Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 1 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Juniper Networks, Inc.
Juniper Networks NFX150 and NFX250 Network Services Platform
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 2 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 9
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Modes of Operation.........................................................................................................10
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................14
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................19
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................21
2.12 Additional Information....................................................................................................21
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................21
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................21
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................22
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................22
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................24
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................25
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................43
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................43
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................44
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................44
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................44
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................44
5.3 Additional Information......................................................................................................44
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................44
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................44
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................45
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................45
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7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................45
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................45
8.1 Mitigation Techniques......................................................................................................45
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................45
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................45
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................45
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................46
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................47
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................56
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................56
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................56
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................56
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................62
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................65
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................66
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................66
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................66
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................68
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................68
11.4 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................68
11.5 End of Life .....................................................................................................................68
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................68
12.1 Attack List......................................................................................................................68
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 4 of 68 Document Version 1.0
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 9
Table 3: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................13
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................13
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................14
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................14
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................19
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................19
Table 10: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................20
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................22
Table 12: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................24
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................25
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................42
Table 15: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................43
Table 16: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................45
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................46
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................47
Table 19: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................52
Table 20: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................55
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................56
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................62
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................62
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................65
Table 25: Error States...............................................................................................................65
List of Figures
Figure 1: Front Panel of the NFX150-S1/S1E.......................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Rear Panel of the NFX150-S1/S1E........................................................................... 7
Figure 3: Front Panel of the NFX250-S1/S1E/S2 .................................................................... 7
Figure 4: Rear Panel of the NFX250-S1/S1E/S2 ..................................................................... 7
Figure 5: Block Diagram.......................................................................................................... 8
1 General
1.1 Overview
Introduction
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a
Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation
Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-3 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 5 of 68 Document Version 1.0
to perform FIPS 140-3 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation.
Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3
criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks NFX150
and NFX250 Network Services Platform provides an overview of the product and a high-level
description of how it meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of 140-3.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress
in methodology, design, and manufacturing. Juniper Networks shall have no liability for any
error or damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for the Juniper Networks
NFX150 and NFX250 Network Services Platform (also referred to as the “module” hereafter)
with firmware version Junos OS 23.4R1.10. The module has a multi-chip standalone
embodiment. It contains specification of the security rules, under which the cryptographic
module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3
standard.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 6 of 68 Document Version 1.0
1.3 Additional Information
The module claims an overall Security Level of 1 with all individual sections at a Security Level
1 with the exceptions of Roles, Services and Authentication (claimed at Security Level 3). The
module does not implement any non-invasive security mitigations or mitigations of other attacks
and thus the requirements per these sections are inapplicable.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The cryptographic module provides for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the
management station and the module. The cryptographic module also provides for an encrypted
connection, using IPSec protocol, between the module and other IPSec peers.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic module’s operational environment is a limited operational environment. The
cryptographic boundary of the hardware module is the entirety of the module/chassis. This
includes the Routing Engine (RE). No components have been excluded from the cryptographic
boundary of the module.
Figure 1: Front Panel of the NFX150-S1/S1E
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Figure 2: Rear Panel of the NFX150-S1/S1E
Figure 3: Front Panel of the NFX250-S1/S1E/S2
Figure 4: Rear Panel of the NFX250-S1/S1E/S2
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Figure 5: Block Diagram
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
NFX150-
S1
NFX150-
S1
Junos OS
23.4R1.10
Intel Atom
C3758
(Denverton-
NS)
4 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 LAN
ports; 2 x 1GbE/10GbE SFP+ WAN
ports; 1 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
management port
NFX150-
S1E
NFX150-
S1E
Junos OS
23.4R1.10
Intel Atom
C3758
(Denverton-
NS)
4 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 LAN
ports; 2 x 1GbE/10GbE SFP+ WAN
ports; 1 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
management port
NFX250-
S1
NFX250-
S1
Junos OS
23.4R1.10
Intel Xeon D-
1528
(Broadwell-
DE)
8 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 LAN
ports; 2 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
LAN/WAN ports; 2 x 100/1000BASE-X
small form-factor pluggable transceiver
(SFP) WAN ports; 2 x 1GbE/10GbE
SFP+ WAN ports; 1 x
10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
management port ADSL2/VDSL2 SFP
(pluggable into any SFP port)
NFX250-
S1E
NFX250-
S1E
Junos OS
23.4R1.10
Intel Xeon D-
1528
(Broadwell-
DE)
8 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 LAN
ports; 2 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
LAN/WAN ports; 2 x 100/1000BASE-X
small form-factor pluggable transceiver
(SFP) WAN ports; 2 x 1GbE/10GbE
SFP+ WAN ports; 1 x
10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
management port ADSL2/VDSL2 SFP
(pluggable into any SFP port)
NFX250-
S2-10T
NFX250-
S2-10T
Junos OS
23.4R1.10
Intel Xeon D-
1528
(Broadwell-
DE)
8 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45 LAN
ports; 2 x 10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
LAN/WAN ports; 2 x 100/1000BASE-X
SFP WAN ports; 2 x 1GbE/10GbE
SFP+ WAN ports; 1 x
10/100/1000BASE-T RJ-45
management port; ADSL2/VDSL2 SFP
(pluggable into any SFP port)
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
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No components have been excluded from the cryptographic boundary of the module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
* The operator can verify that the cryptographic
module is in the Approved mode by observing
the console prompt and running the "show
version" command; * When operating in the
Approved mode, the prompt will read
"<operator>:fips>" (e.g. root:fips>); * The "show
version" command will allow the Crypto Officer
to verify that the validated firmware version is
running on the module; * The Crypto Officer can
also use the "show system fips chassis level"
command (returns "level 1") to determine if the
module is operating in the Approved mode; *
The Approved mode is entered when the
module is configured for it and successfully
passes all self-tests (both pre-operational and
conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests
(CASTs))
Approved global indicator
(string 'fips'
included in the
command
prompt)
Non-
Approved
mode
* The cryptographic module supports a non-
Approved mode of operation; * When operated
in the non-Approved mode of operation, the
module supports non-Approved algorithms as
well as the algorithms supported in the
Approved mode of operation
Non-
Approved
global indicator
