Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
NonStop Volume Level Encryption
Product No: T0867 SW Version: 1.0
FIPS 140–2 Non–Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.6
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Hewlett-Packard Development Company,
L.P.
Corsec Security, Inc.
3000 Hanover Street
Palo Alto, CA 94394
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (650) 857–1501 Phone: (703) 267–6050
http://www.hp.com info@corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................................3
2 NSVLE ......................................................................................................................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................................................................5
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary........................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................8
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................8
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role ................................................................................................................................................9
2.4.2 User Role...................................................................................................................................................................9
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................10
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................10
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................10
2.8 SELF–TESTS..........................................................................................................................................................14
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................14
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................15
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................15
3.2 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................15
3.2.1 Initialization...........................................................................................................................................................15
3.2.2 Assumptions ..........................................................................................................................................................15
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................16
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – ARCHITECTURE OF NSVLE ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................4
FIGURE 2 – BLOCK DIAGRAM OF AN HP PROLIANT SYSTEM .............................................................................................6
FIGURE 3 – NSVLE LOGICAL BOUNDARY.............................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 4 – NSVLE LOGICAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.................................................................................................7
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140–2 SECTION.........................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 – FIPS 140–2 LOGICAL INTERFACES.......................................................................................................................8
TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ................9
TABLE 4 – MAPPING OF USER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ......................................9
TABLE 5 – FIPS–APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ......................................................................................... 10
TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS................................. 12
TABLE 7 – CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PUBLIC KEYS......................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 8 – ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non–proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the NonStop Volume Level
Encryption (NSVLE) from Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. This Security Policy describes
how the NonStop Volume Level Encryption meets the security requirements of FIPS 140–2 and how to run
the module in a secure FIPS 140–2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140–2
validation of the module.
FIPS 140–2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140–2 – Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic
modules. More information about the FIPS 140–2 standard and validation program is available on the
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC):
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption is referred to in this document as NSVLE or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140–2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The HP website (http://www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP.
• For any related questions regarding the NSVLE please contact HP.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140–2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence Document
• Finite State Model
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to HP. With the exception of this Non–Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140–2
Submission Package is proprietary to HP and is releasable only under appropriate non–disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact HP.
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2 NSVLE
This section describes the NonStop Volume Level Encryption (NSVLE) module from HP.
2.1 Overview
Hewlett–Packard’s NonStop technology has been leading the way for over three decades, providing reliable
solutions for the most demanding enterprises. The NonStop platform is used in complex computing
environments, where business–critical applications need 24 x 7 availability, extreme scalability, and fault–
tolerance. NonStop plays an important role in major industries and markets, including finance, healthcare,
telecommunications, manufacturing, retail, and government.
HP NonStop Volume Level Encryption, or NSVLE, is a fully integrated encryption solution using FIPS–
Approved algorithms to protect data from threats such as theft and unauthorized disclosure. NSVLE is
intended to be used by systems with a NonStop infrastructure that include at a minimum the following
components:
• HP Integrity NonStop NS–Series or BladeSystem servers for application support
• HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager (ESKM) for FIPS-Approved key generation and retrieval
(FIPS Validation Certificate# 1303)
• HP Storage Cluster I/O Modules (CLIM) for connecting disk and tape media
• Storage devices such as SAS (Serial Attached SCSI1
) disks, StorageWorks XP Disk Arrays, and
LTO2
Generation 4 tape devices
Within this infrastructure, NSVLE resides as a software module on each Storage CLIM and provides data
at rest encryption for supported SAS and Fibre Channel connected storage devices. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of the NonStop architecture.
Figure 1 – Architecture of NSVLE Environment
1
SCSI – Small Computer System Interface
2
LTO – Linear Tape-Open
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CLIMs, specifically Storage CLIMs in this document, are HP ProLiant class servers that act as adapters for
disks and tapes, using advanced caching technology that speeds up processing. Communication between
NonStop servers and CLIMs is done with a combination of the Maintenance LAN and ServerNet, the core
interconnectivity technology for NonStop systems. The CLIMs are connected directly to the Enterprise
LAN so that they can communicate with the key manager (ESKM) cluster. Interactions between the
ESKM and CLIM must be authenticated using certificates and encrypted through TLS3
, so that the CLIM
can securely receive keys from the ESKM.
NSVLE provides both initial volume encryption and then subsequent ongoing encryption of data with key
rotation, all the while keeping data online, even during write operations. Existing applications can read and
write data normally while data is automatically encrypted and decrypted as it passes through the CLIM.
