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Information Assurance Specialists, Inc.
IAS Router
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 2
Date: June 21, 2016
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................5
Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary ................................................................................6
1.1 Modes of Operation................................................................................................................ 11
2 Cryptographic Functionality...........................................................................................12
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................. 17
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................17
3.1 Assumption of Roles ............................................................................................................... 17
3.2 Authentication Methods......................................................................................................... 18
3.2.1 Password-based Authentication............................................................................................. 18
3.2.2 IPSec Authentication............................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Services ................................................................................................................................... 19
4 Self-tests........................................................................................................................22
5 Physical Security Policy..................................................................................................23
5.1 IAS STEW ................................................................................................................................. 23
5.2 KG-RU...................................................................................................................................... 25
5.3 IAS Router Micro..................................................................................................................... 28
6 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................30
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.................................................................................30
8 Security Rules and Guidance..........................................................................................31
9 References and Definitions............................................................................................32
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List of Tables
Table 1 – IAS Router Configurations ............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................5
Table 3 – IAS Router Micro Port and Interface Identification.......................................................................7
Table 4 – IAS STEW Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................... 9
Table 5 – IAS KG-RU Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................11
Table 6 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions............................................................12
Table 7 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation.........................................13
Table 8 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................13
Table 9 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode..................................................................................................14
Table 10 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................16
Table 11 – Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 17
Table 12 – Roles Description....................................................................................................................... 17
Table 13 – Authentication Description .......................................................................................................19
Table 14 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................19
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services .........................................................................................................19
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................20
Table 17 – Power Up Self-tests...................................................................................................................22
Table 18 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................22
Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................30
Table 20 – References................................................................................................................................. 32
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................32
List of Figures
Figure 1: IAS Router Micro Port and Interface Identification .......................................................................6
Figure 2: IAS STEW Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................... 8
Figure 3: IAS KG-RU Rear Panel Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................10
Figure 4: IAS KG-RU Front Panel Ports and Interfaces................................................................................10
Figure 5: IAS STEW Top View ...................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 6: IAS STEW Right Side ..................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 7: IAS STEW Left Side ....................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 8: IAS STEW Bottom......................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 9: IAS KG-RU Top Image...................................................................................................................26
Figure 10: IAS KG-RU Top Corner................................................................................................................26
Figure 11: IAS KG-RU Side View ..................................................................................................................27
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Figure 12: IAS KG-RU bottom...................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 13: IAS Router Micro Bottom View..................................................................................................28
Figure 14: IAS Router Micro Right Side.......................................................................................................29
Figure 15: IAS Router Micro Left Side .........................................................................................................29
Figure 16: Tamper Evidence........................................................................................................................ 30
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Information Assurance Specialists, Inc. IAS Router
module. The IAS Router is an IPSec VPN gateway. The IAS Router meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2
requirements.
Table 1 – IAS Router Configurations
Module HW P/N and Version FW Version
1 IAS Router IAS STEW Rev 1.0 50e8756 – 2015-11-24
2 IAS Router IAS KG-RU Rev 1.0 50e8756 – 2015-11-24
3 IAS Router IAS Router Micro Rev 1.0 50e8756 – 2015-11-24
The IAS Router is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2
validated cryptographic implementations in a VPN gateway. The IAS Router is a Multi-Chip Standalone
embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is defined as the device enclosure.
The IAS STEW Rev 1.0 and IAS KG-RU Rev 1.0 exclude the Cisco ESR5915 component from the
requirements of FIPS 140-2. The Cisco ESR5915 has been FIPS 140-2 Validated (Cert. #2241); however,
the KG-RU treats all data to/from the Cisco ESR5915 component as plaintext. The Cisco ESR5915
component cannot affect the security of the Module.
The IAS Router Micro Rev 1.0 excludes the Unicom 4GT24-57INL component from the requirements of
FIPS 140-2. This is a passive component and has no security functionality.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the IAS Router are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the IAS Router is depicted in Section 5; the physical cryptographic boundary is the
enclosure. The IAS Router provides network connectivity over its Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and USB interfaces.
