Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Seagate Secure®
TCG Enterprise SSC Self-
Encrypting Drive
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Module Security
Policy
Security Level 2
Rev. 1.7 – May 8, 2023
Seagate Technology, LLC
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Scope........................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Security Levels ........................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 References................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2 Cryptographic Module Description.................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Overview..................................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping............................................................................................................................... 6
2.3 Product Versions......................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2.5 Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.6 FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation.................................................................................................................. 9
2.6.1 TCG Security Mode........................................................................................................................................ 9
2.6.2 ATA Enhanced Security Mode....................................................................................................................... 9
2.6.3 Entering FIPS Approved Mode of Operation ................................................................................................. 9
2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods.................................................................................................................. 10
2.8 Revert-SP Method..................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.9 Show Status............................................................................................................................................................... 10
3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy............................................................................................................... 11
3.1 Operator Roles .......................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles..................................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.2 User Roles..................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role.................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Authentication ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1 Authentication Types.................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2.2 Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode ........................................................................................ 12
3.2.3 Authentication in TCG Security Mode ......................................................................................................... 12
3.2.4 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength............................................................................................. 12
3.2.5 Personalizing Authentication Data................................................................................................................ 13
4 Access Control Policy...................................................................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Services..................................................................................................................................................................... 14
4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs.................................................................................................................................. 17
5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1 Mechanisms ............................................................................................................................................ 20
5 Physical Security.............................................................................................................................................................. 20
5.2 Operator Requirements ......................................................................................................................................... 20
6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................................................. 21
6 Security Rules.................................................................................................................................................................. 22
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.................................................................................................................................. 22
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Table of Tables
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area and Security Level................................................................................................. 4
Table 2: FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports ........................................................................................................................ 6
Table 3: Product Versions..................................................................................................................................................... 7
Table 4: FIPS Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................................... 7
Table 5: Self Tests ................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services – TCG Security Mode.................................................................................. 15
Table 7: FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services – TCG Security Mode .............................................................................. 15
Table 8: FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode................................................................. 16
Table 9: FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode ............................................................. 16
Table 10: Key Management................................................................................................................................................ 19
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Tamper-Evident Security Label on PCBA to Provide Evidence of PCBA Tampering....................................... 20
Figure 2: Tamper Evident Security Label on PCBA Showing Evidence of Tampering..................................................... 21
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in Seagate Secure®
TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive products.
This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard (Appendix C) and Implementation
Guidance (section 14.1). It does not provide interface details needed to develop a compliant application.
This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety.
1.2 Security Levels
FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
Electromagnetic Interface / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI / EMC) 3
Self – tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area and Security Level
The overall security level pursued for the cryptographic modules is Security Level 2.
1.3 References
1. FIPS PUB 140-2
2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2
3. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
4. TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 3.00, January
10, 2011
5. TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 0.9, May 24, 2007
6. TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification, Specification Version 1.0
7. ATA-8 ACS
8. Serial ATA Rev 2.6 (SATA)
1.4 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
CBC Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM Cryptographic Module
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code algorithm
CO Crypto-officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CSPSK Critical Security Parameter Sanitization Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
MEK Media Encryption Key
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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IV Initialization Vector for encryption operation
KDF Key Derivation Function
LBA Logical Block Address
LED Light Emitting Device
MSID Manufactured SID, public drive-unique value that is used as default PIN, TCG term
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
POR Power-on Reset (power cycle)
POST Power on Self-Test
PSID Physical SID, public drive-unique value
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RNG Random Number Generator
SED Self-Encrypting Drive, Seagate HDD/SSD products that provide HW data encryption.
SID Secure ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO role, TCG term
SoC System-on-a-Chip
SP Security Provider or Security Partition (TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140-2)
XTS The XTS-AES algorithm is a mode of operation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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2 Cryptographic Module Description
2.1 Overview
The Seagate Secure®
TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive FIPS 140-2 Module is embodied in Seagate
Enterprise Performance SED model disk drives. These products meet the performance requirements of the
most demanding Enterprise applications. The cryptographic module (CM) provides a wide range of
cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption
(AES-XTS), instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase, independently controlled and
protected user data LBA bands and authenticated FW download. The services are provided through industry
standard TCG Enterprise SSC and ATA protocols.
