............................................................................................................................................11
FIGURE 7 – WIEGAND READERS...................................................................................................................................12
FIGURE 8 – KEY MANAGEMENT POLICY SCREEN .........................................................................................................23
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 4 of 27
© 2008 Software House
IGURE 9 – FIPS MODE REPORT ..................................................................................................................................24
F
L of s
ist Table
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION ..................................................................................................8
TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES ..............................................................................................................12
TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ......14
T 4 – M U R ’ S I , O , CSP , T A .........................15
ABLE APPING OF SER OLE S ERVICES TO NPUTS UTPUTS S AND YPE OF CCESS
ABLE 5 – MAPPING OF CLUSTER MEMBER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS....16
TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS.....................................18
TABLE 7 – ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................................27
T
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the iSTAR eX Controller from Software House.
This Security Policy describes how the iSTAR eX Controller meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2
(Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules)
and how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-
2 validation of the module.
FIPS 140-2 details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS
140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/.
The iSTAR eX Controller is referred to in this document as the iSTAR eX, the Master Controller, Cluster member,
or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
Cryptographic Module Security Policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The Software House website (http://www.swhouse.com) contains information on the full line of products
from Software House.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/) contains contact information for answers to technical or
sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document,
the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Machine
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc.
under contract to Software House. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2
Validation Documentation is proprietary to Software House and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Software House.
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 5 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
2 iSTAR eX Controller
2.1 Overview
The iSTAR eX Controller is a hardware module developed by Software House. The iSTAR eX Controller is a door
controller which is connected to at least one card reader and a door. After a card is swiped through a connected card
reader, the information contained on the card about the person to whom the card is assigned is transmitted to the
iSTAR eX. The iSTAR eX then consults its database and determines whether to allow access to the person by
opening the door. The iSTAR eX will then send a message to open the door if access is allowed. If access is not
allowed, then the door will not open and the user is denied entry.
2.1.1 Module Components
The iSTAR eX Controller is composed of the following hardware components (pictured below in Figure 1):
• iSTAR eX General Control Module (GCM) board
• Power Management Board (PMB)
• LCD Display
• 12V DC Power Supply
• Battery
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 6 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Figure 1 – iSTAR eX Controller Logical Diagram
There is one processor located inside the iSTAR eX and it is located on the GCM board. The PMB contains a
microcontroller which is responsible for managing power distribution within the iSTAR eX and controlling power to
all peripheral modules and card readers.
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 7 of 27
© 2008 Software House
GCM via the Serial
Ah lead acid battery. If the voltage drops below 12 volts, battery power will
circuit boards, peripherals, and readers, which enables the system to be fully functional
attery will keep a typical system operational for a minimum of 4 hours. The battery will
r controllers in the cluster to link events and share
The GCM board contains a 400 MHz PXA255 Microprocessor, a member of the Intel XScale family of ARM
processors that runs Microsoft Windows CE 5.0. The GCM board controls the input and output to and from the card
readers connected to the GCM board and the PMB board.
The PMB board contains an Atmel ATMEGA32 Microcontroller, which communicates with the
Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus. The PMB microcontroller manages the power system and backup facility of the
iSTAR eX. The PMB microcontroller charges the battery, detects power loss, restores main power, and manages
switching between main and battery power, as well as supplying power to the GCM board.
The LCD Display is an internal display that is used during setup and configuration of the iSTAR eX to monitor the
status of the device and the self tests. The 12V DC Power Supply is connected to the PMB and supplies the power
to the iSTAR eX. The battery is a 17.2
be supplied to all iSTAR eX
under battery power. The b
be fully recharged in 24 hours or less.
2.1.2 Deployment
The iSTAR eX Controller provides for secure communications in a network environment for enterprise-wide access
control. Multiple iSTAR eX appliances can be networked into user-defined, logical groups called clusters. Clusters
contain up to 16 iSTAR eX controllers. A host can be connected to several clusters (see Figure 2). Each cluster has
one controller that serves as the master; other controllers in the cluster are cluster members. The master controller
handles the communication of all event and cardholder data between the cluster and a C●CURE 800/8000 host. The
cluster members communicate through the master to the othe
cardholder status and location to mitigate the occurrence of such activities as “tailgating” (following another
cardholder into a secured area without presenting a separate badge) and “passback” (passing back a card to another
person to use) in the area secured by this cluster of controllers.
