Cubic Corporation
Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway
Appliances
Firmware Version: 5.0.1
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 1.7
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Cubic Corporation Corsec Security, Inc.
9333 Balboa Avenue 13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
San Diego, CA 92123 Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 858 277 6780 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
www.cubic.com www.corsec.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 2 of 46
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose...................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 References ..............................................................................................................................................4
1.3 Document Organization..........................................................................................................................4
2. Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE-MFGW..................................................................................................5
2.1 Overview.................................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Module Specification ..............................................................................................................................8
2.3 Module Interfaces................................................................................................................................ 15
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication..................................................................................................... 18
2.4.1 Authorized Roles ...................................................................................................................... 18
2.4.2 Operator Services..................................................................................................................... 18
2.4.3 Additional Services ................................................................................................................... 21
2.4.4 Authentication.......................................................................................................................... 22
2.5 Physical Security................................................................................................................................... 23
2.6 Operational Environment .................................................................................................................... 23
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ......................................................................................................... 24
2.8 EMI / EMC ............................................................................................................................................ 30
2.9 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................................. 30
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests ................................................................................................................. 30
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 31
2.9.3 Critical Function Self-Test......................................................................................................... 32
2.9.4 Self-Test Failures ...................................................................................................................... 32
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................. 32
3. Secure Operation.................................................................................................................................33
3.1 Setup and Configuration...................................................................................................................... 33
3.1.1 Tamper-Evident Seal Inspection and End-User Application..................................................... 33
3.1.2 Initialization.............................................................................................................................. 37
3.1.3 Configure Secure Network Access............................................................................................ 38
3.1.4 Upload Licenses........................................................................................................................ 38
3.1.5 Set up IPsec Tunnels................................................................................................................. 39
3.1.6 Set up Secure Radio Talk Groups.............................................................................................. 39
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance ...................................................................................................................... 40
3.2.1 Password Complexity ............................................................................................................... 40
3.2.2 Monitoring Status..................................................................................................................... 40
3.2.3 Firmware Loading..................................................................................................................... 40
3.2.4 Zeroization................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.5 Cryptographic Bypass Modes................................................................................................... 41
3.3 User Guidance...................................................................................................................................... 42
3.4 Additional Guidance and Usage Policies.............................................................................................. 42
3.5 Non-FIPS-Approved Mode................................................................................................................... 42
4. Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................43
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 3 of 46
List of Tables
Table 1 – Vocality RoIP Variants.................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section.........................................................................................................8
Table 3 – Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Libraries...................................................................................9
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic OpenSSL Cryptographic Library 1.0 .........................9
Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic MbedTLS Cryptographic Library 1.0...................... 12
Table 6 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic Kernel Cryptographic Library 1.0 .......................... 13
Table 7 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic Libgcrypt Cryptographic Library 1.0...................... 14
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved KDFs................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 9 – Allowed Algorithm Implementations....................................................................................................... 15
Table 10 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings.................................................................................................. 17
Table 11 – Mapping of Module Services to Roles, CSPs, and Type of Access ......................................................... 19
Table 12 – Additional Services................................................................................................................................. 21
Table 13 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Module.................................................................................. 22
Table 14 – Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs........................................................... 24
Table 15 – Vocality RoIP Variant FCC IDs................................................................................................................. 30
Table 16 – Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................. 43
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Vocality RoIP Appliance.............................................................................................................................5
Figure 2 – DTECH M3-SE-MFGW Appliance (Black)....................................................................................................7
Figure 3 – DTECH M3-SE-MFGW Appliance (Tan) ......................................................................................................7
Figure 4 – Vocality RoIP Front Panel ....................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 5 – Vocality RoIP Rear Panel......................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 6 – M3-SE-MFGW Front View....................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 7 – M3-SE-MFGW Angled View.................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 8 – Vocality RoIP Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals............................................................................. 35
Figure 9 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Straight View .................................... 35
Figure 10 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Angled View.................................... 36
Figure 11 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Side View........................................ 36
Figure 12 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Fan Cover (Top and Angled Views).............. 37
Figure 13 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory Applied Tamper-Evident Seal – Radio Access Cover........................................ 37
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 4 of 46
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Vocality RoIP1
and DTECH M32
- SE3
Multi-
Function Gateway (MFGW) Appliances from Cubic Corporation (hereafter referred to as Cubic). This Security Policy
describes how the Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances meet the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S.4
and
Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard
and validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is
maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS).
