©2023 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and
intact, including this copyright notice.
1
Samsung SCrypto Cryptographic Module
Software Version: 2.6
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 3.3
Last Update: 2023-9-08
Prepared by:
Gossamer Security Solutions
9176 Red Branch Road, Suite L
Columbia, MD 21045
www.gossamersec.com
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intact, including this copyright notice.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................4
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................................4
2.1 Description of Module........................................................................................................................4
2.2 Description of Operational State.......................................................................................................5
2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary.....................................................................................................6
2.3.1 Software Block Diagram............................................................................................................6
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ...........................................................................................6
4 Roles, Services and Authentication...........................................................................................................7
4.1 Roles.....................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 Services................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.1 Services Available in FIPS Mode of Operation........................................................................7
4.2.2 Non-Approved/Compliant Services ..........................................................................................8
4.3 Operator Authentication....................................................................................................................8
4.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication ....................................................................................8
5 Finite State Machine...................................................................................................................................9
6 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................9
7 Operational Environment..........................................................................................................................9
8 Cryptographic Algorithms.........................................................................................................................9
8.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ..............................................................................................9
8.2 Non-FIPS Approved (but Allowed) Cryptographic Algorithms..................................................12
8.3 Non-FIPS Allowed Cryptographic Algorithm...............................................................................12
9 Cryptographic Key Management............................................................................................................13
9.1 Random Number Generation..........................................................................................................14
9.2 Key Generation.................................................................................................................................14
9.3 Key Entry and Output .....................................................................................................................14
9.4 Key Storage.......................................................................................................................................14
9.5 Zeroization ........................................................................................................................................15
10 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ..................................15
11 Self-Tests ...............................................................................................................................................15
11.1 Power-Up Tests.................................................................................................................................16
11.2 Software Integrity Check.................................................................................................................16
11.3 Conditional Tests..............................................................................................................................16
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.................................................................................................................16
13 Secure Operation..................................................................................................................................17
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13.1 Crypto Officer/User Guidance ........................................................................................................17
13.2 General Guidance.............................................................................................................................17
14 Design Assurance..................................................................................................................................17
14.1 Configuration Management.............................................................................................................17
14.2 Delivery and Distribution ................................................................................................................17
15 Glossary and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................19
16 References .............................................................................................................................................19
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1 Introduction
This document is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Samsung SCrypto Cryptographic
Module hereafter referred to as the module. The module is a software library providing a C-language
application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality.
The module is classified by FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) as a
Security Level 1 multi-chip standalone software module. The physical cryptographic boundary is the
general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the
module is the SCrypto cryptographic module, a single object module file named:
• libscrypto.so1
on the tested platform running TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit or 64-bit) or TEEGRIS 4.2.1
(64-bit)
• libscrypto.a on the tested platform running QSEE 5.18 (64-bit).
Please refer to Table 2 for more information. The module performs no communications other than with the
calling application (the process that invokes the module services). The module’s software version for this
validation is 2.6.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description of Module
The Samsung SCrypto Cryptographic Module is a software only security level 1 cryptographic module
that provides general-purpose cryptographic services. The following table shows the overview of the
security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.
Security Component Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1. Security Levels
1
The single object module file (libscrypto.so) compiled for the tested platform running TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit) is different with
the one running TEEGRIS 4.2 and TEEGRIS 4.2.1 (64-bit).
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including this copyright notice.
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The module has been tested on the following platforms:
# Operating System Processor Platform
1 TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit) Samsung Electronics Exynos 2100 Samsung Galaxy S21+
2 TEEGRIS 4.2 (64-bit) Samsung Electronics Exynos 2100 Samsung Galaxy S21+
3 TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit) Samsung Electronics Exynos W920 Samsung Galaxy Watch 4
4 TEEGRIS 4.2.1 (64-bit) Samsung Electronics Exynos 2200 Samsung Galaxy S22+
5 TEEGRIS 4.2.1 (64-bit) Samsung Electronics Exynos 1280 Samsung Galaxy A53
6 QSEE 5.18 (64-bit) Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 Samsung Galaxy S22+
7 QSEE 5.18 (64-bit) Qualcomm Snapdragon 8+ Gen 1 Samsung Galaxy Z Flip 4
Table 2. Tested Platforms
Notes:
• Please note that this validation covered both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the module on the Samsung
Galaxy S21+ platforms, and only the 32-bit version of the module on the Samsung Galaxy Watch 4
platform, and only the 64-bit version of the module on the Samsung Galaxy S22+, Samsung Galaxy
A53 or Samsung Galaxy Z Flip 4 platforms.
