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Seagate SecureTM
Self-Encrypting Drive
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Module Security Policy
Security Level 2
Revision 0.7
Seagate Technology, LLC
This document may be reproduced and distributed in its original entirety without revision
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Contents
1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Scope............................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 Overview....................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Terms and Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... 4
2 Cryptographic Module Specification..................................................................................................................6
2.1 Cryptographic Module Information ................................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configurations................................................................................................... 8
2.3 Algorithms .................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.3.1 Approved Algorithms........................................................................................................................ 8
2.3.2 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................................... 11
2.4 Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................................................... 12
2.5 Keys, Authentication, and Other Protected Information ................................................................................... 12
2.6 Degraded Mode of Operation ........................................................................................................................ 12
2.7 Requirements from International Standards .................................................................................................... 12
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ....................................................................................................................13
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.................................................................................................................14
4.1 Roles, Service Command, Input and Output – TCG Security Mode .................................................................. 14
4.2 Roles, Service Command, Input and Output – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security supported)........................ 15
4.3 Roles and Authentication – TCG Security Mode............................................................................................. 15
4.4 Roles and Authentication – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security supported) .................................................. 16
4.5 Approved Services, SSPs, Roles, and Access Rights ....................................................................................... 16
4.5.1 Approved Services – TCG Security Mode......................................................................................... 16
4.5.2 Approved Services – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security supported)............................................... 20
4.6 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................................................ 22
5 Software / Firmware Security..........................................................................................................................23
6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................................24
7 Physical Security ...........................................................................................................................................25
8 Non-Invasive Security....................................................................................................................................27
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management .......................................................................................................28
9.1 SSP Storage Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 28
9.2 SSPs ........................................................................................................................................................... 29
9.3 Entropy Sources........................................................................................................................................... 32
9.4 Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................................................... 32
10 Self-Tests ......................................................................................................................................................34
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................ 34
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................. 34
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .....................................................................................................................................36
11.1 Delivery and Operation................................................................................................................................. 36
11.1.1 TCG Enterprise Secure Initialization................................................................................................. 36
11.1.2 TCG Enterprise Ongoing Policy Restrictions..................................................................................... 36
11.1.3 ATA Security Secure Initialization ................................................................................................... 36
11.1.4 ATA Security Ongoing policy Restrictions........................................................................................ 36
11.2 End of Life .................................................................................................................................................. 37
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................38
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Table 1-1: Security Levels .......................................................................................................................................4
Table 1-2: Terms and Acronyms...............................................................................................................................5
Table 2-1: Cryptographic Module Tested Configurations............................................................................................8
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms (HW).....................................................................................................................9
Table 2-3: Approved Algorithms (FW) ...................................................................................................................11
Table 2-4: Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation............................................11
Table 3-1: Ports and Interfaces ...............................................................................................................................13
Table 4-1: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output – TCG Security Mode..........................................................15
Table 4-2: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output - ATA Security Mode ..........................................................15
Table 4-3: Roles and Authentication - TCG Security Mode.......................................................................................16
Table 4-4: Roles and Authentication - ATA Security Mode ......................................................................................16
Table 4-5: Approved Services - TCG Security Mode................................................................................................20
Table 4-6: Approved Services – ATA Security Mode...............................................................................................21
Table 4-7 Non-Approved Services..........................................................................................................................22
Table 7-1: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ..................................................................................................26
Table 9-1: SSP Storage Areas.................................................................................................................................28
Table 9-2: SSPs.....................................................................................................................................................31
Table 9-3: Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification ..................................................................32
Table 10-1: Pre-Operational Self-Tests....................................................................................................................34
Table 10-2: Conditional Self-Tests..........................................................................................................................35
Figure 1: Seagate Self-Encrypting Drive ...................................................................................................................7
Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram ........................................................................................................................12
Figure 3: Module 1 Seal Application Locations........................................................................................................25
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in Seagate
Secure® Self-Encrypting Drive products.
This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard. It does not provide interface details
needed to develop a compliant application.
This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety.
1.2 Overview
The Seagate Secure® Self-Encrypting Drive FIPS 140-3 Module is embodied in Seagate Exos™
Enterprise SED model devices. These products meet the performance requirements of the most
demanding Enterprise applications. The Cryptographic Module (CM) provides a wide range of
cryptographic services including:
• Hardware based data encryption (AES-XTS)
• Instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase
• Independently controlled and protected user data LBA bands
• Authenticated FW download.
These services are provided through industry standard TCG Enterprise SSC, SATA, or SCSI
protocols.
1.3 General
ISO/IEC 24759:2017 Section 6
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 2
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
5 Software / Firmware Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 2
10 Self-Tests 2
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 2
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1-1: Security Levels
The overall security level pursued for the CM (Cryptographic Module) is Security Level 2.
1.4 Terms and Acronyms
Term / Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CM Cryptographic Module
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CO Crypto-Officer
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Term / Acronym Definition
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CSPSK Critical Security Parameter Sanitization Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook Mode
FW Firmware
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
IID Independent and Identically Distributed
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KAS SSC FFC Key Agreement Schemes Shared Secret Computation Finite Field
Cryptography
KDF Key Derivation Function
LBA Logical Block Address
MEK Media Encryption Key
MEKEK Media Encryption Key Encryption Key
PCBA Printed Circuit Board Assembly
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
POR Power-On Reset
PSP Public Security Parameter
PSK Pre-Shared Key (for TLS handshake)
PSID Physical Security ID
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public-key cryptosystem
SAK Signing Authority Key
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SATA Serial ATA (AT Attachment)
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC Security Subsystem Class
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TCG Trusted Computing Group
XTS XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing
Table 1-2: Terms and Acronyms
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Cryptographic Module Information
The Cryptographic Module (CM) is defined as a hardware module. It is a multi-chip embedded
physical embodiment contained in a full drive enclosure. No part of the enclosure is excluded from the
security requirements. A photo of an example module is provided in Figure 1.
The physical interface to the CM is a SATA or SAS connector. The data carried over the SATA and
SAS connectors conform to the industry-standard SCSI, SATA, or TCG Enterprise SSC.