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This policy
was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-
SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances are referred to in this document as “RoIP and M3-SE appliances” or “the
module”.
This Security Policy was produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to Cubic.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The Cubic website (www.cubic.com) contains information on the full line of products from Cubic.
• The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for
technical or sales-related questions about the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is organized into two (2) primary sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the
validated module. This includes a general description of the capabilities and the use of cryptography, as well as a
presentation of the validation level achieved in each applicable functional area of the FIPS standard. It also
provides high-level descriptions of how the module meets FIPS requirements in each functional area. Section 3
documents the guidance needed for the secure use of the module, including initial setup instructions and
management methods and policies.
1 RoIP – Radio over Internet Protocol
2 M3 – Micro, Mobile, Modular
3
SE – Single Enclave
4 U.S. – United States
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 5 of 46
2. Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE-MFGW
2.1 Overview
Cubic Corporation provides a wide range of deployable and tactical communications products and solutions to
meet the diverse mission requirements of their military, government, first-responder and civilian customer base.
Cubic is the parent company of Cubic Mission Solutions (CMS), which provides networked C4ISR5
solutions for
defense, intelligence, security and commercial missions. The CMS C4ISR solutions include the Vocality RoIP
Appliance and the DTECH M3-SE-MFGW Appliance.
The Vocality RoIP Appliance (Figure 1 below) provides users with a simple-to-use, small form factor radio
connectivity solution that allows the connection of traditional PTT6
and digital radio systems to IP7
- and SIP8
-based
networks. The Vocality RoIP includes audio, serial, and radio auxiliary I/O9
ports to maximize compatibility with an
extensive range of radio types, frequencies, and manufacturers. The (optionally) built-in 4G LTE10
, Wi-Fi, and
network ports for connecting to fixed line and satellite services are used to create and extend radio networks
beyond normal PTT radio range. The Vocality RoIP can be expanded with the addition of RoIP Connect and Rack
Kit to offer up to a 12-port RoIP solution.
Figure 1 – Vocality RoIP Appliance
The Vocality RoIP appliance base model provides communications via Ethernet. There are 5 additional variants of
the appliance that also include various combinations of LTE modules and antennas that provide for radio
communications in different frequency bands across the globe. See Table 1 below for a listing of the RoIP variants.
5 C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
6 PTT – Push-to-talk
7 IP – Internet Protocol
8 SIP – Session Initiation Protocol
9
I/O – Input/Output
10 LTE – Long Term Evolution
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
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Page 6 of 46
Table 1 – Vocality RoIP Variants
RoIP Device Part Number LTE Module Antenna
Vocality RoIP Retail Pack 1
Port
ROIP/RP/1 - -
Vocality RoIP LTE(NA)
Retail Pack 1 Port
ROIP/LTENA/RP/1 19-0040-02 LTE Module Mini
PCIe North America (AT&T)
19-0048-01 External 4G
antenna SMA W5095K
Vocality RoIP LTE(NAFD)
Retail Pack 1 Port
ROIP/LTENAV/RP/1 19-0049-01 LTE Module Mini
PCIe North America
(FirstNet)
19-0048-01 External 4G
antenna SMA W5095K
Vocality RoIP LTE(NAV)
Retail Pack 1 Port
ROIP/LTENAFD/RP/1 19-0046-01 LTE Module Mini
PCIe North America
(Verizon)
19-0048-01 External 4G
antenna SMA W5095K
Vocality RoIP LTE(EU)
Retail Pack 1 Port
ROIP/LTEEU/RP1 19-0039-02 LTE Module Mini
PCIe Europe
19-0045-01 External 4G
antenna SMA RA 2.14dBi
Vocality RoIP LTE(ANZ)
Retail Pack 1 Port
ROIP/LTEANZ/RP/1 19-0047-01 LTE Module Mini
PCIe Australia and New
Zealand
19-0045-01 External 4G
antenna SMA RA 2.14dBi
The DTECH M3-SE-MFGW is a portable network appliance designed to communicate over any available
networking technology (including IP over satellite, cellular, radio, ISDN11
, and IP broadband/baseband networks).
The M3-SE-MFGW is a low-power, high-capability RoIP voice crossbanding and gateway module for the M3-SE
product family. The M3-SE-MFGW provides the ability to crossband up to eight (8) separate radio voice networks.
It is compatible with any tactical radio or Land Mobile Radio (LMR) system that supports analog E&M signaling.