• Per IG G.5, CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security
strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on
the validation certificate.
2.2 Description of Operational State
When the module is initialized, the self-tests are executed automatically at load time and the module
enters its operational state automatically if the self-tests pass. A status function is set to indicate if the
device is in an operational state or in an error state. The error state flag is used for the value of the
function FIPS_status() from /src/fips/ fips_manager.c. A calling application can check the module’s status
by calling the FIPS_status() function which returns 1 if in the operational state and returns 0 if in the error state.
The module supports both FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved algorithms. Please refer to section 13 for
instructions to operate the module in a FIPS approved manner.
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2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
2.3.1 Software Block Diagram
Figure 1: Software Block Diagram
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The module runs on a General Purpose Computer (GPC). The Physical Cryptographic Boundary for the
module is the case of that GPC. All the physical components are standard electronic components; there
are not any custom integrated circuits or components dedicated to FIPS 140-2 functionality.
FIPS Interface Ports
Data Input API input parameters
Data Output API output parameters
Control Input API function calls
Status Output API return codes, API output parameters for status
Power Input Physical power connector
Table 3. Ports and Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions and data received through
the I/O system calls. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions and
the data sent through the I/O system calls. The Control Input interface consists of the API function calls.
The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions and status sent through output
parameters.
Logical Boundary (the module)
Samsung SCrypto FIPS
Cryptographic Module
Physical Boundary
Application
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer (CO) role and User role, which meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1
requirements for Roles and Services. The module does not support a Maintenance role. The User and
Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module.
No further authentication is required. The module does not allow concurrent operators.
4.2 Services
4.2.1 Services Available in FIPS Mode of Operation
All services implemented by the module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP
access.
Service Role Description/CSP Access Permission
Initialize User, CO
Module initialization.
CSPs: None
N/A
Self-test User, CO
Perform self tests (FIPS_SCRYPTO_selftest).
CSPs: None
N/A
Show status User, CO
Functions that provide module status information.
CSPs: None
N/A
Zeroize User, CO Functions that destroy all CSPs. read/write/execute
Random number
generation
User, CO
Used for random number and symmetric key generation.
CSPs: Entropy input string, DRBG seed, DRBG V and
DRBG Key
read/write/execute
Asymmetric key
generation
User, CO
Used to generate Asymmetric keys.
CSPs: RSA SGK, RSA SVK, ECDSA SGK, ECDSA
SVK
read/write/execute
Symmetric
encrypt/decrypt
User, CO
Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
CSPs: AES EDK, AES-GCM key
read/write/execute
Symmetric digest User, CO
Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC.
CSPs: AES CMAC Key
read/write/execute
Message digest User, CO
Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.
CSPs: None
read/write/execute
Keyed Hash User, CO
Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC.
CSP: HMAC Key
read/write/execute
Key wrapping User, CO
Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the
calling process (does not establish keys into the module).
CSPs: Key Wrap, RSA KDK and RSA KEK
read/write/execute
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Service Role Description/CSP Access Permission
Digital signature User, CO
Used to generate or verify RSA or ECDSA digital
signatures.
CSPs: RSA SGK, RSA SVK, ECDSA SGK, ECDSA
SVK
read/write/execute
Key derivation User, CO
Used to derive other keying material via SP800-108 KDF
CSP: Key Derivation Key
read/write/execute
Utility User, CO
Miscellaneous helper functions.
