Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall
LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
10900-A Stonelake Blvd.
Austin, TX 78759, USA
www.forcepoint.com
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 20224 Forcepoint
2
Revision History
Revision Date Reason
A March 9, 2022 Initial release.
B February 22, 2024 CMVP Comment Responses
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2024 Forcepoint. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this
copyright notice.
Preface
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Next Generation Firewall (Hardware
Version: 2201, 2205, 2210, 3401 and 3410; firmware Version: 6.10.3.26158) from Forcepoint. This Security
Policy describes how the Next Generation Firewall appliances (referred as NGFW appliances, modules, firewalls)
meet the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which
details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about
the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
This document also describes how to run the modules in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was
prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Next Generation Firewall appliances are
referred to in this document as the NGFW appliances, crypto modules, or modules.
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 20224 Forcepoint
3
Table of Contents
REVISION HISTORY ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND THIRD-PARTY SOFTWARE..................................................................................... 2
PREFACE..................................................................................................................................................................... 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................................................. 3
LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................................................................................................... 5
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................................... 5
1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 SECURITY LEVEL......................................................................................................................................................6
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ........................................................................................................ 6
2.1 MODULE OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................................6
2.2 MODULE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................................................7
2.3 TEST CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................................................................9
2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS................................................................................................................................11
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES........................................................................................................... 18
3.1 PORTS AND INTERFACE OVERVIEW ...........................................................................................................................18
4. ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................................................ 20
4.1 ROLES ................................................................................................................................................................20
4.2 ROLES AND AUTHENTICATION .................................................................................................................................21
4.3 SERVICES.............................................................................................................................................................24
4.4 ALTERNATING BYPASS FEATURE...............................................................................................................................39
4.5 SELF-INITIATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC OUTPUT CAPABILITY .................................................................................................40
5. SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY.................................................................................................................... 41
5.1 FIRMWARE INTEGRITY............................................................................................................................................41
6. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................... 41
7. PHYSICAL SECURITY.......................................................................................................................................... 42
7.1 MODULE CONSTRUCTION.......................................................................................................................................42
7.2 TAMPER-EVIDENT LABELS ......................................................................................................................................42
7.3 INTERNAL BAFFLES................................................................................................................................................46
7.4 MODULE INSPECTION............................................................................................................................................48
8. NON-INVASIVE SECURITY ................................................................................................................................. 49
9. SSP MANAGEMENT .......................................................................................................................................... 49
9.1 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER.............................................................................................................................49
9.2 NON-DETERMINISTIC RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION SPECIFICATION...........................................................................66
10. SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................................................... 66
10.1 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS.......................................................................................................................................66
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 20224 Forcepoint
4
10.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS ......................................................................................................................................67
11. LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE................................................................................................................................ 70
11.1 PERFORMING SECURE INITIALIZATION OF THE MODULE................................................................................................70
11.1.1 Hardware Setup.......................................................................................................................................70
11.1.2 Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation .............................................................70
11.1.3 Downloading and Upgrading to an Approved Firmware Version ...........................................................72
11.1.4 Setting up the Approved Configuration...................................................................................................73
11.1.5 Resetting the Module to Factory Settings (Sanitization).........................................................................74
12. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................................................................. 75
13. GUIDANCE.................................................................................................................................................... 75
13.1 IDENTIFYING THE MODULE VERSION.........................................................................................................................75
13.2 NON-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION....................................................................................................................75
13.3 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND USAGE POLICIES............................................................................................................75
13.4 EXTERNAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................76
APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... 77
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 20224 Forcepoint
5
List of Figures
FIGURE 1: 2201 FRONT PANEL ................................................................................................................................................. 7
FIGURE 2: 2201/2205 REAR PANEL .......................................................................................................................................... 7
FIGURE 3: 2205/2210 FRONT PANEL........................................................................................................................................ 7
FIGURE 4: 2210 REAR PANEL.................................................................................................................................................... 7
FIGURE 5: 3400 SERIES FRONT PANEL...................................................................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 6: 3400 SERIES REAR PANEL ........................................................................................................................................ 8
FIGURE 7: SELF-INITIATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC OUTPUT CAPABILITY STATUS ON SMC WEB GUI............................................. 41
FIGURE 8: 2205/2210 FRONT TEL PLACEMENTS .................................................................................................................... 43
FIGURE 9: 2210 REAR TEL PLACEMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 43
FIGURE 10: 2201 FRONT TEL PLACEMENT.............................................................................................................................. 44
FIGURE 11: 2201/2205 REAR TEL PLACEMENT....................................................................................................................... 44
FIGURE 12: 3400 SERIES FRONT TEL PLACEMENTS ................................................................................................................ 45
FIGURE 13: 3400 SERIES RIGHT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT........................................................................................................... 45
FIGURE 14: 3400 SERIES REAR TEL PLACEMENTS................................................................................................................... 46
FIGURE 15: 3400 SERIES LEFT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT.............................................................................................................. 46
FIGURE 16: DEPICTION OF VENT PROTECTED BY INTERNAL BAFFLE...................................................................................... 47
FIGURE 17: DEPICTION OF THE MODULE VERSION DISPLAYED IN THE SMC GUI .................................................................. 75
List of Tables
TABLE 1: SECURITY LEVELS ....................................................................................................................................................... 6
TABLE 2: CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE TESTED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................. 9
TABLE 3: APPROVED ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................................................................ 12
TABLE 4: NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS ALLOWED IN THE APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION WITH NO SECURITY CLAIMED
....................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 5: PORTS AND INTERFACES.......................................................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 6: ROLES, SERVICES, INPUT AND OUTPUT................................................................................................................... 20
TABLE 7: ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ........................................................................... 22
TABLE 8: MODULE SERVICES .................................................................................................................................................. 25
TABLE 9: PHYSICAL SECURITY INSPECTION GUIDELINES ........................................................................................................ 48
TABLE 10: SUMMARY OF SSPS ............................................................................................................................................... 50
TABLE 11: NON-DETERMINISTIC RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION SPECIFICATION............................................................. 66
TABLE 12: PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS ............................................................................................................................. 67
TABLE 13: CONDITIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM SELF-TESTS.................................................................................... 67
TABLE 14: CONDITIONAL PAIR-WISE CONSISTENCY TESTS .................................................................................................... 69
General
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
6
1.General
1.1 Security Level
The Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall meets all level 2 security requirements for FIPS 140-3 as summarized in the table
below:
TABLE 1: SECURITY LEVELS
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 2
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 2
10 Self-Tests 2
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 2
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Overview
The NGFW appliances are high-performance network security appliances that add a broad range of built-in security
features, including VPN, IPS, anti-evasion, TLS inspection, SD-WAN, and mission-critical application proxies, to a
traditional firewall and provides end-to-end protection across the entire enterprise network. All appliances can be
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
7
deployed as either a Layer 2 or Layer 3 firewall or a next generation IPS. However, in the FIPS 140-3 approved mode, the
appliances are deployed in Firewall/VPN mode of operation, which provides access control and VPN connectivity. Each of
the appliances run NGFW firmware version 6.10.3.26158 based on the NGFW OS 10 operating system with Linux kernel
version 4.19.
2.2 Module Description
The cryptographic module is a hardware module of type multi-chip standalone. The cryptographic boundary of the
module is shown in the figures below. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis.
The NGFW 2201, 2205, and 2210 appliances are a 1U rack-mounted design featuring modular connectivity. All the units
are equipped with 9x GE RJ45 and 4x (2201) or 8x (2205, 2210) 10 Gbps SFP+ fixed Ethernet ports, and include an
interface module slot, allowing for additional connectivity. The appliances contain an integrated, dual redundant (on the
2210), power supply that supports a wide range of voltages: 100 – 240 VAC or -72 – -36 VDC. The operating temperature
range of the appliances is between +5°C to +40°C (+41°F to +104°F).
FIGURE 1: 2201 FRONT PANEL
FIGURE 2: 2201/2205 REAR PANEL
FIGURE 3: 2205/2210 FRONT PANEL
FIGURE 4: 2210 REAR PANEL
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
8
The NGFW 3401 and 3410 are a 2U rack-mounted design featuring modular connectivity. The NGFW 3400 series is
equipped with 1x GE RJ45 and 2x 10 Gbps SFP+ fixed Ethernet ports, and includes eight Network I/O slots, allowing for
additional connectivity. The appliance contains an integrated, dual redundant, power supply that supports a wide range
of voltages: 100 – 240 VAC or -72 – -36 VDC. The operating temperature range of the appliances is between +5°C to +40°C
(+41°F to +104°F).
