Oracle StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive
FIPS 140-2 – Level 1 Validation
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Hardware Part #: 7042136, 7314405
Firmware Version
RB411111
Security Policy Revision 0.12
© Copyright 2017 Oracle Corporation
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Title: Oracle StorageTek T10000D FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
01.20.2017 Author: Acumen Security, LLC
Contributing Authors: Oracle
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 6
2 STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE..................................................................................... 8
2.1 MODULE OVERVIEW........................................................................................................... 8
2.1.1 ORACLE KEY MANAGER................................................................................................. 9
2.1.2 VIRTUAL OPERATOR PANEL........................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE DEPLOYMENT ....................................................... 9
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION .................................................................................................. 11
2.2.1 PERMANENT ENCRYPTION APPROVED MODE ............................................................... 11
2.2.2 ENCRYPTION ENABLED APPROVED MODE.................................................................... 12
2.2.3 ENCRYPTION DISABLED APPROVED MODE................................................................... 12
2.2.4 MIXED MODE ............................................................................................................. 13
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES....................................................................................................... 13
2.3.1 FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPING................................................................. 14
2.3.2 STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE VOP STATUS INFORMATION ................................ 19
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 20
2.4.1 CRYPTO-OFFICER ROLE.............................................................................................. 20
2.4.2 NON-APPROVED SERVICES .......................................................................................... 23
2.4.3 USER ROLE................................................................................................................. 23
2.4.4 ADDITIONAL OPERATOR SERVICES............................................................................... 24
2.4.5 ADDITIONAL STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE SERVICES........................................ 25
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 25
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.......................................................................................... 26
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................. 26
2.7.1 ENCRYPTION ENABLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .................... 26
2.7.2 ENCRYPTION DISABLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ................... 28
2.7.3 MIXED MODE ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS............................................................. 30
2.7.4 ENCRYPTION ENABLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS.. 33
2.7.5 ENCRYPTION DISABLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS. 36
2.7.6 MIXED MODE CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS ............... 38
2.8 EMI/EMC ........................................................................................................................ 41
2.9 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 41
2.9.1 INTEGRITY TESTS......................................................................................................... 41
2.9.2 POWER-ON SELF-TESTS .............................................................................................. 41
2.9.3 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS .......................................................................................... 42
2.9.4 CRITICAL FUNCTIONS TESTS........................................................................................ 43
2.10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS..................................................................................... 43
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3 SECURE OPERATION.............................................................................................................. 44
3.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE (FIRST USE).......................................................... 44
3.1.1 INITIAL SET-UP........................................................................................................... 44
3.1.2 ENCRYPTION DISABLED APPROVED MODE SET-UP ...................................................... 45
3.1.3 ENCRYPTION ENABLED APPROVED MODE SET-UP ....................................................... 45
3.1.4 PERMANENT ENCRYPTION APPROVED MODE SET-UP................................................... 46
3.1.5 MIXED MODE SET-UP................................................................................................. 46
3.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE (NORMAL OPERATION)......................................... 47
3.2.1 USING SSH (ALL MODES) ............................................................................................ 47
3.2.2 MEMORY DUMP OFFLOAD (ALL MODES)...................................................................... 47
3.2.3 SWITCHING TO ENCRYPTION DISABLED APPROVED MODE ........................................... 47
3.2.4 SWITCHING TO ENCRYPTION ENABLED APPROVED MODE ............................................ 48
3.2.5 SWITCHING TO PERMANENT ENCRYPTION APPROVED MODE........................................ 48
3.2.6 SWITCHING TO MIXED MODE...................................................................................... 49
3.3 ZEROIZATION.................................................................................................................... 49
4 ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................. 50
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 – STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE ............................................................................ 9
FIGURE 2 – STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO .................................. 10
FIGURE 3 - STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE (FRONT) ............................................................ 14
FIGURE 4 - STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE (REAR) .............................................................. 15
FIGURE 5 – STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE (BOTTOM)......................................................... 16
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .................................................................. 11
TABLE 2 – MAPPING OF FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES TO STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE
PHYSICAL INTERFACES .................................................................................................................. 17
TABLE 3 – CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER SERVICES............................................................................ 21
TABLE 4 – USER SERVICES............................................................................................................. 23
TABLE 5 – ADDITIONAL OPERATOR SERVICES............................................................................... 25
TABLE 6 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHMS IN STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE (PERMANENT
ENCRYPTION AND ENCRYPTION ENABLED MODES)....................................................................... 26
TABLE 7 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHMS IN STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE (ENCRYPTION
DISABLED MODE).......................................................................................................................... 28
TABLE 8 – MIXED MODE SECURITY FUNCTIONS............................................................................ 30
TABLE 9 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS
(PERMANENT ENCRYPTION AND ENCRYPTION ENABLED MODES)................................................. 33
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TABLE 10 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS
(ENCRYPTION DISABLED MODE) ................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 11 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS (
MIXED MODE) ............................................................................................................................... 38
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the
StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive from Oracle Corporation. This Security Policy
describes how the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive meets the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and
validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved
mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2
validation of the module. The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive may also be
referred to in this document as the Encrypting Tape Drive, the ETD1
, the crypto
module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the
technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More
information is available on the module from the following sources:
 The Oracle Corporation website (http://www.oracle.com) contains
information on the full line of products from Oracle.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-
1/140val-all.htm) contains contact information for individuals to answer
technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission
Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
1
ETD – Encrypting Tape Drive
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 Finite State Machine
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were
produced by Acumen Security under contract to Oracle. With the exception of
this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is
proprietary to Oracle and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Oracle.
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2 STORAGETEK T10000D TAPE DRIVE
2.1 Module Overview
Oracle’s StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Hardware Part #: 7042136/7314405;
Firmware Version: RB411111) blends the highest capacity, performance,
reliability, and data security to support demanding, 24/7 data center operations.
The T10000D delivers fast write speeds (252 MB2
/sec3
) to a native 8.5 TB of
magnetic tape storage; making it ideal for data center operations with growing
data volume. The T10000D provides data protection with built-in AES4
hardware
encryption and multiple FIPS 140-2 Approved modes of operation. Customers
can be assured that their data will always be secure, in any of these FIPS 140-2
Approved modes. The T10000D encrypting tape drive (ETD) operates with data
encryption services:
 permanently enabled
 temporarily enabled
 temporarily disabled
Each encryption mode provides FIPS 140-2 Approved security services and
functionality to ETD operators. For added flexibility, a mixed mode of operation
supporting both FIPS 140-2 Approved and non-FIPS 140-2 Approved operations
is also available. This mode of operation provides a non FIPS-140-2 Approved
method for encrypting the tape cartridge contents for customers who do not
require FIPS 140 protected content.
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is featured in Figure 1 below.
2
MB – Megabytes
3
sec – Second
4
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
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Figure 1 – StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive
2.1.1 Oracle Key Manager
The ETD is intended to be used in conjunction with the Oracle Key Manager
(OKM), which provides centralized key management. The OKM, an external
system component, creates, stores, and manages the keys used for encryption and
decryption of data stored in the tape cartridge used by the ETD. An Oracle Key
Manager (formerly called the Key Management System or KMS) cluster consists
of two or more Key Management Appliances (KMAs), providing policy-based
Lifecycle Key Management, authentication, access control, and key provisioning
services. Connections to the ETD from the OKM are secured through the use of
TLS5
1.0.