The CM, whose cryptographic boundary is the full drive enclosure, has a multiple-chip embedded physical
embodiment. The physical interface to the CM is a SATA connector. The logical interfaces are the industry
standard ATA (refer to Section 1.3, item 7), TCG SWG (refer to Section 1.3, item 5), and Enterprise (refer to
Section 1.3, item 4) protocols, carried on the SATA (refer to Section 1.3, item 8) transport interface. The
primary function of the module is to provide data encryption, access control and cryptographic erase of the
data stored on the flash drive media. The human operator of the drive product interfaces with the CM through
a “host” application on a host system.
2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports
Data Input SATA Connector
Data Output SATA Connector
Control Input SATA Connector
Status Output SATA Connector
Power Input Power Connector
Table 2: FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports
2.3 Product Versions
The following models and hardware versions (PNs) are validated with the following FW versions:
Product Name Capacity, Model #, FW Version
Indicator
FW Versions
Enterprise Capacity® HDD, 3.5”
v6, 7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
10000 GB
ST10000NM0176 [1,2] SF02[1], SF05[2]
Enterprise Capacity® HDD, 3.5”
v6, 7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
10000 GB
ST10000NM0186 [3,4] NF02[3], NF05[4]
ExosTM
7E8 Enterprise 3.5”,
7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
3000 GB
ST3000NM004A [5,6,7,8] TF01[5], TFA2[6], TF03[7],
TG04[8]
ExosTM
7E8 Enterprise 3.5”,
7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
4000 GB
ST4000NM012A [9,10,11,12] SF01[9], SFA2[10], SF03[11],
SF04[12]
ExosTM
7E8 Enterprise 3.5”,
7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
4000BG
ST4000NM013A [13,14,15,16,17] TF01[13], TFA2[14], TF03[15],
HPG4[16], TF04[17]
ExosTM
7E8 Enterprise 3.5”,
7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
6000 GB
ST6000NM025A [18,19,20,21] SF01[18], SFA2[19], SF03[20],
SF04[21]
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Product Name Capacity, Model #, FW Version
Indicator
FW Versions
ExosTM
7E8 Enterprise 3.5”,
7.2K-RPM, SATA Interface
8000 GB
ST8000NM008A [22,23,24,25,26] SF01[22], SFA2[23], SF03[24],
HPG5[25], SF04[26]
Table 3: Product Versions
2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Certificate Number Modes/Key Sizes/Etc.
Used
Standard
Hardware AES #4279 256-bit XTS and CBC SP800-38E and
FIPS 197
Hardware RSA #2300 Signature verification w/ 2048-
bit modulus
FIPS 186-4
Hardware SHA #3515 256-bit FIPS 180-4
Hardware HMAC #2815 256-bit FIPS 198-1
Firmware AES #1343 128-bit, 256-bit CBC FIPS 197
Firmware AES-GCM #2841 256-bit SP800-38D
Firmware AES-GCM
(TLS)
#3759 128-bit, 256-bit SP800-38D
Firmware AES CMAC #3760 128-bit SP800-38B
Firmware SHA #3304 256-bit, 384-bit FIPS 180-4
Firmware RSA #2056 Signature verification w/ 2048-
bit modulus
FIPS 186-4
Firmware DRBG #1146 Hash based DRBG SP800-90A
Firmware HMAC #2613 256-bit FIPS 198-1
Firmware KAS-FFC-SSC #A1776 dhEphem (KAS Role:
Initiator) FB
SP800-56A Rev3
Firmware DSA #A1950 Key Pair Generation 2048-bit
Support KAS-FFC-SSC
FIPS 186-4
Firmware AES Key Wrap #2947 256-bit SP800-38F
Firmware CVL KDF #828 TLSv1.2 KDF SP800-135
Firmware PBKDF #A1777 Option 2a SP800-132
Firmware CKG Vendor Affirmation N/A SP800-133
Hardware ENT(P) N/A N/A SP800-90B
Table 4: FIPS Approved Algorithms
SP800-132, Section 5.4 Option 2a is used and password length is a minimum of 4 bytes. The Master Key is
256 bits and decryption algorithm is AES-GCM. The keys derived from passwords are used in storage
applications.