The M3-SE-MFGW is also capable of extending single radio networks by bridging voice traffic over an existing data
network. Two 1Gbps12
Ethernet interfaces allow for LAN13
and WAN14
network segmentation. A removable
4G15
/LTE cellular radio provides additional WAN uplink capability. The system is also able to operate directly off
PoE16
provided by another network device, extending the functional range of the system. Additionally, a power
pass through connection allows direct mounting to existing M3-SE product family devices without the need for
additional power supplies or external power cabling.
The M3-SE-MFGW is available in two colors (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 below):
• Black – part number M3-SE-MFGW-BK
• Tan – part number M3-SE-MFGW-DT
11 ISDN – Integrated Services Digital Network
12 Gbps – Gigabits per second
13 LAN – Local Area Network
14 WAN – Wireless Area Network
15
4G – Fourth Generation
16 PoE – Power Over Ethernet
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 7 of 46
Figure 2 – DTECH M3-SE-MFGW Appliance (Black)
Figure 3 – DTECH M3-SE-MFGW Appliance (Tan)
Each appliance includes the Radio Gateway feature, which connects PTT radios into IP infrastructure. Radio
Gateway supports several RoIP protocols, including SRTP17
/SRTCP18
and SIP over TLS19
. The RoIP and M3-SE
appliances are also pre-installed with the modular application-based Vocality Gateway Suite software which
provides the following additional features (when licensed):
• Vocality Secure Tunnels – provides security for network traffic via secure VPN20
tunneling, encryption,
and NAT21
traversal. This component allows for the configuration of IPsec22
, IP-in-IP, and GRE23
tunnels.
• Vocality Failover – rule-based software component that interfaces directly with wireless and wired
technologies. Failover allows users to automatically switch between networks by selecting the most
suitable bearer based on availability and user-priorities and works with Secure to maintain secure tunnels
as bearers change.
• Vocality Dispatch – lightweight console application used to create and manage radio talk groups and
provides interoperability between multiple radio devices and manufacturers. This component includes
Registry, which allows the nodes to register with a central server.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances support local or remote management using the Web-based management interface
supported by the module called the Node UI24
, which is accessed over HTTPS25
. The appliances also provide an
17 SRTP – Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
18 SRTCP – Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol
19
TLS – Transport Layer Security
20 VPN – Virtual Private Network
21 NAT – Network Address Translation
22 IPsec – Internet Protocol Security
23 GRE – Generic Routing Encapsulation
24
UI – User Interface
25 HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 8 of 46
SNMPv326
interface for remote management and non-security relevant information about node state and
statistics.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances are validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A27
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC28 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances are validated as a hardware cryptographic module with a multiple-chip standalone
embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 2. The module runs Cubic’s proprietary Linux operating
system (OS) and consists of hardware and firmware components enclosed in a secure, production-grade metal
case. The cryptographic boundary of the module surrounds the entire enclosure of each appliance.
The module includes the following appliances:
• Vocality RoIP (including RoIP variants with onboard LTE modules)
• DTECH M3-SE-MFGW (with no onboard LTE module)
Each appliance is composed of the following components:
• CPU29
• MCU30
• SDRAM31
• Flash memory
26 SNMPv3 – Simple Network Management Protocol version 3
27 N/A – Not Applicable
28 EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
29 CPU – Central Processing Unit
30
MCU – Microcontroller Unit
31 SDRAM – Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 9 of 46
• Line CODECs32
• Serial converter
• Power supplies
• LEDs33
• USB hub (M3-SE-MFGW only)
• Network component(s)
Table 3 below lists the libraries supporting the cryptographic algorithm implementations in the RoIP and M3-SE
appliances. These cryptographic algorithms provide the cryptographic primitives and support secure networking
protocols.
Table 3 – Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Libraries
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 below.
