Ruckus Wireless LLC
Ruckus Networks Virtual SmartZone - Data Plane (vSZ-D)
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Page 2 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 7
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................14
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................15
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................15
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................16
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................16
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................16
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................32
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................32
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status..............................................................................................33
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................33
4.8 Additional Information......................................................................................................33
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................33
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................33
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................33
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................33
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................33
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................34
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................34
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................34
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................34
Page 3 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................34
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................35
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................35
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................49
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................50
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................50
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................50
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................54
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................55
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................57
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................57
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................57
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................58
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................58
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................58
Page 4 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 6
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 7
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation ..................................... 8
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation ................................ 9
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................10
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................14
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................14
Table 10: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................15
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................16
Table 12: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................18
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................18
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................32
Table 15: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................34
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................34
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................35
Table 18: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................42
Table 19: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................49
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................50
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................54
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................54
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................55
Table 24: Error States...............................................................................................................57
List of Figures
Figure 1 Block Diagram.............................................................................................................. 6
Page 5 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
1 General
1.1 Overview
The Ruckus Networks Virtual SmartZone - Data Plane (vSZ-D) offers organizations more
flexibility in deploying the dataplane as needed in a Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
architecture aligned fashion. It offers secure tunneling of user data traffic that encrypts payload
traffic, maintains flat network topology, enables mobility across L2 subnets, and offers
differentiated per site policy control and QoS amongst others.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This is Ruckus Wireless LLC. non-proprietary security policy for Ruckus Networks Virtual
SmartZone - Data Plane (vSZ-D) (hereinafter referred to as vDP or Module), version 7.1.1.3.
The following describes how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP
800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 1 software cryptographic module. The Module,
is the dataplane component for a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) based WLAN
Controller for customers requiring a carrier-class solution that can be deployed on-premises or
hosted in hyperscaler environments.
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The Module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software module. Figure 1 below depicts the
cryptographic boundary (orange color area) and the physical perimeter defined as the tested
Page 6 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
platform’s hard case enclosure around which everything runs. The cryptographic boundary
includes all of the software components of the cryptographic libraries. The physical perimeter is
the Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) on which the Module runs.
The Module performs no communication other than with the calling application (the process that
invokes the Module services).
Figure 1 Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
vdp-7.1.1.3 7.1.1.3 RSA 4096 SigVer
with SHA2-384
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Page 7 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
SmartZone OS
7.1.1.3
Dell PowerEdge
R660xs
Intel Xeon Silver
4410Y
Yes VMware ESXi
8.0
7.1.1.3
SmartZone OS
7.1.1.3
Dell PowerEdge
R660xs
Intel Xeon Silver
4410Y
No VMware ESXi
8.0
7.1.1.3
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode of
Operation
The Module is always in the
approved mode of operation after
initial operations are performed.
Approved Approved mode
indicator: "FIPS
compliance is Enable"
Table 4: Modes List and Description
After the Module is configured in the Approved mode of operation as outlined in Section 11 of
this document, it will be ready to operate in the Approved mode. The Module does not claim the
implementation of a degraded mode operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7301 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A7301 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 256
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A7301 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 384
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A7301 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 512
FIPS 198-1
Page 8 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA2-256 A7301 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7301 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7301 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation
Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7302 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A7302 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7302 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
Counter
DRBG
A7302 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0-128 Increment
8, Additional Input: 0-256 Increment 8, Additional
Input: 0-320 Increment 8, Additional Input: 0-384
Increment 8
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 128, Entropy Input:
192, Entropy Input: 256, Entropy Input: 320, Entropy
Input: 384
Nonce - Nonce: 0, Nonce: 128, Nonce: 64
Personalization String Length - Personalization
String Length: 0-128 Increment 8, Personalization
String Length: 0-256 Increment 8, Personalization
String Length: 0-320 Increment 8, Personalization
String Length: 0-384 Increment 8
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7302 Curve - P-256, P-384 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7302 Curve - P-256, P-384 FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A7302 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 256
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A7302 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 384
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A7302 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 512
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7302 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-
384, P-521
Scheme -
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Page 9 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7302 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - MODP-
2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144,
MODP-8192
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A7302 Initiator Nonce Length - Initiator Nonce Length: 128-
2048 Increment 8
Responder Nonce Length - Responder Nonce
Length: 128-2048 Increment 8
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret Length: 2048-3072 Increment 8
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying
Material Length: 1056-3072 Increment 8
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH
(CVL)
A7302 Cipher - AES-128, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7302 Modulo - 3072 FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7302 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
Mask Function - MGF1
Public Exponent Mode - random
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
A7302 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-3072,
MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA2-256 A7302 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7302 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7302 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.3
KDF (CVL)
A7302 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation
As the Module can only be operated in the Approved mode of operation, and any algorithms not
listed in the tables above will be rejected by the Module while in the Approved mode, the options
defined in SP 800-140B for the following categories are missing from this document.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Page 10 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A The cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per section 4 example 1
in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) and FIPS
140-3 IG D.H. A seed (i.e., the random value)
used in asymmetric key generation is a direct
output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG
(A7302)
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for SSHv2
service
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 192
and 256 bits of
security
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, Path
2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7302)
Curve: P-384, P-
521
KDF SSH:
(A7302)
Counter DRBG:
(A7302)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for
TLSv1.3 service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength
IG:IG D.F
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7302)
Curve: P-256
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A7302)
Counter DRBG:
Page 11 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Scenario 2, Path
2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
(A7302)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for IKEv2
service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 192
bits of security
strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, Path
2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7302)
Curve: P-384
KDF IKEv2:
(A7302)
Counter DRBG:
(A7302)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-FFC
Key Agreement
used for IKEv2
service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 196 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, Path
2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7302)
Domain
Parameter
Generation:
MODP2048,
MODP3072,
MODP4096,
MODP6144,
MODP8192
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A7302)
KDF IKEv2:
(A7302)
Counter DRBG:
(A7302)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KTS (SSHv2
with AES-GCM)
KTS-Unwrap KTS via SSHv2
service by using
AES-GCM
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
AES-GCM:
(A7302)
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
Page 12 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
security strength
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG:IG D.G use of
any approved
authenticated
symmetric
encryption mode
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen for
SSHv2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Modulus: 3072
bits
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKev2)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
for SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Curve: P-384
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
ECDSA SigGen
(TLSv1.3)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
for TLSv1.3
service
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Curve: P-256
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer for
SSHv2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Modulus: 3072
bits
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
for SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Curve: P-384
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
ECDSA SigVer
(TLSv1.3)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
for TLSv1.3
services
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Curve: P-256
SHA2-512:
(A7302)
SSHv2 Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
SSHv2 session
protection.
AES-GCM:
(A7302)
Page 13 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SSHv2 session
keying materials,
used to derive
SSHv2 session
keys.
KDF SSH:
(A7302)
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth TLSv1.3 session
protection &
authentication
AES-GCM:
(A7302)
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
TLSv1.3 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.3 session
keying materials,
used to derive
TLS session
keys
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A7302)
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
IPsec/IKEv2
session
protection
AES-CBC:
(A7301, A7302)
Key Length:
128, 192, 256
bits
AES-GCM:
(A7302)
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authentication
MAC IPsec/IKEv2
session
authentication
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A7301,
A7302)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A7301,
A7302)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A7301,
A7302)
SHA2-256:
(A7301, A7302)
SHA2-384:
(A7301, A7302)
SHA2-512:
(A7301, A7302)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF IPsec/IKEv2
session keying
materials, used
to derive
IPsec/IKEv2
session keys
KDF IKEv2:
(A7302)
Software Load
Test
DigSig-SigVer Digital signature
verification for
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7302)
Page 14 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
software load
test
Modulus: 4096
SHA2-384:
(A7302)
DRBG Function DRBG Used for DRBG
generation
Counter DRBG:
(A7302)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• Algorithm Cert. #A7301 & #A7302 was tested for the OE with PAA and non-PAA.