NOTE: FIPS mode is set at the cluster level; thus, every controller in the cluster will reflect the same FIPS status.
For this validation, however, it is critical to note that a cluster can consist of a single controller. Thus, any
discussion in this document referencing “clusters” (except where multi-controller configurations are expressly
stated) refers to a single-controller cluster, which represents the module.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Figure 2 – Network Topology
The following table details the security level achieved by the iSTAR eX Controller in each of the eleven sections of
FIPS 140-2.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
To ensure continuous connectivity, an iSTAR eX cluster can be configured with multiple communication paths to
the C●CURE 800/8000. These paths can be set up using either a single master controller or two alternative master
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 8 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
controllers. The single master configuration employs one cluster member as the master controller, providing a
“primary” and “secondary” connection to the network. The alternate master configuration employs two cluster
members to act as “primary” and “secondary” master controllers, with each having a single connection to the
network. Figure 3 shows primary and secondary communication lines using a single master (left) and alternate
master (right).
Figure 3 – Single and Alternate Master Configurations
Figure 4 below consists of two diagrams illustrating how communications occur (1) between a cluster member and
the C●CURE 800/8000 Host Server and (2) between two cluster members. The diagram on the left of the figure
shows how cluster member A communicates with the host via the master. The diagram on the right of the figure
ows how cluster member A communicates with cluster member B via the master. The numbered arrows in the
diagrams illustrate the order and direction of the communications path between the various network nodes.
sh
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 9 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Figure 4 – Cluster Member Communication Paths
2.2 Module Interfaces
The iSTAR eX Controller is a multi-chip standalone module that meets overall level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements.
The cryptographic boundary of the iSTAR eX Controller is defined by the module’s steel case enclosure.
Each iSTAR eX Controller has the following interfaces:
• Power plug/adapter
• RS-485 port
• 2 RJ-45 Ethernet ports
• 4 Direct Wiegand Reader ports
• Reader Bus
The power plug/adapter provides power to the iSTAR eX. The RS-485 port is used to communicate with card
readers. The Ethernet ports are used for establishing Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications with other
iSTAR eXs and the C●CURE 800/8000 host server. The four Direct Wiegand Reader ports and the Reader bus are
used for connecting card readers to the iSTAR eX. Figure 5 below shows pictures of some of the types of card
readers that can be connected to the iSTAR eX.
Software House iSTAR eX Contr Page 10 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
oller
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Figure 5 – Multi Technology Card Readers
Figure 6 – RM Readers
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 11 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Figure 7 – Wiegand Readers
All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the
following table:
Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface iSTAR eX Controller
Port/Interface
Data Input RS-485 port, 2 Ethernet ports, 4
Direct Wiegand Reader ports,
Reader Bus
Data Output RS-485 port, 2 Ethernet ports, 4
Open Collectors
Control Input 2 Ethernet ports
Status Output 2 Ethernet ports
Power Power plug/adapter
2.3 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. There are three roles in the module that operators may assume: a
Crypto Officer role, a User role, and a Cluster Member role. These roles are described in the paragraphs that follow.
The module can only be accessed through well-defined commands and interfaces. All operators accessing these
commands are assuming their roles and are authorized.
2.3.1 Crypto Officer Role
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the initialization and management of the cryptographic functions provided
by the module. This role is generally assumed by module’s management applications (acting on behalf of a human
operator): the iSTAR Configuration Utility (ICU) and the C●CURE 800/8000 host server. The ICU provides
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 12 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 13 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
controller, define master IP addresses, and define the IP address of the host server. Other configuration information
is defi ownloaded ●CURE 800/ host server. To e re correct e
inform t is entered must match ation that in the C●C /8000
a
The module receives c io trol input interface, and any status resulting from the
input is communicated status output interface. Information-passing via these interfaces occurs via
ho r. The Crypto Of s authenticated
m uring the TLS h ke.
serv Cr icer role are provided in the table below.
iSTAR eX configuration, diagnostic, and troubleshooting options. The ICU is used to designate the master
ned and d
ation tha
from the C
in the ICU
8000
the inform
nsu
is entered
configuration, th
URE 800
Administration Applic tion.
onfiguration informat
via the module’s
n via the con
secured TLS sessions. The
by providing a digital c
Descriptions of the
module uses RSA f
ertificate containing it R
ices available to the
or the verification of
SA public key to the
ypto Off
st serve
odule d
ficer i
andsha
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Table 3 – Mapping of Crypto Officer Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
Configure the module Configure the module
usin IP
address and
IP data via
manage
application
None N
g the required
connection data.
ment
one
Configure the module
for FIPS-approved
n
dule
for FIPS-approved
None
mode of operatio
Configure the mo
mode of operation.