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic OpenSSL Cryptographic Library 1.0
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard Mode /Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
C2184 AES36 FIPS PUB37 197
NIST SP38 800-38A
CBC39, CTR40 128, 192, 256 data encryption/decryption
32 CODEC – Compression/Decompression
33 LED – Light Emitting Diode
34
IKE – Internet Key Exchange
35 KDF – Key Derivation Function
36 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
37 PUB – Publication
38 SP – Special Publication
39
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
40 CTR – Counter
Implementation Name Use
Cubic OpenSSL Cryptographic Library 1.0 Firmware-based cryptographic primitives (based on
OpenSSL 1.0.2r)
Cubic Mbed TLS Cryptographic Library 1.0 Firmware-based cryptographic primitives (based on Mbed
TLS 2.8.0)
Cubic Kernel Cryptographic Library 1.0 Firmware-based cryptographic primitives (based on Kernel
4.15.18 Crypto Library)
Cubic Libgcrypt Cryptographic Library 1.0 Firmware-based cryptographic primitives (based on
Libgcrypt 1.8.2)
Cubic IKE34 KDF35 1.0 KDF implementations for IKE (based on StrongSwan 5.6.2)
Cubic SRTP KDF 1.0 KDF implementations for SRTP (based on libSRTP 2.2.0)
Cubic SNMP KDF 1.0 KDF implementations for SNMP (based on Net-SNMP 5.7.3)
Cubic TLS KDFs 1.0 KDF implementations for TLS (based on Libssl 1.0.2r)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 10 of 46
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard Mode /Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
NIST SP 800-38D GCM41 128, 256 data encryption/decryption
and message authentication
SP 800-38C CCM 128, 256 data encryption/decryption
A835 AES FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
CFB42 128 data encryption/decryption
C2184 DSA43 FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen 2048, 3072 (SHA44-256,
SHA-384)
digital signature generation
SigVer 1024, 2048, 3072 (SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384)
digital signature verification
C2184 ECDSA45 FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen B-233, B-283, B-409, B-
571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-384, P-
521
digital signature generation
SigVer B-163, B-233, B-283, B-
409, B-571, K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, P-
192, P-224, P-384, P-521
digital signature verification
C2184 HMAC46 FIPS PUB 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS message authentication
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC47 NIST SP 800-56Arev3 FFC48 DH49 Primitive 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144,
8192
shared secret computation
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ECC50 CDH51
Primitive
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-
571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
shared secret computation
C2184 KTS NIST SP 800-38F AES
(unauthenticated
mode) with HMAC
[AES] 128, 256 Key transport (TLS)
Key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
AES (authenticated
mode)
[AES] 128, 256 Key transport (TLS)
Key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength.
Vendor
Affirmed
PBKDF NIST SP 800-132 Option 1(a) - password-based key
derivation
41
GCM – Galois Counter Mode
42 CFB – Cipher Feedback
43 DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm
44 SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
45
ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
46 HMAC – (keyed-) Hashed Message Authentication Code
47 KAS-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme Shared Secret Computation
48 FFC – Finite Field Cryptography
49 ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
50
ECC – Elliptic Curve Cryptography
51 CDH – Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
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Page 11 of 46
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard Mode /Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
C2184 RSA52 FIPS PUB 186-2 SigVer 9.31,
SigVer PSS53
4096 (SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512)
digital signature verification
FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen 9.31,
SigGen PSS
2048, 3072 (SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512)
digital signature generation
SigVer 9.31,
SigVer PSS
1024, 2048, 3072 (SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512)
digital signature verification
A835 RSA FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen 9.31,
SigGen PSS
4096 (SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512)
digital signature generation
SigVer 9.31,
SigVer PSS
4096 (SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512)
digital signature verification
C2184 SHS54 FIPS PUB 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
- message digest
The cryptographic library
supports the truncation of
HMAC SHA-1 to 96 bits
according to NIST SP 800-
107rev1.
The Cubic OpenSSL Cryptographic Library 1.0 AES GCM IV generation method complies with technique #2 in
section A.5 of the Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP as follows: The AES GCM IV is used
in the TLS protocol. The AES GCM IV is internally generated via RBG-based construction in compliance with Section
8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D using the Approved DRBG within the module’s physical boundary and is 96 bits in length.
The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security method implemented by the Cubic OpenSSL
Cryptographic Library:
• Password-based key derivation – The module performs PBKDF2 in compliance with NIST SP 800-132 using
option 1(a) in Section 5.4 to derive the Distribution Upgrade Decryption Key using a password of 52
characters. The 52-character password consists of upper-case and lower-case letters and numbers. An
upper bound on the probability of guessing the password is equal to 1:6252
, or 1:60x1093
. The PBKDF2 is
used for storage applications only. HMAC-SHA-1 is used as the approved PRF55
. The iteration count is 1000
iterations. The length of the salt is 128 bits, and it is generated by a FIPS-Approved DRBG.
• Key agreement scheme (shared secret computation) – The module implements an FFC DH shared secret
computation for its DH key agreement schemes. The shared secret computation is compliant with section
5.7.1.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. This compliance claim follows scenario X1 of FIPS IG D.8, the
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP. This primitive is used by the dhHybrid1,
dhEphem, dhHybridOneFlow, dhOneFlow and dhStatic schemes found in section 6 of that
recommendation.
