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Juniper Networks SRX345, SRX345-DUAL-AC, SRX380 and
SRX1500 Services Gateways
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 1.0
Date: 13 December, 2021
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................7
1.2 Mode of Operation.......................................................................................................................9
1.3 Zeroization..................................................................................................................................10
2 Cryptographic Functionality......................................................................................... 11
2.1 Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................11
2.2 Allowed Algorithms....................................................................................................................14
2.3 Allowed Protocols ......................................................................................................................14
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms................................................................................................................15
2.5 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................................................16
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 18
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles .......................................................................18
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................18
3.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................19
3.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................20
4 Self-tests ..................................................................................................................... 22
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 24
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions...................................24
5.2 SRX380 (14 seals) .......................................................................................................................24
5.3 SRX345 (23 seals) .......................................................................................................................25
5.4 SRX345 Dual-AC (23 seals)..........................................................................................................28
5.5 SRX1500 (8 seals) .......................................................................................................................30
6 Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 33
7 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 34
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configuration ...........................................................................................5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................6
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – SRX Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions ...................................................................11
Table 5 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions ......................................................11
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................12
Table 7 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................13
Table 8 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................13
Table 9 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................14
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................................14
Table 11 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode................................................................................................14
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................16
Table 13 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................................17
Table 14 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................19
Table 15 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................19
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................19
Table 17 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................20
Table 18 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................21
Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................24
Table 20 – References.................................................................................................................................34
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................35
Table 22 – Datasheet ..................................................................................................................................35
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List of Figures
Figure 1– SRX345 (Front) ..............................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 – SRX345 (Rear)...............................................................................................................................7
Figure 3 – SRX345-DUAL-AC (Front)..............................................................................................................7
Figure 4 – SRX345 -DUAL-AC(Rear)...............................................................................................................7
Figure 5 – SRX380 (Front) .............................................................................................................................8
Figure 6 – (Rear)............................................................................................................................................8
Figure 7 - SRX1500 (Front) ............................................................................................................................8
Figure 8– SRX1500 (Rear)..............................................................................................................................8
Figure 9 – SRX380 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (front)........................................................................25
Figure 10 – SRX 380 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear) .....................................................................25
Figure 11 – SRX345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front) .....................................................................26
Figure 12 – SRX 345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear) .....................................................................27
Figure 13 – SRX 345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS) .......................................................................27
Figure 14 – SRX345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS)........................................................................28
Figure 15 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front) .......................................................28
Figure 16 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (Top)..........................................................29
Figure 17 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear) ........................................................29
Figure 18 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS)..........................................................30
Figure 19 - SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS) ..........................................................30
Figure 20 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front) ...................................................................31
Figure 21 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Rear).....................................................................31
Figure 22 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS)......................................................................32
Figure 23 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS)......................................................................32
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential
capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of
users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in
a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end
user experience. All models run Juniper’s Junos OS 20.2R1 firmware. The Junos OS firmware is FIPS-
compliant when configured in FIPS-MODE called JUNOS-FIPS-MODE, version 20.2R1.
This Security Policy covers the
 SRX345,
 SRX345-DUAL-AC,
 SRX380 and
 SRX1500 models.
The firmware image is junos-srxsme-20.2R1.10.tgz for the models SRX345, SRX345-DUAL-AC and
SRX380; and junos-srxentedge-x86-64-20.2R1.10.tgz for the SRX1500 model. The firmware status service
identifies itself as “Junos 20.2R1.10”.
The cryptographic module is defined as a multiple-chip standalone module that executes the Junos OS
20.1R1 firmware on the Juniper Networks SRX345, SRX345-DUAL-AC, SRX380 and SRX1500 models listed
in the table below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configuration
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX345 SRX345 Junos OS 20.2R1 8 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
SRX345-DUAL-
AC
SRX345-DUAL-AC Junos OS 20.2R1 8 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
Dual AC PSU
SRX380 SRX380 Junos OS 20.2R1 16 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
SRX1500 SRX1500 SYS-JB-AC Junos OS 20.2R1 12x1GbE ports; 4x1GbE SFP ports;
4x10GbE SFP ports+; 2 PIM slots (not
used in validation)
AC PSU
SRX1500 SYS-JB-DC Junos OS 20.2R1 12x1GbE ports; 4x1GbE SFP ports;
4x10GbE SFP ports+; 2 PIM slots (not
used in validation)
DC PSU
All JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-
LBLS
N/A Tamper-Evident Seals
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The difference between the hardware versions of the SRX1500 model is regarding the use of AC or DC
current power. This difference is considered non-security relevant.
