FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 1 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
STMICROELECTRONICS
Trusted Platform Module ST33TPHF20SPI
ST33HTPH2E28AAF0 / ST33HTPH2E32AAF0 /
ST33HTPH2E28AAF1 / ST33HTPH2E32AAF1
ST33HTPH2028AAF3 / ST33HTPH2032AAF3
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Level 2
Firmware revision: 49.00 / 4A.00
HW version: ST33HTPH revision A
Date: 2017/07/19
Document Version: 01-11
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 2 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Table of Contents
1 MODULE DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 DEFINITION..................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 MODULE IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................................. 3
1.2.1 AAF0 / AAF1......................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.2 AAF3..................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 PINOUT DESCRIPTION...................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 BLOCK DIAGRAMS ........................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.1 HW block diagram ................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.2 FW block diagrams............................................................................................................... 9
1.5 SECURITY LEVELS......................................................................................................................... 11
1.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................ 12
1.7 MODES OF OPERATION ................................................................................................................. 13
1.7.1 Security module configuration ............................................................................................ 13
1.7.2 Approved modes of operation ............................................................................................ 14
1.7.3 FIPS mode recommendations ............................................................................................ 14
1.7.4 Limited and error modes..................................................................................................... 15
1.8 PORTS AND INTERFACES ............................................................................................................... 16
2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ...................................................................... 17
2.1 ROLES.......................................................................................................................................... 17
2.2 AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................................... 17
2.2.1 Description.......................................................................................................................... 17
2.2.2 Authorization strength......................................................................................................... 18
2.2.3 Authorization protection...................................................................................................... 18
3 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ........................................................................................................... 19
3.1 LIST OF KEYS AND CSPS .............................................................................................................. 19
3.2 SERVICES..................................................................................................................................... 24
3.2.1 Services list......................................................................................................................... 24
3.2.2 Authorization....................................................................................................................... 30
3.3 KEY MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................................ 32
3.3.1 Key entry and output .......................................................................................................... 32
3.3.2 Key transport ...................................................................................................................... 33
4 SELF-TESTS...................................................................................................................................... 34
4.1 POWER-UP TESTS LIST .................................................................................................................. 34
4.2 ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY SELF-TESTS LIST ............................................................................. 35
4.3 CONDITIONAL TESTS LIST .............................................................................................................. 35
4.4 VERIFICATION ............................................................................................................................... 36
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY........................................................................................................ 37
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................................................... 38
7 MITIGATIONS OF OTHER ATTACKS .............................................................................................. 39
7.1 INTERNAL TAMPER DETECTION...................................................................................................... 39
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION....................................................................................................... 39
8 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................... 40
9 ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................... 42
IMPORTANT NOTICE – PLEASE READ CAREFULLY........................................................................... 43
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 3 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1 MODULE DESCRIPTION
1.1 Definition
The ST33TPHF20SPI Trusted Platform Module is a fully integrated security module designed
to be integrated into personal computers and other embedded systems. The security module
is used primarily for cryptographic key generation, key storage and key management as well
as generation and secure storage for digital certificates.
The TPM is a single chip cryptographic HW module as defined in [FIPS 140-2]. The single
silicon chip is encapsulated in a hard, opaque, production grade integrated circuit (IC)
package.
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the perimeter of the IC package. The security
module supports SPI interface compliant with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
specification for PC Client [PTP 0.43]. The HW and FW cryptographic boundaries are indicated
in §1.4 of the current document.
The security module implements version 2.0 of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
specification for Trusted Platform Modules (TPM).
1.2 Module identification
The hardware and firmware versions covered by the FIPS evaluation are identified as follow:
 Hardware version: ST33HTPH revision A
 Firmware version: 49.00 / 4A.00
FW version can be retrieved via response to the command TPM2_GetCapability with property
set to TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1.
The cryptographic services are provided by the cryptographic library “NesLib 5.1 for ST33”.
The product is manufactured in two packages:
 TSSOP28
 TSSOP 28-pin
 4.4 x 9.7 mm
 VQFN32
 Very thin pitch Quad pack no-lead 32-pin
 5 x 5 mm
The security module is available in the following configurations:
1.2.1 AAF0 / AAF1
These configurations of the security module implement both version 1.2 and version 2.0 of the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for Trusted Platform Modules (TPM). Versions
are exclusive and security module manufactured will operate in a default mode (TPM1.2 or
TPM2.0) depending on the configuration.
The current FIPS 140-2 level2 security policy applies to these security module configurations
when the module is irreversibly locked in TPM2.0 mode (cf. §1.7.3 for mode lock
recommendations). As a consequence the TPM FW version 1.2 is excluded from the security
requirements of FIPS 140-2.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 4 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Table 1: Security module configurations
Module configuration
Product name /
HW version
ST33TPHF2ESPI/
ST33HTPH revision A
Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 TSSOP28 VQFN32
Part number ST33HTPH2E28
AAF0
ST33HTPH2E32
AAF0
ST33HTPH2E28
AAF1
ST33HTPH2E32
AAF1
Default mode TPM1.2 TPM2.0
Marking P68HAAF0 P68HAAF1
FW version 49.00
Figure 1: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking
Figure 2: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking
P68HAAF0 corresponds to the module configured by default in TPM1.2 execution mode. This
module is listed as it can be configured in TPM2.0 execution mode as described in §1.7.
P68HAAF1 corresponds to the module configured by default in TPM2.0 execution mode.
1.2.2 AAF3
These configurations of the security module implement only the version 2.0 of the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) specification for Trusted Platform Modules (TPM). The current FIPS
140-2 level2 security policy always applies (no mode lock requested) to these security module
configurations.
Table 2: Security module configurations
Module configuration
Product name / HW
version
ST33TPHF20SPI/
ST33HTPH revision A
Package TSSOP28 VQFN32
Part number ST33HTPH2028AAF3 ST33HTPH2032AAF3
Marking P68HAAF3
FW version 4A.00
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 5 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Figure 3: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking
Figure 4: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 6 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.3 Pinout description
The pin layouts for the ST33TPHF20SPI are shown in Figure 5 and in Figure 6: VQFN32
Pinout Diagram.
Figure 5: TSSOP28 Pinout Diagram
Figure 6: VQFN32 Pinout Diagram
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 7 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Next table gives a description of the products pins.
Table 3: ST33TPHF20 Pin definition (SPI configuration)
Signal Type Description
VPS Input
Power supply. This pin must be connected to 1.8V or 3.3V DC
power rail supplied by the motherboard.
GND Input GND has to be connected to the main motherboard ground.
SPI_RST Input SPI Reset used to re-initialize the device
MISO Output SPI Master Input, Slave Output (output from slave)
MOSI Input SPI Master Output, Slave Input (output from master)
SPI_CLK Input SPI serial clock (output from master)
SPI_CS Input SPI slave select (active low; output from master)
SPI_PIRQ Output SPI IRQ used by TPM to generate an interrupt
PP Input
Physical presence, active high, internal pull-down. Used to
indicate Physical Presence to the TPM.
NiC -
Not internally connected: not connected to the die. May be left
unconnected but no impact on TPM if connected.