The primary function of the module is to provide data encryption access control and cryptographic
erase of the data stored on the drive media. The human operator of the drive interfaces with the CM
through a “host” application on a host system. There is also an LED status indicator on the CM.
The CM may operate in one of two mutually exclusive security modes:
• TCG Security Mode – In the Security mode, access control for User Data is managed by the
Locking SP. In TCG mode the CM can support multiple independent User Data bands/ranges via
the TCG Enterprise SSC protocol. To operate the CM in TCG Security Mode, the host must follow
the steps described in 11.1.1 and 11.1.2.
• ATA Security Mode – In ATA mode, access control for User Data is managed by the ATA Security
State. In ATA mode, the CM only supports a single User Data LBA band/range that includes all
LBAs on the CM. To operate the CM in ATA Security Mode, the host must follow the steps
described in 11.1.3 and 11.1.4.
Note: ATA Security mode is only supported on CMs that support the ATA Security feature set.
When the CM is in the TCG Security Mode or ATA Security Mode, the CM is in a Compliant state
if the steps described in 11.1 are followed. If the CM is in a Compliant state, whether or not the
CM is in an Approved mode or a Non-Approved mode is dependent on what types of services the
host invokes. If the host invokes an Approved service, then the CM is an Approved mode. If the
host invokes a Non-Approved service, then the CM is in a Non-Approved mode.
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Figure 1: Seagate Self-Encrypting Drive
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2.2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configurations
Model Hardware [Part Number and
Version]
Firmware
Version
Distinguishing Features
Exos X18 3.5” SAS
HDD
ST18000NM007J
ST16000NM007J
ST14000NM007J
ST12000NM007J
ST10000NM016G
EP7U Self-Encrypting Drive SAS
(Enterprise SSC)
Exos 7E10 3.5”
SAS HDD
ST10000NM022B
ST10000NM011B
ST8000NM022B
ST8000NM011B
ST6000NM024B
ST6000NM013B
ST4000NM013B
ST4000NM029B
ST4000NM017B
EF34 Self-Encrypting Drive SAS
(Enterprise SSC)
Exos 7E10 3.5”
SATA HDD
ST10000NM021B
ST8000NM021B
ST6000NM023B
ST4000NM012B
ST4000NM028B
SZFP Self-Encrypting Drive SATA
(Enterprise SSC)
Table 2-1: Cryptographic Module Tested Configurations
2.3 Algorithms
This section describes the algorithms used by the CM. The Approved algorithms are described in
section 2.3.1 and the Non-Approved Not Allowed algorithms are described in section 2.3.2. The CM
does not implement any of the following categories of cryptographic algorithms:
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security
Claimed
Note: Not all algorithms, modes, and key sizes that appear in the module’s ACVP certificates are
utilized by the module.
2.3.1 Approved Algorithms
The Approved algorithms used by the CM are shown in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm &
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) /
Key Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A1082 Counter DRBG [SP
800-90A]
AES-256 Prediction Resistance: Yes
Mode: AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled:
Yes
Additional Input: 0 bits, 256 bits
Entropy Input: 256 bits
Nonce: 128 bits
Personalization String Length:
0 bits, 256 bits
Returned Bits: 256 bits
Random-bit generation
#A1090 AES-XTS [SP 800-38E] XTS Key Size: 256 bits
Key Strength: 256 bits
Encryption / decryption
#A1091 HMAC-SHA2-256 [FIPS
198-1]
SHA2-256 MAC: 256 bits
Key Length: 8-512 bits,
Increment 8
Pseudo random function
for PBKDF
#A1092 SHA2-256 [FIPS 180-4] SHA2-256 Message Length: 0-65528 bits,
Increment 8 bits
Cryptographic hashing
#A1093 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4) [FIPS 186-4]
PKCS 1.5 Signature Type: PKCS 1.5
Modulo: 2048, 3072
Key Strength: 112-bit, 128-bit
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Public Exponent Mode:
Random
Signature verification
#A3515 AES-CMAC [SP 800-
38B]
CMAC Direction: Generation
Key Length: 256 bits
Key Strength: 256 bits
MAC Length: 8-128 bits,
Increment 8 bits
Message Length: 128-512 bits
Increment 128 bits
Conditioner for the raw
entropy from the Ring
Oscillator entropy source
N/A ENT (P) [SP 800-90B] Ring Oscillators
Entropy Source
N/A Used as a part of the
DRBG
N/A ENT (P) [SP 800-90B] PES Entropy
Source
N/A Used as a part of the
DRBG
Table 2-2: Approved Algorithms (HW)
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm & Standard Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A1080 AES-GCM [SP 800-38D]1
GCM Direction: Encrypt, Decrypt
IV Generation: Internal
IV Generation Mode: 8.2.2
Key Length: 128 bits, 256 bits
Tag Length: 128 bits
IV Length: 96 bits
Payload Length: 128 bits, 256
bits
AAD Length: 0 bits, 256 bits
Key wrapping
(encryption /
decryption)
#A1081 AES-CMAC [SP 800-38B] CMAC Direction: Generation,
Verification
Key Length: 128 bits, 256 bits
MAC Length: 128 bits
Message Length: 0-65536 bits
Increment 8 bits
Conditioner for the
raw entropy
#A1083 HMAC-SHA2-256 [FIPS
198-1]
SHA2-256 MAC: 256 bits
Key Length: 8-512 bits Increment
8 bits
Key derivation for
Secure Messaging
#A1084 KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 [SP 800-56A rev3]
dhEphem Domain Parameter Generation
Methods: ffdhe2048
Key Strength: 112 bits
Scheme:
dhEphem:
KAS Role: initiator, responder
Key Agreement for
Secure Messaging
#A1084
(KAS-
FFC-
SSC
Cert.),
#A1089
(KDF
TLS
Cert)
KAS [SP 800-56A rev3] SP 800-56A
rev3. KAS-FFC
per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path
(2)
Key Size: 2048 bits
Key Strength: 112 bits
Key Agreement and
Derivation for Secure
Messaging
#A1085 PBKDF [SP 800-132 rev1] Option 2a2
Iteration Count: 1-10000000,
Increment 1
HMAC Algorithm: HMAC-SHA2-
256 (#A1091)
Password Length: 8-64 bytes
Increment 1
Salt Length: 128-512 bits,
Increment 8 bits
Key Data Length: 112-4096 bits
Increment 8 bits
Key derivation3
#A1087 Safe Primes Key
Generation [SP 800-56A
rev3]
