FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module
(Version 3.1.1)
Document Version 1.10 © IBM Security Page 1 of 33
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module
(Version 3.1.1)
Document Version 1.10
February 12, 2016
Prepared For: Prepared By:
IBM Security
6303 Barfield Road
Atlanta, GA 30328
www.ibm.com
SafeLogic Inc.
530 Lytton Avenue, Ste. 200
Palo Alto, CA 94301
www.safelogic.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module
(Version 3.1.1)
Document Version 1.10 © IBM Security Page 2 of 33
Abstract
This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the SiteProtector System
Cryptographic Module (Version 3.1.1).
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 About FIPS 140-2 .............................................................................................................................................4
1.2 About this Document.......................................................................................................................................4
1.3 External Resources...........................................................................................................................................4
1.4 Notices.............................................................................................................................................................4
1.5 Acronyms.........................................................................................................................................................5
2 IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module (Version 3.1.1)......................................................6
2.1 Product Overview ............................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................................................6
2.3 Validation Level Detail.....................................................................................................................................7
2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms................................................................................................................................7
2.4.1 Algorithm Implementation Certificates ...................................................................................................7
2.4.2 Non-Approved Algorithms .......................................................................................................................9
2.5 Module Interfaces............................................................................................................................................9
2.6 Roles, Services, and Authentication...............................................................................................................11
2.6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions.......................................................................................................11
2.6.2 Module API.............................................................................................................................................15
2.6.3 Operator Authentication........................................................................................................................19
2.7 Physical Security ............................................................................................................................................19
2.8 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................................................20
2.9 Cryptographic Key Management...................................................................................................................21
2.10 Self-Tests .....................................................................................................................................................27
2.10.1 Power-On Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................27
2.10.2 Conditional Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................28
2.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks.........................................................................................................................29
3 Guidance and Secure Operation....................................................................................................................31
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance ................................................................................................................................31
3.1.1 Software Packaging................................................................................................................................31
3.1.2 Enabling FIPS Mode................................................................................................................................31
3.1.3 Additional Rules of Operation................................................................................................................32
3.2 User Guidance ...............................................................................................................................................33
3.2.1 General Guidance...................................................................................................................................33
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms......................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 – Validation Level by DTR Section.....................................................................................................................7
Table 3 – Algorithm Certificates (GSKit) ........................................................................................................................9
Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping ............................................................................................11
Table 5 – Module Services and Descriptions and CSP access......................................................................................11
Table 6 - Key Zeroization API .......................................................................................................................................15
Table 7 – Module Keys/CSPs........................................................................................................................................25
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Interfaces Diagram ........................................................................................................................10
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140-2
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Communications
Security Establishment (CSE) and Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) runs the FIPS 140-2
program. The CMVP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP also
validates test reports for modules meeting FIPS 140-2 validation. Validated is the term given to a
product that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-2 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the SiteProtector System Cryptographic
Module (Version 3.1.1) from IBM Security provides an overview of the product and a high-level
description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on
the module’s cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with
instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
The IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module (Version 3.1.1) may also be referred to as
the “module” in this document.
1.3 External Resources
The IBM Security website (http://www.ibm.com) contains information on the full line of products from
IBM Security, including a detailed overview of the SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module (Version
3.1.1) solution. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/) contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and IBM Security
contact information.
1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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1.5 Acronyms
The following table defines acronyms found in this document:
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DTR Derived Testing Requirement
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPOS General Purpose Operating System
GSKit IBM Global Security Kit
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
IBM International Business Machines
ISS Internet Security Systems
KAT Known Answer Test
NIST National Institute of Standards and
Technology
RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms
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2 IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module (Version
3.1.1)
2.1 Product Overview
SiteProtector (http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/site-protector-system) is a centralized
management system that unifies management and analysis for network, server, and desktop protection
agents and small networks or appliances. The SiteProtector is used as the central controlling point for
IBM ISS appliances deployed on the network. The SiteProtector performs the following functionality:
• Manages and monitors Sensors and SiteProtector sub-components;
• Enables an administrator to view configuration data of an appliance supported by SiteProtector;
• Displays audit and system data records; and
• Monitors the network connection between SiteProtector and the Sensors it is configured to
monitor.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The module is the IBM Security SiteProtector System Cryptographic Module (Version 3.1.1), provides the
SiteProtector application with the means to encrypt management session to a managed Sensor. The
module is a software-only module installed on a multi-chip standalone device, such as a General
Purpose Computer running a General Purpose Operating System and provides cryptographic services to
the IBM Security SiteProtector application.