There are algorithms, modes and keys that have been CAVS tested but not utilized by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes and keys shown in this table are utilized by the module.
The module supports the TLS protocol. This protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
The length of the data unit for any instance of an implementation of XTS-AES shall not exceed 2^20 AES
blocks.
The module meets the XTS-AES IG A.9 requirement.
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2.5 Self-Tests
Function Tested Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Hardware XTS-AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware AES – GCM
(800-38D)
Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware AES-GCM
(large block size)
Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware AES CMAC Power-On CMAC KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Hardware RSA Power-On Verify KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Hardware SHA-256 Power-On Digest KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware SHA-512 Power-On Digest KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware 800-90A
DRBG
Power-On DRBG KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware 800-38F Key
Wrap
Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware 800-132
PBKDF
Power-On KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware 800-135 KDF Power-On KDF KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware FFC Diffie
Hellman Ephemeral
Mode
Power-On Diffie-Hellman KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware HMAC Power-On Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code constructed
from SHA-256.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Hardware HMAC Power-On Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code constructed
from SHA-256.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware Integrity
Check
Power-On Signature Verification. Enters FW Integrity Error State.
Firmware Load Check Conditional: When
new
firmware is
downloaded
RSA PKCS#1 signature
verification of new firmware
image is done before it can be
loaded.
Incoming firmware package is not
loaded and is discarded.
Firmware 800-90A
DRBG
Conditional: When
a random number
is generated
Newly generated random
number is compared to the
previously generated random
number. Test fails if they are
equal.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Firmware 800-90A
DRBG Health Tests
Conditional: When
a random number
is generated
Instantiate, Reseed, Generate
and Uninstantiate Health Tests
defined in SP800-90A.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
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Function Tested Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Firmware 800-90B
ENT(P) Health Tests
Conditional:
When a seed for
DRBG is
requested
Repetition Count and Adaptive
Proportion tests are performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error State.
Hardware AES Conditional: When
an AES XTS key
is generated
Generated XTS keys Key_1 and
Key_2 are compared, as per IG
A.9, before being used.
Keys are discarded.
Table 5: Self Tests
2.6 FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation
Before the operator performs Secure Initialization steps detailed in Section 7.1, the drive will operate in a
non-FIPS compliant mode.
For this CM that supports ATA protocol on the SATA interface, the operator may choose to initialize the CM
to operate in either “TCG Security” or “ATA Enhanced Security” mode. After setting up (configuring) the
module per the Security Rules of this policy, the CM is always in Approved mode of operation except when
a critical failure has been detected, when any ‘Exit FIPS mode’ services are invoked, or when the module is
not in ‘Use’ state. For CM that supports both Approved modes, an operator can switch the CM between these
Approved modes of operation and to do so, the CM must transition to the uninitialized state (via ‘Exit FIPS
mode’ service) which results in zeroization of keys and CSPs.
The module’s FIPS mode of operation is enforced through configuration and policy. Violating these ongoing
policy restrictions (detailed in Section 7.2) would mean that one is no longer using the drive in a FIPS
compliant mode of operation. The operator can determine if the CM is operating in a FIPS approved mode
by invoking the Show Status service (refer to Section 4.1).
Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 describe the differences between the 2 modes.
2.6.1 TCG Security Mode
This mode has the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/crypto
erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that
encompasses the whole user data area which is the starting point from which multiple Users request their
independent data areas.
In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (EraseMaster) to administer
the above capability.
2.6.2 ATA Enhanced Security Mode
This mode has the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/crypto
erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that
encompasses the whole user data area.
In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (EraseMaster) to administer
the above capability.
2.6.3 Entering FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
After the module is installed and configured per the Security Rules of this policy in Section 7.1, the drive is
always in the Approved mode of operation except when a critical failure has been detected, causing a
transition to a “Failed” state.
