VMware VMkernel
Cryptographic Module
Software Version: 1.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 1.1
VMware, Inc.
3401 Hillview Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
Tel: 877-486-9273
Email: info@vmware.com
http://www.vmware.com
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 2 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Reference .....................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 Document Organization ...............................................................................................................................4
2 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module....................................................................................................5
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................6
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary..............................................................................................................7
2.2.3 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................8
2.3 Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication ............................................................................................................10
2.4.1 Roles ......................................................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 Services ..................................................................................................................................................10
2.4.3 Authentication.......................................................................................................................................11
2.5 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................11
2.6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................11
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................13
2.7.1 Key Generation ......................................................................................................................................14
2.7.2 Zeroization.............................................................................................................................................14
2.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ................................................14
2.9 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................14
2.9.1 Power-On Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................14
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................15
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................15
3 Secure Operation ........................................................................................................................................16
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance .............................................................................................................................16
3.1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module Secure Operation...............................................................16
3.2 User Guidance ............................................................................................................................................16
4 Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................17
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 3 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram.............................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary...................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................5
Table 2 – Tested Configurations...................................................................................................................6
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm (cryptoLoader).....................................................................................8
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (crypto_fips) ......................................................................................9
Table 5 – Vendor Affirmed Approved Functions (crypto_fips) ......................................................................9
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping .........................................................................................9
Table 7 – Crypto Officer and Users Services..............................................................................................10
Table 8 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Key Components, and CSPs..........................................................13
Table 9 – Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................17
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 4 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic
Module from VMware, Inc. This Security Policy describes how the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2,
which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More
information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Center of Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-
validation-program.
This document also describes how to run the composite module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The VMware
VMkernel Cryptographic Module is also referred to in this document as “the module”.
1.2 Reference
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the composite module in the technical terms
of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The VMware website (http://www.vmware.com) contains information on the full line of products
from VMware.
• The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/Validated-Modules/Search) contains options to get contact information for individuals to
answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Model document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is
proprietary to VMware and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to
these documents, please contact VMware.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 5 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2 VMWARE VMKERNEL CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE
2.1 Introduction
VMware, Inc., a global leader in virtualization, cloud infrastructure, and business mobility, delivers
customer-proven solutions that accelerate Information Technology (IT) by reducing complexity and
enabling more flexible, agile service delivery. With VMware solutions, organizations are creating
exceptional experiences by mobilizing everything, responding faster to opportunities with modern data and
apps hosted across hybrid clouds, and safeguarding customer trust with a defense-in-depth approach to
cybersecurity. VMware enables enterprises to adopt an IT model that addresses their unique business
challenges. VMware’s approach accelerates the transition to solutional-computing while preserving existing
investments and improving security and control.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module is a software cryptographic module whose purpose is to provide
FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic functions to various VMware applications of the VMware ESXi kernel.
The Module is defined as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module and has been validated at the FIPS
140-2 overall Security Level 1. Table 1 below describes the level achieved by the module in each of the
eleven sections of the FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC2
1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1
N/A – Not Applicable
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 6 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
The FIPS 140-2 operational testing was performed on the configurations presented in Table 2.
Table 2 – Tested Configurations
Operating System Processor
Processor
Optimization
Hardware Platform
VMware ESXi 6.7 Intel Xeon E5 None Dell PowerEdge R830
VMware ESXi 6.7 Intel Xeon E5 AES-NI Dell PowerEdge R830
VMware ESXi 6.7 U2 Intel Xeon Gold 6126 None Dell PowerEdge R740
VMware ESXi 6.7 U2 Intel Xeon Gold 6126 AES-NI Dell PowerEdge R740
VMware ESXi 7.0 Intel Xeon Gold 6126 None Dell PowerEdge R740
VMware ESXi 7.0 Intel Xeon Gold 6126 AES-NI Dell PowerEdge R740
In addition to its full AES software implementations, the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module is capable
of leveraging the AES-NI3 instruction set of the supported Intel processors in order to accelerate AES
calculations.
