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Enterprise Secure Key Manager
Hardware P/N M6H81AA, Version 5.0;
Firmware Version: 7.0.1
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 1.0
December 7, 2017
On November 5, 2018, the Atalla business was acquired by Utimaco Inc. For aspects of this Security
Policy document, the rest of this document will refer to the Enterprise Secure Key Manager.
However, the Vendor is now Utimaco Inc.
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................5
2 ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER.....................................................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................6
2.2.1 FIPS Mode of Operation........................................................................................................................8
2.2.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation................................................................................................................9
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................9
2.4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................12
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role .............................................................................................................................12
2.4.2 User Role .............................................................................................................................................15
2.4.3 Micro Focus User Role........................................................................................................................16
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role...........................................................................................................................16
2.4.5 Authentication......................................................................................................................................16
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services ....................................................................................................................18
2.4.7 Non-approved Services........................................................................................................................18
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................18
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................19
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................19
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs.....................................................................................................................................19
2.7.2 Key Generation....................................................................................................................................24
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................24
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................25
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................25
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................26
3.1 INITIAL SETUP ..............................................................................................................................................26
3.2 INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................26
3.2.1 First-Time Initialization.......................................................................................................................26
3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration ...................................................................................................................26
3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSURANCE ................................................................................................................27
3.4 KEY AND CSP ZEROIZATION ........................................................................................................................28
3.5 ERROR STATE...............................................................................................................................................28
ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................................................29
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Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE OF THE ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER ..............................................6
FIGURE 2 – BLOCK DIAGRAM OF ESKM ........................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 3 – FRONT PANEL LEDS ..................................................................................................................................10
FIGURE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS .......................................................................................................................11
FIGURE 5 – REAR PANEL LEDS....................................................................................................................................12
FIGURE 6 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN CLI .........................................................................................................................27
FIGURE 7 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE.........................................................................27
FIGURE 8 – FIPS STATUS SERVER SETTINGS IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE....................................................27
FIGURE 9 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABEL ON ESKM.......................................................................................................28
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Table of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION...................................................................................................6
TABLE 2 – LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL PORTS MAPPING..................................................................................9
TABLE 3 – FRONT PANEL LED DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................10
TABLE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS DESCRIPTIONS.................................................................................................11
TABLE 5 – REAR PANEL LED DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................................12
TABLE 6 – CRYPTO-OFFICER SERVICES........................................................................................................................13
TABLE 7 – USER SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 8 – MICRO FOCUS USER SERVICES....................................................................................................................16
TABLE 9 – CLUSTER MEMBER SERVICES......................................................................................................................16
TABLE 10 – ROLES AND AUTHENTICATIONS ................................................................................................................17
TABLE 11 – STRENGTH OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS ........................................................................................17
TABLE 12 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR SSH....................19
TABLE 13 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR TLS....................20
TABLE 14 – CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED BY THE MODULE’S TLS IMPLEMENTATION IN FIPS MODE ...........................21
TABLE 15 – OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ...................................22
TABLE 16 – ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................................................................29
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Enterprise Secure Key
Manager (ESKM) from Micro Focus. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’ requirements
for cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how the ESKM meets these requirements and
how to use the ESKM in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140-2. This policy was prepared as part
of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the Enterprise Secure Key Manager.
More information about FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is
available at the website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
In this document, the Enterprise Secure Key Manager is referred to as the ESKM, the module, or the
device.
1.2 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a
FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
 The Micro Focus website (https://software.microfocus.com/en-us/home) contains information on
the full line of products from Micro Focus.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
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2 Enterprise Secure Key Manager
2.1 Overview
Micro Focus provides a range of security products for banking, the Internet, and enterprise security
applications. These products use encryption technology—often embedded in hardware—to safeguard
sensitive data, such as financial transactions over private and public networks and to offload security
processing from the server.
The Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a hardened server that provides security policy and key
management services to encrypting client devices and applications. After enrollment, clients, such as
storage systems, application servers and databases, make requests to the ESKM for creation and
management of cryptographic keys and related metadata.
Client applications can access the ESKM via its Key Management Service (KMS) server and the Key
Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) server. Configuration and management can be performed
via web administration, Secure Shell (SSH), or serial console. Status-monitoring interfaces include a
dedicated FIPS status interface, a health check interface, and Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP).
