MiniHSM, MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3,
and MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock
Non-proprietary Security Policy for FIPS 140-2 Level 3
Page 2 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
Stamp Master Clock
Version: 1.0
Date: 1st October 2020
Copyright © 2020 nCipher Security Limited. All rights reserved.
Copyright in this document is the property of nCipher Security Limited. It is not to be reproduced, modified,
adapted, published, translated in any material form (including storage in any medium by electronic means
whether or not transiently or incidentally) in whole or in part nor disclosed to any third party without the prior
written permission of nCipher Security Limited neither shall it be used otherwise than for the purpose for which
it is supplied.
Words and logos marked with ® or ™ are trademarks of nCipher Security Limited or its affiliates in the EU and
other countries.
Information in this document is subject to change without notice.
nCipher Security Limited makes no warranty of any kind with regard to this information, including, but not
limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. nCipher Security
Limited shall not be liable for errors contained herein or for incidental or consequential damages concerned
with the furnishing, performance or use of this material.
Where translations have been made in this document English is the canonical language.
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master
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Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Scope ....................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Security level .........................................................................................................................4
1.3 Cryptographic module description..........................................................................................5
1.4 Operational environment........................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Functionality.........................................................................................................8
2.1 Security World overview.........................................................................................................8
2.2 Keys and Critical Security Parameters ...................................................................................9
2.3 Supported cryptographic algorithms.....................................................................................15
2.3.1 FIPS Approved or Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................15
2.3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms .........................................................................................18
3 Roles and Services .....................................................................................................................20
3.1 Roles ...................................................................................................................................20
3.2 Strength of authentication mechanisms ...............................................................................21
3.3 Services...............................................................................................................................21
4 Physical Security ........................................................................................................................30
5 Rules............................................................................................................................................31
5.1 Delivery................................................................................................................................31
5.2 Initialization procedures .......................................................................................................31
5.3 Creation of new Operators ...................................................................................................31
6 Self-tests......................................................................................................................................33
6.1 Power-up self-tests ..............................................................................................................33
6.2 Conditional self-tests............................................................................................................34
6.3 Firmware load test ...............................................................................................................34
Contact Us ..........................................................................................................................................35
Page 4 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
This document defines the non-proprietary Security Policy enforced by the nShield Hardware Security
Module, i.e. the Cryptographic Module, to meet with the security requirements in FIPS 140-2.
The following product hardware variants and firmware version(s) are in scope of this Security Policy.
Variant name Marketing model number Firmware version
MiniHSM nC4031Z-10 12.50.8
MiniHSM inside nShield Edge F3 nC4031U-10
MiniHSM inside Time Stamp Master Clock TSMC200
Variants
All modules are supplied at build standard “N”
1.2 Security level
The Cryptographic Module meets overall FIPS 140-2 Security Level 3. The following table specifies
the security level in detail.
Table 1 Security level of security requirements
Security requirements section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master
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Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1.3 Cryptographic module description
The nShield MiniHSM is a multi-chip embedded Cryptographic Module as defined in FIPS 140-2, which
comes in a small custom packaged form factor protected by a tamper resistant enclosure, and performs
encryption, digital signing, and key management on behalf of an extensive range of commercial and
custom-built applications including public key infrastructures (PKIs), identity management systems,
application-level encryption and tokenization, SSL/TLS, and code signing.
The nShield MiniHSM is embedded inside the following nCipher devices:
 nShield Edge, which is a portable HSM with integrated smart card reader and USB connection.
 Time Stamp Master Clock (TSMC), which is a network appliance for securely distributing accurate
time throughout an organization. The TSMC is a trusted time source that enforces strong security
policy to protect the root of trust for the time distribution network, deploying an authenticated and
secure time distribution protocol, DS/NTP, ensures the secure delivery of auditable time to multiple
Time Stamp Server (TSS) devices from a single reference time source. The following figure shows
the TSMC appliance.
The Figure below shows the nShield MiniHSM, Edge and TSMC appliance.
Page 6 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
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Table 2 nShield MiniHSM (left), nShield Edge (middle) and TSMC (right)
The cryptographic boundary is delimited in red in the Figures below. It is delimited by the component
package.
The Cryptographic Module provides the following physical ports and interfaces, which remain outside of
the cryptographic boundary:
 Set of 4 serial pins: RTS, CTS, data, ground (data input/output, control input, status output). The
services provided by the module are transported through this interface.
 Set of 4 serial pins: RTS, CTS, data, ground (data input/output, control input, status output) for
connecting a smartcard reader.
 Clear pin (control input)
 Reset pin (control input)
 Mode pin (control input)
Figure 1 Cryptographic module boundary
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master
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1.4 Operational environment
The FIPS 140-2 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the cryptographic
module contains a limited operational environment.
Page 8 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Security World overview
The security model of the module is based around the Security World concept for secure management
of cryptographic keys.
A Security World includes:
 An Administrator Card Set (ACS), a set of Administrator smart cards used to perform administrative
operations,
 Optionally, one or more Operator Card Sets (OCSs), a set or sets of Operator smart cards used
to control access to application keys and to authorise certain operations,
 Optionally, a set of Softcards used to control access to application keys,
 Key Blobs, which contain cryptographic keys and their associated Access Control List (ACL), whose
confidentiality and integrity are protected by approved algorithms. They are stored outside the
Cryptographic Module.