The module is a uniquely identifiable library that is linked into the SiteProtector application. All
operations of the module occur via calls from the SiteProtector application, which occur only when an
operator is successfully authenticated to the host operating system. As such there are no untrusted
services or daemons calling the services of the module. No security functions outside the cryptographic
module provide FIPS-relevant functionality to the module.
The module is comprised of the following files:
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Agent Manager\agentmgr.dll
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Agent Manager\issSessionConfigSvcs5.dll
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Application Server\webserver\IHS\bin\issSessionConfigSvcs5.dll
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Application Server\webserver\IHS\modules\mod_ibm_ssl.so
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Event Collector\issSessionConfigSvcs5.dll
• \ISS\SiteProtector\FIPS Service\FipsService.exe
• \ISS\SiteProtector\Application Server\webserver\IHS\gsk8
• \ISS\SiteProtector\GSK\8.0.50.51
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This module provides no non-FIPS approved mode of operation, and there is only one FIPS approved
mode of operation. Although the module requires no further configuration or compilation, the
procedures in the Guidance and Secure Operation must be followed.
2.3 Validation Level Detail
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Validation Level 1
Table 2 – Validation Level by DTR Section
The “Mitigation of Other Attacks” section is not relevant as the module does not implement any
countermeasures towards special attacks.
2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms
2.4.1 Algorithm Implementation Certificates
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers
from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:
Algorithm CAVP Certificate Use
RSA Key
Generation
186-4KEY(gen)
(2048 or 3072 bits)
1676 Sign / verify
operations
Key transport
RSA
Signature
Generation
PKCS#1.5
(2048 or 3072 bits)
(SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-
384,SHA-512)
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RSA
Signature
Verification
PKCS#1.5 (1024, 2048,
3072 bits)
(SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-
256,SHA-384,SHA-512)
ECDSA KeyPair
Generation
P: 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 233, 283, 409, 571
632 Sign / verify
operations
ECDSA PKV P: 192, 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 163, 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 163, 233, 283, 409, 571
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
P: 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 233, 283, 409, 571
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
P: 192, 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 163, 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 163, 233, 283, 409, 571
ECC CDH
Component
(SP800-56A)
P: 224, 256, 384, 521 462 Cofactor Diffie-
Hellman Primitive
SHA message
digest
generation
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
2717 Message digest in
TLS sessions
Module integrity
via SHA-1
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-
SHA-512
2076 Message
verification
AES AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-
CMAC, AES-256-CMAC,
ECB, CBC, CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128 & OFB
AES_CCM 128, 192,or 256
bit keys (SP800-38C)
AES_GCM 128, 192,or 256
bit keys (FIPS 197, SP800-
38D)
AES_XTS 128, 256 bit keys
(FIPS SP800-38E)1
3279 Data encryption /
decryption
1
AES XTS mode was CAVS validated but not implemented within the module.
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Triple-DES Triple-DES 192-bit keys in
ECB, CBC, CFB64, and OFB
mode, CMAC
1866 Data encryption /
decryption
DRBG 800-
90A
HMAC_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512), HASH_DRBG
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512),
CTR_DRBG (AES-128- ECB,
AES- 192-ECB, AES-256-
ECB)
737 DRBG
Table 3 – Algorithm Certificates (GSKit)
2.4.2 Non-Approved Algorithms
The module implements the following Non-Approved Algorithms:
• True Random Number Generator (TRNG), a non-deterministic RNG (NDRNG) used to seed the
DRBG.
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength).
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128
bits of encryption strength)
• EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #462, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
2.5 Module Interfaces
The figure below shows the module’s physical and logical block diagram:
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Figure 1 – Module Interfaces Diagram
The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary include the computer keyboard port, CDROM drive,
floppy disk, mouse, network port, parallel port, USB ports, monitor port and power plug. When
operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a
software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module’s interfaces are purely logical and are provided
through the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The logical
interfaces expose services that applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be
called by a referencing application (see Section 2.6 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of
available functions).
The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces: data input, data
output, control input, and status output. Each of the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces relates to the
module's callable interface, as follows:
FIPS 140-2 Interface Logical Interface Module Physical Interface
Data Input Input parameters of API function
calls
Ethernet/Network port
Data Output Output parameters of API function
calls
Ethernet/Network port
Control Input API function calls Keyboard and mouse
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Status Output Uses the API function
ICC_GetStatus that provides
information about the status of the
module and returns true or false.
Either state is logged. The function
is called once the context of the
module has been obtained.