• For SSHv2, the Module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation
Guidance C.H scenario #1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.
• For TLS 1.3, the Module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of
Scenario #1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS
1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the cipher suites that explicitly select
AES-GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The Module
supports acceptable AES-GCM cipher suites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52 Rev2. The
Module implements, within its boundary, an IV generation unit for TLS 1.3 that keeps
control of the 64-bit counter value within the AES-GCM IV. If the exhaustion condition is
observed, the Module will return an error indication to the calling application, who will
then need to either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new key for AES-GCM), or
terminate the connection
• The Module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED
from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. Two keys established by IKEv2
for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the
parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or
server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the Module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic Module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133 Rev2. The resulting
generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from
SP800-90A Rev1 DRBG.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E233 Fortanix, Inc.
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
Page 15 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Fortanix DRNG
RDSEED Entropy
Source (Sapphire
Rapids-MCC)
Physical Intel Xeon
Silver 4410Y
128 bits Full
Entropy
AES-CBC-MAC
(A5245)
Table 10: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with
SP 800- 133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1
approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are
implemented:
• Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.2, which
maps to SP 800-56Arev3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3
(“Testing Candidates”) is used.
• ECC (ECDH) key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which
maps to FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix A.2.2 of FIPS 186-5 (“Testing
Candidates”) is used.
Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:
• SSHv2 KDF, TLSv1.3 KDF (RFC 7627), IKEv2 KDF: compliant with SP 800-135r1.
These implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the
SSHv2, TLSv1.3 and IKEv2 protocols, respectively.
Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized
after processing the service
2.10 Key Establishment
The Module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of
operation:
KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
• The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE).
• Note that the module only implements domain parameter generation, key pair generation
and verification, and shared secret computation:
o IKE (RFC 3526):
▪ MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
▪ MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
▪ MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
Page 16 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
▪ MODP-6144 (ID = 17)
▪ MODP-8192 (ID = 18)
KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The Module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. No parts of SSH,
TLS and IPSec/IKEv2 protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input Arguments for an API that provide the data to be used for
processed by the Module.
N/A Data Output Arguments output from an API call.
N/A Control Input Arguments for an API call used to control and configure Module
operation.
N/A Control
Output
N/A
N/A Status Output Return values, and/or log messages.
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in
Table 2. The Module provides its logical interfaces via Application Programming Interface (API)
calls. The logical interfaces provided by the Module are mapped onto the FIPS 140-3 interfaces
(data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as follows.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
Password The minimum length is
fifteen (15) characters
(94 possible
characters).
Password
Based
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed or a
false
acceptance
will occur is
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within one
minute is 10/(94^15),
which is less than
1/100,000.
Page 17 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
1/(94^15)
which is less
than
1/1,000,000.
RSA-
Based
Certificate
The Module supports
RSA public-key based
authentication
mechanism using a
minimum of RSA 3072
bits, which provides 128
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^128)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the module at its highest
can support at most
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128),
which is less than
1/100,000.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7302)
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details
ECDSA-
Based
Certificate
The Modules support
ECDSA public-key
based authentication
mechanism using a
minimum of curve P-
256, which provides 128
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^128)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the Module at its highest
can support at most
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7302)
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^128)
which is less
than
1/1,000,000.
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details.
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
Module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details.
Page 18 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
Module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128),
which is less than
1/100,000.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity Crypto Officer Password
RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
User Identity User Password
RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
Access Point Identity User RSA-Based Certificate
Table 13: Roles
The Module supports Crypto Officer (CO) role, User role, and Access Point (AP) role.
4.3 Approved Services
The following tables detail the types of approved services available to each role in approved
mode of operation, the types of access for each role and the Keys or SSPs they affect.
• Generate G
• Read Access R
• Write Access W
• Execute Access E
• Zeroize Z
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show
Status
Provide
Module's
current
status
N/A API
command
to show
status.
Module's
current
status.