NC -
Not Connected: connected to the die but not usable. May be left
unconnected. Internal pull-down.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 8 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.4 Block diagrams
1.4.1 HW block diagram
A block diagram of the hardware ST33HTPH (with its associated cryptographic boundary) is
provided in Figure 7. TPM is composed of:
 A SecurCore® SC300™ CPU core including a MPU (Memory Protection Unit)
 Memories (RAMs, Flash and ROM)
 HW accelerators for CRC (16 and 32-bits) and cryptographic operations (symmetric
with EDES+ and AES and asymmetric with NESCRYPT)
 A clock generator and three 16-bit timers
 NDRNG (non-deterministic random bit generator)
 SPI master/slave block
 A security administration block dedicated to chip security configuration and alarms
detection
 FW and data stored in the memory areas
Figure 7: ST33HTPH block diagram
SecurCore® SC300™
CPU Core
MPU
I/D bus
S bus
RAM Flash
memory
ST ROM
firewall
ST ROM
APB/AHB
bridge
APB
AES
HW
accelerator
EDES+
HW
accelerator
CRC
HW
accelerator
Clock
generator
Timers
NDRNG
NESCRYPT
HW
accelerator
with
RAM
Security
Administrator
SPI
with
RAM
buffer
Power
mngt
VCC
GND
SPI interface
Cryptographic boundary
GPIOs
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 9 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.4.2 FW block diagrams
Block diagrams of the TPM FW are provided at Figure 8: TPM FW block diagram (TPM2E)
and Figure 9: TPM FW block diagram.
1.4.2.1 AAF0 / AAF1
Figure 8: TPM FW block diagram (TPM2E)
TPM FW is composed of:
 Non-upgradable code blocks located in ROM & flash memories (depicted in orange)
 Boot code
 Cryptographic library
 HW and memory low-level services
 Upgradable code blocks via secure field upgrade mechanism (blue and green boxes)
 Application flash loader (AFL) in charge of TPM field upgrade
 TPM1.2 core (irreversibly deactivated as indicated in §1.7.1)
 TPM1.2 commands code (irreversibly deactivated as indicated in §1.7.1)
 TPM2.0 core
 TPM2.0 commands code
 Low-level services API (incl. cryptographic services, memory management, …)
TPM1.2
core
TPM1.2
commands
AFL
Boot
Low-level services API
Cryptographic
library
HW and memory
services
TPM2.0
core
TPM2.0
commands
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 10 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.4.2.2 AAF3
Figure 9: TPM FW block diagram (TPM20)
TPM FW is composed of:
 Non-upgradable code blocks located in ROM & flash memories (depicted in orange)
 Boot code
 Cryptographic library
 HW and memory low-level services
 Upgradable code blocks via secure field upgrade mechanism (blue and green boxes)
 Application flash loader (AFL) in charge of TPM field upgrade
 TPM2.0 core
 TPM2.0 commands code
 Low-level services API
TPM2.0
core
TPM2.0
commands
AFL
Boot
Low-level services API
Cryptographic
library
HW and memory
services
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 11 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.5 Security levels
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of
FIPS 140-2.
Table 4: Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
Overall 2
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 12 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.6 Cryptographic functions
The security module supports the following cryptographic algorithms (both approved and non-
approved). Algorithm certificate numbers for each approved algorithm are listed below. All
algorithms, keys size or curve lengths listed below are part of services offered by the module.
Table 5: Approved algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key lengths,
curves or
moduli
Use
2342 &
2340
RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256,
RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5
2048 Digital signature
generation
FIPS 186-4 SHA-1, SHA-256,
RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5,
RSASSA-PSS
2048 Digital signature
verification
FIPS 186-4 Appendix C3.1 2048 Key generation
1045 &
1041
CVL RSADP FIPS 186-4 RSA decryption
primitive
2048 Key transport
1025 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256 P-224, P-256 Digital signature
generation
FIPS 186-4 SHA-1, SHA-256 P-224, P-256 Digital signature
verification
FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 P-224, P-256 Key generation
110 & 108 KAS EC-DH SP 800-56A ECC P-224, P-256 Key agreement
2870 &
2875
HMAC
(single call)
FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256 160, 256 Message
authentication
2878 &
2876
HMAC
(sequence)
FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256 160, 256 Message
authentication
123 & 121 KBKDF SP 800-108 CTR Key derivation
1361 DRBG SP 800-90A HASH_based Deterministic random
bit generation
4338 &
4336
AES FIPS 197,
SP 800-38A
ECB, CFB128, OFB,
CBC, CTR
128, 192, 256 Data
encryption/decryption
2345 &
2343
Triple-DES SP 800-67,
SP 800-38A
TECB, TCBC,
TCFB64, TOFB, CTR
192 Data
encryption/decryption
NA KTS (AES
cert #4338 +
HMAC cert
#2870)
KTS (AES
cert #4336 +
HMAC cert
#2875)
SP 800-38F CFB 128, 256 Key transport
3539 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256 Message digest
Vendor
affirmation
CKG SP800-133
(per IG D.12)
Direct generation,
Generation
Key generation1
Table 6: Allowed algorithms
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Key length = 1024 bits Digital signature verification
1 Symmetric keys and seeds used for generating the asymmetric keys are either generated by using
KBKDF or DRBG methods. Methods are detailed per CSPs in Table 13: Keys and CSPs list.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 13 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
RSA key
wrapping
Key length = 2048 bits Key establishment
SHA-1 NA Digital signature verification
NDRNG NA Seed or reseed DRBG 800-90A (with approximatively 366 bits of
entropy). Generate random numbers not dedicated to be used as
cryptographic material.
Table 7: Non-approved algorithms
Algorithm Use
RSA (key length = 1024 bits) Key and digital signature generation
SHA-1 Digital signature generation
ECSchnorr Digital signature generation and verification
ECDAA Digital signature generation
1.7 Modes of Operation
This security policy only applies to the security module when TPM operator follows the
recommendations from:
 §1.7.1 to set and irreversibility lock the security module in the TPM2.0 mode and
exclude the non-compliant mode TPM1.2 that is outside the scope of the evaluation.
 §1.7.2 to execute all self-tests required in a FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation
 §1.7.3 to use the security module in a FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation
1.7.1 Security module configuration
1.7.1.1 AAF0
These security module configurations implement both TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 specifications and
are set to operate by default in TPM1.2 mode. To set and irreversibility lock the security module
in the TPM2.0 mode, TPM operator shall:
 Execute the TPM_SetMode proprietary command with the following parameters:
o mode = 0x01 (TPMLib SET to switch to TPM2.0)
o modeLock = 0x01 (TPMLibLock SET to lock the selected mode)
 Reset the TPM
1.7.1.2 AAF1
These security module configurations implement both TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 specifications and
are set to operate by default in TPM2.0 mode. To irreversibility lock the security module in the
TPM2.0 mode, TPM operator shall:
 Execute the TPM2_SetMode proprietary command with the following parameters:
o mode = 0x01 (TPMLib SET to maintain the module in TPM2.0 mode)
o modeLock = 0x01 (TPMLibLock SET to lock the selected mode)
 Reset the TPM
1.7.1.3 AAF3
No action requested for these security modules configurations.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 14 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.7.2 Approved modes of operation
TPM supports 2 sequential approved modes of operation.
1.7.2.1 Approved mode 1
This mode is the default mode when TPM starts. This mode is limited to a subset of TPM
services.
Table 8: Approved mode 1
Properties Description
Definition Transient mode of operation when TPM is power-up and
before TPM2_SelfTest(full=YES) execution
Configuration No configuration required
Services available List of available services is indicated in last column of Table
14: Command support table.
Algorithms used SHA / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / TDES
CSPs used List of CSPs that might be accessed in this mode is indicated
in Table 14: Command support table.
Self-tests SHS / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / TDES / HW integrity / FW
integrity / NDRNG
1.7.2.2 Approved mode 2
This mode is the full FIPS approved mode of operation.