2.1.2 Virtual Operator Panel
The Virtual Operator Panel (VOP) is an external software application running on
a General Purpose Computer (GPC) that facilitates operator communication with
the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive through the use of an intuitive and user-
friendly Graphical User Interface (GUI). The VOP allows an operator to
configure the drive for FIPS-Approved operation, perform operator services, and
display drive-related status information. An operator of the StorageTek T10000D
Tape Drive will use the VOP, in addition to the OKM, during the initial FIPS
configuration and any time the operator chooses to switch between modes of
operation. Connections to the ETD from the VOP are provided through the
Telnet and SSH network protocols.
2.1.3 StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive Deployment
A sample deployment scenario for the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive with
encryption enabled is provided in Figure 2 below. The ETD is shown with a red,
dotted line surrounding it, representing its cryptographic boundary.
5
TLS – Transport Layer Security
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Service Network Customer Network
ELOM/ILOM Network
Figure 2 – StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive Deployment Scenario
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2.2 Module Specification
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is validated at the FIPS 140-2 section
levels shown in Table 1 for all FIPS-Approved modes of operation.
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC6
1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is a hardware cryptographic module with a
multi-chip standalone physical embodiment as defined by FIPS 140-2. The
primary purpose of this device is to provide FIPS 140-2 Level 1 security to data
being stored on magnetic tape. The cryptographic boundary of the StorageTek
T10000D Tape Drive is defined by the tape drive’s commercial-grade, metallic
enclosure.
The module provides several FIPS-Approved modes of operation that each meet
overall Level 1 FIPS 140-2 requirements specified in Table 1 above. The module
also provides one Mixed mode of operation. Each of the Approved modes and
the Mixed mode are described in the sections below. Cryptographic security
functions and services available in each of the defined modes are specified in the
appropriate sections of this Security Policy. Additional information on each
operational mode of the module, including their invocation, is provided in Section
3 (Secure Operation).
2.2.1 Permanent Encryption Approved Mode
The Permanent Encryption Approved Mode or Permanent Encryption Mode is the
first FIPS-Approved mode of operation provided by the StorageTek T10000D
Tape Drive. This mode provides secure encryption and decryption of data stored
on magnetic tape, using the 256-bit AES cryptographic algorithm. While
6
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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operating in the Permanent Encryption Mode, operators of the module do not
have the ability to disable encryption services. Placing the module into
Permanent Encryption Mode is non-reversible. The ETD will be able to read
from unencrypted tape cartridges while operating in this mode, but will be unable
to append to them if unencrypted data is already present.
To determine that the module is operating in the Permanent Encryption Mode, an
operator can use the VOP to view the drive settings and verify that the
“Encryption Active” and “Permanently encrypting” labels are both set to “Yes”.
In addition, the operator shall verify that the “Use OKM or DPKM7
” label is set to
“OKM”. Instructions to place the module into the Permanent Encryption Mode
are provided in Section 3.1.4 (Permanent Encryption Approved Mode Set-Up).
2.2.2 Encryption Enabled Approved Mode
The second FIPS-Approved mode of operation is the Encryption Enabled
Approved Mode or Encryption Enabled Mode. The Encryption Enabled Mode
provides operators the ability to encrypt and decrypt data that is stored on
magnetic tape. Encryption and decryption are performed using the 256-bit AES
cryptographic algorithm. This mode operates in the same way as the Permanent
Encryption Mode, but with the ability to switch to the Permanent Encryption, the
Encryption Disabled Approved mode and the Mixed mode. The ETD will be able
to read from unencrypted tape cartridges while operating in this mode, but it will
be unable to append to them if unencrypted data is already present.
An operator of the module can determine if the module is operating in the
Encryption Enabled Mode by using the VOP to view the drive settings and verify
that the “Encryption Active” label is set to “Yes” and the “Permanently
encrypting” label is set to “No”. Finally, the operator shall confirm that the “Use
OKM or DPKM” label is set to “OKM”. Instructions to place the module into the
Encryption Enabled Mode are provided in Section 3.1.3 (Encryption Enabled
Approved Mode Set-Up).
2.2.3 Encryption Disabled Approved Mode
When operating in the Encryption Disabled Mode, only plaintext data is stored on
the magnetic tape. This plaintext data is non-security-relevant user data. While
operating in this mode, only unencrypted tape cartridges will be supported for
read and write operations. An operator will be able to switch to any of the
additional FIPS-Approved modes or the Mixed mode while operating the module
in the Encryption Disabled Mode.
7
DPKM – Data Path Key Management
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An operator of the module can determine if the module is operating in the
Encryption Disabled Mode by using the VOP to view the drive settings and verify
that the “Encryption Active” label is set to “No”. Finally, the operator shall
confirm that the “Use OKM or DPKM” label is set to “UNKN8
”. Instructions to
place the module into the Encryption Disabled Mode are provided in Section 3.1.2
(Encryption Disabled Approved Mode Set-Up).
2.2.4 Mixed Mode
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is capable of operating in a Mixed mode of
operation. The Mixed mode of operation is defined as a mode of operation that
allows both FIPS approved and non-approved services. Mixed mode of operation
supports the following approved services, SSH and firmware update. No other
cryptographic services are considered approved in Mixed mode.
Mixed mode of operation supports non-approved key import and export (in
plaintext). These methods of key import and export provide no cryptographic
security. Any data encrypted with this keying material is considered plaintext.
Mixed mode is entered when DPKM is enabled through the VOP. DPKM allows
an operator to use the SCSI9
commands SPIN and SPOUT in order to import
and export keying material to and from the module in plaintext.
Keys and CSPs established in any of the other Approved modes are zeroized prior
to operating in the Mixed mode. Additionally, keys and CSPs established in
Mixed Mode are zeroized prior to operating in the any of the other Approved
modes. An operator of the module can determine if the module is operating in
the Mixed mode by using the VOP to confirm that the “Use OKM or DPKM”
label is set to “DPKM”. Instructions to place the module into the Mixed are
provided in Section 3.1.5. An operator will be able to switch to the Encryption
Disabled Mode while operating the module in the Mixed Mode.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The following is a list of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces supported by the
StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive:
 Data Input
 Data Output
8
UNKN - Unknown
9
SCSI – Small Computer System Interface
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 Control Input
 Status Output
Additionally, the module supports a Power Input interface.
2.3.1 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping
Figure 3 shows the front of the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive. The opening
provides an entryway for an approved StorageTek T10000 T1 or T2 Tape
Cartridge. The ETD will not operate if the wrong tape cartridge is inserted. This
entryway provides the Tape Head and RFID10
Reader/Writer as physical
interfaces to the tape cartridge. The opening at the front of the module is the only
opening in the module. It does not provide access to the interior of the module.
Figure 3 - StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Front)
Figure 4 shows the rear of the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive. It provides the
following physical interfaces:
 Tape Transport Interface (TTI) – RS-23211
Serial connection
 Power Supply Connector
 Host Interfaces – Fibre Channel connection (Hardware version #
7042136)/iSER connection (Hardware version # 7314405)
 Recessed Switch
 Ethernet Port – RJ4512
connection
10
RFID – Radio Frequency Identification
11
RS-232 – Recommended Standard 232
12
RJ45 – Registered Jack 45
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Figure 4 - StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Rear)
The bottom of the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Figure 5) provides one
additional physical interface; the Operator Panel Port. This port is used to provide
general module status as well as additional control input access when the drive is
rack-mounted.
