Page 1 of 38
Renesas Electronics Corporation
RA6M4 Security Management Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Revision 1.02
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................12
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................13
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................13
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................13
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................13
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................13
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................13
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................14
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................14
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................15
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................15
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................22
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................22
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................23
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................23
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................23
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................23
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................23
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................23
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................23
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................24
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................24
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................24
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................24
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................25
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9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................25
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................32
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................32
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................32
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................35
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................36
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................37
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................37
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................37
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................37
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................37
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................38
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................38
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................38
Page 4 of 38
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 9
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................10
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................12
Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................13
Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................13
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................14
Table 11: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................14
Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................15
Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................22
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................23
Table 15: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................24
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................25
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................25
Table 18: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................27
Table 19: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................32
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................32
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................35
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................35
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................36
Table 24: Error States...............................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1 RA6M4 (R7FA6M4AF3CFB) Chip................................................................................ 6
Figure 2 Block Diagram.............................................................................................................. 6
Figure 3 Tamper-evident Coating on Chip.................................................................................24
Page 5 of 38
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the RA6M4 Security
Management Module from Renesas Electronics Corporation. It describes how the module
meets the requirements of Security Level 2 as defined in FIPS 140-3.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
RA6M4 Security Management Module is a hardware cryptographic module certified at FIPS
140-3 Security Level 2. RA6M4 is general-purpose microcontroller designed for industrial, IOT,
and infrastructure applications, embedded with robust security features. This module is provided
as a reference for developing FIPS 140-3-compliant modules using the RA6M4. By referring to
the design of this module, it becomes easier to address FIPS requirements when developing
cryptographic modules using the RA6M4 in customer environments.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics :
N/A for this module.
Cryptographic Boundary:
Page 6 of 38
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the perimeter of the IC package as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 RA6M4 (R7FA6M4AF3CFB) Chip
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) :
The block diagram of the RA6M4 Security Management Module is shown Figure 2. This module
provides the services required by FIPS 140-3 and can execute those services by entering string
commands via UART. The services provided by the module are implemented in Crypto
Firmware. When developing FIPS 140-3 compliant products using RA6M4, implementing only
the User Application part can make the certification process easier.
FW
Security Management Firmware
MCUboot
HW
SCE
CPU
Crypto Firmware
FSP
Cryptographic boundary
Reset
Power
I/O port
User Application
FreeRTOS
GPT
Peripherals
Bootloader
UART
API Call
UART
Data Flash
Code Flash
Extra Flash
RAM
Data Input, Data Output,
Control Input, Status Output
Status Output
Control Input
Power Interface
Figure 2 Block Diagram
Component Description
FW
User Application Parses serial data received via UART and performs the
corresponding cryptographic service.
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Component Description
This module is designed to serve as a reference for
developing cryptographic modules that conform to CMVP,
requiring modifications only to the User Application.
FreeRTOS Task scheduling
Security Management Firmware Implement functionality that complies with FIPS 140-3
requirements, using the Crypto Firmware API as its
interface.
Crypto Firmware Provides the following services to meet FIPS 140-3
requirements
- FSM
- User authentication
- Module version and status display
- Cryptographic services
- Self-test
FSP RA Flexible Software Package
MCUboot For pre-operational self-test, FW Load Test, and part of
CASTs
Boot Loader For module initialization.
HW
Peripherals -
GPT (General PWM Timer) For periodic self-test
SCE (Secure Crypto Engine) For cryptographic services
UART (Universal
Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitter )
For data input/output, control input and status output.
CPU Arm Cortex-M33
Data Flash Flash memory for data store
Code Flash Flash memory for code store
Extra Flash Access Restricted Flash Memory
RAM Random Access Memory
*CAVP certified (A5199) SCE9 Protected Mode v1.1.0 consists of SCE, and FSP that is
included in Security Management Firmware version 1.01.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
RA6M4 Security
Management
Module
R7FA6M4AF3CFB Security Management
Firmware version:1.01;
User Application
version:1.00; Boot loader
version:1.6.25
Arm Cortex-
M33
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
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Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
 Boot Loader
The Boot Loader is used only during the initialization of the module, and after the
initialization is complete, it can’t be used permanently due to the Device Lifecycle
Management capability of the RA6M4. Therefore, it is an excluded firmware component.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Approved security services are
available.