Table 9: Approved mode 2
Properties Description
Definition Full approved mode of operation
Configuration TPM2_SelfTest(full=YES) execution
Services available All services
Algorithms used All supported algorithms (cf. §1.6)
CSPs used All CSPs
Self-tests SHS / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / TDES / RSA / ECDH /
ECDSA / HW integrity / FW integrity / NDRNG
1.7.3 FIPS mode recommendations
To use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode of operation (valid for mode1 and mode2), the TPM
operator shall:
 Use an encryption session for the commands that inputs/outputs CSPs (List is
indicated at §3.3.1). For commands without authorization, encryptedSalt used in
TPM_StartAuthSession on encryption session creation must be different from the
empty buffer.
 Use an approved symmetric algorithm (AES) for encryption sessions
 Use authorization session based on HMAC or policy (no password allowed, cf. §2.2.1).
 Duplicate only objects with encryptedDuplication attribute set.
 Not use FIPS 140-2 non-approved algorithms:
o SHA-1 for RSA digital signature generation
o EC Schnorr for ECC digital signature generation
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 15 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
o ECDAA for ECC digital signature generation
For the following services:
o TPM2_Sign, TPM2_Certify, TPM2_CertifyCreation, TPM2_Quote,
TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest, TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest,
TPM2_GetTime, TPM2_NV_Certify, TPM2_Commit
 Not use TPM2_LoadExternal service to load TDES keys into the TPM
 Use a policy including TPM2_PolicyAuthValue as a minimum in the policy sequence
in case authorization is ensured by policy (authorization by policy must be at least as
secure as authorization by HMAC).
 Use TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth after first TPM init or after each TPM2_Clear to set
the authorization value for the endorsement, platform, owner and lockout hierarchies.
 Use TPM2_CreatePrimary command only for RSA and ECC key with default template.
If operator does not strictly follow the FIPS approved mode recommendations (ex: use of XOR
instead of AES in encryption session), TPM is considered as being in a FIPS non-approved
mode of operation.
To use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS non-approved
mode, the operator shall:
 Zeroize all data listed in Table 13: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be reused
as CSPs in FIPS approved mode
To use the TPM in a FIPS non-approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS approved
mode, the operator shall:
 Zeroize all CSPs listed in Table 13: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be used
by FIPS non-approved algorithms in FIPS approved mode
1.7.4 Limited and error modes
TPM may reach specific states depending on sequence of operation that occurred.
1.7.4.1 Shutdown mode
The shutdown mode is an infinite HW reset loop that may be exit only by a power-off/power-
on sequence. This state is entered when TPM detects that a FW integrity check failed during
the TPM boot sequence.
1.7.4.2 Failure mode
Failure mode is a state of TPM that restricts the commands that can be executed to
TPM_Startup / TPM_GetCapability / TPM_GetTestResult for TPM1.2 and
TPM2_GetCapability / TPM2_GetTestResult for TPM2.0. TPM answers to all other commands
with a specific error code: TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST (0x1C) for TPM1.2 and
TPM_RC_FAILURE (0x101). This state is entered when one (except FW integrity test) of the
self-tests fails.
1.7.4.3 Reduced mode
The reduced mode is a specific state of the field upgrade mode (refer to §6) that can be
reached if the on-going field upgrade procedure failed due to an error detected in the field
upgrade commands received. In reduced mode, only a subset of commands might be
executed: TPM_FieldUpgradeStart / TPM_FieldUpgradeData / TPM_GetCapability /
TPM_GetTestResult / TPM_ContinueSelfTest for TPM1.2 and TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart /
TPM2_FieldUpgradeData / TPM2_GetCapability / TPM2_GetTestResult / TPM2_SelfTest for
TPM2.0. TPM answers to all other commands with the error TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE
(0x143). Reduced mode can be exited in case of the reception of a successful
TPM_FieldUpgradeStart/TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart command that reloads the previous
installed firmware.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 16 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
1.8 Ports and interfaces
The physical port of the security module is the SPI bus. The logical interfaces and their
mapping to physical ports of the module are described below:
Table 10 : Ports and interfaces
Logical interface Description Physical port
Control Input
Interface
Control Input commands
issued to the security
module
SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MOSI /
SPI_RST / PP
Status Output
Interface
Status data output by the
chip
SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MISO /
SPI_PIRQ
Data Input Interface Data provided to the chip
as part of the data
processing commands
SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MOSI
Data Output
Interface
Data output by the chip as
part of the data processing
command
SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MISO
Power interface Power interface of the chip VPS / GND
Here are some details concerning the ports and interfaces of TPM:
1. The module does not include a maintenance interface.
2. Control and data inputs are multiplexed over the same physical interface. Control and
data are distinguished by properly parsing input TPM command parameters according
to input structures description, indicated for each command in [TPM2.0 Part3 r1.16]1.
3. Status and data output are multiplexed over the same physical interface. Status and
data are distinguished by properly setting output TPM response parameters according
to output structures description, indicated for each command in [TPM2.0 Part3 r1.16].
4. The logical state machine and the command structure parsing of the module prevent
from using input data externally from the “data input path” and prevent from outputting
data externally from the “data output path”.
5. While performing key generation or key zeroization (no manual key entry on TPM),
the output data path is logically disconnected while the output status path remains
connected to report any possible failure during command processing. Generally, the
output data path is only connected when TPM outputs response containing data.
6. Plaintext data can be output through usage of:
 TPM2_Unseal, TPM2_RSA_Decrypt, TPM2_EncryptDecrypt
To prevent inadvertent release of the plaintext data, command performs:
 Check of command input structure
 Check of command authorization
 Decryption of the input blob with private part of specified key
However an encryption session might be used with these commands to avoid
releasing plaintext data.
7. The logical state machine and command structure of the module guarantees the
inhibition of all data output via the data output interface whenever an error state exists
and while doing self-tests.
1 Some commands only deal with control input and status output parameters
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 17 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
This chapter gives details about the roles managed by TPM.
2.1 Roles
Services proposed by TPM are accessible under different roles. Next table defines the different
roles supported by the TPM.
Table 11: Roles
Role Description Type of
authentication
Authentication data
Crypto officer (CO) Role that requires knowledge of the
authValue or authPolicy associated to one of
the hierarchy (incl. lockout).
Role based 256-bit secret data
(authValue and/or
authPolicy)
User (U) Role that requires knowledge of the
authValue or authPolicy associated to one
object or NV index.
Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret
data (authValue and/or
authPolicy).
Authorization depends
on userWithAuth object
attribute.
Admin (A) The object Administrator controls the
certification of an object (TPM2_Certify and
TPM2_ActivateCredential) and controls
changing of the authValue of an object
(TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth).
Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret
data (authValue and/or
authPolicy).
Authorization depends
on adminWithPolicy
object attribute.
DUP (D) This authorization role is only used for
TPM2_Duplicate(). If duplication is allowed,
authorization must always be provided by a
policy session and the authPolicy equation of
the object must contain a command that
sets the policy command code to
TPM_CC_Duplicate.
Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret
data (authPolicy).
Some commands can also be executed without any authorization role. Those commands are
marked as NA in the service list table (Table 14: Command support table).
The security module does NOT provide a Maintenance Role or Maintenance Interface and
does NOT support concurrent operators.
Roles are implicitly selected by TPM operator on command execution (cf. Table 14 for
correspondence between service and supported role) by proving knowledge of the
authorization value or knowledge of the policy sequence (nature of authorization session
indicates the type of authorization) that are associated with the object the command is
operating on.