(implicit indicator
based on
exclusion of string
'fips' from the
command
prompt)
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The hardware versions contained in Table 2, with Junos OS 23.4R1.10 installed, contain one
Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Junos OS 23.4R1.10
firmware image must be installed on the module. When operated in the non-Approved mode of
operation, the module supports non-Approved algorithms as well as the algorithms supported in
the Approved mode of operation.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module is in the non-approved mode upon installation of the module firmware, and the
Crypto Officer can place the module into the Approved mode of operation by following the
instructions/commands provided below:
[edit]
root# request system zeroise
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[edit]
root# set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
root# show system fips chassis level
level 1;
To switch from the Approved mode of operation back to the non-Approved mode of operation
the module has to be zeroised again using the following command:
[edit]
root# request system zeroize
Degraded Mode Description:
The module does not support a degraded mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5151 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A5152 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A5151 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC DRBG A5149 Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A5151 Key Length - Key Length: 160 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5149 Key Length - Key Length: 160, 256 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5151 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5152 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A5151 Key Length - Key Length: 512 FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A5151 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A5151 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FC,
MODP-2048
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1 (CVL) A5152 Authentication Method - Digital Signature,
Pre-shared Key
Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key
Length: 8-256 Increment 8
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 256, 384,
2048
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2 (CVL) A5152 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 256, 384,
2048
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived
Keying Material Length: 1136-2432 Increment
8
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A5151 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5151 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A5151 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A5151 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A5151 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5149 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5151 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-256 A5152 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A5149 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A5150 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A5151 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
The following protocols are supported by the module in the Approved mode:
SSHv2 (EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-521; Diffie-Hellman MODP2048; RSA 2048, 3072,
4096 bits; ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521; AES CBC 128, 192, 256 bits; AES CTR 128, 192, 256
bits, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512)
IPsec (IPsec Key Agreement (IKE); KDF IKEv1, IKEv2 128, 192 and 256 bits)
The SSH protocol allows independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and
integrity algorithms. Please note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that
have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any approved service of the module. Only the
algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in the table above are used
by an approved service of the module.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG -
Section
4
Key
Type:Symmetric
and Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP800-133r2 Section 4: Symmetric
key generation and Asymmetric seed
generation using an unmodified output from
an Approved DRBG (example 1); The
module supports the following per NIST SP
800-133r2: 1. Section 5.1: Key Pairs for
Digital Signature Schemes 2. Section 5.2:
Key Pairs for Key Establishment 3. Section
6.2.1: Derivation of symmetric keys
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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The module does not support any non-Approved algorithms in the Approved mode, i.e., it does
not support Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
SHA2-256 (Junos
23.4R1.10 - LibMD
Implementation)
no
security
claimed
Used to store operator passwords in hashed form,
per IG 2.4.A: Use of a non-approved cryptographic
algorithm to "obfuscate" a CSP
SHA-1 (Junos 23.4R1.10
- Kernel Implementation)
no
security
claimed
Used for an extraneous check in the Kernel, per IG
2.4.A: Use of an approved, non-approved or
proprietary algorithm for a purpose that is not
security relevant
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and
Function
RSA with key size less than 2048 SSH
ECDSA with ed25519 curve SSH
EC Diffie-Hellman with ed25519 curve SSH
ARCFOUR SSH
Blowfish SSH
CAST SSH
DSA (SignGen, SigVer, non-compliant) SSH
HMAC-MD5 SSH
HMAC-RIPEMD160 SSH
UMAC SSH
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
In addition to the above non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation, all Approved algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation are also
supported in the non-Approved mode.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS1 KAS-Full Key Agreement
for SSHv2
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
confirmation:no
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
KDF SSH:
(A5151)
KAS2 KAS-Full Key Agreement
for SSHv2
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112
bits of security
strength
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
KDF SSH:
(A5151)
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A5151)
Safe Primes Key
Verification:
(A5151)
KTS1 KTS-Wrap Key Transport
for SSHv2
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:approved
method from IG
D.G
Key
confirmation:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A5151)
AES-CTR:
(A5151)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A5151)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5151)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A5151)
SHA-1: (A5151)
SHA2-256:
(A5151)
SHA2-512:
(A5151)
ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA
Signature
Verification used
for firmware
integrity
FIPS 186-5:size:
P-256,
encryption
strength: 128
bits
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
ECDSA SigVer2 DigSig-SigVer ECDSA
Signature
Verification used
for identity-
based public key
authentication
FIPS 186-5:size:
P-256, P-384, P-
521 curves, 128,
192 and 256 bits
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
DRBG DRBG Kernel DRBG
providing
random bits for
SSP generation
in the
user/application
space
HMAC DRBG:
(A5149)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5149)
SHA2-256:
(A5149)
Entropy Source ENT-Cond Non-Physical
Entropy Source
SHA2-512:
(A5149)
ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Generation of
SSH host keys
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
ECDSA
KeyGen2
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
SSP Agreement
in the context of
SSH
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
ECDSA KeyVer AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Verification of
keys generated
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
ECDSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
using ECDSA in
the context of
SSH
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
RSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Generation of
SSH host keys
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
RSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen Signature
Generation
using RSA in the
context of SSH
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
RSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature
Verification
using RSA for
public key
authentication
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
Password Hash SHA Used to store
passwords in
hashed form
SHA2-512:
(A5150)
KTS2 KTS-Wrap Key Transport
for IPsec
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:approved
method from IG
D.G
Key
confirmation:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A5152)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5152)
SHA2-256:
(A5152)
KAS3 KAS-135KDF
KAS-SSC
Key Agreement
in the context of
IPsec
IG :IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112
bits of security
strength
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
KDF IKEv1:
(A5152)
KDF IKEv2:
(A5152)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A5151)
Safe Primes Key
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 18 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Verification:
(A5151)
CASTs on boot BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
DRBG
ENT-Cond
KAS-135KDF
KBKDF
MAC
SHA
List of
algorithms for
which Known
Answer Tests
(CASTs) have
been
implemented in
the module and
perform on each
boot
AES-CBC:
(A5151, A5152)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A5151)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5151,
A5149, A5152)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A5151)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
HMAC DRBG:
(A5149)
KDF IKEv1:
(A5152)
KDF IKEv2:
(A5152)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5151)
KAS4 KAS-135KDF
KAS-Full
KAS-SSC
Key Agreement
in the context of
IPsec
IG :IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5151)
KDF IKEv1:
(A5152)
KDF IKEv2:
(A5152)
CKG - Section 4
: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 19 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
and 256 bits of
security strength
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
IG C.F
The module only supports testable RSA moduli/key sizes (2048, 3072 and 4096 bits) and thus
the requirements per FIPS 140-3 IG C.F do not apply.
IG C.H
• The GCM IV is constructed in the context of the IETF IPsec protocol and used within the
context of the protocol per the module design. Scenario 1. b. per FIPS 140-3 IG C.H
applies to the module.
• The module complies with RFG 5282. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to
establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are
derived.
• The method ii) has been used i.e. the IPSec implementation has been tested with an
independently developed instance of the protocol and verification has been performed
that the session was successfully established.
• The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs
outside the module’s cryptographic boundary.
• The application negotiates the protocol session keys and the value in the first 32 bits of
the nonce. The construction of the last 64 bits of the “nonce” (the IV in RFC 5282) is
deterministic (i.e. a counter is used).
• The implementation of the management logic for the last 64 bits of the “nonce” (the IV in
RFC 5282) inside the module ensures that when the IV in RFC 5282 exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given security association, either party to the
security association that encounters this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to
establish a new encryption key for the security association in accordance with RFC
7296. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key is established for
use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E215 Juniper Networks
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 20 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Junos OS
Non-Physical
Entropy
Source
Non-
Physical
Intel Atom C3758
(Denverton-NS), Intel
Xeon D-1528
(Broadwell-DE)
512 bits 448 bits SHA2-512
(CAVP Cert.