ffdhe2048 Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048
Key Strength: 112 bits
Key Generation for
dhEphem
#A1088 SHA2-256 [FIPS 180-4] SHA2-256 Message Length: 0-65528 bits
Increment 8 bits
Cryptographic
hashing
SHA2-384 [FIPS 180-4] SHA2-384 Message Length: 0-65528 bits
Increment 8 bits
Cryptographic
hashing
1 The 96-bit IV used for AES GCM is generated by the module randomly by the DRBG.
2 The value of the Iteration Count used is 1000 which meets the requirements in [SP 800-132 rev1] and
customer performance requirements.
3 All keys derived used PBKDF are only used for storage applications.
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#A1089 KDF TLS (CVL) [SP 800-
135 rev1]
TLS v1.2 TLS Version: v1.2
Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256
(#A1088), SHA2-384 (#A1088)
Key derivation for
Secure Messaging.
No parts of the TLS
protocol, other than
the approved
cryptographic
algorithms and TLS
KDF, have been
tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
#A1094 AES-KW [SP 800-38F] KW Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher: Cipher
Key Length: 256 bits
Key Strength: 256bits
Payload Length: 128 bits, 192
bits, 256 bits, 320 bits, 4096 bits
Key wrapping
#A1095 AES-CBC [SP 800-38A] CBC Key Length: 128 bits, 256 bits
Key Strength: 128bits, 256 bits
Encryption /
decryption
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG [SP 800-133 rev2] Sections 4, 5.2
and 6.1
Cryptographic Key Generation;
SP 800-133 rev2 and IG D.H
Key Generation
Note: Symmetric keys
and seeds used for
asymmetric key pairs
are produced using
the unmodified/direct
output of the DRBG.
Table 2-3: Approved Algorithms (FW)
2.3.2 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
The Non-Approved, Not Allowed algorithms used by the CM are shown in Table 2-4.
Algorithm / Function Use / Function
AES-CMAC (non-compliant) Message authentication
AES-GCM (non-compliant) Key wrapping (encryption / decryption)
AES-KW (non-compliant) Key wrapping (encryption / decryption)
AES-XTS (non-compliant) Encryption / decryption
PBKDF (non-compliant) Password-based key derivation
RSA SigGen (non-compliant) Signature generation
Table 2-4: Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
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2.4 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is the enclosure of the drive. The only accessible interfaces to the CM
are the SAS/SATA interface and the Power connector. A block diagram of the CM is provided in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram
2.5 Keys, Authentication, and Other Protected Information
Keys and Protected Information are listed in Section 9 of this document. Authentication is listed in
Section 4 of this document.
2.6 Degraded Mode of Operation
The CM does not support a degraded mode of operation.
2.7 Requirements from International Standards
The CM follows many standards including:
• SAS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_attached_SCSI
• SATA: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_ATA
• TCG Enterprise: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/storage/
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface Data that Passes Over Port / Interface
SAS Connector • Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
• TCG Packets
• SCSI Packets
SATA Connector • Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
• TCG Packets
• SATA Packets
LED Status output N/A
Power Connector Power input N/A
Serial Port Disabled N/A
Table 3-1: Ports and Interfaces
The CM does not support a control output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
This section describes the roles, services, and authentications supported by the CM.
Some services in this section are identified as aligning with the “lock-based authentication model”. The
“lock-based authentication model” is described in IG 4.1.A. The primary purpose of the CM is data-at-
rest protection for User Data and the “lock-based authentication model” is sufficient to meet this use
case. Assuming the CM has been correctly initialized (see section 11.1), when the CM is powered
cycled, the CM will be in a locked state and will require authentication and unlocking prior to the
Approved service being available.
4.1 Roles, Service Command, Input and Output – TCG Security Mode
Role Service Input Output
Drive Owner (Crypto Officer) Set PIN TCG Set Method TCG Return
Status
Set FW Ports TCG Set Method
Set TLS PSK TCG Set Method
Create TLS
Session
TCG StartTLS Method
Send/Receive TLS
Message
IF-Send/IF-Receive Interface Return
Status
FW Download4 Interface FW Download
Command
EraseMaster (Crypto Officer) Set PIN TCG Set Method TCG Return
Status
Cryptographic
Erase
TCG Erase Method
Certified Erase TCG Erase Method
Enable/Disable
BandMasters
TCG Set Method
Set TLS PSK TCG Set Method
Create TLS
Session
TCG StartTLS Method
Send/Receive TLS
Message
IF-Send/IF-Receive Interface Return
Status
BandMaster (0-31) (Crypto
Officer)
Set PIN TCG Set Method TCG Return
Status
Set Range
Attributes
TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock User
Data for Read
and/or Write
TCG Set Method
Set TLS PSK TCG Set Method
Create TLS
Session
TCG StartTLS Method
User Data Read /
Write (Locking
Enabled)5
Interface Read / Write
Command
Interface Return
Status
Send/Receive TLS
Message
IF-Send/IF-Receive
Unauthenticated Show Status TCG Level 0 Discovery,
TCG Get Method
4 No operator authentication is enforced for the FW Download service that was unlocked by the
Set FW Ports service. If the new FW violates device FW rollback policy both the FW Download
and Rollback FW Download ports must be unlocked. This service aligns with the “lock-based
authentication model” (see section 4).
5 No operator authentication is enforced for the User Data Read / Write service that was unlocked
by the Lock / Unlock User Data for Read and/or Write service. This service aligns with the “lock-
based authentication model” (see section 4).
