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Juniper Networks ACX5448-M Router
Firmware: Junos OS 20.3R1
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Document Version: 1.4
Date: December 17, 2021
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Contents
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary ..........................................................................6
1.2 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................6
1.2.1 FIPS ApprovedMode....................................................................................................................7
1.2.2 Non-ApprovedMode ...................................................................................................................7
1.3 Zeroization ..........................................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Functionality ..................................................................................................................9
Approved Algorithms....................................................................................................................9
Allowed Algorithms.....................................................................................................................11
Protocols .....................................................................................................................................12
Disallowed Algorithms.................................................................................................................12
Critical Security Parameters........................................................................................................13
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .....................................................................................................15
Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles..........................................................................15
Authentication Methods .............................................................................................................15
Approved Services.......................................................................................................................16
Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................17
4 Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................19
5 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................................20
6 Security Rules and Guidance...............................................................................................................21
Cryptographic-Officer Guidance .................................................................................................21
Installing the FIPS-Approved firmware image ....................................................................21
Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation......................................................................22
Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation..............................................24
Entering Keys and CSPs via the Serial Interface..................................................................24
User Guidance.............................................................................................................................24
7 References and Definitions .................................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations.........................................................................4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................4
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................6
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions ...................................................................................9
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions ...................................................................................9
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................9
Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................11
Table 8 – MACsec Approved Cryptographic Functions...............................................................................11
Table 9 – Microsemi VSC8258 Chip ............................................................................................................11
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................................11
Table 11 – Protocols using approved algorithms in FIPS Mode..................................................................12
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................13
Table 13 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................................14
Table 14 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................16
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services .........................................................................................................16
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................17
Table 17 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services.....................................................................................18
Table 18 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services.................................................................................18
Table 19 – References.................................................................................................................................25
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................25
Table 21 – Datasheet ..................................................................................................................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary ACX5448-M ............................................................................6
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks ACX5448-M
Universal Metro Router. The ACX5448-M series provides dedicated high-performance processing for
flows and sessions and integrates advanced security capabilities that protect the network
infrastructure as well as user data.
This FIPS 140-2 validation includes the ACX5448-M router. The FIPS validated version of firmware is
Junos OS 20.3R1. The name of the image file is:
 junos-vmhost-install-acx-x86-64-20.3R1.8.tgz
The cryptographic boundary for the ACX5448-M is defined as the outer edge of the router. The
cryptographic module provides for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management
station and the module. The cryptographic modules also provide for an encrypted connection, using
MACsec, between devices. All other data input to or output from the modules are considered
plaintext for this FIPS 140-2 validation.
The cryptographic modules are defined as a multiple-chip standalone module that executes Junos OS
20.3R1 firmware on the Juniper Networks ACX5448-M Universal Metro Router as listed in Table 1 below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Chassis differences Network Ports
ACX5448-M ACX5448-M-AC-AFO
ACX5448-M-DC-AFO
ACX5448-M-AC-AFI
ACX5448-M-DC-AFI
AC Unit Air flow out
DC Unit Air flow out
AC Unit Air flow in
DC Unit Air flow in
44 SFP+/SFP ports
(MACsec) + 6 QSFP28
ports
The module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
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The module has a non-modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes
a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this
validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the
modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The module does not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
Juniper's development processes are such that future releases of Junos should be FIPS validate-able
when run on the same hardware platform and meet the claims made in this document. Only the
versions that explicitly appear on the certificate, however, are formally validated. The CMVP makes no
claim as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when
operating under a version that is not listed on the validation certificate.
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Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 below. The cryptographic boundary is defined as
the outer edge of the chassis. The module does not rely on external devices for input and output of
critical security parameters (CSPs).
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary ACX5448-M
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
Management port (1),
44 SFP+/SFP ports
(MACsec) + 6 QSFP28
ports
LAN
Communications/Remote
management
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Serial 1 Console serial port
Control in, Data in, Data out
Status out
USB 1 USB port - load Junos image Control in, Data in
Power 1 Power connector Power
LEDs 6 Status indicator lighting Status out
Reset Button 1 Reset Control in
Clocking ports
(1PPS and 10
MHz GPS)
2
connect the module to
external clock signal
sources
Control in
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The
module must always be zeroized when switching between FIPS Approved mode of operation and the
non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.
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1.2.1 FIPS Approved Mode
The module with Junos OS 20.3R1 installed, contains a FIPS-Approved mode of operation and a non-
Approved mode of operation. The Crypto-Officer places the module in an Approved mode of operation
by following the instructions in Crypto-Officer guidance (section 6.1).