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock Page 9 of 36
2.2 Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module uses and protects the following keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs):
Table 3 CSP table
CSP Type Description Generation Input Output Storage Zeroization
KRE - Recovery
Confidentiality
Key
RSA 3072-bit Key used to protect recovery keys (KR).
KTS (vendor affirmed)
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Make Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Initialize Unit
KR - Recovery
Key
AES 256-bit Key used to derive (using SP 800-108 KDF in counter
mode) the keys Ke (AES 256-bit) and Km (HMAC-
SHA256) that protect an archive copy of an application
key.
 AES cert#C754
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
KRE
Make Blob -
encrypted with
KRE
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Initialize Unit,
Clear Unit, power
cycle or reboot.
Impath session
keys
AES 256-bit in
CBC mode.
Integrity with
HMAC SHA-256.
Used for secure channel between two modules. It consists
of a set of four session keys used in an Impath session for
encryption, decryption, MAC generation and MAC
validation.
 AES cert#C754
 HMAC cert#C754
3072-bit DH key
exchange with one-
step KDF with SHA-1
between two modules.
No No Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Clear Unit, new
session, power
cycle or reboot.
Page 10 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock
KJSO - JSO key DSA 3072-bit nShield Junior Security Officer key used with its associated
certificate to perform the operations allowed by the NSO.
 DSA cert#C754
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Make Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Destroy, Initialize
Unit, Clear Unit,
power cycle or
reboot.
KA - Application
key
AES 128, 192,
256 bits
HMAC with key
sizes >= 112 bits
RSA with key
sizes >= 2048
bits
DSA, DH with
key sizes >=
2048 bits
ECDSA, ECDH,
EC MQV with
curves:
 P-224, P-
256, P-384,
P-521
 K-233, K-
283, K-409,
K-571
 B-233, B-
283, B-409,
B-571
Keys associated with a user to perform cryptographic
operations, that can be used with one of the following
validated algorithms:
 AES and KTS cert#C754
 HMAC cert#C754
 RSA cert #C754
 DSA cert #C754
 ECDSA cert #C754
 Key Agreement (KAS) cert#C754
 KBKDF cert#C754
 KTS (vendor affirmed)
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
LT or KR
Make Blob -
encrypted with
LT or KR
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Destroy, Initialize
Unit, Clear Unit,
power cycle or
reboot
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock Page 11 of 36
KM - Module Key AES 256-bit Key used to protect logical tokens and associated module
Key Blobs.
 AES cert#C754
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Make Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Non-volatile
memory
Initialize Unit
KML - Module
Signing Key
DSA 3072-bit Module Signing Key used by the module to sign key
generation and module state certificates.
When the nShield module is initialized, it automatically
generates this key that it uses to sign certificates using
DSA with SHA-256. This key is only ever used to verify
that a certificate was generated by a specific module.
 DSA cert #C754
DRBG No No Non-volatile
memory
Initialize Unit
KNSO - NSO key DSA 3072-bit nShield Security Officer key used for NSO authorisation
and Security World integrity. Used to sign Delegation
Certificates and to directly authorize commands during
recovery operations
 DSA cert #C754
DRBG Load Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Make Blob -
encrypted with
LT
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Destroy, Initialize
Unit, Clear Unit,
power cycle or
reboot.
LT - Logical
Token
AES 256-bit Key used to derive the keys that are used to protect token
protected key blobs. Logical Tokens are split in shares
(encrypted with Share Key) between one or more
smartcards or a softcard, using the Shamir Secret Sharing
scheme.
 AES cert #C754
 KDF cert #C754
DRBG Read Share -
encrypted with
Share Key
Write Share -
encrypted with
Share Key
Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Destroy, Initialize
Unit, power cycle
or reboot
Page 12 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock
 HMAC cert #C754
Share Key AES 256-bit Protects a share when written to a smartcard or softcard.
This key is used to derive (using SP 800-108 AES CTR
KDF) the keys Ke (AES 256-bit) and Km (HMAC-SHA256)
that wrap the share.
 AES cert #C754
 KDF cert #C754
 HMAC cert #C754
DRBG No No Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
N/A
Remote
Administration
session keys
AES 256-bit in
CBC mode
Integrity with
CMAC
Used for secure channel between the module and a
smartcard. This is a set of four AES 256-bit session keys,
namely Km-e (for encrypting data send to the smartcard),
Kc-e (for decrypting data from the smartcard), Km-a (for
CMAC generation) and Kc-a (for CMAC verification).
 AES cert #C754
ECDH P-521 key
agreement with SP
800-108 KDF in
counter mode.
No No Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Clear Unit, new
session, power
cycle or reboot.
KAL - Key Audit
Logging
DSA 3072-bit Used for signing the log trail.
 DSA cert #C754
DRBG No No Non-volatile
memory
Initialize Unit
DRBG internal
state
Hash_DRBG The module uses the Hash_DRBG with SHA-256
compliant with SP800-90A.
 Hash DRBG cert #C754
Entropy source No No Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Clear Unit, power
cycle or reboot.
DRBG entropy
input
2336 bits Entropy input string used to initialize and re-seed the
DRBG.
Entropy source No No Ephemeral,
stored in
volatile RAM.
Clear Unit, power
cycle or reboot.