The deployment architecture of the Enterprise Secure Key Manager is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 – Deployment Architecture of the Enterprise Secure Key Manager
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The Enterprise Secure Key Manager is validated at FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
Web Server Application Server Database Storage System
Enterprise Secure Key Manager
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Section Section Title Level
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The block diagram of the module is given in Figure 2. The cryptographic boundary is clearly shown in the
figure. Notice that the power supplies are not included in the boundary.
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of ESKM
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2.2.1 FIPS Mode of Operation
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following Approved algorithms:
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption: 128, 192, and 256 bits, in Electronic
Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Counter (CTR), Key Wrap (KW) modes, CMAC generation
and verification, 128 and 256 bits Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)1 2
encryption and decryption, and 256 bits in
Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) (Certificate #3995)
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) encryption and decryption: 3-key, in ECB and CBC modes,
and CMAC generation and verification, (Certificate #2194)
 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Certificate #3297)
 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 (Certificate #2609)
 Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-4 key generation,PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation, and
signature verification: 2048 and 3072 bits (Certificate #2051)
 RSA Decryption Primitive (RSADP) (CVL Certificate #821)
 TLS Key Derivation Function (KDF) (CVL Certificate #820)
 SSH KDF (CVL Certificates #822)
 Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) using AES in CTR mode for KMS (Certificate #1186)
 Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) using AES in CTR mode for KMIP (Certificate #1185)
 SNMP KDF (CVL Certificate # 823)
 ECDSA (Curves P256, P384) Signature Generation and Verification (Certificate #889)3
 ECDH primitive (Curves P256, P384) (CVL Certificate #842)
 Key Transport Scheme (AES Certificate #3995; AES-GCM, key establishment methodology provides 128 or
256 bits of encryption strength)1
, (AES Certificate #3995; AES Key Wrap, key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)4
, (AES Certificate #3995 and HMAC Certificate
#2609; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)5
, (Triple-
DES Certificate #2194 and HMAC Certificate #2609; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)5
.
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following non-Approved but allowed
algorithms and protocols:
 A non-Approved Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) to seed the DRBG.6
 The following commercially-available protocols for key establishment. The protocol algorithms have been
tested by the CAVP (see certificate #s above) but the protocol implementations themselves have not been
reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
o Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol using RSA 2048 bits for key transport (key wrapping: key
establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength), or using EC Diffie-Hellman
for key agreement (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of
encryption strength).7
1
AES GCM is only used as part of TLS 1.2 cipher suites conformant to IG A.5, RFC 5288 and SP 800-52 which are
listed in Table 14 of this document.
2
If the module’s power is lost and then restored, new GCM keys will be negotiated (to meet IG A.5).
3
The module’s cryptographic library provides support for ECDSA Public Key Generation, but this functionality is not
utilized in this version of the module.
4
KMIP clients can elect to use AES-KW to encrypt the key block.
5
Authenticated and encrypted key transport as part of SSH and TLS protocols.
6
The module generates a minimum of 256 bits of entropy before generating keys.
7
No parts of this protocol other than the KDF have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP.
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o SSHv2 protocol using Diffie-Hellman key agreement (the Diffie-Hellman key establishment scheme
provides 112 bits of security) or ECDH key agreement (the ECDH key establishment scheme
provides 128 or 192 bits of security).7
2.2.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
In the non-FIPS mode of operation, the module also implements the following non-Approved algorithms:
 DES
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA providing less than 112bits of security strength for signature generation and verification, and key
establishment as well as the above listed protocols for key establishment.
2.3 Module Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces:
 Data Input
 Data Output
 Control Input
 Status Output
The module features the following physical ports and LEDs:
 Serial port (RS232 DB9)
 Ethernet 10/100/1000 RJ-45 ports (Network Interface Card [NIC], quantity: 4)
 Monitor port (VGA DB15)
 Power input (100-240VAC)
 LEDs (four on the front panel and three on the rear panel)
The logical interfaces and their physical port mappings are described in Table 2.
Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping
Logical Interface Physical Ports
Data Input Serial, Ethernet
Data Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet
Control Input Serial, Ethernet
Status Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet, LEDs
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There are no ports on the front panel. There are four LEDs on the front panel. See Figure 3.
Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs
Descriptions of the LEDs are given in Table 3.
Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1
Unit Identifier (UID)
LED/button
Blue = Identification is activated.
Off = Identification is deactivated.