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption is validated at the following FIPS 140–2 section levels:
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140–2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC4
1
9 Self–tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption is a software module with a multi–chip standalone embodiment.
The overall FIPS security level of the module is 1. The following sections will define the physical and
logical boundaries of the NSVLE module.
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software cryptographic module, there are no physical protection mechanisms implemented. The
module must rely on the physical characteristics of host systems, which were not tested as part of this FIPS
140–2 validation. NSVLE has been tested on two HP Storage CLIM hardware platforms, which are HP
ProLiant class servers. The physical boundary of the cryptographic module is the HP ProLiant chassis,
which encloses the complete set of hardware and software, including the operating system and the module.
See Figure 2 below for a block diagram of a ProLiant host system.
3
TLS – Transport Layer Security
4
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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Figure 2 – Block Diagram of an HP ProLiant System
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
NSVLE is a software implementation, as shown in Figure 3, which resides on each CLIM and consists of
three components:
• Kryptonmod – Cryptographic engine (loadable kernel module) providing data encryption and
decryption of disk data using the XTS5
-AES6
and AES-CBC7
algorithms.
• ESKM client API8
library – Cryptographic engine providing Enterprise Secure Key Manager
interface support to allow key generation, secure key retrieval, and secure communication with the
ESKM appliance. An ESKM appliance is a FIPS-validated server that can create, store, and
manage millions of encryption keys.
• KM9
client application – A client application that communicates with the NonStop Servers and
external ESKM cluster node. KM client application interfaces with the ESKM client API library
to request keys and key attributes from the ESKM appliance via a TLS session.
Figure 4 shows a logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and interacting with CLIM
host application software.
5
XTS – XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR) Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing
6
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
7
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
8
API – Application programming interface
9
KM – Key Manager
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Figure 3 – NSVLE Logical Boundary
Figure 4 – NSVLE Logical Operating Environment
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2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s logical interfaces exist in the software as both an API as well as a Command Line interface
(CLI). Physically, ports and interfaces are considered to be those of the host server. The CLI, API, and
physical interfaces can be categorized into following interfaces defined by FIPS 140–2:
• Data Input Interface
• Data Output Interface
• Data Control Interface
• Status Output Interface
• Power Interface
A mapping of the FIPS 140–2 logical interfaces, the physical interfaces, and the module can be found in the
following table:
Table 2 – FIPS 140–2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140–2 Interface Physical Interface Logical Interface
Data Input Mouse/Keyboard, Serial, USB,
ServerNet, Fibre Channel,
SAS/SATA, PCI, and DVD/CD
drive
Arguments for API calls that contain
data to be used or processed by the
module
Data Output Monitor, Serial, USB, ServerNet,
Fibre Channel, SAS/SATA, PCI,
and DVD/CD drive
Arguments for API calls that contain
module response data to be used or
processed by the caller
Control Input Mouse/Keyboard, Serial, iLO, and
Network
CLI, API Function calls and arguments
that initiate and control the operation
of the module
Status Output Monitor, Serial, USB, Network,
ServerNet, Fibre Channel,
SAS/SATA, and PCI
Return values from API function calls,
error messages
Power Power ports Not Applicable
2.4 Roles and Services
NSLVE does not perform authentication of any operators. It relies on the authentication mechanisms
supported by the operating system on which it runs. The module supports the following roles: Crypto–
Officer (CO) and User. Both roles are implicitly assumed when services are executed.
Note 1: The following definitions are used in Table 3 and Table 4 for “CSP10
and Type of Access”.
R – Read: The plaintext CSP is read by the service.
W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized by the service.
X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Note 2: Input and Output parameters of an API call that are not specifically plaintext, ciphertext, or a CSP
are NOT itemized in the “Input” and “Output” columns, since it is assumed that most API calls will have
such parameters.
10
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
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2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role
The Crypto Officer role has the ability to utilize the module via the KM client application CLI.
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer role are provided in the table below.
Table 3 – Mapping of Crypto Officer Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Create Key Requests a new key from an
ESKM
CLI command
parameters
Success or
error code
• KCBC – W
• KXTS – W
Key
Attribute
Services
Set or get key attributes of
an existing key
CLI command
parameters
Status No CSP access
Clone Key Request ESKM to clone a
preexisting key
CLI command
parameters
Success or
error code
No CSP access
Get Key Retrieves a key from the
ESKM server and pass it to
Kryptonmod
CLI command
parameters
Success or
error code,
key
• KCBC – W
• KXTS – W
2.4.2 User Role
The User role has the ability to use all services offered by the module’s ESKM client API library and
Kryptonmod software components. Descriptions of these services are provided in Table 4 below.
