Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of
Broadcom
Web Isolation Virtual Appliance
Software Version: 1.10.48-fips+74
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.3
©2020 Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom — All rights reserved
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Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom
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San Jose, CA 95131
www.broadcom.com
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©2020 Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom — All rights reserved
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................. 5
2. WEB ISOLATION VIRTUAL APPLIANCE ........................................................................................... 6
2.1 OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................................. 7
2.2.2 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ..................................................................................... 8
2.2.3 Logical Cryptographic Boundary ....................................................................................... 9
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES...................................................................................................................... 9
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES................................................................................................................... 10
2.4.2 Crypto-Officer Role.......................................................................................................... 11
2.4.3 User Role ........................................................................................................................ 12
2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism .............................................................................................. 13
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ..................................................................................................................... 14
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................ 14
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT............................................................................................. 15
2.8 SELF-TESTS ................................................................................................................................. 22
2.8.2 Power-Up Self-Tests ....................................................................................................... 22
2.8.3 Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................... 22
2.8.4 Critical Function Tests..................................................................................................... 23
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................................................... 23
3. SECURE OPERATION........................................................................................................................ 24
3.1 SECURE MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................. 24
3.1.1 Initialization...................................................................................................................... 24
3.1.2 Management ................................................................................................................... 26
3.1.3 Zeroization....................................................................................................................... 26
3.2 USER GUIDANCE........................................................................................................................... 27
4. ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................ 28
©2020 Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom — All rights reserved
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT OF A WEB ISOLATION VIRTUAL APPLIANCE......................................................6
FIGURE 2 BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE DELL POWEREDGE R830 SERVER HARDWARE ............................................8
List of Tables
TABLE 1 SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .......................................................................................7
TABLE 2 WEB ISOLATION VIRTUAL APPLIANCE CONFIGURATIONS......................................................................7
TABLE 3 FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR THE FRONT OF THE WI VA......................................10
TABLE 4 FIPS AND WI VA ROLES .................................................................................................................10
TABLE 5 CRYPTO OFFICER ROLE SERVICES AND CSP ACCESS.......................................................................11
TABLE 6 USER ROLE SERVICES AND CSP ACCESS ........................................................................................13
TABLE 7 AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS USED BY THE MODULE.....................................................................14
TABLE 8 FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR WEB ISOLATION CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARY
VERSION 1.0 ..........................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 9 FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR WEB ISOLATION INTEGRITY LIBRARY VERSION 1.0
.............................................................................................................................................................16
TABLE 10 FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR WEB ISOLATION SSH LIBRARY VERSION 1.0 ..17
TABLE 11 FIPS-ALLOWED ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................................17
TABLE 12 LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ..........................18
TABLE 13 ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................................28
5 Security Policy 2/24/2020
©2020 Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom — All rights reserved
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a Non-Proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Web Isolation Virtual Appliance, software
version 1.10.48-fips+74 from Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom. This Non-Proprietary Security
Policy describes how the Web Isolation Virtual Appliance meets the security requirements of Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the virtual appliance in the Approved mode of operation. This policy was
prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Web Isolation Virtual Appliance is
referred to in this document as the Web Isolation Virtual Appliance, Web Isolation, crypto module, or module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The Symantec website (www.broadcom.com) contains information on the full line of products from
Symantec.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains
contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Non-Proprietary Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to
this document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Model document
• Submission Summary document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to
Symantec and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please
contact Symantec.
6 Security Policy 2/24/2020
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2. Web Isolation Virtual Appliance
2.1 Overview
IT security teams experience a constant barrage of attacks trying to penetrate their defenses and steal their data.
Millions of new internet hosts – domains and sub-domains – are born every day. The vast majority of these exist for
less than 24-hours, coming up and down quickly. These sites, valid and malicious, are not categorized and analyzed
for risk effectively by web filtering and threat intelligence services because they have no meaningful reputational
history. Add to this websites that are categorized and have a potentially unsafe risk profile, and security
professionals have a real challenge on their hands. Some enterprises set policies that completely block sites that
cannot be categorized or are assessed to have a potentially unsafe risk level. This typically results in overblocking
their employee’s web use since valid sites get caught up in these types of policy rules. Others may choose to roll the
dice and permit access to these types of sites in order to not impede their employee’s ability to perform their
business activities, but this opens the organization up to undo risk. This risk is magnified in the case of privileged
users, who are prized targets for cybercriminals because of the significant access rights and sensitive data typically
found on their machines.