2 Power/Standby LED
Green = System is on.
Amber = System is in standby, but power is still applied.
Off = Power cord is not attached, power supply failure has occurred,
no power supplies are installed, facility power is not available.
3 Aggregate Network LED
Solid green = Link to network
Flashing green = Network activity
Off = No network connection
4 System Health LED
Green = System health is normal.
Amber = System health is degraded. Red = System health is critical.
Off = System health is normal (when in standby mode).
The components on the rear panel are illustrated in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components
Descriptions of components on the rear panel are given in Table 4.
Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions
Item Definition
1 Slot 1 PCIe 3.0 x 16 (Blocked)
2 Slot 2 PCIe 3.0 x 16 (Blocked)
3 Video connector
4 Serial connector
5
NIC 4 connector (Not used)8
NIC 3 connector (Not used)8
NIC 2 connector
NIC 1 connector
6 iLO connector (Blocked)
7 USB connectors (4) (Blocked)
8 Power supply bay 1
9 Power supply bay 2
The three LEDs on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 5.
8
NIC 3 and NIC 4 are not used by the module. RJ-45 plugs are installed as a reminder to the operator.
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Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs
Descriptions of LEDs on the rear panel are given in Table 5.
Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1
Standard NIC activity LED
for NIC 1 and NIC 2
Green = Activity exists.
Flashing green = Activity exists.
Off = No activity exists.
2
Standard NIC link LED for
NIC 1 and NIC 2
Green = Link exists.
Off = No link exists.
3 UID LED
Solid blue = Identification is activated.
Off = Identification is deactivated.
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports four authorized roles:
 Crypto-Officer
 User
 Micro Focus User
 Cluster Member
All roles require identity-based authentication.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Crypto-Officer accesses the module via the Web Management Console and/or the Command Line
Interface (CLI). This role provides all services that are necessary for the secure management of the
module. Table 6 shows the services for the Crypto-Officer role under the FIPS mode of operation. The
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purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is
described in the second column (“Description”). The Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in the rightmost
column correspond to the keys and other CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 6 – Crypto-Officer Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with a username
and the associated password and/or
certificate/public key
Crypto-Officer passwords – read;
SSH keys – read, write (only DH,
ECDH, and session keys).
TLS keys – read, write (only MS,
ECDH, and session keys).
Perform first-time
initialization
Configure the module when it is used for
the first time
Crypto-Officer (admin) password –
write;
Krsa private – write;
Log signing keys – write;
KRsaPub – write;
KRsaPriv – write.
Configure FIPS mode Enable/disable FIPS mode None
Manage CSPs Manage all client CSPs that are stored
within the module. This includes the
generation, storage, export (only public
keys), import, and zeroization of keys.
Client CSPs – write, read, delete;
PKEK – write, read, delete.
Manage clusters Manage all clusters that are defined within
the module. This includes the creation,
joining, and removal of a cluster from the
module.
Cluster Member passwords –write,
delete
Cluster key –write, read, delete
Manage services Manage all services supported by the
module. This includes the starting and
stopping of all services.
SNMPv3 password – write, delete
Manage operators Create, modify, or delete module
operators (Crypto-Officers and Users).
Crypto-Officer passwords – write,
delete; User passwords – write,
delete
Manage certificates Create/import/delete certificates KRsaPub – write, read, delete;
KRsaPriv – write, read, delete;
CARsaPub – write, read, delete;
CARsaPriv – write, read, delete;
Client RSA public keys – read;
KECDSAPub – write, read, delete;
KECDSAPriv – write, read, delete;
CAECDSAPub – write, read, delete;
Client ECDSA public keys – read.
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped
with the module
All CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration
Delete the current configuration file and
restores the default configuration settings
None
Restore configuration
file
Restore a previously backed up
configuration file
None
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Service Description Keys/CSPs
Backup configuration
file
Back up a configuration file None
Sign logs Sign module’s logs using log signing key. Log signing keys – read
Export logs Export module’s logs. None
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module All keys and CSPs – delete
Load firmware9
Load firmware onto the module Firmware signature key – read
9
New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any
other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2
validation.
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2.4.2 User Role
The User role is associated with external applications or clients that connect to the KMS via its XML
interface or to the KMIP interface. Users in this role may exercise services—such as key generation and
management—based on configured or predefined permissions. See Table 7 for details. The keys and
CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 7 – User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with credentials such
as username and password (in addition to the
certificate during TLS)
User passwords – read.