FIGURE 5: 3400 SERIES FRONT PANEL
FIGURE 6: 3400 SERIES REAR PANEL
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
9
2.3 Test Configuration
The following tested configurations are covered in this security policy:
TABLE 2: CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE TESTED CONFIGURATION
Model Hardware
[Part Number
and Version]
Firmware Version Distinguishing Features
NGFW 2201 2201 Firmware: 6.10.3.26158 1U
• Intel Xeon D-2123IT
Skylake Processor
• 1 Power Supply Unit
• 2 x 16 GB DDR4 RAM
NGFW 2205 2205 Firmware: 6.10.3.26158 1U
• Intel Xeon D-2145NT
Skylake Processor
• 1 Power Supply Unit
• 4 x 10GE PCIe card
• 2 x 16 GB DDR4 RAM
NGFW 2210 2210 Firmware: 6.10.3.26158 1U
• Intel Xeon D-2177NT
Skylake Processor
• 2 Power Supply Units
• 4 x 10GE PCIe card
• 2 x 16 GB DDR4 RAM
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
10
Model Hardware
[Part Number
and Version]
Firmware Version Distinguishing Features
NGFW 3401 3401 Firmware: 6.10.3.26158 2U
• Intel Xeon 4210
Cascade Lake Processor
• 2 Power Supply Units
• 8 Port Gigabit Ethernet
RJ45 Module
• 8 x 8GB RDIMM D4
RAM
NGFW 3410 3410 Firmware: 6.10.3.26158 2U
• Intel Xeon 6230N
Cascade Lake Processor
• 2 Power Supply Units
• 8 Port Gigabit Ethernet
RJ45 Module
• 12 x 16GB RDIMM D4
RAM
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
11
2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms
The following cryptographic library and associated CAVP certificates are used by the cryptographic module:
 Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Cryptographic Module (Cert. #A2155)
 Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Library (Cert. #A2209)
 Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Kernel Module (Cert. #A2166)
 Forcepoint NGFW Entropy Library (Cert. #A2167)
The approved algorithms implemented by the module alongside their mapping to the certificates above alongside
algorithms use by services are listed in the table below. Note that the referenced algorithm certificates may contain
more tested options than are utilized by the module, and that only those listed in the table below are implemented and
used.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
12
TABLE 3: APPROVED ALGORITHMS
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Cryptographic Module
#A2155 AES
FIPS 197, SP
800-38A, SP
800-38D, SP
800-38F
AES-CBC, AES-ECB, AES-
GCM, AES-KWP
Direction: Encrypt,
Decrypt
Key Length: 128, 192,
256
Used for confidentiality of
configuration files, logs, and
monitoring data, management
connections and services, peer
connections, VPN, HTTPS, and TLS
connections
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG
SP 800-
133rev21
RSA, EC, and FFC key
pairs per FIPS 186-4
and SP 800-56Arev3
using the unmodified
output of the DRBG for
seeds.
Symmetric keys using
the unmodified output
of the DRBG
RSA 2048, 3072 bits
EC P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521 curves
FFC 2048-8192 bits
Key generation for all module
services that utilize internal
generation
#A2155 CVL
SP 800-
135rev1
IKEv1 KDF, IKEv2 KDF,
TLS 1.2 KDF2
IKE with SHA-1, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
TLS with SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
TLS and IPsec connections
1 The module complies with Section 6.1, 5, and Section 4 (Bullet 1) of SP 800-133rev2.
2
No parts of the IKEv1, IKEv2, or TLS protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have
been tested by the CAVP and CMVP
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
13
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A2155 DRBG
SP 800-90A
AES-256-CTR Prediction Resistance:
No
Supports Reseed
Capabilities:
Derivation Function
Enabled: Yes
Additional Input: 0-256
bits
Entropy Input: 512-
1024 bits
Nonce: 256 bits
Personalization String
Length: 0-256 bits
All random number generation and
key generation within the module
#A2155 ECDSA
FIPS 186-4
Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification,
Public Key Validation
P-224, P-256, P-384
and P-521 curves
SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Used in TLS and VPN connections
for digital signatures
#A2155 HMAC
FIPS 198-1
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
> 256 bit keys Used for authentication of
configuration files, logs, and
monitoring data, management
connections and services, peer
connections, VPN, HTTPS, TLS
connections and SNMP monitoring.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
14
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A2155 KAS
SP 800-
56Arev3
KAS-ECC-SSC with CVL
(IKEv1 KDF)3
See KAS-ECC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for VPN
connections
KAS-ECC-SSC with CVL
(IKEv2 KDF)3
See KAS-ECC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for VPN
connections
KAS-FFC-SSC with CVL
(IKEv1 KDF)4
See KAS-FFC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for VPN
connections
KAS-FFC-SSC with CVL
(IKEv2 KDF)4
See KAS-FFC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for VPN
connections
#A2155 KAS
SP 800-
56Arev3
KAS-ECC-SSC with CVL
(TLS 1.2 KDF)3
See KAS-ECC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for TLS
connections
KAS-FFC-SSC with CVL
(TLS 1.2 KDF)3
See KAS-FFC-SSC and
CVL entries
Establishing session keys for TLS
connections
#A2155 KAS-ECC-
SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
ephemeralUnified
KAS Role: initiator,
responder
Domain Parameter
Generation Methods:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Establishing shared secrets for TLS
and VPN connections
3 Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
4 Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 202 bits of encryption strength.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
15
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A2155 KAS-FFC-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
dhEphem
KAS Role: initiator,
responder
Domain Parameter
Generation Methods:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, MODP-
2048, MODP-3072,
MODP-4096, MODP-
6144, MODP-8192
Establishing shared secrets for TLS
and VPN connections
#A2155 KTS5
SP 800-38F
AES-CBC
HMAC
AES-128, AES-256
HMAC-SHA-1 with
160-bit keys
HMAC-SHA2-256 with
256-bit keys
HMAC-SHA2-384 with
384-bit keys
TLS and IPsec connections
#A2155 KTS5
SP 800-38F
AES-GCM AES-128, AES-256 TLS and IPsec connections
#A2155 KTS6
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP AES-256 Used in VPN connections
5 Key establishment methodology provides 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
6 Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength.
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
16
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A2155 RSA
FIPS 186-4
Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
PKCS #1 v1.5 and PSS
1024 (verification
only), 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Used in TLS and VPN connections
for digital signatures
#A2155 Safe Primes
Key
Generation
Safe Primes
Key
Verification
SP 800-
56Arev3
FFC key pairs per SP
800-56Arev3 using the
unmodified output of
the DRBG for seeds
Safe Prime Groups:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, MODP-
2048, MODP-3072,
MODP-4096, MODP-
6144, MODP-8192
Key generation for all module
services that utilize KAS-FFC-SSC
#A2155 SHS
FIPS 180-4
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
BYTE only Used in HTTPS user authentication
and as a prerequisite for higher-
level algorithms
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Library
#A2209 AES
FIPS 197, SP
800-38A, SP
800-38C
AES-ECB, AES-CFB128 Direction: Encrypt,
Decrypt
Key Length: 128, 192,
256
Used in peer connections, SNMP
monitoring
#A2209 KBKDF
SP 800-108
SHA2-256
Counter and Feedback
Mode
> 112 bit keys Key Derivation
Cryptographic Module Specification
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
17
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
#A2209 PBKDF
SP 800-132
SHA-1, SHA2-256 128, 256-bit keys Key Encryption, Key Derivation
Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Kernel Module
#A2166 AES
FIPS 197, SP
800-38A, SP
800-38D
AES-CBC, AES-GCM Direction: Encrypt,
Decrypt
Key Length: 128, 192,
256
Used in VPN connections
#A2166 HMAC
FIPS 198-1
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
> 112 bit keys Used in VPN connections
#A2166 SHS
FIPS 180-4
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
BYTE only Used as a prerequisite for higher-
level algorithms (HMAC)
Forcepoint NGFW Entropy Library
N/A ENT (NP)
SP 800-90B
Non-physical RNG
based on CPU timing
jitter
Entropy source
expected to provide
full entropy in its
outputs due to the
vetted conditioning
component.
Raw noise expected to
provide at least 1/3
bits of min-entropy
per 64-bit sample.
Used to seed the module’s DRBG
#A2167 SHA-3
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 BYTE only Conditioning within the entropy
source
Cryptographic Module Interfaces
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
18
TABLE 4: NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS ALLOWED IN THE APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION WITH NO SECURITY CLAIMED
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
Triple-DES-CBC Use of a non-approved
cryptographic algorithm to
“obfuscate” a CSP allowed as
per IG 2.4.A Scenario 1.
Used to obfuscate/de-obfuscate private keys stored on
disk
SHA-1 Use of a non-approved
cryptographic algorithm to
“obfuscate” a CSP allowed as
per IG 2.4.A Scenario 1.
Used to derive the key pair obfuscation and integrity
protection keys
3.Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interface Overview
The figures in section Module Description identify the physical interfaces to the cryptographic module. The following
table maps the physical interface to logical interfaces and supported data:
TABLE 5: PORTS AND INTERFACES
Physical port Logical interfaces Data that passes over
port/interface
VGA port Status output Used for external connections to
monitors, which can be used for
status monitoring
SSD port (x2) N/A None
SSD port LEDs (x4) Status output Used to indicate whether an SSD
is in the bay and SSD activity
(reads and writes)
Interface module slot (x1
on 2200 series, x8 on
3400 series)
Data input, Data output, Control input, Control output,
Status output
Network traffic
Cryptographic Module Interfaces
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
19
Physical port Logical interfaces Data that passes over
port/interface
Interface module slot
LEDs
Status output Used to indicate link status and
network activity
Power button Control input Used to turn on and turn off the
module
Power LEDs (x3) Status output Used to indicate whether the
module is running, in a standby
state, or powered down
IPMI port Disabled in the validated configuration None
IPMI port LEDs (x2) Status output Used to indicate link status and
network activity
Fixed Gb ethernet port (x9
on 2200 series, x1 on
3400 series)
Data input, Data output, Control input, Control output,
Status output
Network traffic
Fixed ethernet port LEDs
(x18 on 2200 series, x2 on
3400 series)
Status output Used to indicate link status and
network activity
Fixed SFP+ ports (x2 on
3400 series, x4 on 2201,
x8 on 2205, 2210)
Data input, Data output, Control input, Control output,
Status output
Network traffic
Fixed SFP+ port LEDs (x4
on 3400 series, x8 on
2201, x16 on 2205, 2210)
Status output Used to indicate link status and
network activity
Console port Status output Used for external connections to
console monitors, which can be
used for status monitoring
Console port LEDs (x2) Status output Used to indicate link status and
console activity
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
20
Physical port Logical interfaces Data that passes over
port/interface
USB ports (x2) Control input, disabled after initialization Can be used to input initial
configuration from SMC
Power input (x1 on 2201,
2205, x2 on 2210, 3400
series)
Power input Used to input power to the
module
Power input LEDs (x2) Status output Used to indicate power input
status
Fan LEDs (x3) Status output Used to indicate fan status
4.Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The mapping of the cryptographic module’s roles services is in the table below:
TABLE 6: ROLES, SERVICES, INPUT AND OUTPUT
Role Service Input Output
Crypto officer Initialize module NA NA
Crypto officer Shut down the module NA NA
Crypto officer Zeroize keys NA NA
Crypto officer Display versioning
information
NA Module version
information
Crypto officer Show status NA Module status
Crypto officer Perform self-tests NA NA
Crypto officer Management Connection
Service
Configuration
commands
Configuration status
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
21
Role Service Input Output
Crypto officer Peer Connection Service NA Heartbeat, state
synchronization data,
and data
synchronization data
Crypto officer Key pair management
service
Key pair request NA
Crypto officer User management service Password hashes NA
Crypto officer Modify and apply
configuration
Configuration
commands
Configuration status
User IPsec VPN Service IKE key negotiation
IPsec traffic
IKE key negotiation
IPsec traffic
User Mobile VPN Service IKE key negotiation
IPsec traffic
IKE key negotiation
IPsec traffic
User HTTPS User
Authentication Service
TLS data TLS data
User TLS Inspection Service TLS data TLS data
User HTTPS Proxy Service TLS data TLS data
Crypto officer Export Logs and
Monitoring Data Service
NA Logs and monitoring
data
User SNMP Monitoring Service SNMP requests SNMP responses
4.2 Roles and Authentication
The module supports role-based authentication within the module, where all roles must authenticate to the module by
providing their authentication data.