Web Isolation provides the following benefits:
• Allow protected access to uncategorized or potentially risky sites
• Increase business productivity by giving employees access to a broader set of websites
• Secure web browsing for executives and privileged users whose access to sensitive documents and systems
makes them highly prized targets for cybercriminals
• Prevent users from disclosing corporate credentials to malicious websites
• Avoid patient zero by blocking advanced malware and targeted phishing attacks, minimizing alerts,
investigations and remediation efforts
• Simplify web access policies and minimize support tickets requesting access to blocked site
See Figure 1 below for a typical deployment scenario for the Web Isolation Virtual Appliance (included in the red-
dotted line).
Figure 1 Typical Deployment of a Web Isolation Virtual Appliance
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©2020 Symantec & CA Technologies, a division of Broadcom — All rights reserved
The module is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels in Table 1.
Table 1 Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
For the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module was tested on the following Symantec virtual appliance configurations
listed in Table 2.
Table 2 Web Isolation Virtual Appliance Configurations
Virtual Appliance Type SKU
Web Isolation FWI-VA-NEW-1-100
FWI-VA-NEW-100-250
FWI-VA-NEW-250-500
FWI-VA-NEW-500-1K
FWI-VA-NEW-1K-2500
Threat Isolation Gateway TIG-VA-NEW-1-100
TIG-VA-NEW-100-250
TIG-VA-NEW-250-500
TIG-VA-NEW-500-1K
TIG-VA-NEW-1K-2500
The different SKUs in Table 2 represent changes in the number supported users, and amount of web isolation
possible. The module can be licensed as “Web Isolation” or a “Threat Isolation Gateway.” All appliance
configurations are exactly the same from a cryptographic functionality and boundary perspective. The Crypto
Officer and User services of the module are identical for all SKUs running either license.
The module is a multi-chip standalone software module that meets overall Level 1 FIPS 140-2 requirements. The
module was tested and found compliant on a Dell PowerEdge R830 Server using VMware ESXi v6.0 hypervisor to
provide the virtualization layer.
The module software consists of the Web Isolation software with a Linux operating system as the guest OS in a
VMware ESXi virtual machine. The module software, version 1.10.48-fips+74, contains the Web Isolation
Cryptographic Library v1.0, the Web Isolation Integrity Library v1.0, and the Web Isolation SSH Library v1.0.
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2.2.2 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, the virtual appliance has no physical characteristics; however, the physical boundary of the
cryptographic module is defined by the hard enclosure around the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server on which it runs.
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server (the dashed line surrounding the hardware
components represents the module’s physical cryptographic boundary, which is the outer case of the hardware
platform), and identifies the hardware with which the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server’s processor interfaces.
Figure 2 Block Diagram of the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server hardware
The module’s physical cryptographic boundary is further illustrated by the black dotted line in Figure 3 below.
The module makes use of the physical interfaces of the tested platform hosting the virtual environment upon which
the module is installed. The hypervisor controls and directs all interactions between the WI VA and the operator,
and is responsible for mapping the module’s virtual interfaces to the GPC’s physical interfaces. These interfaces
include the integrated circuits of the system board, processor, network adapters, RAM1
, hard disk, device case,
power supply, and fans. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server (the dashed line
surrounding the hardware components represents the module’s physical cryptographic boundary, which is the outer
case of the hardware platform), and identifies the hardware with which the Dell PowerEdge R830 Server’s processor
interfaces.
1 RAM – Random Access Memory
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2.2.3 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The logical cryptographic boundary of the module (shown by the red dotted line in Figure 3) consists of the Linux
OS, and Web Isolation software, which contains the Web Isolation Cryptographic Library v1.0.
Figure 3 WI VA Cryptographic Boundary
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
• Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
As a software module, the virtual appliance has no physical characteristics. The module’s physical and electrical
characteristics, manual controls, and physical indicators are those of the host system (Dell PowerEdge R830 Server).
The VMware hypervisor provides virtualized ports and interfaces for the module. Interaction with the virtual ports
created by the hypervisor occurs through the host system’s Ethernet port. Management, data, and status traffic must
all flow through the Ethernet port. Direct interaction with the module via the host system is possible over the serial
port; however, the Crypto Officer must first map the physical serial port to the WI VA using vSphere Client. The
mapping of the module’s logical interfaces in the software to FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces is described in Table 3
below.