In some of these exit scenarios (e.g. repeated POST failure), the drive cannot be restored to FIPS mode and
does not provide any FIPS services.
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2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods
Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted by the CM for storage on / retrieval from the drive media, the data
can be erased using cryptographic methods. The data is erased by zeroizing the Media Encryption Key
(MEK).
Other FIPS services can be used to erase all the other private keys and CSPs (see Section 2.8).
2.8 Revert-SP Method
The TCG Revert-SP method may be invoked to transition the CM back to the manufactured state
(uninitialized). This corresponds to the Exit FIPS Mode service and is akin to a “restore to factory defaults”
operation. This operation also provides a means to zeroize keys and CSPs. Subsequently, the CM has to be
re-initialized before it can return to a FIPS compliant mode of operation. This Revert-SP method is invoked
as an unauthenticated service by virtue of the use of a public credential (PSID).
2.9 Show Status
Show status service can be used to determine if the drive is operational under the security constraints of FIPS.
For this purpose TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism is utilized. TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism maybe
invoked by the operator to know if drive is in “use” or security “fail” state. If the Drive Security Life Cycle
State is 0x80 then drive is in Use State i.e. security is operational. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is
0xFF the drive is in security Fail State i.e. drive is not operational in terms of FIPS services.
The LED indicates the drive is powered on. Drive activity is indicated by blinking of the LED. No other
status is indicated through LED.
In addition, the TCG Get method can be used to retrieve the approved modes of operation value. The values
of 0x01 or 0x02 correspond to ATA Enhanced Security Mode and TCG Security Mode respectively. The
value 0x00 indicates the CM is in the uninitialized state.
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3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy
3.1 Operator Roles
Note: The following identifies the CO and User roles with a general description of the purposes. For further
details of the services performed by each role in each FIPS mode, see section 4.1.
3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles
3.1.1.1 Drive Owner
This CO role corresponds to the SID (Secure ID) Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Enterprise SSC
[4]. This role is used to download a new FW image. Note: only a FIPS validated firmware version can be
loaded to the module. Otherwise, the module is not operating in FIPS mode.
3.1.1.2 EraseMaster (TCG Security Mode)
This CO role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section1.3, item 4].
This role is used to enable/disable User roles, and erase the user data region (LBA band). An operator is
authenticated to this role with role-based authentication.
3.1.2 User Roles
3.1.2.1 BandMasters (0-31) (TCG Security Mode)
This user role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section1.3, item 4].
This role is used to lock/unlock and configure a user data band (“LBA band”) for read/write access.
A CM can be configured to support up to 32 user data bands, which are controlled by their respective
BandMaster credentials. By default 2 user bands are enabled. BandMasters are enabled/disabled using the
EraseMaster role. An operator is authenticated to the BandMaster role with identity-based authentication. If
a user data band is erased (EraseMaster service) then the BandMaster PIN is reset to MSID.
3.1.2.2 User (ATA Enhanced Security Mode)
This role corresponds to the same named role as defined in ATA [refer to Section 1.3, item 7]. It can unlock
(and also lock) the drive so that an operator can read and write data to the drive. This role can also use the
Cryptographic Erase service.
3.1.2.3 Master (ATA Enhanced Security Mode)
This role corresponds to the same named role as defined in ATA [refer to Section 1.3, item 7]. This role
only provides a backup authentication to the ATA User and does not have access to administration services
beyond those of the ATA User role.
3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role
This role can perform the Show Status service.
If the operator has physical access to the drive, this role can also reset the module with a power cycle
(which results in POSTs). This role can also use the public PSID value to invoke the Exit FIPS Mode
service. See section 4.1 for details.
3.2 Authentication
3.2.1 Authentication Types
Operator roles have identity-based authentication. For example, the Drive Owner has only one ID and one
PIN. In TCG Security Mode, the CM has up to 32 User operators. Each of these operators is assigned a unique
ID to which a PIN is associated, thus this provides identity-based authentication.
For some services the authentication is performed in a separate associated service; e.g. the Read Unlock
service is the authentication for subsequent User Data Read service. If the User Data Read service is attempted
without prior authentication then the command will fail.