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock Page 13 of 36
The following table describes the public keys handled by the module:
Table 4 Public key table
Public Key Type Description Generation Input Output Storage
Firmware Integrity
key (KFI)
DSA 3072-
bit
Public key used to ensure the integrity of firmware
updates. The module validates the signature before
new firmware is written to non-volatile storage.
 DSA cert #C754
At nCipher Firmware update No In firmware
KJWAR ECDSA P-
521
nCipher root warranting public key for Remote
Administrator Cards and Remote Operator Cards
 ECDSA cert #C754
At nCipher Firmware update None Persistent storage in
plaintext inside the
module (EEPROM)
Application keys
public key
See
description
Public keys associated with private Application keys:
 RSA cert #C754
 DSA cert #C754
 ECDSA cert #C754
 Key Agreement (KAS) cert#C754
 KTS (vendor affirmed)
At creation of the
application key
Load Blob - encrypted with LT Key export Stored in the key blob of
the application key
KJSO public key DSA 3072-
bit
Public key associated to KJSO
 DSA cert #C754
At creation of the
KJSO
Load Blob - encrypted with LT Key export Public key hash stored
in the module persistent
storage
Page 14 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master Clock
KNSO public key DSA 3072-
bit
Public key associated to KNSO
 DSA cert #C754
At creation of the
KNSO
Load Blob - encrypted with LT Key export Public key hash stored
in the module persistent
storage
KML public key DSA 3072-
bit
Public key associated to KML
 DSA cert #C754
At creation of
KML
No Key export Public key hash stored
in the module persistent
storage
KAL public key DSA 3072-
bit
Public key associated to KAL
 DSA cert #C754
At creation of
KAL
No Included in
the audit trail
Public key hash stored
in the module persistent
storage
KRE public key RSA 3072-
bit
Public key associated to KRE
 KTS (vendor affirmed)
At creation of the
KNSO
Load Blob - encrypted with LT Key export Stored in a key blob
FET public key DSA 1024-
bit
Feature Enable Tool (FET) public key used to verify
FET certificates
 DSA cert #C754
At nCipher Firmware update No Persistent storage in
plaintext inside the
module (EEPROM)
Impath DH public key DH 3072-bit Public key from peer used in the Impath DH key
agreement
 KAS-FFC cert #C754
No Loaded with Cmd_ImpathKXFinish No Ephemeral, stored in
volatile RAM.
Remote
Administration ECDH
public key
NIST P-521 Public key from peer used in the Remote
Administration ECDH key agreement
 KAS-ECC cert #C754
No Loaded with
Cmd_DynamicSlotExchangeAPDUs
No Ephemeral, stored in
volatile RAM.
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master
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2.3 Supported cryptographic algorithms
2.3.1 FIPS Approved or Allowed Algorithms
The following tables describe the Approved or allowed cryptographic algorithms supported by the
Cryptographic Module.
Table 5 Approved algorithms
Cert # Algorithm Standard Details
#C754 AES FIPS 197
SP800-
38A
SP800-
38D
SP800-
38B
ECB ( e/d; 128 , 192 , 256 ); CBC ( e/d; 128 , 192 , 256 ); CTR ( int only; 256 )
CMAC (Generation/Verification ) (KS: 128; Block Size(s): ; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max:2^16 ;
Tag Len(s) Min: 16 Max: 16 ) (KS: 192; Block Size(s): ; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16 ;
Tag Len(s) Min: 16 Max: 16 ) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): ; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16
;Tag Len(s) Min: 16 Max: 16 )
GCM (KS: AES_128 ( e/d ) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96 64 32 ) (KS:AES_192 (
e/d ) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96 64 32 ) (KS: AES_256 ( e/d ) Tag Length(s):
128 120 112 104 96 64 32 )
IV Generated: ( Internal (using Section 8.2.2 ) ) ; PT Lengths Tested: ( 0 , 1024 ,1024 ) ;
AAD Lengths tested: ( 1024 , 1024 ) ; 96BitIV_Supported ;
OtherIVLen_Supported
DRBG: Val#C754
#C754 KTS SP800-
38D
SP800-
38F
GCM (KS: AES_128 ( e/d ) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96 64 32 ) (KS:AES_192 (
e/d ) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96 64 32 ) (KS: AES_256 ( e/d ) Tag Length(s):
128 120 112 104 96 64 32 )
IV Generated: ( Internal (using Section 8.2.2 ) ) ; PT Lengths Tested: ( 0 , 1024 ,1024 ) ;
AAD Lengths tested: ( 1024 , 1024 ) ; 96BitIV_Supported ;
OtherIVLen_Supported
DRBG: Val#C754
KW ( AE , AD , AES-128 , AES-192 , AES-256 , FWD , 128 , 256 , 192 , 320 , 4096 )
#C754 SHA FIPS 180-
4
SHA-1 (BYTE-only)
SHA-224 (BYTE-only)
SHA-256 (BYTE-only)
SHA-384 (BYTE-only)
SHA-512 (BYTE-only)
Implementation does not support zero-length (null) messages.