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Role Service Input Output
Reset Module POR TCG Return
Status
Unblock PIN POR
DRBG Generate
Bytes
TCG Random Method
Exit FIPS Mode TCG RevertSP Method
Compliance
Indicator
TCG Level 0 Discovery
Table 4-1: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output – TCG Security Mode
4.2 Roles, Service Command, Input and Output – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security
supported)
Role Service Input Output
Drive Owner (Crypto Officer) Set PIN/Password TCG Set Method TCG Return
Status
Set FW Ports TCG Set Method
FW Download6 Interface FW Download
Command
Interface Return
Status
Master, User (Crypto Officer) Set PIN/Password ATA Security Set
Password
Interface Return
Status
Lock / Unlock User
Data for Read
and/or Write
ATA Authenticate
Cryptographic
Erase
ATA Erase
User Data Read /
Write7
Interface Read / Write
Command
Unauthenticated Show Status TCG Level 0 Discovery TCG Return
Status
Reset Module POR
Unblock PIN POR
Disable Services ATA Freeze Lock
Exit FIPS Mode TCG RevertSP Method
Compliance
Indicator
TCG Level 0 Discovery
Table 4-2: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output - ATA Security Mode
4.3 Roles and Authentication – TCG Security Mode
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Drive Owner (Crypto Officer) Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 8 bytes (64 bits)
and each failed authentication takes
a minimum of 15ms which calculates
into a probability to guess the PIN in
one minute to 4000/264
EraseMaster (TCG Security
Mode) (Crypto Officer)
Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 8 bytes (64 bits),
and each failed authentication takes
a minimum of 15ms which calculates
into a probability to guess the PIN in
one minute to 4000/264
6 No operator authentication is enforced for the FW Download service that was unlocked by the
Set FW Ports service. If the new FW violates device FW rollback policy both the FW Download
and Rollback FW Download ports must be unlocked. This service aligns with the “lock-based
authentication model” (see section 4).
7 No operator authentication is enforced for the User Data Read / Write (Locking Enabled) service
that was unlocked by the Lock / Unlock User Data for Read and/or Write service. This service
aligns with the “lock-based authentication model” (see section 4).
Page 16
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
BandMaster (0-31) (TCG
Security Mode) (Crypto Officer)
Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 8 bytes (64 bits),
and each failed authentication takes
a minimum of 15ms which calculates
into a probability to guess the PIN in
one minute to 4000/264
Table 4-3: Roles and Authentication - TCG Security Mode
4.4 Roles and Authentication – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security supported)
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Drive Owner (Crypto Officer) Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 32 bytes (256
bits), and each failed authentication
takes a minimum of 15ms which
calculates into a probability to guess
the PIN in one minute to 4000/2256
User (ATA Security Mode)
(Crypto Officer)
Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 32 bytes (256
bits), and each failed authentication
takes a minimum of 15ms which
calculates into a probability to guess
the PIN in one minute to 4000/2256
Master (ATA Security Mode
(Crypto Officer)
Role-based authentication.
Memorized Secret
Authenticator type from SP
800-63B.
Min PIN length is 32 bytes (256
bits), and each failed authentication
takes a minimum of 15ms which
calculates into a probability to guess
the PIN in one minute to 4000/2256
Table 4-4: Roles and Authentication - ATA Security Mode
4.5 Approved Services, SSPs, Roles, and Access Rights
If the CM is operating in TCG Security Mode, the Approved services provided by the CM are described in
section 4.5.1. If the CM is operating in ATA Security Mode, the Approved services provided by the CM are
described in 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Approved Services – TCG Security Mode
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs8
Indicator
Set PIN Change
operator
authentication
data
PBKDF
(#A1085), AES-
GCM (#A1080),
HMAC-SHA2-256
(#A1091), SHA2-
256 (#A1092)
EraseMaster
Password,
BandMaster
Password,
SID
EraseMaster,
BandMaster,
Drive Owner
W TCG Return
Status
8 Definitions for Roles SSP Access column values:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is an output)
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP
Page 17
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs8
Indicator
FW Download Load complete
FW image. If
code self-test
passes with a
valid key,
device runs
new code.
RSA SigVer
(#A1093, 3072-
bit), SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Firmware
Update Key,
Platform
Key, SAK
Drive Owner9
E ATA/SCSI
Status
Enable /
Disable
BandMasters
Enable /
disable a user
authority
PBKDF
(#A1085),
HMAC-SHA2-256
(#A1091), SHA2-
256 (#A1092)
BandMaster
Password
EraseMaster E TCG Return
Status
Set FW Ports Set
PortLocked
and
LockOnReset
attributes on
the FW
Download port
or Rollback
FW Download
port
None None Drive Owner E TCG Return
Status
Set Range
Attributes
Set location,
size, and
locking
attributes of an
LBA range
None None BandMasters None TCG Return
Status
Lock / Unlock
User Data
Range for
Read and/or
Write
Block or allow
read (decrypt)
or write
(encrypt) of
user data in a
range
AES-KW
(#A1094)
MEK,
MEKEK,
CSPSK
BandMasters E TCG Return
Status
User Data
Read / Write
(Locking
Enabled)
Encrypt /
decrypt user
data from an
LBA range
where Locking
is enabled10
AES-XTS
(#A1090)
MEK BandMasters11
E ATA/SCSI
Status
Cryptographic
Erase
Erase user
data in LBA
range and
place the
range in the
uninitialized
state.
None MEKEK,
MEK,
Master Key,
CSPSK,
Bandmaster
Password
EraseMaster Z TCG Return
Status
9 FW download port must be unlocked.
10 Locking is enabled for an LBA range if the ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled values are set to
“True” and the LockOnReset value includes “Power Cycle”. The current values of these attributes can be
determined using the Show Status Approved Service (i.e., the TCG Get Method on the associated LBA range
locking object).