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 2
2 Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-test 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
The modules have a non-modifiable limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
They include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the
scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into
the module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figures 1-8 below. The cryptographic boundary is defined
as the outer edge of the chassis. The module does not rely on external devices for input and output of
critical security parameters (CSPs).
Figure 1– SRX345 (Front)
Figure 2 – SRX345 (Rear)
Figure 3 – SRX345-DUAL-AC (Front)
Figure 4 – SRX345 -DUAL-AC(Rear)
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Figure 5 – SRX380 (Front)
Figure 6 – (Rear)
Figure 7 - SRX1500 (Front)
Figure 8– SRX1500 (Rear)
The following table maps each logical interface type defined in the FIPS 140-2 standard to one or more
`physical interfaces.
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet (data) LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Ethernet (mgmt.) Remote management. Control in, Data in, Status out, Data out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power Power connector Power in
Reset Button Reset Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Firmware load port/Storage device Tamper Evident Label – Inaccessible
HA Cluster Control Ports Tamper Evident Label – Inaccessible
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1.2 Mode of Operation
The Junos OS firmware image must be installed on the device by executing the following command from
the command line interface in the version of Junos OS running on the device:
user@host> request system software add /<image-path>/<junos package> no-copy no-
validate reboot
where /<image path>/<junos package>point to the Junos OS 20.2R1 firmware image file.
Once the image is installed, the Crypto-Officer (CO) shall follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the
tamper seals to the module. Next, the module is configured in FIPS-MODE, as described below, and
rebooted. Once the module is rebooted and the integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial
power-on in FIPS-MODE, the module is operating in the FIPS-Approved mode. The Crypto-Officer (CO)
must create a backup image of the firmware to ensure it is also a JUNOS-FIPS-MODE image by issuing the
request system snapshot command.
If the module was previously in a non-Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
zeroize the CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3
The CO shall enable the module for FIPS mode of operation by performing the following steps.
1. Enable the FIPS mode on the device.
user@host> set system fips level 2
2. Set the root password.
user@host# set system root-authentication plain-text-password
New password: type password here
Retype new password: retype password here
3. Commit and reboot the device.
user@host> commit
When AES GCM is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must configure the
module to use IKEv2 by running the following commands:
IKE:
root@host# set security ike proposal <ike_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-256-
gcm
IPSec:
root@host# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-
128-gcm
root@host# set security ike gateway <gateway_name> version v2-only
root@host# commit
In order to ensure compliance with [IG A.13], the module must be configured to limit the number of blocks
encrypted by a specific key bundle with the Triple-DES algorithm to a value less than 2^20. Both IPsec and
IKEv2 may utilize Triple-DES encryption. In IPsec, Triple-DES may be used for transfer of data packets and
in IKEv2 Triple-DES may be utilized for re-keying operations that occur when the IPsec protocol reaches a
configured limit for the number of packets transmitted.
When Triple-DES is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IPsec, the CO must configure the IPsec
proposal lifetime-kilobytes to comply with [IG A.13] using the following command, setting <kilobytes> to
a value less than or equal to 8192 which is the maximum amount of kilobytes permitted to be encrypted
by a key:
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co@fips-srx:fips# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> lifetime-kilobytes
<kilobytes>”
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
Whenever <kilobytes> of data has been transmitted by the IPsec protocol, a re-key operation is triggered
to establish a new key bundle for IPsec. This rekey operation is negotiated by the IKE protocol. If the IKE
protocol is configured to use Triple-DES, it must also be configured to limit the number of blocks to a value
less than 2^20. Because the Maximum lifetime of IKE key is 24 hours, the IPsec limit needs to be set to
ensure that the number of rekey operations in a 24-hour period won’t cause the IKE protocol to encrypt
more than 2^20 blocks. To reduce the number of rekey operations requested by the IPsec protocol, it is
necessary to increase the number of blocks transmitted by the IPsec protocol. Therefore, when Triple-DES
is the encryption-algorithm for IKE, the lifetime-kilobytes for the associated IPsec proposal in the above
command must be greater than or equal to 6913080.
