Apple Inc.
©2021 Apple Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Module Version 10.0
Prepared for:
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
www.apple.com
Prepared by:
atsec information security Corp.
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Trademarks
Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or
service marks of others.
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 PURPOSE ...........................................................................................................................................5
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION / COPYRIGHT ..............................................................................................5
1.3 EXTERNAL RESOURCES / REFERENCES ...................................................................................................5
1.4 ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ...................................................................... 8
2.1 MODULE DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................8
2.1.1 Module Validation Level.............................................................................................................8
2.1.2 Module components..................................................................................................................8
2.1.3 Tested Platforms........................................................................................................................8
2.2 MODES OF OPERATION .........................................................................................................................9
2.2.1 Approved Security Functions .................................................................................................. 10
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions .......................................................................................... 12
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY ................................................................................................ 14
2.4 MODULE USAGE CONSIDERATIONS...................................................................................................... 14
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES .......................................................15
4 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................16
4.1 ROLES ............................................................................................................................................. 16
4.2 SERVICES ......................................................................................................................................... 16
4.3 OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION .............................................................................................................. 19
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...................................................................................................... 20
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................................21
6.1 APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................................................. 21
6.2 POLICY ............................................................................................................................................ 21
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT............................................................................. 22
7.1 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION..........................................................................................................22
7.2 KEY / CSP GENERATION ....................................................................................................................22
7.3 KEY / CSP ESTABLISHMENT ...............................................................................................................22
7.4 KEY / CSP ENTRY AND OUTPUT..........................................................................................................23
7.5 KEY / CSP STORAGE .........................................................................................................................23
7.6 KEY / CSP ZEROIZATION....................................................................................................................23
8 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMI/EMC)..... 24
9 SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................... 25
9.1 POWER-UP TESTS ............................................................................................................................25
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests................................................................................................25
9.1.2 Software / firmware integrity tests...........................................................................................25
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests .............................................................................................................25
9.2 CONDITIONAL TESTS .........................................................................................................................25
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test..........................................................................25
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test......................................................................................................26
9.2.3 SP800-90A Health Tests ........................................................................................................26
9.2.4 Critical Function Test...............................................................................................................26
10 DESIGN ASSURANCE .......................................................................................................27
10.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ..........................................................................................................27
10.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION .................................................................................................................27
10.3 DEVELOPMENT..................................................................................................................................27
10.4 GUIDANCE........................................................................................................................................27
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance .............................................................................................27
10.4.2 User Guidance.........................................................................................................................27
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS .................................................................................... 28
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List of Tables
Table 1 Module Validation Level .....................................................................................................................8
Table 2 Tested Platforms................................................................................................................................9
Table 3 Approved and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions ........................................................................ 12
Table 3a Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions ............................................................................ 12
Table 4 Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions .................................................................... 13
Table 5 Roles................................................................................................................................................ 16
Table 6 Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode........................................................................ 18
Table 7 Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode ............................................................................ 19
Table 8 Keys and CSPs.................................................................................................................................22
Table 9 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests........................................................................................................25
List of Figures
No table of figures entries found.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM
(ccv10). It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic services it provides. This document
also defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for operating the module.
This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic modules and
is intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.
FIPS 140-2 details the requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada for cryptographic
modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.
For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program please refer to the NIST CMVP
website [CMVP].
Throughout the document “Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10)”, “cryptographic
module”, “corecrypto KEXT” or “the module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Apple corecrypto
Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10). Throughout the document “OS” refers to “iOS”, “iPadOS”, “tvOS”,
“watchOS” and “TxFW” unless specifically noted. “ccv10” is used to refer to the module version 10.0.
1.2 Document Organization / Copyright
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original
entirety without any revision, ©2021 Apple Inc.
1.3 External Resources / References
The Apple website (http://www.apple.com) contains information on the full line of products from Apple Inc.
For a detailed overview of the operating system iOS and the associated security properties refer to [OS]
and [SEC]. For details on the OS releases with their corresponding validated modules and Crypto Officer
Role Guides refer to the Apple OS Security Guide in the webpage - “Product security certifications,
validations, and guidance for iOS” [Guide]. Additional References are listed below.