*The additional port pictured is the Manufacturing Servo Interface. This interface
is not operational in any of the modes of operation; therefore, it is not listed in the
interfaces table (Table 2) below.
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Figure 5 – StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Bottom)13
Table 2 provides a mapping of all of the physical interfaces of the StorageTek
T10000D Tape Drive listed above to their respective FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interfaces. The functionality and logical interface mappings of these physical
interfaces do not change between Approved modes.
13
The security seal shown does not provide additional physical security
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Table 2 – Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces to StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive Physical Interfaces
Physical Interface Quantity
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interfaces
Supported
Description
Tape Head 2
Data Input
Data Output
Provides the interface to the magnetic tape media, where
the user data to be encrypted is written to, and where the
data to be decrypted is read from.
Tape media resides in six possible cartridge types:
1) Standard Data
2) SPORT (reduced length) Data
3) VolSafe (write-once) Data
4) Sport VolSafe Data (reduced length, write-once)
5) Cleaning
6) Diagnostic (used by a service representative)
TTI connector (RS-
232)
1
Control Input
Data Output
Status Output
Primarily used for tape library communications.
The operator can review the status output to determine if
the module has passed or failed different self-tests. The
status output from this port consists of messages
indicating failure and success.
Recessed switch 1 Control Input
Short press: Reset the module’s IP14
address to the default
IP address (10.0.0.1)
Long press: Force ETD data dump15
Power supply connector 1 Power 100-240 VAC16
@ 50-60 Hz17
14
IP – Internet Protocol
15
All unencrypted dumps shall be deleted by the CO after their creation
16
VAC – Volts Alternating Current
17
Hz - Hertz
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Physical Interface Quantity
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interfaces
Supported
Description
Interface Port (Host
Interface)
2
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
This interface is used to transfer user data between the
ETD and the host. When the host transfers user data to
the ETD through this interface, the ETD encrypts and
writes the data to the magnetic media. When the host
receives user data from the ETD through this interface,
the ETD delivers data read from the magnetic media that
has been decrypted by the ETD.
On hardware version 7042136 the interface can be
configured to support one of two protocols:
1) Fibre Channel, in accordance with the Fibre Channel
Protocol-3 (FCP-3), SCSI Primary Commands-3, and
SCSI Stream Commands (SSC-3) specifications
2) FICON18
, in accordance with the Fibre Channel
Single-Byte Command Code Sets-3 Mapping Protocol
(FC-SB-3), Revision 1.6 specification
3)
On hardware version 7314405 the interface supports
iSCSI19
Extensions for RDMA20
(iSER) version 1.0, July
2003
Ethernet Port
(RJ-45)
1
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
The primary uses of this interface is to:
1) Configure the ETD
2) Deliver encryption keys to the ETD
3) Obtain ETD status and diagnostic data
4) Download firmware to the ETD
5) Deliver status information to an SNMP21
server.
18
FICON – Fibre connection
19
iSCSI – Internet Small Computer System Interface
20
RDMA – Remote Direct Memory Access
21
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
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Physical Interface Quantity
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interfaces
Supported
Description
Operator Panel Port22
1
Status Output
Control Input
The Bottom cover of the ETD has an Operator Panel
connector carrying the following signals:
A. Four signals to provide status output:
1. Power Indicator output signal
2. Activity Indicator output signal
3. Clean Indicator output signal
4. Service Indicator output signal
B. An LCD23
display output interface. The LCD is used
to display ETD status and configuration menu text.
C. Four switch signals (input):
1. IPL24
Switch
2. Unload Switch
3. Menu Switch
4. Select Switch
RFID Reader/Writer 1
Data Input
Data Output
Used to obtain information from each tape inserted into
the ETD to reduce access times and manage the lifecycle
of the cartridge. Various statistical data and information
of record locations are written to the RFID located on the
tape cartridge
2.3.2 StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive VOP Status Information
The module outputs status information via the Ethernet Port to the VOP to
provide a more detailed drive and encryption status to the operator. Drive statuses
include whether the ETD has a tape, is online, or has encountered an error.
Encryption statuses include whether the ETD has correct encryption keys and if it
is capable of performing encryption. Detailed statuses of the module are provided
in the StorageTek Virtual Operator Panel User’s Guide; freely available at:
http://docs.oracle.com.
22
Status and control information provided through Operator Panel Port is provided in Chapter 2 of the StorageTek
T10000 Tape Drive Operator’s Guide.
23
LCD – Liquid Crystal Display
24
IPL – Initial Program Load
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2.4 Roles and Services
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive cryptographic module provides two roles
which operators may assume:
 Cryptographic Officer (CO)
 User
Each role is assumed implicitly by an operator and is determined by the service
which the operator is executing. The ETD supports up to twelve concurrent
operators. Each connection to the ETD is logically separated by the module by
unique session keys.
Each role, and the services available to them in each Approved mode, is detailed
in the sections below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters
(CSPs) listed in the tables indicate the type of access required using the following
notation:
 R – Read: The item is read or referenced by the service.
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security
function.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The CO is in charge of the initial configuration of the StorageTek T10000D Tape
Drive which includes placing the module into one of the modes of operations. A
list of services available to the CO, and the Approved mode the service is
available in, is provided in Table 3.
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Table 3 – Cryptographic Officer Services
Service Description Approved Mode
CSP and Type of
Access
Enable Permanent
Encryption Mode
Provide public and private keys in
order to connect to OKM; Enable
encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
CA_Cert – WX
TDPrivKey – W
TDPubKey – W
Enable Encryption
Enabled Mode
Provide public and private keys in
order to connect to OKM; Enable
encryption
Encryption Disabled
CA_Cert – WX
TDPrivKey – W
TDPubKey – W
Enable Encryption
Disabled Mode
Turn encryption off; OKM
services are enabled
Encryption Enabled
Mixed Mode
CA_Cert – WX
TDPrivKey – W
TDPubKey – W
Enable Mixed Mode
Bring the module into a Mixed
mode of operation
Encryption Disabled None
Configure Module
Perform routine module
configuration
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Place drive
online/offline
Add or remove Fibre Channel and
iSER connectivity to the ETD
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Load Firmware Update module firmware
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
FSPubKey – RX
FSRootCert – X
Reset Zeroization of all keys and CSPs
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
All Keys and CSPs25
–
W
Access Module via
Virtual Operator’s
Panel (VOP)
Log into VOP and manage the
module
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Create Dump
(Encrypted)
Create an encrypted dump file and
save to EEPROM26
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
DRBG27
‘Key’ Value –
WRX
DRBG ‘V’ Value –
WRX
DRBG Seed – WRX
DEKey – WX
DEPubKey – X
25
Dump excludes DEPubKey, FSPubKey, and FSRootCert
26
EEPROM – Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
27
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
Page 22 of 51
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Service Description Approved Mode
CSP and Type of
Access
Create Dump
(Unencrypted)
Create an unencrypted dump file
and save to EEPROM
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Initial Program
Load (IPL)
Reinitialize module and run self-
tests
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Download Audit
Log
Downloadaudit log
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
View Drive Data Read module configuration data
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Download event
logs
Download the currently stored
event logs
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Download Dump
Download the currently stored
dump file.
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Download Perm
logs
Download the currently stored
permanent error logs
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Delete Event Logs
Delete the currently stored event
logs.