FIPS selection from
the configuration
screen
None
Create database of
access card rights access card rights
User names and
applicable
authorization data
None
Create database of None
Reboot the module Command t
to reboot and r
he module
estart.
Reboot command Module reboots (and,
if configured for FIPS
None
mode, initiates power
up self-tests)
Generate new RSA
key pairs and
certificate
Generate new RSA
key pairs and
certificate.
Message from the
C●CURE 800/8000
Server to generate
new RSA key pair
New RSA key pair
and certificate
generated
RSA key – Read /
Write
PRNG seed – Read
Establish a secure Establish a secure Digital certificate Secure connection AES key – Read
TLS session TLS session with a
C●CURE 800/8000
Server.
established RSA key – Read
PRNG seed – Read
Encrypt data for
transmission
Encrypt data for Plaintext data to be Encrypted data AES key – Read
. transmission. transmitted RSA key – Read
PRNG seed – Read
Decrypt received Decrypt received Ciphertext data Decrypted data AES
dat
key – Read
a. data. received RSA key – Read
Terminate a secure
TLS session
Terminate a secure
TLS session.
None Secure connection
terminated
None
Show s Displ tus
information.
Selectio
appropri nu
RE
Status
displaye
N
tatus ay module sta n of the
ate me
item on the C●CU
800/8000 Server
window is
d on the
C●CURE 800/8000
Server.
one
Perform self-tests d run all
ts.
Reboot command Module reboots and
p
ES key – Write
d
Initiate an
power-up self-tes initiates power u
self-tests
A
PRNG seed – Rea
2.3.2 User Role
ms ic has access to the cu ctionality. The
ith ard. The User initiates the access request iding the card
reader t ired to the module. The sliding o ds a request to the controller,
hich contains the access control database created by the Crypto Officer via the host server and uploaded into the
odule.
The User role perfor
User is a human w
through a card
general security serv
an access control c
hat is hard-w
es and module’s general se
process by sl
f the card sen
rity fun
w
m
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 14 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 15 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
the User via the data input interface, and any data to be sent back is
communicated via the module’s data output interface.
ly assumed by swiping the access card through the attached card reader. Descriptions of
these services available to the User role are provided in the table below.
f User Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
The module receives access request data from
The User role is implicit
Table 4 – Mapping o
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
Initiates access
request process
Request access to
controlled area.
Access rights
information (via card
swipe on card reader)
Opened door for
approved access
request
None
Receive access
request response
Receive a response
to the access request
Access request Access approval or
denial
None
2.3.3 Cluster Member Role
The Cluster Member role is another user-type role that is assumed by a networked controller in a single- or multi-
ss requests from the Cluster Member role via the data input
cated via the module’s data output interface. The module uses
provided in the table below.
controller environment. In the multi-controller environment, the module is designated as the master controller; as
such, all other controllers in its cluster can communicate with it, but can only communicate with each other by first
relay the information through the module (refer to Figure 4 above). The Cluster Member role is responsible for
establishing the TLS session with the module and for the encryption and transmission of access control data to the
module.
The module receives access event data and acce
interface, and any data to be sent back is communi
RSA for the verification of Cluster Member credentials and the exchange of encryption keys. The Cluster Member
is authenticated by providing a digital certificate containing its RSA public key to the module during the TLS
handshake.
Descriptions of the services available to the Cluster Member role are
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 16 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
ber Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of
Access
Table 5 – Mapping of Cluster Mem
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type of
Access
Initiate a secure TLS Initiate a secure TLS Digital certificate Secure con
session session with a
module.
nection
established
AES key – Read
RSA keys – Read
Encrypt data for
transmission.
Encrypt data for
transmission.
Plaintext data to be
transmitted
Encrypted data AES key – Read
Determine access
rights
Check access card
rights database
Access rights
information
Access approval or
denial
None
Decrypt received
data.
Decrypt received
data.
Ciphertext data
received
Decrypted data AES key – Read
Terminate a secure
TLS session
Terminate a secure
TLS session.