#C754 HMAC with
SHA
FIPS 198-
1
HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS ) SHS Val#C754
HMAC-SHA224 ( Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS ) SHS Val#C754
HMAC-SHA256 ( Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS ) SHS Val#C754
HMAC-SHA384 ( Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS ) SHS Val#C754
HMAC-SHA512 ( Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS ) SHSVal#C754
Page 16 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
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#C754 RSA FIPS 186-
4
FIPS186-4:
186-4KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Random_e
PGM(ProbRandom: ( 2048 , 3072 , 4096) PPTT:( C.3 )
ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]
SIG(gen) (2048 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (4096
SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )
SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (2048 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
(3072 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (4096 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
[RSASSA-PSS]:
Sig(Gen): (2048 SHA( 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384 SaltLen( 48 ) , 512
SaltLen( 64 ) )) (3072 SHA( 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384 SaltLen( 48 ) ,
512 SaltLen( 64 ) 4096 SH( 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384 SaltLen( 48 ) ,
512 SaltLen( 64 ) ))
Sig(Ver): (1024 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 20 ) , 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384
SaltLen( 48 ) )) (2048 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 20 ) , 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384
SaltLen( 48 ) , 512 SaltLen( 64 ) )) (3072 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 20 ) , 224 SaltLen( 28 ) , 256
SaltLen( 32 ) , 384 SaltLen( 48 ) , 512 SaltLen( 64 ) )) (4096 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 20 ) , 224
SaltLen( 28 ) , 256 SaltLen( 32 ) , 384 SaltLen( 48 ) , 512 SaltLen( 64 ) ))
SHA Val#C754
DRBG: Val#C754
Vendor
affirmed
KTS SP 800-
56B
KTS-OAEP-basic with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
#C754 DSA FIPS 186-
4
FIPS186-4:
PQG(gen)PARMS TESTED: [ (2048, 224)SHA( 224 ); (2048,256)SHA( 256 ); (3072,256)
SHA( 256 ) ]
PQG(ver)PARMS TESTED: [ (1024,160) SHA( 1 ); (2048,224) SHA( 224 ); (2048,256)
SHA( 256 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ) ]
KeyPairGen: [ (2048,224) ; (2048,256) ; (3072,256) ]
SIG(gen)PARMS TESTED: [ (2048,224) SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ); (2048,256) SHA(
256 , 384 , 512 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 , 384 , 512 ); ]
SIG(ver)PARMS TESTED: [ (1024,160) SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ); (2048,224)
SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ); (2048,256) SHA( 256 , 384 , 512 ); (3072,256) SHA( 256 ,
384 , 512 ) ]
SHS: Val#C754
DRBG: Val#C754
#C754 ECDSA FIPS 186-
4
FIPS186-4:
PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-
409 B-571 ExtraRandomBits )
PKV: CURVES( ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B )
SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-256, 384, 512) P-384:
(SHA-384, 512) P-521: (SHA-512) K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-256,
384, 512) K-409: (SHA-384, 512) K-571: (SHA-512) B-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-
283: (SHA-256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-384, 512) B-571: (SHA-512) )
SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)
P-256: (SHA-256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-384, 512) P-521: (SHA-512) K-163: (SHA-1,
224, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-256, 384, 512) K-
409: (SHA-384, 512) K-571: (SHA-512) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233:
MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time Stamp Master
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(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-384, 512) B-571:
(SHA-512) )
SHS: Val#C754
DRBG: Val#C754
#C754 Key
Agreement
Component
SP800-
56A
KAS-FFC-Component: (FUNCTIONS INCLUDED IN IMPLEMENTATION: KPG Partial
Validation)
SCHEMES: Ephem: (KARole: Initiator / Responder) FB FC OneFlow: (KARole: Initiator /
Responder) FB FC Static: (KARole: Initiator / Responder) FB FC DSA Val#C754, SHS
Val#C754, DRBG Val#C754
KAS-ECC-Component: (FUNCTIONS INCLUDED IN IMPLEMENTATION: KPG Partial
Validation)
SCHEMES: FullMQV: (KARole: Initiator / Responder) EB: P-224 EC: P-256 ED: P-384
EE: P-521 EphemUnified: (KARole: Initiator / Responder) EB: P-224 EC: P-256 ED: P-
384 EE: P-521
OnePassDH: (KARole: Initiator) EB: P-224 EC: P-256 ED: P-384 EE: P-521
StaticUnified: (KARole: Initiator / Responder) EB: P-224 EC: P-256 ED: P-384 EE: P-521
ECDSA Val#C754, SHS Val#C754, DRBG Val#C754
#C754 KBKDF SP800-
108
CTR_Mode: ( Llength( Min16 Max16 ) MACSupported( [CMACAES256] )
LocationCounter( [BeforeFixedData] ) rlength( [8] ) )
AES Val#C754
DRBG Val#C754
#C754 DRBG SP800-
90A
Hash_Based DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled ( SHA-256 ) (
SHS Val#C754 ) ]
Vendor
affirmed
CKG SP800-
133
Symmetric keys are generated using the unmodified output of the approved DRBG.
Table 6 Allowed algorithms
Algorithm
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #C754, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #C754, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
EC MQV (CVL Cert. #C754, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
Allowed Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG). NDRNG is used to seed the approved DRBG.
The module generates a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Page 18 of 36 MiniHSM & MiniHSM for nShield Edge F3 & MiniHSM for Time
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2.3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms
The following table describes the non-approved cryptographic algorithms supported by the
Cryptographic Module in non-Approved mode.