CSPs: None
N/A
Table 4. Approved/Allowed Services and CSP Access
The following document provides a description and API functions of the cryptographic services
listed above:
• FIPS_SCrypto_Functional_Design, a Samsung internal document
4.2.2 Non-Approved/Compliant Services
In addition to the above listed FIPS-Approved/Allowed services, the cryptographic module also provides
non-Approved services; however, any use of the module’s non-Approved services causes the module to
operate in a non-FIPS compliant manner. Thus, operators concerned with FIPS compliance, should not
utilize any of the following non-Approved service(s):
• Triple-DES: API functions DES_set_key() and DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt()
• DSA: API functions DSA_do_sign() and DSA_do_verify()
• DH: API function: DH_generate_key()
• ECDH: API function: ECDH_compute_key()
Please note that prior to using any of the Non-Approved/Compliant services listed above, the CO must
zeroize all CSPs. Likewise, to put the module back into the FIPS mode from the non-FIPS mode, the CO
must zeroize all Keys/CSPs used in non-FIPS mode, and then strictly follow up the instructions in section
13.1 of this document to put the module into the FIPS mode.
4.3 Operator Authentication
There is no operator authentication; assumption of role is implicit by action.
4.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication
No authentication is required at security level 1; authentication is implicit by assumption of the role.
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5 Finite State Machine
For information pertaining to the Finite State Model, please refer to Samsung’s internal
FIPS_SCrypto_Functional_Design document.
6 Physical Security
The module is a software entity only and thus does not claim any physical security.
7 Operational Environment
This module will operate in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition.
The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent
operators are explicitly excluded). The external application that makes calls to the cryptographic
module is the single user of the module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
8 Cryptographic Algorithms
8.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implemented the following FIPS approved algorithms.
Algorithms Modes and Description API Function FIPS Approved
(Cert #)
AES ECB (e/d; 128, 192, 256); CBC (e/d; 128, 192,
256); OFB (e/d; 128, 256); CTR (ext only; 128,
192, 256)
KW (Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt; Cipher: Cipher
Key Length: 128, 192, 256; Payload Length: 128,
256, 320)
AES_set_encrypt_key
AES_set_decrypt_key
AES_encrypt
AES_decrypt
AES_ecb_encrypt
AES_cbc_encrypt
AES_ctr128_encrypt
AES_ofb128_encrypt
AES_wrap_key
AES_unwrap_key
Cert. #A915
AES-CMAC CMAC (Generation/Verification, 128, 192, 256) CMAC_Init
CMAC_Update
CMAC_Final
CMAC_Reset
Cert. #A915
AES-GCM GCM (e/d), (128, 192 or 256) CRYPTO_gcm128_init
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv
CRYPTO_gcm128_aad
CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt
CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt
CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32
CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32
Cert. #A915
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Algorithms Modes and Description API Function FIPS Approved
(Cert #)
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA
PKG: CURVES (P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521
ExtraRandomBits);
PKV: CURVES (P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521)
SigGen: CURVES (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521)
with SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SigVer: CURVES (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521)
with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
EC_KEY_generate_key
ECDSA_do_sign
ECDSA_do_verify
ECDSA_sign
ECDSA_verify
Cert. #A915
SP800-90A
DRBG
Block Cipher (CTR) based DRBG with AES-256 CTR_DRBG_init
CTR_DRBG_reseed
CTR_DRBG_generate
CTR_DRBG_clear
Cert. #A915
HMAC HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
HMAC_Init_ex
HMAC_Update
HMAC_Final
Cert. #A915
SHA SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 SHA1_Init
SHA1_Update
SHA1_Final
SHA1
SHA224_Init
SHA224_Update
SHA224_Final
SHA224
SHA256_Init
SHA256_Update
SHA256_Final
SHA256
SHA384_Init
SHA384_Update
SHA384_Final
SHA384
SHA512_Init
SHA512_Update
SHA512_Final
SHA512
Cert. #A915
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Algorithms Modes and Description API Function FIPS Approved
(Cert #)
FIPS 186-4 RSA FIPS186-4:
186-4KEY(gen): Key Generation Mode: B.3.3,
Modulo: 2048, Primality Tests: C.2; Modulo:
3072, Primality Tests: C.2. Public Exponent Mode:
Fixed; Fixed Public Exponent: 10001; Private Key
Format: Standard [RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5]
SIG(gen) (2048/3072) with SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384 and SHA2-512;
SIG(Ver) (1024/2048/3072) with SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384 and SHA2-512.