The module does not implement a limit on consecutive authentication attempts, as described in section 5.2.2 of SP 800-
63B. However, this is mitigated by the two-second delay for failed user password attempts and by a conservative
argument about network session rate for the other authenticators. The success probability for random attempts during a
one-minute period, as shown in the third column of the below table, shows that the module is well protected against
password guessing attacks for all authenticators.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
22
Note: The strength of HMAC SHA-1 is estimated at 80 bits of strength in the analysis, below. NIST SP 800-107 states that
the strength is somewhat less than 80 bits but does not specify a value. For simplicity, 80 bits are used in the analysis
below. This does not change the conclusion if the actual strength is somewhat less than 80 bits.
TABLE 7: ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Crypto Officer (SMC, Peer NGFW,
Log Server)
Single factor cryptographic software
(ECDSA Digital Signature, HMAC-
SHA-1)
The public key used for
authentication is ECDSA, yielding at
least 112 bits of strength, assuming
the smallest curve size P-224. The
chance of a random authentication
attempt falsely succeeding is 1 /
(2112
).
Assuming 1 attempt per
microsecond, there can be
60,000,000 attempts in a one-
minute period. This means that at
worst case an attacker has the
probability of breaking the
authentication in one minute as
60,000,000 / (2112
).
User (SNMP) Single factor cryptographic software
(HMAC-SHA-1)
The SNMP key is the output of the
SNMP KDF as described in NIST SP
800-135. The key is a 160-bit SHA-1
hash value. The chance of a random
attempt falsely succeeding is 1 /
(280
).
Assuming 1 attempt per
microsecond, there can be
60,000,000 attempts in a one-
minute period. This means that in
the worst case, an attacker has the
probability of guessing the key in
one minute as 60,000,000/ (280
).
User (HTTPS, Mobile VPN) Memorized secret (SHA2-512) Once properly configured, the
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
23
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
minimum length of the password is
10 characters, with 94 different
case-sensitive alphanumeric
characters and symbols possible for
usage. Assuming a minimum
password length of 10 characters,
the chance of a random attempt
falsely succeeding is 1 / (9410
).
The module adds a two-second
delay between each login attempt.
Therefore, the maximum number of
login attempts is limited to 30 per
minute. This means that in the
worst case, an attacker has the
probability of guessing the
password in one minute as 30 /
(9410
).
User (IPsec VPN) Single factor cryptographic software
(RSA or ECDSA Digital Signature)
Memorized secret (HMAC-SHA-1)
PSK: The minimum PSK length is 14
characters. Therefore, assuming a
minimum length password of 14
characters, the probability to guess
every character successfully is 1 /
(9414
).
Assuming 1 attempt per
microsecond, there can be
60,000,000 attempts in a one-
minute period. This means that in
the worst case, an attacker has the
probability of guessing the key in
one minute as 60,000,000 / (9414
).
Digital Signature: The public key
used for authentication can be
either ECDSA or RSA, yielding at
least 112 bits of strength, assuming
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
24
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
the smallest curve size P-224 or
modulus size 2048 bit. The chance
of a random authentication attempt
falsely succeeding is 1 / (2112
).
Assuming 1 attempt per
microsecond, there can be
60,000,000 attempts in a one-
minute period. This means that at
worst case an attacker has the
probability of breaking the
authentication in one minute as
60,000,000 / (2112
).
4.3 Services
All services listed in the table below can be accessed in approved mode and when in this mode exclusively use the
security functions listed in Cryptographic Algorithms.
Notes on the content of Table 8: Module Services:
 In the ‘Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs’ column:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
In the ‘Keys and/or SSPs’ column:
For a complete description of SSP referenced from the table, see section SSP Management.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
25
TABLE 8: MODULE SERVICES
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Initialize module Set up the module
using NGFW Initial
Configuration
Wizard. The setup
process includes
mandatory
firmware upgrade,
applying initial
configuration and
enabling the
Approved Mode of
operation.
DRBG Configuration File
Protection Key
Configuration File
Protection
Passphrase
Crypto officer G, R,W,E Log field
Started in FIPS 140
operating mode.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
26
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Shut down the
module
Terminate module
operations in
preparation for
powering off.
None Ephemeral SSPs7 Crypto officer Z Power LED
A shut down
module is indicated
by an unlit power
LED.
7 The designation of ‘Ephemeral SSPs’ encompasses any keys noted to be stored solely in the module’s SDRAM in Table 10: Summary of SSPs
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
27
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Zeroize keys The module will
overwrite all CSPs.
Zeroization of keys
can be invoked by
performing a
factory reset
exercising
commands. The
zeroization occurs
while the module is
still in the
Approved mode,
and the module is
restored to a
factory state.
DRBG
All CSPs Crypto officer E,Z Console output
System zeroization
complete following
reboot.
Factory default
settings restored.
Display versioning
information
Display the module
name and version
information.
None
None Crypto officer N/A Console output:
Forcepoint NGFW
version <version>
SMC monitoring
interface: version
displayed in SMC
monitoring
window.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
28
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Show status Report the status of
the module.
None
None Crypto officer N/A SMC monitoring
interface
SMC: Approved
mode displayed in
SMC monitoring
window
Perform self-tests Perform all power-
on self-tests.
See section Self-
Tests
Firmware Integrity
Check Public Key
Crypto officer R,E Console output:
FIPS power-up tests
succeeded.
Log field:
Cryptographic self-
tests succeeded
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
29
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Management
Connection Service
SMC establishes
secure
management
connections to the
module over TLS.
After initializing the
module and initial
contact with SMC,
all post-installation
configuration and
modification of
initial configuration
is secured using TLS
connections from
SMC.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, SHA, TLS KDF
TLS SSPs8
DRBG SSPs9
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field
Management; TLS:
Connection
established
8 The designation of ‘TLS SSPs’ encompasses the TLS Encryption Key, TLS Authentication Key, TLS Pre-Master Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS ECDSA Private Key, TLS
ECDSA Public Key, TLS ECDH Private Key, TLS ECDH Public Key, TLS Trusted Certificates
9 The designation of ‘DRBG SSPs’ encompasses the 256-bit DRBG Entropy Input, 256-bit DRBG Seed, 128-bit DRBG ‘V’ Value, and 256-bit DRBG ‘Key’ Value
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
30
Peer Connection
Service
Peer NGFW
modules establish
secure network
connection within a
cluster.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
RSA, SHA, TLS KDF
Cluster Protocol
Key, State
Synchronization
Key, HTTPS RSA
Private Key, HTTPS
RSA Public Key, IKE
Encryption Key, IKE
Authentication Key,
SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi, SK_pr, IPsec
Encryption Key,
IPsec
Authentication Key,
VPN RSA Private
Key, VPN RSA
Public Key, VPN
ECDSA Private Key,
VPN ECDSA Public
Key, VPN DH Public
Key, VPN ECDH
Public Key
TLS SSPs8
DRBG SSPs9
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field
dsd: FIPS: starting
in FIPS compliant
mode
ssd: FIPS: starting in
FIPS compliant
mode
sendlogd: FIPS:
starting in FIPS
compliant mode
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
31
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Key pair
management
service
SMC using the
management
communication
protocol requests
engine to generate
key pair and
certificate signing
request.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KBKDF, RSA,
SHA, TLS KDF
VPN RSA Private
Key, VPN RSA
Public Key, VPN
ECDSA Private Key,
VPN ECDSA Public
Key, HTTPS RSA
Private Key, HTTPS
RSA Public Key,
Configuration File
Encryption Key,
Configuration File
Authentication Key
TLS SSPs8
DRBG SSPs9
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field
Private key
<filename> has
been created
User management
service
SMC enters the
user password
hashes using
LDAPS.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, SHA, TLS KDF
User Password
TLS SSPs8
DRBG SSPs9
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field
slapd: FIPS: running
in FIPS compliant
mode
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
32
Modify and apply
configuration
Verify and apply
the configuration
changes to the
modules securely
including
configuration of
client protection
and server
protection
certificate authority
and TLS credentials.