Table 7 Non-approved algorithms
Algorithm
Symmetric encryption and decryption
DES
Triple DES encryption, MAC generation
AES GCM with externally generated IV
AES CBC MAC
Aria
Camellia
Arc Four (compatible with RC4)
CAST 256 (RFC2612)
SEED (Korean Data Encryption Standard)
Asymmetric
Raw RSA data encryption and decryption
KTS-OAEP-basic with SHA-256 with key size less than 2048 bits
ElGamal (encryption using Diffie-Hellman keys)
KCDSA (Korean Certificate-based Digital Signature Algorithm)
RSA digital signature generation with SHA-1 or key size less than 2048 bits
DSA digital signature generation with SHA-1 or key size less than 2048 bits
ECDSA digital signature generation with SHA-1 or curves P-192, K-163 , B-163, Brainpool
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DH with key size p < 2048 bits or q < 224 bits
ECDH with curves P-192, K-163, B-163, Brainpool
EC MQV with curves P-192, K-163 or B-163
Deterministic DSA compliant with RFC6979
Ed25519 public-key signature
X25519 key exchange
Hash
HAS-160
MD5
RIPEMD-160
Tiger
Message Authentication Codes
HMAC with MD5, RIPEMD-160 and Tiger
HMAC with key size less than 112 bits
Other
TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 KDF
PKCS#8 padding
EMV support:
Cryptogram (ARQC) generation and verification (includes EMV2000, M/Chip 4 and Visa Cryptogram Version 14, EMV 2004,
M/Chip 2.1, Visa Cryptogram Version 10)
Watchword generation and verification
Hyperledger client side KDF
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3 Roles and Services
3.1 Roles
The Cryptographic Module supports the following roles:
 nShield Security Officer (NSO)
 Junior Security Officer (JSO)
 User
nShield Security Officer (NSO)
This role is represented by Administrator Card holders, which have access to KNSO and are
responsible for the overall management of the Cryptographic Module.
To assume this role, an operator or group of operators need to present a quorum m of N of smartcards,
and the KNSO Key Blob. Each operator is identified by its individual smartcard, which contains a
unique logical token share.
Junior Security Officer (JSO)
This role is represented by either Administrator Card or Operator Card holders with a KJSO and an
associated Delegation Certificate signed by KNSO, authorising a set of commands.
To assume this role, an operator or group of operators need to present a quorum m of N of
smartcards and the associated Delegation Certificate. Each operator is identified by its individual
smartcard or Softcard, which contains a unique logical token share.
User
This role is represented by Application key owners, which are authorised to perform approved services
in the module using those keys.
To assume this role, an operator or group of operators need to present a quorum m of N of
smartcards or a Softcard, and the Key Blob. Each operator is identified by its individual Smartcard or
Softcard, which contains a unique logical token share.
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3.2 Strength of authentication mechanisms
Table 8 Strength of authentication table
Authentication
mechanism
Type of
authentication
Strength of Mechanism
Smartcard Identity based A logical token share stored in a Smartcard or Softcard is encrypted and MAC'ed. An
attacker would need to guess the encrypted share value and the associated MAC in
order to be able to load a valid Logical token share into the module. This requires, as a
minimum, guessing a 256-bit HMAC-SHA256 value, which gives a probability of 2^-256.
This probability is less than 10^-6.
The module can process around 2^16 commands per minute. This gives a probability of
success in a one minute period of 2^-240, which is less than 10^-5.
Softcard Identity based
3.3 Services
The following table describes the services provided by the Cryptographic Module and the access
policy.
The Access column presents the access level given to the CSP, R for Read, W for Write, Z for Zeroise
Table 9 Service table
Service Description Authorized
roles
Access CSPs
Big number operation
Cmd_BignumOp
Performs an operation on a large integer. Unauthenticated - None
Make Blob
Cmd_MakeBlob
Creates a Key blob containing the key.
Note that the key ACL needs to authorize
the operation.
User / JSO /
NSO
W KA, KRE, KR,
KJSO, KM,
KNSO, LT
Buffer operations
Cmd_CreateBuffer
Cmd_LoadBuffer
Mechanism for loading of data into the
module volatile memory. The data can be
loaded in encrypted form which can be
decrypted inside the module with a key
that has been previously loaded.
Unauthenticated R KA
Bulk channel
Cmd_ChannelOpen
Cmd_ChannelUpdate
Provides a bulk processing channel for
encryption / decryption, MAC generation /
verification and signature generation /
verification.
User R KA
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Check User Action
Cmd_CheckUserAction
Determines whether the ACL associated
with a key allows a specific operator
defined action.
User / JSO /
NSO
R KNSO, KJSO; KA
Clear Unit
Cmd_ClearUnit
Zeroises all keys, tokens and shares that
are loaded into the module. Will cause
the module to reboot and perform self-
tests.
Unauthenticated Z KA, KR, Impath
keys, KJSO,
remote
administration
session keys
Set Module Key
Cmd_SetKM
Allows a key to be stored internally as a
Module key (KM) value. The ACL needs
to authorize this operation.
NSO W KM
Remove Module Key
Cmd_RemoveKM
Deletes a given KM from non-volatile
memory.
NSO Z KM
Duplicate key handle
Cmd_Duplicate
Creates a second instance of a Key with
the same ACL and returns a handle to the
new instance.
Note that the source key ACL needs to
authorize this operation.
User / JSO /
NSO
R KA
Enable feature
Cmd_StaticFeatureEnable
Enables the service. This service requires
a certificate signed by the Master Feature
Enable key.
Unauthenticated - None
Encryption / decryption
Cmd_Encrypt
Cmd_Decrypt
Encryption and decryption using the
provided key handle.