The Crypto-Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in an Approved mode by observing the
console prompt and running the “show version” command. When operating in FIPS mode, the prompt
will read “<user>@<device name>:fips>” (e.g. crypto-officer@ACX5448-M:fips>). The “show version”
command will allow the Crypto-Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is running on the
module. The Crypto-Officer can also use the “show system fips chassis level” command to determine if
the module is operating in FIPS mode.
The Approved mode supports the approved and allowed algorithms, functions and protocols
identified in Table 4 – 11. The services available in this mode are described in Tables 14 and 16.
1.2.2 Non-Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports the algorithms identified in Section 2.2 as well as the
algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer can place the module into a non-approved mode of operation by following the
instructions in the Crypto-Officer guidance (section 6.1).
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, or vice-versa, the Crypto-Officer shall zeroize all
keys and CSPs.
Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the device, including all cryptographic
keys and CSPs and returning the module to its factory default state. The Crypto-Officer initiates the
zeroization process by entering the “request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding” operational command from
the CLI after enabling FIPS mode. Use of this command is restricted to the Crypto-Officer.
The Crypto-Officer shall perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
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CAUTION: Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process is complete, no data is left
on the Routing Engine. The device is returned to the factory default state, equivalent to a fresh
installation of the firmware, without any configured users or configuration files.
To zeroize the device:
1. From the CLI, enter
Crypto-officer@device> request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding
warning: System will be rebooted and may not boot without configuration
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
2. To initiate the zeroization process, type yes at the prompt:
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
yes
3. When the system finishes rebooting the system will be in a factory default state.
Note: The Crypto-Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 below. Table 11 summarizes the high-level protocol algorithm support.
There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this/these table(s).
Approved Algorithms
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
A869 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
A869 HMAC FIPS 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128, 256
A869 SHS FIPS 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
A873 HMAC
FIPS 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 128, 256
A873 SHS FIPS 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
A871 AES
FIPS 197
SP800-38A
CBC, CTR,
ECB
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A1
CKG SP 800 133
Section 6.1
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
1
Vendor Affirmed
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N/A2
KAS-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
ECC DH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
Key Agreement
Scheme
A871 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384, 512 Key Derivation
A871 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Number
Generation
A871 ECDSA FIPS 186-4
B.4.2 Testing
Candidates
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen,
SigVer, PKV
A871 HMAC FIPS 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 160
Message
Authentication
SHA-224 Key size: 224 bits, λ = 192
SHA-512 Key size: 512 bits, λ = 512
SHA-256
Key size: 256, bits, λ =
256
Message
Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
N/A KTS
AES CBC Cert. # A871 and HMAC Cert. #
A871
key establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES CBC Cert. # A871 and HMAC
Cert. # A871
key establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
A871 RSA FIPS 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 512)
n=4096 (SHA 256, 512)
KeyGen, SigGen,
SigVer
A871 SHS FIPS 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation,
KDF Primitive
SHA-224
Message Digest
Generation
A871 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
2
Vendor Affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3
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Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
A872 HMAC FIPS 198
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Key size: 256, bits, λ = 256
A872 SHS SP800- 180-4
SHA1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest
Generation,
KDF Primitive
A872 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Bit
Generation
Table 8 – MACsec Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
A870 AES
SP800- 197-
38A
ECB, CBC Key Sizes: 128, 256 AES CMAC
SP800-38D CMAC Key Sizes: 128,256
Key Derivation SP 800-
108: Used to generate
MACsec keys
SP800-38F KW Key Size: 128
Key Wrapping for
MACsec keys
A870 KBKDF SP 800-108 Counter
CMAC AES128
CMAC AES256
KDF for MACsec keys
N/A KTS AES KW # A870
Key Wrapping (key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 bits of
encryption strength)
Table 9 – Microsemi VSC8258 Chip
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
AES
3969
AES
SP800-38D,
802.11AE
GCM, XPN Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
Allowed Algorithms
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG IG 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
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Protocols
Table 11 – Protocols using approved algorithms in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
MACsec MKA MACsec Key Agreement Shared secret
AES GCM 128/256
AES XPN 128/256
HMAC-SHA-
256
SSHv23
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256,
P-384, P-521
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
ECDSA P-521
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096
Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
HMAC-SHA2-
512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The
MACsec and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher
and integrity. In Table 11 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and
may be used in any viable combination.
The modules can take on the role of Peer or Authenticator in reference to the MACsec protocol. The
AES GCM IV construction is performed in compliance with IEEE 802.1AE and its amendments.
Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms and protocols are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is
operated in an Approved mode of operation. The algorithms are available as part of the SSH
connect service when the module is operated in the non-Approved mode.