AES, HMAC, KBKDF,
PBKDF
Configuration file
encryption key,
Configuration file
authentication key,
Key Encryption
Passphrase, Key
Encryption Key,
VPN Pre-Shared
Key, Client
Protection CA RSA
Private Key, Client
Protection IM CA
RSA Private Key,
Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Private Key, Client
Protection RSA
Private Key, Client
Protection ECDSA
Private Key, SNMP
Encryption Key,
SNMP
Authentication Key,
Cluster Protocol
Key
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field
Inspection: System
Policy-Loaded
Inspection: System
Policy-Applied
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
33
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
IPsec VPN Service VPN tunneling
clients establish
secure IPsec VPN
connections to the
module.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, IKE KDF,
KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-
FFC-SSC, RSA, SHA
User Password, IKE
Encryption Key, IKE
Authentication Key,
SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED,SK_d,SK_
pi,SK_pr, IPsec
Encryption Key,
IPsec
Authentication Key,
VPN Trusted
Certificates
VPN SSPs10
DRBG SSPs9
User G,R,W,E Log field
IPsec VPN: IPsec SA
initiator done
IPsec VPN: IPsec SA
responder done
10
The designation of ‘VPN SSPs’ encompasses the VPN RSA Private Key, VPN ECDSA Private Key, VPN Pre-Shared Key, VPN DH Private Key, VPN DH Shared Secret,
VPN ECDH Private Key, VPN ECDH Shared Secret, VPN Key Wrapping Key, VPN RSA Public Key, VPN ECDSA Public Key, VPN DH Public Key, VPN ECDH Public Key
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
34
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Mobile VPN Service VPN tunneling
clients establish
secure IPsec VPN
connections to the
module.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, IKE KDF,
KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-
FFC-SSC, RSA, SHA,
TLS KDF
User Password, IKE
Encryption Key, IKE
Authentication Key,
SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED,SK_d,SK_
pi,SK_pr, IPsec
Encryption Key,
IPsec
Authentication Key,
VPN Trusted
Certificates
TLS SSPs8
VPN SSPs10
DRBG SSPs9
User G,R,W,E Log field
IPsec VPN: Mobile
session created
IPsec VPN: Mobile
session closed
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
35
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
HTTPS User
Authentication
Service
End user’s
authentication to
the module via web
browser.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
RSA, SHA, TLS KDF
User Password
HTTPS SSPs11
DRBG SSPs9
User G,R,W,E Log field
New user has been
authorized
User has been
reauthorized
11
The designation of ‘HTTPS SSPs’ encompasses the HTTPS Encryption Key, HTTPS Authentication Key, HTTPS Pre-Master Secret, HTTPS Master Secret, HTTPS RSA
Private Key, HTTPS DH Private Key, HTTPS ECDH Private Key, HTTPS RSA Public Key, HTTPS DH Public Key, HTTPS ECDH Public Key
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
36
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
TLS Inspection
Service
Perform TLS
inspection on
HTTPS network
traffic.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
RSA, SHA, TLS KDF
Trusted Internet
Certificates
Inspection SSPs12
Client Protection
SSPs13
Server Protection
SSPs14
DRBG SSPs9
User G,R,W,E Log field
Inspection; TLS
Decrypted=true
12
The designation of ‘Inspection SSPs’ encompasses the Inspection DH Private Key, Inspection ECDH Private Key, Inspection Encryption Key, Inspection
Authentication Key, Inspection Pre-Master Secret, Inspection Master Secret, Inspection DH Public Key, Inspection ECDH Public Key
13
The designation of ‘Client Protection SSPs’ encompasses the Client Protection CA RSA Private Key, Client Protection IM CA RSA Private Key, Client Protection IM
CA ECDSA Private Key, Client Protection RSA Private Key, Client Protection ECDSA Private Key, Client Protection CA RSA Public Key, Client Protection IM CA RSA
Public Key, Client Protection IM CA ECDSA Public Key, Client Protection ECDSA Public Key, and Client Protection ECDSA Public Key, Client Protection RSA Public Key
14
The designation of ‘Server Protection SSPs’ encompasses the Server Protection RSA Private Key, Server Protection ECDSA Private Key, Server Protection RSA Public
Key, and Server Protection ECDSA Public Key
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
37
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
HTTPS Proxy
Service
Sidewinder proxy
used for outbound
traffic.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
PBKDF, RSA, SHA.
TLS KDF
Key Encryption Key,
Trusted Internet
Certificates
SSM SSPs15
DRBG SSPs9
User G,R,W,E Log field
SSM Proxy; TLS
Decrypted=true
Export Logs and
Monitoring Data
Service
Traffic logs and
monitoring data are
exported to Log
Server securely.
AES, DRBG, ECDSA,
HMAC, KAS-ECC-
SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
RSA, SHA, TLS KDF
TLS SSPs8
DRBG SSPs9
Crypto officer G,R,W,E Log field entries are
received by the log
server.
SMC Monitoring
data shown in the
SMC monitoring
window
15
The designation ‘SSM SSPs’ encompasses the SSM HTTPS DH Private Key, SSM HTTPS DH Public Key, SSM HTTPS ECDH Private Key, SSM HTTPS ECDH Public Key,
SSM HTTPS Encryption Key, SSM HTTPS Authentication Key, SSM HTTPS Pre-Master Secret, SSM HTTPS Master Secret, SSM Client Protection RSA Private Key, SSM
Client Protection ECDSA Private Key, SSM Client Protection RSA Public Key, and SSM Client Protection ECDSA Public Key
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint.
38
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Key and/or
SSPs
Roles
Access Rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
SNMP Monitoring
Service
SNMP manager
receives network
management
information and
traps.
AES, HMAC
SNMP Encryption
Key, SNMP
Authentication Key
User R,E Log field
smonitd: FIPS
starting in FIPS
compliant mode
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
39
4.4 Alternating Bypass Feature
The module operates in an alternating bypass mode according to the policies set. The enabling and disabling of the bypass capability is performed via ‘Modify and apply
configuration’ service allocated to the CO role. The module implements the following forms of alternating bypass:
VPN network traffic:
For policy-based VPN traffic, the module operates with bypass deactivated if the module action is set to IPsec VPN, where the module is operating to provide VPN service for
the specified source/destination addresses. The module will encrypt/decrypt network traffic according to the policy. The module operates with bypass activated if the module
action is set to allow in Access rules for network traffic, where the module is accepting/sending plaintext data for the specified source/destination addresses. For route-based
VPN traffic, the module operates with bypass deactivated when network traffic is routed to module interfaces that are designated as endpoints for a VPN tunnel and is sent into
the VPN tunnel. If Access rules allow the traffic, traffic is automatically sent through the tunnel to the endpoint. The module operates with bypass activated when network
traffic is routed to module interfaces that accept plaintext data. Based on the Access rule (allow/discard), the traffic is either forwarded to the endpoint or dropped. In both
cases, to activate the bypass feature, two independent actions must be taken by a CO. The CO must create the firewall policy allowing the bypass feature and apply the policy to
the module to enable it.
Firewall network traffic:
The default action for network traffic in firewall Access rules is discard. For firewall traffic, the module operates with bypass deactivated if the traffic from the endpoint is
sent/received using HTTPS, and the module action is set to allow. If traffic from the endpoint is passed directly to the module using HTTP, and the module action is set to allow,
then the module is operating with bypass activated. For incoming traffic, if the HTTPS option is selected, the module connections with the endpoint are encrypted using TLS
(bypass deactivated). If the HTTP option is selected, the module accepts connections in plaintext (bypass activated). For Outgoing traffic, If HTTPS is selected, web traffic will be
re-encrypted using TLS (bypass deactivated). If HTTP is configured, web traffic is sent in plaintext (bypass activated). Two independent actions must be taken by a CO. The CO
must create the firewall policy allowing bypass and apply to the module to enable it.
The rules in the policy that is currently applied to the module specify whether the module allows the encrypted or plaintext traffic. The status information for the bypass
activation and deactivation can be viewed via established management connection from SMC as indicated below:
Bypass – When bypass is activated, the Situation field in the Logs view shows “Connection Allowed” and the TLS decrypted field in the Connections view is blank.
IPSEC VPN/HTTPS – The Situation field in the Logs view indicates the respective operations performed by these services. For example, “IPsec-SA-Responder-Done”.
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
40
TLS inspection – For this service the Situation field in the Logs view shows “Connection_Allowed” and the TLS decrypted field in Connections view is "true".
4.5 Self-Initiated Cryptographic Output Capability
The Export Logs and Monitoring Data Service and the Peer Connection Service are self-initiated cryptographic output capabilities supported by the module. In both cases, these
services are triggered by the module itself without a specific request to perform the service.
The Export Logs and Monitoring Data Service is enabled on the first policy push from the SMC where the Log Server address is specified. This is configured through two
independent steps: adding the Log Server and activating the policy.
The Peer Connection Service is enabled when the module is joined to a cluster. While the module is in a cluster, this communication happens, and it stops when
module is removed from the cluster. This is also configured through two independent steps:
• Installing the new engine (module) and performing the initial configuration after adding the engine to the Firewall Cluster element’s properties and defining
the node-specific IP addresses of the new node.
• Refreshing the security policy of the Firewall Cluster.
The Crypto officer can make usage of the module’s Show status service to determine if the self-initiated cryptographic output capability is active by observing the ‘Status’ tab
on the SMC Web GUI:
Software/Firmware Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
41
FIGURE 7: SELF-INITIATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC OUTPUT CAPABILITY STATUS ON SMC WEB GUI
5.Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Firmware Integrity
The Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall’s firmware integrity is checked on startup as described in section Self-Tests. The module runs the self-test functions to check the
firmware integrity as well as the cryptographic algorithms used. Any failures during these tests will result in a module halt in which an error message is output, the module
reboots and data output is inhibited.
The images are stored as signed binaries using the “Firmware Integrity Check Public Key” which uses ECDSA with P-521 and SHA2-512. The operator can trigger an on-demand
check of the module firmware by rebooting the module.
6.Operational Environment
Per Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual, this section is not-applicable. The module supports a non-modifiable operating environment as defined by ISO/IEC
19790:2012 and meets the Level 2 Physical Security requirements.