Figure 1 through Figure 4 depict the ports and interfaces provided by the IAS Router. The Network
interface consists of the FIPS 140-2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, and Status Output interfaces.
C D E F G
A
L M N O P
I
J
K
B H
Figure 1: IAS Router Micro Port and Interface Identification
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Table 3: IAS Router Micro Port and Interface Identification
Ref Port Type Subsystem Port Identifier Logical Interface
A RP-SMA Wi-Fi Antenna IAS Router Network
B Power In Power 9-36VDC Input Power (input)
C Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH5 Network
D Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH1 Network
E Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH3 Network
F Console Port IAS Router CONSOLE Control (input)
Status (output)
G Fast Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH0 Network
H RP-SMA Wi-Fi Antenna IAS Router Network
I Status (top) and Power
(bottom) LED
IAS Router Status
J Power Button IAS Router PWR Control (input)
K Reset to Factory Defaults
Button
IAS Router Reset to
Factory
Default
Control (input)
L USB 3.0 ports IAS Router USB3.0 Network
M Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH2 Network
N Gigabit Ethernet Port with
Power over Ethernet 802.3af
IAS Router ETH4 Network
O USB 2.0 Ports IAS Router USB 2.0 Network
P Auxiliary Serial Port IAS Router SERIAL Control (output)
Q Power Out (on rear, not
shown)
Power Power (output)
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B C D E F G H I J K
A
O P Q R S T U V W Y
L X
Z
M
N
Figure 2: IAS STEW Ports and Interfaces
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Table 4: IAS STEW Ports and Interfaces
Ref Port Type Subsystem Port Identifier Logical Interface
A RP-SMA Wi-Fi Antenna IAS Router Network
B Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH5 Network
C Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH1 Network
D Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH3 Network
E Console Port IAS Router CONSOLE Control (input)
Status (output)
F Fast Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH0 Network
G Power Out (optional) Power Power (output)
H Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/0 Network
I Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/1 Network
J Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/3 Network
K RP-SMA Wi-Fi Antenna Cisco Network
L Status (top) and Power
(bottom) LED
IAS Router Status
M Power Button IAS Router Control (input)
N Reset to Factory Defaults
Button
IAS Router Control (input)
O USB 3.0 ports IAS Router Network
P Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH2 Network
Q Gigabit Ethernet Port with
Power over Ethernet 802.3af
IAS Router ETH4 Network
R USB 2.0 Ports IAS Router Network
S Auxiliary Serial Port IAS Router SERIAL Control (output)
T Power In Power Power (input)
U Console Port Cisco CONSOLE Control (input)
Status (output)
V Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/2 Network
W Fast Ethernet Port with Power
over Ethernet 802.3af
Cisco FE0/4 Network
X Reset to Factory Defaults
Button
Cisco Control (input)
Y Power Switch Cisco Control (input)
Z Status (top) and Power
(bottom) LEDs
Cisco Status (output)
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B C D
A
H I J
E F G
Figure 3: IAS KG-RU Rear Panel Ports and Interfaces
L M
T
K
Q R S
O P
N
Figure 4: IAS KG-RU Front Panel Ports and Interfaces
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Table 5: IAS KG-RU Ports and Interfaces
Ref Port Type Subsystem Port Identifier Logical Interface
A Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/1 Network
B Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/3 Network
C Gigabit Ethernet Port Cisco ETH2 Network
D Gigabit Ethernet Port Cisco ETH3 Network
E Fast Ethernet Port Cisco FE0/2 Network
F Fast Ethernet Port with Power
over Ethernet 802.3af
Cisco FE0/4 Network
G Power In Power 9-36VDC Input Power (input)
H Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH4 Network
I Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH5 Network
J Gigabit Ethernet Port IAS Router ETH1 Network
K Status (top) and Power
(bottom) LEDs
IAS Router STATUS, PWR Status (output)
L Power Switch IAS Router PWR Control (input)
M Power Switch Cisco PWR Control (input)
N Status (top) and Power
(bottom) LEDs
Cisco STATUS, PWR Status (output)
O Reset to Factory Defaults
Button
IAS Router RESET Control (input)
P Console Port IAS Router CONSOLE Control (input)
Status (output)
Q USB 3.0 ports IAS Router USB Network
R USB 2.0 Ports IAS Router USB Network
S Console Port Cisco CONSOLE Control (input)
Status (output)
T Reset to Factory Defaults
Button
Cisco RESET Control (input)
1.1 Modes of Operation
The Module operates in three (3) distinct modes of operation: Standard Mode, FIPS Mode, and CSfC
Mode. The Standard Mode is a non-FIPS mode of operation. The FIPS Mode and CSfC Mode are FIPS
Approved modes of operation. The non-Approved mode of operation, Standard Mode, supports the
identical services as FIPS Mode and CSfC Mode; however, it supports the non-Approved algorithms
listed in Table 9. To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation, authenticate to the web
management page and check the mode indicator on the System Configuration page as depicted below.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The IAS Router implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the table below.