None Crypto
Officer
User
Access
Point
Page 19 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show
Version
Provide
Module's
name/ID
and
versioning
information
N/A Command
s `show
cpuinfo`
and `show
fips-
version`
Module's
name/ID
and
versioning
information
None Crypto
Officer
User
Access
Point
Reboot/Perf
orm Self-
Tests
Perform
Self-Tests
(Pre-
operational
self-tests
and
Conditiona
l Self-
Tests)
after
reboot.
N/A API
commands
to conduct
on-
demand
Self-Tests.
Status of
the self-
tests
results.
None Crypto
Officer
User
Perform
Zeroization
Perform
Zeroization
.
N/A API
commands
to conduct
Zeroization
operation
or Power
down the
tested
platform.
Status of
the SSPs
zeroization
.
None Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value: Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
Z
- User
Password:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
Private
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
Peer
ECDH
Public
Page 20 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- SSHv2
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- SSHv2
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
Peer
ECDH
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Page 21 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Shared
Secret: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
Master
Secret: Z
- TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Private
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer DH
Public
Key: Z
Page 22 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Private
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer
ECDH
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Private
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Peer
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
Page 23 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
2 ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Pre-
Shared
Secret: Z
-
SKEYSEE
D: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authentica
tion Key: Z
Crypto
Officer
Authenticati
on
Crypto
Officer
Role
Authentica
tion
N/A Crypto
Officer
Authentica
tion
Request
Status of
the Crypto
Officer
Authenticat
ion
None Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key: W,E
User
Authenticati
on
User Role
Authentcat
ion
N/A User
Authentica
tion
Requset
Status of
the User
Authenticat
ion
None User
- User
Password:
W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public
Page 24 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key: W,E
Access
Point
Authenticati
on
Access
Point Role
Authentcat
ion
N/A Access
Point
Authentica
tion
Request
Status of
the Access
Point
Authenticat
ion
None Access
Point
- AP
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
Configure
Network
Sets
configurati
on of the
systems.
N/A API
commands
to
configure
the
Module.
Status of
the
completion
of network
related
configurati
on.
None Crypto
Officer
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
SSHv2
configurat
ion
success
status
message.
API
commands
to
configure
SSHv2.
API
commands
to
configure
SSHv2.
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
- SSHv2
RSA
Private
Key: W
- SSHv2
RSA
Public
Key: W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private
Key: W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public
Key: W
Configure
TLSv1.3
Function
Configure
TLSv1.3
Function.
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
TLSv1.3
configurat
API
commands
to
configure
TLSv1.3
Status of
the
completion
of TLSv1.3
configurati
on.
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Private
Key: W
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Public
Key: W
Page 25 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ion
success
status
message.
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private
Key: W
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public
Key: W
Configure
IPsec/IKEv2
Functions
Configure
IPsec/IKEv
2
Functions
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
with
IPsec/IKE
v2
configurat
ion
success
status
message.
API
commands
to
configure
IPsec/IKEv
2.
Status of
the
completion
of
IPsec/IKEv
2 secure
tunnel
configurati
on.
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Private
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Public
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Private
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Public
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Pre-
Shared
Secret: W
Run SSHv2
Function
Execute
SSHv2
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
Successf
ul SSHv2
log
message.
API
commands
to execute
SSHv2
service.
Status of
SSHv2
secure
tunnel
establishm
ent.
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
Crypto
Officer
- SSHv2
ECDH
Private
Key:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R,W
- SSHv2
Peer
Page 26 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
IPsec/IKev2
)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
ECDH
Public
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
RSA
Private
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
RSA
Public
Key: R,W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public
Key: R,W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
Page 27 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,W,E
User
- SSHv2
ECDH
Private
Key:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R,W
- SSHv2
Peer
ECDH
Public
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
RSA
Private
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
RSA
Public
Key: R,W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public
Key: R,W
- SSHv2
Page 28 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,W,E
Run
TLSv1.3
Function
Execute
TLSv1.3
Function.
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
Successf
ul
TLSv1.3
log
message.
API
command
to execute
TLSv1.3
service.
Status of
TLSv1.3
establishm
ent.