An operator might switch from one role to another by executing commands requiring different
roles and proving knowledge of the authorization value or policy sequence of objects the role
is associated to.
2.2 Authentication
2.2.1 Description
In FIPS approved mode of operation, TPM uses a mechanism for authorization that consists
in:
1. Opening an authorization session that may be of the following types:
a. HMAC
b. Policy
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 18 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
2. Executing the expected policy commands sequence in case of policy authorization
session (defined policy must follow recommendations listed in §1.7.3).
3. Do the comparison between reference value and computed value. If both match,
command execution is authorized.
More details on HMAC and policy sessions can be found in §19 of [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16].
2.2.2 Authorization strength
As minimum value of authorization or policy values might be 160-bit random values (based on
unbiased distribution of ‘0’ and ‘1’), the probability for an attacker to guess the authorization
data is:
1
2160
= 6.84 ∗ 10−49
This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-6 required by [FIPS140-2].
The number of attempts per minute that an attacker can make is limited by the DAM (Dictionary
Attack Mechanism). DAM consists in counting the number of failed authentication. When this
counter reaches a pre-defined threshold, a lockout period is started. During this period, no
authorized command execution is allowed and a specific error is returned in TPM response
until period expires. Next table indicates the threshold values and the lockout durations:
Table 12: DAM lockout durations
Failed authentication counter >31
Lockout period (in seconds) 7200
This table indicates that an attacker can do a maximum (during the first minute) of 32 trials per
minute before DAM being active. As a result the probability per minute that a random attempt
will lead to a successful authorization matches FIPS requirements. Value is equal to:
32 ∗
1
2160
= 2.19 ∗ 10−47
This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-5 required by [FIPS140-2].
NB: commands handling (reception, processing and response sending) is negligible compared
to the lockout periods and not taken into account in the above computation.
NB2: DAM parameters might be changed by using TPM2_DictionnaryAttackParameters
command. However to operate in a FIPS approved mode, they shall not be changed in order
not to decrease the authorization strength computed above.
2.2.3 Authorization protection
By following recommendations to operate in FIPS mode of operation, authorization data
associated to objects, NV indexes or hierarchies are never output from TPM in plaintext form
and thus are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Authorization can be changed via the following services:
 TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth
 TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth
 TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth
As indicated in Table 14, roles that imply authentication are associated with these services
meaning that authentication are protected against unauthorized modification and substitution.
TPM authorization mechanism (HMAC or policy digest comparison) does not provide any
information about authentication data or policy sequence. Authentication indicates pass
(command executed) or fail (command not executed) and does not provide feedback that
could weaken the strength of authentication.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 19 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
3 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
This chapter gives details about the services, keys and CSPs that the TPM manages.
3.1 List of Keys and CSPs
Table 13: Keys and CSPs list
Keys/CSPs Description Zeroized
Index Name
Hierarchies
1 nullSeed 32 bytes primary seed values resp. for NULL, platform, endorsement and
storage hierarchies.
NullSeed is a random value generated by HDRBG at each TPM power-up.
PpSeed / epSeed / spSeed are random values generated by HDRBG at first
TPM power-up.
They are used as keys for:
 KDFa to derive seedValue and sensitive during object creation (cf.
[TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §27.6.4)
 KDFa to generate a symmetric encryption key used in TPM2B_PRIVATE
structure en/decryption.
 KDFa to generate HMAC key used in TPM2B_PRIVATE integrity
protection generation or verification
They are used as seeds for:
 DRBG to generate random as input to prime numbers (RSA) and private
key generation (ECC)
TPM reset
2 ppSeed
TPM2_Change
PPS
3 epSeed
TPM2_Change
EPS
4 spSeed
TPM2_Clear
5 nullProof 32 bytes secret values resp. for NULL, platform, endorsement and storage
hierarchies.
NullProof is a random value generated by HDRBG at each TPM power-up.
PhProof / ehProof / shProof are random values generated by HDRBG at first
TPM power-up.
They are used as keys for:
 KDFa to generate context encryption key and IV (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16]
§30.3.1)
 HMAC to compute context blob integrity (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §30.3.2)
 HMAC to compute/verify tickets
shProof is used also as key for:
 KDFa to generate obfuscation value used in attestation commands (cf.
[TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §36.7)
TPM reset
6 phProof
TPM2_Change
PPS
7 ehProof
TPM2_Clear
8 shProof
TPM2_Clear
9 platformAuth 32 bytes authorization data (authValue) used in authorization session based
resp. on platform, endorsement, and storage or lockout hierarchy authorization.
PlatformAuth is set to 0 at each TPM2_Startup (CLEAR).
EndorsementAuth / ownerAuth / lockoutAuth are set to 0 at first TPM power-up.
Primary auth values can be changed with command
TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth.
They are used as keys for:
 HMAC authorization in case of unsalted and unbound session
 KDFa to generate session key used in HMAC authorization in case of
bound session
They are used as part of keys for:
 HMAC authorization in case of salted or bound session (key is
concatenation of sessionKey and authValue)
 KDFa to generate session key used in HMAC authorization in case of
salted and bound session (key is concatenation of authValue and salt)
TPM2_Startup
10 endorsementAuth TPM2_Clear /
TPM2_Change
EPS
11 ownerAuth
TPM2_Clear
12 lockoutAuth
TPM2_Clear
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 20 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
They are used as reference values for comparison in case of password
authorization session.
13 platformPolicy 32 bytes authorization data (authPolicy) used in authorization session based
resp. on platform, endorsement, storage or lockout hierarchy policy.
platformPolicy is set to 0 at each TPM2_Startup (CLEAR).
endorsementPolicy / ownerPolicy / lockoutPolicy are set to 0 at first TPM power-
up.
Primary policies can be changed with command TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy.
They are used as reference values for a comparison in case of policy session.
TPM2_Change
PPS
14 endorsementPolicy TPM2_Clear /
TPM2_Change
EPS
15 ownerPolicy
TPM2_Clear
16 lockoutPolicy
TPM2_Clear
Objects
17 authValue 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during object creation
(TPM2_Create/TPM2_CreatePrimary) used to authorize commands based on
this object.
Value can be changed with command TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth.
It is used as:
 HMAC and/or KDFa keys or part of keys in authorization session based on
HMAC or password (usage is the same than for CSPs 9/10/11/12)
 Secret value extended into policyDigest on TPM2_PolicySecret command
TPM2_Clear
(owner &
endorsement)
TPM2_Change
PPS (platform)
TPM2_Change
EPS
(endorsement)
18 authPolicy 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during object creation
(TPM2_Create/TPM2_CreatePrimary) used to authorize commands based on
this object.
It is used as reference value for a comparison in case of policy session
TPM2_Clear
(owner &
endorsement)
TPM2_Change
PPS (platform)
TPM2_Change
EPS
(endorsement)
19 seed 32 random bytes generated by HDRBG if object parent is not a hierarchy (if
hierarchy, primary seed is used, cf. CSPs 1/2/3/4).
It is used as key for:
 KDFa to generate seedValue and sensitive during object creation (cf.
[TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §27.6.4)
Transient value
only available
during object
creation
20 seedValue 32 bytes generated from seed (CSP 19) or one of the primary seeds (CSP
1/2/3/4) through use of KDFa. Set to 0 for asymmetric keys that are not used as
storage key.
It is used (when not set to 0) as:
 Data in SHA computation to generate object’s unique value (HMAC and
symmetric key creation)
 Key in KDFa to generate a symmetric encryption key used in
TPM2B_PRIVATE structure en/decryption.