11 User Data range must be unlocked.
Page 18
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs8
Indicator
FW Rollback Prevents
downgrading
FW to a
release that
violates the
device FW
rollback policy
None None Drive Owner None ATA/SCSI
Status
Create TLS
Session
Support host-
initiated TLS
Session
Safe Primes Key
Generation (#
A1087), KAS
(#A1084), KDF
TLS (#A1089),
HMAC-SHA2-256
(#A1083)
Secure
Messaging
Session
Key, Secure
Messaging
Key Pair,
Bandmaster
PSKs,
EraseMaster
PSK, Drive
Owner PSK
Drive Owner,
EraseMaster,
BandMaster
E TCG Return
Status
Set TLS PSK Set Pre-
Shared key
used for TLS
None BandMaster
PSKs,
EraseMaster
PSK, Drive
Owner PSK
Drive Owner,
EraseMaster,
BandMaster
W TCG Return
Status
Send/Receive
TLS Message
Send or
receive a TLS
message
AES-CBC
(#A1095), AES-
GCM (#A1080),
SHA2-256
(#A1088), SHA2-
384, (#A1088)
Secure
Messaging
Session
Key, Secure
Messaging
Key Pair
Drive Owner,
EraseMaster,
BandMaster
E ATA/SCSI
Status
Certified
Erase
Erase user
data in LBA
range and
place the
range in the
uninitialized
state.
None MEKEK,
MEK,
Master Key,
CSPSK,
Bandmaster
Password
EraseMaster Z TCG Return
Status
Show Status Provides
information on
the current
configuration
of the CM and
reports
whether FIPS
service is
operational
and operating
in a Compliant
state.
None None None None TCG Return
Status,
ATA/SCSI
Status
Page 19
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs8
Indicator
Reset Module Runs Pre-
Operational
Self- Tests
and zeroizes
keys and
CSPs in RAM
and complete
the Secure
Boot process
by validating
the FW on the
drive.
RSA SigVer
(#A1093, 3072-
bit), SHA2-256
(#A1092)
SID,
EraseMaster
Password,
BandMaster
Password
None Z N/A
Unblock PIN Resets
password
attempt
counters
None None None None N/A
DRBG
Generate
Bytes
Returns
SP800-90A
rev1 DRBG
random
number
Counter DRBG
(#A1082), AES-
CMAC (#A1081)
AES-CMAC
(#A3515), ENT
(P)
None None None TCG Return
Status
Exit FIPS
Mode
Exit a
Compliant
state12
None SID
Password,
EraseMaster
Password,
BandMaster
Password,
MEKs,
MEKEKs,
Master
Keys,
CSPSKs,
EraseMaster
PSK,
BandMaster
PSKs, Drive
Owner PSK
None (using
PSID)
Z TCG Return
Status
Compliance
Indicator
Reports FIPS
140 revision,
overall security
level, HW and
FW revisions,
and module
name
None None None None TCG Return
Status
12 CM will enter Uninitialized State.
Page 20
Table 4-5: Approved Services - TCG Security Mode
4.5.2 Approved Services – ATA Security Mode (if ATA Security supported)
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs13
Indicator
Set
PIN/Password
Change operator
authentication data.
Note: Setting the
User PIN may also
set the Drive Owner
PIN
PBKDF
(#A1085), AES-
GCM (#A1080),
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (#A1091),
SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Master,
User
Passwords
Master,
User, Drive
Owner
W TCG Return
Status, ATA
Status
FW Download Enable / disable FW
download port and
load complete FW
image. If code self-
test passes with a
valid key, device
runs new code
RSA SigVer
(#A1093, 3072-
bit), SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Firmware
Update
Key,
Platform
Key, SAK
Drive
Owner14
E TCG Return
Status, ATA
Status
FW Rollback Prevents
downgrading FW to
a release that
violates the device
FW rollback policy
None None Drive
Owner
None ATA Status
Lock / Unlock
User Data
Range for Read
and/or Write
Enable user data
read/write and Set
PIN services
AES-KW
(#A1094)
MEK User
(optional,
Master)
E ATA Status
User Data
Read / Write
Encryption /
decryption of user
data
AES-XTS
(#A1090)
MEK User
(optional,
Master)15
E ATA Status
Cryptographic
Erase
Erase user data on
CM and place the
CM in the
uninitialized state.
None MEKEK,
MEK,
Master
Keys,
CSPSK,
User
Password
Master,
User
Z ATA Status
Unblock PIN Reset Master and
User password
attempt counter
None None None None N/A
Set FW Ports Set PortLocked and
LockOnReset
attributes on the
FW Download port
or Rollback FW
Download port
None None Drive
Owner
E TCG Return
Status
13 Definitions for Roles SSP Access column values:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is an output)
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP
14 FW download port must be unlocked.
15 User Data must be unlocked.
Page 21
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs13
Indicator
Show Status Provides
information on the
current
configuration of the
CM and reports
whether FIPS
service is
operational and
operating in a
Compliant state.
None None None None ATA Status
/ TCG
Return
Status
Reset Module Runs Pre-
Operational Self-
Tests and zeroizes
keys and CSPs in
RAM and complete
the Secure Boot
process by
validating the FW
on the drive.
RSA SigVer
(#A1093, 3072-
bit), SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Master
Password,
User
Password
None Z N/A
Disable
Services
Disables ATA
Security commands
until POR
None None None None ATA Status
Exit FIPS Mode Exit a Compliant
state16
None Master
Password,
User
Password,
MEK,
MEKEK,
Master
Keys,
CSPSK
None
(using
PSID)
Z TCG Return
Status
Compliance
Indicator
Reports FIPS 140
revision, overall
security level, HW
and FW revisions,
and module name
None None None None TCG Return
Status
Table 4-6: Approved Services – ATA Security Mode
16 CM will enter Uninitialized State.
Page 22
4.6 Non-Approved Services
The Non-Approved services provided by the CM are described in Table 4-7.
Service Description Algorithms
Accessed
Roles Indicator
User Data Read /
Write (Locking
Disabled)
Encrypt / decrypt user data
from an LBA range where
Locking is disabled17
AES-XTS (non-
compliant)
None ATA/SCSI Status
Cryptographic Erase Generates new range key
following sanitization of the
electronic media.