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Table 3 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for the front of the WI VA
Physical Port / Interface Logical Port/Interface FIPS 140-2 Interface
Host System Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports
Virtual Ethernet Ports Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Host System Serial Port Virtual Serial Port Control Input
Status Output
Data input and output are the packets utilizing the services provided by the modules. These packets enter and exit the
module through the Virtual Ethernet ports. Control input consists of Configuration or Administrative data entered
into the modules. Control input enters the module through the Virtual Ethernet and Virtual Serial Port interfaces
(GUI, SSH CLI, and Serial CLI). Status output consists of the status provided or displayed via the user interfaces
(such as GUI, SSH CLI, and Serial CLI) or available log information. Status output exits the module via the user
interfaces (such as GUI , SSH CLI, and Serial CLI) over the Virtual Ethernet or Virtual Serial Ports.
2.4 Roles and Services
Before accessing the modules for any administrative services, COs and Users must authenticate
to the module according to the methods specified in Table 7. The modules offer two
management interfaces:
• Command Line Interface (CLI): Accessible locally via the serial interface, or remotely using SSH. This
interface is used for management of the modules. This interface must be accessed locally via the serial to
perform the initial module configurations (IP address, DNS server, gateway, and subnet mask). When the
module has been properly configured, this interface can be accessed via SSH. Management of the module
may take place via SSH or via the serial port. Authentication is required before any functionality will be
available through the CLI.
• Web User Interface (UI): A graphical user interface accessible remotely with a web browser that supports
TLS. This interface is used for management of the modules. Authentication is required before any
functionality will be available through the Web UI
The details of these modes of operation are found below in Table 4.
Table 4 FIPS and WI VA Roles
FIPS Roles Module Roles and Privileges
CO The CO is an administrator of the module with capabilities to perform
tasks such as account management and audit log management.
User The User is a non-privileged user on the CLI, and has read-only
permissions (Viewer) through the Management UI. The User’s
services are a subset of the CO services.
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Descriptions of the services available to a Crypto Officer (CO) and Users are described below in Table 5 and Table
6 respectively. For each service listed below, COs and Users are assumed to already have authenticated prior to
attempting to execute the service. Please note that the keys and CSPs listed in the table indicate the type of access
required using the following notation:
• R: The CSP is read
• W: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized
• X: Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
The Show Status service of the module is invoked whenever any of the services below in Table 5 or Table 6. As the
module only operates in the Approved mode, executing any service of the module provides the status of the module.
2.4.2 Crypto-Officer Role
Descriptions of the FIPS 140-2 relevant services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in Table 5 below.
Additional services that do not access CSPs can be found in the following documents:
• Symantec Threat Isolation Platform Guide for Administrators, Version 1.10-fips
• Symantec Web Isolation Release Notes, Version 1.10-fips
The link for all documentation can be found here:
• https://techdocs.broadcom.com/us/en/symantec-security-software/web-and-network-security/web-
isolation/1-0.html
• After navigating to this link, filter the documentation by version, selecting “1.10-fips.”
Table 5 Crypto Officer Role Services and CSP Access
Service Description CSP and Access Required
Set up the module
(serial port only)
Initialize the module. For more information, see
section 3.1.1 in this Security Policy.
CO Password : W
Create remote management
session (CLI)
Manage the module through the CLI (SSH)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
DH public key: WRX
DH private key: WRX
ECDH public key: WRX
ECDH private key: WRX
SSH Session Key: WRX
SSH Authentication Key: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
Create remote management
session (Web UI)
Manage the module through the Web UI (TLS)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
DH public key: WRX
DH private key: WRX
ECDH public key: WRX
ECDH private key: WRX
TLS Session Key: WRX
TLS Authentication Key: WRX
TLS Pre-Master Secret: WRX
TLS Master Secret: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
CO Authentication Authenticate to the CO role CO Password: R
Manage Zone Configuration Edit Zones None
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Service Description CSP and Access Required
Configure Reporting Configure reports servers, review activity logs,
review analytics, and configure log forwarding
parameters.
None
Configure Threshold
Monitoring
Thresholds can be configured for metrics that
will trigger an event log creation/email
notification when the threshold is reached (e.g.,
high CPU load, low disk space).
