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3e Technologies International, Inc.
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
3e-543
AirGuard iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic
Module
HW Versions 1.0
FW Versions 1.0
Security Policy
Version 1.0
January 2014
Copyright 2012 by 3e Technologies International.
This document may freely be reproduced and distributed in its entirety.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS................................................................................................. 3
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 4
1.1. PURPOSE ............................................................................................................... 4
1.2. DEFINITION ........................................................................................................... 4
1.3. PORTS AND INTERFACES........................................................................................ 5
1.4. SCOPE.................................................................................................................... 6
2. ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION................................................ 6
2.1 ROLES & SERVICES ............................................................................................... 7
2.2 AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS AND STRENGTH ................................................. 7
2.3 SERVICES .............................................................................................................. 8
3. SECURE OPERATION AND SECURITY RULES ........................................... 10
3.1. SECURITY RULES................................................................................................. 10
3.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY TAMPER EVIDENCE............................................................ 10
4. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................................... 12
5. SECURITY RELEVANT DATA ITEMS ............................................................ 12
5.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS........................................................................... 12
5.2. SELF-TESTS ......................................................................................................... 12
5.2.1 Power-on Self-tests ..................................................................................... 12
5.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND SRDIS.................................................................... 13
6. DESIGN ASSURANCE.......................................................................................... 14
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Glossary of terms
CO Cryptographic Officer
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
MAC Medium Access Control
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SRDI Security Relevant Data Item
ISA International Society of Automation
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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose
This document describes the non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for
3e Technologies International„s ISA 100.11a wireless sensor product, the 3e-543
AirGuard iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module (Hardware Versions: HW V1.0,
Firmware Versions: 1.0). This policy was created to satisfy the requirements of FIPS
140-2 Level 2. It defines 3eTI‟s security policy and explains how the 3e-543 AireGuard
iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module meets the FIPS 140-2 security
requirements.
The figure below shows the 3e-543 Secure Access Point Cryptographic Module.
Figure 1 – 3e-543 AirGuard iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module
1.2. Definition
The 3e-543 AirGuard iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module is a device which
consists of electronic hardware, embedded software and an enclosure. For purposes of
FIPS 140-2, the module is considered to be a multi-chip embedded module. The 3e-543
AirGuard iField Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module is enclosed in a tamper-resistant
opaque metal enclosure, protected by tamper-evident tape intended to provide physical
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security shown in figure 1. The module‟s cryptographic boundary is the metal enclosure.
The components attached to the underside of the PCB and the components (RTC, reset
delay chip, logic gates, and resistors, underside of chip pads, impedance beads and
capacitors) which reside outside of the protective "can" of the module are excluded from
FIPS requirements. This device always runs in FIPS mode. The table below lists the
security level of this module.
Table 1 – Module Security Level
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module
Specification
2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and
Interfaces
2
3 Roles, Services, and
Authentication
2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC11 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
14 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
2
1.3. Ports and Interfaces
The module provides sensor analog and digital connection pins, one wireless radio, LEDs
and USB port for serial management session communication and power input as shown
in the figure below:
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ISA 100.11a
RADIO
EnergyMicro CPU
Sensor Terminals
GPIO/Analog
RF
RAM
FLASH
FIPS Boundary
USB connector
USB
POWER
External power
EEPROM
Figure 2 – 3e-543 Wireless Sensor Cryptographic Module High Level Block
Diagram
The ports are defined below:
a. Status output: USB port and LED (GPIO) pins
b. Data output: Radio interface
c. Data input: Radio interface, USB port and sensor terminal pins
d. Control input: USB port, radio interface and reset pin
e. Power port
1.4. Scope
This document covers the secure operation of the 3e-543 AirGuard iField Wireless
Sensor Cryptographic Module, including the initialization, roles and responsibilities of
operating the product in a secure, FIPS-compliant manner, and a description of the
Security Relevant Data Items (SRDIs).
2. Roles, Services, and Authentication
The product software supports three separate roles. The set of services available to each
role is defined in this section. The product authenticates an operator‟s role by verifying
his/her password or possession of a shared secret.
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2.1 Roles & Services
The product supports the following authorized roles for operators:
Crypto Officer Role: The Crypto officer (CO) role performs all security functions
provided by the product. This role performs cryptographic initialization and management
functions (e.g., module initialization, input/output of cryptographic keys and SRDIs,
audit functions and Administrator user management). The Crypto Officer authenticates
to the product using a username and password (8-32 characters).