None Secure connection
terminated
None
2.3.4 Non-FIPS Services
When the iSTAR eX is running in FIPS mode, it goes Dark (i.e., it functions as a black box) and inhibits the
following services:
• ICU broadcast messages
• ICU configuration
• Simple Network Management Protocol
• NanView - a Software House development tool
• iSTAR web page
When the iSTAR eX is running in non-FIPS mode, these services are normally allowed. However, they must be
disabled when running in FIPS mode. The disabling of these services is discussed in Section 3 of this document.
2.4 Physical Security
The iSTAR eX Controller is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The GCM, PMB, LCD, power supply,
and battery of the iSTAR eX Controller are entirely contained within a steel case enclosure. When punch-outs are
removed to make necessary power and network connections, the gaps in those punch-out holes must be properly
secured to resist probing. When properly installed, and after all open punch-out holes are properly secured, the
module’s enclosure is resistant to probing and is opaque within the visible spectrum.
The iSTAR eX Controller has a door on the front which contains a lock. The door is protected with tamper-evident
seals in order to reveal tampering with the door. The iSTAR eX Controller has punch-out holes for Ethernet and
power cables. Unused punch-out holes are covered with tamper-evident seals to prevent tampering. See Secure
Operation in Section 3 below for instructions on how to affix the tamper-evident seals.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module does not provide a modifiable general-purpose operating system to the user. The module does not offer
any method for an operator to load new software on the module. The operating system is stored on the module’s
flash and executes the code on the processor chip.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
ware Hous AR eX Co er Page 17 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.6 Cryptog Management
The module m K ent mode that the host and al STAR eX controllers in the same
cluster mu he use of specific key m ent modes is required; custom
certificates must be (Custom Controller Management mode) or the host
(Custom Host
2.6.1 Approved Algorithms
The iSTAR eX i lemen e followi proved algorithms:
ncry n Standard ) CBC1
mode 256-bit – FIPS 197 tificate #433)
tic R m Number Generator (RNG) – Appendix A.2.4 o SI X9.31 (certificate #283)
1 ertificate # )
2
10 it key for signat generation/verification (certifi 19)
2.6.2 Non-Approved Algorithm
The iSTAR eX i en e followi -FIPS-approved algorithms:
S key wrappi thodology provides 80 bits of e on strength)
er Generat NG) – hardware implementa
Soft e iST ntroll
raphic Key
ploys a sy
e. In FIP
either
Management
em
st us
ste -wide
S mode of
generated by
mode).
ey Managem
operation, t
the controller
l i
anagem
mp
E
inis
– FIPS
24-b
ts th
ptio
ando
80-2 (c
used
ng FIPS-ap
(AES
575
ure
• Ad
• Det
• SHA
• RSA
• R
• Pseu
vanced
erm
-1
(cer
f AN
cate #2
s
ng non
ng me
or (PR
mplem
24-bit
-Random
ts th
(key
Numb
A 10
do
ncrypti
tion
Cipher Block Ch ing
A – Ri mir and eman
1
CBC –
2
RS
ain
Adl
vest Sha
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 18 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
The module supports the foll cal secu
ic tograph nents
owing criti rity parameters:
Table 6 – List of Cryptograph Keys, Cryp ic Key Compo , and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Session Key 256-bit AES
symmetric key
Generated internally Never output Stored in RAM for
duration of the
session
Deleted after session
is over
a
transferred during
TLS with the server
Encrypting dat
C●CURE 800/8000
RSA public key
1024-bit RSA public
key
Input during TLS
negotiations
Never output Stored in volatile
memory
Deleted after session
is over
Used along with
certificate to
authenticate the
C●CURE 800/8000
host server.
iSTAR eX RSA public
key
1024-bit RSA public
key
a) Generated
internally (when in
Custom Controller
Key Management
mode)
b) Generated by the
C●CURE 800/8000
host server and
downloaded to
module (when in
Custom Host Key
Management mode)
Transmitted during
TLS session
negotiation; sent to
C●CURE 800/8000
for signature.
Stored in non-volatile
memory
When a new RSA key
pair is generated.