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3.2.2 Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode
In ATA Enhanced Security Mode, Master and User operator authentication is provided through a PIN
provided in the ATA Security command [refer to Section 1.3, item 3]. In the event of authentication failure,
the ATA command will abort, and subsequent read/write services will abort. A password attempt counter is
implemented as specified in ATA, which when reached, blocks Master/User service authentication (with
command abort), until the module is reset (Unblock PIN service).
Depending on a parameter of the Set PIN service for the User password, the User services may or may not be
fully extended to the Master role. If the Master Password Capability is set to “High”, then either role can
access the same services. Otherwise the Master role only has access to the erase service.
Drive Owner authentication for the Set PIN and Enable/Disable FW Download services is provided through
the TCG Authenticate to Admin SP.
3.2.3 Authentication in TCG Security Mode
Operator authentication is provided within a TCG session. The host application can have only a single session
open at a time. Authentication of an operator, using the TCG interface, uses the Authenticate method to
authenticate to a role after a session has been started. Authentications will persist until the session is closed.
Another method of authentication uses the StartTLS method in order to setup a secure TLS tunnel. Note that
this method is only available after the PSKs have been set, which requires the operator to first authenticate
using the method described in the preceding paragraph.
During a session the application can invoke services for which the authenticated operator has access control.
Note that a security rule of the CM is that the host must not authenticate to more than one operator (TCG
authority) in a session.
For the Show Status the host application will authenticate to the “Anybody” authority which does not have a
private credential. Therefore this operation is effectively an unauthenticated service.
3.2.4 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength
Operator authentication by means of the respective CO/User roles PIN is implemented. This mechanism also
applies to the respective User roles associated with PSKs. The PINs have a maximum length of 32 bytes (256
bits). The PSKs have a maximum length of 64 bytes (512 bits). Per the policy security rules, the minimum
PIN/PSK length is 4 bytes (32 bits) (Rule 2 in Section 7.1). This gives a probability of 1/232
of guessing the
PIN in a single random attempt. This easily meets the FIPS 140-2 authentication strength requirements of less
than 1/1,000,000.
In TCG interface, each failed authentication attempt for PINs takes a minimum of 15ms to complete. Thus a
theoretical maximum of {(60*1000)/15} attempts can be processed in one minute. Thus the probability of
multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is 4000/232
. This is significantly lower than the FIPS
requirement of 1/100,000. The PINs have a retry attribute (“TryLimit”) that controls the number of
unsuccessful attempts before the authentication is blocked. The “TryLimit” has an unmodifiable value of
1024. Since the “TryLimit” is unmodifiable, only 1024 attempts can be processed in one minute before the
authorities are locked out.
In TCG interface, each authentication attempt for PSKs takes a minimum of 500ms to complete. Thus a
theoretical maximum of {(60*1000)/500} attempts can be processed in one minute. Thus the probability of
multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is 120/232
. This is significantly lower than the FIPS
requirement of 1/100,000.
In ATA security interface, the PIN blocking feature limits the number of unsuccessful attempts to 5 (it
“unblocks” with module reset) and the minimum time for a module reset is about 15 seconds (about 4/min).
Thus the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed is 4/232
. This is significantly lower than the FIPS
requirement of 1/100,000.
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3.2.5 Personalizing Authentication Data
The initial value for SID and various other PINs is a manufactured value (MSID). This is a device-unique,
32-byte, public value. The Security Rules (Section 7) for the CM requires that the PIN values must be
“personalized” to private values using the “Set PIN” service. Note that for ATA Enhanced Security Mode,
setting the User PIN also sets the Drive Owner PIN to the same value; the Drive Owner PIN can be set to a
different value with the TCG Set Method.
The initial value for PSKs are empty and disabled. For Drive Owner PSKs, “personalized” to private values
by Drive Owner role using the “Set TLS PSK” service. For EraseMaster PSK, “personalized” to private
values by EraseMaster role using the “Set TLS PSK” service. For BandMaster PSKs, “personalized” to
private values by respective BandMasters role using the “Set TLS PSK” service.