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Delete Dump
Delete the currently stored dump
file
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Delete Perm Logs
Deletes currently stored
permanent error logs
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Page 23 of 51
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Service Description Approved Mode
CSP and Type of
Access
Tape Management
Load or unload a new tape
cartridge into the module
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Run Diagnostics
Perform a diagnostic test on the
module
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
2.4.2 Non-Approved Services available in Mixed Mode
DPKM and the SPIN and SPOUT SCSI commands available in Mixed mode of
operation are considered non-approved services and do not provide any FIPS-
approved cryptographic protection. Because SPIN and SPOUT are considered a
plaintext key establishment technique, they shall not be used in the Approved
mode of operation. Any keys established by SPIN or SPOUT are considered
non-Approved keys and shall not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
2.4.3 User Role
The User of the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is the everyday user of the
module. The User is responsible for importing the encryption and decryption
keys when operating in one of the Approved modes with encryption enabled.
Once an encryption key has been obtained, the User has the ability to encrypt and
decrypt data stored on the tape cartridge. A list of services available to the User,
and the Approved mode the service is available in, is provided as Table 4.
Table 4 – User Services
Service Description Approved Mode CSP and Type of Access
Encrypt Data
Encrypt data from the module to
the tape cartridge
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
MEKey – X
Decrypt Data
Decrypt data read from the tape
cartridge
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
MEKey – X
Write Plaintext Data
Write plaintext data from the
module to the tape cartridge
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Read Plaintext Data
Read plaintext data from the
tape cartridge
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Page 24 of 51
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Establish TLS Session
Establish connection with OKM
cluster
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
DRBG ‘Key’ Value – WRX
DRBG ‘V’ Value – WRX
DRBG Seed – WRX
TLS_PM – WRX
TLS_MS – WRX
TLS_EMK – W
TLS_DMK – W
TLS_ECK – W
TLS_DCK – W
CA_Cert – X
TDPubKey – X
TDPrivKey – X
Establish SSH session
Establish connection with
remote workstation
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
SSH_HOST_PRIV – X
SSH_HOST_PUB - X
SSH_SK - WRX
SSH_SA - WRX
SSH_KEX_PRI - WRX
Export AES Key Wrap
Key (AKWK)
Export AKWK to the OKM
cluster
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
DRBG ‘Key’ Value – WRX
DRBG ‘V’ Value – WRX
DRBG Seed – WRX
AKWK – W
KWKPublicKey – X
TLS_EMK – X
TLS_ECK – X
Import
KWKPublicKey
Import the KWKPublicKey
from the OKM cluster onto the
module
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
KWKPublicKey – W
TLS_DMK – X
TLS_DCK – X
Import ME_Key
Import one or more ME_Keys
onto the module from the OKM
cluster
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
ME_Key – W
TLS_DMK – X
TLS_DCK – X
AKWK – X
2.4.4 Additional Operator Services
In addition to CO and User services, the module provides services to operators
that are not required to assume an authorized role. These services do not modify,
disclose, or substitute the keys and CSPs established in one of the Approved
modes. The overall security of the module is not affected by these services.
Table 5 lists the services available to operators not required to assume an
authorized role. These services are available in all Approved modes of operation.
Page 25 of 51
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Table 5 – Additional Operator Services
Service Description Approved Mode
CSP and Type of
Access
Show Status
Determine the current status of the
module by reading the information
provided on the VOP
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Power
Cycle/Perform Self-
Tests
Cycle the power on the module,
which will invoke self-tests on
power-up
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Reset Module IP
Reset the module’s IP address to
the default IP address using the
recessed switch
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Interface Port
Management
Manage the module through the
Interface Port (non-security
relevant)
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Library
Management
Manage the module and retrieve
status information through the TTI
(non-security relevant)
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
Operator Panel
Management
Manage the module and retrieve
status information through the
Operator Panel port (non-security
relevant)
Permanent Encryption
Encryption Enabled
Encryption Disabled
Mixed Mode
None
2.4.5 Additional StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive Services
In addition to the services provided in the sections above, the StorageTek
T10000D Tape Drive provides additional services to operators which do not
affect the overall security of the module. These additional, non-security relevant
services are listed in the documents stated in Section 3 (Secure Operation) of this
Security Policy. These documents are freely available at http://docs.oracle.com.
2.5 Physical Security
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive satisfies level 1 physical security
requirements by being constructed of a hard, production-grade metal exterior.
The module provides an opening, which is required for the insertion of media
(tape cartridges). The opening is constructed of hard, production-grade plastic.
All internal hardware, firmware, and cryptographic data are protected by the
enclosure of the module, which makes up its physical cryptographic boundary.
Page 26 of 51
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NOTE: The labels pictured in Figure 5 above do not add any additional security to
the module.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment for the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive consists of
two NIOS II processors, which are the module’s only general-purpose processors.
These processors execute the module’s firmware (Firmware Version: RB411111).
New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this
validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The module does not employ a general purpose Operating System.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive was designed to operate in several FIPS-
Approved modes of operation: Permanent Encryption Mode, Encryption Enabled
Mode, Encryption Disabled Mode, and Mixed Mode. The following sections
detail which cryptographic algorithms, keys, and CSPs are available for each
FIPS-Approved mode.
2.7.1 Encryption Enabled Cryptographic Algorithm Implementations
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive provides access to the same cryptographic
algorithms when operating in either the Permanent Encryption Approved Mode or
Encryption Enabled Approved Mode. The cryptographic algorithms available in
these Approved modes are listed inTable 6.
Table 6 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms in StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Permanent Encryption and
Encryption Enabled Modes)
Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
AES28
256-bit ECB29
mode Provides encryption for multiple services
including AES in ECB mode as used in
firmware AES CCM encryption (with Cert #
4039) and with the SP30
800-90A CTR31
DRBG (Cert # 1209)
4039
28
AES – Advanced Encryption System
29
ECB – Electronic Code Book
30
SP – Special Publication
31
CTR - Counter
Page 27 of 51
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Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
AES 256-bit ECB mode (Used with OKM) Provides AES in ECB mode as used to unwrap
AES Media Keys32
being sent from the OKM.
(Cert # 4047)
4047
AES Key Wrap 256-bit (Used with OKM) Unwrap AES Media Keys being sent from the
OKM (Used with AES ECB Cert #4047)
4047
AES 256-bit CCM mode AES in CCM mode as used with AES in ECB
mode with Cert # 4039
4039
AES 128-bit CTR mode AES in CTR mode (with AES-ECB-128 as the
forward cipher funtion) used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
AES 128-bit CBC mode AES in CBC mode used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
AES 256-bit CBC33
mode (TLS 1.0/1.1
implementation)
AES in CBC mode used in a TLS session
between the ETD and OKM
4040
AES 256-bit ECB mode
(DCCM hardware implementation)
AES in ECB mode as used in hardware AES
CCM encryption with Cert # 2760
2760
AES 256-bit CCM mode
(DCCM hardware implementation)
AES in CCM mode as used with AES in ECB
mode Cert # 2760
2760
SHA34
-1 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with HMAC SHA-1 (Cert # 2636), RSA 2048-
bit (Cert # 2074)); User data hashing; Used as
part of the SSH KDF (Cert #866).
3330
SHA-1 (TLS 1.0/1.1 implementation) Used as part of the TLS 1.0/1.1 Key Derivation
Function; Used with HMAC SHA-1 (TLS
1.0/1.1 implementation Cert # 867).