Counter DRBG
(#A1082)18
,
AES-CMAC (non-
compliant), AES-
KW (non-
compliant), AES-
GCM (non-
compliant), PBKDF
(non-compliant)
EraseMaster ATA/SCSI Status
Certified Erase Generates new range key
and provides certificate of
media disposition for each
piece of the electronic media
following sanitization.
Counter DRBG
(#A1082)18
AES-CMAC (non-
compliant), AES-
KW (non-
compliant), AES-
GCM (non-
compliant), PBKDF
(non-compliant),
RSA SigGen (non-
compliant)
EraseMaster ATA/SCSI Status
Table 4-7 Non-Approved Services
17 Locking is disabled for an LBA range if the ReadLockEnabled or WriteLockEnabled values are
set to “False”, or the LockOnReset value does not include “Power Cycle”. The current values of
these attributes can be determined using the Show Status Approved Service (i.e., the TCG Get
Method on the associated LBA range locking object),
18 Allowed per FIPS 140-3 IG 4.1.A, Exception b.
Page 23
5 Software / Firmware Security
During the power-on boot process, the CM will verify the authenticity and integrity of the CM firmware
using RSA Signature Verification (certificate #A1093) with the following parameters:
• The key is the Signing Authority Key i.e., SAK (see section 9.2).
• The modulus size is 3072 bits.
• The hash function is SHA2-256 (#A1092).
The operator can invoke the boot firmware integrity test on demand by performing a power-on reset
operation on the CM.
Page 24
6 Operational Environment
The CM operates in a limited operational environment where the CM firmware (FW) may be updated
by an external source via the FW download operation. Prior to accepting new FW provided by the FW
download operation, the CM will verify the signature of the new FW (see section 10.2).
Note: The ability to download FW to the device is restricted based on the state of the FW Download
and Rollback Download logical ports (see section 4.5). All FW downloads require the FW Download
port to be unlocked. Rollback FW downloads (i.e., downgrading FW to a release that violates the
device FW rollback policy) require both the FW Download and Rollback FW Download ports to be
unlocked,
Page 25
7 Physical Security
The CM is a multi-chip embedded module of product grade components with standard passivation.
The CM is surrounded in a metal enclosure that is opaque within the visible spectrum. To meet the
level 2 physical security requirements, the CM employs a single factory installed tamper-evident
labels to prevent physical tampering. Refer to Table 7-1 for actions required by the operator to ensure
that physical security is maintained.
Physical Security Mechanism Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection / Test
Inspection / Test Guidance Details
Opaque, tamper-evident
security label (TEL) on exposed
(back) side of PCBA
The frequency of
the physical
inspection should
be determined by
the Crypto Officer.
It is recommended
that the TEL be
inspected monthly.
Periodic inspection of TEL to detect
evidence of tampering:
• Checkerboard pattern on TEL
• Security label cutouts do not match
original
• Security label over PCBA screws not
penetrated
Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the
module should be removed from service.
Refer to the End-of-Life section of this
document for more information on
removing the module from service.
Figure 3: Module 1 Seal Application Locations
Page 26
Table 7-1: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Page 27
8 Non-Invasive Security
The CM does not provide mitigation against any non-invasive attacks.
Page 28
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management
9.1 SSP Storage Areas
The storage areas on the CM where SSPs may be present are described in Table 9-1.
Table 9-1: SSP Storage Areas
Name Description Persistence Type
DRAM Temporary, volatile memory Dynamic
HW Registers Temporary, volatile memory Dynamic
ROM Persistent, non-modifiable, non-volatile memory Static
Media Persistent, non-volatile memory Static
Serial Flash Persistent, non-volatile memory Static
Page 29
9.2 SSPs
The SSPs (Sensitive Security Parameters) used by the device are different depending on which security mode the CM is operating. The SSPs
used by the CM are described in Table 9-2.
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function &
Cert.
Number
Generation Import /
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Keys
SID19
/ CSP 256 bits PBKDF
(#A1085)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Reset Module, Set
PIN
Set PIN
Master, User
Passwords (ATA
Security Mode only)
/ CSP
256 bits PBKDF
(#A1085)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Reset Module, Set
PIN
Set PIN
Unlock user data
Master/User MEK
(ATA Security Mode
only) / CSP
256 bits AES-XTS
(#A1090),
CKG
Internally
generated
N/A N/A HW
Registers,
plaintext
Media,
AES-KW
encrypted
Exit FIPS Mode,
Cryptographic
Erase
Unlock user data
Cryptographic erase
Encrypted by MEKEKs
and CSPSKs
EraseMaster
Password (TCG
Security Mode) /
CSP
64-256 bits PBKDF
(#A1085)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Reset Module Set PIN
Cryptographic erase
BandMaster (0-31)
Passwords (TCG
Security Mode) /
CSP
64-256 bits PBKDF
(#A1085)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Reset Module, Set
PIN,
Cryptographic
Erase
Set PIN
Lock / unlock user data
MEKs / CSP 256 bits AES-XTS
(#A1090),
CKG
Internally
generated
N/A N/A HW
Registers,
plaintext
Media,
AES-KW
encrypted
Exit FIPS Mode,
Cryptographic
Erase
Lock / Unlock User Data
Range for Read and/or
Write
Encrypted by MEKEKs
and CSPSKs
Entropy Input String
/ CSP
448 bits Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Internally
generated
N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
N/A Services using DRBG
(cryptographic erase)
19
Drive Owner PIN
Page 30
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function &
Cert.