None
Define Profiles Define profiles for:
• Isolation
• Download
• Upload
• Activity Logging Profile
• End-User Data Protection
• Application Data Protection
None
Zeroize keys Zeroize keys by invoking the command “fgcli
system reset”. This will zeroize all CSPs
All Keys
Change password Change CO password CO Password: W
Perform integrity check and
power-on self-tests
Perform integrity check and power-on self-tests
on demand by rebooting the machine
DH public key: W
DH private key: W
ECDH public key: W
ECDH private key: W
SSH Session Key: W
SSH Authentication Key: W
TLS Session Key: W
TLS Authentication Key: W
TLS Pre-Master Secret: W
TLS Master Secret: W
DRBG CSPs: W
HMAC Key: R
2.4.3 User Role
Descriptions of the FIPS 140-2 relevant services available to the User role are provided in Table 6 below. Additional
services that do not access CSPs can be found in the following documents:
• Symantec Threat Isolation Platform Guide for Administrators, Version 1.10-fips
• Symantec Web Isolation Release Notes, Version 1.10-fips
The link for all documentation can be found here:
• https://support.symantec.com/content/unifiedweb/en_US/Documentation.html?prodRefKey=1251137&loca
le=en_US
• After navigating to this link, filter the documentation by version, selecting “1.10-fips.”
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Table 6 User Role Services and CSP Access
Service Description CSP and Access Required
Create remote management
session (CLI)
Manage the module through the CLI (SSH)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
DH public key: WRX
DH private key: WRX
ECDH public key: WRX
ECDH private key: WRX
SSH Session Key: WRX
SSH Authentication Key: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
Create remote management
session (Web UI)
Manage the module through the Web UI (TLS)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
DH public key: WRX
DH private key: WRX
ECDH public key: WRX
ECDH private key: WRX
TLS Session Key: WRX
TLS Authentication Key: WRX
TLS Pre-Master Secret: WRX
TLS Master Secret: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
User Authentication Authenticate to the User role User Password: R
View Reporting View reports servers, activity logs, review
analytics, and log forwarding parameters.
None
View Threshold Monitoring Thresholds can be viewed for metrics that will
trigger an event log creation/email notification
when the threshold is reached (e.g., high CPU
load, low disk space).
None
View Profiles View profiles for:
• Isolation
• Download
• Upload
• Activity Logging Profile
• End-User Data Protection
• Application Data Protection
None
View module configuration
parameters and public
keys/certificates (CLI)
View non-privileged level information
including IP configuration and public
keys/certificates.
RSA Public Key: R
Change password Change User password (CLI Only) User Password: W
2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism
The module supports role-based authentication. COs and Users must authenticate using a user ID and password.
Secure sessions that authenticate Users have no interface available to access other services (such as Crypto Officer
services). There are no additional timing limitations provided by the module during authentication or between
authentication attempts.
Each CO or User SSH session remains active (logged in) and secured until the operator logs out. Each CO and User
Web UI session remains active until the operator logs out or inactivity for a configurable amount of time has elapsed.
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The authentication mechanisms used in the module are listed in Table 7.
Table 7 Authentication Mechanisms Used by the Module
Role Type of
Authentication
Authentication Strength
Crypto-Officer Password The modules support password authentication internally. For
password authentication done by the modules, passwords are
required to be at minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum
64 bytes (number of characters is dependent on the character set used
by system). An 8-character password allowing all printable American
Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) characters (95)
with repetition equates to a 1:(958
), or 1:6,634,204,312,890,625
chance of false acceptance. The Crypto-Officer may connect locally
using the serial port or remotely after establishing a TLS or SSH
session.
User Password The modules support password authentication internally. For
password authentication done by the modules, passwords are
required to be at least 8 characters in length and maximum of 64
bytes (number of characters is dependent on the character set used by
system). An 8-character password allowing all printable American
Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) characters (95)
with repetition equates to a 1:(958
), or 1: 6,634,204,312,890,625
chance of false acceptance. The User may connect remotely after
establishing a TLS session.
2.5 Physical Security
The Web Isolation Virtual Appliance is a software module, which FIPS defines as a multi-chip standalone
cryptographic module. As such, it does not include physical security mechanisms. Thus, the FIPS 140-2 requirements
for physical security are not applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements on the following operational
environment and hardware:
• Dell PowerEdge R830 Server appliance
• Intel Xeon E5 4620v4 (single-user mode) processor
• VMware ESXi v6.0 with Ubuntu Linux 14.04 as the guest OS
All cryptographic keys and CSPs are under the control of the guest operating system, which protects the CSPs
against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution.