Approved The successful completion of
a service
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module starts as an approved mode of operation after starting up in Single-Chip mode. To
start in Single-Chip mode, set the voltage on the MD pin of RA6M4 to “High” and release reset.
Mode Change Instructions and Status :
N/A for this module.
Degraded Mode Description :
N/A for this module.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5199 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A5199 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CMAC A5199 Direction - Generation,
Verification
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A5199 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A5199 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Conditioning Component AES-
CBC-MAC SP800-90B
A5199 Key Length - 128 SP 800-90B
Counter DRBG A5199 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-128
Derivation Function Enabled -
No
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5199 Curve - P-224, P-256
Secret Generation Mode - extra
bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5199 Curve - P-224, P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5199 Curve - P-224, P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5199 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
KDF SP800-108 A5199 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported
Lengths: 128, 256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5199 Key Generation Mode -
probable
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5199 Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5199 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A5199 Message Length - Message
Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A SP800-133r2 Section 4,
example1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
AES-128 CBC-
MAC
no security
claimed
For interoperability, performed along with inputting
User key
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
AES ECB/CBC
encryption/decrypti
on
BC-UnAuth AES ECB/CBC
encryption/decrypti
on
key
strength:128/256 bit
AES-CBC:
(A5199)
AES-ECB:
(A5199)
AES CCM/GCM
encryption/decrypti
on
BC-Auth AES CCM/GCM
encryption/decrypti
on
key
strength:128/256 bit
AES-CCM:
(A5199)
AES-GCM:
(A5199)
AES CMAC MAC AES CMAC
generation /
verification
key
strength:128/256 bit
AES-
CMAC:
(A5199)
RSA Sig Gen DigSig-
SigGen
RSA Signature
generation
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
RSA Sig Ver DigSig-
SigVer
RSA Signature
verification
key
length:2048/3072/40
96 bit
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
SHA SHA Sha message
digest
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
Page 11 of 38
Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
ECDSA Sig Gen DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA Signature
generation
curve:P-224. P-256 ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
ECDSA Sig Ver DigSig-
SigVer
ECDSA Signature
verification
curve:P-224. P-256 ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
HMAC MAC HMAC generation
/verification
key length:256 bit HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A5199)
RSA 2048 Key
Pair Generation
AsymKeyPair
-KeyGen
CKG
RSA 2048 Key
Pair Generation
key length:2048 bit RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
CKG: ()
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation
AsymKeyPair
-KeyGen
CKG
ECDSA key pair
generation
curve:P-224, P-256 ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
CKG: ()
Random Number
Generation
DRBG Random number
generation
Counter
DRBG:
(A5199)
Conditionin
g
Componen
t AES-
CBC-MAC
SP800-
90B:
(A5199)
FW update UNK Update User
Application area
curve:P-256 ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
User
Authentication
UNK Authenticate users
with a challenge
response
curve:P-256 ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5): (A5199)
Counter
DRBG:
(A5199)
Page 12 of 38
Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
AES 128 Key
Generation
CKG AES 128 Key
Generation
key strength:128 bit CKG: ()
KEK for HUK
deriving
KBKDF Derive a KEK for
HUK
key strength:256 bit KDF
SP800-
108:
(A5199)
User key
decryption for key
update
BC-
UnAuthDecry
pt
Decryption of user
keys for input to
the module
key strength:128 bit AES-CBC:
(A5199)
AES-128
CBC-MAC:
()
KTS User key
wrapping
KTS-Wrap Encryption of user
keys for secure
storage in the
module
Standard:N/A
IG D.G:approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CCM:
(A5199)
KTS User key
unwrapping
KTS-Unwrap Decryption of user
keys for output
from the module
Standard:N/A
IG D.G:approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CCM:
(A5199)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
Although the module supports the AES 256-bit operations, it imports the key for the operation
externally and cannot generate the key internally.
Similarly, although the module supports RSA operations for 3072 and 4096-bit sizes, it imports
the keys for these operations externally and cannot generate the keys internally.
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
 AES-GCM encryption is in compliance with IG.C.H Scenario 2. When the AES-GCM
encryption service is executed, a 96-bit IV is generated from the approved DRBG inside the
cryptographic module. This specification assures that the probability of being called with the
same key and the same IV is less than 2^32.
 RSA Signature Generation/Verification is in compliance with IG C.F. RSA signature
generation supports a modules length of 2048 bits, and RSA signature verification supports
modules length of 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
Page 13 of 38
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E176 Renesas Electronics Corporation
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Entropy Source Physical R7FA6M4AF3CFB 128 128 A5199
Table 9: Entropy Sources
Entropy Information:
The module has an analog noise source and conditions it using AES-128 CBC-MAC for output.