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.3)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
TLSv1.3
Crypto
Officer
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private
Key:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R,W
- TLSv1.3
Peer
ECDH
Public
Key: W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Page 29 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
Private
Key: W,E
- TLSv1.3
RSA
Public
Key: R,W
- TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private
Key: W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public
Key: R,W
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
- TLSv1.3
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,W,E
Page 30 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Run
IPsec/IKEv2
Functions
Execute
IPsec/IKEv
2
Functions
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
Successf
ul
IPsec/IKE
v2 log
message.
API
command
to execute
IPsec/IKEv
2
Status of
IPsec/IKEv
2 secure
tunnel
establishm
ent
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKev2
)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticati
on
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Private
Key:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Public
Key:
G,R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer DH
Public
Key: W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Private
Key:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer
ECDH
Public
Key: W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
Page 31 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Private
Key: W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Public
Key: R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Private
Key: W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Public
Key: R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Peer
Public
Key:
R,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Pre-
Shared
Secret:
W,E
-
SKEYSEE
D: G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key:
G,W,E
Page 32 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,W,E
Software
Load Test
Execute
the
Software
Load Test
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
complian
ce is
Enable"
and
successfu
l Software
Loading
status
message
Command
s to load
new
software
image
Outcome
of the
Software
Load Test
Software
Load Test
Crypto
Officer
- Software
Load Test
Key: R,E
Table 14: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The Module supports the software load test by using RSA 4096 SigVer with SHA2-384 (Cert.
#A7302) for the new validated software to be uploaded into the Module. A Software Load Test
Key was preloaded to the Module’s binary at the factory and used for software load test. In
order to load new software, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the Module before loading
the software. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the Module is not performed.
Page 33 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
The Module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the
verification fails.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
N/A for this module.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The Module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator
request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to
executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the Module conducts two
independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a
single error.
4.8 Additional Information
The Module supports Unauthenticated service, where the unauthenticated users can run the
self-test service by power-cycling the Module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, all
firmware components within the physical boundary are protected by RSA 4096 SigVer with
SHA2-384 (Cert. # A7302) signature calculated at build time. At initialization, the signature is
recalculated and compared to the hardcoded build-time generated signature value. If at load
time the signature does not match, the module exits with an error. If failure occurs during self-
test, all crypto functionality is disabled.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the integrity
test on-demand.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The Module is a software module, which is operated in a modifiable operational environment per
FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The Module’s software version running on each tested
platform is 7.1.1.3.
The Module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality
of the host device’s OS prevent unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys,
Page 34 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module
execution. The Module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational
environments provide the capability to separate individual application processes from each
other by preventing uncontrolled access to SSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs
regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within
the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the Module are owned by the
Module and are not owned by external processes/operators.
7 Physical Security
N/A for this module.
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area Name
Description Persistence
Type
DRAM Volatile memory (within TOEPP) provided by the ESXi host for
the Module temporary.
Dynamic
Flash
(NVRAM)
Non-Volatile memory (within TOEPP) provided by the ESXi host
for the Module to retain memory across power-cycles.
Static
Table 15: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Peer Public
Key Input
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Module Plaintext Automated Electronic
Module
Public Key
Output
Module External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypted
by GCM
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Module Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods
Page 35 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
Method
CO issues
zeroization service
via Controller
The zeroization command will
erase all SSPs stored in the
DRAM/NVRAM of the Module.