User R KA
Erase from smartcard /softcard
Cmd_EraseFile
Cmd_EraseShare
Removes a file or a share from a
smartcard or softcard
NSO / JSO /
User
- None
Format Token
Cmd_FormatToken
Formats a smartcard or a softcard. NSO / JSO - None
File operations
Cmd_FileCopy
Cmd_FileCreate
Performs file operations in the module. NSO / JSO - None
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Cmd_FileErase
Cmd_FileOp
Firmware Authenticate
Cmd_FirmwareAuthenticate
Reports firmware version, using a zero
knowledge challenge response protocol
based on HMAC.
The protocol generates a random value to
use as the HMAC key.
Note: in FIPS Level 3 mode this services
is not available.
Unauthenticated - None
Force module to fail
Cmd_Fail
Causes the module to enter a failure
state.
Unauthenticated - None
Foreign Token open
Cmd_ForeignTokenOpen
Opens a channel for direct data access to
a Smartcard
Requires Feature Enabled.
NSO / JSO - None
Foreign Token command
Cmd_ForeignTokenCommand
Sends an ISO-7816 command to a
smartcard over the channel opened by
ForeignTokenOpen.
Unauthenticated - None
Firmware Update
Cmd_Maintenance
Cmd_ProgrammingBegin
Cmd_ProgrammingBeginChunk
Cmd_ProgrammingLoadBlock
Cmd_ProgrammingEndChunk
Cmd_ProgrammingEnd
Cmd_ProgrammingGetKeyList
Perform a firmware update. Restricted
service to nCipher signed Firmware.
Unauthenticated R KFI
Generate prime number
Cmd_GeneratePrime
Generates a random prime number. Unauthenticated R, W DRBG internal
state
Generate random number
Cmd_GenerateRandom
Generates a random number from the
Approved DRBG.
Unauthenticated R, W DRBG internal
state
Get ACL
Cmd_GetACL
Get the ACL of a given key. User R KA
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Get key application data
Cmd_GetAppData
Get the application data field from a key. User R KA
Get challenge
Cmd_GetChallenge
Get a random challenge that can be used
in fresh certificates.
Unauthenticated R, W DRBG internal
state
Get KLF2
Cmd_GetKLF2
Get a handle to the Module Long Term
(KLF2) public key.
Unauthenticated - None
Get Key Information
Cmd_GetKeyInfo
Cmd_GetKeyInfoEx
Get the type, length and hash of a key. NSO / JSO /
User
R KA
Get module signing key
Cmd_GetKML
Get a handle to the KML public key. Unauthenticated R KML
Get list of slot in the module
Cmd_GetSlotList
Get the list of slots that are available from
the module.
Unauthenticated - None
Get Logical Token Info
Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfo
Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfoEx
Get information about a Logical Token:
hash, state and number of shares.
NSO / JSO /
User
R LT
Get list of module keys
Cmd_GetKMList
Get the list of the hashes of all module
keys and the KNSO.
Unauthenticated R KM, KNSO
Get module state
Cmd_GetModuleState
Returns unsigned data about the current
state of the module.
Unauthenticated - None
Get real time clock
Cmd_GetRTC
Get the current time from the module
Real Time Clock.
Unauthenticated - None
Get share access control list
Cmd_GetShareACL
Get the Share's ACL. NSO / JSO /
User
R Share Key
Get Slot Information
Cmd_GetSlotInfo
Get information about shares and files on
a Smartcard that has been inserted in a
module slot.
Unauthenticated - None
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Get Ticket
Cmd_GetTicket
Get a ticket (an invariant identifier) for a
key. This can be passed to another client
or to a SEE World which can redeem it
using Redeem Ticket to obtain a new
handle to the object.
NSO / JSO /
User
- None
Initialize Unit
Cmd_InitializeUnit
Cmd_InitializeUnitEx
Causes a module in the pre-initialization
state to enter the initialization
state. When the module enters the
initialization state, it erases all Module
keys (KM), the module's signing key
(KML), and the hash of the Security
Officer's keys, HKNSO. It then generates
a new KML and KM.
Unauthenticated Z KA, KRE, KR,
KJSO, KM, KAL,
KML, KNSO, LT
Insert a Softcard
Cmd_InsertSoftToken
Allocates memory on the module that is
used to store the logical token share and
other data objects.
Unauthenticated R Share Key
Remove a Softcard
Cmd_RemoveSoftToken
Removes a Softcard from the module. It
returns the updated shares and deletes
them from the module’s memory.
Unauthenticated Z Share Key
Impath secure channel
Cmd_ImpathGetInfo
Cmd_ImpathKXBegin
Cmd_ImpathKXFinish
Cmd_ImpathReceive
Cmd_ImpathSend
Support for Impath secure channel.
Requires Feature Enabled.
NSO / JSO /
User
R, W KML, Impath keys
Key generation
Cmd_GenerateKey
Cmd_GenerateKeyPair
Generates a cryptographic key of a given
type with a specified ACL. It returns a
handle to the key. Optionally, it returns a
KML signed certificate with the hash of
the key and its ACL information.
NSO / JSO R, W KML, DRBG
internal state, KA,
KJSO,
Key import
Cmd_Import
Loads a plain text key into the module. If
the module is initialized in FIPS level 3
mode, this service is available for public
keys only.