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4 Access Control Policy
4.1 Services
The following tables represent the FIPS 140-2 services for each FIPS Approved Mode in terms of the
Approved Security Functions and operator access control.
Hardware versions that support ATA protocol (defined in Section 2.3) provide services indicated in Tables
1.1 and 1.2 (when in TCG Security Mode), Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (when in ATA Enhanced Security Mode).
For cryptographic algorithm certificates and hardware version association, refer to Section 2.4.
Note the following:
• Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved mode.
• Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g. hashing as
part of asymmetric key)
• Operator authentication is not represented in this table.
• Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs.
• Service input and output details are defined by the TCG and ATA standards.
• Unauthenticated services (e.g. Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs.
• Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock
services used by an authenticated operator; e.g. User data read / write.
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services - TCG Security Mode
Service Name Description Operator Access Control Command(s)/Event(s)
Set PIN Change operator authentication data. EraseMaster,
BandMasters, Drive
Owner
TCG Set Method
Firmware
Download
Enable / Disable FW Download and load
complete firmware image. If the self-test of
the code load passes then the device will run
with the new code.
Drive Owner ** TCG Set Method, ATA
DOWNLOAD
MICROCODE
Enable / Disable
BandMasters
Enable / Disable a User Authority. EraseMaster TCG Set Method
Set Range
Attributes
Set the location, size, and locking attributes
of the LBA range.
BandMasters TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock
User Data Range
for Read and/or
Write
Block or allow read (decrypt) / write
(encrypt) of user data in a range.
BandMasters TCG Set Method
User Data Read /
Write
Encryption / decryption of user data to/from
a LBA range.
Access control to this service is provided
through Lock / Unlock User Data Range.
BandMasters ATA Read, Write Commands
Cryptographic
Erase
Erase user data in an LBA range by
cryptographic means: changing the Media
encryption key (MEK). BandMaster PIN is
also reset.
EraseMaster TCG Erase Method
Set TLS PSK Set PSK for Secure Messaging. EraseMaster,
BandMasters, Drive
Owner
TCG Set Method
Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services – TCG Security Mode
FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services - TCG Security Mode
Service Name Description Operator Access Control Command(s)/Event(s)
Enable Secure
Messaging
Support host initiated TLS Session. None TCG StartTLS Method
Show Status Reports if the CM is operational in terms of
FIPS services and approved mode of
operation value.
None TCG Level 0 Discovery,
TCG Get Method
FIPS Operating Mode
indicator (Byte 30, bit 0)
= 1.
Reset Module Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP in
RAM.
None POR
DRBG Generate
Bytes
Returns an SP800-90A DRBG Random
Number.
None TCG Random()
Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation.
Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode.
None (using PSID) TCG AdminSP.RevertSP()
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor
Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall
Security Level, Hardware and Firmware
revisions and Module name.
None ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE
– Protocol 0
Table 7: FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services – TCG Security Mode
**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services - ATA Enhanced Security Mode
Service Name Description Operator Access Control Command(s)/Event(s)
Set PIN Change operator authentication data. User (optional Master),
Drive Owner
ATA SECURITY SET
PASSWORD, TCG Set
Method
Firmware
Download
Enable / Disable FW Download and load
complete firmware image. If the self-test of
the code load passes then the device will run
with the new code.
Drive Owner** TCG Set Method, ATA
DOWNLOAD
MICROCODE
Unlock User Data Enable user data read/write and Set PIN
services.
User (optional Master) ATA SECURITY UNLOCK
User Data Read /
Write
Encryption / decryption of user data. User (optional Master) ATA Read / Write Commands
Cryptographic
Erase
Erase user data through cryptographic
means: by zeroizing the encryption key and
the User PIN.
Note: FIPS mode is exited.
Master, User ATA SECURITY ERASE
PREPARE + ATA
SECURITY ERASE UNIT
Sanitize Sanitize user data through cryptographic
means: by zeroizing the encryption key.
User (optional Master) ATA CRYPTO SCRAMBLE
Disable Services Disables ATA Security commands until
POR
User (optional Master) ATA SECURITY FREEZE
LOCK
Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation.
Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode.