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program
FIPS 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, “FIPS PUB 140-2 Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” Issued May-25-2001, Effective 15-Nov-2001,
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/standards
FIPS 140-2 IGNIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program,” December 2019
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/fips140-2/fips1402ig.pdf
FIPS 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
FIPS 198 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
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OS Technical Overview for all Apple Platforms
https://developer.apple.com/
SEC Security Overview
https://developer.apple.com/security/
SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation”, December 2001
SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality”, May 2004
SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices”, January 2010
SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38F, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping”, December 2012
SP800-57P1 NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1:
General”, July 2016
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67, “Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher”, (Revised) January 2012
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A, “Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132, “Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation”,
December 2010
Guide User Guidance and CO Guidance:
https://support.apple.com/HT211006
https://support.apple.com/HT202739
https://support.apple.com/HT208389
https://support.apple.com/HT208390
https://support.apple.com/HT208675
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1.4 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation
CFB Cipher Feedback mode of operation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter mode of operation
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook mode of operation
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA DSA based on ECC
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KEXT Kernel extension
KDF Key Derivation Function
KPI Kernel Programming Interface
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback (mode of operation)
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
RNG Random Number Generator
SHS Secure Hash Standard
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Description
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) is a software cryptographic module running
on a multi-chip standalone mobile device.
The cryptographic services provided by the module are:
• Data encryption / decryption • Signature generation/verification
• Generation of hash values • Random number generation
• Message authentication • Key generation
2.1.1 Module Validation Level
The module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The following table
shows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the validation.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1 Module Validation Level
2.1.2 Module components
There are no components excluded from the validation testing of the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space
Module for ARM (ccv10).
2.1.2.1 Software components
corecrypto has a KPI layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported algorithms. These
implementations include proprietary optimizations of algorithms that are fitted into the corecrypto
framework. The corecrypto KEXT is linked dynamically into the OS kernel.
2.1.2.2 Hardware components
There are no hardware components within the cryptographic module boundary.
2.1.3 Tested Platforms
The module has been tested with and without PAA on the following hardware platforms. PAA=NEON is
present in Apple A, S and T series processors.
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Manufacturer Operating
System
Processor Hardware Platform
Apple Inc. iOS 13 Apple A9 iPhone 6S Plus
Apple A10 Fusion iPhone 7 Plus
Apple A11 Bionic iPhone 8 Plus
Apple A12 Bionic iPhone Xs Max
Apple A13 Bionic iPhone 11 Pro Max
iPadOS 13 Apple A8 iPad mini 4
Apple A8X iPad Air 2
Apple A9 iPad (5th
generation)
Apple A9X iPad Pro (9.7 inch)
Apple A10 Fusion iPad (6th
generations)
Apple A10X Fusion iPad Pro (12.9 inch, 2nd
generation)
Apple A12 Bionic iPad mini (5th generation)
Apple A12X Bionic iPad Pro (12.9 inch, 3rd
generation)
tvOS 13 Apple A10X Fusion Apple TV 4K
watchOS 6 Apple S1P Apple Watch Series 1
Apple S3 Apple Watch Series 3
Apple S4 Apple Watch Series 4
Apple S5 Apple Watch Series 5
TxFW 10.15 Apple T2 Apple T21
Table 2 Tested Platforms
In addition to the configurations tested by the laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on the
following platforms.
for iOS13:
• iPhone 6s and iPhone SE with an Apple A9
• iPhone 7 with an Apple A10 Fusion
• iPhone 8 and iPhone X with an Apple A11 Bionic
• iPhone Xr and iPhone Xs with an Apple A12 Bionic
• iPhone 11 and iPhone 11 Pro with an Apple A13 Bionic
for iPadOS 13
• iPad Pro (12.9) with an Apple A9X
• iPad (7th generation) with an Apple A10 Fusion
• iPad Pro (10.5-inch) with an Apple A10X Fusion
• iPad Air (3rd generation) with an Apple A12 Bionic
• iPad Pro (11-inch) with an Apple A12X Bionic
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate (IG G.5).