Used along with
certificate to
authenticate the
iSTAR eX.
oprietary Security Policy ion 0.7 a 4, 2008
S iST ntroller Page 19
© ware House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
, Vers J nuary
oftware House AR eX Co of 27
2008 Soft
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zero o
izati n Use
i i p
8
r
h
Ma e
er output r ol
m
W S
n e
yp
e
STAR e
private ke
X RSA
y
1024-b
key
t RSA rivate a) Generate
internally (
Custom C
Key Mana
mode)
b) Generate
C●CURE
host serve
downloade
module (w
Custom H
nagem
d
whe
ontr
gem
d b
00/8
and
d to
en i
ost
nt
n in
oll
en
y t
00
the
n
Ke
mo
er
t
he
0
y
de)
Nev Sto
me
ed in
ory
non-v atile
p
hen a n
air is ge
ew R
erat
A key
d.
Encr
sym
ting AES
tric key.
m
P e s of see Int ge
by -FIP
ap RN
e tput lash
mem
Upo t f the
iSTA X
Gener do
rando for
genera A
and AE
ating pseu
m numbers
tion of RS
S keys
art o
n res
R e
Stored in F
ory
r ou
Nev
RNG s ed 160 bit d value ernally
the non
proved
nerate
S
G
d
Non-Pr
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 20 of 27
© 2008 Software House
to encrypt communications from the module to the C●CURE 800/8000 host server
(and a master controller when the module is used in a multi-controller cluster environment). This key is generated
odule.
The RSA public/private key pair generated by the module is also stored in the Flash memory in plaintext. The RSA
public/private key pair can be zeroized by creating a new key pair.
2.7 Self-Tests
The iSTAR eX Controller performs the following self-tests at power-up:
• Firmware integrity test
• Cryptographic algorithm tests
o Known Answer Tests (KATs)
ƒ AES KAT
ƒ SHA-1 KAT
ƒ RSA KAT
ƒ ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG KAT
The iSTAR eX Controller performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG test for FIPS-Approved PRNG
• Continuous RNG test for non-FIPS-approved hardware PRNG
• Pairwise consistency test for RSA
If one of the KATs or the firmware integrity test fails, then the iSTAR eX will not boot into FIPS mode. The iSTAR
eX will try again to boot into FIPS mode. If the device cannot boot into FIPS mode, the problem may need to be
diagnosed by the Crypto Officer.
If one of the conditional self tests fails, TLS communications will not occur. If the continuous RNG test fails, the
RNG will generate another number until it does not equal the previous number.
2.8 Design Assurance
Software House’s source code, user manuals, and procedures are all maintained in Rational ClearCase. The version
of Software House’s code and documents are labeled in ClearCase to uniquely identify the code associated with that
version. The user manuals are tailored for each specific customer and are updated with each version of the iSTAR
eX.
Additionally, Microsoft Visual SourceSafe (VSS) version 6.0 is used to provide configuration management for the
iSTAR eX Controller’s FIPS documentation. This software provides access control, versioning, and logging.
2.6.2.1 Key Generation
The AES Symmetric Key is used
during the TLS session as allowed per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance 7.1 (updated June 26, 2007).
2.6.2.2 Key Input and Output
The RSA public/private key pair used for the TLS sessions is generated internally, and the RSA private key is never
output from the m
2.6.2.3 Key Storage and Zeroization
AES Symmetric keys and PRNG seeds are stored in volatile memory in plaintext and zeroized after use or on
reboot.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 21 of 27
© 2008 Software House
led by Software House. The iSTAR eX GCM, PMB, and power supply
printed on them. These are then scanned and assigned to the iSTAR eX
, the end-user must examine the package for evidence of tampering. Tamper-evidence
other irregularities in the packaging.
. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 level 2
n.
The modules are distributed in cartons sea
each have their own unique serial number
assembly serial number, which is printed on a label on the outside of the box. Software House ships the modules
using recognized package delivery companies. The Crypto Officer receives the module from Software House via
this secure delivery mechanism.
Upon receipt of the module
includes tears, scratches, and
Since the modules do not enforce an access control mechanism before the module is initialized, the end-user must
maintain control of the module at all times until the iSTAR eX Controller has been installed and sealed with tamper-
evident stickers.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable
requirements for this validatio
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
3 Secure Operation
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 22 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
R eX Controller meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place
he module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
ule is properly mounted, and that the power and
securing of punch-out openings after connections are made) must be
performed by a certified professional under the end-user’s direct supervision.
3.2
When th nhibits the
following
•
•
•
•
• i
When iSTA structed
to chan ntroller
(Custom nt mode)
before th
For ma being
accessed. T vate key
download or generation.