3331
SHA-256 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with RSA 2048 (Cert # 2074)) and as part of
the SSH Key Derivation Function ) (Used with
Cert #866). SHA-256 is also used with RSA
2048 Signature Generation and ECDSA
Signature Generation (Cert #905).
3330
HMAC35
SHA-1 (TLS 1.0/1.1 implementation) Provides integrity during a TLS session; Used
with SHA-1 (Cert #: 3331)
2637
HMAC SHA-1 Provides integrity during a SSH session; Used
with SHA-1 (Cert #3330)
2636
32
Media Keys are a defined CSP. See Table 9 in VE07.03.01
33
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
34
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
35
HMAC – (Keyed-) Message Authentication Code
Page 28 of 51
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Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
HMAC SHA-1 (OKM Agent implementation) Provide keyed message authentication when
creating the challenge responses as part of the
certificate service of the OKM. Used with
SHA-1 (Cert # 3330)
2642
RSA 2048-bit PKCS36
#1 v1.5 Signature Verification Verifies the signature of a new firmware image
to be loaded onto the ETD; Used with SHA-
256 (Cert # 3330)
2074
RSA 2048-bit PKCS #1 v1.5 Signature Generation Performs session establishment in support of
SSH.
2074
RSA 2048-bit FIPS 186-4 Key Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH 2074
Elliptic-Curve P-256 (ECDSA) Key Pair Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH
with NIST curve P-256
905
Elliptic-Curve P-256(ECDSA) Signature Generation Performs session establishment in support of
SSH, with NIST curve P-256
905
TLS 1.0 and 1.1 Key Derivation
Note: The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP
TLS 1.0 and 1.1 Key Derivation (SP800-135
rev1; Section 4.2.1); Used with SHA-1 (Cert #
3331) and DRBG (Cert # 1209)
867
SSH Key Derivation
Note: The SSH protocol has not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP
SSH Key Derivation (SP800-135 rev1; Section
5.2) 866
SP800-90A CTR DRBG Generates random numbers for nonces and
keys for multiple services including TLS, SSH,
and OKM
1209
2.7.2 Encryption Disabled Cryptographic Algorithm Implementations
The Encryption Disabled Approved Mode utilizes a subset of the cryptographic
algorithms listed in Table 6. A list of cryptographic algorithms used by the
module while operating in the Encryption Disabled Mode is provided as Table 7.
Table 7 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms in StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive (Encryption Disabled Mode)
Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
AES37
256-bit ECB38
mode Provides encryption for multiple services
including with the SP39
800-90A CTR40
DRBG
(Cert # 1209)
4039
36
PKCS – Public Key Cryptographic Standard
37
AES – Advanced Encryption System
38
ECB – Electronic Code Book
39
SP – Special Publication
Page 29 of 51
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Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
AES 128-bit CTR mode AES in CTR mode used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
AES 128-bit CBC mode AES in CBC mode used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
SHA41
-1 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with HMAC SHA-1 (Cert # 2636), RSA 2048-
bit (Cert # 2074)); User data hashing; Used as
part of the SSH KDF (Cert #866).
3330
SHA-256 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with RSA 2048 (Cert # 2074)) and as part of
the SSH Key Derivation Function (Used with
Cert #866). SHA-256 is also used with RSA
2048 Signature Generation and ECDSA
Signature Generation (Cert #905).
3330
HMAC SHA-1 Provides integrity during a SSH session; Used
with SHA-1 (Cert # 3330)
2636
RSA 2048-bit PKCS42
#1 v1.5 Signature Verification Verifies the signature of a new firmware image
to be loaded onto the ETD; Used with SHA-1
(Cert #3330) and SHA-256 (Cert # 3330)
2074
RSA 2048-bit PKCS #1 v1.5 Signature Generation Performs session establishment in support of
SSH.
2074
RSA 2048-bit FIPS 186-4 Key Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH 2074
Elliptic-Curve P-256 Key Pair Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH
with NIST curve P-256
905
Elliptic-Curve P-256 DSA (ECDSA) Performs session establishment in support of
SSH, with NIST curve P-256
905
SSH Key Derivation
Note: The SSH protocol has not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP
SSH Key Derivation (SP800-135 rev1; Section
5.2) 866
SP800-90A CTR DRBG Generates random numbers for nonces and keys
for multiple services including SSH
1209
40
CTR - Counter
41
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
42
PKCS – Public Key Cryptographic Standard
Page 30 of 51
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2.7.3 Mixed Mode Algorithm Implementations
A list of cryptographic algorithms used by the module while operating in the
Mixed Mode is provided in Table 8.
Table 8 – Mixed Mode Security Functions
Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
AES43
256-bit ECB44
mode Provides encryption for multiple services
including with the SP45
800-90A CTR46
DRBG
(Cert # 1209)
4039
AES 128-bit CTR mode AES in CTR mode used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
AES 128-bit CBC mode AES in CBC mode used in remote SSH
sessions.
4039
SHA47
-1 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with HMAC SHA-1 (Cert # 2636), RSA 2048-
bit (Cert # 2074)). Used as part o the SSH
KDF (Cert #866).
3330
SHA-256 Provides hashing for multiple services
including, digital signature verification (Used
with RSA 2048 (Cert # 2074)) and as part of
the SSH Key Derivation Function (Used with
(Cert # 866)). SHA-256 is also used with RSA
2048 Signature Generation and ECDSA
Signature Generation (Cert #905).
3330
HMAC SHA-1 Provides integrity during a SSH session; Used
with SHA-1 (Cert # 3330)
2636
RSA 2048-bit PKCS48
#1 v1.5 Signature Verification Verifies the signature of a new firmware image
to be loaded onto the ETD; Used with SHA-1
and SHA-256 (Cert # 3330)
2074
RSA 2048-bit PKCS #1 v1.5 Signature Generation Performs session establishment in support of
SSH.
2074
RSA 2048-bit FIPS 186-4 Key Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH 2074
43
AES – Advanced Encryption System
44
ECB – Electronic Code Book
45
SP – Special Publication
46
CTR - Counter
47
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
48
PKCS – Public Key Cryptographic Standard
Page 31 of 51
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Algorithm Implementation Description
Certificate
Number
Elliptic-Curve P-256 Key Pair Generation Performs Key Generation in support of SSH
with NIST curve P-256
905
Elliptic-Curve P-256 DSA (ECDSA) Performs session establishment in support of
SSH, with NIST curve P-256
905
SSH Key Derivation
Note: The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP
SSH Key Derivation (SP800-135 rev1; Section
5.2) 866
SP800-90A CTR DRBG Generates random numbers for nonces and
keys for multiple services including SSH
1209
Caveat: Additional information concerning SHA-1 and specific guidance on
transitions to the use of more robust hashing algorithms is contained in NIST
Special Publication 800-131A.
When operating in the Permanent Encryption and Encryption Enabled Approved
Modes, the ETD receives data from an OKM cluster wrapped with AES Key
Wrap. AES Key Wrap, as defined in SP 800-38F, is an approved key wrapping,
key establishment methodology.
 AES (Cert #4047, Key Wrapping provides 256 bits of encryption strength)
The following non-Approved methods are allowed for use, as described, in the
Permanent Encryption, and Encryption Enabled Modes:
 RSA (Key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides
112 bits of encryption strength)
 The module provides a Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
(NDRNG) as the entropy source to the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90A CTR
DRBG. The NDRNG provides a minimum of 384-bits to the DRBG for
use in key generation.