Because the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module is defined as a software cryptographic module, it
possesses both a physical cryptographic boundary and a logical cryptographic boundary.
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, the module must rely on the physical characteristics of the host system. The physical
boundary of the cryptographic module is defined by the hard enclosure around the host system on which it
runs. The host system consists of integrated circuits of the system board, processor, RAM, hard disk, device
case, power supply, and fans. See Figure 1 below for a block diagram of the host system.
3
AES-NI – Advanced Encryption Standard-New Instructions
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 7 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The logical cryptographic boundary for the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module is depicted in Figure
2. The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module boundary consists of one kernel object file, crypto_fips,
and one application, cryptoLoader. The cryptoLoader is responsible for performing the integrity testing over
both components and loading crypto_fips. The crypto_fips provides cryptographic services to the kernel
components once the integrity tests and power-on self-tests have passed successfully.
The colored arrows, in Figure 2, indicate the logical information flows into and out of the module.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 8 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Figure 2 - Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary
2.2.3 Modes of Operation
The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module only supports a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
module must be configured as described in section 3.
Table 3 includes the FIPS-Approved algorithms for the cryptoLoader and Table 4 and Table 5 include the
FIPS-Approved algorithms implemented in the crypto_fips.
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm (cryptoLoader)
Algorithm Implementation/Mode Certificate Number
SHS SHA-256 #3774, #C1171
HMAC SHA-256 #3048, #C1171
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 9 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (crypto_fips)
Algorithm Modes Certificate Number
AES (128, 192, and 256-bit keys) ECB, CBC, CTR (ext),
GCM
#4531, #C1172
AES (128 and 256-bit keys) XTS-AES-128,
XTS-AES-256
#4531, #C1172
SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-
512
#3712, #C1172
DRBG CTR_DRBG #1488, #C1172
HMAC SHA-1 and SHA-256, #2989, #C1172
Table 5 – Vendor Affirmed Approved Functions (crypto_fips)
Algorithm Modes IG Reference
AES-CBC Ciphertext Stealing (CS) (128, 192,
and 256-bit keys) Mode: CBC-CS3
Vendor Affirmed IG A.3.
Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct
2010
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s logical interfaces exist at a low level in the software as an API. Both the API and physical
interfaces can be categorized into the following interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
• Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
• Power input
As a software module, the module’s manual controls, physical indicators, and physical and electrical
characteristics are those of the host platform. A mapping of the FIPS 140-2 defined interfaces and the
logical interfaces of the module can be found in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping
FIPS Interface Logical Interface
Data Input The function calls that accept input data for processing
through their arguments.
Data Output The function calls that return by means of their return codes
or argument generated or processed data back to the caller.
Control Input The function calls that are used to initialize and control the
operation of the module.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 10 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Status Output Return values for function calls; Module generated error
messages.
Power Input Not applicable.
2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication
2.4.1 Roles
There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: A Crypto-Officer
(CO) role and a User role. Each role and their corresponding services are detailed in the sections below.
The User and Crypto-Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module services.
Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in Table 7 below indicates the
types of access required using the following notation:
• R – Read: The CSP is read.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an FIPS-Approved or Allowed security function or
authentication mechanism.
2.4.2 Services
The CO and User roles share many services, including encryption, decryption, and random number
generation services. The CO performs installation and initialization, show status, self-tests on demand, and
key zeroization services. Below, Table 7 describes the CO and User services.