 Key in KDFa to generate HMAC key used in TPM2B_PRIVATE integrity
protection generation or verification
TPM2_Clear
(owner &
endorsement)
TPM2_Change
PPS (platform)
TPM2_Change
EPS
(endorsement)
21 symKey 16 bytes generated from derivation of seedValue through KDFa usage.
It is used as key for:
 Symmetric en/decryption of TPM2B_PRIVATE structure
Transient value
only available
during
command
processing
22 hmacKey 32 bytes generated from derivation of seedValue through KDFa usage.
It is used as key for:
Transient value
only available
during
command
processing
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 21 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
 HMAC used in TPM2B_PRIVATE integrity protection generation or
verification
23 sensitive Object sensitive part that might be passed as encrypted parameter to
TPM2_Create command or generated with KDFa from seed or primary seed (if
sensitiveDataOrigin attribute is set) in case object is a symmetric key or a
HMAC key. For RSA or ECC key, sensitive corresponds to the private key.
Depending on object’s nature, sensitive is used as key for:
 en/decryption (RSA, AES, TDES)
 signature generation (RSA, ECDSA, HMAC)
 secret value exchange (ECDH)
Available key lengths correspond to the ones listed in Table 5: Approved
algorithms (Key nature and length are selected by user thanks to the interface
of the keys creation commands).
TPM2_Clear
(owner &
endorsement)
TPM2_Change
PPS (platform)
TPM2_Change
EPS
(endorsement)
NV Indexes
24 authValue 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during NV index creation
(TPM2_DefineSpace) used to authorize commands based on this object.
Value can be changed with command TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth.
It is used as:
 HMAC and/or KDFa keys or part of keys in authorization session based on
HMAC or password.
 Secret value extended into policyDigest on TPM2_PolicySecret command
TPM2_NV_Und
efineSpace
/
TPM2_NV_Und
efineSpaceSpec
ial
25 authPolicy 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during object creation
(TPM2_DefineSpace) used to authorize commands based on this object.
It is used as reference value for a comparison in case of policy session
TPM2_NV_Und
efineSpace
/
TPM2_NV_Und
efineSpaceSpec
ial
Sessions
26 salt Value passed encrypted (with a loaded decrypt key) to
TPM2_StartAuthSession.
It is used as:
 Part of KDFa key to generate the sessionKey (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16]
§19.6)
Transient value
only available
during
TPM2_StartAut
hSession
processing
27 sessionKey Key generated by KDFa (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §19.6) and whose value
depends on salt and bind parameters of TPM2_StartAuthSession command
(size depends on symmetric algorithm used).
It is used as:
 HMAC key used to generate and verify command authorization
 Part of KDFa key used to generate encryption key and IV of encryption-
based session
TPM2_FlushCo
ntext
28 encryption key
and IV of
encryption-based
session
Symmetric key and IV generated by KDFa (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] §21.3) from
sessionKey and object’s authValue.
It is used as key and IV for:
 Symmetric en/decryption of first parameter of command/response if
parameter structure is of type TPM2B_
TPM2_FlushCo
ntext
Context
29 contextKey 16 bytes randomly generated by HDRBG at each TPM reset.
It is used as:
 Key in KDFa to generate a symmetric encryption key and IV used in
context blob en/decryption
TPM reset
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 22 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
30 symKey, IV 2*16 bytes derived by using KDFa from contextKey. It is used as key and IV for:
 Symmetric en/decryption of context blob
Transient value
only available
during
TPM2_ContextS
ave /
TPM2_ContextL
oad processing
Duplication
31 inner symKey Symmetric key passed as input to duplication commands or generated by
HDRBG (size depends on symmetric algorithm used).
It is used as:
 Symmetric en/decryption key to protect TPM2B_PRIVATE output structure
Transient value
only available
during
command
processing
32 seed 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG if new parent is a RSA key or
via KDFe if new parent is an ECC key.
It is used as key for :
 KDFa to generate a symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection
 KDFa to generate a HMAC key for outer integrity protection
33 outer symKey Symmetric key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:
 Symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection of TPM2B_PRIVATE
output structure
34 outer hmacKey HMAC key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:
 HMAC integrity key for outer protection of TPM2B_PRIVATE output
structure
Credential
35 seed 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG if new parent is a RSA key or
via KDFe if new parent is an ECC key.
It is used as key for :
 KDFa to generate a symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection
 KDFa to generate a HMAC key for outer integrity protection
Transient value
only available
during
command
processing
36 symKey Symmetric key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:
 Symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection of credentialBlob
37 hmacKey HMAC key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:
 HMAC integrity key for outer protection of credentialBlob
DRBG
38 DRBG state Internal state (V and C secret values) of the HDRBG (based on SHA256) stored
in RAM. TPM2_Clear
ECC
39 commitNonce 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG at each TPM2_Startup
(CLEAR).
It is used as key for :
 KDFa to generate an ECC ephemeral private key used in
TPM2_EC_Ephemeral command / TPM2_ZGen_2Phase
Transient value
only available
during
command
processing
40 ephemeral key –
derived from
commitNonce
ECC private key (size depends on curve selected) generated with KDFa from
commitNonce. It is used as ephemeral private key in:
 TPM2_Ephemeral command (scalar multiplication) to generate the
associated ephemeral public key
 TPM2_Zgen_2Phase (ECDH scheme) to generate outZ2 (output point)
41 ephemeral key ECC private key (size depends on curve selected) generated with HDRBG. It is
used as ephemeral private key in:
 TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen command (ECDH scheme) to generate zPoint
(output point)
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 23 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Primary keys
42 Endorsement key -
RSA primes
2 primes of 1024 bits used to construct EK if parameters in
TPM2_CreatePrimary command match the default EK RSA template.
Generated by FIPS140-2 compliant HSM.
TPM2_Change
EPS
43 Endorsement key -
ECC private key
ECC 256 bits private key used to construct EK if parameters in
TPM2_CreatePrimary command match the default EK ECC template.
Generated by FIPS140-2 compliant HSM.
TPM2_Change
EPS
Field upgrade keys
44 Field upgrade
verification key
2048 bits permanent RSA key unique per TPM product line. Only public part of
the key is stored in the TPM (modulus, exponent). No (public key)
Transient DRBG
47 Transient DRBG
state
Internal state (V and C secret values) of a HDRBG instance (based on SHA256)
stored in RAM. HDRBG is instantiated from primary seeds and used only in
TPM2_CreatePrimary to generate prime numbers for primary RSA keys.
Transient DRBG
state cleared at
the end of
random
numbers
generation
DRBG input seed
48 DRBG input seed 48-bytes value output from a NDRNG. Transient value
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 24 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
3.2 Services
Next table lists all services supported by the TPM and indicates for each service, the role that
can use this service and the keys/CSPs that can be accessed.