Table 6 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
Triple-DES [FIPS 46-3, SP 800-67]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: DES-EDE3-CBC
Key sizes: 168 bits (DES-EDE3)
1935
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP800-38D]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC, CTR, GCM
Key sizes: 128, 256 bits
3430
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: AES 256 CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
782
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification, Public Key Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-256, P-384, P-521
663
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA: 1, 256, 384, 512
2182
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Algorithm Description Cert #
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
[SP 800-135]
Functions: IKE v1 KDF, IKEv2 KDF
493
(CVL)
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF
523
(CVL)
RSA [FIPS 186-4, PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
1756
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
2830
Table 7 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
Key Transport
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B]
Key sizes: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.4
Table 8 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Non-SP 800-56A
Compliant DH
[IG D.8]
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112, 128,
or 192 bits of encryption strength)
Non-SP 800-56A
Compliant ECDH
[IG D.8]
EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128,
192, or 256 bits of encryption strength)
NDRNG [Annex C]
Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG; minimum of 256 bits per access. The NDRNG
output is used to seed the FIPS Approved AES 256 CTR DRBG.
MD5 [IG G.13]
TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 KDF. No security is provided by this algorithm.
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Table 9 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol/Operation Algorithm
Standard
Mode
FIPS
Mode
CSFC
Mode
1 2 3
IKE
Encryption 3des x X
AES128CBC x X x
AES256CBC x x x
Integrity md5 x
Sha x
sha256 x x x
sha384 x x x
sha512 x x
Key Exchange dh1 - modp768 x
dh2 – modp1024 x
dh5 – modp1536 x
dh14 – modp2048 x x x
dh15 – modp3072 x x
dh16 – modp4096 x x
dh17 – modp6144 x x
dh18 – modp8192 x x
dh19 – ecp256 x x x
dh20 – ecp384 x x x
dh21 – ecp521 x x x
PRF matches selected IKE integrity algo
ESP
Encryption 3des x x
AES128CBC x x x
AES256CBC x x x
AES128CTR x x
AES256CTR x x
AES128GCM16 x x
AES256GCM16 x x
Integrity md5 x
Sha x
sha256 x x x
sha384 x x x
sha512 x x x
PFS Key Exchange No PFS x
dh1 - modp768 x
dh2 – modp1024 x
dh5 – modp1536 x
dh14 – modp2048 x x x
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Protocol/Operation Algorithm
Standard
Mode
FIPS
Mode
CSFC
Mode
1 2 3
dh15 – modp3072 x x
dh16 – modp4096 x x
dh17 – modp6144 x x
dh18 – modp8192 x x
dh19 – ecp256 x x x
dh20 – ecp384 x x x
dh21 – ecp521 x x x
IKE Authentication
PSK adhere to password complexity rules x x x
Certificate signature
algorithms rsa_with_sha1 x
rsa_with_sha256 x x
rsa_with_sha384 x x
rsa_with_sha512 x x
ecdsa_with_sha1 x
ecdsa_with_sha256 x x x
ecdsa_with_sha384 x x x
ecdsa_with_sha512 x x
Certificate private
key types RSA 1024 x
RSA 2048 x x
RSA 4096 x x
EC on p256 x x X
EC on p384 x x X
Protocol/
Operation Algorithm (RFC)
Standard
Mode
FIPS
Mode
CSFC
Mode
TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2
Ciphers
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 x x x
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 x x x
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 x x x
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 x x x
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 x x x
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 x x x
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 x x x
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 x x x
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Protocol/
Operation Algorithm (RFC)
Standard
Mode
FIPS
Mode
CSFC
Mode
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA x x x