TLS keys – read, write (only MS,
ECDH, and session keys).
Generate key Generate a cryptographic key Client keys – write;
PKEK – write.
Modify CSP attributes Update/add/delete attributes None
Delete CSP Delete a CSP Client CSP – delete;
PKEK – delete.
Query CSP attributes Query a CSP’s attributes that the User is
allowed to access
None
Query Query the module’s supported capabilities None
Import CSP Import CSPs such as keys, secret data Client CSP – write;
PKEK – write.
Export CSP Export a CSP, such as a cryptographic key,
certificate, and other KMIP objects
Client CSP – read;
PKEK – read.
Get certificate info Return a list of local CAs including the
certificate status, certify and re-certify
None
Clone key Clone an existing key under a different key
name
Client CSP – write, read;
PKEK – write, read.
Generate random
number
Generate a random number DRBG seed – write, read, delete
DRBG v – write, read, delete
DRBG entropy input – write,
read, delete
DRBG key – write, read, delete
Crypto operation Perform a cryptographic operation using the
client key
Client key – write;
PKEK – read.
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Service Description Keys/CSPs
Re-key Create a new version of the client key Client key – write;
PKEK – read.
Activate CSP Activate CSP None
Revoke CSP Revoke CSP None
2.4.3 Micro Focus User Role
The Micro Focus User role can reset the module to an uninitialized state in the event that all Crypto-
Officer passwords are lost, or when a self-test permanently fails. See Table 8. The keys and CSPs in the
rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 8 – Micro Focus User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to the
module
Authenticate to ESKM with a signed token Micro Focus User RSA public
key – read
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with
the module
All keys/CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration
Delete the current configuration file and
restores the default configuration settings
None
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys/CSPs in the module All keys/CSPs – delete
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role
The Cluster Member role is associated with other ESKMs that can connect to this ESKM and access
cluster services. See Table 9. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and
CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 9 – Cluster Member Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate Cluster
Member
Authenticate to ESKM via TLS Cluster Member passwords –
read; Cluster key – read; Cluster
Member RsaPub – read
Receive Configuration
File
Update the module’s configuration settings None
Zeroize Key Delete a specific key Cluster key – delete
Backup Configuration
File
Back up a configuration file None
2.4.5 Authentication
The module performs identity-based authentication for the four roles. Three authentication schemes are
used: authentication with certificate in TLS, public key authentication via SSH, and authentication with
password. See Table 10 for a detailed description.
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Table 10 – Roles and Authentications
Role Authentication
Crypto-Officer Username and password with optional digital certificate or
public key
User Username and password and/or digital certificate
Micro Focus User Digital certificate
Cluster Member Authenticates with Cluster Password and Cluster Key
(certificates)
Table 11 provides a mapping of the security strength for each authentication scheme.
Table 11 – Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
Scheme Strength
Digital
Certificate
and Public
Key
A 2048 bit RSA key provides 112 bits of security. The probability of a successful random
guess is 2-112
which is significantly less than 1 in 1,000,000 (10-6
).
The module’s network interface supports a maximum theoretical bandwidth of 1010
bits per
second. Assuming a 2048-bit key size, at least 2048 bits of data must be transmitted for one
authentication attempt.10
Therefore, in a worst case scenario the maximum number of
attempts possible in a minute is 60 x (1010
/ 2048) = 292968750. The probability of a
successful attempt in one minute is 292968750 x 2-112
≈ 5.64237x10-26
which is significantly
less than 1 in 100,000.
An ECDSA key using NIST Curve P256 provides equivalent to 128 bits of security. The
probability of a successful random guess is 2-128
which is significantly less than 1 in
1,000,000 (10-6
).
The module’s network interface supports a maximum theoretical bandwidth of 1010
bits per
second. Assuming a 256-bit key size, at least 256 bits of data must be transmitted for one
authentication attempt.10
Therefore, in a worst case scenario the maximum number of
attempts possible in a minute is 60 x (1010
/ 256) = 2343750000. The probability of a
successful attempt in one minute is 2343750000 x 2-128
≈ 6.88766x10-30
which is
significantly less than 1 in 100,000 (10-5
).