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
42
7.Physical Security
7.1 Module Construction
The module is enclosed in a strong metal (steel) enclosure that provides tamper-evidence. Any tampering that might compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual
inspection of the physical integrity of a module. The Crypto Officer should perform a visual inspection of the module at regular intervals.
The module’s enclosure is opaque to resist visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components
of the device.
7.2 Tamper-Evident Labels
The following table depicts the number of tamper evident labels required for each hardware module:
Hardware Module Number of Tamper Evident Labels Required
NGFW 2201 2
NGFW 2205 3
NGFW 2210 4
NGFW 3400 14
Each shipment of the Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Kit includes 25 tamper labels. Additional tamper labels can be purchased in single boxes of 25 (SKU: ACFIPS3) from Forcepoint.
In addition to the strong metal enclosure, the module employs uniquely numbered tamper-evident labels. The following images depict the tested, Approved TEL configurations
for the modules:
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
43
FIGURE 8: 2205/2210 FRONT TEL PLACEMENTS
FIGURE 9: 2210 REAR TEL PLACEMENTS
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
44
FIGURE 10: 2201 FRONT TEL PLACEMENT
FIGURE 11: 2201/2205 REAR TEL PLACEMENT
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
45
FIGURE 12: 3400 SERIES FRONT TEL PLACEMENTS
FIGURE 13: 3400 SERIES RIGHT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
46
FIGURE 14: 3400 SERIES REAR TEL PLACEMENTS
FIGURE 15: 3400 SERIES LEFT SIDE TEL PLACEMENT
7.3 Internal Baffles
The module also employs internal baffles to deter visual observation of the internal components of the modules through vents. The following image depicts a vent that is
protected by a baffle:
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
47
FIGURE 16: DEPICTION OF VENT PROTECTED BY INTERNAL BAFFLE
Physical Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
48
7.4 Module Inspection
The following routine inspections are recommended.
TABLE 9: PHYSICAL SECURITY INSPECTION GUIDELINES
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test
Guidance Details
Physical inspection of
enclosure surfaces and
tamper-evident seals for
signs of tamper.
On receipt of module following transport.
At any point following any un-authorized access to the
environment hosting the module.
Following any extended periods of unattended storage for the
module.
<see below>.
Any attempts to remove the covers will result in tamper evidence.
Example (but not exhaustive) pictures of potential attempts to tamper a module are shown below:
Non-Invasive Security
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
49
If any evidence of tampering is observed on the module enclosures or tamper-evident seals, the modules shall be considered in a non-compliant state. Upon such discovery,
the CO shall immediately take the module out of operation and contact Forcepoint Customer Support.
8.Non-Invasive Security
N/A: Section 8, Non-Invasive Security is Not-Applicable as there are currently no requirements in SP 800-140F.
9.SSP Management
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameter
The following table lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) used to perform approved security functions supported by the cryptographic module.
The following notes should be observed when reading the table:
• When reading the ‘strength’ column, the listed security strength is calculated using methods in FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, ‘Strength of SSP Establishment Methods’.
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
50
• When reading the ‘Security Function and Cert Number’ column, this is the security function that will consume the SSP.
• When reading the ‘Use and Related Keys’ column, this will contain the other SSPs that are either established via the SSP, other SSPs that are used to establish the SSP,
or if it is a key pair the associated public or private component will be listed as well.
TABLE 10: SUMMARY OF SSPS
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
TLS Encryption
Key
256 bits AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Data encryption key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: TLS Master Secret
TLS
Authentication
Key
256 bits HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Authentication key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: TLS Master Secret
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established through
Elliptical Curve Diffie-
Hellman agreement
using NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Shared secret generated or
established for a TLS session.
Related SSPs: TLS ECDH Private
Key, TLS ECDH Public Key, TLS
Master Secret
TLS Master Secret 112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Value calculated during TLS
handshake.
Related SSPs: TLS Pre-Master
Secret, TLS Encryption Key, TLS
Authentication Key
TLS ECDSA Private
Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Obfuscated
(equivalent to
Plaintext) on
disk
Disk erasure Private key used in TLS
signature.
Related SSPs: TLS ECDSA Public
Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
51
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
TLS ECDH Private
Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: TLS Pre-Master
Secret, TLS ECDH Public Key
IKE Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv1 or
IKEv2 KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Data encryption key used in IKE
negotiations.
Related SSPs: SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d, SK_pi, SK_pr
IKE
Authentication
Key
128-256
bits
HMAC
Cert
#A2155
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv1 or
IKEv2 KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Authentication key used in IKE
negotiations.
Related SSPs: SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d, SK_pi, SK_pr
SKEYID, SKEYID_d 112-256
bits
KDF IKE
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv1
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Values calculated during IKE v1
negotiation.
Related SSPs: VPN DH Shared
Secret, VPN ECDH Shared Secret,
VPN Pre-Shared Key, IKE
Encryption Key, IKE
Authentication Key, IPsec
Encryption Key, IPsec
Authentication Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
52
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi, SK_pr
112-256
bits
KDF IKE
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Values calculated during IKEv2
negotiation.
Related SSPs: VPN DH Shared
Secret, VPN ECDH Shared Secret,
VPN Pre-Shared Key, IKE
Encryption Key, IKE
Authentication Key, IPsec
Encryption Key, IPsec
Authentication Key
IPsec Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2166
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv1 or
IKEv2 KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Data encryption key used in
IPsec negotiations.
Related SSPs: SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d, SK_pi, SK_pr
IPsec
Authentication
Key
128-256
bits
HMAC
Cert
#A2166
N/A Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Derived using IKEv1 or
IKEv2 KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Authentication key used in IPsec
negotiations.
Related SSPs: SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d, SK_pi, SK_pr
VPN RSA Private
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Generated Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Private authentication key used
in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN RSA Public
Key
VPN ECDSA
Private Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Generated Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Private authentication key used
in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN ECDSA Public
Key
VPN Pre-Shared
Key
112-256
bits
KDF IKE
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext or
encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Shared secret used in IKE.
Related SSPs: SKEYID, SKEYID_d,
SKEYSEED, SK_d, SK_pi, SK_pr
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
53
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
VPN DH Private
Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN DH Public
Key, VPN DH Shared Secret
VPN DH Shared
Secret
112-202
bits
KDF IKE
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established via KAS-
FFC-SSC Key
Agreement
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Diffie-Hellman shared secret in
IKE
Related SSPs: VPN DH Private
Key, VPN DH Public Key
VPN ECDH Private
Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN ECDH Public
Key, VPN ECDH Shared Secret
VPN ECDH Shared
Secret
112-256
bits
KDF IKE
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established via KAS-
ECC-SSC Key
Agreement
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman
shared secret in IKE
Related SSPs: VPN ECDH Private
Key, VPN ECDH Public Key
VPN Key
Wrapping Key
256 bits AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived via KBKDF Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off IKE and IPsec key and key
wrapping material
Related SSPs: Cluster Protocol
Key
HTTPS Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Data encryption key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS Master
Secret
HTTPS
Authentication
Key
256 bits HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Authentication key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS Master
Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
54
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HTTPS Pre-Master
Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established through
Diffie-Hellman
agreement or Elliptical
Curve Diffie-Hellman
agreement using NIST
SP 800-56Arev3
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session or
Power off
Shared secret generated or
established for a TLS session.
Related SSPs: HTTPS DH Private
Key, HTTPS DH Public Key,
HTTPS ECDH Private Key, HTTPS
ECDH Public Key, HTTPS Master
Secret
HTTPS Master
Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Value calculated during TLS
handshake.
Related SSPs: HTTPS Pre-master
Secret, HTTPS Encryption Key,
HTTPS Authentication Key
HTTPS RSA
Private Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Generated Obfuscated
(equivalent to
Plaintext) on
disk
Disk erasure Private authentication key used
in HTTPS user authentication.
Related SSPs: HTTPS RSA Public
Key
HTTPS DH Private
Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS DH Public
Key, HTTPS Pre-master Secret
HTTPS ECDH
Private Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS ECDH
Public Key, HTTPS Pre-master
Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
55
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Client Protection
CA RSA Private
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Private signature key used in TLS
inspection CA.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
CA RSA Public Key
Client Protection
IM CA RSA Private
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
IM CA RSA Public Key
Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Private Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA Public Key
Client Protection
RSA Private Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
RSA Public Key
Server Protection
RSA Private Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Server Protection
RSA Public Key
Client Protection
ECDSA Private
Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
ECDSA Public Key
Server Protection
ECDSA Private
Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Private authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Server Protection
ECDSA Public Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
56
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Inspection DH
Private Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection DH
Public Key, Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
Inspection ECDH
Private Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection ECDH
Public Key, Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
Inspection
Encryption Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Data encryption key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection Master
Secret
Inspection
Authentication
Key
256 bits HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Authentication key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection Master
Secret
Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established through
Diffie-Hellman
agreement or Elliptical
Curve Diffie-Hellman
agreement using NIST
SP 800-56Arev3
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Shared secret generated or
established for TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection ECDH
Private Key, Inspection ECDH
Public Key, Inspection DH
Private Key, Inspection DH
Public Key, Inspection Master
Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
57
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Inspection Master
Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Value calculated during TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection Pre-
Master Secret, Inspection
Encryption Key, Inspection
Authentication Key
SSM HTTPS DH
Private Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used
in HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key, SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Private Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Private ephemeral key
agreement key used
in HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS ECDH
Public Key, SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SSM HTTPS
Encryption Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Data encryption key used in
HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS Master
Secret
SSM HTTPS
Authentication
Key
256 bits HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Authentication key used in
HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS Master
Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
58
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Established through
Diffie-Hellman
agreement or Elliptical
Curve Diffie-Hellman
agreement using NIST
SP 800-56Arev3
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Shared secret generated or
established for
HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS DH
Private Key, SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key, SSM HTTPS ECDH
Private Key, SSM HTTPS ECDH
Public Key, SSM HTTPS Master
Secret
SSM HTTPS
Master Secret
112-256
bits
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived using TLS 1.2
KDF
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Value calculated during
HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret, SSM HTTPS
Encryption Key, SSM HTTPS
Authentication Key
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Private Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Used to identify the module in
the SSM Proxy Service
Related SSPs: SSM Client
Protection RSA Public Key
SSM Client
Protection ECDSA
Private Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Used to identify the module in
the SSM Proxy Service
Related SSPs: SSM Client
Protection ECDSA Public Key
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Public Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Used to identify the module in
the SSM Proxy Service
Related SSPs: SSM Client
Protection RSA Private Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
59
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
SSM Client
Protection ECDSA
Public Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Used to identify the module in
the SSM Proxy Service
Related SSPs: SSM Client
Protection ECDSA Private Key
SNMP Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext or
encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Data encryption key used in
SNMPv3.