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in the tables below.
Table 8 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for Web Isolation Cryptographic Library version 1.0
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Use
#5678 AES SP 800-38A, SP
800-38D
CBC, CTR, GCM2
128, 256 Data Encryption / Decryption
#5678 and
#3781
KTS SP 800-38F AES and HMAC 128, 256 Key Transport
#2847 Triple-DES SP 800-67 CBC 168 (3 different keys) Data Encryption3
/ Decryption
#2847 and
#3781
KTS SP 800-38F Triple-DES and
HMAC
112 Key Transport
#4551 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Message Digest
#3781 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
128,
256,
256,
512
Message Authentication
#3056 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256
PKCS1 v1.5
2048, 3072 KeyPair Generation
Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification
#2296 DRBG SP 800-90A CTR-based Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
2
AES-GCM was only CAVP tested for 256-bits.
3
The maximum number of encryption operations for each Triple-DES key is 2^20.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Use
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC SP 800-56A rev 3 FFC (2048, 256) Key Agreement Scheme – Key
Agreement Scheme Shared Secret
Computation (KAS-SSC) per SP
800-56Arev3, Key Derivation per
SP 800-135rev1 (TLS KDF CVL.
Cert. #2066 and SSH KDF CVL
Cert. #2067).
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC SP 800-56A rev 3 ECC P-256, P-384, P-512 Key Agreement Scheme – Key
Agreement Scheme Shared Secret
Computation (KAS-SSC) per SP
800-56Arev3, Key Derivation per
SP 800-135rev1 (TLS KDF CVL.
Cert. #2066 and SSH KDF CVL
Cert. #2067).
#2066 CVL
TLS 1.2
SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 SHA Sizes =
SHA-256, SHA384
Key Derivation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP 800-133 Key Generation
Table 9 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for Web Isolation Integrity Library version 1.0
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Use
#4548 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 Software Integrity Check
#3778 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-256, 256 Software Integrity Check
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Table 10 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for Web Isolation SSH Library version 1.0
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Use
#2067 CVL
SSH
SP 800-135rev1 AES-128 CBC, AES-
256 CBC
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 Key Derivation
Table 11 FIPS-Allowed Algorithms
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Key Wrapping
(PKCS#1)
Provides 112 or 150 bits of encryption strength Key Wrapping
RSA Signature Verification 1536 bits Signature Verification
Non-Deterministic Random
Number generator (NDRNG)
Seeding for the FIPS-Approved DRBG
(SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG)
NOTE: No parts of the TLS and SSH protocols, other than the KDF, have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
The vendor affirms generated seeds for private keys are generated per SP 800-133 (unmodified output from a DRBG)
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The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 12.
Table 12 List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
HMAC Key HMAC SHA-
256
Computed during setup
and initialization.
Never output Stored in
plaintext on
non-volatile
memory.
N/A Software Integrity
Check
RSA Public Keys 2048, 3072-bits Modules’ public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Public key of a peer
enters module in
plaintext
Output during
TLS/SSH4
negotiation
in plaintext.
Stored in
plaintext form
on non-volatile
memory
Zeroize keys service Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
RSA Private Keys 2048, 3072-bits Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Never output Stored in
plaintext form
on non-volatile
memory
Zeroize keys service Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
DH public key 2048-bits Module’s public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s Public
key exits the module in
plaintext
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
DH private key 224-bits Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
4
SSH session negotiation uses only RSA key pairs of 2048-bits. All RSA key pair sizes can be used for TLS session negotiation.
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
ECDH public key P-256 key Module’s public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s Public
key exits the module in
plaintext
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
ECDH private key P-256 key Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
TLS Session key AES CBC, CTR,
or GCM5
128-
or 256-bit key
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Output in encrypted
form during TLS
protocol handshake
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Encrypting TLS data
TLS Session
Authentication key
HMAC SHA-1-,
256-, 384- or
512-bit key
Internally generated Never exits the module Resides in
volatile
memory in
plaintext
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Data authentication
for TLS sessions
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
384-bit key Input in encrypted
form from TLS client
Never Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Establishing the TLS
Master Secret
5
AES-GCM – The module's use of GCM is specific to TLS and is compatible with TLS 1.2 and supports the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP800-52 Rev 1, Section 3.3.1.
AES-GCM – The module generates a new AES GCM key in TLS when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key based
on the counter size.