S mode through one of three ways:
emory switch set. After reboot, this controller can be treated as a new
controller.
FIPS mode. This will cause all the on-line iSTAR eX
nments) Remove the controller from the FIPS cluster. The controller will
vate key
e to non-FIPS mode will cause all of the connected
e effect.
r custom certificates. If the system does not detect a custom
certificate, the system displays an error message. The cluster configuration screen stays open after selecting the
ge.
The iSTA
and keep t
3.1 Installation
It is the responsibility of the end-user to ensure that the mod
Ethernet cables are properly connected. The iSTAR eX hardware does not include mounting hardware for an
installation. Mounting hardware depends upon the site and must be approved by a structural engineer or other
certified professional. All installation activities not performed directly by the end-user (including the removal of
punch-out holes from the module and the
Initial Setup
e iSTAR eX is running in FIPS mode, it goes Dark (i.e., it functions as a black box) and i
services:
ICU broadcast messages
ICU configuration
Simple Network Management Protocol
NanView - a Software House development tool
STAR web page
R eX is running in non-FIPS mode, these services are normally allowed. If the iSTAR eX is in
ge from non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode, a new set of public/private keys is downloaded to the co
Host Key Management mode) or generated by the controller (Custom Controller Key Manageme
e change occurs.
ximum protection, these services must be dynamically inhibited to prevent the private key fr
he host sends a “Go Dark” message to instruct the iSTAR eX to prepare for the public/pri
om
A controller running in FIPS mode can be set to run in non-FIP
• Reset the controller with clear-m
• On the cluster configuration screen, turn off
controllers within the cluster to reboot. After reboot, they will run in non-FIPS mode.
• (In multi-controller cluster enviro
then operate in non-FIPS mode.
When entering FIPS mode, the driver notifies the iSTAR eX to “Go Dark” and to prepare to accept the pri
or certificate file download.
Changing from non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode or from FIPS mod
iSTAR eX controllers to reboot. Upon successful reboot, the changes will tak
Upon booting into FIPS mode, the system will check fo
<OK> button and displays the error messa
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
3.2.1 Putting the iSTAR eX in FIPS 140-2 Mode of Operation
FIPS mode can only be activated if the C●CURE system is set to use custom certificates to enforce maximum
security.
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 23 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
connect back to the host.
management modes is required; custom certificates must be either
er Management mode) or the C●CURE host (Custom Host
1. Turn on FIPS mode via the Cluster Configuration screen by selecting FIPS, then selecting OK.
2. All the on-line iSTAR eX controllers in the cluster will reboot and re
3.2.2 Setting up a Custom Certificate for FIPS Mode
In FIPS mode of operation, the use of specific key
generated by the controller (Custom Controll
Management mode). See Figure 8 below.
Figure 8 – Key Management Policy Screen
2.2.3.1 Setting up a Custom Controller Certificate
To set up a custom controller certificate:
1. Generate CA and host certificate at the module.
2. On the "System Variable => Key Management Policy" screen of the Admin program, select the Custom
Controller Certificates option.
3. The system will automatically copy and download the new custom certificates to the host.
4. Send the signing request to a designated monitoring station.
5. All communicating iSTAR eX controllers will reboot and come back using the new certificates.
ode to FIPS.
llers to run in FIPS mode.
9. All communicating controllers reboot and come back in FIPS mode
2.2.3.2 Setting up a Custom Host Certificate
6. For each cluster, change its encryption m
7. The system automatically tells the contro
8. Stunnel service running on the C●CURE host restarts.
To set up a custom controller certificate:
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 24 of 27
© 2008 Software House
2. On the "System Variable => Key Management Policy" screen of the Admin program, select the Custom
st and to the
g the new certificates.
5. For each cluster, change its encryption mode to FIPS.
luster in the C●CURE 800/8000
r you. There is a column in the generated report which will indicate in
1. Generate CA, host, and controller certificate.
Host Certificates option.
3. The system will automatically copy and download the new custom certificates to the ho
controllers.