3.2.1 Services list
Table 14: Command support table
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
Start-up
1 _TPM_Init NA W (first boot only) : 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,
14, 15, 16
W : 29, 38, 48
X
2 TPM2_Startup NA W : 1, 5, 9, 13, 39 X
3 TPM2_Shutdown NA - X
Testing
4 TPM2_SelfTest NA - X
5 TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest NA - X
6 TPM2_GetTestResult NA - X
Session commands
7 TPM2_StartAuthSession NA W : 26, 27, 38, 48
C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 24, 26, 28, 38, 48
8 TPM2_PolicyRestart NA -
Objects commands
9 TPM2_Create U R : 18
W : 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48
C : 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48
O : 20, 23
10 TPM2_Load U R : 18
W : 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48
C : 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48
11 TPM2_LoadExternal NA W : 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48
C : 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48
X
12 TPM2_ReadPublic NA R : 23
W : 28 C : 28
X
13 TPM2_ActivateCredential A, U R : 18, 23, 35
W : 28, 36, 37, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 48
14 TPM2_MakeCredential NA R : 23
W : 28, 35, 36, 37
C : 28, 36, 37
O : 35
15 TPM2_Unseal U R : 18, 23
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
O : 23
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 25 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
16 TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth A R : 18
W : 17, 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
Duplication commands
17 TPM2_Duplicate D R : 18
W : 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48
O : 23, 31, 32
18 TPM2_Rewrap U R : 18, 32
W : 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48
O : 23, 31, 32
19 TPM2_Import U R : 18, 32
W : 28, 31, 33, 34, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48
O : 23
Asymmetric primitives
20 TPM2_RSA_Encrypt NA C: 28
21 TPM2_RSA_Decrypt U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
22 TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen NA W : 28, 41
C : 28, 41
23 TPM2_ECDH_ZGen U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
24 TPM2_ECC_Parameters NA - X
25 TPM2_ZGen_2Phase U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 40, 48
Symmetric primitives
26 TPM2_EncryptDecrypt U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
27 TPM2_Hash NA W: 28 C: 28
28 TPM2_HMAC U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
Random number generator
29 TPM2_GetRandom NA C : 28, 38, 48 X
30 TPM2_StirRandom NA W : 28, 38, 48
C: 28
X
Hash/HMAC/Event sequences
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 26 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
31 TPM2_HMAC_Start U R : 18
W : 17, 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
32 TPM2_HashSequenceStart NA W: 17, 28
C: 28
X
33 TPM2_SequenceUpdate U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
34 TPM2_SequenceComplete U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
35 TPM2_EventSequenceComplete U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
Attestation commands
36 TPM2_Certify A, U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
37 TPM2_CertifyCreation U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
38 TPM2_Quote U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
39 TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest CO R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
40 TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest CO R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
41 TPM2_GetTime CO R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
Ephemeral EC keys
43 TPM2_EC_Ephemeral NA W : 28, 40
C : 28, 39
Signing and signature verification
44 TPM2_VerifySignature NA R : 23
W : 28
C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 28
45 TPM2_Sign U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48
Command audit
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 27 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
46 TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStat
us
CO R : 13, 18
C : 9, 11, 15, 27
Integrity collection (PCR)
47 TPM2_PCR_Extend U R : 18
C : 27
48 TPM2_PCR_Event U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38
49 TPM2_PCR_Read NA - X
50 TPM2_PCR_Allocate CO R : 13, 18
C : 9, 27
53 TPM2_PCR_Reset NA -
54 _TPM_Hash_Start NA - X
55 _TPM_Hash_Data NA - X
56 _TPM_Hash_End NA - X
Enhanced authorization commands
57 TPM2_PolicySigned NA C: 28
58 TPM2_PolicySecret U R : 18
W : 28, 38, 48
C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 24, 27, 28, 38, 48
59 TPM2_PolicyTicket NA W : 28 C: 28
60 TPM2_PolicyOR NA -
61 TPM2_PolicyPCR NA W : 28 C: 28
62 TPM2_PolicyLocality NA -
63 TPM2_PolicyNV U R : 18
W : 28
C : 27, 28
64 TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer NA W : 28 C: 28
65 TPM2_PolicyCommandCode NA -
66 TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence NA -
67 TPM2_PolicyCpHash NA W : 28 C: 28
68 TPM2_PolicyNameHash NA W : 28 C: 28
69 TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect NA W : 28 C: 28
70 TPM2_PolicyAuthorize NA W : 28 C: 28
71 TPM2_PolicyAuthValue NA -
72 TPM2_PolicyPassword NA -
73 TPM2_PolicyGetDigest NA W : 28 C: 28
74 TPM2_PolicyNvWritten NA -
Hierarchy commands
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 28 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
75 TPM2_CreatePrimary CO R : 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 42, 43
W : 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 47, 48
C : 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 42,
43, 48
Z : 47
76 TPM2_HierarchyControl CO C : 9, 10, 11, 27
77 TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy CO W : 13, 14, 15, 16, 28
C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28
78 TPM2_ChangePPS CO Z : 2, 6, 13,14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 43
79 TPM2_ChangeEPS CO Z : 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 42
80 TPM2_Clear CO R : 13, 16
W : 38, 48
Z : 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,
23, 24, 25, 38, 48
C : 38
81 TPM2_ClearControl CO R : 13, 16
W : 38, 48
C : 9, 12, 38, 48
82 TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth CO R : 13, 16
W : 9, 10, 11, 12, 28, 38, 48
C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 28, 38, 48
Non-Volatile Storage
83 TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset CO R : 16
W : 38, 48
C : 12, 38, 48
84 TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters CO R : 16
W : 38, 48
C : 12, 38, 48
Field Upgrade
86 TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart CO W : 28
C : 9, 13, 28, 44
87 TPM2_FieldUpgradeData NA -
Context Management
88 TPM2_ContextSave NA W : 30
C : 29, 30
89 TPM2_ContextLoad NA W : 30
C : 29, 30
90 TPM2_FlushContext NA Z : 17, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28 X
91 TPM2_EvictControl CO R : 13, 15
C : 9, 11
Clock and Timers
92 TPM2_ReadClock NA - X
93 TPM2_ClockSet CO R : 13, 15
C : 9, 11
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 29 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
94 TPM2_ClockRateAdjust CO R : 13, 15
C : 9, 11
Capability Commands
95 TPM2_GetCapability NA - X
96 TPM2_TestParms NA - X
Non-volatile storage
97 TPM2_NV_DefineSpace CO R : 13, 15, 18
W : 24, 25, 28, 38, 48
C : 9, 11, 27, 28, 38, 48
98 TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace CO W : 38, 48
C : 27, 38, 48
Z : 24, 25
99 TPM2_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial CO,
A
W : 38, 48
C : 27, 38, 48
Z : 24, 25
100 TPM2_NV_ReadPublic NA C: 28 X
101 TPM2_NV_Write U W : 28, 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
102 TPM2_NV_Increment U W : 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 38, 48
103 TPM2_NV_Extend U W : 28, 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
104 TPM2_NV_SetBits U W : 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 38, 48
105 TPM2_NV_WriteLock U W : 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 38, 48
106 TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock CO W : 38, 48
C : 27, 38, 48
107 TPM2_NV_Read U W : 28, 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
108 TPM2_NV_ReadLock U W : 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 38, 48
109 TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth A W : 24, 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
110 TPM2_NV_Certify U W : 28, 38, 48
R : 25
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 30 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Services Role
Keys and CSP access
W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize
C = used as key in cryptographic operation
R = read (and not used as C)
Authorized
in limited
approved
mode
Proprietary commands
111 TPM2_SetMode CO W : 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
112 TPM2_SetCommandSet CO W : 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
113 TPM2_RestoreEK CO Z : 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20
R : 42, 43
W : 23, 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
114 TPM2_SetCommandSetLock CO W : 28, 38, 48
C : 27, 28, 38, 48
Misc commands
115 TPM2_PP_Commands CO -
Non FIPS services
116 Field upgrade de-obfuscation1 NA -
3.2.2 Authorization
Some of the services listed above manipulate CSPs without requiring the operator to assume
an authorized role:
 Services restricted to use of SHS:
TPM2_Hash, TPM2_HashSequenceStart
 Services using DRNG (read, state update without manipulation):
TPM2_GetRandom, TPM2_StirRandom
 Services used for authentication mechanism:
TPM2_StartAuthSession, TPM2_PolicySigned, TPM2_PolicyTicket,
TPM2_PolicyPCR, TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer TPM2_PolicyLocality,
TPM2_PolicyCpHash, TPM2_PolicyNameHash, TPM2_PolicyAuthorize,
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect, TPM2_PolicyGetDigest
 Services using (read, cryptographic operation) only public part of objects:
TPM2_ReadPublic, TPM2_RSA_Encrypt, TPM2_NV_ReadPublic
 Specific services that do not affect security of the module:
TPM2_LoadExternal: loaded object not considered as protected object (specific
attribute).