2.2 Modes of operation
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) has an Approved and Non-Approved Mode of
operation. The Approved Mode of operation is configured in the system by default. If the device starts up
successfully then corecrypto KEXT has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved Mode. Any
1
The user for Apple T2 are iMac Pro, Mac Pro, Mac mini, MacBook Air and MacBook Pro
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calls to the Non-Approved security functions listed in Table 4 will cause the module to assume the Non-
Approved Mode of operation.
The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved ciphers as all
keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP) handled by the module are ephemeral and there are no keys
and CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests or integrity tests is not required.
Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the self-
tests are always performed during initialization of the module. This includes the hardware-assisted AES
(AES-NI) and SHA implementations.
The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed Table 3. If multiple
implementations of the same cipher are present, the module selects automatically which cipher is used
based on internal heuristics.
2.2.1 Approved Security Functions
Approved security functions are listed in Table 3. The Algorithm Certificate Numbers listed in Table 3 are
obtained from NIST for successful validation testing of the cryptographic algorithms implementations of
the module that runs on the hardware platforms listed in Table 2. For the current standards, test
requirements, and special abbreviations used in the following tables, please refer to [CAVP]. Not all the
algorithms/modes verified through CAVP are available for use by the module.
Cryptographic
Function
Standards
and
Algorithm
Modes and Options
Algorithm
Certificate
Number
Random Number
Generation
[SP800-90A]
DRBG
HMAC_DRBG
Modes:
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
A16 (c_ltc)
CTR_DRBG
Modes:
AES-128
AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
Without Predication Resistance
A15 (c_asm)
A13 (vng_asm)
HMAC_DRBG
Modes:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
Without Predication Resistance
A18 (vng_ltc)
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
[FIPS 197]
AES
[SP800-38 A]
[SP800-38 E]
[SP800-38 F]
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes
CBC ECB
CFB8 OFB
CFB128
CTR
A15 (c_asm)
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
CCM GCM
CTR
ECB
A13 (vng_asm)
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Cryptographic
Function
Standards
and
Algorithm
Modes and Options
Algorithm
Certificate
Number
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
CBC OFB
CFB128 XTS (Key length: 128, 256
bits key)
ECB
A14 (asm_arm)
[SP800-67]
Triple-DES
Keying Option: 1; All Keys Independent
Modes:
ECB
A16 (c_ltc)
Key Wrapping SP800-38D Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
AES-CCM
AES-GCM
A13 (vng_asm)
SP800-38F Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes
AES-KW
A15 (c_asm)
Digital Signature [FIPS186-4]
RSA
Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)
Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)
Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
A18 (vng_ltc)
[FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
Key Pair Generation (PKG):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Public Key Validation (PKV)
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Generation:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Verification:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
A18 (vng_ltc)
Message Digest [FIPS 180-4]
SHS
Modes
SHA-384
SHA-512
A16 (c_ltc)
Modes
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
A18( vng_ltc)
Modes
SHA-256
A172
(vng_neon)
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198]
HMAC
Modes
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
A16 (c_ltc)
Modes
HMAC-SHA-256
A172
(vng_neon)
2
The S1P and S3 from the armv7 processor family do not implement vng_neon and do not have the A17 ACVT
certificate.