Because the lifetime-kilobytes cannot be set to a value that is less than 8192 and greater than 6913080,
Triple-DES encryption may not be used for IKE and IPsec simultaneously. e.g. if IKE is configured to use
Triple-DES, IPsec would be configured to use AES.
According to SP800-131A Rev3, the use of Triple-DES is no longer allowed after 2023. Thus, from January
1st
, 2024
The show version command will display the version of the Junos OS on the device so that the CO can
confirm it is the FIPS validated version. The CO should also verify the presence of the suffix string “:fips”
in the cli prompt, indicating the module is operating in FIPS mode.
The show configuration security ike and show configuration security ipsec commands display the
approved and configured IKE/IPsec configuration for the device operating in FIPS-approved mode.
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must run the following
commands to zeroize the Approved mode CSPs:
user@host> request system zeroize
This command wipes clean all the CSPs/configs as well as the disk. After zeroization, the device will have
to be reimaged to bring it back into FIPS mode, as all the disk partitions are securely erased. The CO must
follow the instructions in Section 1.2, including installing the FIPs validated image on the device and new
tamper evident labels after reimaging.
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer. The cryptographic officer shall
perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 below. Although the module may have been tested for additional algorithms
or modes, only those listed below are actually utilized by the module. Table 11 summarizes the allowed
high-level protocol and algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
Table 4 – SRX Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2034
C2036
AES [38A] CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
C2035
C2036
AES [38D] GCM Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
C2034
C2036
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256 Key size: 256 bits, λ = 128
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES1
[67] TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A2
KAS-SSC [56ARev3]
FFC DH
dhEphem
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-2048 (ID=24) Key Agreement Scheme (IKE in
SRX345, SRX345-DUAL-AC and
SRX380)
ECC DH
Ephemeral
Unified
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
Table 5 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2028
C2094
AES
[197] CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
[38D] GCM Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
CVL [135]
IKEv1 SHA 256, 384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 SHA 256, 384
DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
HMAC [198] SHA-256
Key size: 256bits
λ = 256
Message Authentication, KDF
Primitive
1
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A].
2
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
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SHA-384
Key size: 384 bits,
λ = 384
SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES3
[67] TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A KTS
AES-CBC Certs. C2028 and C2094, and
HMAC Certs. C2028 and C2094
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
AES-GCM Certs C2028 and C2094
Triple-DES-CBC Certs. C2028 and C2094,
and HMAC Certs. C2028 and C2094
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C2032
C2094
RSA [186]
PKCS1_V1
_5
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen, SigVer4
ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2031
C2039
AES [38A]
CBC
CTR
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
N/A5
KAS-SSC [56ARev3]
FFC DH
dhEphem
MODP-2048 (ID=14) Key Agreement Scheme (IKE/SSH)
MODP-2048 (ID=24) Key Agreement Scheme (IKE)
ECC DH
Ephemeral
Unified
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
Key Agreement Scheme (IKE)
C2031
C2039
ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen, SigVer
HMAC [198]
SHA-1
Key size: 160 bits,
λ = 160
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
3 3
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A].
4
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
5
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
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SHA-512
Key size: 512 bits,
λ = 512
Message Authentication
N/A KTS
AES-CBC Certs. C2031 and C2039, and
HMAC Certs. C2031 and C2039
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Certs. C2031 and C2039,
and HMAC Certs. C2031 and C2039
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C2031
C2039
RSA [186]
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
KeyGen6
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigVer7
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation,
KDF Primitive
Triple-DES8
[67] TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
C2031
C2039
CVL9
[56A] ECC CDH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
ECC CDH primitive used as part of
key agreement for SSH protocol
Table 7 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2033
C2040
CVL [135] SSH SHA 1, 256, 384 Key Derivation
Table 8 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2030
C2038
HMAC [198] SHA-1
Key size:160 bits,
λ = 160
Password Hashing
6
RSA 4096 KeyGen was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 KeyGen was tested and testing for RSA 4096 KeyGen is not available.