Each 128-bit output sample provides a minimum entropy of 128 bits, which means full entropy.
RNG Information:
Use the entropy source output as a seed to generate random numbers with AES-128 CTR-
DRBG.
2.9 Key Generation
This module uses a DRBG compliant with SP800-90A Rev.1 to generate AES, RSA and
ECDSA keys. The random numbers used for the cryptographic keys are obtained from the
DRBG. It performs cryptographic key generation(CKG) in accordance with SP800-133r2 Section
4, example1. CKG uses the output values of the CTR-DRBG described in NIST SP800-90A as
keys.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Page 14 of 38
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
UART
TXD
Data Output
Status
Output
Output of Service Execution
UART
RXD
Data Input
Control Input
Input for Service Execution
P415 Status
Output
Set High means that Operator is authenticated.
P404 Status
Output
Set High means that zeroization is completed.
P400 Status
Output
This port is error indicator, TogglePO Self-Test Error, Set
HighCO Self-Test ERROR
Reset Control Input Reset
Clock Control Input Clock
Power Power 3.3V power
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Challenge
response
The challenge-
response method is
implemented for user
authentication. When
the user
authentication service
is executed, the
module sends a 128-
bit challenge. The
ECDSA P-256
signature is sent back
in response to this
challenge, and if the
signature is correct,
the authentication is
successful.
User
Authentication
The target
strength I
1/1,000,000. The
probability that a
random attempt
will succeed, or a
false acceptance
will occur
depends on the
ECDSA P-256
strength.
Therefore, the
probability is
1/2^128, which is
less than
1/1,000,000.
The target strength
I 1/100,000. Since
the module
generates a 1 ms
wait for each
authentication
attempt. Therefore,
the probability that
multiple attacks
within a given
minute will be
successful is
60,000/2^128,
which is less than
1/100,000.
Table 11: Authentication Methods
This module provides identity-based authentication, with the authentication method embedded
in challenge response authentication using 128-bit random number. It stores authentication
information, including ID, role and authentication public key, linked together. Only one user can
be logged in at the same time.
Page 15 of 38
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO Identity Crypto Officer Challenge response
User Identity User Challenge response
Table 12: Roles
This module supports two roles: User and CO(Crypto Officer) role. The maintenance role isn’t
implemented.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
AES
encrypt
ion
Perform
AES
ECB/CBC/
CCM/GCM
encryption
"aes enc result:",
"aesccm enc
result:", "aesgcm
enc result:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY;
plain
text
ciphe
r text
AES
ECB/CBC
encryption/
decryption
AES
CCM/GCM
encryption/
decryption
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
User
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
AES
decrypt
ion
Perform
AES
ECB/CBC/
CCM/GCM
decryption
"aes dec result:",
"aesccm dec
result:", "aesgcm
dec result:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY;
ciphe
r text
plain
text
AES
ECB/CBC
encryption/
decryption
AES
CCM/GCM
encryption/
decryption
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
User
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
AES
CMAC
Genera
tion
Perform
AES CMAC
generation
"MAC:" via UART Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY;
mess
age
MAC
value
AES
CMAC
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
User
- AES-KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
AES
CMAC
Verifica
tion
Perform
AES CMAC
verification
"MAC:" via UART Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY;
mess
age;
MAC
value
"True
" or
"Fals
e"
AES
CMAC
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- AES-KEY: E
- HUK: E
User
- AES-KEY: E
- HUK: E
Page 16 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
RSA
Signat
ure
Genera
tion
Perform
RSA
Signature
Generation
"signature:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY;
mess
age
signa
ture
RSA Sig
Gen
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- RSA-PRIVATE-
KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
User
- RSA-PRIVATE-
KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
RSA
Signat
ure
Verifica
tion
Perform
RSA
Signature
Verification
"signature:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY;
mess
age;
signa
ture
"True
" or
"Fals
e"
RSA Sig
Ver
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
User
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W,E
- HUK: E
ECDS
A
Signat
ure
Genera
tion
Perform
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
"signature:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY;
mess
age
signa
ture
ECDSA Sig
Gen
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY:
W,E
- HUK: E
User
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY:
W,E
- HUK: E
ECDS
A
Signat
ure
Verifica
tion
Perform
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
"signature:" via
UART
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY;
mess
age;
signa
ture
"True
" or
"Fals
e"
ECDSA Sig
Ver
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: E
- HUK: E