NSO / JSO R KA, KJSO
Derive Key
Cmd_DeriveKey
Performs key wrapping, unwrapping,
transport and derivation. The ACL needs
to authorize this operation.
NSO / JSO /
User
R, W KA, KJSO
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Load Blob
Cmd_LoadBlob
Load a Key blob into the module. It
returns a handle to the key suitable for
use with module services.
NSO / JSO /
User
W KA, KRE, KR,
KJSO, KM,
KNSO
Load Logical Token
Cmd_LoadLogicalToken
Initiates loading a Logical Token from
Shares, which can be loaded with the
Read Share command.
Unauthenticated - None
Generate Logical Token
Cmd_GenerateLogicalToken
Creates a new Logical Token with given
properties and secret sharing parameters.
NSO / JSO W KM, LT, KJSO
Message digest
Cmd_Hash
Computes the cryptographic hash of a
given message.
Unauthenticated - None
Modular Exponentiation
Cmd_ModExp
Cmd_ModExpCrt
Cmd_RSAImmedVerifyEncrypt
Cmd_RSAImmedSignDecrypt
Performs a modular exponentiation
(standard or CRT) on values supplied
with the command.
Unauthenticated - None
Module hardware information
Cmd_ModuleInfo
Reports detailed hardware information. Unauthenticated - None
No Operation
Cmd_NoOp
No operation. Unauthenticated - None
Change Share Passphrase
Cmd_ChangeSharePIN
Updates the passphrase of a Share. NSO / JSO /
User
R, W Share Keys
NVRAM Allocate
Cmd_NVMemAllocate
Allocation in NVRAM. NSO / JSO - None
NVRAM Free
Cmd_NVMemFree
Deallocation from NVRAM. NSO / JSO - None
Operation on NVM list
Cmd_NVMemList
Returns a list of files in NVRAM. Unauthenticated - None
Operation on NVM files Operation on an NVRAM file. Unauthenticated None
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Cmd_NVMemOp
Key export
Cmd_Export
Exports a key in plain text.
Note: in FIPS level 3 mode, only public
keys can be exported.
NSO / JSO /
User
R KA
Pause for notifications
Cmd_PauseForNotifications
Wait for a response from the module. Unauthenticated None
Read file
Cmd_ReadFile
Reads data from a file on a Smartcard or
Softcard. The ACL needs to authorize this
operation.
NSO / JSO - None
Read share
Cmd_ReadShare
Reads a share from a Smartcard or
Softcard. Once a quorum of shares have
been loaded, the module re-assembles
the Logical Token.
NSO / JSO /
User
R Share Keys, LT
Send share to remote slot
Cmd_SendShare
Reads a Share and encrypts it with the
Impath session keys for transmission to
the peer module.
NSO / JSO /
User
R Impath Keys,
Share Keys
Receive share from remote slot
Cmd_ReceiveShare
Receives a Share encrypted with the
Impath session keys by a remote module.
NSO / JSO /
User
R Impath Keys,
Share Keys
Redeem Ticket
Cmd_RedeemTicket
Gets a handle in the current name space
for the object referred to by a ticket
created by Get Ticket.
NSO / JSO /
User
- None
Remote Administration
Cmd_DynamicSlotCreateAssociation
Cmd_DynamicSlotExchangeAPDUs
Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigure
Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigureQuery
Cmd_VerifyCertificate
Provides remote presentation of
Smartcards using a secure channel
between the module and the Smartcard.
NSO / JSO /
User
R, W Remote
administration
session keys
Destroy
Cmd_Destroy
Remove handle to an object in RAM. If
the current handle is the only one
remaining, the object is deleted from
RAM.
Unauthenticated Z KA, KJSO,
KNSO, LT
Report statistics Reports the values of the statistics tree. Unauthenticated - None
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Cmd StatGetValues
Cmd_StatEnumTree
Show Status
Cmd_NewEnquiry
Report status information. Unauthenticated - None
Secure Execution Engine
Cmd_CreateSEEWorld
Cmd_GetWorldSigners
Cmd_SEEJob
Cmd_SetSEEMachine
Cmd_TraceSEEWorld
Creation and interaction with SEE
machines.
NSO / JSO - None
Set ACL
Cmd_SetACL
Replaces the ACL of a given key with a
new ACL. The ACL needs to authorize
this operation.
NSO / JSO /
User
W KA
Set key application data
Cmd_SetAppData
Writes the application information field of
a key.
User W KA
Set NSO Permissions
Cmd_SetNSOPerms
Sets the NSO key hash and which
permissions require a Delegation
Certificate.
NSO - None
Set real time clock
Cmd_SetRTC
Sets the Real-Time Clock value. NSO / JSO - None
Signature generation
Cmd_Sign
Generate a digital signature or MAC
value.
NSO / JSO /
User
R KA, KNSO, KJSO
Sign Module State
Cmd_SignModuleState
Returns a signed certificate that contains
data about the current configuration of the
module.
Unauthenticated R KML
Signature verification
Cmd_Verify
Verifies a digital signature or MAC value. NSO / JSO /
User
R KA
Write file
Cmd_WriteFile
Writes a file to a Smartcard or Softcard. NSO / JSO - None
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Write share
Cmd_WriteShare
Writes a Share to a Smartcard or
Softcard.