An ECDSA key using NIST Curve P384 provides equivalent to 192 bits of security. The
probability of a successful random guess is 2-192
which is significantly less than 1 in
1,000,000.
The module’s network interface supports a maximum theoretical bandwidth of 1010
bits per
second. Assuming a 384-bit key size, at least 384 bits of data must be transmitted for one
authentication attempt.10
Therefore, in a worst case scenario the maximum number of
attempts possible in a minute is 60 x (1010
/ 384) = 1562500000. The probability of a
successful attempt in one minute is 1562500000 x 2-192
≈ 2.48921x10-49
which is
significantly less than 1 in 100,000 (10-5
).
10
In reality, much more data is required to be transmitted for each authentication attempt.
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Scheme Strength
Password Passwords in the module must consist of eight or more characters from the set of 90
human-readable numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower case), and special character
symbols. In a worst case scenario (password consisting of all numbers) the size of the
password space is 108
. The probability of a successful random guess is 10-8
which is less
than 1 in 1,000,000 (10-6
).
After five unsuccessful password attempts, the module is locked down for 60 seconds. The
probability of a successful password attempt in one minute is 5 x 10-8
which is less than 1 in
100,000 (10-5
).
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services
The following services do not require authentication:
 SNMP statistics
 FIPS status services
 Health check services
 Network Time Protocol (NTP) services
 Initiation of self-tests by rebooting the ESKM
 Negotiation of the XML protocol version for communications with the KMS
SNMP is used only for sending statistical information (SNMP traps). FIPS status and health check are
status-report services, unrelated to security or cryptography. NTP is a date/time synchronization service
that does not involve keys or CSPs. Initiation of self-tests and negotiation of the XML protocol version do
not involve keys or CSPs.
The services listed above for each role comprise the entire set of services available in non-FIPS mode.
2.4.7 Non-approved Services
The following services are available in non-FIPS mode:
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for importing certificates and downloading and restoring backup files
 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication
 Use of the following algorithms with KMS or KMIP servers: RC4, MD5, DES, RSA-512, RSA-768,
RSA-1024
 SNMPv1/SNMPv2
 SSL 3.0
 RSA encryption and decryption operations (note, however, that RSA encryption and decryption
associated with TLS handshakes and Sign and Sign Verify are allowed in FIPS Mode)
2.5 Physical Security
The module was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by Title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (that
is, for business use).
The Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire contents
of the module, including all hardware, software, firmware, and data, are enclosed in a metal case. The
case is opaque and must be sealed using a tamper-evident label in order to prevent the case cover from
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being removed without signs of tampering. Two pick-resistant locks are installed on the module’s front
bezel to protect the front interfaces, including the power switch, from unauthorized access. All circuits in
the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. Once the bezel is locked and the module
has been configured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be accessed without
signs of tampering. See Section 3.3 – Physical Security Assurance of this document for more information.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Enterprise Secure Key Manager—the
module does not provide a general purpose operating system.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs
The SSH and TLS protocols employed by the FIPS mode of the module are security-related. Table 12
and Table 13 introduce cryptographic keys, key components, and CSPs involved in the two protocols,
respectively.
Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DH
public
param
2048-bit Diffie-
Hellman public
parameters
Generated by DRBG
during session
initialization
In
plaintext
In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
DH
private
param
2048-bit Diffie-
Hellman private
parameters
Generated by DRBG
during session
initialization
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
ECDH
public
param
P256 or P384 EC
Diffie-Hellman
public parameters
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
In
plaintext
In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
ECDH
private
param
P256 or P384 EC
Diffie-Hellman
private
parameters
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
Krsa
public
2048-bit RSA
public keys
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
In
plaintext
In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
Verify the
signature of the
server’s
message.
Krsa
private
2048-bit RSA
private keys
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
Sign the
server’s
message.