Related SSPs: None
SNMP
Authentication
Key
256 bits HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext or
encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Authentication key used in
SNMPv3.
Related SSPs: None
TLS ECDSA Public
Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Public key used in TLS signature.
Related SSPs: TLS ECDSA Private
Key
TLS ECDH Public
Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically at
the expiration of
the session
or Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: TLS ECDH Private
Key, TLS Pre-Master Secret
VPN RSA Public
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of
TLS/IKE
protocols
Generated, Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Public authentication key used
in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN RSA Private
Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
60
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
VPN ECDSA Public
Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of
TLS/IKE
protocols
Generated, Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Public authentication key used
in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN ECDSA
Private Key
VPN DH Public
Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of IKE
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN DH Private
Key, VPN DH Shared Secret
VPN ECDH Public
Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of IKE
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in IKE.
Related SSPs: VPN ECDH Private
Key, VPN ECDH Shared Secret
HTTPS RSA Public
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocols
Generated, Input Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Public authentication key used
in HTTPS user authentication.
Related SSPs: HTTPS RSA Private
Key
HTTPS DH Public
Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS DH Private
Key, HTTPS Pre-master Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
61
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
HTTPS ECDH
Public Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS.
Related SSPs: HTTPS ECDH
Private Key, HTTPS Pre-master
Secret
Client Protection
CA RSA Public Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Public signature key used in TLS
inspection CA.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
CA RSA Private Key
Client Protection
IM CA RSA Public
Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
IM CA RSA Private Key
Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Public Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA Private Key
Client Protection
RSA Public Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.6
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
RSA Private Key
Server Protection
RSA Public Key
112-150
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Server Protection
RSA Private Key
Client Protection
ECDSA Public Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
FIPS 186-4,
Testing
Candidates
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Related SSPs: Client Protection
ECDSA Private Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
62
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Server Protection
ECDSA Public Key
112-256
bits
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Public authentication key used
in TLS inspection.
Inspection DH
Public Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection DH
Private Key, Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
Inspection ECDH
Public Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used in TLS
inspection.
Related SSPs: Inspection ECDH
Private Key, Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key
112-202
bits
KAS-FFC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used
in HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS DH
Private Key, SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Public Key
112-256
bits
KAS-ECC-
SSC Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-
56Ar3,
Testing
Candidates
Input and
Output in
Plaintext as
part of TLS
protocol
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use or
Power off
Public ephemeral key
agreement key used
in HTTPS inspection.
Related SSPs: SSM HTTPS ECDH
Private Key, SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
63
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
TLS Trusted
Certificates
112-256
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Disk erasure Trusted certificates for use in
TLS
Related SSPs: None
Trusted Internet
Certificates
112-256
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Disk erasure Trusted certificates for
authenticating internet servers
Related SSPs: None
VPN Trusted
Certificates
112-256
bits
RSA Cert.
#A2155
ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Trusted certificates for use in
VPNs
Related SSPs: None
256-bit DRBG
Entropy Input
256 DRBG
Cert.
#A2155
ENT (NP) N/A Generated Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Entropy input for 256-bit DRBG
Related SSPs: 128-bit DRBG ‘V’
Value, 256-bit DRBG ‘Key’ Value,
256-bit DRBG Seed
128-bit DRBG ‘V’
Value
128 DRBG
Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-90A N/A Derived via SP 800-
90A mechanisms
based on entropy
input
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
V (128 bits) for 256-bit DRBG
Related SSPs: 256-bit DRBG
Entropy Input, 256-bit DRBG
Seed
256-bit DRBG
‘Key’ Value
256 DRBG
Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-90A N/A Derived via SP 800-
90A mechanisms
based on entropy
input
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Key (256 bits) for 256-bit DRBG
Related SSPs: 256-bit DRBG
Entropy Input, 256-bit DRBG
Seed
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
64
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
256-bit DRBG
Seed
256 DRBG
Cert.
#A2155
SP 800-90A N/A Derived via SP 800-
90A mechanisms
based on entropy
input
Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Seeding material for the DRBG
Related SSPs: 256-bit DRBG
Entropy Input, 128-bit DRBG ‘V’
Value, 256-bit DRBG ‘Key’ Value
Cluster Protocol
Key
256 HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext or
encrypted on
disk
Disk erasure Used for authentication within
the cluster protocol.
Related SSPs: None
State
Synchronization
Key
128 AES Cert.
#A2155
HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
CKG using
unmodified
DRBG output
Input and
Output
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Generated, Input Plaintext in
SDRAM
Power off Used for encryption and
authentication in the state
synchronization protocol.
Related SSPs: None
Configuration File
Protection Key
256 KBKDF
Cert.
#A2209
CKG using
unmodified
DRBG output
N/A Generated Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Used to derive the configuration
file encryption and
authentication keys.
Related SSPs: Configuration File
Encryption Key, Configuration
File Authentication Key
Configuration File
Protection
Passphrase
256 PBKDF
Cert.
#A2209
CKG using
unmodified
DRBG output
N/A Generated Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Used to derive the key pair
obfuscation and integrity
protection keys.
Related SSPs: None
Configuration File
Encryption Key
256 AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived via KBKDF Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Used to encrypt configuration
files on disk.
Related SSPs: Configuration file
protection Key
SSP Management
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
65
Key / SSP Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function
and Cert
Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use and Related Keys
Configuration File
Authentication
Key
256 HMAC
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived via KBKDF Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Used to authenticate
configuration files on disk.
Related SSPs: Configuration file
protection Key
User Password >65 bits N/A N/A Input hashed
(SHA2-512)
and salted
Input SHA2-512
digest on disk
Disk erasure Identify users in HTTPS
authentication and Mobile VPN.
Related SSPs: None
Key Encryption
Passphrase
256 PBKDF
Cert.
#A2209
N/A Input
Encrypted via
TLS (KTS)
Input Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Derive the key encryption key
used to protect private keys
stored on disk.
Related SSPs: Key Encryption
Key
Key Encryption
Key
128 AES Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Derived via PBKDF Plaintext in
SDRAM
Automatically
after use
or Power off
Used to encrypt/decrypt private
keys stored on disk.
Related SSPs: Key Encryption
Passphrase
Firmware
Integrity Check
Public Key 16
256 ECDSA
Cert.
#A2155
N/A N/A Pre-loaded by the
manufacturer
Plaintext on
disk
Disk erasure Used for firmware integrity
check.
Related SSPs: None
16 The key “Firmware Integrity Check Public Key” is not considered to be an SSP, but otherwise included for completeness.
Self-Tests
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
66
9.2 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
The module includes a non-deterministic Random Number Generator (RNG) within the module boundary.
The non-deterministic RNG is used exclusively to feed an approved SHA-3 conditioning function where in-turn the
output of the conditioning function is used to seed the DRBG.
The Non-Deterministic RNG complies with SP 800-90B and has been certified using FIPS 140-3 IG D.J with guidance
set out in FIPS 140-3 IG D.K.
TABLE 11: NON-DETERMINISTIC RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION SPECIFICATION
10. Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Tests
The module performs the pre-operational self-tests upon power-up to confirm the firmware integrity, and to check
the continued correct operation of the random number generator and each of the implemented cryptographic
algorithms used in support of the integrity checks.
While the module is running these self-tests, all data output interfaces are disabled until the successful completion of
the self-tests. If one of the pre-operational self-tests fails or a conditional self-test fails, the module enters an error
state. An error message is output on the status output interface specifying the library within the module that failed
the self-test. In this state, all data output via the module’s data output interfaces is inhibited. The module proceeds to
reboot and reruns all self-tests. Successful completion of the self-tests will clear the error state, and the module will
return to the Approved mode of operation. For any consecutive failure of the self-tests during restart, the appliance
continues to restart. If the problem persists, CO intervention is required to either perform a restore to factory
defaults settings and reinstall, or power-off and contact Forcepoint Customer Support.
Entropy sources Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
CPU timing jitter Full-entropy output SP 800-90B compliant Non-Deterministic RNG using a software-
based noise source internal to the module boundary. Output from
the noise source is fed through an approved conditioning function
based on SHA3-256.
Raw noise is generated based on non-deterministic jitter inherent in
CPUs from factors such as CPU instruction pipelines, CPU clock
cycles being different from memory bus clock speeds, CPU
frequency scaling, CPU power management, instruction and data
cache states, CPU topology, different CPU cache technologies, CPU
branch prediction, hardware interrupts, etc.
The module achieves full entropy from the output of the
conditioning function where every 512-bits used to seed the DRBG
includes 512-bits of entropy.
All outputs from the noise source are subjected to health testing
ahead of being fed to the conditioning function.
Self-Tests
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
67
TABLE 12: PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS
Test Operations Performed Indicator
Root Filesystem Integrity Test (ECDSA with P-521
and SHA2-512)
Verify Error output and module
reboot.