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA x x x
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA x x x
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA x x x
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only:
• MD5 (outside of the TLS KDF)
• Diffie-Hellman (modp < 2048, provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
• RSA (any size) with SHA-1
• RSA 1024
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) are described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 10 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Number CSP Description / Usage
1
TLS DH/ECDH Private Key
Used to agree upon a secret that is used as input
to the pre_master_secret
2 RSA TLS_pre_master_secret TLS secret used to derive the master_secret
3 DH/ECDH TLS_pre_master_secret TLS secret used to derive the master_secret
4 TLS_master_secret TLS secret used to derive the session_key
5 TLS_session_key TLS session secret key
6
TLS_PKI_private
Certificate private key used to negotiate session
keys for TLS sessions
7
IKE DH/ECDH Private Key
Used to agree upon a secret that is used as input
to derive the IKE Session key
8
IPSec_PSK
Shared secret value used in IKE and ESP session
keys negotiation
9
IPSec_PKI_private
Certificate private key used to negotiate ESP and
IKE session keys
10 IPSec_IKE_key IKE session secret key
11 IPSec_ESP_key ESP session secret key
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Number CSP Description / Usage
12 Administrator PW Used to authenticate administrative users
2.2 Public Keys
Table 11 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
TLS DH/ECDH Public Key Used to agree upon a secret that is used as input to the pre_master_secret
TLS_PKI_public Certificate public key used to negotiate session keys for TLS sessions
IKE DH/ECDH Public Key Used to agree upon a secret that is used as input to derive the IKE session key
IPSec_PKI_public Certificate public key used to negotiate ESP and IKE session keys
IPSec_PKI_CA_public CA certificates
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The Module supports two (2) distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The
cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles by requiring the CO to authenticate to gain
access to CO operations.
Table 12 lists all operator roles supported by the IAS Router. The IAS Router supports concurrent
operators. Operators can login via the web management interface. Authenticated operator sessions
can be manually terminated using the logout feature or if the device is reboot all authenticated sessions
are automatically terminated. User authentication passwords are protected within the device via a hash
mechanism, are masked while the user is entering the value, and are protected in transmission by TLS.
The IAS Router does not support a maintenance role.
Table 12 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
CO Cryptographic Officer – The
Crypto Officer configures the
services provided by the
module and is authenticated
by password-based
authentication
Identity based Username and password
User User – The User is a network
entity that can establish an
IPSec VPN
Role based IKE PSK, RSA signature,
ECDSA signature
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3.2 Authentication Methods
All authentication data is protected from modification and substitution within the IAS Router by
restricting physical access to the internal storage media. When performing remote administration
authentication data is protected in flight through the HTTPS/SSL/TLS encrypted management web page.
Authentication data is protected during entry by masking all authentication data entry fields.
3.2.1 Password-based Authentication
Passwords are required to have a minimum length of 8 characters in FIPS mode. Of the 8 characters
there must be a capital letter, a lowercase letter, a number, and a special character. The module
supports the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”. Characters
can repeat within the password. Therefore the possibility of randomly guessing the correct characters
of a minimum length password (independent of sequence) is 1 in 262
* 10 * 10 * 724
=
1,816,672,665,600.