 The module provides MD5 for use with TLS 1.0 protocol.
Page 32 of 51
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The following non-Approved methods are allowed for use, as described, in the
Encryption Disabled and Mixed Modes:
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides
112 bits of encryption strength)
 The module provides a Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
(NDRNG) as the entropy source to the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90A CTR
DRBG. The NDRNG provides a minimum of 384-bits to the DRBG for
use in key generation.
 The module provides MD5 for use with TLS 1.0 protocol.
Page 33 of 51
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2.7.4 Encryption Enabled Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The cryptographic keys, key components, and other CSPs used by the module while operating in either the Permanent
Encryption Approved Mode or Encryption Enabled Approved Mode are shown in Table 9.
Table 9 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs (Permanent Encryption and Encryption Enabled Modes)
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Media Key (MEKey) AES CCM 256-bit Generated externally;
Input encrypted via
AKWK
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM49
and FPGA50
“Reset” service;
Switch Approved
Mode
To encrypt and decrypt
data to and from
magnetic tape
AES Key Wrap Key
(AKWK)
AES ECB 256-bit Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encapsulated
via KWKPublicKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Decrypt MEKey
Dump Encryption
Key (DEKey)
AES CCM 256-bit Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encrypted via
DEPubKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Encrypt dump files
Dump Encryption
Public Key
(DEPubKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
Not Applicable Encapsulate DEKey
Tape Drive Private
Key (TDPrivKey)
RSA 2048-bit
private key
Generated externally;
Input via TLS_ECK
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM
and EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Switch Approved
Mode
Authenticate the
module to OKM cluster
appliance during TLS
session
Tape Drive Public
Key (TDPubKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Input via TLS_ECK
Output encrypted via
DEKey; Output in
plaintext
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
“Reset” service;
Switch Approved
Mode
Authenticate the
module to OKM cluster
appliance during TLS
session
49
RAM – Random Access Memory
50
FPGA – Field Programmable Gate Array
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
TLS_PM 48 bytes random
data
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encapsulated
via CA_Cert
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Premaster secret for
TLS 1.0/1.1 session
TLS_MS 48 bytes pseudo-
random data
Generated internally
via TLS 1.0/1.1
PRF51
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Master secret for TLS
1.0/1.1 session
TLS_EMK HMAC SHA-1 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via TLS 1.0/1.1 PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Authentication key for
data leaving the module
(per TLS 1.0/1.1)
TLS_DMK HMAC SHA-1 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via TLS 1.0/1.1 PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Authentication key for
data entering the
module (per TLS
1.0/1.1)
TLS_ECK AES CBC 256-bit Generated internally
via TLS 1.0/1.1 PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Encryption key for data
leaving the module (per
TLS 1.0/1.1)
TLS_DCK AES CBC 256-bit Generated internally
via TLS 1.0/1.1 PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Decryption key for data
entering the module
(per TLS 1.0/1.1)
SSH_HOST_PRIV RSA 2048-bit
Private Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Private Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encrypted
via DEKey
Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
51
PRF (Pseudo Random Function) is based on a hash on the TLS_PM and nonces; Utilizes SHA-1 and MD5 (Message Digest 5)
Page 35 of 51
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SSH_HOST_PUB RSA 2048-bit Public
Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Public Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output plaintext Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
SSH_SK AES CTR 128-bit
AES CBC 128-bit
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_SA HMAC SHA-1 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session integrity
Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_KEX_PRI ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Private Key (per SSH
2.0)
SSH_KEX_PUB ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Public Key (per SSH
2.0)
CA_Cert RSA 2048-bit public
Key
Generated externally.
Input in plaintext via
CA52
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
“Reset” service;
Switch Approved
Mode
Authenticate the OKM
cluster appliance to the
module during TLS
session
Key Wrap Key
Public Key
(KWKPublicKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Input encrypted via
TLS_ECK
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
“Reset” service;
Switch Approved
Mode
Wrap AKWK to be
sent to OKM cluster
52
CA – Certificate Authority
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Firmware Signature
Public Key
(FSPubKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Does not exit the
module
Plaintext in
EEPROM
Not Applicable Validate a new
firmware image loaded
onto module
Firmware Signature
Root Certificate Key
(FSRootCert)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
Not Applicable Verify the chain of
certificates provided by
the new firmware
image
DRBG Seed Random bit value Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Generate random
values for the
CTR_DRBG
DRBG ‘V’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
2.7.5 Encryption Disabled Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The cryptographic keys, key components, and other CSPs used by the module while operating in the Encryption
Disabled Approved Mode are shown in Table 10.
Table 10 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs (Encryption Disabled Mode)
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Firmware Signature
Public Key
(FSPubKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Does not exit the
module
Plaintext in
EEPROM
Not Applicable Validate a new
firmware image loaded
onto module
Firmware Signature
Root Certificate Key
(FSRootCert)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
Not Applicable Verify the chain of
certificates provided by
the new firmware
image
SSH_HOST_PRIV RSA 2048-bit
Private Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Private Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
SSH_HOST_PUB RSA 2048-bit Public
Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Public Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output plaintext Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
SSH_SK AES CTR 128-bit
AES CBC 128-bit
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_SA HMAC SHA-1 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session Integrity
Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_KEX_PRI ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Private Key (per SSH
2.0)
SSH_KEX_PUB ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Public Key (per SSH
2.0)
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DRBG Seed Random bit value Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Generate random
values for the
CTR_DRBG
DRBG ‘V’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
2.7.6 Mixed Mode Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The cryptographic keys, key components, and other CSPs used by the module while operating in the Mixed Mode are
shown in Table 11.
Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs ( Mixed Mode)
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Firmware Signature
Public Key
(FSPubKey)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Does not exit the
module
Plaintext in
EEPROM
Not Applicable Validate a new
firmware image loaded
onto module
Firmware Signature
Root Certificate Key
(FSRootCert)
RSA 2048-bit public
key
Generated externally;
Hardcoded into
module
Output encrypted via
SSH_SK
Plaintext in
EEPROM and RAM
Not Applicable Verify the chain of
certificates provided by
the new firmware
image
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SSH_HOST_PRIV RSA 2048-bit
Private Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Private Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
SSH_HOST_PUB RSA 2048-bit Public
Key
ECDSA P256 Curve
Public Key
Generated internally
via Approved DRBG
Output plaintext Plaintext in
EEPROM
“Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Authentication
SSH_SK AES CTR 128-bit
AES CBC 128-bit
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_SA HMAC SHA-1 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via SSH PRF
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Session Integrity
Keys
(per SSH 2.0)
SSH_KEX_PRI ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Private Key (per SSH
2.0)
SSH_KEX_PUB ECDH P-256 Curve
(128-bits) or FFC
DH Group 14 (112-
bits)
Generated internally
via ECDH or FFC
DH
Output encrypted
via SSH_SK
Plaintext in RAM Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
SSH Key Exchange
Public Key (per SSH
2.0)
DRBG Seed Random bit value Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Generate random
values for the
CTR_DRBG
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DRBG ‘V’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Internal DRBG state
value (integer)
Generated internally Output encrypted via
DEKey
Plaintext in RAM “Reset” service;
Power cycle;
Switch Approved
Mode
Internal state value for
the CTR_DRBG
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2.8 EMI/EMC
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements
specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional
Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.9 Self-Tests
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive performs the required Integrity Test and
Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs) during initial power-up. On-demand self-tests can
be performed by the “IPL” service available to the CO or by cycling the power of
the module. The module executes conditional self-tests during normal operation
whenever a new random number is generated, asymmetric key pairs are
generated, or whenever new firmware is loaded. The following sections describe
the power-up and conditional self-tests that are run by the module in each
Approved mode. All test run without requiring operator intervention.