Algorithms
 RSA with key size less than 2048
 ECDSA with ed25519 curve
 ECDH with ed25519 curve
 ARCFOUR
 Blowfish
 CAST
 DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
 HMAC-MD5
 HMAC-RIPEMD160
 UMAC
 Diffie-Hellman
 Chacha20
 Poly
 OpenSSL AES-GCM
3
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
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Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the HMAC DRBG
DRBG_State Values V and Key which comprise the HMAC_DRBG state
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the HMAC DRBG
ECDH Shared
Secret
The Diffie-Hellman shared secret used in EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. Created
per the EC Diffie-Hellman protocol. Provides between 128-256 bits of security.
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-
256. RSA 2048
SSH ECDH Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. ECDH P-256, P-384, or P-521
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256);
SSH Session Integrity Key: HMAC (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA2-512).
MACsec CAK
Externally generated pre-shared key entered when MACsec static connectivity
association key (CAK) security mode is enabled (32 characters for 128-bit AES keys or
64 characters for 256-bit AES keys). Entered by the CO when configuring the module
via SSH or the serial interface4
.
MACsec CKN Externally generated pre-shared key used to identify the CAK (64 characters).
Entered by the CO when configuring the module via SSH or the serial interface5
.
MACsec SAK Security Association Key used to encrypt/decrypt traffic for a given session. Derived
from CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128-bit AES).
MACsec KEK Key Encryption Key used to transmit SAK to other members of a MACsec connectivity
association. Derived from CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128-bit AES).
MACsec ICK Integrity Check Key used to verify the integrity and authenticity of MPDUs. Derived
from CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128/256-bit CMAC).
HMAC Key The LibMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function
test.
User Password Passwords used to authenticate Users to the module.
CO Password Passwords used to authenticate COs to the module.
4
When entered via the serial interface, the CO must use a non-network GPC.
5
When entered via the serial interface, the CO must use a non-network GPC.
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Table 13 – Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256. RSA 2048, 4096.
SSH-ECDH-
PUB
Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. ECDH P-256, P-384, or
P-521
Auth-User Pub User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-
384, or P-521; RSA 2048, 4096
Auth-CO Pub CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-384,
or P-521; RSA 2048, 4096
Root CA ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package CA ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at software load
and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Crypto-Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication.
The Crypto-Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or
super-user, the Crypto-Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The User role cannot change the
configuration.
Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and ECDSA or RSA public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters. Thus,
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming
0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-
second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous
(e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-
second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best
approachfor the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be
spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per
hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
9/(9610
), which is less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384,
and P-521), which has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of either 2128
, 2192
or
2256
depending on the curve. Thus, the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/ (2128
), which is
less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection establishment rate limits the number of connection
attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
15,000/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000.
RSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports RSA (2048, 4096), which
has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of 2112
(2048). Thus, the probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/ (2112
), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection
establishment rate limits the number of connection attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in
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a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 15,000/ (2112
), which is less than 1/100,000.
Approved Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 18 lists the access to
CSPs by each service.
Table 14 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic MACsec encrypted transfer of data x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
MACsec connect Initiate MACsec connection
x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on demand. x
Load Image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into the
switch.
x
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
MACsec
SAK
MACsec
CAK
MACsec
CKN
MACsec
KEK
MACsec
ICK
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E -- GWR
G
W
R
-- --
GW
R
W
R
W
R
G
W
G
W
G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- E E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
MACsec
connect
-- E -- -- -- -- -- GE -- -- GE GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
G
EZ
GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- -- Z -- -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Local
reset
G
EZ
GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- -- Z -- -- --
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module (persistent
storage) Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in
Section 2.2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 11.
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Table 17 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant)
(non-compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non-compliant) MACsec encrypted transfer of data x
Status
(non-compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
MACsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate MACsec connection x
Console access
(non-compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on
demand
x
Load Image
(non-compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 18 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly,
and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by
power cycling the module (Remote reset service).
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module in the FIPS Mode of
operation. If any one of the fails, the module enters the Error state.
 Firmware Integrity check: using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
 Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
 OpenSSL KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o ECDH P-256 KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o KAS -ECC KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
 LibMD KATs
o HMAC-SHA-1
o HMAC-SHA-256
o SHA-512
 QuickSec KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 MacSec KATs
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o AES128-CMAC KAT
o AES256-CMAC KAT
o AES-ECB (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-ECB (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-KEYWRAP wrapping/unwrapping with AES GCM (128, 192, 256) KAT
o SP 800-108 KBKDF KAT
 VSC8258
o AES GCM Encrypt/Decrypt with AES 256 KAT
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBGs in the OpenSSL and Quicksec libraries.
 Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG.
 SP 800-56A assurances as per SP 800-56Arev3 Sections 5.5.2,5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3, in accordance to
IG 9.6.
 Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
 Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification).
5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps,
slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component
contained within the cryptographic boundary.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term shall in this context
specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all
other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead
to a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting
plaintext CSPs.