On the GUI, Authentication attempts are limited to 1-19 successive incorrect attempts results in a 1-19
minute authentication attempt lockout. Therefore, the maximum number of attempts in a 1 minute
window is 19 and the probability of successfully guessing the password in a One (1) minute period of
time is approximately 1 in 85,425,052,631.
On the rescue terminal, successive authentication attempts are limited to every 4 seconds. Therefore, a
maximum of 15 authentication attempts can be made within a minute and the probability of guessing
the password within a one (1) minute period of time is approximately 1 in 108,205,066,667.
3.2.2 IPSec Authentication
The module supports RSA-based, ECDSA-based and Pre Shared Key authentication for IPSec. On IPSec,
authentication attempts occur within a session. Each IPSec authentication session remains active until it
either succeeds or times out after 30 seconds. There are several limits to the number of simultaneous
authentication attempts in place. Simultaneous authentication attempts from a peer (defined as an IP
source address) are limited to 5. System wide simultaneous authentication attempts are limited to 50.
Therefore, the theoretical maximum of authentication attempts in a 1 minute window is 100 and the
probability of successfully guessing the worst case IPsec authentication method (Pre-Shared Key) is 100
in 1,623,076,000,000 or 1 in 16,230,760,000.
3.2.2.1 RSA-based Authentication
When using RSA based authentication the smallest modulus allowed is 2048, which has 112-bits of
strength. Therefore, the probability of successfully randomly guessing the authentication value is 1 in
2112
.
3.2.2.2 ECDSA-based Authentication
When using ECDSA based authentication the weakest curve is P-256 which has 128-bits of strength.
Therefore, the probability of successfully randomly guessing the authentication value is 1 in 2128
.
3.2.2.3 Pre Shared Key (PSK)-based Authentication
When using PSK based authentication the minimum PSK length is eight (8) characters. The same
complexity rules apply as the password-based authentication mechanism.
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Table 13 – Authentication Description
Authentication Method Probability of false acceptance
(1.0 x 10-6
required)
Password Auth 1 / 262
* 105
* 8 = 5.4 x 10-8
PSK Auth 1 / 262
* 105
* 8 = 5.4 x 10-8
RSA Auth 1 / 2112
ECDSA Auth 1 / 2128
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below.
Table 14 – Authenticated Services
Service Role Description
Reset to Defaults /
Zeroize
CO Destroys all CSPs
Configure the
Router
CO Define networks/interfaces, firewall behavior, routing, user accounts,
user permissions, set the time, enable/disable protocols, etc.
Configure VPN CO Manage authentication credentials, IPSec security policies, and IPSec
security associations
Show status CO View network and interface statistics, active IPSec sessions, and other
system status items
Establish/Maintain
IPSec VPN
User Authenticate, establish, maintain, and terminate an IPSec VPN (phase
1 and 2, IKE and CHILD) with another network entity
The Authenticated Services require an administrator or peering IPSec router to authenticate using one if
the methods outlined in Section 3.2 prior to accessing the service.
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services
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Service Description
Route Traffic Provides processing for user traffic
Module Reset
(Self-test)
Reset the IAS Router and invoke a self-test
LED Status View VPN status LED and power status LED
The Unauthenticated Services are provided for users and administrators.
Table 16 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes
of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The Module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the Module
uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The Module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the Module, when the Module generates a CSP, or when the Module overwrites
an existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service CSPs (as identified in Table 10)
Reset to Defaults / Zeroize Z – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Configure the Router G – 3, 4, 5, 6
R – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12
E – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12
W – 6, 8, 9, 12
Z – 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12
Configure VPN G – 9
R – 8, 9
E – 9
W – 8, 9
Z – 8, 9
Show status –N/A
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Service CSPs (as identified in Table 10)
Establish/Maintain IPSec VPN G – 7
R – 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
E – 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
W – 7, 10, 11
Z – 7, 10, 11
Route Traffic G –
R – 11
E – 11
W –
Z –
Module Reset
(Self-test)
G –
R –
E –
W –
Z – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11
LED Status N/A
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4 Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self-tests are available on demand by power
cycling the Module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 17 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If the module successfully
completes self-tests, it creates a syslog entry indicating successful completion of the self-tests. If one of
the KATs fails, the Module enters the Critical Error state, which then causes the Module to reboot.