`set-factory` or
Zeroization method
via Controller
Session
Termination
Zeroization upon
session termination
Session termination will
automatically zeroize all session
based temporary SSPs
Terminate Session
Reboot Zeroization upon
rebooting the
module
Reboot to zeroize all temporary
SSPs stored in volatile memory
Reboot
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Used to
seed the
DRBG
384 bits -
at least
256 bits
Entropy
Input - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG
Seed
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG
Seed - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG
Internal
State V
value
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG
Internal
State V
value -
CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG Key Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG Key
- CSP
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
Password
Used to
authenticat
e the
Crypto
Officer
8-30
Character
s - 8-30
Character
s
Authenticati
on Data -
CSP
User
Password
Used to
authenticat
e the User
8-30
Character
s - 8-30
Character
s
Authenticati
on Data -
CSP
AP
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Used for
initial AP
authenticati
on to
Module
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Certificate -
CSP
Page 36 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Software
Load Test
Key
Used for
Software
Load Test
4096 bits
- 152 bits
Public Key
- CSP
Software
Load Test
SSHv2
ECDH
Private Key
Used to
derive the
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(SSHv2)
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive the
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
derive
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Keys
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Development
SSHv2
RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
RSA Public
Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the SSHv2
service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
Page 37 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKev2)
SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the SSHv2
service
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key
Used for
SSHv2
session
confidentiali
ty
protection
128, 256
bits - 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.3
)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
Session
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Development
Page 38 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Encryption
Key and
TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key
TLSv1.3
RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
TLSv1.3
service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
to 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
TLSv1.3
service
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.3)
Page 39 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLSv1.3
Master
Secret
A shared
secret
created
during the
handshake
that forms
the basis
for the
encryption
key.
384 bits -
384 bits
Master
Secret -
CSP
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key
A key
generated
from the
master
secret and
used to
encrypt and
decrypt the
actual data
sent in the
TLS
connection.
128, 256
bits - 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Private Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP20
48,
MODP30
72,
MODP40
96,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
FFC
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH Public
Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP20
48,
MODP30
72,
MODP40
96,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
Page 40 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer DH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP20
48,
MODP30
72,
MODP40
96,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key and
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Authenticati
on Key
MODP20
48,
MODP30
72,
MODP40
96,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 192
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Private Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(IKEv2)
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key and
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
Page 41 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Authenticati
on Key
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
IPsec/IKEv
2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
IPsec/IKEv
2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
IPsec/IKEv
2 service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.3,
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
and used
by the
module to
sign data
for
IPsec/IKEv
2
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKev2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
and used
by
IPsec/IKEv
2 peer to
authenticat
e the
module
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
Page 42 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
IPsec/IKEv
2 service
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 Pre-
Shared
Secret
Used for
IPsec/IKEv
2
authenticati
on
1-128
character
s - 1-128
character
s
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SKEYSEE
D
Keying
material
used to
derive the
IPsec/IKE
Session
Encryption
Key and
IPsec/IKE
Authenticati
on Key
160 bits -
160 bits
Keying
Material -
CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key
Used to
secure
IPsec/IKEv
2 session
confidentiali
ty
128, 192,
256 bits -
128, 192,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authenticati
on Key
Used to
secure
IPsec/IKEv
2 session
authenticati
on
at least
160 bits -
at least
160 bits
Message
Authenticati
on Key -
CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
Table 18: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
DRBG
Entropy
Input
DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroizatio
n Method
Reboot
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used
With
Page 43 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
DRBG Seed DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroizatio
n Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used
With
DRBG
Internal
State V
value
DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroizatio
n Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Key:Used
With
DRBG Key DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroizatio
n Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used With
Crypto
Officer
Password
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Encrypt
ed
Zeroizatio
n Method
User
Password
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Encrypt
ed
Zeroizatio
n Method
AP
Authenticatio
n Certificate
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While AP
is
connected
to Module
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
Software
Load Test
Key
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
N/A
SSHv2
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
Page 44 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SSHv2
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
SSHv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
SSHv2 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 RSA
Peer Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
SSHv2 ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
Page 45 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
SSHv2 ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
SSHv2
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLSv1.3
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
TLSv1.3 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
Page 46 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
TLSv1.3 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
TLSv1.3 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
TLSv1.3 ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
TLSv1.3 ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
Master
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
Page 47 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 Master
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Private
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Public Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
DH Public
Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Private Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer DH
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Private Key:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Private
Key:Derived From
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
DH Public
Key:Derived From
SKEYSEED:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
Page 48 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Private
Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Private
Key:Derived From
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
SKEYSEED:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Private
Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
Page 49 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key
Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
Pre-Shared
Secret
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash
(NVRAM):Plaintex
t
Zeroizatio
n Method
SKEYSEED:Deriv
ed to
SKEYSEED DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Deriv
ed From
IPsec/IKEv2
Authenticatio
n Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroizatio
n Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Deriv
ed From
Table 19: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
SHA-1
The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification.