TPM2_MakeCredential: convenience function that do not use TPM secrets.
TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen: ephemeral ECC key generation
TPM2_EC_Ephemeral: ephemeral ECC key generation
1 This service is not callable from TPM interface but is only used internally by TPM2_FieldUpgradeData
command. It consists of de-obfuscating data received by the TPM2_FieldUpgradeData command with a
non-FIPS approved algorithm.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 31 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
TPM2_FieldUpgradeData: transport command for field upgrade. Can be used only if
TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart command has been successfully executed (authorized
command)
TPM2_ContextSave: save objects under an encrypted and integrity protected format
TPM2_ContextLoad: load encrypted and integrity protected objects into TPM
TPM2_FlushContext: flush loaded object/session from TPM volatile memory
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 32 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
3.3 Key management
3.3.1 Key entry and output
Next table indicates the approved method used to encrypt all secret, private keys and data
(indicated by S for secret value, P for private key and D for user defined data in type column),
entered into or output from the cryptographic module.
Table 15 : Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input
Service Parameter name Type Input or
output
Encryption
algorithm
TPM2_ActivateCredential credentialBlob S Input AES CFB
secret S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH
TPM2_ContextSave context D Output AES CFB
TPM2_ContextLoad context D Input AES CFB
TPM2_Create inSensitive P / S Input AES CFB (*)
outPrivate P / S Output AES CFB
TPM2_CreatePrimary inSensitive P / S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_Duplicate encryptionKeyIn
(if present)
S Input AES CFB (*)
encryptionKeyOut S Output AES CFB (*)
duplicate S Output AES CFB
outSymSeed S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH
TPM2_EventSequenceComplete buffer D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_GetRandom randomBytes D Output AES CFB (**)
TPM2_Hash data D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_HashSequenceStart auth S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_HMAC buffer D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_HMACStart auth S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_Import encryptionKeyIn
(if present)
S Input AES CFB (*)
duplicate S Input AES CFB
inSymSeed S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH
outPrivate S Output AES CFB
TPM2_Load inPrivate P / S Input AES CFB
TPM2_LoadExternal inPrivate P / S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_MakeCredential credentialBlob S Output AES CFB
secret S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH
TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_NV_DefineSpace auth S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_NV_Extend data D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_NV_Read data D Output AES CFB (**)
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 33 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
TPM2_NV_Write data D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*)
outPrivate S Output AES CFB
TPM2_PCR_Event eventData D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_Rewrap inDuplicate S Input AES CFB
inSymSeed S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH
outDuplicate S Output AES CFB
outSymSeed S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH
TPM2_RSA_Decrypt message D Output AES CFB (**)
TPM2_RSA_Encrypt message D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_SequenceComplete buffer D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_SequenceUpdate buffer D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy authPolicy S Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_StirRandom inData D Input AES CFB (*)
TPM2_Unseal outData D Output AES CFB (**)
TPM2_EncryptDecrypt outData D Output AES CFB (**)
(*): Parameter decryption is ensured by use of a decryption session (attribute DECRYPT set)
(**): Parameter encryption is ensured by use of an encryption session (attribute ENCRYPT set). This is
mandatory if output data is a CSP.
3.3.2 Key transport
Relative security strength has been calculated for each cryptographic algorithm supported by
the module and used for key transport. TPM FW prevents use of key in a transport scheme
with lower strength than the transported key.
Table 16: Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm
Comparable number
of bits of security
RSA OAEP (2048 bits) 112
ECDH (P-224 curve) 112
ECDH (P-256 curve) 128
AES CFB (128 bits)1
128
AES CFB (256 bits)2
256
1 AES is used in conjunction with HMAC approved authentication method ([SP800-38F] compliant)
2 AES is used in conjunction with HMAC approved authentication method ([SP800-38F] compliant)
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 34 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4 SELF-TESTS
Self-tests run by the cryptographic module are split in three categories:
 Power-up self-tests
 Full self-tests
 Conditional self-tests
The power-on self-tests do not require operator intervention in order to run. Power-on self-
tests execution completes all tests except KATs on asymmetric algorithms (RSA, ECDSA,
ECDH). Completion of power-on self-tests allows the TPM to be in a limited approved mode
allowing to process only a subset of TPM commands (see §1.7.2.1).
To switch from limited approved mode to full approved mode, operator shall execute
TPM_SelfTestFull command. This command requests the module to switch mode by
executing all self-tests listed in Table 18 : Asymmetric cryptography self-tests list (power-up
self-tests plus the remaining self-tests, that mainly concern asymmetric cryptography).
The security module outputs an “error” Return Code via the status interface when the error
state is entered due to a failed self-test. While in error state, security module does not perform
any cryptographic functions and all data output via the data output interface are inhibited.
If power-on self-tests have passed successfully, no status is indicated but commands that
require self-tests to be completed can be successfully executed.
4.1 Power-up tests list
Table 17 : Power-up self-tests list
Algorithm
tested
Test description
SHA1 SHA1 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected
digest (20 bytes)
SHA256 SHA256 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected
digest (32 bytes)
HMAC
SHA256
HMAC-SHA256 computation on known data (16 bytes) / known key (16 bytes, same value
as data) and comparison of output to the expected MAC (32 bytes). Self-test allows
validating the secure SHA algorithm also used in standalone (out of HMAC context).
KDF SP800-
108
KDF (based on SHA1) computation on known data (16 bytes) / known label (“TEST”) and
comparison of output to the expected value (32 bytes).
Hash-
DRBG
Instantiate, Generate and Reseed API are tested in a single test sequence in accordance
with §11.3 of [SP800-90A]. Output of HDRBG (55 bytes) is compared to a reference value.
AES AES CFB encryption is done on known data (32 bytes) / known key (16 bytes) and known IV
(16 bytes, same value as key). The 32 bytes output data are compared to the expected
reference data. If comparison succeeds, AES CFB decryption is done on encrypted data
with same key & same IV as encryption. 32 bytes output are compared to the initial
plaintext data.
Triple-DES Triple-DES CFB encryption is done on known data (32 bytes) / known key (24 bytes) and
known IV (8 bytes). The 32 bytes output data are compared to the expected reference
data. If comparison succeeds, Triple-DES CFB decryption is done on encrypted data with
same key & same IV as encryption. 32 bytes output are compared to the initial plaintext
data.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 35 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
FW
integrity
FW integrity is verified by computing an EDC (CRC-16 ISO 13239) and comparing it to
reference values. FW integrity is verified during boot sequence before execution of one of
the code block (CML, AFL and TPM) and during full self-tests execution. If failure is
detected during boot sequence, TPM enters an infinite reset loop that can be exit only by
power-off/power-on sequence. In failure is detected during self-tests, status is set to FAIL
and error is returned.