Monitor
Power None Power supply/connector
Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
The module’s logical interfaces are provided only through the Application Programming Interface (API)
that a calling daemon can operate. The module distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically
separating the information according to the defined API.
As shown in Figure 1 – Module Interfaces Diagram and Table 5 – Module Services and Descriptions , the
output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes
performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output
interface when the module zeroizes keys.
2.6 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports a Crypto Officer and a User role. The Crypto Officer (i.e., a human operator) can
initialize and configure the module while the User role (i.e., SiteProtector) can only access the services of
the module. The module does not support a Maintenance role.
2.6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions
Service Notes Modes CAVP Keys and CSPs Roles Access
Type
Symmetric Algorithms
AES encryption &
decryption
128, 192,or 256-bit keys
(FIPS 197)
Encrypt/Decrypt
(with and without
hardware support)
CBC,ECB, CFB1,
CFB8, CFB128,
OFB
3279 AES Symmetric
key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read/Write
Triple-DES
encryption &
decryption
192-bit (of which 168
bits are key bits and the
rest are parity bits) keys
(SP 800-67)
Encrypt/Decrypt
CBC, ECB,
CFB64, OFB
1866 Triple-DES
Symmetric key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read/Write
Public Key Algorithms
ECDSA KeyPair
Generation
P: 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 233, 283, 409, 571
N/A 632 ECDSA public and
private key
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
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Service Notes Modes CAVP Keys and CSPs Roles Access
Type
ECDSA PKV P: 192, 224, 256, 384,
521
K: 163, 233, 283, 409,
571
N/A 632 ECDSA key
material
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
ECDSA Signature
Generation
P: 224, 256, 384, 521
K: 233, 283, 409, 571
B: 233, 283, 409, 571
N/A 632 ECDSA private
key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read
ECDSA Signature
Verification
P: 192, 224, 256, 384,
521
K: 163, 233, 283, 409,
571
B: 163, 233, 283, 409,
571
N/A 632 ECDSA public key Crypto
Officer
User
Read
RSA Key
Generation
186-4KEY(gen)
(2048 or 3072 bits)
N/A 1676 RSA public and
private key
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
RSA Signature
Generation
PKCS#1.5
(2048 or 3072 bits)
(SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-
384,SHA-512)
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 1676 RSA private key Crypto
Officer
User
Read
RSA Signature
Verification
PKCS#1.5 (1024, 2048,
3072 bits)
(SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-
256,SHA-384,SHA-512)
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 1676 RSA public key Crypto
Officer
User
Read
RSA Key Wrapping Encrypt / Decrypt
(2048, 3072 bits)
Allowed to be used in
FIPS mode
N/A 1676 RSA public and
private key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read
Diffie-Hellman
(DH)
2048 or 4096 bit
modulus
Allowed to be used in
FIPS mode
Key agreement
and Key
Generation
N/A DH public and
private key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read/Write
EC Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH)
P: 224, 256, 384, 521
(SP 800-56A)
Key agreement
and Key
Generation
(ECC CDH
compone
nt test
#462)
ECDH public and
private key
Crypto
Officer
User
Read/Write
Hash Functions
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Service Notes Modes CAVP Keys and CSPs Roles Access
Type
SHA-1 message
digest generation
FIPS 180-4
(not valid for signature
generation)
N/A 2717 None Crypto
Officer
User
N/A
SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 message
digest generation
FIPS 180-4, SHA-2
algorithms
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 2717 None Crypto
Officer
User
N/A
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
FIPS 198, 198-1
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 2076 HMAC-SHA-1 key,
HMAC-SHA-224
key, HMAC-SHA-
256 key, HMAC-
SHA-384 key,
HMAC-SHA-512
key
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
Encryption Functions
AES-128-CMAC,
AES-192-CMAC,
AES-256-CMAC
128, 192, or 256 bit
keys (FIPS 197)
Encrypt/Decrypt
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 3279 CMAC-AES-128
key, CMAC-AES-
192 key,
CMAC-AES-256
key
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
Triple-DES CMAC
(CMAC with three
key Triple-DES)
192-bit keys (FIPS 197) CBC 1866 CMAC-Triple-DES
key (192-bit)
Crypto
Officer
User
Write
AES_CCM 128, 192,or 256 bit keys
(SP800-38C)
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 3279 AES_CCM key Crypto
Officer
User
Write
AES_GCM 128, 192,or 256 bit keys
(FIPS 197, SP800-38D)
(with and without
hardware support)
N/A 3279 AES_GCM key Crypto
Officer
User
Write
Random Bit Generator
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Service Notes Modes CAVP Keys and CSPs Roles Access
Type
DRBG 800-90A SP 800-90A
(with and without
hardware support).