Table 7 – Crypto Officer and Users Services
Role Service Description
CSP and Type of
Access
CO, User Encryption Encrypt plaintext using supplied key and
algorithm specification
AES Key – RX
CO, User Decryption Decrypt ciphertext using supplied key and
algorithm specification
AES Key – RX
CO, User Hashing Compute and return a message digest using
SHA algorithm
None
CO, User Message Authentication
Code generation
Compute and return a hashed message
authentication code
HMAC Key – RX
CO, User Random bit generation Generate random bits by using the DRBG DRBG CSPs – RXW
CO Installation and
initialization of the module
Installation and initialization of the module
following the Secure Operation section of
the Security Policy
None
CO Show status Returns the current mode of operation of
the module
None
CO Run Self-tests on demand Runs Self-tests on demand during module
operation
All CSPs – W
CO Zeroization Zeroizes all CSPs All CSPs – W
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 11 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.4.3 Authentication
The module is a Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement authentication.
Roles are assumed implicitly through the execution of either a CO or a User service.
2.5 Physical Security
The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module is a software module, which FIPS 140-2 defines as a multi-
chip standalone cryptographic module. As such, it does not include physical security mechanisms. Thus,
the FIPS 140-2 requirements for physical security are not applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements on a Dell PowerEdge
R740 Server with an Intel Xeon Gold 6126 processor running VMware vSphere Hypervisor ESXi 6.7 U2 or
ESXi 7.0
The module was also tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements on a Dell PowerEdge
R830 Server with an Intel Xeon E5 processor running VMware vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi) 6.7. The module
only allows access to CSPs through its well-defined API.
Further, VMware, Inc. affirms that the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module runs in its configured,
Approved mode of operation on the following binary compatible platforms executing ESXi 6.7, ESXi 6.7
U2, or ESXi 7.0:
• Dell PowerEdge T320 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R530 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R730 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R830 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge T/R/Mx40 series with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen9 with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL38P Gen8 with AMD Opteron Processor
• Cisco UCS – B22 M Series Blade Servers with Intel Processor
• Cisco UCS – C24 M3 Series Rackmount with Intel Xeon Processor
Further, VMware, Inc. affirms that the module also runs in its configured Approved mode of operation when
the ESXi (6.7, 6.7 U2, or 7.0) is operated in Cloud (Private, Public, and Hybrid) itself and in Cloud solutions
too.
No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module and the security strength of keys when the
module is ported to an operational environment that is not listed on the CMVP validation certificate.
In addition to its full AES software implementations, the VMware VMkernel Cryptographic module is capable
of leveraging the AES-NI instruction set of supported Intel and AMD processors in order to accelerate AES
calculations.
All cryptographic keys and CSPs are under the control of the OS, which protects its CSPs against
unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. The module only allows access to CSPs through
its well-defined API.
The tested operating system segregates user processes into separate process spaces. Each process
space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The
Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS
140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 12 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 13 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 8.
Table 8 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Key Components, and CSPs
Key/CSP
Key/CSP
Description
Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES key 128, 192,
256-bit key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Encryption,
Decryption
AES XTS Key 128, 256-bit
key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Encryption,
Decryption
HMAC key 112-bit key Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Message Authentication
DRBG seed Seed used to
derive the
internal state
of the DRBG.
Input via API in
plaintext
Does not exit the module In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Random number
generation
DRBG entropy 256-bits Input via API in
plaintext
Does not exit the module In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Random number
generation
DRBG.InternalState_V V (256-bits) Generated
Internally
Does not exit the module In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
DRBG.InternalState_Key [Need Size] Generated
Internally
Does not exit the module In RAM Reboot OS; Cycle
host power
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 14 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.7.1 Key Generation
The Module implements a NIST SP 800-90A DRBG for the generation of random bits. The implementation
of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (maximum of 256 bits of security strength) as the block cipher along with the
appropriate derivation function. The cryptographic module is passed keys and CSPs as API parameters,
associated by memory location. The application calling the cryptographic module passes keys and CSPs
in plaintext within the physical boundary. Key Entry/Output.
Symmetric keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by
the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.
2.7.2 Zeroization
Keys and CSPs can be zeroized by rebooting the host hardware platform.
2.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The Dell PowerEdge R830 has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device,
pursuant to Part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against
harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. This equipment
generates, uses, and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with
the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this
equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful interference, in which case the user will be required
to correct the interference at his own expense.