Administrator User Role: This role performs general product configuration. No CO
security functions are available to the Administrator. The Administrator can also reboot
the product if deemed necessary. The Administrator authenticates to the product using a
username and password (8-32 characters).
Device Role: The purpose of the device role is to describe other devices as they interact
with this Cryptographic Module, including:
- Other ISA 100.11a wireless sensor
- ISA 100.11a wireless gateway
The Device Role has access to the data encryption and decryption service (AES-CCM).
The is the only FIPS 140-2 corresponding “User” role.
NetUser Role: This is a special administrator role assumed by the ISA100 Gateway
device when the Gateway loads firmware into the module using the encrypted wireless
data link. The NetUser authenticates to the module with user name and password. The
only extra service available to this role is to load firmware over wireless link.
2.2 Authentication Mechanisms and Strength
The following table summarizes the roles and the type of authentication supported for
each role:
Table 2 – Authentication versus Roles
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
Crypto Officer
Administrator User
NetUser
ID-based Userid and password
Device
ISA100.11a wireless
sensor
ISA 100.11a wireless
gateway
Static key
Static key
The possession of network join
key, identifiable with MAC
address
The possession of the network
join key, identifiable with MAC
address
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The following table identifies the strength of authentication for each authentication
mechanism supported:
Table 3 – Strength of Authentication
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Userid and password (8-32 chars) Minimum 8 characters => 94^8 =
6.096E15
Static key 128 bits => 2^128 = 3.40E38
The module halts (introduces a delay) for one second (initial value and keep
incrementing) after each unsuccessful authentication attempt by Crypto Officer or
Administrator. The highest rate of authentication attempts to the module is one attempt
per second. This translates to 60 attempts per minute. Therefore the probability for
multiple attempts to use the module's authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period is 60/(94^8), or less than (9.84E-15).
As for the wireless device, the IEEE 15.4 network join key is 128 bits, the probability for
a random attempt to succeed is 1:2128
. The fastest network connection supported by the
module is 256 Kbps. Hence at most (256 ×103
× 60 = 1.536x107
) 1,536,000bits of data
can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is less than 1: (2128
/ 1.536x107
),
which is less than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
2.3 Services
The Crypto Officer and Administrator can configure the module while Device users can
only use the encryption/decryption service of the module. The table below details the
roles and available services
Table 4- Services and Roles
Service and
Purpose
Details Crypto
Officer
Administrator Device NetUser
Input of Keys Network Join key
Firmware
verification key
X
Create and
manage
Administrator
user
Support up to 10
administrator
users
X
Change password Administrator
change his own
password only
X X
Load Firmware Upload new
firmware to the
X X
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module
Show system
status
View traffic
status and
systems log
excluding
security audit log
X X
Key zeroization
via reboot
X X
View Audit Log View security
audit logs
X
Factory default Delete all
configurations
and set device
back to factory
default state
X X
Sensor setting
and other general
configuration
X X
Wireless data
encryption &
decryption
X X
Please note that the Crypto Officer should only load the NIST FIPS validated firmware as
indicated in this document. Loading invalidated firmware will result in the module
operating in non-validated mode.
The table below shows the services and their access rights to the Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs)
Table 5- CSPs and Access by Services
Service and Purpose CSPs Access
Input of Keys Network Join key
Firmware verification key
Write
Create and manage Administrator
user
Administrator Password Read and Write
Change password CryptoOfficer, Administrator or
NetUser password
Read and Write
Show system status None None
Key zeroization via reboot All Write
Factory default Delete all configurations and set
device back to factory default
state
Write
Sensor setting and other general
configuration
None None
Wireless data encryption &
decryption
Execute
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3. Secure Operation and Security Rules
By factory default, the device is put in FIPS mode with NO security setting, and the radio
is turned on but the network join key is not configured.
In order to operate the product securely, each operator shall be aware of the security rules
enforced by the module and shall adhere to the physical security rules and secure
operation rules detailed in this section.
3.1. Security Rules
The following product security rules must be followed by the operator in order to ensure
secure operation:
1. The Crypto Officer shall not share any key, or SRDI used by the product with any
other operator or entity.
2. The Crypto officer is responsible for inspecting the tamper evident seals. Other
signs of tamper include wrinkles, tears and marks on or around the label.
3. The Crypto Officer shall change the default password when configuring the
product for the first time. The default password shall not be used. The module
software also enforces the password change upon Crypto Officer‟s first log in.
4. The Crypto Officer shall login to make sure radio join key and configured and
applied in the device.