HMAC_DRBG
(SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-
512),
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-
512),
CTR_DRBG
(AES-128-ECB,
AES-192-ECB,
AES-256-ECB)
737 Seed Crypto
Officer
User
Write
FIPS 140-2 Functions
Configure Initializes the module
for FIPS mode of
operation
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
Execute
Self-Test Performs self-tests on
critical functions of
module. Run during
startup and
periodically during
operations to prevent
any secure data from
being released and to
ensure all
components are
functioning correctly
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
Execute
Show Status Shows status of the
module
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
User
Execute
Zeroization Zeroizes keys.
Ephemeral CSPs are
zeroized by the RAM
clearing processes,
and static CSPs are
zeroized by
uninstalling the
module and
formatting the hard
drive
N/A N/A None Crypto
Officer
Execute
Table 5 – Module Services and Descriptions and CSP access
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Secret keys, public/private keys, and CSPs are protected from unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized
modification, and unauthorized substitution because only authorized users are allowed access to the
GPOS and SiteProtector application. The SiteProtector application ensures that no keys or CSPs leave the
physical boundary of the module in plaintext. The module does not output intermediate key values, nor
does it generate keys with non-Approved key generation methods.
Ephemeral CSPs are zeroized by the RAM clearing processes, and static CSPs are zeroized by uninstalling
the module and formatting the hard drive. All keys and CSPs are stored in memory, and zeroization has
been implemented to ensure no traces are left of any CSPs upon termination of the service using the
CSP. Zeroization has been implemented by overwriting the allocated memory buffer with zeros before
freeing the memory to other uses. Any service using a CSP will zeroize the CSP upon normal termination
and when transitioning into error states. Zeroization is initiated by terminating the process and
powering off the module. Zeroization will complete before any other malicious command could
compromise the keys currently being zeroized because the module will not process additional
commands until it finishes executing the current command.
Key zeroization services are performed via the following API functions:
Key Zeroization Services API functions
Clean up memory locations used by low-level
arithmetic functions
ICC_BN_clear_free() ICC_BN_CTX_free()
Clean up symmetric cipher context ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free()
Clean up RSA context ICC_RSA_free()
Clean up Diffie-Hellman context ICC_DH_free()
Clean up asymmetric key contexts ICC_EVP_PKEY_free()
Clean up HMAC context ICC_HMAC_CTX_free()
Clean up ECDSA and ECDH contexts ICC_EC_KEY_free()
Clean up CMAC context ICC_CMAC_CTX_free()
Clean up AES-GCM context ICC_AES_GCM_CTX_free()
Clean up RNG context ICC_RNG_CTX_free()
Table 6 - Key Zeroization API
It is the calling application’s responsibility to appropriately utilize the provided zeroization methods (i.e.
API functions) as listed in the table above to clean up involved cryptographic contexts before they are
released.
2.6.2 Module API
The following list enumerates the API functions supported. Functions marked with (CO) are crypto
officer functions.
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• ICC_EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags
• ICC_GetStatus
• ICC_Init (CO)
• ICC_SetValue (CO)
• ICC_GetValue
• ICC_Attach (CO)
• ICC_Cleanup
• ICC_SelfTest
• ICC_GenerateRandomSeed
• ICC_OBJ_nid2sn
• ICC_EVP_get_digestbyname
• ICC_EVP_get_cipherbyname
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_new
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_free
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_init
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_copy
• ICC_EVP_MD_type
• ICC_EVP_MD_size
• ICC_EVP_MD_block_size
• ICC_EVP_MD_CTX_md
• ICC_EVP_Digestinit
• ICC_EVP_DigestUpdate
• ICC_EVP_DigestFinal
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_block_size
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_key_length
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_iv_length
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_type
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher
• ICC_DES_random_key
• ICC_DES_set_odd_parity
• ICC_EVP_EncryptInit
• ICC_EVP_EncryptUpdate