Pre-operational Bypass Test Bypass Error output and module
reboot.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module automatically performs conditional self-tests based on the module operation. These self-tests do not
require operator input to initiate. Implemented conditional tests are in one of the following forms:
• Known Answer Test (KAT)
• Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT)
• Health tests
• Bypass tests
All KATs alongside health testing of the noise source are performed immediately following the pre-operational self-
tests at module power-on
TABLE 13: CONDITIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM SELF-TESTS
Test
Cryptographic Mechanism
Tested
Location
When
Performed
Operations
Performed
Indicator
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Cryptographic Module
KAT test for
AES encryption
and decryption
AES-CBC-128 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
AES GCM
encryption and
decryption
AES-GCM-128 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
Health test for
AES-CTR-256
DRBG
AES-256 CTR_DRBG Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Instantiate, Reseed,
Generate
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
AES-CTR-256
DRBG
AES-256 CTR_DRBG Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Prediction
Resistance: No
Derivation Function
Enabled: Yes
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for Diffie-
Hellman (KAS-
FFC-SSC)
KAS-FFC-SSC (2048, 224) Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Shared Secret
Computation
Error output and
module reboot.
Self-Tests
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
68
Test
Cryptographic Mechanism
Tested
Location
When
Performed
Operations
Performed
Indicator
KAT for EC
Diffie-Hellman
(KAS-ECC-SSC)
KAS-ECC-SSC w/ P-224 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Shared Secret
Computation
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for ECDSA
verification
ECDSA P-224 w/ SHA2-224 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Verify Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for ECDSA
signing
ECDSA P-224 w/ SHA2-224 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Sign Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for HMAC HMAC-SHA2-256 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
MAC Generation,
Verification
Error output and
module reboot.
Configuration
Bypass Test
HMAC Cert.
#A2155
New Policy
Files Received
MAC Verification Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for RSA
verification
RSA 2048 w/ SHA2-256
PKCS#1v1.5
Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Verify Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for RSA
signing
RSA 2048 w/ SHA2-256
PKCS#1v1.5
Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Sign Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
SHA
SHA-1, SHA2-512 Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Hashing Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for IKEv1
and IKEv2 KDF
IKEv1 and IKEv2 KDFs Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Key Derivation Error output and
module reboot.
KAT for
TLSv1.2 KDF
TLSv1.2 KDF Cert.
#A2155
Upon Library
Load
Key Derivation Error output and
module reboot.
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Library
KAT test for
AES encryption
and decryption
AES-CCM-192
AES-CCM can only be used for
self-testing purposes.
Cert.
#A2209
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
AES encryption
end decryption
AES-ECB-128 Cert.
#A2209
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
PBKDF2
PBKDF w/ SHA2-256 Cert.
#A2209
Upon Library
Load
Key Derivation Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
KBKDF
KBKDF w/ HMAC-SHA2-256 Cert.
#A2209
Upon Library
Load
Key Derivation Error output and
module reboot.
Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Kernel Module
KAT test for
AES encryption
and decryption
AES-CBC, CFB, ECB, OFB
128, 192, 256
Cert.
#A2166
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
Self-Tests
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
69
Test
Cryptographic Mechanism
Tested
Location
When
Performed
Operations
Performed
Indicator
KAT test for
AES-GCM
authenticated
encryption and
decryption
AES-GCM-128 Cert.
#A2166
Upon Library
Load
Encryption,
Decryption
Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
SHA
SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512 Cert.
#A2166
Upon Library
Load
Hashing Error output and
module reboot.
KAT test for
HMAC
HMAC-SHA-1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
Cert.
#A2166
Upon Library
Load
MAC Generation,
Verification
Error output and
module reboot.
Forcepoint NGFW Entropy Library
KAT for SHA3-
256
SHA3-256 Cert.
#A2167
Upon Library
Load
Hashing Error output and
module reboot.
Repetition
Count Test
ENT (NP) N/A At Startup and
Upon Entropy
Generation
Comparison of
Subsequent Entropy
Samples
Error output and
module reboot.
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
ENT (NP) N/A At Startup and
Upon Entropy
Generation
Comparison of
Samples within
Window
Error output and
module reboot.
TABLE 14: CONDITIONAL PAIR-WISE CONSISTENCY TESTS
Test
Cryptographic
Mechanism Tested
Location
When
Performed
Operations
Performed
Indicator
PCT for RSA key pairs
created for digital
signature purposes
RSA w/ PKCS#1v1.5 Cert.
#A2155
Upon RSA Key
Generation
Sign, Verify Error output
and module
reboot.
PCT for ECDSA key pairs
created for digital
signature purposes
ECDSA Cert.
#A2155
Upon ECDSA Key
Generation
Sign, Verify Error output
and module
reboot.
PCT for DH key pairs
created for key agreement
purposes
KAS-FFC-SSC Cert.
#A2155
Upon DH Key
Generation
Public Key
Recalculation
Error output
and module
reboot.
PCT for ECDH key pairs
created for key agreement
purposes
KAS-ECC-FFC Cert.
#A2155
Upon ECDH Key
Generation
Public Key
Recalculation
Error output
and module
reboot.
Life-Cycle Assurance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
70
11. Life-Cycle Assurance
Operating the module without following the guidance below will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the
scope of this Security Policy.
11.1 Performing Secure Initialization of the Module
11.1.1 Hardware Setup
Upon receiving the NGFW hardware, the CO shall check that the appliance is not damaged and that all required parts
and instructions are included. If the Network Components are not installed in the appliance, the CO must insert them
by performing the following:
Note: Read all safety instructions before installing the Network Components. Do not install any Network Components
while the appliance is on. Fasten a grounding strip from the wrist to the appliance.
1. Locate the Network Component slots on the front of the appliance.
2. If the appliance was shipped with the Network Component slot(s) covered by a plate, remove the
thumbscrew and plate from the appliance. Store the thumbscrew and plate in case the Network Component
is eventually removed.
3. Push the Network Component into the slot. The Network Component is properly installed when the front of
the Network Component is flush with the front of the appliance.
The NGFW uses tamper-evident seals to protect against unauthorized access to the internal components of the
chassis through removable covers. The CO shall apply labels to the module as depicted in section Tamper-Evident
Labels.
11.1.2 Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation
The administration of the NGFW modules is done through the SMC, which provides centralized administrative
functionalities for all the managed NGFW modules. The SMC can be shipped preinstalled on its own Forcepoint
hardware appliance, installed as a virtual machine on a virtualization platform, or installed on a third-party Windows
or Linux platform. The SMC can be accessed by an administrator via a Java-based Management Client running on the
administrator’s workstation.
Using the Management Client, create a configuration for the NGFW Engine in the Approved Mode of Operation.
1. To use HTTPS User Authentication and TLS Inspection for Client Protection or Server Protection, create a TLS
Cryptography Suite Set element. Select only the Approved and Allowed algorithms and TLS cipher suites. The
Management Connection Service, Peer Connection Service, Key Pair Management Service, and User
Management Service utilize the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suite. Refer to
Table 3: Approved Algorithms above for a list of algorithms implemented. For more information, see the
“Create TLS Cryptographic Suite Set elements” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• In accordance with the NGFW Product user guide, the following TLS Cipher Suites are utilized within
the module:
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Life-Cycle Assurance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
71
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
2. To use certificates signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) that is not one of the default Trusted Certificate
Authority elements, create a Trusted Certificate Authority element. Import only a certificate signed using a
Approved signature algorithm. For more information, see the “Create Trusted Certificate Authority elements”
topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
3. To use HTTPS User Authentication, create a TLS Profile element. Select the TLS Cryptography Suite Set
element, the Trusted Certificate Authority, and the minimum TLS version. For more information, see the
“Create TLS Profile elements” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
4. Create the NGFW Engine Element by defining the properties in the Engine Editor.
• Browse to Advanced Settings, then select FIPS-Compatible Operating Mode.
• Select “FIPS-Disable Remote Engine Upgrades” for the NGFW to prevent firmware load attempts
from the SMC.
• To use HTTPS User Authentication, browse to Add-Ons | User Authentication, then enable HTTPS
and select the TLS Profile element. Use 2048 or greater as the Key Length when creating a certificate
signing request in HTTPS Settings. For more information, see the “Enable browser-based user
authentication” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• To use TLS Inspection for Client Protection, create a Client Protection Certificate Authority element
and import the private key and the certificate used to issue certificates in TLS Inspection. Use only
the Approved algorithms and key size for the key pair and certificate. In the Engine Editor, browse to
Add-Ons | TLS Inspection, then select the Cryptography Suite Set. For more information, see the
“Configure TLS inspection for client protection” and “Activating TLS inspection” topics in the “Setting
up TLS Inspection” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• To use TLS Inspection for Server Protection, browse to Add-Ons | TLS Inspection, then select the
Cryptography Suite Set. For more information, see the “Activating TLS inspection” topic in the
“Setting up TLS Inspection” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• When using TLS Inspection or Sidewinder HTTPS proxy, create a Firewall Policy that has an Access
rule that allows the TLS connection and create an Inspection Policy that has an Inspection rule that
terminates connections that match the TLS_Certificate-Verify-Failed Situation. On the Inspection tab
of the Firewall Policy, you must select the Inspection Policy that you created.
• To use Sidewinder HTTP and HTTPS proxies, browse to Add-Ons | Sidewinder Proxy, click Advanced,
then set the value of the tls_cipher_override property to
TLSv1.2+ECDHE+AES!AESCCM:TLSv1.2+DHE+AES!AESCCM!DSS on the HTTP tab. For more
information, see the “Advanced settings for Sidewinder Proxies” topic in the “Sidewinder Proxies”
chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
Life-Cycle Assurance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
72
• When using IPsec, disable Automated RSA Certificate Management. Browse to VPN | Certificates,
then deselect Automated RSA Certificate Management.