#A5149)
Table 10: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG and supports the following sections per
NIST SP 800-133r2 (CKG): Sections 4, 5.1, 5.2 and 6.2.1.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements full KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC per NIST SP 800-56Ar3 and
KDF SSH/IKEv1/IKEv2 per NIST SP 800-135r1; IG D.F Scenario 2 (path 2 option 2, separate
testing of the SSC and SP800-135r1 KDF). The KAS1, KAS2, KAS3 and KAS4 in the Security
Functions Implementations Table 9 have been documented in accordance with this
requirement:
KAS1: KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A5151 and CVL Cert. #A5151; SSP establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
KAS2: KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A5151 and CVL Cert. #A5151; SSP establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
KAS3: KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A5151 and CVL Cert. #A5152; SSP establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
KAS4: KAS (KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A5151 and CVL Cert. #A5152; SSP establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
The Approved Algorithm list includes the tested components (KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC,
KDF SSH, KDF IKEv1 and KDF IKEv2) as individual entries.
Per IG D.G:
The module supports the IETF SSH and IPsec protocols and thus implements key transport in
the context of the protocols (per the KTS1 and KTS2 entries in the Security Functions
Implementations Table 9).
The module implements the approved KTS using approved AES modes:
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 21 of 68 Document Version 1.0
o KTS1: KTS (AES Cert. #A5151 and HMAC Cert. #A5151; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength corresponding to the key lengths
between 128 to 256 bits), used in the context of the IETF SSH protocol.
o KTS2: KTS (AES Cert. #A5152 and HMAC Cert. #A5152; SSP establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength corresponding to the key lengths
between 128 to 256 bits), used in the context of the IETF IKEv1/IKEv2 protocol
2.11 Industry Protocols
No parts of the SSH and IPsec protocols, other than the KDF SSH, IKEv1 KDF and IKEv2 KDF,
have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
2.12 Additional Information
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term shall in this context
specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all
other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access
to any cryptographic services.
3. Self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during SSP generation, self-test execution, zeroisation, and error
states.
5. Status information does not contain SSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which SSPs are zeroised by the zeroisation service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not output intermediate key values.
9. The module does not output plaintext CSPs.
10. The Crypto officer shall verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a
FIPS 140-3 validated image. If any non-validated firmware image is loaded the module
will no longer be a validated module.
11. The Crypto Officer shall retain control of the module while zeroisation is in process.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Ethernet Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
RJ-45 Management, RJ-45 LAN/WAN Communications, 1-
Gigabit SFP network/uplink ports, 1/10-Gigabit SFP+ uplink
ports
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 22 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Status
Output
Serial Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Console Serial Port
USB Data Input
Control
Input
USB port
Mini-USB Data Input
Control
Input
mini USB port
System Status
LEDs
Status
Output
Status indicator lighting
Power Power Power connector
Reset Button
(NFX150)
Control
Input
Reset
Mode Button
(NFX250)
Control
Input
To toggle the Status LED to show the different port
parameters (speed, duplex mode, or administrative status)
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not support control output.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Username
and
password
over the
console and
SSH
* The module enforces 10-
character passwords (at
minimum) chosen from the 96
human readable ASCII
characters; The maximum
password length is 20-
characters; Thus, the probability
of a successful random attempt is
1/(96^10), which is less than
1/1,000,000 (million); * The
module enforces a timed access
SHA2-512
(A5150)
1/(96^10) 9/(96^10)
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 23 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
mechanism as follows: For the
first two failed attempts
(assuming 0 time to process), no
timed access is enforced; Upon
the third attempt, the module
enforces a 5-second delay; Each
failed attempt thereafter results in
an additional 5-second delay
above the previous (e.g., 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay,
5th failed attempt = 15-second
delay, 6th failed attempt = 20-
second delay, 7th failed attempt
= 25-second delay); This leads to
a maximum of 7 possible
attempts in a one-minute period
for each getty; The best
approach for the attacker would
be to disconnect after 4 failed
attempts and wait for a new getty
to be spawned; This would allow
the attacker to perform roughly
9.6 attempts per minute (576
attempts per hour/60 mins); this
would be rounded down to 9 per
minute, because there is no such
thing as 0.6 attempts; The
probability of a success with
multiple consecutive attempts in
a one-minute period is 9/(96^10),
which is less than 1/100,000
Username
and ECDSA
public key
over SSH
* The module supports ECDSA
(P-256, P-384, and P-521), which
has a minimum equivalent
computational resistance to
attack of either 2^128, 2^192 or
2^256 depending on the curve;
Thus, the probability of a
successful random attempt is
1/(2^128), which is less than
1/1,000,000 (million) *
Configurable SSH connection
establishment rate limits the
number of connection attempts,
and thus failed authentication
attempts in a one-minute period
to a maximum of 15,000
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
1/(2^128) 15,000/(2^128)
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 24 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
attempts; The probability of a
success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-
minute period is 15,000/(2^128),
which is less than 1/100,000
Username
and RSA
public key
over SSH
* The module supports RSA
(2048, 3072, 4096 bits), which
has a minimum equivalent
computational resistance to
attack of 2^112 (2048 bits); Thus,
the probability of a successful
random attempt is 1/ (2^112),
which is less than 1/1,000,000
(million) * Configurable SSH
connection establishment rate
limits the number of connection
attempts, and thus failed
authentication attempts in a one-
minute period to a maximum of
15,000 attempts; The probability
of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-
minute period is 15,000/(2^112),
which is less than 1/100,000
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
1/
(2^112)
15,000/(2^112)
Table 12: Authentication Methods
The module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication. The
module implements two forms of identity-based authentication, username, and password over
the console and SSH connections, as well as username and an ECDSA or RSA public key-
based authentication over SSHv2.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Super-user Identity Crypto Officer
(CO)
Username and password
over the console and SSH
Username and ECDSA
public key over SSH
Username and RSA
public key over SSH
Operator Identity User Username and password
over the console and SSH
Username and ECDSA
public key over SSH
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 25 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Username and RSA
public key over SSH
Read-only Identity User Username and password
over the console and SSH
Username and ECDSA
public key over SSH
Username and RSA
public key over SSH
Root Identity Crypto Officer
(CO)
Username and password
over the console and SSH
Username and ECDSA
public key over SSH
Username and RSA
public key over SSH
Unauthorised Identity User Username and password
over the console and SSH
Username and ECDSA
public key over SSH
Username and RSA
public key over SSH
Table 13: Roles
The module supports two roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. Root and Super-user correspond
to the Crypto Officer role whereas Operator, Read-Only and Unauthorised operator types
correspond to the User role. The module supports concurrent operators but does not support a
maintenance role and/or bypass capability.