This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031
112-bit security keys
The module includes an implementation of DH using MODP-2048 for shared secret
computation. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2030.
Page 50 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7302)
RSA 4096
SigVer with
SHA2-384
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Module is in
normal state
RSA
SigVer
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Module performs the following self-tests, which include the pre-operational and Conditional
self-tests. Prior to the Module providing any data output via the data output interface, the
Module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-
operational self-tests, the Module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests
(CASTs). The self-test success or failure results are an output of the return value of the library
load API call, which is functioning as the self-test status indicator. If anyone of the self-tests
fails, the Module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the Module’s
status output interface. While the Module is in the error state, all data through the data output
interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by
reloading the Module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the Module
transitions to the operational state.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A7301)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power up
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A7301)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power up
AES-ECB Encrypt KAT
(A7302)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power up
AES-ECB Decrypt KAT
(A7302)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power up
AES-GCM
Authenticated Encrypt
KAT (A7302)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power up
Page 51 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
AES-GCM
Authenticated Decrypt
KAT (A7302)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power up
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Re
seed (A7302)
AES-128 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Instantiat
e,
Generate
, and
Reseed
KATs
Power up
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) KAT
(A7302)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA Power up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) KAT
(A7302)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA Power up
Entropy Source Start-up
Health Tests
Runs the
CHTs for
a
probationa
ry period
of 65535
bits from
the
entropy
source.
Startup
Entropy
Source
Health
Tests
CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
Entropy Source Startup
Logic Integrity BIST
Performs
a logic
integrity of
the
Entropy
Source
Startup
Logic
Integrity
BIST
CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
Entropy Source
Continuous Health Tests
(CHT)
Compose
d of a
short-term
test
yielding a
pass/fail
over
individual
256-bit
blocks of
noise
source
data and a
CHT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performed
continuou
sly as
entropy
source is
active
Page 52 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
long-term
evaluation
of the
pass/fail
history of
the past
256 block
(totaling
65536
bits) to
infer an
entropy
source
failure
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7301)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7302)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7301)
SHA2-384 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7302)
SHA2-384 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7301)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7302)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A7302)
Curve P-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive
Z KAT
Power up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A7302)
MODP-
2048
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive
Z KAT
Power up
Page 53 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
KDF IKEv2 KAT
(A7302)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
KDF SSH KAT (A7302) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5) KAT (A7302)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Power up
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5) KAT (A7302)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Power up
SHA2-384 KAT (A7302) Output
size: 384
bits
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT
(A7302)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A7302)
Curve P-
256
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consistenc
y tests on
the newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operationa
l use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A7302)
MODP-
2048
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consistenc
y tests on
the newly
generated
key pairs
before the
Page 54 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
first
operationa
l use.
Software Load Test RSA 4096
SigVer
with
SHA2-384
Signatur
e
Verificati
on
SW/F
W
Load
Module
is in
normal
state
RSA
4096
SigVer
with
SHA2-
384
When
software
has been
uploaded
to the
Module
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7302)
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW Integrity Recommend 60
Days
Reboot
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A7301)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A7301)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-ECB Encrypt KAT
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-ECB Decrypt KAT
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
Entropy Source Start-up
Health Tests
Startup
Entropy
Source
Health Tests
CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Page 55 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Entropy Source Startup
Logic Integrity BIST
Startup Logic
Integrity BIST
CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Entropy Source Continuous
Health Tests (CHT)
CHT CAST N/A N/A
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7301)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7301)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7301)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A7302) KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SSH KAT (A7302) KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
SHA2-384 KAT (A7302) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A7302) KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A7302)
PCT PCT Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A7302)
PCT PCT Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
Software Load Test Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Hard
Error
State
If self-tests fail, the
Module is put into an
error state
Pre-Operational Firmware
Integrity Test
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
Reboot the
Module
System
enters
quarantine
Page 56 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
(A7301)
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A7301)
AES-ECB Encrypt KAT
(A7302)
AES-ECB Decrypt KAT
(A7302)
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (A7302)
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (A7302)
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
(A7302)
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7301)
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A7302)
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7301)
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A7302)
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7301)
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A7302)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
KAT (A7302)
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
KAT (A7302)
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A7302)
KDF SSH KAT (A7302)
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A7302)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT
(A7302)
SHA2-384 KAT (A7302)
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A7302)
state and
reboots
Soft
Error
State
If any of the less
severe self-tests fail,
the module will be put
into the soft error state
where the failed self-
tests are retried until
Entropy Source Start-up
Health Tests
Entropy Source Startup Logic
Integrity BIST
Entropy Source Continuous
Health Tests (CHT)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
The self-
test will be
retried.