User (optional Master) ATA SECURITY DISABLE
PASSWORD, ATA
SECURITY ERASE
PREPARE + ATA
SECURITY ERASE UNIT
Table 8: FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode
FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services - ATA Enhanced Security
Mode
Service Name Description Operator Access Control Command(s)/Event(s)
Unblock PIN Reset Master and User password attempt
counter.
None POR
Show Status Reports if the CM is operational in terms of
FIPS services and approved mode of
operation value.
None TCG Level 0 Discovery,
TCG Get Method
FIPS Operating Mode
indicator (Byte 30, bit 0)
= 1.
Reset Module Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP RAM
storage.
None POR
Exit FIPS Mode Exit Approved Mode of Operation.
Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode.
None (using PSID) TCG AdminSP.RevertSP()
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor
Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall
Security Level, Hardware and Firmware
revisions and Module name
None ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE
– Protocol 0
Table 9: FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode
**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The following table defines the keys / CSPs and the operators / services which use them. Note the following:
• The use of PIN CSPs for authentication is implied by the operator access control.
• The Set PIN service is represented in this table even though generally it is only used at module setup.
• All non-volatile storage of keys and CSPs is in the system area of the drive media to which there is
no logical or physical access from outside of the module.
• The module uses SP 800-90A DRBG and adopts Hash_DRBG mechanism.
• Symmetric keys and seeds for asymmetric keys are unmodified outputs from the DRBG.
• Read access of private values are internal only to the CM and are thus not represented in this table.
• There is no security-relevant audit feature.
• The module generates symmetric keys which are the direct unmodified output from the DRBG.
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Table 3 – “Key Management”
Name
Mode (ATA /
TCG / Both) Description
Type (Pub / Priv, key / CSP (e.g.
PIN)), size Operator Role Services Used In Access **(W, X)
SID (Secure ID), aka Drive
Owner PIN
Both
Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32-256 bits Drive Owner Set PIN W
Master, User Passwords ATA Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32-256 bits Master, User Set PIN W
Master, User MEK ATA Media Encryption Key Private, AES Key, 256 bits Master, User Unlock User Data X
EraseMaster EraseMaster Auth Data Private, PIN, 32-256 bits Master, User
Master, User
Unlock User Data X
TCG Cryptographic Erase X
BandMaster (0-32)
Passwords
Users Auth. Data Private, PIN, 32-256 bits Master, User Sanitize X
TCG Lock/Unlock User Data X
LBA Range MEKs
TCG
MEK (per LBA band) Private, AES Key, 256 bits BandMasters Lock/Unlock User Data X
Entropy Input String Both
*Input to a DRBG mechanism of a string of
bits that contains entropy
Private, 256 bits None
Services which use the DRBG
(cryptographic erase)
X
Seed
Both
*String of bits that is used as input to a
DRBG mechanism Private, Hash seed, 440 bits None
Services which use the DRBG
(cryptographic erase, SetPIN) X
Internal State Both
*Collection of stored information about
DRBG instantiation
Private, V and C 440
bits each
None
Services which uses the DRBG
(cryptographic erase, SetPIN)
X
ORG 0-0 - ORG 0-1
Both
Firmware Load Test Signature Verify Key Public, RSA Key, 2048 bits Drive Owner FW Download X
MEKEK
Both
This key is used to wrap the MEK Private, AES Key, 256 bits
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Lock/Unlock User Data, Cryptographic
Erase, Set PIN W,X
Master Key
Both
This key is used to protect the MEKEK Private, AES Key, 256 bits
Drive Owner,
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Unlock User Data, Cryptographic
Erase, Set PIN W,X
CSPSKs Both
Critical Security Parameter Sanitization
Keys, used within PBKDF
Private, AES Key, 256 bits
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Lock/Unlock User Data, Cryptographic
Erase, Set PIN
W, X
Drive Owner PSKs
TCG
Pre-Shared secret value used for TLS
handshake (up to 4 are supported) Private, Pre-Shared Key, 32-512 bits Drive Owner Set TLS PSK W,X
EraseMaster PSK
TCG
Pre-Shared secret value used for TLS
handshake Private, Pre-Shared Key, 32-512 bits EraseMaster Set TLS PSK W,X
BandMaster PSKs
TCG
Pre-Shared secret value used for TLS
handshake(32 are supported) Private, Pre-Shared Key, 32-512 bits BandMaster Set TLS PSK W,X
Secure Messaging
Session Key
TCG
Derived session unique key Private, AES Key, 128 or 256 bits
EraseMaster,
BandMasters,
Drive Owner
Enable Secure Messaging X
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Table 3 – “Key Management”
Name
Mode (ATA /
TCG / Both) Description
Type (Pub / Priv, key / CSP (e.g.