[RSASSA-PSS]: SIG(gen) (2048/3072) with SHA-
1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384 and SHA2-
512;
SIG(Ver) (1024/2048/3072) with SHA-1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384 and SHA2-512
RSA_sign
RSA_verify
RSA_private_encrypt
RSA_public_decrypt
RSA_generate_key_fips
Cert. #A915
KBKDF (SP800-
108)
KDF Mode: Counter; MAC Mode: HMAC-SHA2-
512; Fixed Data Order: After Fixed Data, Before
Fixed Data,
In the Middle of Fixed DataCounter Length: 8, 16,
24, 32; Supported Lengths: 512, 4096
NIST_KDF_HMAC_SHA512_Ctr
_Mode
Cert. #A915
RSADP Primitive RSADP: (Mod 2048) RSA_decrypt CLV Cert. #A915
CKG (vendor
affirmed)
Vendor affirmed Cryptographic Key Generation RSA_generate_key_fips
EC_KEY_generate_key
ENT (P) Physical Entropy Source. Used to seed FIPS
approved SP800-90A DRBG. The ENT (P)
is located inside the module’s physical boundary,
but the outside the logical boundary, which is
complaint with the scenario defined in FIPS 140-2
IG 7.14 #1 (b).
rand_get_seed( )
Table 5. CAVP validated algorithms
Notes:
• There are some algorithm modes/key lengths that were tested but not used by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are listed in this table.
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• The AES-GCM IV generation method from AES Cert. #A915 is in compliance with IG A.5,
scenario #2. The DRBG with Cert. #A915 is called to generate the IV inside the module, and the
IV length is 96 bits. The new AES-GCM key will be generated if the module loses power.
• KTS (AES Cert. #A915; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits
of encryption strength).
In addition, the API functions listed in Table 5 were obtained from a Samsung provided source code
document and the FIPS_SCrypto_Functional_Design document.
8.2 Non-FIPS Approved (but Allowed) Cryptographic Algorithms
In addition, the module supports the following Non-Approved but Allowed algorithms that can be
used in FIPS-mode:
Algorithm Notes
PKCS#1-v1.5, 2048 bits, RSA key
wrapping (encrypt and decrypt)
The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for encryption or decryption of
keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs are established into or
exported out of the module using these services.
Table 6. Non-Approved (but Allowed) Algorithms
Caveats:
• RSA: CVL Cert. #A915, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength.
8.3 Non-FIPS Allowed Cryptographic Algorithm
The cryptographic module implements the following non-FIPS Allowed algorithms that are not permitted
for use while operating in a FIPS 140-2 compliant fashion:
• Triple-DES (non-compliant)
• DSA (non-compliant)
• Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement primitive (non-compliant)
• EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement primitive (non-compliant)
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9 Cryptographic Key Management
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services
are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures.
CSP Name Description Generated/Input Output
RSA SGK RSA (2048/3072 bits) signature
generation key
Internally generated or input via
API in plaintext.
N/A
RSA KDK RSA (2048 bits) key decryption
(private key transport) key
Internally generated or input via
API in plaintext.
N/A
ECDSA SGK FIPS 186-4 ECDSA (P-224/P-
256/P-384/P-521 Curves)
signature generation key
Internally generated or input via
API in plaintext.
N/A
AES EDK AES (128/192/256 bits) encrypt /
decrypt key
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
AES CMAC Key AES (128/192/256 bits) CMAC
generate / verify key
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
AES GCM Key AES (128/192/256 bits) encrypt /
decrypt / generate / verify key
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
HMAC Key Keyed hash key
(160/224/256/384/512 bits)
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG CSPs
V (128 bits), Seed (256/320/384
bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256
bits), Entropy input (384 bits
from hardware entropy noise
source)
Internally generated per SP800-
90A.