An operator assuming the Crypto Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console
or SSH connection. As Root or Super-user, the Crypto Officer has permission to view and
configure passwords and public keys within the module. The User role monitors the module via
the console or SSH. The User role does not have the permission to modify the configuration.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Configur
e
security
(security
relevant)
Security
relevant
configurati
on (SSH,
authenticat
ion data)
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
Commands
(SSH
configuration:
set system
services ssh
root-login
allow)
Traffic DRBG
Entropy
Source
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen
2
Root
- SSH
Private Host
Key: G
- User
Password:
W,E
- CO
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 26 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
successful
completio
n of each
service
RSA
KeyGen
Passwo
rd Hash
Password:
W,E
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- SSH Public
Host Key: G
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: W
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: W
Super-user
- SSH
Private Host
Key: G
- User
Password:
W,E
- CO
Password:
W,E
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 27 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- SSH Public
Host Key: G
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: W
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: W
Configur
e (non-
security
relevant)
Non-
security
relevant
configurati
on
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Commands
(miscellaneo
us
commands
e.g., for IP
address
configuration,
routing
protocols,
etc.)
Traffic Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- CO
Password: E
Root
- CO
Password: E
Show
status
Query the
module
status
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Command
(show
system fips
chassis level,
requests
system fips
self-tests)
CLI output
(show system
fips chassis
level: returns
“level 1” to
indicate that
the module is
operating in
the Approved
mode and no
output/blank
to indicate
that it is
operating in
the non-
Approved
mode;
request
system fips
self-tests:
Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- CO
Password: E
Root
- CO
Password: E
Operator
- User
Password: E
Read-only
- User
Password: E
Unauthorise
d
- User
Password: E
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 28 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
module
continues to
be
operational
upon
successful
execution/ret
urns an error
indicator and
enters an
error state in
case of a
failure)
Show
status
(LED)
LEDs on
the module
provide
physical
status
output
LED(s) on
the
chassis
turned on
N/A LED None Super-user
Operator
Read-only
Unauthorise
d
Root
Unauthentic
ated
Show
module's
versionin
g
informati
on
Query the
module's
versioning
information
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Command
(show
version)
CLI output Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- CO
Password: E
Operator
- User
Password: E
Read-only
- User
Password: E
Unauthorise
d
- User
Password: E
Root
- CO
Password: E
Zeroise
(Perform
zeroisati
on)
Destroy all
SSPs
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
Command
(request
system
zeroise no-
forwarding)
N/A Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- SSH
Private Host
Key: Z
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 29 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
completio
n of each
service
Z
- SSH
Session
Key: Z
- User
Password: Z
- CO
Password:
E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: Z
- ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- DH Shared
Secret: Z
- HMAC
Key: Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: Z
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: Z
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: Z
-
JuniperRoot
CA: Z
-
PackageCA:
Z
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 30 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
Z
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: Z
- IKE-PSK: Z
- IKE-
SKEYID: Z
- IKE-SEK: Z
- ESP-SEK:
Z
- IKE-DH-
PRI: Z
- IKE-DH-
PUB: Z
Root
- SSH
Private Host
Key: Z
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH
Session
Key: Z
- User
Password: Z
- CO
Password:
E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 31 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: Z
- ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- DH Shared
Secret: Z
- HMAC
Key: Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: Z
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: Z
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: Z
-
JuniperRoot
CA: Z
-
PackageCA:
Z
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
Z
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: Z
- IKE-PSK: Z
- IKE-
SKEYID: Z
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 32 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
- IKE-SEK: Z
- ESP-SEK:
Z
- IKE-DH-
PRI: Z
- IKE-DH-
PUB: Z
Perform
approve
d
security
functions
(SSH
connecti
on)
Initiate
SSH
connection
for SSH
monitoring
and control
(CLI)
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Authenticatio
n data
(Username
and
password/pu
blic-key
based
authenticatio
n)
SSH session KAS1
KAS2
KTS1
ECDSA
SigVer2
DRBG
Entropy
Source
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen
2
ECDSA
KeyVer
ECDSA
SigGen
RSA
KeyGen
RSA
SigGen
RSA
SigVer
Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Key: G,E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- DH Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: G
- SSH DH
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 33 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- CO
Password: E
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
Root
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Key: G,E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- ECDH
Shared
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 34 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Secret:
G,E,Z
- DH Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- CO
Password: E
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
Operator
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Key: G,E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 35 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- DH Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- User
Password: E
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
Read-only
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 36 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Key: G,E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- DH Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- User
Password: E
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 37 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Key: W,E,Z
Unauthorise
d
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Key: G,E,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: E
- ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- DH Shared
Secret:
G,E,Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E,Z
- User
Password: E
- User
Authenticatio
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 38 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
n Public
Keys: E
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
E
- SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
- SSH DH
Client Public
Key: W,E,Z
Console
Access
Console
monitoring
and control
(CLI)
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Username,
password
(set system
login user
<username>
class
<crypto-
officer/user
class>
operator
authenticatio
n plaintext-
password)
N/A Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- CO
Password: E
Operator
- CO
Password: E
Read-only
- User
Password: E
Unauthorise
d
- User
Password: E
Root
- CO
Password: E
Perform
self-tests
(remote
reset)
Software
initiated
reset,
performs
self-tests
on
demand
via SSH
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Control
input/reset
signal
(request
system
reboot)
N/A KAS1
KAS2
KTS1
DRBG
Entropy
Source
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen
2
ECDSA
KeyVer
ECDSA
SigGen
RSA
KeyGen
RSA
Super-user
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH
Session
Key: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
G,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value:
G,Z
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 39 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
SigGen
Passwo
rd Hash
CASTs
on boot
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: G,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: G,Z
- ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- DH Shared
Secret: Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E
- CO
Password: E
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
- CO
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
Root
- SSH ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 40 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Session
Key: Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G Key value:
G,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G V value:
G,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G entropy
input: G,Z
-
HMAC_DRB
G seed: G,Z
- ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- DH Shared
Secret: Z
- HMAC
Key: G,E,Z
- SSH ECDH
Public Key:
G,E
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,E
- CO
Password: E
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
- SSH
Private Host
Key: E
- SSH Public
Host Key: E
- User
Authenticatio
n Public
Keys: E
- CO
Authenticatio
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 41 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
n Public
Keys: E
Perform
self-tests
(local
reset)
Hardware
reset or
power
cycle
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Control
input/reset
signal
N/A CASTs
on boot
Super-user
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Root
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Operator
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Read-only
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Unauthorise
d
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Unauthentic
ated
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Load
Image
Verification
and
loading of
a validated
firmware
image into
the router
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service
Image,
commands
N/A ECDSA
SigVer
Passwo
rd Hash
Super-user
- CO
Password: E
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
-
JuniperRoot
CA: E
-
PackageCA:
E
Root
- CO
Password: E
- Firmware
Integrity
Key: E
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 42 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP Access
-
JuniperRoot
CA: E
-
PackageCA:
E
Perform
approve
d
security
functions
(IPsec
connecti
on)
Initiate
IPsec
connection
Global
Approved
Mode
indicator
"fips" at
the CLI
combined
with
successful
completio
n of each
service.