User
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: E
- HUK: E
Rando
m
numbe
r
genera
tion
Perform
Random
number
generation
"random
number:" via
UART
- Rand
om
numb
ers
Random
Number
Generation
CO
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
User
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
HMAC
Genera
tion
Perform
HMAC
Generation
"MAC:" via UART Wrap
ped
HMA
MAC
value
HMAC
KTS User
CO
- HMAC-256-KEY:
W,E
Page 17 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
C-
256-
KEY;
mess
age
key
unwrapping
- HUK: E
User
- HMAC-256-KEY:
W,E
- HUK: E
HMAC
Verifica
tion
Perform
HMAC
Verification
"MAC:" via UART Wrap
ped
HMA
C-
256-
KEY;
mess
age;
MAC
value
"True
" or
"Fals
e"
HMAC
KTS User
key
unwrapping
CO
- HMAC-256-KEY:
W,E
- HUK: E
User
- HMAC-256-KEY:
W,E
- HUK: E
SHA
Hash
Genera
tion
Perform
SHA Hash
Generation
"message
digest:" via
UART
mess
age
diges
t
SHA CO
User
AES
128
key
genera
tion
Perform
AES 128
key
generation
"Wrapped AES-
128 key:" via
UART
- Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY
AES 128
Key
Generation
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
- AES-KEY: G
- HUK: E
RSA
2048
key
pair
genera
tion
Perform
RSA 2048
key pair
generation
"Wrapped rsa-
2048 private
key:" and
"Wrapped rsa-
2048 public key:"
via UART
- Wrap
ped
RSA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY;
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
RSA 2048
Key Pair
Generation
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
- RSA-PRIVATE-
KEY: G
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: G
- HUK: E
ECDS
A P224
key
pair
genera
tion
Perform
ECDSA
P224 key
pair
generation
"Wrapped ecdsa-
p224 private
key:" and
"Wrapped ecdsa-
p224 public key:"
via UART
- Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY;
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
ECDSA
Key Pair
Generation
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY: G
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: G
- HUK: E
Page 18 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
PUB
LIC-
KEY
ECDS
A P256
key
pair
genera
tion
Perform
ECDSA
P256 key
pair
generation
"Wrapped ecdsa-
p256 private
key:" and
"Wrapped ecdsa-
p256 public key:"
via UART
- Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY;
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
ECDSA
Key Pair
Generation
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY: G
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: G
- HUK: E
AES
128
key
update
Perform
AES 128
key update
"Wrapped
AES_128_KEY:"
via UART
encry
pted
AES-
KEY
Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- AES-KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
AES
256
key
update
Perform
AES 256
key update
"Wrapped
AES_256_KEY:"
via UART
encry
pted
AES-
KEY
Wrap
ped
AES-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- AES-KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
RSA
2048
private
key
update
Perform
RSA 2048
private key
update
"Wrapped
RSA_PRIVATE_
KEY:" via UART
encry
pted
RSA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- RSA-PRIVATE-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
RSA
2048
public
key
update
Perform
RSA 2048
public key
update
"Wrapped
RSA_PUBLIC_K
EY:" via UART
encry
pted
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
Page 19 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
RSA
3072
public
key
update
Perform
RSA 3072
public key
update
"Wrapped
RSA_3072_PUB
LIC_KEY:" via
UART
encry
pted
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
RSA
4096
public
key
update
Perform
RSA 4096
public key
update
"Wrapped
RSA_4096_PUB
LIC_KEY:" via
UART
encry
pted
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Wrap
ped
RSA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- RSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
ECDS
A P224
private
key
update
Perform
ECDSA
P224
private key
update
"Wrapped
ECDSA_P224_P
RIVATE_KEY:"
via UART
encry
pted
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
ECDS
A P224
public
key
update
Perform
ECDSA
P224 public
key update
"Wrapped
ECDSA_P224_P
UBLIC_KEY:" via
UART
encry
pted
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
ECDS
A P256
private
key
update
Perform
ECDSA
P256
private key
update
UART sends
strings that
"Wrapped
ECDSA_P256_P
RIVATE_KEY:"
encry
pted
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PRIV
ATE-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- ECDSA-
PRIVATE-KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
ECDS
A P256
public
key
update
Perform
ECDSA
P256 public
key update
"Wrapped
ECDSA_P256_P
UBLIC_KEY:" via
UART
encry
pted
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Wrap
ped
ECD
SA-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- ECDSA-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
Page 20 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
HMAC
256
key
update
Perform
HMAC 256
key update
"Wrapped
HMAC_256_KEY
:" via UART
encry
pted
HMA
C-
256-
KEY
Wrap
ped
HMA
C-
256-
KEY
User key
decryption
for key
update
KTS User
key
wrapping
CO
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- HMAC-256-KEY:
W
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
Show
module
version
Show
current
module
status,
logged-in
user and
error log for
self-test.