4. All communicating iSTAR eX controllers will reboot and come back usin
6. The system automatically tells the controllers to run in FIPS mode.
7. Stunnel service running on the C●CURE host restarts.
8. All communicating controllers reboot and come back in FIPS mode
3.2.3 Verifying FIPS Mode of Operation
To see if you are operating in FIPS mode, go to Report => Hardware => iSTAR C
host server, and it will generate a report fo
what mode the cluster is running. It will either say “non-FIPS” or “FIPS 140-“ (see in Figure 9 below).
idance
Figure 9 – FIPS Mode Report
3.3 Crypto Officer Gu
The Crypto Officer is the person responsible for setting up, configuring, and administrating the iSTAR eX.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
3.3.1 Initialization
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 25 of 27
© 2008 Software House
The Crypto Officer must ensure that the mod , and that the power and Ethernet cables are
properly connected. All installation activities to Officer (including the removal of punch-
out holes from the module and the securing of punch-out openings after connections are made) must be performed
by a certified profes r the direct supervision of th ficer.
Before the iSTAR eX lle d:
• Check equipment (hard upply, and wiring). Verify that the contents of the shipped
boxes match th in House if any items are missing or damaged.
• Check power e t the site.
• Ensure proper or AR eX are available.
The iSTAR eX hardwa n or installation. Mounting hardware depends upon the
site and must be appr y certified professional. Software House recommends
anchoring systems to a structur ) load. The iSTAR eX will need to be
mounted and the powe h labels can be applied.
The tamper-evident la unch-out holes and across the door on the front of the
iSTAR eX. The follow eps els for the iSTAR eX.
1. Ensure the syst is unplugge
2. Clean the area hic els will be applied to remove any grease, dirt, etc. Rubbing
alcohol can b or
3. Apply a tamp en des, top, and bottom of the
iSTAR eX. M re ole so that the label must be
removed in
4. Apply a tamper-e dent o the seam between the door and the rest of the enclosure
along the top, m,
5. Log the serial ers
6. Allow a min 2
The Crypto Officer mu odi idence of tampering (including unusual dents, scrapes,
or damage to tamper t l r-evident labels still have the proper serial numbers.
Additionally, the Cryp ce rts for the module for strange activity. If indications of
suspicious activity are th mmediately take the module offline and investigate.
3.3.2 Managemen
Management of the iSTAR X i ●CURE 800/8000 host server and the ICU. The ICU is a
diagnostic tool for sett ram eX - IP address, host IP address, etc. - and it can download new
firmware to the iSTAR eX. The ICU, however, is disabled in the FIPS mode of operation, so all management while
the FIPS mode of operation occurs through the C●CURE 800/8000. The C●CURE 800/8000 is the access control
system. This is where you have a database of the personnel, doors, iSTAR eXs, panels, etc. The C●CURE
800/8000 is used to set-up the rules governing access & actions. Those rules are then downloaded as a database file
to the iSTAR eX so it can make its own decisions.
3.3.3 Zeroization
The AES symmetric key is a temporary key and is automatically zeroized after the TLS session is terminated. The
iSTAR eX’s public/private RSA key pair is deleted and overwritten when a new RSA key pair is generated.
ule is properly mounted
not performed by the Cryp
sional unde e Crypto Of
is insta d the following must be performe
ware, software, power s
g lists. Contact Software
e pack
, wiring, quipment clearances and code compliance a
tools f mounting and wiring the iST
re does ot include mounting hardware f
oved b a Structural Engineer or other
e capable of sustaining a 75 lb. (34.1 kg
ernet connected before the tamper evidence
r and Et
bels are applied across all unused p
ing st detail application of the lab
em d.
s to w h the tamper-evident lab
e used f this purpose.
er-evid
ake su
t label across any unused punch out holes on the si
that about half the label is not on the punch out h
order to punch out the hole from the casing.
vi
botto
label perpendicular t
and side of the case.
numb of the applied labels.
imum of 4 hours for the labels to cure.
st peri
-eviden
cally check the module for ev
abels) and verify the tampe
to Offi r should monitor logs and ale
found, e Crypto Officer should i
t
e s handled through the C
ing pa eters on the iSTAR
in
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 26 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3.4 19BUser Guidance
The User is a human with an access control card requesting access to a controller-secured area. The User accesses
the module’s cryptographic functionalities. Although the User does not have any ability to modify the configuration
of the module, they should check that the host application is enabled and providing cryptographic protection.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.7 January 4, 2008
Software House iSTAR eX Controller Page 27 of 27
© 2008 Software House
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 3BAcronyms
Table 7 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM General Controller Module
ICU iSTAR Configuration Utility
IP Internet Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PC Personal Computer
PMB Power Management Board
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
TLS Transport Layer Security
VSS Visual SourceSafe