HW
integrity
HW integrity is guaranteed via check of HW sensors. If failure is detected during boot
sequence, status is set to FAIL and error is returned.
4.2 Asymmetric cryptography self-tests list
Table 18 : Asymmetric cryptography self-tests list
Algorithm
tested
Test description
RSA A known key is loaded (2048 bits length). Signature RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is generated
on known data (20 bytes). Output of signature is compared to a reference signature.
Signature verification is performed on the generated signature.
ECDH A known private key d (32 bytes length) is used with a known point P of NIST P-256
curve to compute P = dQ. Q is compare to known reference point.
ECDSA A known private key (256 bits) is used to generate ECDSA signature based on NIST P-
256 curve. Output of signature is compared to a reference signature. Signature
verification is performed on the generated signature.
4.3 Conditional tests list
Table 19 : TPM conditional tests
Algorithm tested Test description
FW integrity FW integrity is verified by computing an EDC (CRC-16 ISO 13239) and comparing it
to reference values.
Hash-DRBG Each 32 bytes of generated data are compared to the previous generated data. If
data are equal, status is set to FAIL and error is returned.
NDRNG TPM performs AIS31 statistical test verification on NDRNG output and continuous
HW self-tests (AS09.42) on NDRNG 48-bits output sequence. If test fails, TRNG_ERR
bit is raised in SEC_STAT register. Status is set to FAIL and error is returned.
FW load During field upgrade procedure, several checks are performed before authorizing
the FW to be upgraded:
- Verification of signature (RSASSA-PSS) on the first data blob to ensure
authentication of the FW
- Verification of digest (SHA256) on each subsequent blob to guarantee
integrity of the full FW.
RSA
key generation
A new RSA key is generated or retrieved from pre-computed keys (done in BKG).
Depending on the key purpose (signing or encrypting) indicated in sign attribute of
the key, en/decryption or signing/verification is done on known data (16 bytes).
ECC key generation On each ECC key generation, an ECDSA signature is generated and verified on
curve NIST P-256.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 36 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4.4 Verification
Successful completion of self-tests can be verified through use of TPM2_GetTestResult
command. The first 4 bytes of response indicate self-tests status. If they are equal to 0, self-
tests completed successfully. If not, the subsequent 4 bytes indicate the list of algorithms not
fully self-tested.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 37 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
The security module meets Physical Security protection requirements for FIPS level 2. CSPs
are physically protected from unexpected disclosure and modification. Security module is
tamper evident, encapsulated in an opaque package. Regular visual inspection must be
conducted by user to check that HW integrity of the chip has not been damaged. Some
physical security protection mechanisms beyond the requirements for level 2 have been
implemented and are described in “Mitigations of other attacks”.
Normal operating ranges are defined in the respective TOE datasheet [ST33TPHF2ESPI DS]:
 Temperature:
The normal operating temperature range of the security module is -40°C to +105°C.
 Voltage:
The normal operating voltage range of the security module is 1.8V or 3.3V (±10%).
 Frequency:
The internal system clock is created by an internal oscillator.
Operation outside these ranges is not guaranteed, but physical security mechanisms are
implemented to assure that CSPs remain protected from unauthorized disclosure, usage,
modification or deletion.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 38 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Module operational environment is “limited modifiable” because TPM FW can only be modified
through field upgrade service (use of TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart and TPM2_FieldUpgradeData
commands). The Non-upgradable code blocks are non-modifiable.
FIPS 140-2 level 1 & 2 operational environment requirements of [FIPS 140-2] section 4.6.1
are then not applicable to the security module.
New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS
140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation
and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 39 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
7 MITIGATIONS OF OTHER ATTACKS
The security module meets Physical Security protection requirements for FIPS level 2.
7.1 Internal Tamper Detection
The security module contains an active metal shield that covers the internal TPM circuitry and
memory components. Cutting, removing or modifying the shield layer will cause the TPM to
Reset and enter a SHUTDOWN mode.
7.2 Environmental protection
The security module contains circuitry which will detect environmental conditions outside the
range described in the product datasheet. Power supply voltage is continuously monitored. If
conditions exist outside the range determined by the TPM tamper detection circuitry, the chip
will reset and will enter a FAILURE mode. The chip will remain Reset and in FAIL mode as
long as the environmental condition causing the tamper event persists.
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 40 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
8 REFERENCES
Reference Document
[ST33TPHF2ESPI DS] ST33TPHF2ESPI Datasheet, STMicroelectronics, December 2015
[TPM2.0 Part1 r1.16] TPM2.0 Main, Part 1, Architecture, rev 1.16, TCG
[TPM2.0 Part2 r1.16] TPM2.0 Main, Part 2, Structures, rev 1.16, TCG
[TPM2.0 Part3 r1.16] TPM2.0 Main, Part 3, Commands, rev 1.16, TCG
[TPM2.0 Part4 r1.16] TPM2.0 Main, Part 4, Supporting routines, rev 1.16, TCG
[PTP 0.43] TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Specification, rev. 00.43 with
errata
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules /
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), CHANGE
NOTICES (12-03-2002)
[FIPS DTR] National Institute of Standards and Technology and Communications
Security, Derived Test Requirements(DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
[FIPS IG] National Institute of Standards and Technology and Communications
Security, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the
Cryptographic Module Validation Program
[FIPS 180-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard,
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012
[FIPS 186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature
Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
186-4, July 2013
[FIPS 197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
197, November 2001
[SP800-135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Function Validation System, September 2015.
[SP800-108] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009.
[SP800-131A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Transitions:
Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, 11/06/15.
[FIPS 198-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code, NIST Computer Security Division Page 3
07/26/2011, (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 198-1, July, 2008
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 41 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Reference Document
[SP800-90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators,
January 2012.
[SP800-38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December
2012.
[SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography, March 2007.
[FIPS 140-2 TPM]
TCG FIPS 140-2 Guidance for TPM2.0, v1.0, TCG
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 42 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
9 ACRONYMS
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CO Crypto Officer
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSAP Delegate Specific Authorization Protocol
EK Endorsement Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FUM Field Upgrade Mode
GPIO General Purpose I/O
HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NV Non-volatile (memory)
OIAP Object-Independent Authorization Protocol
OSAP Object Specific Authorization Protocol
PCR Platform Configuration Register
RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman
RTM Root of Trust for Measurement
RTR Root of Trust for Reporting
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SRK Storage Root Key
TCG Trusted Computed Group
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSS TPM Software Stack
FIPS140-2 SECURITY POLICY
Page 43 of 43
NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
IMPORTANT NOTICE – PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
STMicroelectronics NV and its subsidiaries (“ST”) reserve the right to make changes, corrections, enhancements,
modifications, and improvements to ST products and/or to this document at any time without notice. Purchasers should
obtain the latest relevant information on ST products before placing orders. ST products are sold pursuant to ST’s terms
and conditions of sale in place at the time of order acknowledgement.
Purchasers are solely responsible for the choice, selection, and use of ST products and ST assumes no liability for
application assistance or the design of Purchasers’ products.
No license, express or implied, to any intellectual property right is granted by ST herein.
Resale of ST products with provisions different from the information set forth herein shall void any warranty granted by ST
for such product.
ST and the ST logo are trademarks of ST. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners.
Information in this document supersedes and replaces information previously supplied in any prior versions of this
document.
© 2017 STMicroelectronics - All rights reserved
www.st.com