AES-GCM – The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary.
AES-GCM – In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption is established
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
TLS Master Secret 384-bit key Generated internally
during session
negotiation
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Establishing the TLS
Session Key
SSH Session Key Triple-DES 168-
bit, AES CBC,
CTR 128- or
256-bit key
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Output in encrypted
form during SSH
protocol handshake
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Encrypting SSH data
SSH Session
Authentication key
HMAC SHA-1-,
256- or 512-bit
key
Internally generated Never exits the module Resides in
volatile
memory in
plaintext
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Data authentication
for SSH sessions
Crypto Officer
Password
Minimum of
eight (8) and
maximum of 64
bytes long
printable
character string
Externally generated.
Enters the module in
encrypted form via a
secure TLS or SSH
session.
Enters the module in
plaintext via a directly
attached cable to the
serial port
Exits in encrypted form
via a secure TLS
session for external
authentication
Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Zeroize keys service Authenticating a CO
for Web UI or CLI
User Password Minimum of
eight (8) and
maximum of 64
bytes long
printable
character string
Externally generated.
Enters the module in
encrypted form via a
secure TLS or SSH
session.
Exits in encrypted form
via a secure TLS
session for external
authentication
Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Zeroize keys service Authenticating User
for Web UI or CLI
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Seed
384-bit random
number
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Seeding material for
the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy6
416-bit random
number with
derivation
function
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Entropy material for
the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value
Internal state
value
Internally generated Never Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Used for the SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value
Internal state
value
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Used for the SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG
NOTE: The Approved DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 384-bits from an entropy-generating NDRNG inside the module’s cryptographic boundary.
6
The Entropy required by the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (with AES-256) is supplied by the NDRNG
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2.8 Self-Tests
If the module fails any power-up self-tests, including the startup integrity test, the corresponding self-test error or
modified files for the integrity test is printed to the CLI (when being accessed via the local console):
Integrity Test example:
***FILE has changed****
Openssl.c
Algorithms KAT example:
***********ERROR TO DUE FIPS LOCKDOWN!****************
“ERROR: Self-test failed for AES.
When either of these errors occurs, the modules halt operation and provide no functionality. The only way to clear the
error and resume normal operation is for the CO to reboot the modules. The status output provided above is shown
only over the CLI (when being accessed via the serial port). The remote CLI via SSH or Web Management interface
will be inaccessible when the module is in an error state.
The sections below describe the self-tests performed by the module.
2.8.2 Power-Up Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests at power up:
• Software integrity check (HMAC-SHA-256) by the Web Isolation Integrity Library
• Known Answer Tests for the Web Isolation Cryptographic Library
o AES-ECB KAT for encryption and decryption
o AES-GCM KAT for decryption and decryption
o TDES KAT for encryption and decryption
o SHA KAT using each of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o HMAC KAT using each of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o RSA Sign/Verify KAT with SHA-256
o RSA wrap/unwrap KAT
o SP800-90A DRBG KAT
o DH “Primitive Z” KAT*
o ECDH “Primitive Z” KAT*
* These self-tests are performed although not required, since SP800-56A rev 3 is vendor affirmed.
No data output occurs via the data output interface until all power-up self-tests on all crypto implementations
have completed.
2.8.3 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the conditional self-tests:
• RSA pairwise consistency check upon generation of an RSA keypair
• Continuous RNG test (CRNGT) for the SP800-90A DRBG
• Continuous RNG test (CRNGT) for the Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG)
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2.8.4 Critical Function Tests
The Web Isolation Virtual Appliance performs the following critical function tests:
• DRBG Instantiate Critical Function Test
• DRBG Reseed Critical Function Test
• DRBG Generate Critical Function Test
• DRBG Uninstantiate Critical Function Test
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1
requirements for this validation.
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3. Secure Operation
The Web Isolation Virtual Appliance meets FIPS-140-2 Level 1 requirements. The sections below describe how to
place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Caveat: This guide assumes that a virtual environment is already setup and ready for accepting a new virtual
appliance installation
3.1 Secure Management
The CO is responsible for initialization and security-relevant configuration and management of the module. Please
see the Symantec Threat Isolation Platform Guide for Administrators, Version 1.10-fips for more information on
configuring and maintaining the module.
Caveat: While the WI VA may hold and boot from multiple software images, only the software image documented
in this Security Policy (Software Version: 1.10.48-fips+74) may be used for booting in order to remain compliant.