PIN)), size Operator Role Services Used In Access **(W, X)
Secure Messaging Key
Pair TCG
Key pair used for deriving shared secret
during handshake
Public and Private, Diffie-Hellman, 2048
and 256 bits
EraseMaster,
BandMasters,
Drive Owner
Enable Secure Messaging X
Table 10: Key Management
* Source: Section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication 800-90A
** W- Write access is allowed, X – Execute access is allowed
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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5.1 Mechanisms
The CM has the following physical security:
• Production-grade components with standard passivation
• One opaque, tamper-evident security label (TEL) on the exposed (back) side of the PCBA applied
by Seagate manufacturing prevents electronic design visibility and protects physical access to the
electronics by board removal
• Access to the interior of the drive is prevented via a weld of the drive top cover to the base deck.
• Exterior of the drive is opaque
• The tamper-evident label cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence 
The tamper-evident label cannot be easily replicated with a low attack time
Figure 1: Tamper-Evident Security Label on PCBA to Provide Evidence of PCBA Tampering
5.2 Operator Requirements
The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence:
• Checkerboard pattern on security label
• Security label cutouts do not match original
Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service.
5 Physical Security
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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Figure 2: Tamper Evident Security Label on PCBA Showing Evidence of Tampering
6 Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates
in a “non-modifiable operational environment”. That is, while the module is in operation the operational
environment cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. FW can be upgraded (replaced) with
a signed FW download operation. If the code download is successfully authenticated then the module will
begin operating with the new code image.
Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Non-Proprietary FIPS 140 Module Security Policy Rev. 1.7
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6 Security Rules
6.1 Secure Initialization
The following are the security rules for initialization and operation of the CM in a FIPS 140-2 compliant
manner. Reference the appropriate sections of this document for details.
1. Users: At installation and at periodic intervals examine the physical security mechanisms for
tamper evidence.
2. CM using ATA protocol on the SATA interface can transition to either of the modes by doing one
of the following:
• ATA Enhanced Security Mode: User Set PIN.
• TCG Security Mode: Authenticates to the Locking SP as BandMaster 0, BandMaster 1 or
EraseMaster.
3. COs and Users: At installation, set all operator PINs applicable for the FIPS mode to private values
of at least 4 bytes (32 bits) length:
• ATA Enhanced Security Mode: Master and User. Drive Owner (optional).
• TCG Security: Drive Owner, EraseMaster and BandMasters
4. Drive Owner: At installation, disable the “Makers” authority1
5. At installation, the value of LockOnReset1
for FW Download must be set to “Power Cycle” and it
must not be modified.
6. At installation, the value of PortLocked1
for FW Download must be set to “TRUE”.
At the end of these steps, the CM will be in a FIPS Approved Mode of operation. This can be verified
with Show Status service (refer to Section 4.1).
6.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions
1. Prior to assuming a new role, close the current Session and start a new Session, or do a power cycle, so
that the previous authentication is cleared.
2. User Data Read/Writes shall be an authenticated service 2
. Therefore, set ReadLockEnabled1
and
WriteLockEnabled1
to “True” (the default value is “False”). If a band is configured with a value of
“False” then the band is to be considered excluded from the module boundary.
3. Set all PSKs (Drive Owner PSKs, EraseMaster PSK, BandMaster PSKs) applicable for the FIPS mode to
private values of at least 4 bytes (32 bits) length.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.
1
Refer Section 1.3, Item 5
2
Refer to Section 4.1, Table 1.1