Table 17 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Firmware
Integrity
ECDSA P-256 signature check of a SHA256 message digest is performed on each
executable file, the kernel, all kernel modules, and all interpreted php code resident in
the image.
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
DRBG KATs: CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
ECDSA PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA KATs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
HMAC KATs: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
TDES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB,
Key sizes: 3-key
Key Transport
Using RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 18 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the
NDRNG.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
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Test Target Description
Firmware Load ECDSA P-256 signature check of a SHA256 message digest is performed when
firmware is loaded.
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally per SP 800-90A Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
Bypass Test SHA256 checksum validated whenever the bypass configuration (firewall) is altered.
5 Physical Security Policy
Tamper seals are applied during the manufacturing process. A subsection is used for each model of the
IAS Router covered under this validation.
5.1 IAS STEW
The IAS STEW is housed in an industrial quality enclosure using production grade components and
materials.
The IAS STEW utilizes tamper evident seals to ensure physical security of the Module’s internal
components. The STEW enclosure has 5 pieces and the application and location of the six tamper
evident seals ensures that the 5 pieces remain intact as a complete enclosure and none of the pieces can
be surreptitious opened or removed.
Ideally, tamper evident measures should be inspected whenever physical access control of the Module
has been lost or interrupted. Devices under kept under physical access control should be inspected
monthly.
Figure 5: IAS STEW Top View
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Figure 6: IAS STEW Right Side
Figure 7: IAS STEW Left Side
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Figure 8: IAS STEW Bottom
5.2 KG-RU
The KG-RU utilizes tamper evident seals to ensure physical security of the Module’s internal
components. The KG-RU enclosure has three (3) pieces and the application and location of the three (3)
tamper evident seals ensures that the three (3) pieces remain intact as a complete enclosure and none
of the pieces can be surreptitious opened or removed.
Ideally, tamper evident measures should be inspected whenever physical access control of the Module
has been lost or interrupted. Devices kept under physical access control should be inspected monthly.
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Figure 9: IAS KG-RU Top Image
Figure 10: IAS KG-RU Top Corner
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Figure 11: IAS KG-RU Side View
Figure 12: IAS KG-RU bottom
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5.3 IAS Router Micro
The IAS Router Micro utilizes tamper evident seals to ensure physical security of the Module’s internal
components. The IAS Router Micro enclosure has four (4) pieces and the application and location of the
three tamper evident seals ensures that the four (4) pieces remain intact as a complete enclosure and
none of the pieces can be surreptitious opened or removed.
Ideally, tamper evident measures should be inspected whenever physical access control of the Module
has been lost or interrupted. Devices under kept under physical access control should be inspected
monthly.
Figure 13: IAS Router Micro Bottom View
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Figure 14: IAS Router Micro Right Side
Figure 15: IAS Router Micro Left Side
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Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper evident seals Monthly Verify that all of the tamper seals are present and
in the correct locations as depicted above. Inspect
each seal to verify that the word “VOID” does not
appear (even faintly). See Figure 16. In the event
tamper seals indicate “VOID” (even faintly), the
device should be removed from use and returned
to IAS for inspection and application of new
tamper seals.
Figure 16: Tamper Evidence
6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware update service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within
the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
This module does not implement mitigation for any other attacks.
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8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2
module.
1. The Module provides two (2) distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
3. The operator can command the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or
resetting the Module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
9. The Module performs a bypass test when the mechanism governing bypass is modified.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program, December 28, 2015
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman (public-key cryptosystem)
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
TLS Transport Layer Security
VPN Virtual Private Network