none - modu
le id /
versi
on
None CO
User
Unauthenticated
Show
module
status
Show
module
status
none - modu
le
statu
s
None CO
User
Unauthenticated
Zeroiza
tion
Perform
CSP
Zeroization
P404 Set High - - None CO
- RTL Key: Z
-
MCUBOOT_IMAGE
_SIGNING_KEY: Z
Firmwa
re
update
Perform
Firmware
update
none new
firmw
are;
signa
ture
- FW update CO
-
MCUBOOT_IMAGE
_SIGNING_KEY: E
User
authent
ication
Challenge
response
authenticati
on using
ECDSA P-
256
Signature
verification
P415 Set High User
ID;
signa
ture
- User
Authenticat
ion
Unauthenticated
- ECDSA-P256-
USER-PUBLIC-
KEY: E
- ECDSA-P256-CO-
PUBLIC-KEY: E
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key): W,E
- HUK: E
Add
User
Perform
Add User
none User
ID;
encry
pted
ECD
SA-
P256
-
USE
- User key
decryption
for key
update
CO
- ECDSA-P256-
USER-PUBLIC-
KEY: W
- KEY-UPDATE-
KEY: E
- HUK: E
- AES-CBC-MAC-
KEY: E
Page 21 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
R-
PUB
LIC-
KEY
Delete
User
Perform
Delete
User
none User
ID
- None CO
- ECDSA-P256-CO-
PUBLIC-KEY: Z
pre
operati
onal
self
test
Perform
pre
operational
self test
none - - KEK for
HUK
deriving
CO
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK: G,E
- HUK: W
-
MCUBOOT_IMAGE
_SIGNING_KEY: E
User
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK: G,E
- HUK: W
-
MCUBOOT_IMAGE
_SIGNING_KEY: E
Unauthenticated
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK: G,E
- HUK: W
-
MCUBOOT_IMAGE
_SIGNING_KEY: E
On-
deman
d
selftest
Perform
ondemand
conditional
self test
"Conditional test
completed" via
UART
- - KEK for
HUK
deriving
CO
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK:
G,E,Z
- HUK: W
- DRBG seed: G
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key):
G,W,E
User
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK:
G,E,Z
- HUK: W
- DRBG seed: G
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key):
G,W,E
Page 22 of 38
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Input
s
Outp
uts
Security
Functions
SSP Access
Open Initialize
the module
"Crypto Firmware
initialized
successfully" via
UART
- - KEK for
HUK
deriving
CO
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK:
G,E,Z
- HUK: W
- DRBG seed: G
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key):
G,W,E
User
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK:
G,E,Z
- HUK: W
- DRBG seed: G
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key):
G,W,E
Unauthenticated
- RTL Key: E
- KEK for HUK:
G,E,Z
- HUK: W
- DRBG seed: G
- DRBG internal
state (V, Key):
G,W,E
Close Close the
module
none - - None CO
User
Unauthenticated
Display
User
List
Display
User List
none - - None CO
User
Table 13: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The Firmware load function via UART interface is implemented. ECDSA P-256 signature
verification is performed during the firmware load test. The update applies only to the User
Page 23 of 38
Application, and other firmware cannot be updated. To maintain certification, the firmware to
be loaded must be validated.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The firmware integrity test is executed after the module’s power off/on (this may also mean
reset hereafter). It is performed by MCUboot according to the following procedures.
 MCUboot’s integrity is verified by EDC(CRC32).
 The User Application and Crypto Firmware area are verified by ECDSA P-256.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
This module can execute an on-demand test by executing the power off/on or selftest
command.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied :
N/A for this module.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper-evident coating on chip Every month Confirmation that there is no visual damage
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The chip is treated with a opaque coating designed to provide tamper evidence.