• ICC_EVP_EncryptFinal
• ICC_EVP_DecryptInit
• ICC_EVP_DecryptUpdate
• ICC_EVP_DecryptFinal
• ICC_EVP_OpenInit
• ICC_EVP_OpenUpdate
• ICC_EVP_OpenFinal
• ICC_EVP_SealInit
• ICC_EVP_SealUpdate
• ICC_EVP_SealFinal
• ICC_EVP_SignInit
• ICC_EVP_SignUpdate
• ICC_EVP_SignFinal
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• ICC_EVP_VerifyInit
• ICC_EVP_VerifyUpdate
• ICC_EVP_VerifyFinal
• ICC_EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new
• ICC_EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free
• ICC_EVP_EncodeInit
• ICC_EVP_EncodeUpdate
• ICC_EVP_EncodeFinal
• ICC_EVP_DecodeInit
• ICC_EVP_DecodeUpdate
• ICC_EVP_DecodeFinal
• ICC_RAND_bytes
• ICC_RAND_seed
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_decrypt
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_encrypt
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_new
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_free
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_size
• ICC_RSA_new
• ICC_RSA_generate_key
• ICC_RSA_check_key
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA
• ICC_RSA_free
• ICC_RSA_private_encrypt
• ICC_RSA_private_decrypt
• ICC_RSA_public_encrypt
• ICC_RSA_public_decrypt
• ICC_i2d_RSAPrivateKey
• ICC_i2d_RSAPublicKey
• ICC_d2i_PrivateKey
• ICC_d2i_PublicKey
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_set1_DH
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_get1_DH
• ICC_DH_new
• ICC_DH_new_generate_key
• ICC_DH_ check
• ICC_DH_free
• ICC_DH_size
• ICC_DH_compute_key
• ICC_DH_generate_parameters
• ICC_DH_get_PublicKey
• ICC_id2_DHparams
• ICC_d2i_DHparams
• ICC_RSA_size
• ICC_BN_CTX_new
• ICC_BN_CTX_free
• ICC_BN_mod_exp
• ICC_HMAC_CTX_new
• ICC_HMAC_CTX_free
• ICC_HMAC_Init
• ICC_HMAC_Update
• ICC_HMAC_Final
• ICC_BN_div
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• ICC_ECDSA_SIG_new
• ICC_ECDSA_SIG_free
• ICC_i2d_ECDSA_SIG
• ICC_d2i_ECDSA_SIG
• ICC_ECDSA_sign
• ICC_ECDSA_verify
• ICC_ECDSA_size
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY
• ICC_EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY
• ICC_EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name
• ICC_EC_KEY_new
• ICC_EC_KEY_free
• ICC_EC_KEY_generate_key
• ICC_EC_KEY_get0_group
• ICC_EC_METHOD_get_field_type
• ICC_EC_GROUP_method_of
• ICC_EC_POINT_new
• ICC_EC_POINT_free
• ICC_EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_G
Fp
• ICC_EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_G
Fp
• ICC_EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_G
F2m
• ICC_AES_GCM_DecryptUpdate
• ICC_AES_GCM_EncryptFinal
• ICC_AES_GCM_DecryptFinal
• ICC_AES_GCM_GenerateIV_NIST
• ICC_GHASH
• ICC_AES_CCM_Encrypt
• ICC_AES_CCM_Decrypt
• ICC_get_RNGbyname
• ICC_RNG_CTX_new
• ICC_RNG_CTX_free
• ICC_RNG_CTX_Init
• ICC_RNG_Generate
• ICC_RNG_ReSeed
• ICC_RNG_CTX_ctrl
• ICC_RSA_sign
• ICC_RSA_verify
• ICC_EC_GROUP_get_degree
• ICC_EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp
• ICC_EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
• ICC_EC_GROUP_get0_generator
• ICC_i2o_ECPublicKey
• ICC_o2i_ECPublicKey
• ICC_BN_cmp
• ICC_BN_add
• ICC_BN_sub
• ICC_BN_mod_mul
• ICC_EVP_PKCS82PKEY
• ICC_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8
• ICC_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free
• ICC_d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
• ICC_i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
• ICC_d2i_ECPKParameters
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• ICC_i2d_ECPKParameters
• ICC_EC_GROUP_free
• ICC_EC_KEY_set_group
• ICC_EC_KEY_dup
• ICC_RSA_X931_derive_ex
• ICC_Init
• ICC_EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag
• ICC_OPENSSL_cpuid_override
• ICC_OPENSSL_cpuid
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags
• ICC_OPENSSL_HW_rand
• ICC_OPENSSL_rdtscX
• ICC_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy
• ICC_BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex
2.6.3 Operator Authentication
Operators authenticate to the module via the Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (General Purpose
Operating System), which implements a username/password authentication mechanism and enforces
operator authentication prior to the operator utilizing any system services. Further, the Windows login
authentication mechanism required to access the module distinguishes operators that have
administrator rights on the computer system. The modules rely on this mechanism to distinguish an
operator between the two supported roles. The module itself does not contain authentication data.