Connectio
n status
can be
checked
using
"show
security
ipsec
security-
associatio
ns"
Commands
(set security
ipsec
security-
association
sa-name; *
set interfaces
<name> unit
0 family inet
address <ip
address>; *
set security
ike security-
association
sa-name)
IPsec
session
KTS2
KAS3
KAS4
Root
- IKE-PSK:
W,E
- IKE-
SKEYID:
G,E,Z
- IKE-SEK:
G,E,Z
- ESP-SEK:
G,E,Z
- IKE-DH-
PRI: G,E,Z
- IKE-DH-
PUB:
G,R,E,Z
Super-user
- IKE-PSK:
W,E
- IKE-
SKEYID:
G,E,Z
- IKE-SEK:
G,E,Z
- ESP-SEK:
G,E,Z
- IKE-DH-
PRI: G,E,Z
- IKE-DH-
PUB:
G,R,E,Z
Table 14: Approved Services
G = Generate: The service generates or derives the CSP/Public Key.
I = Input: The service inputs the CSP/Public Key.
E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP/Public Key.
O = Output: The service outputs the CSP/Public Key. CSP are always protected with the
approved KTS.
Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP/Public Key after usage. A zeroised CSP is not
retrievable or reusable.
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 43 of 68 Document Version 1.0
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Configure security
(security relevant)
Security relevant
configuration
RSA with key size
less than 2048
ECDSA with
ed25519 curve
EC Diffie-Hellman
with ed25519
curve
ARCFOUR
Blowfish
CAST
DSA (SignGen,
SigVer, non-
compliant)
HMAC-MD5
HMAC-
RIPEMD160
UMAC
Root, Super-user
Perform approved
security functions
(SSH connection)
Initiate SSH connection
for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
RSA with key size
less than 2048
ECDSA with
ed25519 curve
EC Diffie-Hellman
with ed25519
curve
ARCFOUR
Blowfish
CAST
DSA (SignGen,
SigVer, non-
compliant)
HMAC-MD5
HMAC-
RIPEMD160
UMAC
Root, Super-user,
Operator, Read-Only,
Unauthorized
Table 15: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module supports loading of firmware from an external source (a complete image
replacement) and a firmware load test using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 (CAVP Cert.
#A5151) is performed in support of the load.
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 44 of 68 Document Version 1.0
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The module supports self-initiated cryptographic output in the context of the IPsec protocol and
two independent configurations are required serving as the independent internal actions:
• set security ipsec security-association sa-name
• set security ike security-association sa-name
The following “show” commands indicate the status of the Ipsec service:
• show security ike security-associations
• show security ipsec security-associations
• show security ipsec statistics
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs the firmware integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 (CAVP
Cert. #A5151). The ECDSA P-256 public key used for signature verification is a non-SSP and
stored persistently across reboots in the module’s Non-Volatile RAM (NVRAM) and is exempt
from zeroisation.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by rebooting the module.
5.3 Additional Information
The module firmware image is delivered in the form of a pre-compiled tarball (.tgz).
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module contains a limited operational environment since it supports loading of firmware
from an external source. The Junos OS 23.4R1.10 operating system is contained within the
module, i.e., the tested configurations listed in the Tested Module Identification – Hardware in
this document.
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 45 of 68 Document Version 1.0
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
Security rules and restrictions for configuration of the operational environment have been
specified in Sections 2.12 and 11.1 of this document.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone meeting Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc
coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. The module enclosure
is made of production grade materials. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots,
or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the
cryptographic boundary. No actions are required by the operator to ensure that physical security
is maintained.
8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The module does not implement any non-invasive security mitigations and thus the
requirements per this section do not apply to the module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random Access Memory Static
RAM Random Access Memory Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Entered over
SSH - NVRAM
External
endpoint
NVRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS1
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 46 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Loaded at
manufacture
External
endpoint
NVRAM Plaintext N/A N/A
Entered through
the CLI via
console
connection -
NVRAM
External
endpoint
NVRAM Plaintext Manual Direct
Output
encrypted with
IPsec KEK
RAM External
endpoint
(IPsec
peer)
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS2
Input during
SSH negotiation
External
endpoint
RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output during
SSH negotiation
(host key)
NVRAM External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output during
SSH negotiation
(Key Agreement
public key)
RAM External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module is complaint with FIPS 140-3 IG 9.5.A MD/DE and AD/EE for SSPs entered via the
module’s CLI via a direct connection to its serial/console port and for SSPs
entered/output/established via SSH/IPsec respectively.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroisation
command
Command used to zeroise the
module: request system
zeroize no-forwarding
Used to provide zeroisation as
a service
Operator
initiated
Power-cycle Power cycling the module to
zeroise temporary SSPs
Power cycling the module to
zeroise temporary SSPs
Operator
initiated
Session
termination
Termination of SSH sessions
automatically zeroises
temporary SSPs used as part
of the session
Termination of SSH sessions
automatically zeroises
temporary SSPs used as part
of the session
Module
initiated
Not zeroised PSP not zeroised since it
cannot be modified due to
being inaccessible in the
filesystem
PSP not zeroised since it
cannot be modified due to
being inaccessible in the
filesystem
N/A
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 47 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Derivation of
SSH session
key
EC Diffie-Hellman/Diffie-
Hellman shared secrets are
zeroised after use in
derivation of SSH session key
EC Diffie-Hellman/Diffie-
Hellman shared secrets are
zeroised after use in
derivation of SSH session key
Module
initiated
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
SSH Private
Host Key
Host key
generated,
used for
authenticatio
n and
encryption in
the context of
SSH
P-256 for
ECDSA,
2048 bits
for RSA -
128 bits
for
ECDSA,
112 bits
for RSA
Private Host
Key - CSP
DRBG
ECDSA
KeyGen
RSA
KeyGen
KAS1
KAS2
SSH ECDH
Private Key
Ephemeral
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
used in SSH
KAS-
ECC-
SSC P-
256, P-
384, P-
512 - 128
bits, 192
bits, 256
bits
ECDH
Private Key -
CSP
DRBG
ECDSA
KeyGen2
KAS1
SSH DH
Private Key
Ephemeral
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
used in SSH
2048 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
- 112 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
DH Private
Key - CSP
DRBG KAS2
SSH Session
Key
SSH Session
Key
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Session Key
- CSP
KAS1
KAS2
User
Password
Passwords
used to
authenticate
10-20
character
s -
1/(96^10)
User
Password -
CSP
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 48 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