The module consists of standard, production-quality ICs, designed to meet commercial-grade
specifications, and uses standard passivation techniques for the entire chip.
Page 24 of 38
Figure 3 Tamper-evident Coating on Chip
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
Code Flash Flash memory for code store Static
Data Flash Flash memory for data store Static
Extra Flash Access Restricted Flash Memory Static
SCE Internal register Internal registers of SCE Dynamic
RAM RAM Dynamic
Table 15: Storage Areas
The Bootloader, which is an excluded component, is stored in Extra Flash.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Key update
(input)
UART Data
Flash
Encrypted Manual Electronic User key
decryption for
key update
Key update
(output)
Data
Flash
UART Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS User key
wrapping
Cryptographic
service
parameter
(input)
UART RAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS User key
unwrapping
Page 25 of 38
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Add User (input) UART Data
Flash
Encrypted Manual Electronic User key
decryption for
key update
Key generation
(output)
SCE
Internal
register
UART Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS User key
wrapping
Initialization
Process (input)
UART Data
Flash
Encrypted Manual Electronic User key
decryption for
key update
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroization
Service
Erase the Code Flash area containing the SCE
driver that includes the 'RTL Key', which serves as
the root of SSP protection.
Overwrite the
flash area
with 0xFF.
CO
power off/on The SSP held in the SCE internal register is
volatilized by cutting power with power off/on.
Additionally, when the initialization process is
performed, SCE internal register is set to "0".
Turning the power off and on triggers the
initialization process as zeroization.
Clear SCE
internal
register to 0
CO, User
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Categ
ory
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used By
RTL Key AES-128 key
used for
deriving the
KEK for HUK
128 -
128
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
Gener
ated at
factory
KEK for HUK
deriving
KEK for HUK AES-256 key
used to
encrypt the
HUK for
storage in the
RA6M4
256 -
256
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
KEK
for
HUK
derivin
g
AES
CCM/GCM
encryption/de
cryption
HUK Hardware
Unique Key
for each
device
256 -
256
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
Gener
ated at
factory
KTS User key
wrapping
KTS User key
unwrapping
Page 26 of 38
Name Description Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Categ
ory
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used By
DRBG internal state (V,
Key)
DRBG
internal state
256 -
128
DRBG
intrnal
state -
CSP
Count
er
DRBG
(A519
9)
Random
Number
Generation
Counter
DRBG
(A5199)
DRBG seed Seed used for
DRBG
Instantiation.
256 -
256
DRBG
seed -
CSP
Count
er
DRBG
(A519
9)
Counter
DRBG
(A5199)
KEY-UPDATE-KEY Key used to
update the
user key
128 -
128
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
User key
decryption for
key update
AES-KEY 128/256-bit
key used for
AES
encryption/de
cryption in
ECB/CBC/GC
M/CCM
modes and
for
generating/ve
rifying AES
CMAC
128,
256 -
128,
256
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
AES
128
Key
Gener
ation
AES
ECB/CBC
encryption/de
cryption
AES
CCM/GCM
encryption/de
cryption
AES CMAC
RSA-PRIVATE-KEY RSA private
key used for
signature
generation
2048
- 112
Privat
e Key
- CSP
RSA
2048
Key
Pair
Gener
ation
RSA Sig Gen
RSA-PUBLIC-KEY RSA public
key used for
signature
verification
2048,
3072,
4096
- 112,
128,
150
Public
Key -
PSP
RSA
2048
Key
Pair
Gener
ation
RSA Sig Ver
ECDSA-PRIVATE-KEY ECDSA
private key
used for
signature
generation
224,
256 -
112,
128
Privat
e Key
- CSP
ECDS
A Key
Pair
Gener
ation
ECDSA Sig
Gen
Page 27 of 38
Name Description Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Categ
ory
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used By
ECDSA-PUBLIC-KEY ECDSA public
key used for
signature
verification
224,
256 -
112,
128
Public
Key -
PSP
ECDS
A Key
Pair
Gener
ation
ECDSA Sig
Ver
ECDSA-P256-CO-
PUBLIC-KEY
ECDSA public
key for Crypto
Officer used
for user
authentication
256 -
128
Public
Key -
PSP
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
User
Authenticatio
n
ECDSA-P256-USER-
PUBLIC-KEY
ECDSA public
key for User
used for user
authentication
256 -
128
Public
Key -
PSP
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
User
Authenticatio
n
HMAC-256-KEY HMAC-SHA2-
256 Key used
for
generation/ve
rification
256 -
256
Symm
etric
Key -
CSP
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
HMAC
MCUBOOT_IMAGE_SI
GNING_KEY
ECDSA public
key for the
firmware
integrity test
and the load
test
256 -
128
Public
Key -
PSP
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
FW update
AES-CBC-MAC-KEY Key used for
interoperabilit
y with
inputting User
key
128 -
-
Symm
etric
Key -
Neithe
r
Gener
ated
outsid
e the
modul
e
AES-128
CBC-MAC
Table 18: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
RTL Key Code
Flash:Obfusc
ated
Zeroizati
on
Service
KEK for HUK SCE Internal
register:Plaint
ext
Until
power
off/on
power
off/on
RTL
Key:Derive
d From
Page 28 of 38
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
HUK:Decry
pts
HUK Extra
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A AES-
KEY:Encryp
ts
RSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Encryp
ts