The GPOS will allow an operator to change roles only if the User knows the Crypto Officer password and
vice versa. The operating system is responsible for ensuring previous authentication data is cleared upon
powering off of the module.
Passwords for the Crypto-Officer and User role must be a minimum of 8 characters (see Secure
Operation section of this document). The password can consist of alphanumeric values, a-z A-Z 0-
9, yielding 62 choices per character. The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/628
, which is
less than 1/1,000,000.
The GPOS module will lock an account after 5 failed authentication attempts; thus, the maximum
number of attempts in one minute is 5. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive
attempts in a one minute period is 5/628
which is less than 1/100,000.
2.7 Physical Security
This section of requirements does not apply to this module. The module is a software-only module and
does not implement any physical security mechanisms.
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2.8 Operational Environment
The cryptographic module were tested and validated on the following hardware platform:
• Intel Core i7-2600 @ 3.4GHz (1-CPU / 4-core)
The module runs on Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard (Single-user mode), Version 6.3. The
module’s software is entirely encapsulated by the cryptographic boundary (shown in Figure 1).
The GPC(s) used during testing are assumed to have met Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for
business use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B.
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2.9 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:
Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Interface Privileges
AES Session
Key
AES 128, 192, 256
encryption &
decryption of
management traffic
Internal generation at
installation by DRBG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: Via secure
TLS tunnel
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Decrypt
Encrypt
Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R W D
Triple-DES
Session Key
Triple-DES 192
encryption &
decryption
of management traffic
Internal generation at
installation by DRBG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: Via secure
TLS tunnel
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Decrypt
Encrypt
Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R W D
HMAC key HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 for
message verification
Internal generation at
installation by DRBG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R W D
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protected memory.
Crypto Officer
Password
Alphanumeric
passwords externally
generated by a human
user for
authentication to the
operating system.
Not generated by the
module; defined by the
human user of the
workstation
Storage: on disk/obfuscated
Type: Static
Association: controlled by the
operating system
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual entry
via operating system
Output: NA
Configure Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
None
User Password Alphanumeric
passwords externally
generated by a human
user for
authentication to the
operating system.
Not generated by the
module; defined by the
human user of the
workstation
Storage: on disk/obfuscated
Type: Static
Association: controlled by the
operating system
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual entry
via operating system
Output: NA
Configure Crypto
Officer
D
User
R W
DRBG Seed Key 256-bit value to seed
the FIPS-approved
DRBG
Generated internally
by non-Approved RNG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
None
User
None
Entropy Input
String
Input value for
entropy calculation
Generated internally
by non-Approved RNG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
None
User
None
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Hash_DRBG
mechanism
V and C values Generated internally
by non-Approved RNG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
None
User
None
HMAC_DRBG
mechanism
V and Key values Generated internally
by non-Approved RNG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
None
User
None
CTR_DRBG
mechanism
V and Key values Generated internally
by non-Approved RNG
Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
None
User
None
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RSA Private
Key
Private asymmetric
key for sign / verify
operations and
key establishment2
for
SiteProtector TLS
connections.
Internal generation Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: Key handle
from API request is
output only to the
SiteProtector
application
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R
RSA Public Key Public asymmetric key
for sign / verify
operations and
key establishment for
SiteProtector TLS
connections
Encryption/Decryption
of the Premaster
Secret for
entry/output
Internal generation Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via X509
certificates.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA`
Output: Key handle
from API request is
output only to the
SiteProtector
application
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R
ECDHE Private
Key
Private asymmetric
key for key
establishment3
for
Internal generation Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Static
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
R W D
2
Key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength
3
Key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength
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SiteProtector TLS
connections. Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Output: Key handle
from API request is
output only to the
SiteProtector
application
User
R
ECDHE Public
Key
Public asymmetric key
for key establishment3
for SiteProtector TLS
connections.
Encryption/Decryption
of the Premaster
Secret for
entry/output
Internal generation Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via X509
certificates.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA`
Output: Key handle
from API request is
output only to the
SiteProtector
application
Establish Session Crypto
Officer
R W D
User
R
R = Read W = Write D = Delete
Table 7 – Module Keys/CSPs
Secret keys, public/private keys, and CSPs are protected from unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, and unauthorized
substitution because only authorized users are allowed access to the GPOS and SiteProtector application. The SiteProtector application ensures
that no keys or CSPs leave the physical boundary of the module in plaintext. The module does not output intermediate key values, nor does it
generate keys with non-Approved key generation methods.