7
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
8
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A]
9
Use of ECDH is only allowed until June 30, 2022
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SHA-256
Key size:256bits,
λ = 256
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
Table 9 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C2029
C2037
DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
HMAC [198] SHA-256
Key size:256 bits,
λ = 256
DRBG Primitive
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman [IG] D.810
CVL Certs. #C2031 and #C2039 with CVL
Certs. #C2033 and #C2040; provides
between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength.
SSH key agreement including key
derivation
2.3 Allowed Protocols
Table 11 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv111
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
Diffie-Hellman (L=2048, N=2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256
EC Diffie-HellmanP-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC12
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
10
ECDH is only allowed until June 30, 2022.
11
RFC 2409 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the IKEv1 protocol
12
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A].
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IKEv213
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
Diffie-Hellman (L=2048, N=2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256
EC Diffie-HellmanP-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC14
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM15
128/256
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
IPsec ESP
IKEv1 with optional:
 Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
 Diffie-Hellman (L=2048, N=2047)
 EC Diffie-Hellman P-256
 EC Diffie-HellmanP-384
IKEv1
Triple-DES CBC16
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM17
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA1-96
HMAC-SHA-256-
128
IKEv2 with optional:
 Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
 Diffie-Hellman (L=2048, N=2047)
 EC Diffie-Hellman P-256
 EC Diffie-HellmanP-384
IKEv2
Triple-DES CBC 18
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM19
128/192/256
SSHv220
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N=2047)
RSA 2048
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC21
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1-96
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The IKE and SSH
algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In reference
to the Allowed Protocols in Table 10 above: each column of options for a given protocol is independent
and may be used in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect
(non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an
Approved mode of operation.
13
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296, from which all keys are derived, including Triple-
DES keys.
14
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A].
15
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
16
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A]
17
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
18
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023.
19
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
20
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
21
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023.
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 RSA with key size less than 2048
 ECDSA with ed25519 curve
 ECDH with ed25519 curve
 ARCFOUR
 Blowfish
 CAST
 DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
 HMAC-MD5
 HMAC-RIPEMD160
 UMAC
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
DH Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Diffie Hellman (DH) key agreement (256 bits).
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. RSA 2048,
ECDSA P-256. Used to identify the host.
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used
in SSH DH (L=2048, N=2047)
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; SSH Session
Integrity Key: HMAC
ESP-SEKs
IPSec ESP Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session
Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096 ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE-SEKs
IKE Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session
Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-DH-PRI
IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used
in IKE. DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
HMAC key
The libMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function
test.
CO-PW Password used to authenticate the CO.
User-PW Password used to authenticate the User.
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Table 13 – Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256.
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in
SSH key establishment. DH (L=2048, N=2047)
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in IKE
key establishment. DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA
P256, P-384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA
P256, P-384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Root-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package
CA at software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package
CA at software load and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using either of the identity-based operator authentication methods in section 3.2.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module
and establish VPN tunnels.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role cannot not change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-based authentication: username and password over the
Console and SSH, as well as username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication
The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human readable ASCII
characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters; thus the probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0
time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second
delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second
delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach
for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned.
This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour/60
mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of
a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/(9610
), which is less than
1/100,000.
Signature verification
Public key authentication in SSH uses either RSA or ECDSA signatures. Let 𝑥 denote the maximum number
of signature verifications that the IUT can perform in a minute. Assuming a minimum security strength of
112 bits for the signature algorithm (corresponding to 2048-bit key RSA signatures as per SP800-57 Part1
Rev3), the probability of success for a single random attempt is at most 1/2^112 , which is less than
1/10^6. It follows that the probability of a successful brute-force attack with multiple consecutive
attempts in a one-minute period is at most 𝑥/2^112 . For this probability to be greater than 1/100,000,
the number of verifications per minute should be 𝑥 > 2^112/10^5 ≅ 2^197, which is clearly an
infeasible amount of signature verifications. To see this, note that if the IUT was able to compute one
signature verification per CPU cycle, this would amount to 60 × 16 × 2.2 × 10^9 ≅ 2^41 ≪ 2^197
verifications per minute for the fastest processor, corresponding to the Cavium CN7360 processor, which
consists of 16 cores at a clock rate of 2.2 GHz. Thus, the success probability of a brute-force attack during
a one-minute period is less than 1/100,000, as required by FIPS 140-2.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 16 lists the access to CSPs by
each service.