users to the
module
per
attempt,
9/(96^10)
per
minute
CO Password Passwords
used to
authenticate
COs to the
module
10-20
character
s -
1/(96^10)
per
attempt,
9/(96^10)
per
minute
CO
Password -
CSP
HMAC_DRBG
V value
A critical
value of the
internal state
of DRBG
256 bits -
256 bits
Internal state
of the DRBG
- CSP
DRBG DRB
G
HMAC_DRBG
Key value
A critical
value of the
internal state
of DRBG
440 bits -
440 bits
Internal state
of the DRBG
- CSP
DRBG DRB
G
HMAC_DRBG
entropy input
Entropy input
to the
HMAC_DRB
G
512 bits -
448 bits
Entropy input
to the
HMAC_DRB
G - CSP
Entropy
Source
HMAC_DRBG
seed
Seed
provided to
the
HMAC_DRB
G
512 bits -
440 bits
Seed
provided to
the
HMAC_DRB
G - CSP
DRBG DRB
G
ECDH Shared
Secret
Used in EC
Diffie-
Hellman
(ECDH)
exchange
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
bits, 192
bits, 256
bits
Shared
secret - CSP
KAS1
DH Shared
Secret
Used in
Diffie-
Hellman
(DH)
exchange
2048 bits
- 112 bits
Shared
secret - CSP
KAS2
HMAC Key MAC key 128 bits
and 256
bits - 128
bits and
256 bits
MAC key -
CSP
KAS1
KAS2
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 49 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
SSH Public
Host Key
Host key
generated,
used to
identify the
host. Also
paired with
the private
key for
authenticatio
n and
encryption in
the context of
SSH
P-256 for
ECDSA
and 2048
bits for
RSA -
128 bits
for
ECDSA,
112 bits
for RSA
Public key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
RSA
KeyGen
User
Authentication
Public Keys
Used to
authenticate
users to the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 for
ECDSA
and
2048,
3072 and
4096 bits
for RSA -
128, 192,
256 bits
for
ECDSA,
112, 192
and 256
bits for
RSA
Public key -
PSP
CO
Authentication
Public Keys
Used to
authenticate
the CO to the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 for
ECDSA
and
2048,
3072 and
4096 bits
for RSA -
128, 192,
256 bits
for
ECDSA,
112, 192
and 256
bits for
RSA
Public key -
PSP
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 50 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
JuniperRootC
A
ECDSA
prime256v1
X.509 V3
Certificate
Used to
verify the
validity of the
PackagCA
ECDSA
P-256 -
128 bits
Public key
certificate -
Neither
PackageCA ECDSA
prime256v1
X.509 V3
Certificate
Certificate
that holds the
public key for
the signing
key used to
generate all
the
signatures
used on the
packages
and
signature
lists
ECDSA
P-256 -
128 bits
Public key
certificate -
Neither
SSH ECDH
Public Key
Ephemeral
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
used in SSH
KAS-
ECC-
SSC P-
256, P-
384, P-
512 - 128
bits, 192
bits, 256
bits for
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Public key -
PSP
DRBG
ECDSA
KeyGen2
SSH DH
Public Key
Ephemeral
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
used in SSH
2048 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
- 112 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
Public key -
PSP
DRBG
Firmware
Integrity Key
Public key
used to
perform the
firmware
integrity test
ECDSA
P-256 -
128 bits
Public key -
Neither
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 51 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
on each boot
and
authenticate
firmware
loaded from
an external
source
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared
Key used to
authenticate
IKE
connections
256 bits -
256 bits
IKE Pre-
Shared Key -
CSP
IKE-SKEYID IKE secret
used to
derive IKE
and IPsec
ESP session
keys
256 bits -
256 bits
IKE shared
secret - CSP
KAS3
KAS4
KAS3
KAS4
IKE-SEK IKE Session
Keys. AES
(128 bits),
HMAC (SHA-
256)
AES: 128
bits,
HMAC:
256 bits -
AES: 128
bits,
HMAC:
256 bits
IKE Session
Key - CSP
KAS3
KAS4
KTS2
ESP-SEK ESP Session
Keys. AES
(128 bits),
HMAC (SHA-
256)
AES: 128
bits,
HMAC:
256 bits -
AES: 128
bits,
HMAC:
256 bits
ESP Session
Key - CSP
KAS3
KAS4
KTS2
SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key
Ephemeral
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
used in SSH
(sent by the
client to the
module
acting as the
server)
KAS-
ECC-
SSC P-
256, P-
384, P-
512 - 128
bits, 192
bits, 256
bits for
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Public key -
PSP
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 52 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used
By
SSH DH
Client Public
Key
Ephemeral
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
used in SSH
(sent by the
client to the
module
acting as the
server)
2048 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
- 112 bits
for KAS-
FFC-SSC
Public key -
PSP
IKE-DH-PRI Diffie-
Hellman
private key
used in IKE
2048 bits
- 112 bits
IKE Diffie-
Hellman
private key -
CSP
KAS3
KAS4
IKE-DH-PUB Diffie-
Hellman
public key
used in IKE
2048 bits
- 112 bits
IKE Diffie-
Hellman
public key -
PSP
KAS3
KAS4
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related
SSPs
SSH Private
Host Key
NVRAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
command
SSH ECDH
Private Key
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH DH
Private Key
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH Session
Key
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
User
Password
Entered
over SSH -
NVRAM
Entered
through the
NVRAM:Obfuscate
d
Zeroisation
command
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 53 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related
SSPs
CLI via
console
connection -
NVRAM
CO Password Entered
over SSH -
NVRAM
Entered
through the
CLI via
console
connection -
NVRAM
NVRAM:Obfuscate
d
Zeroisation
command
HMAC_DRBG
V value
RAM:Plaintext Until
power-
cycle
Power-
cycle
HMAC_DRBG
Key value
RAM:Plaintext Until
power-
cycle
Power-
cycle
HMAC_DRBG
entropy input
RAM:Plaintext Until
power-
cycle
Power-
cycle
HMAC_DRBG
seed
RAM:Plaintext Until
power-
cycle
Power-
cycle
ECDH Shared
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Until SSH
session
key
derivation
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Derivation
of SSH
session key
DH Shared
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Until SSH
session
key
derivation
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Derivation
of SSH
session key
HMAC Key RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH Public
Host Key
Output
during SSH
NVRAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
command
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 54 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related
SSPs
negotiation
(host key)
User
Authentication
Public Keys
Entered
over SSH -
NVRAM
Entered
through the
CLI via
console
connection -
NVRAM
NVRAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
command
CO
Authentication
Public Keys
Entered
over SSH -
NVRAM
Entered
through the
CLI via
console
connection -
NVRAM
NVRAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
command
JuniperRootC
A
Loaded at
manufactur
e
NVRAM:Plaintext Not
zeroised
PackageCA Loaded at
manufactur
e
NVRAM:Plaintext Not
zeroised
SSH ECDH
Public Key
Output
during SSH
negotiation
(Key
Agreement
public key)
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH DH
Public Key
Output
during SSH
negotiation
(Key
Agreement
public key)
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
Firmware
Integrity Key
Loaded at
manufactur
e
NVRAM:Plaintext Not
zeroised
IKE-PSK Entered
over SSH -
NVRAM
Entered
through the
CLI via
NVRAM:Plaintext Zeroisation
command
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 55 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related
SSPs
console
connection -
NVRAM
IKE-SKEYID RAM:Plaintext until
session
key
derivation
Derivation
of SSH
session key
IKE-SEK RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
ESP-SEK RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH ECDH
Client Public
Key
Input during