Table 4 – Mapping of User Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Load
Kryptonmod
Load Kryptonmod during
boot
None Status No CSP access
Key Container
Services
Create, prepare, or delete
an entry in Kryptonmod
container table
API call
parameters
Status No CSP access
Decrypt Decrypt data using specified
key
API call
parameters, key,
ciphertext
Plaintext • KCBC – R, X
• KXTS – R, X
Encrypt Encrypts data using specified
key
API call
parameters key,
plaintext
Ciphertext • KCBC – R, X
• KXTS – R, X
Export Generic
Key
Exports a “generic” key
from the cryptographic
module. This key is not
allowed to be directly used
by the cryptographic
module.
API call
parameters
Status, key No CSP Access
Key Info Services Return the status, length, or
algorithm type of a key
API call
parameters
Status No CSP access
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Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Get Table Returns table sans keys or
encryption context
None Status No CSP access
Get Status Returns the current module
status (version, self–test
results, algorithm support)
None Status No CSP access
Set Key Populates Key Container
with a key
API call
parameters, key
Status • KCBC – W
• KXTS – W
Self–Test Perform encrypt/decrypt
using test data
API call
parameters
Status No CSP access
2.5 Physical Security
NonStop Volume Level Encryption is a software–only module and does not include physical security
mechanisms. Thus, the FIPS 140–2 requirements for physical security are not applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested on an HP ProLiant DL385 G5 server with an AMD11
Opteron quad–core processor
running the Debian Linux HPTE12
Version 3.0.0 OS and an HP ProLiant DL380 G6 server with an Intel
E5540 quad–core processor running Debian Linux HPTE Version 4.0.0 OS. For FIPS 140–2 compliance,
these are considered to be single user operating systems. As such, all keys, intermediate values, and other
CSPs remain only in the process space of the operator using the module. The operating systems use native
memory management mechanisms to ensure that outside processes cannot access the process space used by
the module
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the following FIPS–Approved algorithms (Note: all algorithm implementations are
in the ESKM client API library software component of NSVLE except for those specifically identified as
belonging to the Kryptonmod component):
Table 5 – FIPS–Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm Certificate Number
Symmetric Key Algorithm
AES CBC13
128 and 256-bit and XTS 256-bit 1364, 1365
Triple-DES 168–bit CBC 941
Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA)
SHA-1 1246
Message Authentication Code (MAC) Function
HMAC using SHA-1 800
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
11
AMD – Advanced Micro Devices
12
HPTE – Hewlett-Packard Telco Extensions
13
CBC – Cipher–Block Chaining
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Algorithm Certificate Number
ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG 751
Asymmetric Key Algorithm
RSA (X9.31, PKCS14
#1.5) sign/verify: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096-bit 666
The following non–Approved algorithm implementations are supported by the module (note that these
algorithms are allowed for use in the FIPS–Approved mode of operation):
• RSA key wrapping (key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
• MD5 for use within the TLS Key Derivation Function (KDF)
14
PKCS – Public–Key Cryptography Standards
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The CSPs supported by the module are shown in the table below.
Note: The “Input” and “Output” columns in Table 6 are in reference to the module’s logical boundary.
Table 6 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Use Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization
KCBC
(AES CBC)
AES 256–bit key Kryptonmod symmetric
encryption and
decryption
Enters encrypted Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Delete Key Container
service
KXTS
(XTS-AES)
AES 256–bit key Kryptonmod symmetric
encryption and
decryption
Enters encrypted Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Delete Key Container
service
ANSI X9.31
Seed
128–bit RNG seed Input into the ANSI
X9.31 PRNG
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
ANSI X9.31
Seed Key
AES 128–bit key
AES 256–bit key
Input into the ANSI
X9.31 PRNG
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
TLS_PM
(TLS Premaster
Secret)
384–bit key
material
Derive the master secret
during TLS session
negotiation
Enters encrypted or
generated internally
Exits
encrypted
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
TLS_M
(TLS Master
Secret)
384–bit key
material
Input into the session key
creation process within
TLS
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API
AES Key AES 128–bit key
AES 256–bit key
Symmetric encryption and
decryption (e.g. during
TLS session negotiation)
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
TDES Key TDES 168–bit key Symmetric encryption and
decryption(e.g. during
TLS session negotiation)
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
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CSP CSP Type Use Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization
HMAC Key HMAC key Data authentication (e.g.