Table 14 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security Security relevant configuration X
Configure Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status Show status X X
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) X X
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) X X
Remote reset Software initiated reset X
Load image
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into
the switch.
X
Table 15 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services
SERVICE
CSP
DRBG
Seed
DRBG
State
DRBG
Entropy
Input
DH/ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH/ECDH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E -- -- GWR -- -- -- WR GWR -- -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Zeroize Z Z Z -- Z Z Z Z Z Z -- -- -- -- Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- GE E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec
connect
-- E -- GE -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z Z
Local
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z -- Z Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts except for SSH Connect
(non-compliant) and IPSec Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security
functions identified in Section 2.4 and the SSHv2 row of Table 10. The IPsec (non-compliant) supports the
DSA in Section 2.4 and the IKEv1, IKEv2 and IPSec rows of Table 10.
Table 17 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security (non-
compliant)
Security relevant configuration X
Configure (non-
compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic (non-
compliant)
IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status (non-compliant) Show status X X
Zeroize (non-compliant) Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control
(CLI)
X X
IPsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
Console access (non-
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) X x
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Remote reset (non-
compliant)
Software initiated reset X
Load image (non-
compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the router.
X
Table 18 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-
compliant)
Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-
compliant)
Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed
successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module
enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
 Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
 Data Plane KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o DH (L=2048, N=256) KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o ECDH P-256 KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
 Control Plane QuickSec KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
 OpenSSL KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o DH (L=2048, N=256) KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o ECDH P-256 KAT
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 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
 OpenSSH KATs
o KDF-SSH KAT
 LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1
o HMAC SHA-256
o SHA-512
 Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-1
 Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment,
and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
 Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
 Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
 SP800-56A assurances as per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2,5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3, in accordance to IG
9.6.
 Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification)
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5 Physical Security Policy
The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits,
cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within
the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been
breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. (Seals
are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.) The tamper-evident
seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.
The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals
and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the
tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module
is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state.
Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper seals (part # JNPR-
FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS),
opaque metal enclosure.
Once per month by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Seals should be free of any tamper
evidence.
If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been
compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of
the module’s CSPs by following the steps in section 1.3 of the Security Policy and then follow the steps in
Section 1.2 to place the module back into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions
For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions:
 Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side.
 Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
 Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least
1 hour for the adhesive to cure.
5.2 SRX380 (14 seals)
Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
 Five (5) seals (TEL 1-5). Applied to the top of the chassis, covering one of the five chassis screws
each.
 Four (4) seals (TEL 6-9). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots.
 Two (2) seals (TEL 10 & 11). Applied to the rear panel, one covering the blank faceplate, the other
placed vertically wrapping around onto the base of the device.
 One (1) seal (TEL 15). Applied across the grounding connection, if it is not in use.
 Two (2) seals (TEL 12 & 13). Applied to the front panel on either side of the LED matrix on the left
of the device.
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 One (1) seal (TEL 14). Covering the Front USB port.
Figure 9 – SRX380 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (front)
TEL1-5 covering one of the five chassis screws each; TEL 6-9 covering the front I/O Slots; TEL 12-13 on
either side of the LED matrix; TEL 14 covering the Front USB port.
Figure 10 – SRX 380 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear)
TEL10 covering the blank faceplate, TEL11 placed vertically wrapping around onto the base of the
device and TEL15 across the grounding connection.
5.3 SRX345 (23 seals)
Tamper evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
 Five (5) seals (TEL 1-5). Applied to the top of the chassis, covering one of the five chassis screws
each.
 Four (4) seals (TEL 6-9). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots. TEL 6 shall also be used to
cover the front USB data port. All shall wrap around the top of the device.
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 Two (2) seals (TEL 10 & 11). Applied to the rear panel, one covering the blank faceplate, the other
placed vertically next to the right-most fan vent. Both shall wrap around onto the base of the
device.
 Six (6) seals (TEL 12-17). Applied to cover the chassis screws on the left-hand side of the device.
 Six (6) seals (TEL 18-23). Applied to cover the chassis screws on the right-hand side of the device.
Figure 11 – SRX345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front)
TEL 1-5 covering each of the five chassis screws. TEL 6-9 covering the front I/O Slots with TEL 6 also
covering the USB data port.
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Figure 12 – SRX 345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear)
TEL 10 covering the blank faceplate, TEL 11 placed vertically wrapping around onto the base of the
device.