Ephemeral CSPs are zeroized by the RAM clearing processes, and static CSPs are zeroized by uninstalling the module and formatting the hard
drive. All keys and CSPs are stored in memory, and zeroization has been implemented to ensure no traces are left of any CSPs upon termination
of the service using the CSP. Zeroization has been implemented by overwriting the allocated memory buffer with zeros before freeing the
memory to other uses. Any service using a CSP will zeroize the CSP upon normal termination and when transitioning into error states.
Zeroization is initiated by terminating the process and powering off the module. Zeroization will complete before any other malicious command
could compromise the keys currently being zeroized because the module will not process additional commands until it finishes executing the
current command.
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The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please see NIST document SP800-131A for guidance regarding the use
of non FIPS-approved algorithms.
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2.10 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations
to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly.
In the event of any self-test failure, the module/SiteProtector application will output an error to the
audit log and will shutdown. In addition to self-test failures, successful loading of the module is also
logged. To access status of self-tests, success or failure, the application provides access to the audit log.
Status is viewable via operating environment’s audit mechanism and by verifying proper loading and
operation of the SiteProtector application. While the module is running self-tests, the module will not
output data. The SiteProtector application makes calls to the SiteProtector System Cryptographic
Module (Version 3.1.1), and data will not be returned until the self-tests complete.
No keys or CSPs will be output when the module is in an error state. The module will halt and the
process will terminate; as such, no data will be output via the data output interface. Additionally, the
module does not support a bypass function, and the module does not allow plaintext cryptographic key
components or other unprotected CSPs to be output on physical ports. No external software or
firmware is allowed to be loaded in a FIPS mode of operation.
The following sections discuss the module’s self-tests in more detail.
2.10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon every initialization of the module and if any of the tests fail, the
module will not initialize. The module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed by the
users. The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
• Module integrity check for the GSKit cryptographic library is via 2048-bit CAVS-validated RSA
public key (PKCS#1.5) and a single HMAC SHA-1 digest calculated over the module at the time it
is created. This RSA public key is stored inside the static stub and relies on the operating system
for protection. Self-test and library verification is performed at library load by hooking the
shared library’s ‘call on load’ entry points.
• Module integrity checks for other SiteProtector modules are by digital signature verification
based on a 3072-bit CAVS-validated RSA public key using SHA-256 hashing. The signatures are
created when the modules are created by IBM. Signature verification is done by the
SiteProtector FIPS service before shared library is loaded.
• RSA signature generation with 2048 modulus KAT
• RSA signature verification with 2048 modulus KAT
• ECDSA pairwise consistency test with P-384
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• ECDSA signature verification with P-384 KAT
• ECDSA pairwise consistency test with B-233
• ECDSA signature verification with B-233 KAT
• ECDSA pairwise consistency test with K-233
• ECDSA signature verification with K-233 KAT
• Triple-DES – CBC (separate encrypt and decrypt KATs)
• AES 256 – CBC (separate encrypt and decrypt KATs)
• AES_GCM (separate encrypt and decrypt KATs)
• AES_CCM (separate encrypt and decrypt KATs)
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAT
• HMAC: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAT
• DRBG 800-90A KAT
• RSA encryption with 2048 modulus KAT
• RSA decryption with 2048 modulus KAT
• Critical functions test - Performed as part of the GPC initialization and operation, e.g. RAM
Power-On Self-Test (POST) at boot time, and persistent storage (hard drive) sector check-sum
tests
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on
self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can
be run on demand by reinitializing the module in FIPS approved Mode of Operation. Upon passing the
power-on self-tests, the module will log the success and will continue to boot normally; successful
loading of the SiteProtector application will indicate that all self-tests have passed. If a self-test fails, the
module will not load and the SiteProtector application will halt.
2.10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are on-demand tests and tests run continuously during operation of the module. If
any of these tests fail, the module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed by the users.
The module can be re-initialized to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. The module
performs the following conditional self-tests:
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• Pairwise consistency test for RSA (Signature Generation, Signature Verification, Key Generation,
Key Wrapping)
• Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA (KeyPair Generation, PKV, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification)
• DRBG 800-90A
o Health Tests compliant with SP 800-90A – Section 11.3.
o The DRBG 800-90A generates a minimum of 8 bytes per request. If less than 8 bytes are
requested, the rest of the bytes is discarded and the next request will generate new
random data.
o The first 8 bytes of every request is compared with the last 8 bytes requested, if the
bytes match an error is generated.
o For the first request made to any instantiation of a DRBG 800-90A, two internal 8 byte
cycles are performed.
o The DRBG 800-90A relies on the environment (i.e. proper shutdown of the shared
libraries) for resistance to retrospective attacks on data.
o The DRBG 800-90A performs known answer tests when first instantiated and health
checks at intervals as specified in the standard.