RSA-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Encryp
ts
ECDSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Encryp
ts
ECDSA-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Encryp
ts
ECDSA-
P256-CO-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Encryp
ts
ECDSA-
P256-
USER-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Encryp
ts
HMAC-256-
KEY:Encryp
ts
KEY-
UPDATE-
KEY:Decry
pts
AES-
KEY:Decry
pts
RSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Decry
pts
RSA-
Page 29 of 38
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
P256-CO-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
P256-
USER-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
HMAC-256-
KEY:Decry
pts
AES-CBC-
MAC-
KEY:Decry
pts
DRBG internal state (V,
Key)
SCE Internal
register:Plaint
ext
Until
power
off/on
power
off/on
DRBG seed SCE Internal
register:Plaint
ext
Until
power
off/on
power
off/on
KEY-UPDATE-KEY Initializatio
n Process
(input)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A AES-
KEY:Decry
pts
RSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Decry
pts
RSA-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
Page 30 of 38
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
ECDSA-
PRIVATE-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
P256-CO-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
ECDSA-
P256-
USER-
PUBLIC-
KEY:Decry
pts
HMAC-256-
KEY:Decry
pts
HUK:Encry
pted by
AES-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Cryptogra
phic
service
parameter
(input)
Key
generation
(output)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
RSA-PRIVATE-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Cryptogra
phic
service
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
Page 31 of 38
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
parameter
(input)
Key
generation
(output)
RSA-PUBLIC-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
ECDSA-PRIVATE-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Cryptogra
phic
service
parameter
(input)
Key
generation
(output)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
ECDSA-PUBLIC-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Cryptogra
phic
service
parameter
(input)
Key
generation
(output)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
ECDSA-P256-CO-PUBLIC-
KEY
Initializatio
n Process
(input)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
ECDSA-P256-USER-
PUBLIC-KEY
Add User
(input)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
Page 32 of 38
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storag
e
Durati
on
Zeroizati
on
Related
SSPs
HMAC-256-KEY Key
update
(input)
Key
update
(output)
Cryptogra
phic
service
parameter
(input)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
MCUBOOT_IMAGE_SIGNI
NG_KEY
Initializatio
n Process
(input)
Data
Flash:Plainte
xt
Zeroizati
on
Service
AES-CBC-MAC-KEY Initializatio
n Process
(input)
Data
Flash:Encrypt
ed
N/A HUK:Encry
pted by
Table 19: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
CRC-32 32 bit Error Detection
Code
SW/FW
Integrity
Input via
UART can be
accepted
MCUboot integrity
check
ECDSA
P256
ECDSA
P256
ECDSA P256
signature
verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Input via
UART can be
accepted
User Application &
Crypto Firmware
Integrity check
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KDF
SP800-108
(A5199)
256bit KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
KDF Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
Page 33 of 38
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
AES CCM
enc(A5199)
128 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Encrypt Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
AES CCM
dec(A5199)
128 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Decrypt Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
Counter
DRBG
(A5199)
256 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
instantiate
function,
generate
function
Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
Entropy
Source
Health Test
- fault
detection
test
CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
APT, RCT Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
AES-GCM
(A5199)
128 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Encrypt Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
AES-ECB
(A5199)
128 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Decrypt Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
RSA
SigGen
2048 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
Sign Execution of
Open or
Execution of
Page 34 of 38
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
completed."
via UART
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
2048 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Verify Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
SHA2-256
(A5199)
256 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Hash Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5199)
256 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
HMAC
Gen,
HMAC
Verify
Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
P224 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Sign Execution of
Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
P224 KAT CAST "Conditional
test
completed."
via UART
Verify Before Pre-
Operational
Self-Tests,
and Execution
of Open or
Execution of
On-demand
selftest or
Periodic self-
test
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
2048 PCT PCT Output
tested key
pair via
UART.