SSH
negotiation
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
SSH DH Client
Public Key
Input during
SSH
negotiation
RAM:Plaintext Until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
IKE-DH-PRI RAM:Plaintext until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
IKE-DH-
PUB:Paire
d With
IKE-DH-PUB Output
encrypted
with IPsec
KEK
RAM:Plaintext until
session
terminatio
n
Zeroisation
command
Power-
cycle
Session
termination
IKE-DH-
PRI:Paired
With
Table 20: SSP Table 2
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 56 of 68 Document Version 1.0
9.5 Transitions
SHA-1: The module uses SHA-1 as a PRF for HMAC and the SSH KDF. In accordance with SP
800-131Ar2 and CMVP Programmatic Transitions, usage of SHA-1 for non-digital-signature
applications is deprecated until Dec 31, 2030, and disallowed thereafter.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity Test
Using ECDSA P-256
with SHA2-256
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
FIPS Self-tests
Passed
Verify
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module is compliant with FIPS 140-3 IG 10.2.A in that it performs a self-test, a Known
Answer Test (KAT) for the ECDSA P-256 (with SHA2-256) algorithm used in the firmware
integrity test on each boot prior to executing the firmware integrity test.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
HMAC
DRBG
(A5149)
Prediction
Resistance:
Yes Supports
Reseed
Capabilities:
Mode: SHA2-
256 Entropy
Input: 256
Nonce: 128
Personalizati
on String
Length: 0-
256
Increment 8
Additional
Input: 8-256
Increment 8
Returned
Bits: 1024
KAT CAST NIST
800-90
HMAC
DRBG
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
HMAC-
SHA2-
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST HMAC-
SHA2-
N/A During
boot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 57 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
256
(A5149)
256
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Encrypt
- 128 bits
Key Length:
128 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Encrypt
- 192 bits
Key Length:
192 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Encrypt
- 256 bits
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Decrypt
- 128 bits
Key Length:
128 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Decrypt
- 192 bits
Key Length:
192 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5151)
- Decrypt
- 256 bits
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
HMAC-
SHA-1
(A5151)
Key Length:
160 bits
KAT CAST HMAC-
SHA-1
Known
Answer
N/A During
boot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 58 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
Test:
Passed
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(A5151)
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST HMAC-
SHA2-
256
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
(A5151)
Key Length:
512 bits
KAT CAST HMAC-
SHA2-
512
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A5151)
- P-256
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods: P-
256
KAT CAST KAS-
ECC-
EPHEM-
UNIFIED-
NOKC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A5151)
- P-384
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods: P-
384
KAT CAST KAS-
ECC-
EPHEM-
UNIFIED-
NOKC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
KAS-
FFC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A5151)
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods:
MODP-2048
KAT CAST KAS-
FFC-
EPHEM-
NOKC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
KDF
SSH
(A5151)
Cipher: AES-
128, AES-
192, AES-
256 ; Hash
KAT CAST KDF-
SSH-
SHA2-
256
N/A During
boot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 59 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
Algorithm:
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A5151)
Modulus
2048 bits
SHA2-256
KAT CAST RSA-
SIGN
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Sign During
boot
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A5151)
Modulus
2048 bits
SHA2-256
KAT CAST RSA-
VERIFY
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Verify During
boot
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A5151)
Curve: P-256
Hash
Algorithm:
SHA2-256
KAT CAST ECDSA-
SIGN
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Sign During
boot
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A5151)
Curve: P-256
Hash
Algorithm:
SHA2-256
KAT CAST ECDSA-
VERIFY
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Verify During
boot
SHA2-
512
(A5150)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST SHA-2-
512
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
Entropy
test -
RCT
NIST SP
800-90B
Repetitive
Count Test
RCT CAST pass Cutoff value C = 21 During
boot and
continually
Entropy
test -
APT
NIST SP
800-90B
Adapative
Proportion
Test
APT CAST pass W = 512; Cutoff
value C = 311
During
boot and
continually
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS18
Curve: P-256
Hash
PCT PCT 0 Key pair generated
for signature
generation/verificat
On key
generation
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 60 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
6-5)
(A5151)
Algorithm:
SHA2-256
ion in the context
of SSHv2 protocol
KAS-
FFC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A5151)
- PCT
Capabilities:
Domain
Parameter:
MODP2048
PCT PCT 0 Key pair generated
for SSP agreement
in the context of
SSHv2 protocol
On key
generation
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS18
6-5)
(A5151)
Modulus:
2048 Hash
SHA2-256
PCT PCT 0 Key pair generated
for signature
generation/verificat
ion in the context
of SSHv2 protocol
On key
generation
Firmware
Load
Test
Curve: P-256
Hash
Algorithm:
SHA2-256
KAT SW/F
W
Load
Host OS
upgrade
staged.
Reboot
the
system to
complete
installatio
n!
Verify On loading
of firmware
from an
external
source
Manual
entry test
(duplicat
e
entries)
Duplicate
entry test
required for
entry of
operator
passwords
and IKE PSK
via direct
connection to
the module's
console
(serial)
interface
Duplicate
entry test
required
for entry
of
operator
passwor
ds and
IKE PSK
via direct
connecti
on to the
module's
console
(serial)
interface
Manu
al
Entry
Comman
d prompt
with "fips"
string
provided
post
completio
n of the
test
N/A On
configurati
on of
operator
passwords
and IKE
PSK
KDF
IKEv1
(A5152)
Key sizes
128, 192,
256 with 128
to 256 bits of
key strength
KAT CAST KDF
IKEV1
Known
Answer
test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 61 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
KDF
IKEv2
(A5152)
Key sizes
128, 192,
256 with 128
to 256 bits of
key strength
KAT CAST KDF
IKEV2
Known
Answer
test:
Passed
N/A During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Encrypt
- 128 bits
Key Length:
128 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Encrypt
- 192 bits
Key Length:
192 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Encrypt
- 256 bits
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Encrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Decrypt
- 128 bits
Key Length:
128 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Decrypt
- 192 bits
Key Length:
192 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
AES-
CBC
(A5152)
- Decrypt
- 256 bits
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST AES-
CBC
Known
Answer
Test:
Passed
Decrypt During
boot
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(A5152)
Key Length:
256 bits
KAT CAST HMAC-
SHA2-
256
Known
N/A During
boot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 62 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Condition
s
Answer
Test:
Passed
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs) are performed on each boot of the module. Other
conditional self-tests are performed by the module when the corresponding condition is met.