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Cryptographic
Function
Standards
and
Algorithm
Modes and Options
Algorithm
Certificate
Number
Modes
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
A18( vng_ltc)
CKG [SP800-133] ECDSA Key Pair Generation:
curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Vendor Affirmed
Table 3 Approved and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
Cryptographic
Function
Standards
and
Algorithm
Modes and Options
Algorithm
Certificate
Number
RSA Key Wrapping Non-[SP 800-
56B], [SP800-
131A]
KTS RSA-OAEP
PKCS#1 v1.5
Modulus size: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits
Non-Approved,
but Allowed
MD5
(Used as part of the TLS
key establishment scheme
only)
Message Digest Digest size 128 bit Non-Approved,
but Allowed:
NDRNG Random Number
Generation
N/A Non-Approved,
but Allowed:
provided by the
underlying
operational
environment
Table 3a Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions
Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Note
DES Encryption / Decryption:
Key Size 56 bits
Non-Approved
MD2 Message Digest
Digest size 128 bit
Non-Approved
MD4 Message Digest
Digest size 128 bit
Non-Approved
RIPEMD Message Digest
Digest size 160
Non-Approved
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Signature Generation
Signature Verification
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF ANSI X9.63 Hash Based KDF Non-Approved
RFC6637 KDF KDF based on RFC6637 Non-Approved
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Non-Approved
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Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Note
Integrated Encryption
Scheme on elliptic curves
Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192
PKV: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
Non-Approved
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit increments
Non-Approved
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
RC2 Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
RC4 Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key CBC
MAC)
MAC generation Non-Approved
RSA Key Wrapping PKCS#1 v1.5 and KST RSA-OAEP
Key Size < 2048
Non-Approved
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
Signature Generation:
Key Size < 2048
Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
Signature Verification
Key Size (modulus) < 1024
Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.31
Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
RSA
Signature Verification
PKCS#1 v1.5
Key sizes (modulus): 1536 bits
Non-Compliant
SP800-56C KDF Non-Compliant
Triple-DES
Symmetric Encryption
and Decryption
Optimized Assembler (asm_arm) Implementation:
Encryption / Decryption
Mode: CTR
Non-Compliant
Encryption / Decryption:
Two-Key implementation
AES-CMAC AES-128/192/256 MAC generation /verification Non-Compliant
Table 4 Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions
Note: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved algorithm,
while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm, but the
implementation is either not validated by the CAVP or/and the self-tests are not implemented (IG 9.4).
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2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the iPhone, iPad, Apple TV, Apple Watch
or T2 running iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, watchOS or TxFW respectively. Consequently, the embodiment of the
module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram
2.4 Module Usage Considerations
A user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module:
• AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with SP800-38D section 8.2.1 in compliance with IG
A.5 scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS
protocol version 1.2. Users should consult [SP 800-38D], especially section 8, for all of the details
and requirements of using AES-GCM mode In case the module’s power is lost and then restored,
the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed.
• AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS
data unit does not exceed 220
blocks.
• In order to meet the IG A.13 requirement, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt
more than 216
64-bit blocks of data.
• When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions
of ccaes_[cbc|ecb]_[encrypt|decrypt]_mode.
• When using SHA, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions
ccsha[1|224|256|384|512]_di.
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3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C Language Kernel Programming Interfaces (KPIs).
In detail, these interfaces are the following:
• Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, KPIs and callable services will be
referred to as “KPI.”
• Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters,
namely the kernel module plist whose information is supplied to the module by the kernel module
loader.
• Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each KPI lists
possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language KPIs within
the module is provided in the header files and the KPI documentation. Messages are documented
also in the KPI documentation.
The module is a kernel extension optimized for library use within the OS kernel and does not contain any
terminating assertions or exceptions. Once the module is loaded into the OS kernel its cryptographic
functions are made available to OS kernel services only. Any internal error detected by the module is
reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling OS Kernel service must examine
the return code and act accordingly. There is one notable exceptions: ECDSA does not return a key if the
pair-wise consistency test fails.
The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes the system
to crash if any self-test fails – see Section 9.
The module communicates error status synchronously through the use of documented return codes
(indicating the module’s status). It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a
FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.
Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the
applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
4.1 Roles
The module supports a single instance of the two authorized roles: the Crypto Officer and the User. No
support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a maintenance operator.
Role General Responsibilities and Services (details see below)
User Utilization of services (section 4.2) of the module tested platforms (section 2.1)
Crypto Officer (CO) Utilization of services (section 4.2) of the module tested platforms (section 2.1)
Table 5 Roles
4.2 Services
The module provides services to authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer Role according
to the applicable FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
Table 6 contains the cryptographic functions employed by the module in the Approved Mode. For each
available service it lists, the associated role, the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and cryptographic
keys involved, and the type(s) of access to the CSPs and cryptographic keys.
CSPs contain security-related information (secret and private cryptographic keys, for example) whose
disclosure or modification can compromise the main security objective of the module, namely the
protection of sensitive information.