Figure 13 – SRX 345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS)
TEL 12-17 covering the chassis screws on the left-hand side of the device.
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Figure 14 – SRX345 Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS)
TEL 18-23 covering the chassis screws on the right-hand side of the device.
5.4 SRX345 Dual-AC (23 seals)
Tamper evident seals must be applied to the following locations.
 Four (4) seals (TEL 1-4). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots. TEL 1 shall also be used to
cover the front USB data slot. All shall wrap around the top of the device.
 Five (5) seals (TEL 5-9). Applied to the top of the chassis, covering one of the five chassis screws
each.
 Two (2) seals (TEL 10 & 11). Applied to the rear panel, one covering the blank faceplate, the other
placed vertically next to the AC power-input. Both shall wrap around onto the base of the device.
 Six (6) seals (TEL 12-17). Applied to cover the chassis screws on the left-hand side of the device.
 Six (6) seals (TEL 18-23). Applied to cover the chassis screws on the right-hand side of the device.
Figure 15 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front)
TEL 1-4 covering the front I/O slots with TEL 1 also covering the USB data port.
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Figure 16 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (Top)
TEL 5-9 covering each of the five chassis screws.
Figure 17 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear)
TEL 11 covering the blank faceplate, TEL 10 placed vertically wrapping around onto the base of the
device.
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Figure 18 – SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS)
TEL 12-17 covering the chassis screws on the left-hand side of the device.
Figure 19 - SRX345 Dual-AC Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS)
TEL 18-23 covering the chassis screws on the right-hand side of the device.
5.5 SRX1500 (8 seals)
Tamper evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
 Two (2) seals (TEL 1 & 2). Applied vertically to the front of the chassis, one covering the USB port
and the other covering the High Availability (HA) port. Both of these shall also cover part of the
front I/O slot.
 Two (2) seals (TEL 3 & 4). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots and wrapping around to
the top of the device.
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 Two (2) seals (TEL 5 & 6). Applied to the rear panel, one covering the blank faceplate and wrapping
around the bottom of the device, the other placed vertically between the right-most and second-
right-most fan vent and wrapping around onto the top of the device.
 One (1) seals (TEL 7). Applied to cover the chassis screw on the left-hand side of the device. This
should wrap around the bottom of the device.
 One (1) seals (TEL 8). Applied to cover the chassis screw on the right-hand side of the device. This
should wrap around the bottom of the device.
Figure 20 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Front)
TEL 1 - 2 covering the USB data port and the HA port, in addition to part of the front I/O slot; TEL 3 - 4
covering the front I/O Slots.
Figure 21 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (Rear)
TEL 6 covering the blank faceplate; TEL 5 between the two fan vents wrapping around on top of the
device.
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Figure 22 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (LHS)
TEL 7 covering cover the chassis screw on the left-hand side.
Figure 23 – SRX1500 Tamper-Evident seal placement (RHS)
TEL 8 covering cover the chassis screw on the right-hand side.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically
refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements
indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext
CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the
firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to IPsec ESP lifetime-kilobytes to ensure the
module does not encrypt more than 2^20 blocks with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the
encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec ESP. The operator is required to ensure that Triple-DES keys
used in SSH do not perform more than 2^20 encryptions.
15. Use of SSH ECDH is only allowed until June 30th, 2022. From July 1st, 2022, the module should be
configured to disallow the use of ECDH in SSH.
16. Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per [SP800-131A]. From
January 1st, 2024, the module should be configured to disallow the use of Triple-DES.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Special Publication 800-
56A, March 2007
[56ARev3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Special Publication 800-
56A Revision 3, April 2018
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-
1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, Revision 2,
November 2017
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
June 2015
Copyright Juniper, 2021 Version 1.0 Page 35 of 35
Juniper Networks Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[133] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, Special Publication 800-133, Revision 1, July 2019
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
Table 22 – Datasheet
Model Title URL
SRX345,
SRX345-DUAL-
AC, SRX380
SRX300 Line of Services Gateways for the
Branch
https://www.juniper.net/assets/uk/en/l
ocal/pdf/datasheets/1000550-en.pdf
SRX1500 SRX1500 Services Gateway
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/l
ocal/pdf/datasheets/1000551-en.pdf