• To use IPsec, right-click the Gateway element, then select Tools | Generate Certificate to create a
certificate signing request. Select RSA with 2048 or greater key size, or ECDSA as the Public Key
Algorithm. For more information, see the “Create a VPN certificate or certificate request for a VPN
Gateway element” topic in the “Managing VPN certificates” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW
Product Guide.
5. To use an IPsec VPN, create a VPN Profile element. Use only the Approved and Allowed algorithms and key
sizes in the profile. Refer to Table 3: Approved Algorithms above for a list of algorithms implemented.
Additionally, in the profile element, the IPsec Tunnel Lifetime should be set to less than 232
bytes. Select the
VPN Profile element. For more information, see the “Create VPN Profile elements” topic in the “VPNs in
Forcepoint NGFW” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
6. Create Access Rules to configure the Alternating Bypass Feature.
7. Save the initial configuration for the NGFW Engine. Make a note of the one-time password, which is required
for initial contact with the SMC.
See section “Setting up the Approved Configuration” for setting up the device configurations.
11.1.3 Downloading and Upgrading to an Approved Firmware Version
The NGFW appliances are delivered in an operational state with the most recent firmware preinstalled. The NGFW
firmware must be upgraded to the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware version to be placed in the Approved mode
of operation.
Note: The upgrade to the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware version is necessary even if the same version was
installed previously. This is required because the file system checksum is stored during the upgrade process. A
method to update the firmware image with a SHA2-512 checksum signed with ECDSA P-521 is provided. Prior to
installing the new image, its associated checksum is checked. If the signature check fails, the new firmware is ignored,
and the current firmware remains loaded. If the signature check passes, the new image will be installed and executed
after the appliance is restarted. Any firmware loaded into the module other than version 6.10.3.26158 is out of the
scope of this validation and will mean that the module is not operating in the approved mode of operation.
A FIPS 140-3 Validated NGFW firmware version is downloaded as follows:
1. Login to the Forcepoint Support https://support.forcepoint.com/Login
2. Proceed to the Forcepoint NGFW downloads section.
3. Download the firmware version 6.10.3.26158 installation file (sg_engine_6.10.3.26158_x86-64-small.zip).
4. Verify the SHA checksum.
Note: The correct checksums are shown on the download page and can also be found in the release notes
After downloading the firmware, the operator can upgrade to a FIPS 140-3 validated firmware version:
1. Save the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware version upgrade .zip file to the root directory of a USB drive.
Note – The firmware upgrade zip file must be in the root directory of the media.
2. Connect to the appliance using a monitor and keyboard.
3. Power on the appliance and start the NGFW Configuration Wizard.
Life-Cycle Assurance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
73
4. Select the Firewall/VPN option.
5. Select Upgrade. The Select Source Media dialog opens.
6. Select the appropriate media type and select OK. The firmware update signature is verified.
7. Select OK. The upgrade starts.
8. Select “Set kernel in FIPS mode” after restart. Select OK.
9. The NGFW appliance restarts and displays the upgraded version.
10. Verify the NGFW firmware version to ensure that the FIPS validated NGFW firmware version is loaded.
11.1.4 Setting up the Approved Configuration
To configure the NGFW Engine:
1. Start the NGFW Configuration Wizard as instructed in the Configuring the Engine in the Engine Configuration
Wizard section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
2. Configure the network interfaces according to your environment as instructed in the Configuring the
Network Interfaces section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
a. Configure the operating system settings according to the "Configuring the Operating System
Settings" section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
b. Select both:
- "Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode" (This automatically disables the SSH daemon
and root password options in the Engine Configuration Wizard).
- "FIPS 140-3 compatible mode" (This setting ensures the module uses only FIPS 140-3
approved algorithms and security functions).
3. Contact the Management Server as instructed in the Contacting the Management Server section of the
NGFW Installation Guide. Enter node IP address manually is selected by default and other IP address options
are disabled when the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode” setting is enabled. The engine restarts.
4. To verify the “FIPS 140-3 compatible operating mode” setting is activated:
a. Verify that the following messages are displayed on the console when the engine restarts:
- FIPS: rootfs integrity check OK (Displayed after the root file system integrity test has been
executed successfully)
- FIPS power-up tests succeeded (Displayed after the FIPS 140 power-up tests have been
executed successfully)
b. Continue as instructed in the “After Successful Management Server Contact” section of the NGFW
Installation Guide.
Note: If the engine does not enter the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode” even though it is configured to
do so, or if the power-up tests fail (a power-up test error message is displayed or the success message is not
displayed), the appliance must be reset to factory settings and reinstalled.
Note: The “FIPS 140-3 compatible operating mode” and “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode” settings must
be enabled during the initial configuration of the appliance.
Life-Cycle Assurance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
74
11.1.5 Resetting the Module to Factory Settings (Sanitization)
Resetting the appliance to factory settings is not part of the normal installation procedure. There is no need to reset
the appliance to factory settings before starting to use it for the first time. These instructions can be used to reset the
appliance to factory settings when necessary, such as when initial configuration has been completed without enabling
the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode”, during use, or when the appliance is being removed from use.
To reset the appliance to factory settings:
1. Reboot the appliance and select System restore options from the boot menu. NGFW System Restore starts.
2. Enter 2 for Advanced data removal options.
3. Enter one of the following options:
• 1 for 1 pass overwrite
• 8 for a Custom number of overwrite passes
If you selected Custom, enter the number of overwrite passes. A larger number of overwrites is more secure, but it
may take a considerable amount of time depending on the appliance storage capacity
Mitigation of Other Attacks
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
75
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 2
requirements for this validation.
13. Guidance
13.1 Identifying the Module Version
1. At the Home screen of the SMC that is being used to manage the module, click on the firewall.
2. On the right-hand column, under “Info”, the firewall version (and update package) will be in the “General”
tab
FIGURE 17: DEPICTION OF THE MODULE VERSION DISPLAYED IN THE SMC GUI
13.2 Non-Approved Mode of Operation
When configured according to the guidance in this Security Policy, the modules do not support a Non-Approved mode
of operation.
13.3 Additional Guidance and Usage Policies
The notes below provide additional guidance and policies that must be followed by module operators:
• Use of AES GCM: The module generates AES GCM IV in accordance with SP 800-38D in compliance with
IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation in the TLS context follows RFC 5288 and SP 800-52rev2 section
3.3.1 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2. The GCM IV generation in the IPsec context
follows RFC 4106 and RFC 7296 and shall only be used with IPsec and IKEv2 to be compliant with IG C.H.
The implementation of the 64-bit nonce_explicit part of the IV is deterministic and management logic is
inside the module. By the design of the module and by virtue of the data size limit (see above section
Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation) set, the maximum number possible value
of 2^64 for nonce_explicit part of the IV is never reached. In case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be re-distributed.
• Use of PBKDF: The module implements key derivation through the SP 800-132 PBKDF2. The module
supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, whereby the MK is used directly as the DPK. Keys
derived from passwords or passphrases are only used for data at rest. The length of the salt should be at
least 128 bits and the length of the password or passphrase should be at least 10 characters, which
provides the probability of guessing this password or passphrase to be (1/94)10
. The caller shall observe
all requirements and should consider all recommendations specified in SP 800-132 with respect to the
strength of the generated key, including the quality of the password and the quality of the salt. Keys
derived from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used in storage applications. For
encrypted private key entry as part of the configuration, the PBKDF2 iteration count must be between
Guidance
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
76
1000 and 10000 to allow the recommended minimum in SP 800-132 while keeping performance the
impact small, and the passphrase must be at least 14 characters.
• Use of insecure protocols – The following insecure protocols are disabled by default: SSH, Console
Access, and WIFI Interfaces. The root password option is automatically disabled. To maintain compliance
with FIPS requirements, these protocols and services shall not be enabled.
• Network Component replacement – As noted earlier, the NGFW appliances are modular by design. The
Network Components are field-replaceable. Operators in the field can order the desired Network
Components directly from Forcepoint Customer Support using the appropriate part numbers. The CO
must install the Network Components as described in section Hardware Setup above.
Because these Network Components play a role in maintaining the module’s physical security, they are
secured in place using tamper-evident labels. Thus, replacing a Network Component necessitates the
replacement of any tamper-evident label affixed to the Network Component as well. When a CO orders
Network Components, they must also order a Forcepoint NGFW FIPS kit with the Stock Keeping Unit
ACFIPS3. The FIPS kit is delivered with the number of tamper-evident labels required for proper
installation (see details per NGFW appliance in section Tamper-Evident Labels). Module operators must
follow the guidance below to ensure continued compliance with FIPS requirements:
1. Zeroize all keys and CSPs on the module.
2. Remove power from the module.
3. Remove the Network Component to be replaced.
4. Remove any remaining bits of the now-broken tamper-evident label from the module chassis.
5. Install the replacement Network Component in the open slot.
6. Using a 99% isopropyl alcohol solution, clean the chassis surface in the area where the
replacement tamper-evident label will be placed.
7. Affix the replacement tamper-evident label to the chassis (refer to section Tamper-Evident Labels
for placements). Allow 24 hours for the seal to fully cure.
8. Apply power to the module
13.4 External Guidance Documents
Forcepoint NGFW Installation Guide:
https://help.forcepoint.com/docs/ngfw/v610/install/ngfw_6100_ig_a_en-us.pdf
Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide:
https://help.forcepoint.com/docs/ngfw/v610/mgmt/ngfw_6100_pg_a_en-us.pdf
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
77
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
78
Term Definition
ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission
I/O Input/Output
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation Function
KDF Key Derivation Function
KTS Key Transport Scheme
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
Mbps Megabits per second
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
N/A Not Applicable
OFB Output Feedback
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCT Pair-Wise Consistency Test
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POST Power-on Self-Test
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC Shared Secret Computation
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall - LEVEL 2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. B, Copyright © 2024 Forcepoint
79
Term Definition
USB Universal Serial Bus