The access types are denoted as follows:
• R: the item is read/ execute or referenced by the service
• W: the item is written or updated by the service
• Z: the persistent item is zeroized by the service
Service
Roles CSPs and
crypto keys
Access
Type
USER CO
Triple-DES encryption and decryption
Encryption
Input: plaintext, IV, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, IV, key
Output: plaintext
X X Triple-DES key R
AES encryption and decryption
Encryption
Input: plaintext, IV, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, IV, key
Output: plaintext
X X AES key R
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Service
Roles CSPs and
crypto keys
Access
Type
USER CO
AES Key Wrapping
Encryption
Input: plaintext, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, key
Output: plaintext
X X AES key R
RSA Key Wrapping Using PKCS#1 v1.5 and KST RSA-OAEP, (non-
approved but allowed)
Encryption
Input: plaintext, the modulus n, the public key e
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, the modulus n, the private key d
Output: plaintext
X X RSA key pair R
Secure Hash Generation using SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
or SHA-512
Input: message
Output: message digest
X X None N/A
Secure Hash Generation using MD5 (non-approved but allowed) X X none N/A
HMAC generation using HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384, or HMAC-SHA-512
Input: HMAC key, message
Output: HMAC value of message
X X Secret HMAC
key
R
RSA signature generation and verification
Signature generation
Input: the modulus n, the private key d,
the SHA algorithm (SHA -224/ SHA-256/ SHA-384 /SHA-512), a
message m to be signed
Output: the signature s of the message
Signature verification
Input: the modulus n, the public key e,
the SHA algorithm (SHA-1/ SHA -224/ SHA-256/ SHA-384 /SHA-
512), a message m, a signature for the message
Output: pass if the signature is valid,
fail if the signature is invalid
X X RSA key pair R
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Service
Roles CSPs and
crypto keys
Access
Type
USER CO
ECDSA signature generation and verification
Signature generation
Input: message m, q, a, b, XG, YG, n, the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/
SHA-256/ SHA-384/ SHA-512), sender’s private key d
Output: signature of m as a pair of r and s
Signature verification
Input: received message m’, signature in form on r’ and s’ pair, q, a, b,
XG, YG, n, sender’s public key Q, he SHA algorithm (SHA-1/ SHA-224/
SHA-256/ SHA-384/ SHA-512)
Output: pass if the signature is valid,
fail if the signature is invalid
X X ECDSA key pair R
Random number generation
Input: Entropy Input, Nonce, Personalization String
Output: Returned Bits
X X Entropy input
string, Nonce, V
and Key
R
W
ECDSA key pair generation
Input: q, FR, a, b, domain_parameter_seed, G, n, h.
Output: private key d, public key Q
X X ECDSA key pair W
Release all resources of symmetric crypto function context (i.e.
Symmetric Key Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X AES / Triple-DES
key
Z
Release all resources of hash context (i.e. MAC Key Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X HMAC key Z
Release all resources of asymmetric crypto function context (i.e.
Asymmetric Key Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ ECDSA)
Z
Reboot (implicit Power-on Self-test)
Input: N/A
Output: pass if the Self-test is successful,
fail if the Self-test is unsuccessful
X X None N/A
Show Status
Input: N/A
Output: Status of module
X X None N/A
Table 6 Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode
Service
Roles
User CO
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves encryption / decryption X X
DES Encryption / Decryption X X
Triple-DES Encryption/
Decryption
asm_arm implementation CTR mode (non-compliant) X X
Two-Key Triple-DES (non-approved)
CAST5 Encryption /Decryption X X
Blowfish Encryption /Decryption X X
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Service
Roles
User CO
RC2 Encryption /Decryption X X
RC4 Encryption /Decryption X X
MD2 Message Digest Generation X X
MD4 Message Digest Generation X X
RIPEMD Message Digest Generation X X
RSA PKCS#1 (v1.5 and PSS) Signature Generation / Verification
Key size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
X X
RSA ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key size (modulus): 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
Public key exponent values: 65537 or larger
X X
RSA PKCS#1 (v1.5 and PSS) and ANSI X9.31
Signature Generation, Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification, Key Size < 1024
X X
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and KST RSA-OAEP Key Wrapping
Key size < 2048
X X
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification
Key size= 1536 bits
X X
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points X X
ECDSA
Key Generation: Curve P-192
Key Verification: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
X X
Ed25519 Key agreement/ Signature Generation/ Signature Verification X X
SP800-56C Key Derivation X X
ANSI X9.63 Hash Based Key Derivation X X
RFC6637 Key Derivation X X
AES-CMAC MAC Generation / Verification X X
OMAC MAC Generation X X
Table 7 Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode
4.3 Operator authentication
Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism
for operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit in the action taken. The module relies upon
the operating system for any operator authentication.