The pairwise consistency tests are performed on key pair generation for use in signature
generation/verification (ECDSA and/or RSA tests) and/or for use in KAS-ECC-SSC or KAS-
FFC-SSC SSP agreement (ECDSA and FFC tests respectively). The firmware load test is
performed when a firmware image is loaded onto the module from an external source.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware
Integrity Test
KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC DRBG
(A5149)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5149)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
Encrypt - 128
bits
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
Encrypt - 192
bits
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
Encrypt - 256
bits
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
Decrypt - 128
bits
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 63 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Decrypt - 192
bits
AES-CBC
(A5151) -
Decrypt - 256
bits
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
HMAC-SHA-1
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5151) - P-256
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5151) - P-384
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
KDF SSH
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
SHA2-512
(A5150)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Entropy test -
RCT
RCT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Entropy test -
APT
APT CAST On Demand Manually via a
reboot
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually via a
reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5151) - PCT
PCT PCT On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 64 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5151)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually via a
reboot
Firmware Load
Test
KAT SW/FW Load On Demand Manually via
loading of
firmware from an
external source
Manual entry
test (duplicate
entries)
Duplicate entry
test required for
entry of operator
passwords and
IKE PSK via
direct
connection to
the module's
console (serial)
interface
Manual Entry On Demand Manually via
configuration of
operator
passwords and
IKE PSK
KDF IKEv1
(A5152)
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
KDF IKEv2
(A5152)
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Encrypt - 128
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Encrypt - 192
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Encrypt - 256
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Decrypt - 128
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Decrypt - 192
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
AES-CBC
(A5152) -
Decrypt - 256
bits
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5152)
KAT CAST On demand Manually via a
reboot
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 65 of 68 Document Version 1.0
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
The pre-operational firmware integrity test as well as all CASTs must be completed successfully
prior to any other use of cryptography by the module in the Approved mode of operation. These
tests can also be performed periodically by rebooting the module.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Hard
Error
state
If the pre-operation
firmware integrity test, if
any of the CASTs or pair-
wise consistency tests
fail, then the module
returns an error indicator,
inhibits all data output
and enters the hard error
state
If the pre-
operational
firmware
integrity test
or if any of
the CASTs
fail
N/A "FIPS error: self-
test failure" for
firmware integrity
failure, "FIPS error
1: <name of the
algorithm> Known
Answer Test:
Failed" for CAST
failure and -1 for
pair-wise
consistency test
failure
Soft
Error
state
*In case of a firmware
load test failure, the
module rejects the
firmware, returns an error
indicator and enters the
soft error state *In the
event of an APT or RCT
health test failure, output
from the entropy source is
inhibited, all entropy
accumulated in the
conditioning context is
discarded and the start-
up health-tests are
performed again
If the
firmware load
test fails
If the APT or
RCT test fails
N/A for firmware
load test failure;
In case of APT
and/or RCT
failures, new data
continues to be
tested by the
health tests, and
once both health
tests indicate a
"pass", the
entropy source
again outputs data
"Validation Error"
for the firmware
load test failure;
entropy data
discarded in case
of APT/RCT failure
Table 25: Error States
If the pre-operation firmware integrity test or if any of the CASTs fail, then the module returns
the error indicator “FIPS error: self-test failure”, inhibits all data output and enters the hard error
state.
If the conditional self-tests fail, the module enters the soft error state, i.e., it rejects the
generated keypair/loaded image, returns an error indicator and resumes normal operation.
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 66 of 68 Document Version 1.0
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that all the cryptographic algorithms operate
correctly, and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Pre-operational as well as
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CAST) are performed on each power up/boot of
the module and on demand by power cycling the module (Perform self-tests (remote reset)
service).
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Crypto Officer must follow the procedures defined below for secure installation, initialization,
startup and operation of the module.
Crypto Officer Guidance
The Crypto Officer must check to verify the firmware image being loaded on the module is the
FIPS 140-3 validated version/image. If the image is the FIPS 140-3 validated image, then
proceed with installation of the image.
Installing the firmware image
Download the validated firmware image from
https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks
authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password
supplied by Juniper Networks representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download
the firmware image to a local host or to an internal software distribution site.
Connect to the console port on the module from your management device and log in to the
Junos OS CLI. Copy the firmware package to the module to the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the
new package on the NFX device:
root> request system software add /var/tmp/package.tgz.
NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the
installation and then issue the request system software delete package.tgz command, where
package.tgz is, for example, jinstall-host-nfx-3-x86-64-23.4R1.10-secure-signed.tgz. This is your
last chance to stop the installation.
Reboot the device to load the installation and start the new firmware image:
root > request system reboot
After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new
version of the firmware is successfully installed.
Also install the built-in fips-mode.tgz package needed for enabling the Approved-mode and the
jpfe-fips package needed for execution of the CASTs. Please note that this is a one-time
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 67 of 68 Document Version 1.0
installation post which the module remains in the Approved mode once enabled and
automatically executes the CASTs on each boot without requiring any operator or external
intervention. The following are the commands used for installing these packages:
operator>request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz
operator>request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz
Enabling Approved mode of Operation:
The Crypto Officer is responsible for initializing the module in the Approved mode of operation.
The Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The Crypto Officer shall place
the module in the Approved mode by first zeroising it to ensure no SSPs are present. Next, the
cryptographic officer shall follow the steps found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration
Guide for NFX series Network Services Platform, Release 23.4R1 document Chapter 2 to place
each module into the Approved mode of operation. The steps from the aforementioned
document are repeated below.
1. Zeroise the module using the “request system zeroize” command. The Crypto Officer shall
retain control of the module while zeroisation is in process. Once the module comes up in the
“amnesiac mode” post zeroisation, connect to it using the console port with username “root” and
enter the configuration mode. Enable the Approved mode on the module by setting the
Approved level to 1, and verify the level
[edit]
root# set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
root# show system fips chassis level
level 1;
2. Configure the root-authentication password (i.e., Crypto Officer credentials) as follows:
root> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
root# set system root-authentication plain-text-password
New password:
Retype new password:
3. Commit the configuration
[edit ]
root# commit
configuration check succeeds
Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key
Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key
Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key
'system' reboot is required to transition to fips level 1
commit complete
4. Reboot the device:
Copyright Juniper Networks, Inc. 2026 Page 68 of 68 Document Version 1.0
[edit]
root# run request system reboot
Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes
During the reboot, the device runs the pre-operational firmware integrity test and all CASTs. It
returns a login prompt.
5. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify the
firmware version is the validated version:
root:fips > show version
Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation:
As Crypto Officer, the operator needs to disable the Approved mode of operation on the device
to return it to the non-Approved mode of operation. To disable the Approved mode on the
device, the module must be zeroised (step 1 defined above).
11.2 Administrator Guidance
For further information and for the Administrator guidance, please see the the FIPS Evaluated
Configuration Guide for NFX Network Services Platform, Release 23.4R1 document.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
For further information and for the non-Administrator guidance, please see the the FIPS
Evaluated Configuration Guide for NFX Network Services Platform, Release 23.4R1 document.
11.4 Maintenance Requirements
No other maintenance requirements apply for operation of the module in the Approved/non-
Approved modes as defined above.
11.5 End of Life
The module can be securely sanitized at the end of its lifetime by zeroising it.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The module does not implement any mitigation of other attacks and thus the requirements per
this section do not apply to the module.