N/A
Key Wrap AES Key Wrap using 128, 192
or 256-bit keys
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
Key Derivation Key Input key (512 bits) used
for SP800-108 KBKDF function
Input via API in plaintext. N/A
Table 7. Critical Security Parameters
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Below is the table listing all public keys used within the module.
CSP Name Description
RSA SVK RSA (1024/2048/3072 bits) signature verification public key
RSA KEK RSA (2048 bits) key encryption (public key Transport) key
ECDSA SVK ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521 Curves) signature verification key
Table 8. Public Keys
9.1 Random Number Generation
The module employs an Approved SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG for creation of random numbers. The
module uses ENT (P) from the operational environment as the source of random numbers for DRBG
seeds. The ENT (P) produces the random numbers from an entropy pool maintained by the underlying
Operating System. The module is a software module that contains an approved DRBG that is seeded
exclusively from one known entropy source located inside the module’s physical boundary but the outside
the logical boundary, which is complaint with FIPS 140-2 IG 7.14 #1 (b). The module provides at least
256 bits entropy to instantiate the DRBG.
The module performs the Repetition Count Test (RCT) and Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) as the Health
Test to the entropy source that is used to instantiate the module’s DRBG.
9.2 Key Generation
The module provides an SP 800-90A compliant DRBG service for creation of random data (which a
calling application may use as symmetric key material) and for generation of RSA and ECDSA private
keys as shown in Table 7. In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 6 in SP800-133. The resulting generated seed used in the
asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
9.3 Key Entry and Output
The module possesses only one key, its self-integrity test HMAC key. Beyond that key, the module does
not store any other keys persistently, and it is the calling applications responsibility to appropriately
manage keys. The module does not support manual key entry or key output. Keys or other CSPs can only
be exchanged between the module and the calling application using appropriate API calls. The module
does not output intermediate key generation values.
9.4 Key Storage
Keys are not stored inside the cryptographic module. A pointer to a plaintext key is passed through the
algorithm APIs. Intermediate keys stored in the module’s memory are immediately replaced with 0s in the
memory after use. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call)
can only be accessed using the module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process
space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or
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15
export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping
sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently.
9.5 Zeroization
The zeroization mechanism for all of the CSPs is to replace 0s in the memory which originally stored the
CSPs. Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by calling zeroization API function
OPENSSL_cleanse() for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly
destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for
parameters passed in and out of the module.
10 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMI/EMC)
Lab Name: CS & Environment Center of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
The test device which runs the module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (i.e., for home
use).
FCC ID for each Tested Platform:
Device Processor Operating
System
FCC ID
Samsung Galaxy S21+ Samsung Electronics Exynos 2100 TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit) A3LSMG996B
Samsung Galaxy S21+ Samsung Electronics Exynos 2100 TEEGRIS 4.2 (64-bit) A3LSMG996B
Samsung Galaxy Watch 4 Samsung Electronics Exynos W920 TEEGRIS 4.2 (32-bit) A3LSMR875
Samsung Galaxy A53 Samsung Electronics Exynos 1280 TEEGRIS 4.2.1 (64-bit) A3LSMA536V
Samsung Galaxy S22+ Samsung Electronics Exynos 2200 TEEGRIS 4.2.1 (64-bit) A3LSMS908B
Samsung Galaxy S22+ Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 QSEE 5.18 (64-bit) A3LSMS908U
Samsung Galaxy Z Flip 4 Qualcomm Snapdragon 8+ Gen 1 QSEE 5.18 (64-bit) A3LSMF721U
Table 9. FCC IDs
For information related to the FCC ID of the devices, please refer to Samsung’s internal
FIPS_SCrypto_Functional_Design document.
11 Self-Tests
The module performs a series of power-up self-tests, that covers all of its FIPS-approved algorithms. The
module executes all self-tests when the module is initialized during the boot process. Self-tests can also be
manually invoked by calling FIPS_SCRYPTO_post(1). When the module passes all of its power-up self-
tests, the module sets an internal variable to reflect this. A calling application can call the FIPS_status()
API to obtain the value of this internal variable (1 if the self-tests have passed, and 0 if a FIPS error has
occurred). In addition to Known Answer Tests (KATs) for each of the module’s cryptographic
algorithms, the module also performs a binary integrity test to check for corruption. If any KAT self-test
or the integrity test fails, the module sets its error flag (static variable), returns an error code to the API
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16
function caller to indicate the error, enters an error state (FIPS_ERR), and inhibits Crypto APIs that return
cryptographic information.