52 RSA – Rivest Shamir and Adleman
53 PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme
54
SHS – Secure Hash Standard
55 PRF – Pseudo-Random Function
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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• Key agreement scheme (shared secret computation) – The module implements an ECC CDH shared secret
computation for its ECDH key agreement schemes. The shared secret computation is compliant with
section 5.7.1.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. This compliance claim follows scenario X1 of FIPS IG D.8, the
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP. This primitive is used by the Full Unified
Model, Ephemeral Unified Model, One-Pass Unified Model, One-Pass Diffie-Hellman, and Static Unified
Model schemes found in section 6 of that recommendation.
Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic MbedTLS Cryptographic Library 1.0
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard
Mode /
Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
C2187 AES FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
CBC, CTR 128, 256 data encryption/decryption
FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38C
CCM56 128, 256 data encryption/decryption
FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38D
GCM 128, 256 data encryption/decryption
and message authentication
C2187 ECDSA FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 digital signature generation
SigVer P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521
digital signature verification
C2187 HMAC FIPS PUB 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384
KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS message authentication
A849 HMAC FIPS PUB 198-1 SHA-512 KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS message authentication
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC NIST SP 800-56Arev3 FFC DH Primitive 2048 shared secret computation
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ECC CDH Primitive P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 shared secret computation
C2187 RSA FIPS PUB 186-2 SigVer PKCS571.5,
SigVer PSS
4096 (SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384)
digital signature verification
FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen PKCS1.5,
SigGen PSS
2048, 3072 (SHA-256, SHA-
384)
digital signature generation
SigVer PKCS1.5,
SigVer PSS
1024, 2048, 3072 (SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384)
digital signature verification
A849 RSA FIPS PUB 186-4 SigGen PKCS1.5,
SigGen PSS
4096 (SHA-256, SHA-384) digital signature generation
SigVer PKCS1.5,
SigVer PSS
4096 (SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384)
digital signature verification
C2187 SHS FIPS PUB 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384
- message digest
A849 SHS FIPS PUB 180-4 SHA-512 - message digest
The Cubic MbedTLS Cryptographic Library 1.0 AES GCM IV generation method complies with technique #2 in
section A.5 of the Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP as follows: The AES GCM IV is used
56
CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
57 PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standard
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in the TLS protocol. The AES GCM IV is internally generated via RBG-based construction in compliance with Section
8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D using the Approved DRBG within the module’s physical boundary and is 96 bits in length.
The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security method implemented by the Cubic MbedTLS
Cryptographic Library:
• Key agreement scheme (shared secret computation) – The module implements an FFC DH shared secret
computation for its DH key agreement scheme. The shared secret computation is compliant with section
5.7.1.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. This compliance claim follows scenario X1 of FIPS IG D.8, the
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP. This primitive is used by the dhHybrid1,
dhEphem, dhHybridOneFlow, dhOneFlow and dhStatic schemes found in section 6 of that
recommendation.
• Key agreement scheme (shared secret computation) – The module implements an ECC CDH shared secret
computation for its ECDH key agreement scheme. The shared secret computation is compliant with
section 5.7.1.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. This compliance claim follows scenario X1 of FIPS IG D.8, the
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the CMVP. This primitive is used by the Full Unified
Model, Ephemeral Unified Model, One-Pass Unified Model, One-Pass Diffie-Hellman, and Static Unified
Model schemes found in section 6 of that recommendation.
Table 6 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic Kernel Cryptographic Library 1.0
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard
Mode /
Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
C2183 AES FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
CBC, CTR 128, 192, 256 data encryption/decryption
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG NIST SP 800-133rev1 - - symmetric key generation
C2183 DRBG NIST SP 800-90Arev1 CTR-based 256-bit AES deterministic random bit
generation
HMAC-based SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
C2183 HMAC FIPS PUB 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
- message authentication
C2183 SHS FIPS PUB 180-4 SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
- message digest
The cryptographic library
supports the truncation of
HMAC SHA-1 to 96 bits
according to NIST SP 800-
107rev1.
The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security method implemented by the Cubic OpenSSL
Cryptographic Library:
• Cryptographic key generation – As per NIST SP 800-133rev1, the module uses the Cubic Kernel
Cryptographic Library 1.0 FIPS-Approved CTR-based and HMAC-based DRBGs specified in NIST SP 800-
90Arev1 to generate cryptographic keys. The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified
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output from the DRBG. Entropy for the module’s DRBGs is provided by a CPU jitter-based non-
deterministic random number generator (NDRNG) internal to the module, which was assessed per the
guidance in FIPS 140-2 IG 7.15. The entropy source provides 1.199384 bits of entropy per 4 bits of raw
noise data.