3.2. Physical Security Tamper Evidence
The physical security provided is intended to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security
(i.e. tamper evidence). The tamper evidence tape is applied at the factory. Crypto Officer
should check the integrity of the tape at the first time using the crypto module and later at
one year interval. In case he/she notices any damage or missing seals, the Crypto Officer
shall treat the device no longer in FIPS mode of operation and shall power off the device.
The picture below shows the physical interface side of 3e-543 enclosure with tamper-
evident seals.
Figure 3 – 3e-543 with tamper seals
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4. Operational Environment
This module uses Energy Micro EFM32 processor with 3eTI embedded firmware. The
firmware version is 1.0.
5. Security Relevant Data Items
This section specifies the product‟s Security Relevant Data Items (SRDIs) as well as the
product-enforced access control policy.
5.1. Cryptographic Algorithms
The product supports the following FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms. The
algorithms are listed below, along with their corresponding CAVP certificate numbers.
3e Technologies International Inc. Sensor Cryptographic Library Algorithm
Implementation version 1.0
AES: #2251
SHS: SHA-1, SHA-256 #1939
HMAC: SHA-1, SHA-256 #1379
ECDSA verify with P256 curve #359
NIVIS Radio Hardware Encryption Engine
AES (CCM, CMAC) #1611
5.2. Self-tests
POST (Power on Self Tests) is performed on each boot. A command to reboot the device
is considered on-demand self test “Crypto Officer” can send reboot command from serial
console GUI.
5.2.1 Power-on Self-tests
3eTI 543 Sensor Cryptographic Module Power-on self-tests include all known answers
test for algorithms listed above.
AES CCM 128 – encrypt KAT
AES CCM 128 – decrypt KAT
SHA-1, SHA-256 KAT
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
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*ECDSA verification is supported by the module. There is no separate test for it since the
integrity test meets the requirement.
NIVIS Radio Hardware Encryption Engine Power-on self-tests:
AES CCM 128 bit –encrypt KAT
AES CCM 128 bit –decrypt KAT
Software Integrity Test
Firmware Integrity Test with ECDSA P256 curve verify
Radio firmware Integrity Test with ECDSA P256 curve verify
Firmware integrity is performed at POST (Power On Self Test) during module boot up.
5.2.2 Conditional Self-tests
Whenever a firmware package (for the application processor) is uploaded through
GUI console over USB port or over the air, the package integrity check is performed
before the firmware can be updated. The firmware package is digitally signed with 3eTI
ECDSA private key and the crypto module performs ECDSA verify before accepting the
firmware.
Whenever a radio firmware is uploaded either through the GUI console or Over
the Air (OTA), the radio firmware‟s integrity is checked via ECDSA before acceptance.
Then the radio is rebooted with the newly updated firmware and all self tests are
performed again.
Whenever a key is input through the local USB console, double entries are
required the two entries are compare to make sure the contents are identical. In case of
inconsistent key entries, the key input will be rejected.
5.3 Cryptographic Keys and SRDIs
The module contains the following security relevant data items:
Table 6 - SRDIs
Keys/CSPs
Key/CSP Type Generation/ Output Storage Zeroization Use
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Input
Operator
passwords
ASCII string Input over
serial console
Not output Hashed value
is stored in
EEPROM
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings.
Used to
authenticate
CryptoOfficer
Or
Administrator
User
Firmware
verification
key
ECDSA
public key
Embedded in
firmware at
compile time.
One
additional key
can be input
through serial
console
Not output Plaintext in
flash
N/A Used for
firmware
digital
signature
verification
ISA 100.11a
radio network
join key
AES key
(HEX string)
Updated value
through serial
console and
stored in
EEPROM
Not output Plaintext in
FLASH
Plaintext in
Radio FLASH
storage
Zeroized
when
firmware is
upgraded or
new value is
input through
local
management
console.
Used to
communicate
with ISA
100.11a
Gateway and
data packets
encryption/de
cryption
(AES_CCM)
HMAC Key ASCII string
4-64 chars
Input over
serial console
Not output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when reset to
factory
settings or
changed via
console
Message
authentication
Application
Data
Encryption
Key
AES_CCM
Key (HEX
string)
Input over
serial console
No output Plaintext in
flash
Zeroized
when new
values is input
or at factory
default
Used to
encrypt the
application
level data
6. Design Assurance
All source code and design documentation for this module are stored in version control
system CVS. The module is coded in C with module‟s components directly
corresponding to the security policy‟s rules of operation. Functional Specification is also
provided.