Booting from any other software image will result in a non-compliant module
Per IG 9.7 the loaded software image is a completely replacement of the validated image. Any software version
loaded that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
3.1.1 Initialization
Physical access to the module’s host hardware shall be limited to the CO, and the CO shall be responsible for putting
the module into the Approved mode.
Download and Extraction
1. Download the installer file from https://support.broadcom.com/security/download-center.
2. Mount the downloaded ISO file to the virtual CD/DVD and boot the VM.
3. When the following screen appears, choose Install Threat Isolation.
4. At the end of the installation, the system automatically reboots.
5. Log into the installed machine using the following default credentials:
Username: fireglass
Password: fireglasssecure
6. At the command line, go to root and type the following:
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sudo passwd fireglass
7. Enter your new password.
8. Enter your new password a second time
Note: the CO must configure the password to be at least 8 characters in length.
9. The following message will be displayed:
password updated successfully
10. To enable the report server, run the following command:
cd /opt/fireglass/current/ci_infra/report_server
sudo ./install.sh
Initializing the Symantec Threat Isolation Platform
1. Log into the gateway machine through the terminal
2. Run the following command:
sudo fgcli setup
3. The Network Configuration Wizard starts.
4. Follow the instructions of the wizard to perform Initial Setup.
5. The system reinitializes, and the following message is displayed:
Done
Running the First Time Wizard and Defining Components
1. Open the Symantec Threat Isolation Management UI. From your web browser, open the following URL:
https://<management host or IP>:9000
2. The login page appears.
3. Enter the following default credentials:
Username: admin
Password: admin
4. Click the arrow to log in.
5. The License Agreement window appears.
6. Read the terms of the license agreement and check the checkbox to accept them.
7. Click Next.
8. The Initial Settings window appears. Enter the DNS name for the management machine (public DNS host
name). Also, enter the appropriate time zone.
9. Click Next.
10. The authentication Settings window appears.
11. Type in a new password for the admin account that is at least 8 characters. Retype in the password for
confirmation.
12. Enter an email address for receiving notifications.
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13. The Active Directory window appears, leave the settings as unconfigured and click Next.
14. The Product Registration window appears.
15. The Components screen appears. Ensure all 3 boxes are checked as follows:
16. The Summary window appears. The message, “The Initial configuration has been successfully completed,”
should appear. Click Finish.
Upon completion of these initialization steps, the module is considered to be operating in its Approved mode of
operation. The module only operates in the Approved mode once it has been configured. There is no non-Approved
mode of operation.
3.1.2 Management
The CO is able to monitor and configure the module via the Web UI (HTTPS over TLS) and the CLI (serial port or
SSH).
The CO should monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently
reporting errors, customers should consult Symantec’s Support portal and the administrative guidance documents to
resolve the issues. If the problems cannot be resolved through these resources, Symantec customer support should be
contacted.
Key sizes less than what is specified shall not be used. The CO password must be at least 8 characters in length. The
CO must change the CLI password after initial login.
The CO must restrict Web Interface management sessions to be established only using the TLS 1.2 protocol only.
3.1.3 Zeroization
The CO can return the module to its factory state by invoking the command “fgcli system reset”. This command will
zeroize all persistent keys and CSPs by overwriting the previously stored values with new values. The RSA private
key, Crypto-Officer password, and User password are stored persistently and are therefore zeroized as part of this
procedure.
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In addition, rebooting the module causes all temporary keys stored in volatile memory (SSH Session key, SSH
Authentication Key, TLS session key, TLS Authentication key, TLS Pre-Master Secret, TLS Master Secret, DRBG
entropy values, and NDRNG entropy values) to be zeroized. The Crypto-Officer must wait until the module has
successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed.
3.2 User Guidance
The User is only able to access the module remotely via SSH (CLI) or HTTPS (Web UI). The User must change his
or her password at the initial login. The User must be diligent to pick strong passwords (alphanumeric with minimum
8 characters) that will not be easily guessed, and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User
should be careful to protect any secret/private keys in their possession, such as TLS or SSH session keys. The User
should report to the Crypto-Officer if any irregular activity is noticed.
The User must restrict Web Interface management sessions to be established only using the TLS 1.2 protocol only.
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4. Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 13 Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AC Alternating Current
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DH Diffie Hellman
DHE Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Ephemeral
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter-Mode
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security