11. The Crypto-Officer shall verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a FIPS
validated image. If any non-validated firmware image is loaded the module will no longer be a
FIPS validated module.
12. The Crypto-Officer shall retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with
the AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The operator shall ensure that the number of 64-bit blocks encrypted by the same key does not
exceed 2^20 with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the encryption algorithm for SSH.
15. Virtual Chassis is not supported in FIPS mode and shall not be configured on the modules.
16. RSA key generated shall only be 2048 bits or greater.
17. The module shall only be used with CMVP FIPS 140-2 validated modules when supporting the
MACsec protocol for providing Peer, Authenticator functionality.
18. The link between the Peer and Authenticator, used in the MACsec communication, should be
secure to prevent the possibility for an attacker to introduce foreign equipment into the local area
network.
19. 3-key Triple-DES has been implemented in the module and is FIPS approved until December 31,
2023. Should the CMVP disallow the usage of Triple-DES post December 31, 2023, then users must
not configure Triple-DES.
Cryptographic-Officer Guidance
The Crypto-Officer must check to verify the firmware image on the device is the FIPS 140-2 validated
image. If the image is the FIPS 140-2 validated image, then proceed to section 6.1.2.
Installing the FIPS-Approved firmware image
Download the validated firmware image from the
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https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks
authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by
Juniper Networks representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download the firmware image
to a local host or to an internal software distribution site.
Connect to the console port on the device from your management device and log in to the Junos OS
CLI. Copy the firmware package to the device to the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the downloaded
firmware image on the device:
user@device> request vmhost software add /var/tmp/package.tgz.
NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the
installation and then issue the request system software delete package.tgz command, where
package.tgz is, for example, junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-20.3R1.8.tgz. This is your last chance to
stop the installation.
Reboot the device to load the installation and start the new firmware image:
user@device> request vmhost reboot
After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new
version of the firmware is successfully installed.
Also install the fips-mode package and jpfe-fips package needed for enabling FIPS mode and running
KATS respectively. These packages are part of the downloaded firmware. The following are the
commands used for installing these packages:
user@device >request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz
user@device >request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz
Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for initializing the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
FIPS-Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The Crypto-Officer shall place the
module in the FIPS-Approved mode by first zeroizing the device to delete all keys and CSPs. The
instructions for zeroizing the module are in section 1.3 of this document. Next, the Crypto-Officer shall
follow the steps found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for ACX5448-M Devices,
Release 20.3R1 document Chapter 2 to place the module into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
steps from the aforementioned document are repeated below:
To enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the device:
1. Zeroize the device as explained in Section 1.3.
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2. Login to the device with crypto-officer credentials and enter configuration mode:
crypto-officer@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
crypto-officer@device#
3. Enable FIPS mode on the device by setting the FIPS level to 1, and verify the level:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # show system fips
chassis level 1;
4. Commit the configuration
[edit ]
crypto-officer@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key
Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key
Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key
[edit]
'system'
reboot is required to transition to FIPS level 1
commit complete
5. Reboot the device:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device# run request vmhost reboot
Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes
During the reboot, the device runs Known Answer Tests (KATS). It returns a login
prompt:
crypto-officer@device:fips>
6. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the “show version” command to verify the
firmware version is the validated version.
crypto-officer@device:fips> show version
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Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation
As Crypto-Officer, the operator needs to disable the FIPS-Approved mode of operation on the device to
return it to a non-Approved mode of operation. To disable FIPS-Approved mode on the device, the
device must be zeroized. Follow the steps found in section 1.3 to zeroize the device.
Entering Keys and CSPs via the Serial Interface
The Crypto-Officer must use a non-networked GPC when entering keys or CSPs (such as MACsec CAK
and CKN values).
User Guidance
The user should verify that the module is operating in the desired mode of operation (FIPS-Approved
mode or non-Approved mode) by observing the command prompt when logged into the device. If the
string “:fips” is present, then the device is operating in a FIPS-Approved mode. Otherwise it is operating
in a non-Approved mode.
All FIPS users, including the Crypto Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.
All FIPS users must:
• Keep all passwords confidential.
• Store devices and documentation in a secure area.
• Deploy devices in secure areas.
• Check audit files periodically.
• Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
• Follow these guidelines:
• Users are trusted.
• Users abide by all security guidelines.
• Users do not deliberately compromise security.
• Users behave responsibly at all times.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 19 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendationfor Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAK Connectivity Association Key
CKN Connectivity Association Key Name
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
ICK Integrity Check Key
KEK Key Encrypting Key
MACsec Media Access Control Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SCB Switch Control Board
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 21 – Datasheet
Model Title URL
ACX5448-M ACX5448-M 5G UNIVERSAL
ROUTING PLATFORM
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000644-en.pdf