Krsa
public
auth
2048-, 3072-bit
RSA public key
Imported by the
Crypto-Officer
In
plaintext
In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
Authenticate
Crypto-Officer
SSH Ks SSH session 3-
key Triple-DES
key, 128-, 192-,
256-bit AES key
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination or
when a new Ks is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Encrypt and
decrypt data
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SSH
Khmac
SSH session 512-
bit HMAC key
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination or
when a new
Khmac is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Authenticate
data
Table 13 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
ECDH public
param
P256 or P384 EC
Diffie-Hellman public
parameters
Generated by
DRBG during
session
initialization
In plaintext In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Establish TLS
Pre-MS
ECDH private
param
P256 or P384 EC
Diffie-Hellman
private parameters
Generated by
DRBG during
session
initialization
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Establish TLS
Pre-MS
Pre-MS TLS pre-master
secret
Input in
encrypted form
from TLS client
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Derive MS
MS TLS master secret Derived from Pre-
MS using FIPS
Approved key
derivation
function
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Derive TLS Ks
and TLS
Khmac
KRsaPub Server RSA public
key (2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext
a X509
certificate
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Client encrypts
Pre-MS. Client
verifies server
signatures
KECDSAPub Server ECDSA
public key (P-256,
P-384)
Externally
generated;
imported by
Crypto Officer
over TLS
In plaintext
a X509
certificate
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Client encrypts
Pre-MS. Client
verifies server
signatures
KRsaPriv Server RSA private
key (2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Server
decrypts Pre-
MS. Server
generates
signatures
KECDSAPriv Server ECDSA
private key (P-256,
P-384)
Externally
generated;
imported by
Crypto Officer
over TLS
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Server
decrypts Pre-
MS. Server
generates
signatures
CARsaPub Certificate Authority
(CA) RSA public key
( 2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Verify CA
signatures
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Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
CAECDSAPu
b
Certificate Authority
(CA) ECDSA public
key (P-256, P-384)
Externally
generated;
imported by
Crypto Officer
over TLS
In plaintext In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Verify CA
signatures
CARsaPriv CA RSA private key
( 2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Sign server
certificates
Cluster
Member
RsaPub
Cluster Member
RSA public key (
2048-bit)
Input in plaintext Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Verify Cluster
Member
signatures
TLS Ks TLS session 128-bit
AES, 256-bit AES,
or 192-bit Triple-
DES symmetric
key(s)
Derived from MS Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Encrypt and
decrypt data
travelling
within TLS
tunnel.
TLS Khmac TLS session
HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA256, or
HMAC-SHA384
key(s)
Derived from MS Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Authenticate
data travelling
within TLS
tunnel.
Table 14 details all cipher suites supported by the TLS protocol implemented by the module. The suite
names in the first column match the definitions in RFC 2246 and RFC 4346.
Table 14 – Cipher Suites Supported by the Module’s TLS Implementation in FIPS Mode
Suite Name Authentication
Key
Transport
Symmetric
Cryptography
Hash
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-
1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-
1
TLS_RSA_WITH_TDES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA RSA Triple-DES (3-
key)
SHA-
1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-
256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-
256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-
256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-
384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDSA ECDHE AES (128-bit) SHA-
256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDSA ECDHE AES (256-bit) SHA-
384
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Suite Name Authentication
Key
Transport
Symmetric
Cryptography
Hash
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 RSA ECDHE AES (256-bit) SHA-
384
Other CSPs are tabulated in Table 15.
Table 15 – Other Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Client AES
key
128, 192 or
256-bit AES
key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client AES
CMAC key
128, 192 or
256-bit AES
CMAC key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client TDES
key
Triple-DES
key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client TDES
CMAC key
Triple-DES
CMAC key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client RSA
public keys
RSA public
key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
At operator
delete
Verify signatures
Client ECDSA
public keys
ECSDA
public key
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
At operator
delete
Verify signatures
Client RSA
keys
RSA private
keys
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Sign messages
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Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Client ECDSA
keys
ECDSA
private key
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Sign messages
Client HMAC
keys
HMAC-
SHA1,
HMAC-
SHA224,
HMAC-
SHA256,
HMAC-
SHA384, or
HMAC-
SHA512
keys
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
Encrypted
with PKEK in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or
zeroize request
Compute keyed-
MACs
Client
certificate
X.509
certificate
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted
with TLS Ks)
per client’s
request
In non-
volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or by
zeroize request
Encrypt data/verify
signatures
Crypto-Officer
passwords
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or by
zeroize request
Authenticate Crypto-
Officer
User
passwords
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or by
zeroize request
Authenticate User
Cluster
Member
password
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
When a device
attempts to become a
Cluster Member
Micro Focus
User RSA
public key
2048-bit
RSA public
key
Input in
plaintext at
factory
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At installation of
a patch or new
firmware
Authenticate Micro
Focus User
Cluster key Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or by
zeroize request
Authenticate Cluster
Member
Log signing
keys
2048-bit
RSA public
and private
keys
Generated by
DRBG at
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
When new log
signing keys
are generated
on demand by
Crypto-Officer
Sign logs and verify
signature on logs
DRBG entropy
input
PRNG input Generated by
non-
Approved
RNG or input
in ciphertext
over TLS
Never In volatile
memory
When module is
powered off
Initialize DRBG
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Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
DRBG seed DRBG seed Generated as
part of
derivation
function for
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Never In volatile
memory
When module is
powered off
Initialize DRBG
DRBG v DRBG
Internal
State
Generated as
part of
derivation
function for
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Never In volatile
memory
When module is
powered off
DRBG Internal State
DRBG key DRBG
Internal
State
AES key
used for SP
800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Never In volatile
memory
When module is
powered off
DRBG Internal State
PKEK 256-bit AES
key
Generated by
DRBG
In encrypted
form for
backup
purposes only
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or by
zeroize request
Encrypt Client CSP
SNMPv3
password
Shared
secret, at
least 8
characters
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or by
zeroize request
SNMPv3
authentication
SNMPv3
session key
128-bit AES Derived
shared secret
Never In volatile
memory
When the
module is
powered off
Encrypt/decrypt
SNMP traffic
Firmware
signature key
2048-bit
RSA public
key
Input in
plaintext at
factory
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At installation of
a patch or new
firmware
Verify firmware
signature
2.7.2 Key Generation
The module uses the DRBG (AES in CTR mode) as specified in SP 800-90A to generate cryptographic
keys. This DRBG is a FIPS 140-2 Approved RNG as specified in Annex C to FIPS 140-2.
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization
All ephemeral keys are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Ephemeral keys are zeroized when they are
no longer used. Other keys and CSPs are stored in non-volatile memory with client CSPs being stored in
encrypted form.
To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute the reset factory settings
zeroize command at the serial console interface. For security reasons, this command is available only
through the serial console.
Since the zeroization process can take just over one minute, the Crypto-Officer must remain with the
physical module until the zeroization operation is complete.
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2.8 Self-Tests
The device implements two types of self-tests: power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests.
Power-up self-tests include the following tests:
 Firmware integrity tests (RSA 2048-bit signature verification)
 Known Answer Test (KAT) on Triple-DES (encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key)
 KAT on AES (encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128-bit key; this covers the KAT requirement for
all AES modes although the GCM and Key Wrap modes are additionally tested)
 KAT on AES GCM (encrypt and decrypt, 256-bit key)
 KAT on AES Key Wrap (authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption, 128-, 192-, 256-
bit key)
 KAT on HMAC (one KAT per SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
 KAT on SHA covered by above HMAC KATs per IG 9.1
 KAT on DRBG for KMS (CTR_DRBG, 256-bit AES with derivation function)
 KAT on DRBG for KMIP (CTR_DRBG, 256-bit AES with derivation function)
 KAT on Diffie-Hellman (2048-bit prime modules with 256-bit prime subgroup, shared secret
calculation)
 KAT on SSH Key Derivation Function (2048-bit shared secret)
 KAT on TLS Key Derivation Function (TLS 1.0 with SHA-1, TLS 1.1 with SHA-256, TLS 1.1/1.2
with SHA-384)
 KAT on RSA signature generation and verification (sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt using 2048-bit
key , SHA-256)
 KAT on RSA Decryption Primitive (decrypt, 2048-bit)
 KAT on SNMP Key Derivation Function
 KAT on ECDSA sign/verify
 KAT on ECDH
Conditional self-tests include the following tests:
 Pairwise consistency test for new RSA keys
 Continuous random number generator test on DRBG (for both KMS and KMIP)
 Health Checks per SP 800-90A Section 11.3 (for both KMS and KMIP)
 Continuous random number generator test on non-Approved RNG
 Diffie-Hellman pairwise consistency test
 Diffie-Hellman primitive test
 ECDH pairwise consistency test
 ECDH primitive test
 Firmware load test
The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When one or more power-up
self-tests fail, the module enters the Fatal Error state. When a conditional self-test fails, the module enters
the Soft Error state. See Section 3 of this document for more information.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. No claim is made that the module mitigates against any attacks beyond the
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation.