during TLS session
negotiation)
Generated internally Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
Software
Integrity Key
HMAC key Authenticate NSVLE
during power–on self–test
Not input or
generated
Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Not applicable per FIPS
140–2 Implementation
Guidance Section 7.4
RSA Private Key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072, or 4096 bit
RSA private key
Used to authenticate or
provide confidentiality to
data (e.g. during TLS
session negotiation)
Enters in plaintext Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
The public keys supported by the module are shown in the table below:
Table 7 – Cryptographic Module Public Keys
Key Key Type Use Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization
RSA Public Key 1024, 1536, 2048,
3072, or 4096 bit
RSA public key
Used to authenticate or
provide confidentiality to
data (e.g. during TLS
session negotiation)
Enters in plaintext Not output Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle the host
computer or API call
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2.8 Self–Tests
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption performs the following self–tests at power–up:
• Software integrity test using HMAC–SHA–1
• Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o AES–CBC 128 and 256 bit key encrypt/decrypt
o XTS-AES 256 bit key encrypt/decrypt
o Triple–DES CBC 168 bit key encrypt/decrypt
o SHA–1
o HMAC–SHA–1
o RSA signature generation/verification and encrypt/decrypt
o ANSI X9.31 PRNG Appendix A.2.4 KAT
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption performs the following conditional self–tests:
• Continuous RNG Test for the ANSI X9.31 PRNG
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140–2
Level 1 requirements for this validation.
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3 Secure Operation
The NonStop Volume Level Encryption meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140–2. The sections below
describe how to securely operate the module.
3.1 Initial Setup
The CLIM’s Debian Linux operating system is set for single–user mode at the factory before it is delivered
to the end–user, who has no ability to make modifications. Therefore, from a FIPS 140–2 perspective, it is
considered to be a single–user operating system. The NSVLE software module is installed at the factory as
part of the entire CLIM software component. The initial setup for NSVLE involves obtaining and
installing a NSVLE license that will enable encryption on the CLIM, and then configuring the KM client
application and other NonStop components, such as ESKM.
3.2 Secure Management
The module always operates in FIPS–Approved mode when used as specified within this Security Policy.
3.2.1 Initialization
In order to use NSVLE on a NonStop system with installed HP Storage CLIMs, the following security
relevant tasks will need to be completed.
• Install the NSVLE license so that encryption can be enabled. See the NonStop Volume
Level Encryption Guide for details.
• Create a client certificate for the CLIM and have it signed by the ESKM Certificate
Authority. See the NonStop CLIM Installation and Configuration Guide for details.
• Install the signed client certificate on the CLIM.
• Configure CLIM/ESKM LAN connection.
• Configure ESKM server settings (e.g. enable TLS with client certificate authentication).
See the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager Users Guide for details.
• Configure the storage devices for encryption.
• The Crypto-Officer shall ensure that the ESKM client application module is launched
using skm command with the – loadKrypton argument. Failure to do this will result in the
module being only partially loaded.
• Verification of proper installation and start-up of the module can be verified by viewing
the log file. The status message indicating successful start up and operation is, “Krypton
driver successfully loaded”. This indicates that the module was started appropriately and
has passed all FIPS power-on self-tests.
The library will only use FIPS–approved algorithms for cryptographic purposes when used as defined
within this Security Policy.
3.2.2 Assumptions
The module must be managed in accordance with all delivery, operation, and user guidance. To ensure the
secure operation of the module, the following assumptions are made:
• Crypto–Officers are non–hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrative guidance.
• Crypto–Officers will not modify any boot scripts which come preinstalled on the CLIM platforms.
• The module will be used only as specified within this FIPS 140-2 Security Policy document.
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4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms.
Table 8 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AMD Advanced Micro Devices
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CLIM Cluster I/O Module
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESKM Enterprise Secure Key Manager
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC (Keyed–) Hash Message Authentication Code
HP Hewlett–Packard
HPTE Hewlett-Packard Telco Extensions
iLO Integrated Lights Out Management Processor
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KM Key Manager
LTO Linear Tape-Open
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSVLE NonStop Volume Level Encryption
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OS Operating System
PKCS Public–Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
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Acronym Definition
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SATA Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
VSS Visual Source Safe
XTS XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR) Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext
Stealing
Prepared by:
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