Unauthenticated - None
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4 Physical Security
The product is a multi-chip embedded Cryptographic Module, as defined in FIPS 140-2. It is enclosed
in a hard and opaque epoxy resin which meets the physical security requirements of FIPS 140-2 level
3.
Note: The module hardness testing was only performed at a single temperature and no assurance
is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.
To ensure physical security, the module should be inspected periodically for evidence of tamper
attempts, including the entire enclosure including the epoxy resin security coating for obvious signs of
damage.
The module has a clear pin, which puts the module into the self-test state, clearing all stored key
objects, Logical Tokens and impath keys and running all self-tests. The long term security critical
parameters, NSO's key, module keys and module signing key can be cleared by returning the module
to the factory state.
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5 Rules
This section describes how to accept, initialise and operate the module in the FIPS approved mode.
5.1 Delivery
The nShield Cryptographic Module is sent to the customers using a standard carrier service. After
accepting the delivery of the module, the Crypto Officer shall perform a physical inspection of the
module (refer to Physical Security). This inspection is done to ensure that the module has not been
tampered with during transit. If the inspection results indicate that the module has not been tampered
with, the Crypto Officer can then proceed with installation and configuration of the module.
The module must be installed and configured according to the User Guides and the Initalization
procedures described below.
5.2 Initialization procedures
To configure the Cryptographic Module in FIPS approved mode, the following steps must be followed:
1. Put the module in pre-initialization mode.
2. Create a FIPS 140-2 level 3 compliant Security World using nCipher supplied utility new-world and
setting the mode to fips-140-2-level-3.
3. Put the module in Operational mode.
An operator can verify that the module is configured in FIPS approved mode with the command line
utility nfkminfo, which reports mode fips1402level3.
5.3 Creation of new Operators
New User
To create a new User, the following steps must be followed:
1. Authenticate as NSO or JSO role.
2. Create a new Logical Token, LTU.
3. Split the LTU into one or more smartcards or a Softcard.
4. Generate a new Application key with the ACL configured so that the key can only be blobbed under
LTU.
5. Generate a Key Blob for the Application key protected by LTU.
6. Give to the Operator the Key Blob, the Operator Cards or Softcard.
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New Junior Security Officer (JSO)
To create a new JSO, the following steps must be followed:
1. Authenticate as NSO or JSO role.
2. Generate a new Logical Token, LTJSO.
3. Split LTJSO into one or more smartcards or Softcard.
4. Generate a new asymmetric key pair (KJSOpriv, KJSOpub):
a. Set the ACL of KJSOpriv to allow Sign and UseAsSigningKey,
b. Set the ACL of KJSOpub to allow ExportAsPlain
5. Generate a Key Blob for KJSOpriv protected by LTJSO
6. Export KJSOpub.
7. Create a Delegation Certificate signed by NSO or an already existing JSO, which includes
KJSOpriv as the certifier and authorises the following actions
a. OriginateKey, which authorises generation of new keys,
b. GenerateLogToken, which authorises the creation of new Logical Tokens,
c. ReadFile, WriteFile,
d. FormatToken.
8. Give the Operator the Certificate, the Key Blob, the smartcards or Softcard.
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6 Self-tests
The Cryptographic Module performs power-up and conditional self-tests. It also supports power-up self-
tests upon request by resetting the module, either by pressing the Clear button or by sending the Clear
Unit command.
In the event of a self-test failure, the module enters an error state which is signalled by the SOS morse
pattern flashing in the output LED. While in this state, the module does not process any commands.
6.1 Power-up self-tests
In the self-test state the module clears the RAM, thus ensuring any loaded keys or authorization
information is removed and then performs the following:
 Power-up self-test on hardware components,
 Firmware integrity verification,
 Cryptographic self-tests as specified below.
Table 10 Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
Algorithm Description
AES Known Answer Test: ECB encryption and decryption with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys
AES CMAC Known Answer Test: 128-bit key
SHA1 SHA1 KAT test, other size are tested along with KAT HMAC
HMAC with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256,
SHA384, SHA512
Known Answer Test
RSA Known Answer Test: sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt with 2048-bit key
Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
DSA Known Answer Test: sign/verify with 2048-bit key
Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
ECDSA Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify with curves P-224 and B-233
Key Agreement Primitive Z Known Answer Test for modular exponentiation
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Key Agreement Primitive Z Known Answer Test for point multiplication with curves P-384 and B-233
KBKDF Known Answer Test
DRBG Health Tests according to SP 800-90A
Note: continuous test are done on the entropy source, but are not required or useful
for the DRBG, as described in IG 9.8
Entropy source Continuous test
6.2 Conditional self-tests
The module performs pair-wise consistency checks when RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys are generated
and the continuous test on the entropy source.
6.3 Firmware load test
The Cryptographic Module supports firmware upgrades in the field, with authenticity, integrity and roll-
back protection for the code. nCipher provides signed firmware images with the Firmware Integrity Key.
The module performs the following actions before replacing the current image:
 Code signature verification with the public Firmware Integrity Key.
 Image decryption with the Firmware Confidentiality Key.
 Verification that the Version Security Number (VSN) of the new image is not less than the VSN of
the current image.
Note: updating the firmware to a non-FIPS validated version of the firmware will result in the module
operating in a non-Approved mode.
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Contact Us
Web site: https://www.ncipher.com
Help Centre: https://help.ncipher.com
Email Support: support@ncipher.com
You can also contact our Support team by telephone, using the following numbers:
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