Number
Generation Import /
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Keys
DRBG Seed / CSP 384 bits Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Internally
generated
N/A N/A HW
Registers,
plaintext
N/A Services using DRBG
(cryptographic erase, Set
PIN)
DRBG Key / CSP 256 bits Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Internally
generated20
N/A N/A HW
Registers,
plaintext
N/A Services using DRBG
(cryptographic erase, Set
PIN)
DRBG Internal State
V / CSP
128 bits Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Internally
generated20
N/A N/A HW
Registers,
plaintext
N/A Services using DRBG
(cryptographic erase, Set
PIN)
Platform Key21
/
PSP
3072 bits /
128 bits
(strength)
RSA SigVer
(#A1093)
Pre-loaded
at factory
N/A N/A ROM,
plaintext
N/A Reset module
Firmware Update
Key / PSP
3072 bits /
128 bits
(strength)
RSA SigVer
(#A1093)
Pre-loaded
at factory
N/A N/A ROM,
plaintext
N/A FW download
SAK22
/ PSP 3072 bits /
128 bits
(strength)
RSA SigVer
(#A1093)
Pre-loaded
at factory
Import:
Embedded
in Firmware
Download
Image
N/Al Serial
Flash,
plaintext
N/A Reset module
MEKEK / CSP 256 bits AES-KW
(#A1094),
CKG
Internally
generated
N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Media,
AES-GCM
encrypted
Exit FIPS Mode Lock / Unlock User Data
Range for Read and/or
Write Cryptographic erase
Set PIN
Encrypted by Master Keys
Master Key / CSP 256 bits AES-GCM
(#A1080),
PBKDF
(#A1085)
Derived N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Exit FIPS Mode Lock / Unlock User Data
Range for Read and/or
Write Cryptographic erase
Set PIN
20 Source: section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication 800-90A. Values of V and the AES key are the critical values of the
internal state on which the security of this DRBG mechanism depends (i.e., V and the AES key are the “secret values” of the internal state).
21 PK is used for pre-operational FW integrity test and is not an SSP but included in this table for completeness.
22 SAK is used for pre-operational FW integrity test and are not SSPs but included in this table for completeness.
Page 31
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function &
Cert.
Number
Generation Import /
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Keys
CSPSKs / CSP 256 bits AES-KW
(#A1094),
CKG
Internally
generated
N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Media,
plain text
Exit FIPS Mode Lock / Unlock User Data
Range for Read and/or
Write Cryptographic erase
Set PIN
Drive Owner PSKs /
CSP
32-512 bits KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(#A1084)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Media,
plaintext
Exit FIPS Mode Set TLS PSK
EraseMaster PSK
(TCG Security
Mode) / CSP
32-512 bits KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(#A1084)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Media,
plaintext
Exit FIPS Mode Set TLS PSK
BandMaster PSKs
(TCG Security
Mode) / CSP
32-512 bits KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(#A1084)
N/A Import: sent
from host
N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Media,
plaintext
Exit FIPS Mode Set TLS PSK
Secure Messaging
Session Key / CSP
128-256 bits AES-GCM
(#A1080).
KDF TLS
(#A1089)
Derived N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
Reset Module Send/Receive TLS
Message
Secure Messaging
Key Pair / CSP
2048 bits /
112 bits
(strength) &
256 bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(#A1084)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
(#A1087)
CKG
KDF TLS
(#A1089)
Internally
generated
N/A N/A DRAM,
plaintext
N/A Send/Receive TLS
Message
Table 9-2: SSPs
Page 32
9.3 Entropy Sources
The Entropy sub-system uses a Non-Deterministic Random Bit Generator (NRBG) to generate
random data. The NRBG is supplied with conditioned entropy via two Entropy sources. Each
conditioned output of an entropy source is a 128-bit full entropy output. The NRBG used by the device
is the XOR-NRBG construction described in SP 800-90C and the DRBG construction is based on SP
800-90A rev 1.
The DRBG seed used for instantiation is constructed by concatenating the following values:
• Entropy Input (256 bits of conditioned entropy)
• Nonce (128 bits of conditioned entropy)
• Personalization String (64 bits of device unique data such as the device serial number
padded to 256 bits)
The concatenated value is passed to the derivation function Block_Ciper_df as described in SP 800-
90A rev. 1 which outputs 384 bits of seed material.
The design of the entropy sources is based on the recommendations in SP 800-90B. The entropy
sub-system has two independent entropy sources:
• Ring Oscillator entropy source
• PES entropy source
The Entropy sources generate entropy samples when required by the Entropy sub-system. The raw
samples from each entropy source are stored in independent entropy pools. The raw entropy samples
from each source are concatenated into 128-bit blocks. When there are greater than 256 bits of
entropy in an entropy pool23
, based on the minimum entropy of the sources, the Entropy subsystem
concatenates sufficient 128-bit blocks for 256 bits of entropy and passes the concatenation of these
blocks to the CMAC conditioner (#A1081 (PES) and #A3515 (Ring Oscillator)).
The entropy sources used by the CM are described in Table 9-3.
Entropy Sources Minimum Number
of Bits of Entropy
Details
Position Error Signal (PES) 3 out of 4-bits Met IID requirements
Ring Oscillators 6 out of 8-bits Met IID requirements
Table 9-3: Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
9.4 Zeroization Methods
The method used by the CM to zeroize SSPs is different depending on where the SSP is stored:
• If a SSP is stored in volatile memory, the CM will zeroize the SSP (when required) by writing the
memory where the SSP is stored with a pattern of all bytes set to 0x00.
Note: When the CM is powered down all SSPs stored in volatile memory are zeroized
automatically as the volatile memory can only store data when powered.
• If a SSP is stored unprotected (i.e., plaintext) in non-volatile memory, the CM will zeroize the SSP
(when required) by writing the memory where the SSP is stored with a pattern of all bytes set to
0x00 and then writing the new SSP value.
23 The combined entropy is calculated using Method 2 as described in IG D.O Combining Entropy from
Multiple Sources.
Page 33
• If a SSP is stored protected (i.e., encrypted using another SSP) in non-volatile memory, the CM
will zeroize the SSP (when required) by writing the memory where the SSP is stored with a new
SSP value.24
24 As indicated in Table 9-2 some keys are stored encrypted on the CM using an approved algorithm.
Per IG 9.6.A, they are considered “protected” thus not requiring zeroization when unprotected SSPs
are zeroized.
Page 34
10 Self-Tests
The sections below list all self-tests performed by the module, along with the failure behavior when
any of the self-tests fail. While in an error state, the module outputs an error indicator, disables
cryptographic operations and the data output interface is inhibited. All pre-operational and conditional
self-tests can be executed on-demand by power-cycling the module.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Function
Tested
Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Firmware
Integrity
Integrity Test25
RSA PKCS#1 3072/SHA-256
signature verification on signed
FW stored on the CM (#A1093
and #A1092)26
. The keys used
are the Platform Key and one of
the SAKs (see section 9.2).