11.1 Power-Up Tests
At module start-up, Known Answer Tests are performed. These tests are automatic and do not need
operator intervention. If the value calculated and the known answer do not match, the module
immediately enters into FIPS_ERR state. Once the module is in FIPS_ERR state, the module becomes
unusable via any interface.
The module implements each of the following Power On Self-Tests:
• AES-ECB encryption and decryption Known Answer Tests (KATs)
• AES-CMAC KAT
• AES-GCM KAT
• AES-KW KAT
• ECDSA (sign and verify) Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) in lieu of Power On Self-Test
• SP800-108 KDF (KBKDF) KAT
• RSA KATs (separate KAT for signing; separate KAT for verification)
• SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3
are performed)
• HMAC KATs (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-
SHA-512)
11.2 Software Integrity Check
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time
with the value stored in the module that was computed at build time.
11.3 Conditional Tests
The Module also implements the following conditional tests:
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT)
• ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT)
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
No other attacks are mitigated.
©2023 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact,
including this copyright notice.
17
13 Secure Operation
13.1 Crypto Officer/User Guidance
The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the
general public. The module and its host application are to be installed on an operating system specified
in Section 2.1 or one where portability is maintained.
Additional Rules of Operation:
1. The writable memory areas of the module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the
application so that the operating system is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the application has
access to that instance of the module.
2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot
access the address space of the process containing the module.
3. Only the services defined in Table 4 shall be used in FIPS mode of operation.
13.2 General Guidance
The module is not distributed as a standalone library and is only used in conjunction with the solution.
The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing CSPs via wipe/secure delete
procedures. If the module power is lost and restored, the calling application can reset the IV to the last
value used.
14 Design Assurance
14.1 Configuration Management
Perforce is used as the repository for both source code and documents. All source code and documents
are maintained on an internal server. Release is based on the Changelist number, which is automatically
generated. Every check-in process creates a new Changelist number. Versions of controlled items
include information about each version. For documentation, revision history inside the document
provides the current version of the document. Version control maintains all the previous versions and the
version control system automatically numbers revisions.
For source code, unique information is associated with each version such that source code versions can
be associated with binary versions of the final product. The source code of the module available in the
Samsung internal Perforce repository, as listed in the Functional Design document, is used to build
target binary.
14.2 Delivery and Distribution
The cryptographic module is never released as source code, but the module sources are stored and
maintained at a secure development facility with controlled access.
The vendor distributes the module as part of the larger system firmware images specific to each phone
model and carrier or as part of mobile applications. Only authorized personnel can register the module
©2023 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact,
including this copyright notice.
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binary with the vendor’s automated manufacturing system, so that it can be loaded (as part of a larger
image) onto newly manufactured phone hardware without any manual intervention or (for mobile
applications) distributed through a secure method (for example, the Google Play Store). Employees are
not allowed to bring in any personal belongings to the manufacturing facility and entrance to the facility is
controlled through employee ID based badge access and monitored using CCTV. SAMSUNG only
releases the module binary in image form and through OTA (Over the Air) mechanisms, the latter of
which is controlled by SAMSUNG or mobile carriers. In either case, if the binary were modified by an
unauthorized entity, the device would detect the modification and not accept the modified binary.
©2023 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact,
including this copyright notice.
19
15 Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCTV Closed Caption Television
CMT Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ENP (P) Physical Entropy Source
ENT (NP) Non-Physical Entropy Source
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FSM Finite State Model
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
O/S Operating System
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
16 References
[1] FIPS 140-2 Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[2] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[3] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[4] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[5] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[6] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[7] SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[8] ANSI X9.31 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA)
[9] SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html
[10] SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html
[11] SP 800-131A Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Lengths, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html