2.9.1 Integrity Tests
An integrity test is the first operation performed by the StorageTek T10000D
Tape Drive after power has been supplied. The module performs a 32-bit CRC53
on the firmware and hardware/FPGA images as its approved integrity technique.
Data output is not available while the integrity test is being performed. If the test
passes, the module will continue on to perform the required Known Answer Tests
(KATs) on its cryptographic algorithms. If the firmware integrity test fails, the
module will remain in its initial boot state and create an unencrypted dump file54
.
The CO will be required to reboot the module in order to resolve the error.
2.9.2 Power-On Self-Tests
POSTs are performed by the ETD when power is applied to the module and after
the integrity test has passed. Data output is not available while the POSTs are
being performed. After the POSTs successfully complete, the module will begin
normal operation. Normal operation may be in one of the Approve modes or in
the Mixed mode. The operational status of the module is determined when the
module first boots. If any of the POSTs fail, then the ETD will create an
unencrypted dump file and then continue to reboot. Otherwise, the module
indicates that all self-tests have passed by moving to a normal operational state.
The following POSTs are performed by the module during every boot-up,
regardless of current operational mode:
53
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
54
When operating in the Permanent Encryption or Encryption Enabled Modes, unencrypted data dumps shall be deleted by the
CO after their creation
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 AES ECB Encrypt KAT (OKM agent and firmware)
 AES ECB Decrypt KAT (OKM agent and firmware)
 AES CBC Encrypt KAT (firmware and TLS implementation)
 AES CBC Decrypt KAT (firmware and TLS implementation)
 AES CCM Encrypt KAT (firmware)
 AES CCM Decrypt KAT (firmware)
 AES CCM Encrypt KAT (hardware)
 AES CCM Decrypt KAT (hardware)
 AES Key Wrap KAT (OKM agent)
 RSA Sign/Verify KAT (firmware)
 ECDSA Sign/Verify (firmware)
 SHA-1 KAT (firmware and TLS implementation)
 HMAC SHA-1 KAT (firmware, OKM agent and TLS implementation)
 SHA-256 KAT (firmware)
 SP 800-90A CTR DRBG KAT (firmware)
 ECDH KAT (firmware)
 TLS KDF KAT (TLS implementation)
2.9.3 Conditional Self-Tests
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive performs a Continuous Random Number
Generator Test (CRNGT) on the output from the DRBG each time a new random
number is generated. In addition, a CRNGT is performed on the output from the
NDRNG prior to being used as entropy input for the DRBG. If any of the
CRNGTs fail, the module will generate a dump file. If the dump file is to be
encrypted, the module will attempt to perform the CRNGT a second time. If the
CRNGT passes on the second attempt, the ETD will encrypt the dump file and
then reboot. If the CRNGT fails on the second attempt, the dump file is discarded
and the module will then reboot.
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive performs a Pairwise Consistency Test on
each Asymetric key pair (RSA and Elliptic Curve) generated in support of
establishing a SSH session.
In each mode, a firmware load test is performed on new firmware being loaded
onto the module. Firmware can be loaded onto the module via the Host Interface,
the Tape Head interface, or via the Ethernet Interface. The ETD uses a 2048-bit
RSA digital signature verification to confirm the integrity of the firmware prior to
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being loaded onto the module. This test is applied to all loaded firmware
including the FPGA firmware components. If the test passes, the module will
store the new firmware image in EEPROM. A reboot of the module is required to
switch to the new firmware. If the test fails, the new firmware image will be
discarded and the module will resume normal operation.
2.9.4 Critical Functions Tests
When operating in the Permanent Encryption and Encryption Enabled Approved
Modes, critical function self-tests are required by the module when operating the
SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. Critical functions tests are crucial for the proper and
secure operation of the DRBG. These tests will ensure the DRBG always
produces random information.
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive performs the following critical function
self-tests:
 SP 800-90A DRBG Instantiate Test
 SP 800-90A DRBG Generate Test
 SP 800-90A DRBG Reseed Test
 SP 800-90A DRBG Uninstantiate
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks
beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for this validation.
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3 SECURE OPERATION
The Oracle StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive meets Level 1 requirements for
FIPS 140-2. This section provides Cryptographic Officer guidance for the proper
use and maintenance of the module. Instructions for placing the module into one
of the Approved modes are also provided. Operators of the ETD should read and
be familiar with the following Oracle documents prior to configuring and
operating the module:
 StorageTek T10000 Tape Drive Operator’s Guide (Part#: E20714-08;
June 2014)
 Oracle Virtual Operator Pane 2.2: User’s Guide (Part #: E55615-01;
August 2014)
 Oracle Key Manager: Administration Guide (Part #: E41579-05;
September 2015)
Prior to setting up the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive for first use, the CO shall
use the instructions provided in these guides to install the latest versions of Oracle
Key Manager and the Virtual Operator Panel onto a trusted system. These
external software components are required for setting up the ETD for normal
operation.
3.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance (First Use)
This section provides instructions on how to place the StorageTek T10000D Tape
Drive into each of the FIPS-Approved modes after first receiving the drive from
Oracle Corporation. For first-time use, these operations shall be performed with
an Oracle Service Representative present.
3.1.1 Initial Set-Up
Prior to placing the module into one of the Approved modes, the CO shall
perform the following steps:
1. Install the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive following the instruction
provided in StorageTek T10000 Tape Drive Installation Manual
2. Examine the hardware part number on the rear label. Confirm it matches the
hardware version number on this Security Policy (Hardware Part #:
7042136/7314405)
3. Verify the VOP version is version 2.2 or higher.
4. Using VOP, the CO shall check the Version Tab (Retrieve View Drive
Data) to confirm the current firmware version number matches the firmware
version number listed on this Security Policy (Firmware Version: RB411111)
5. Using VOP, the CO shall check the Version Tab (Retrieve View Drive
Data) to confirm the version of the FPGAs
a. CO Hardware Revision: 0000xxxxxxD7
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b. RO Hardware Revision: xxxx9500
c. DC Hardware Revision: xx050383
d. PRML Hardware Revision: 00004502
6. Enable SSH and SFTP services and disable Peek and Poke services
a. Set the drive to an “offline” state
(Drive Operations  Set Offline)
b. Using VOP, navigate to the “Network” tab in the “Drive Data”
window (Configure  Drive Data)
c. Set “Telnet Enabled” and “FTP Enabled” to “No”
d. Set “SSH & SFTP Enabled” to “Yes”
e. Set “SSH FIPS Mode” to “Yes”
f. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
3.1.2 Encryption Disabled Approved Mode Set-Up
The StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive is initially delivered to an Oracle customer
with the Encryption Disabled Mode configured. Upon first receiving the ETD,
the CO shall perform the following steps to ensure the module is operating in the
Encryption Disabled Mode:
1. Follow the steps outlined in Section 3.1.1 (Initial Set-Up)
2. Set the drive to an “offline” state (Drive Operations  Set Offline)
3. Using VOP, navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “View Drive Data” window
(Retrieve  View Drive Data)
4. Verify that the “Use OKM or DPKM” Field is set to “UNKN” and the
“Permanently encrypting” Field is set to “UNKN”. If these fields are not set to
these values then follow the steps in 3.2.3 to place the module in the
Encryption Disabled Approved Mode.