Enters FW Integrity Error State.
Table 10-1: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Function
Tested
Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Hardware Self-Tests
AES-XTS
(#A1090)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
XTS encrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-XTS
(#A1090)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
XTS decrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-XTS
(#A1090)
Critical Functions
Test: When an AES
XTS Key is
generated
Generated XTS Key_1 and
Key_2 are compared, as per IG
C.I, before being used.
Keys are discarded
SHA2-256
(#A1092)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
Digest KAT Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (#A1091)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
HMAC SHA-256 KAT / 256-bit
key
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
RSA SigVer
(#A1093)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
Signature Verification KAT /
3072-bit key
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-CMAC
(#A3515)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
CMAC KAT / 256-bit bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
KAT Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
Counter
DRBG
(#A1082)
Critical Functions
Test: When a
random number is
generated
Instantiate, generate, reseed and
un-instantiate health tests as per
section 11.3 of SP 800-90A
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
Firmware Self-Tests
AES-CBC
(#A1095)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
CBC encrypt KAT / 256 bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-CBC
(#A1095)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
CBC decrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-GCM
(#A1080)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
GCM encrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
25 The algorithm used for the Firmware Integrity Test (RSA) is conditionally tested before it is used
in the execution of Firmware Integrity Test.
26 The SAKs are used as the keys for pre-operational FW integrity test.
Page 35
Function
Tested
Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
AES-GCM
(#A1080)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
GCM decrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-CMAC
(#A1081)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
CMAC KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
SHA2-384
(#A1088)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
Digest KAT Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (#A1083)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
HMAC SHA-256 KAT / 256-bit
key
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(#A1084)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
Diffie-Hellman Primitive Z KAT /
2048-bit key
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-KW
(#A1094)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
KW encrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
AES-KW
(#A1094)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
KW decrypt KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
KDF TLS
(#A1089)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
KAT / 384-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
PBKDF
(#A1085)
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Test
KAT / 256-bit key Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
Firmware
Loading
Firmware Load Test RSA PKCS#1 3072 / SHA-256
signature verification of new FW
image performed before FW can
be loaded (#A1093 and #A1092)
Incoming FW package is not
loaded and is discarded
ENT Critical Functions
Test: When a seed
for DRBG is
requested
Repetition Count and Adaptive
Proportion tests as per SP 800-
90B
Enters FIPS Self-Test Error State
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
(#A1087)
Critical Functions
Test: When a key is
generated
Assurances as per sections 5.5
and 5.6 of SP 800-56A rev3
Keys are discarded
Table 10-2: Conditional Self-Tests
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11Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Delivery and Operation
To initialize the CM into the Compliant state, one of the following procedures must be followed: TCG
Enterprise or ATA Security. Upon receiving the CM, the authorized operator must inspect the physical
security mechanisms for tamper evidence and verify that the drive boots up in an uninitialized Security
Mode.
The “FIPS Operating Mode” Indicator designates whether the drive has been configured to operate in
the Compliant state. The “FIPS Operating Mode” Indicator is a bit (byte 30, bit 0) in the Vendor Unique
fields in Level 0 Device Discovery. If byte 30, bit 0 of the Vendor Unique fields is set to one (1), then
the device is operating in a Compliant state. If the bit is set to zero (0), then the device is operating in
a Non-Compliant state and is not considered a FIPS 140 validated CM.
11.1.1 TCG Enterprise Secure Initialization
1. Upon receipt of the product examine the shipping packaging and the product packaging to ensure it
has not been accessed during shipping by the trusted courier.
2. At initialization and periodically thereafter, examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper
evidence.
3. At initialization, set all enabled operator PINs applicable for the Compliant state to private values of at
least 8 bytes (64 bits) in length: Drive Owner, EraseMaster, and BandMasters27.
4. Set ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled to “True” and the LockOnReset column to include
“Power Cycle”, on at least one (1) User Data range.
5. At initialization, disable the “Makers” authority.
6. At initialization, the value of LockOnReset for FW Download port must be set to include “Power
Cycle”.
11.1.2 TCG Enterprise Ongoing Policy Restrictions
1. The ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled values must be set to “True” and the LockOnReset
value must include “Power Cycle”, for at least one (1) User Data range.
2. The “Makers” Authority must be disabled.
3. The LockOnReset value for the FW Download port must include “Power Cycle”.
11.1.3 ATA Security Secure Initialization
1. Upon receipt of the product examine the shipping packaging and the product packaging to ensure it
has not been accessed during shipping by the trusted courier.
2. At initialization and periodically thereafter, examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper
evidence.
3. Transition the CM to ATA Security Mode by setting the User Password to a private value of 32 bytes
(256 bits) in length.
4. At initialization, set the remaining operator Passwords/PINs applicable for the Compliant state to
private values of at least 8 bytes (64 bits) in length: Master and Drive Owner (optional).
5. At initialization, the value of LockOnReset for FW Download port must be set to “Power Cycle”.
11.1.4 ATA Security Ongoing policy Restrictions
1. The “Makers” Authority must be disabled.
2. The LockOnReset value for the FW Download port must include “Power Cycle”.
27 A subset of the operator authority/PINs are enabled by default. If use of any other
authority/PINs not enabled by default is required in the Compliant state, the Crypto Officer will
need to enable them as part of the initialization steps.
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11.2 End of Life
When the CM reaches end-of-life, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all SSPs prior to discarding the CM.
The Crypto Officer shall perform the following steps when the CM is at end-of-life:
1. The Crypto Officer shall revert the CM to the factory default state by invoking the Revert or RevertSP
methods28 on the Admin SP.
2. If step 1 fails, all SSPs on the device may not have been sanitized. If this occurs, the Crypto Officer
should handle the CM per organizational policies.
28 The Revert/RevertSP methods will cause the CM to zeroize all the SSPs and exit the Compliant
state.
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12Mitigation of Other Attacks
The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3.