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5 Physical Security
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) is a software module intended to operate on a
multi-chip standalone platform. The FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements do not apply to this
module since it is a software module.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) operates in a modifiable operational
environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. The module is included in the OS executing on the
hardware specified in section 2.1.3.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (single-user mode; concurrent operators are
explicitly excluded).
FIPS Self-Test functionality is invoked along with mandatory FIPS 140-2 tests when the module is loaded
into memory by the operating system.
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7 Cryptographic Key Management
The following Table summarizes the cryptographic keys and CSPs used in the Apple corecrypto Kernel
Space Module for ARM (ccv10) with the ley lengths supported, the available methods for key generation,
key entry and key output and zeroization.
Name Key / CSP Size Generation Entry / Output Zeroization
AES Keys 128, 192, 256 bits N/A. Supplied by the caller Entry : calling
application
(see 7.4)
Output: N/A
automatic
zeroization
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
(see 7.6).
Triple-DES
Keys
192 bits
HMAC Keys min 112 bits
RSA key pair 2048, 3072, 4096
ECDSA key
pair
P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521 curves
The private keys are generated
using FIPS186-4 Key
Generation method, and the
random value used in the key
generation is generated using
SP800-90A DRBG.
Entry : calling
application
(see 7.4)
Output: calling
application
(see 7.4)
Entropy input
string
Obtained from the NDRNG Entry: OS
Output: N/A
DRBG nonce Obtained from the NDRNG
DRBG V, Key Derived from DRBG input string
as defined by SP800-90A
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Table 8 Keys and CSPs
7.1 Random Number Generation
The module uses a FIPS 140-2 approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as
specified in NIST SP 800-90A. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a
CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module also
employs a HMAC_DRBG for random number generation. The deterministic random bit generators are
seeded by the read_random interface. The read_random is the Kernel Space interface that receives
random bits from an entropy source composed by a Fortuna PRNG and the NDRNG from the ARM-based
processor. The entropy source provides 256-bits of security strength in seeding and reseeding the module
approved DRBGs.
7.2 Key / CSP Generation
The following approved key generation methods are used by the module:
• The module does not implement symmetric key generation.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) ) for asymmetric keys as per [SP 800-133] (vendor affirmed) compliant with
[FIPS 186-4] and using DRBG compliant with [SP 800-90A]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used
in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP 800-90A] CTR_DRBG. The generated seed is
an unmodified output from the DRBG. The module does not output any information or intermediate
results during the key generation process. The DRBG itself is single-threaded.
7.3 Key / CSP Establishment
The module provides the following key establishment services in the Approved Mode:
• the AES Key wrapping using KW, CCM and GCM modes.
• The RSA key wrapping using PKCS#1 v1.5 or RSA-OAEP is non-approved but allowed method.
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The encryption strengths for the key establishment methods are determined in accordance with FIPS 140-
2 Implementation Guidance IG 7.5 and NIST [SP 800-57 (Part1)].
• AES key wrapping is used for key establishment methodology that provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength.
• RSA key wrapping is used for key establishment methodology that provides between 112 and 152
bits of encryption strength.
7.4 Key / CSP Entry and Output
All keys are entered from, or output to, the invoking kernel service running on the same device. All keys
entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys are output from the module in
plain text form if required by the calling kernel service. The same holds for the CSPs.
7.5 Key / CSP Storage
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) considers all keys in memory to be
ephemeral. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling
kernel service. The same holds for CSPs.
The module protects all keys, secret or private, and CSPs through the memory protection mechanisms
provided by the OS, including the separation between the kernel and user-space. No process can read the
memory of another process. No user-space application can read the kernel memory.