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3 Secure Operation
The Enterprise Secure Key Manager meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below
describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The device should be unpacked and inspected according to the Installation Guide. The Installation Guide
also contains installation and configuration instructions, maintenance information, safety tips, and other
information.
3.2 Initialization and Configuration
3.2.1 First-Time Initialization
When the module is turned on for the first time, it will prompt the operator for a password for a default
Crypto-Officer. The module cannot proceed to the next state until the operator provides a password that
conforms to the password policy described in Section 2.4.5. The default username associated with the
entered password is “admin”.
During the first-time initialization, the operator must configure minimum settings for the module to operate
correctly. The operator will be prompted to configure the following settings via the serial interface:
 Date, Time, Time zone
 IP Address/Netmask
 Hostname
 Gateway
 Management Port
3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration
In order to comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the following functionality must be disabled on
the ESKM:
 Global keys
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for importing certificates and downloading and restoring backup files
 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication
 Use of the following algorithms: RC4, MD5, DES, RSA-512, RSA-768, RSA-1024
 SSL 3.0
 RSA encryption and decryption operations (note, however, that RSA encryption and decryption
associated with TLS handshakes and Sign and Sign Verify are permitted)
These functions need not be disabled individually. There are two approaches to configuring the module
such that it works in the Approved FIPS mode of operation:
Through a command line interface, such as SSH or serial console, the Crypto-Officer should use the fips
compliant command to enable the FIPS mode of operation. This will alter various server settings as
described above. See Figure 6. The fips server command is used for the FIPS status server
configuration. The show fips status command returns the current FIPS mode configuration.
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Figure 6 – FIPS Compliance in CLI
In the web administration interface, the Crypto-Officer should use the “High Security Configuration” page
to enable and disable FIPS compliance. To enable the Approved FIPS mode of operation, click on the
“Set FIPS Compliant” button. See Figure 7. This will alter various server settings as described above.
Figure 7 – FIPS Compliance in Web Administration Interface
In the web administration interface, the User can review the FIPS mode configuration by reading the
“High Security Configuration” page.
When operating in FIPS mode, the FIPS Status Server is enabled by default and should not be disabled.
Figure 8 – FIPS Status Server Settings in Web Administration Interface
The Crypto-Officer must zeroize all keys when switching from the Approved FIPS mode of operation to
the non-FIPS mode and vice versa.
All services are available in both the Approved FIPS mode of operation and the non-FIPS mode of
operation.
3.3 Physical Security Assurance
One serialized tamper-evidence label has been applied during manufacturing on the metal casing. See
Figure 9. The tamper-evidence label has a special adhesive backing to adhere to the module’s surface
and have an individual, unique serial number. It should be inspected every six months and compared to
the previously-recorded serial number to verify that fresh label have not been applied to a tampered
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module. If the label shows evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the module has
been compromised and contact Micro Focus Customer Support.
Figure 9 – Tamper-Evidence Label on ESKM
3.4 Key and CSP Zeroization
To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute reset factory settings
zeroize command in the serial console interface. Notice that, for security reasons, the command cannot
be initiated from the SSH interface.
Since the zeroization process can take just over one minute, the Crypto-Officer must remain with the
physical module until the zeroization operation is complete.
When switching between different modes of operations (FIPS and non-FIPS), the Crypto-Officer must
zeroize all CSPs.
3.5 Error State
The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state.
When a power-up self-test fails, the module will enter the Fatal Error state. When a conditional self-test
fails, the module will enter the Soft Error state. The module can recover from the Fatal Error state if power
is cycled or if the ESKM is rebooted. A Micro Focus User can reset the module when it is in the Fatal
Error State. No other services are available in the Fatal Error state. The module can recover from the Soft
Error state if power is cycled. A User can access the FIPS Status Server on port 9081 and find the error
message indicating the failure of FIPS self-tests. Access to port 9081 does not require authentication.
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Acronyms
Table 16 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standard Institute
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Codebook
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESKM Enterprise Secure Key Manager
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HDD Hard Drive
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IDE Integrated Drive Electronics
iLO Integrated Lights-Out
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
ISA Instruction Set Architecture
KAT Known Answer Test
KMS Key Management Service
KMIP Key Management Interoperability Protocol
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
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Acronym Definition
N/A Not Applicable
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
RFC Request for Comments
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
UID Unit Identifier
USB Universal Serial Bus
VGA Video Graphics Array
XML Extensible Markup Language