Log
message
Page 57 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
passed and an error
indicator provided.
PCT (A7302)
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
PCT (A7302)
Software Load Test
Table 24: Error States
If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the Module reports the error and enters the Error
state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited.
The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the Module and perform the self-
tests, including the pre-operational integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The Module will
only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational integrity test
and the conditional CASTs.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The Module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and
powering the Module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure
may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The Crypto Officer must
configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
• Deployment: Deploy the Virtual SmartZone (vSZ-D) image on a hypervisor by following up the
steps specified in section “vSZ-D FIPS Installation with FIPS Image” of “RUCKUS FIPS and
Common Criteria Configuration Guide for SmartZone and AP, 7.1.1.3”
• Controller Configuration with Approved mode Software Image:
1. Power on the Module and access the CLI via its virtual console port from hypervisor.
2. At the login prompt, login with the default administrator username and password
(admin/admin). And then, issue ‘enable’ (en) command with the privileged mode
password to promote the authorization.
3. If the system is first time boot up, issue ‘setup’ command and follow the virtual console’s
instructions to configure the system fundamental parameters, such as the network and its
controller (vSZ). Note that its FIPS mode will be changed if the FIPS mode differs from
the mode on the controller. In this case, the system will reboot when FIPS mode is being
changed. In addition, the login passwords will be synchronized from its controller.
Note: Although not recommended, if needed to disable the Approved Mode, the
CO must disable the Approved mode via the controller. Once this is done, the
module will be reconfigured and reset. From then on, the module can be
configured to use both Approved and Non-Compliant algorithms.
Page 58 of 58
Ruckus Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
4. At the command prompt enter ‘fips?’ to display the list of available commands.
5. Enter ‘fips status’ to verify whether the Approved mode is enabled or disabled. If the
Approved mode is enabled, user should be able to observe “FIPS compliance is Enable”
from the console. On the other hand, if the Approved mode is disabled, “FIPS compliance
is Disable” will be shown on the console.
6. Enter ‘fips showlog’ to display the results of self-tests and verify all are passing.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
RUCKUS SmartZone (LT-GA) Network Management Guide, 7.1.0
- This guide is written for service operators and system administrators who are responsible for managing,
configuring, and troubleshooting Ruckus devices. Consequently, it assumes a basic working knowledge of
local area networks, wireless networking, and wireless devices. This guide supports all platforms of the
controller. It is recommended to view the New In This Document section for a high-level overview.
RUCKUS SmartZone (LT-GA) Controller Administration Guide, 7.1.0
- The Controller Administration Guide, 7.1.0 provides comprehensive instructions for configuring,
managing, and maintaining the controller platform running version 7.1.0. Intended for network
administrators and IT professionals, the guide covers key administrative tasks such as initial setup, system
configuration, network and security settings, user management, firmware upgrades, backup and restore
procedures, monitoring, logging, and troubleshooting. It includes best practices, tips for navigating both the
CLI and GUI, and guidance on integrating with external services and management tools. Supporting both
new and existing deployments, the guide enables administrators to effectively manage controller
performance, security, and scalability in dynamic network environments.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
No specific Non-Administrator guidance.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.