3.1.3 Encryption Enabled Approved Mode Set-Up
To place the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive into the Encryption Enabled Mode,
the CO shall perform the following steps:
1. Follow the steps outlined in Section 3.1.1 (Initial Set-Up)
2. Using OKM, the CO shall add the ETD to the OKM cluster
3. Set the drive to an “offline” state (Drive Operations  Set Offline)
4. Using VOP, navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window
(Configure  Drive Data)
5. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” Field to “OKM”
6. Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “No”
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7. Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and OKM IP Address
8. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Encryption Enabled
Approved Mode.
3.1.4 Permanent Encryption Approved Mode Set-Up
To place the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive into the Permanent Encryption
Mode, the CO shall perform the following steps:
1. Follow the steps outlined in Section 3.1.1 (Initial Set-Up)
2. Using OKM, the CO shall add the ETD to the OKM cluster
3. Set the drive to an “offline” state (Drive Operations  Set Offline)
4. Using VOP, navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window
(Configure  Drive Data)
5. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” Field to “OKM”
6. Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “Yes”
7. Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and OKM IP Address
8. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Permanent
Encryption Approved Mode. Once operating in this mode, the module will be
unable to operate in any other Approved or Mixed modes.
3.1.5 Mixed Mode Set-Up
The CO can place the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive into the Mixed Mode
after initially receiving the ETD. The CO shall perform the following steps:
1. Follow the steps outlined in Section 3.1.1 (Initial Set-Up)
2. Set the drive to an “offline” state (Drive Operations  Set Offline)
3. Using VOP, navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window
(Configure  Drive Data)
4. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” field to “DPKM”
5. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Mixed Mode.
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3.2 Cryptographic Officer Guidance (Normal Operation)
This section assumes the StorageTek T10000D Tape Drive has been placed into
one of the FIPS-Approved modes or the Mixed Mode. Instructions on how to
place the drive into another mode are provided in this section. The CO is
responsible for placing the ETD into one of the Approved modes of operation.
An Oracle Service Representative is not required to be present when switching
Approved modes. Switching between modes will cause keys to be zeroized.
3.2.1 Using SSH (all modes)
The module supports SSH communications for remote administration. SSH is
available in each mode of operation. When using SSH for remote administration,
only the following options may be used from an SSH client to establish a FIPS-
approved session:
1. Protocol Version: SSH v2.0
2. Encryption: AES 128-bit CTR or AES 128-bit CBC
3. MAC: HMAC-SHA-1
4. KEX: ecdh-sha2-nistp256 or diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
5. Host Key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ssh-rsa
Using the preceding options will allow a FIPS-approved SSH session to be
established.
3.2.2 Memory Dump Offload (all modes)
Memory dumps may only be offloaded using SFTP (SSH). All other forms of
offload are prohibited.
3.2.3 Switching To Encryption Disabled Approved Mode
The CO can place the module into the Encryption Disabled Mode from the
Encryption Enabled Mode or the Mixed Mode. The CO shall perform the
following steps to place the module into the Encryption Disabled Mode:
1. Using the “Drive Operations” menu on VOP, reset the ETD55
2. After reboot, use the “Drive Operations” menu to place the drive offline
3. Navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window (Configure 
Drive Data)
4. Set the “Turn encryption off” field to “Yes”
5. Press the “Commit” button
55
Step 1 is not required if the drive is currently operating in the Mixed Mode
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After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Encryption Disabled
Approved Mode.
3.2.4 Switching To Encryption Enabled Approved Mode
The CO can place the module into the Encryption Enabled Mode from the
Encryption Disabled Mode. The CO shall perform the following steps to place
the module into the Encryption Enabled Mode:
1. Using the “Drive Operations” menu on VOP, place the drive offline
2. Navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window (Configure 
Drive Data)
3. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” field to “OKM”
4. Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “No”
5. Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and OKM IP Address
6. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Encryption Enabled
Approved Mode.
3.2.5 Switching To Permanent Encryption Approved Mode
The CO can place the module into the Permanent Encryption Mode from the
Encryption Disabled Mode or the Encryption Enabled Mode. The CO shall
perform the following steps to place the module into the Permanent Encryption
Mode:
1. Using the “Drive Operations” menu on VOP, reset the ETD56
2. Using “Drive Operations” menu on VOP, place the drive offline
3. Navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window (Configure 
Drive Data)
4. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” field to “OKM”
5. Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “Yes”
6. Enter a valid Agent ID, Pass Phrase, and OKM IP Address
7. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Permanent
Encryption Approved Mode. Once operating in this mode, the module will be
unable to operate in any of the other .
56
This step is not needed if the drive is currently operating in the Encryption Disabled Mode
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3.2.6 Switching To Mixed Mode
The CO can place the module into the Mixed Mode from the Encryption Disabled
Mode. The CO shall perform the following steps to place the module into the
Mixed Mode:
1. Use the “Drive Operations” menu to place the drive offline
2. Navigate to the “Encrypt” tab in the “Drive Data” window (Configure 
Drive Data)
3. Set the “Use OKM or DPKM” field to “DPKM”
4. Set the “Permanently encrypting” field to “UNKN”
5. Press the “Commit” button
After pressing the “Commit” button, the ETD will reboot to normal operation.
From this point forward, the module will be operating in the Mixed Mode of
Operation.
While in Mixed mode, the CO has available several FIPS-Approved services,
including,
1. Firmware Load
2. Remote Management via SSH
Selecting Data Path Key Management (DPKM) to initialize Mixed Mode
establishes keys that are established via non-FIPS Approved methods. This
provides no cryptographic security for the data that is transformed with the keys.
All tape data is considered plaintext in Mixed Mode of operation.
3.3 Zeroization
Zeroization of the module’s Critical Security Parameters shall be done under
direct control of the Cryptographic Officer. Zeroization can be accomplished by
the CO performing the Reset service.
The CO shall perform the following steps to zeroize the ETD:
1. Using the “Drive Operations” menu on VOP, reset the ETD (this step is not
required if the drive is operating in the Mixed Mode or the Encryption
Disabled Approved Mode). The drive will reboot.
2. Using an SSH Client program such as PuTTY or OpenSSH, connect to the
ETD using the “cust” account and issue the command “ecpt sshreset”. The
drive will reboot.
3. Using the “Retrieve” menu in VOP, select “Delete Dumps”.
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright notice.
4 ACRONYMS
Acronyms used within this document are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AKWK AES Key Wrap Key
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CTR Counter
DPKM Data Path Key Management
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only
Memory
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ETD Encrypting Tape Drive
FC-SB-3 Fibre Channel Single-Byte-3
FCP-3 Fibre Channel Protocol-3
FICON Fibre Connection
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash-based Message Authentication Code
Hz Hertz
IP Internet Protocol
IPL Initial Program Load
KAT Known Answer Test
KMA Key Management Appliance
KMS Key Management System
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
MB Megabytes
MD5 Message Digest Algorithm 5
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OKM Oracle Key Manager
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
POST Power-On Self-Test
PRF Pseudo-Random Function
RAM Random Access Memory
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RJ Registered Jack
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright notice.
RS Recommended Standard
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
sec Second
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SP Special Publication
SSC-3 SCSI Stream Commands-3
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTI Tape Transport Interface
UNKN Unknown
VAC Volts Alternating Current
VOP Virtual Operator Panel