• True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
o A non-deterministic RNG (NDRNG) is used to seed the DRBG. Every time a new seed or n
bytes is required (either to initialize the DRBG, reseed the DRBG periodically or reseed
the DRBG by user’s demand), the cryptographic module performs a comparison
between the SHA- 256 message digest using the new seed and the previously calculated
digest. If the values match, the TRNG generates a new stream of bytes until the
continuous DRBG test passes.
The module will inhibit data output via the output interface when conditional tests are performed. Once
the tests have passed and the keys have been generated, the module will pass the key to the calling
daemon.
2.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate other attacks.
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3 Guidance and Secure Operation
This section describes how to configure the module for FIPS-approved mode of operation. Operating the
module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS-approved
mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
3.1.1 Software Packaging
The module is included with SiteProtector Version 3.1.1 and is available for direct download. The
SiteProtector application (and subsequently the module) is to be installed on a Windows Server 2012 R2
(Single-user mode) operating system.
3.1.2 Enabling FIPS Mode
To meet the cryptographic security requirements, especially for secure communication, certain
restrictions on the installation and use of SiteProtector must be followed. The steps below will ensure
that the module implements all required self-tests and uses only approved algorithms.
Only the Express install package is supported. Other installation options are not valid. To install
SiteProtector, please follow these steps4
:
Installation
1. Install the packages on the machine intended to run SiteProtector and in this order:
1) SiteProtectorExpress-Setup.exe
2) EventArchiver-Setup.exe (optional for UCR validation)
3) FIPSService-Setup.exe.
2. All SiteProtector components must be installed on a single hardware / OS platform. The only
exception to this rule is that the management Console may be installed and used remotely.
3. The installation must be a new install. Upgrading from a previous version of SiteProtector is not valid.
Configure
1. Install the License.
A license is required to update SiteProtector components to the latest version.
To install the license in the SiteProtector Console:
a. Select Tools -> Licenses -> Agent/Module
b. Select the Licenses tab (2nd tab)
c. Select the Add button.
d. Location and select the provided SiteProtector license key.
4
Note that upgrading from a previous Express Install is not supported and a clean install is required.
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e. Press the F5 key to refresh the License tab until all licenses display the state "Key Good".
f. Select the OK button to close the License dialog.
2. Reboot the machine.
3. Apply the component updates.
Several SiteProtector components will display update status of "Out of Date".
The component updates should be installed in this order:
1. Database / Product Maintenance
2. Database / Product Features
3. SiteProtector Core (additional database updates may need now appear and requires updating)
4. Event Collector
5. Agent Manager
To install an update to a SiteProtector component from the Console, in the Agent view:
a. Right-click the component.
b. Select Updates -> Apply XPU...
c. Select Accept on the license agreement page.
d. Select Next on the Schedule Update page.
e. Select Finish on the Select XPU page.
Note: The X-press Update Server and Event Archiver (optional) will update automatically.
When all update statuses show "Current", the component versions should be:
- Database 3.1.1.12 (XPU 1.468) [or greater]
- Event Collector 3.1.1.2 [or greater]
- FIPS Service 3.1.1 [or greater]
- SiteProtector Core 3.1.1.2 [or greater]
- Security Fusion Module 3.0 [or greater]
- Agent Manager 3.1.1.7 [or greater]
- X-press Update Server 3.1.1.2 [or greater]
- Event Archiver 3.1.1.2 (optional) [or greater]
All SiteProtector components must be installed on a single hardware / OS platform.
The installation must be a new install. Upgrading from a previous version of SiteProtector is not valid.
Remote management is allowed as long as the module implements IBM® Java JCE FIPS 140-2
Cryptographic Module (Software Version: 1.7), FIPS 140-2 Certificate #1993. Optionally, download
Console-Setup.exe and install on a different machine than SiteProtector is installed.
3.1.3 Additional Rules of Operation
1. All host system components that can contain sensitive cryptographic data (main memory,
system bus, disk storage) must be located in a secure environment.
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2. The writable memory areas of the Module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the
SiteProtector application so that the Module is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the SiteProtector
application has access to that instance of the Module.
3. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot
access the address space of the process containing the Module.
3.2 User Guidance
3.2.1 General Guidance
The User must configure and enforce the following initialization procedures in order to operate in FIPS
approved mode of operation: the end user of the operating system is responsible for zeroizing CSPs by
via wipe/secure delete procedures.