2.9 Self-Tests
Cryptographic self-tests are performed by the module after initialization of the module, and on demand by
power cycling the module. Conditional self-tests are also performed as specified by the FIPS 140-2
requirements. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status,
and any error resolutions.
Self-tests are health checks that ensure the cryptographic algorithms implemented within the module are
operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-2 broadly fall within two categories:
1. Power-On Self-Tests
2. Conditional Self-Tests
2.9.1 Power-On Self-Tests
The module performs the required set of power-on self-tests. These self-tests are performed automatically
by the module when the module is powered-up. The list of power-on self-tests that follows may also be run
on-demand when the CO reboots the Operating System. The module will perform the listed power-on self-
tests to successful completion. During the execution of self-tests, data output from the module is inhibited.
If any of the self-tests fail, the module will return an error code to the application that tried to load and
initialize the module. The module will enter an error state and none of the module’s services are available
in the error state. In order to resolve a cryptographic self-test error, the module must be restarted by
rebooting the OS. If the error persists, the module must be reinstalled.
• The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module performs the following power-On Self-Tests:
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 15 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
• Software integrity check
o HMAC SHA-256
• Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o AES 128 Encryption KAT: (ECB, CBC, CTR modes)
o AES 128 Decryption KAT: (ECB, CBC, CTR modes)
o AES GCM Encryption KAT
o AES GCM Decryption KAT
o AES XTS Encryption KAT
o AES XTS Decryption KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
o HMAC SHA-1 and HMAC SHA-256 KAT (also test SHA-1 and SHA-256)
o DRBG (CTR_DRBG) KAT
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module implements the conditional self-tests identified below. If an error is encountered, the module
will return an error and will remain in an error state. After entering the error state, all subsequent calls to
the module will be rejected, ensuring that data output from the module is inhibited. In order to resolve a
cryptographic self-test error, the module must be restarted by rebooting the OS. If the error persists, the
module must be reinstalled.
The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module performs the following conditional self-tests:
• NIST SP 800-90A DRBG Health Tests; and
• Continuous Random Number Generation Test (CRNGT) on entropy input from NDRNG.
• Continuous Random Number Generation Test (CRNGT) on the DRBG.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module was not designed to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-
2 Level 1 requirements for this validation.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 16 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3 SECURE OPERATION
The VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections
below describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
3.1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module Secure Operation
VMware ESXi 6.7, ESXi 6.7 U2, and ESXi 7.0 contain the FIPS 140-2 validated VMware VMkernel
Cryptographic Module. There are no additional steps, beyond installing the base system, that must be
performed to use the module correctly.
3.2 User Guidance
The User or API functions calls should be designed to deal with the identified error cases of the VMware
VMkernel Cryptographic Module. There are no additional user guidance instructions for correct operation
of the module.
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 17 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 ACRONYMS
Table 9 provides definitions for the acronyms used in this document.
Table 9 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard – New Instructions
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generation Test
CSE Communication Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CS Ciphertext Stealing
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC (Keyed) Hash Message Authenticating Code
INT A validated Cryptographic Module which lies internal or
inside of the boundary in regard to the reference diagram CM
software physical boundary
IT Information Technology
KAT Known Answer Test
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SP Special Publication
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
April 23, 2020 Page 18 of 19
© 2020 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
XTS XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext
stealing (XTS)
Security Policy, Version 1.1 VMware VMkernel Cryptographic Module
VMware, Inc. 3401 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto CA 94304 USA Tel 877-486-9273 Fax 650-427-5001 www.vmware.com
Copyright © 2020 VMware, Inc. All rights reserved. This product is protected by U.S. and international copyright and intellectual property laws. VMware products are covered by one or more patents listed at
http://www.vmware.com/go/patents. VMware is a registered trademark or trademark of VMware, Inc. in the United States and/or other jurisdictions. All other marks and names mentioned herein may be
trademarks of their respective companies.