7.6 Key / CSP Zeroization
Keys and CSPs are zeroized when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the device is
powered down. Additionally, the user can zeroize the entire device directly (locally) or remotely, returning it
to the original factory settings.
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8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The EMI/EMC properties of the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) are not
meaningful for the software library. The devices containing the software components of the module have
their own overall EMI/EMC rating. The validation test environments have FCC, part 15, Class B rating.
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9 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the random bit generator requires
continuous verification. The FIPS Self Tests functionality runs all required module self-tests. This
functionality is invoked by the OS Kernel startup process upon device initialization. If the self-tests
succeed, the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) instance is maintained in the
memory of the OS Kernel on the device and made available to each calling kernel service without
reloading.
All self-tests performed by the module are listed and described in this section.
9.1 Power-Up Tests
The following tests are performed each time the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10)
starts and must be completed successfully for the module to operate in the FIPS Approved Mode. If any of
the following tests fails, the device shuts down automatically. To run the self-tests on demand, the user
may reboot the device.
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Algorithm Modes Test
Triple-DES ECB KAT (Known Answer Test)
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
AES implementations selected by the module for
the corresponding environment
AES-128
ECB, CBC, XTS, GCM,
CCM
KAT
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
DRBG (CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG; tested
separately)
N/A KAT
HMAC-SHA implementations selected by the
module for the corresponding environment
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
512
N/A KAT
ECDSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
PCT
RSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
KAT
Table 9 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
9.1.2 Software / firmware integrity tests
A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module
for ARM (ccv10). The corecrypto’s HMAC-SHA256 is used as an Approved algorithm for the integrity test.
If the test fails, then the device powers itself off.
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests
No other critical function test is performed on power up.
9.2 Conditional Tests
The following sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto Kernel Space
Module for ARM (ccv10).
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) performs a continuous random number
generator test on the noise source (i.e., NDRNG), whenever it is invoked to seed the SP800-90A DRBG.
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9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) generates asymmetric ECDSA key pairs and
performs all required pair-wise consistency tests with the newly generated key pairs.
9.2.3 SP800-90A Health Tests
The Apple corecrypto Kernel Space Module for ARM (ccv10) performs the health tests as specified in
section 11.3 of [SP800-90A].
9.2.4 Critical Function Test
No other critical function test is performed conditionally.
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10 Design Assurance
10.1 Configuration Management
Apple manages and records source code and associated documentation files by using the revision control
system named “Git.”
Apple module hardware data, which includes descriptions, parts data, part types, bills of materials,
manufacturers, changes, history, and documentation are managed and recorded. Additionally,
configuration management is provided for the module’s FIPS documentation.
The following naming/numbering convention for documentation is applied.
<evaluation>_<module>_<os>_<mode>_<doc name>_<doc version (##.##)>
Example: FIPS_CORECRYPTO_IOS_tvOS_KS_SECPOL_4.0
Document management utilities provide access control, versioning, and logging. Access to the Git
repository (source tree) is granted or denied by the server administrator in accordance with company and
team policy.
10.2 Delivery and Operation
The corecrypto KEXT is built into the OS. For additional assurance, it is digitally signed. The Approved
Mode is configured by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of
the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4. This transition is only temporary as the module returns to
the Approved mode after that call.
10.3 Development
The Apple crypto module (like any other Apple software) undergoes frequent builds utilizing a “train”
philosophy. Source code is submitted to the Build and Integration group (B & I). Integration (merge) can
only take place after the corecrypto project successfully passes internal integration and system tests on all
platforms. B & I builds, integrates and does basic sanity checking on the operating systems and apps that
they produce. Copies of older versions are archived offsite in underground granite vaults.
10.4 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module’s validated status
while in use.
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
The Approved Mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into
the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4. If the device
starts up successfully then corecrypto KEXT has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved
Mode.
10.4.2 User Guidance
As above, the Approved Mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be
transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4.
If the device starts up successfully then corecrypto KEXT has passed all self-tests and is operating in the
Approved Mode.
Kernel programmers that use the module API shall not attempt to invoke any API call directly and only
adhere to defined interfaces through the kernel framework.
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11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module protects against the utilization of known Triple-DES weak keys. The following keys are not
permitted:
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}.