Key Pair
Gen
Execution of
RSA 2048 key
pair
generation
ECDSA
KeyGen
224, 256 PCT PCT Output
tested key
Key Pair
Gen
Execution of
ECDSA key
Page 35 of 38
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
pair via
UART.
pair
generation
services
FW Load
Test
ECDSA
p256
signature
Signature
Verify
SW/FW
Load
"fwupdate
success" via
UART
FW Load
Test
Execution of
fwupdate
command
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
CRC-32 Error Detection
Code
SW/FW Integrity per 15 minutes programmatically
ECDSA P256 ECDSA P256
signature
verification
SW/FW Integrity per 15 minutes programmatically
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
KDF SP800-108
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
AES CCM
enc(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
AES CCM
dec(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
Counter DRBG
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
Entropy Source
Health Test
fault detection
test
CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
AES-ECB
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
SHA2-256
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
Page 36 of 38
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
KAT CAST per 10 minutes programmatically
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
PCT PCT - -
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5199)
PCT PCT - -
FW Load Test Signature Verify SW/FW Load - -
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information
The Pre-operational self-test measures its interval using a timer and runs automatically every 15
minutes.
The Conditional self-test measures its interval using a timer and runs automatically every 10
minutes.
The timer starts counting once user authentication is successful and the state transitions to
either the User or CO role.
The on-demand pre-operational test can be executed by power off/on.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
PO Self-
Test
Error
State
Error state caused by
failure of self-test
executed by MCUboot
In the case where the
self-test executed by
MCUboot encounters
an error.
power
off/on
P400 toggles
between low and
high at 0.5
second intervals
CO Self-
Test
Error
State
Error state caused by
failure of self-test
executed by User
Application
In the case where the
self-test executed by
User Application
encounters an error.
power
off/on
P400 Set High
Table 24: Error States
This module transitions to an error state if it fails the self-test.
MCUboot performs the Po-operational Test, FW Load Test, and ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5).
Other self-tests are executed by the User Application.
Page 37 of 38
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Renesas Electronics provides the evaluation board for the module, the EK-RA6M4, and the
firmware executable file to customers.
 EK-RA6M4
https://www.renesas.com/en/products/microcontrollers-microprocessors/ra-cortex-m-
mcus/ek-ra6m4-evaluation-kit-ra6m4-mcu-group
 Security Management Firmware (ra6m4_security_management_module.zip)
After obtaining the above, please initialize the module following the steps below by CO. The
details of the procedure are described in the user setup manual
“RA6M4_SMM_Setting_Manual_rev.1.0.docx”.
Note that this operation is proceeded with using a NON-networked GPC. Connect the GPC to
the module via a serial port of the EK-RA6M4.
1. Set up the EK-RA6M4
2. Writing the executable firmware
3. Writing the user keys
4. Changing the Device Life Cycle
5. Authentication using the default CO public key
6. Updating the default CO public key
The Boot Loader included in the module is written to the Extra Flash area of the RA6M4 at the
time of product shipment.
The Boot Loader version can be checked using RFP (Renesas Flash Programmer). By
executing a command with the "-sig" option in RFP.
rfp-cli -d RA -t jlink -sig
The other component version can be outputted by “Show module version” service.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Refer to the RA6M4_SMM_Usage_Guidance_rev.1.0.docx
Note that using the “Add User” service or using the “key update” services must be proceeded
with using a NON-networked GPC connect to the module via a serial port of the EK-RA6M4.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Refer to the RA6M4_SMM_Usage_Guidance_rev.1.0.docx
11.4 Design and Rules
N/A for this module.
Page 38 of 38
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
N/A for this module.
11.6 End of Life
The following procedures are used to ensure secure sanitization and destruction of
cryptographic module.
1. Secure sanitization
Execute the “zeroization” command in the CO role to zeroize the unprotected SSPs.
2. Secure destruction
Destroy the RA6M4 (R7FA6M4AF3CFB) to fragments smaller than 2 mm².
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.