Table 7 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations – Cubic Libgcrypt Cryptographic Library 1.0
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Standard
Mode /
Method
Key Lengths / Curves /
Moduli
Use
C2182 AES FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
CFB58128 128, 192, 256 data encryption/decryption
In addition, the RoIP and M3-SE appliances include several protocol libraries that implement FIPS-Approved KDFs:
• IKEKDFs implemented by the Cubic IKE KDF1.0 protocol library
• SRTP KDF implemented by the Cubic SRTP KDF 1.0 protocol library
• SNMP KDF implemented by the Cubic SNMP KDF 1.0 protocol library
• TLS v1.2 KDF implemented by the Cubic Mbed TLS Cryptographic Library 1.0
• TLS v1.0/1.1/1.2 KDFs implemented by the Cubic TLS KDFs 1.0 protocol library
The FIPS-Approved KDFs are listed in Table 8 below.
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved KDFs
Certificate
Number
Algorithm Specification Mode / Method
Key Lengths /
Curves / Moduli
Use
C2186 CVL NIST SP 800-135rev1 IKEv1/v2 - key derivation
C2185 CVL NIST SP 800-135rev1 SNMPv3 - key derivation
Vendor
Affirmed
CVL NIST SP 800-135rev1 SRTP - key derivation
C2188 CVL NIST SP 800-135rev1 TLS v1.0, 1.1, 1.2 - key derivation
C2187 CVL NIST SP 800-135rev1 TLS v1.2 - key derivation
*No parts of the IKE, SNMP, and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP59 or CMVP.
Note that the module implements the SRTP KDF per RFC60
3711 (as documented in NIST SP 800-135rev1) using
the 48-bit index value in SRTCP61
per the NIST-published Informative Note. However, no CAVP or ACVP testing was
available for this component at the time of this evaluation. Thus, in accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG G.20, the SRTP
KDF algorithm is listed individually in Table 8 above as “vendor affirmed” and considered Approved for use in FIPS
mode.
58 CFB – Cipher Feedback
59 CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
60
RFC – Request for Comment
61 SCRTP – Secure Real-Time Transport Control Protocol
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The RoIP and M3-SE appliances employ the non-FIPS-approved algorithm implementations shown in Table 9,
which are allowed for use in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Table 9 – Allowed Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm Caveat Use
SHA-1 Legacy-use DSA, ECDSA and RSA signature verification
NDRNG - seeding for the DRBGs
SHA-1 - Digital signature generation in TLS62
2.3 Module Interfaces
The RoIP appliance provides the following physical ports and interfaces:
• Quad Serial & Radio Auxiliary I/O*
o Serial
o GPIO63
• Audio
• Ethernet
• USB64
• Antenna connectors
• SIM65
card slot
• LEDs
• Reset button
• Power connector
*NOTE: The serial connections and radio auxiliary I/O (programmable GPIO signals) are not available over
individually separated connector ports, but rather are available using the 26-way DB15HD data port located on
the front panel of the appliance. The serial connection is available through pins 1-8 and 10-17. The GPIO
connection is available through pins 9, 18, 20, 22, 24, and 26. The remaining pins are designated as ground.
62 Per NIST SP 800-52, SHA-1 is an allowed hashing technique for generating digital signatures within the TLS protocol.
63 GPIO – General Purpose Input/Output
64
USB – Universal Serial Bus
65 SIM – Subscriber Identity Module
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Figure 4 – Vocality RoIP Front Panel
Figure 5 – Vocality RoIP Rear Panel
The M3-SE appliance provides the following physical ports and interfaces:
• Serial & Auxiliary I/O
o Serial
o GPIO
• Audio
• Ethernet
• USB
• Antenna connectors
• LEDs
• Reset button
• Power connector
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Figure 6 – M3-SE-MFGW Front View
Figure 7 – M3-SE-MFGW Angled View
Each of the listed physical ports maps to one of the defined FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces. These interfaces provide:
• Data Input
• Data Output
• Control Input
• Status Output
• Power
Physical interfaces for the RoIP and M3-SE appliances are described in Table 10 below:
Table 10 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
Physical Port/Interface
Quantity
FIPS 140-2 Interface
RoIP
M3-SE
Ethernet 2 2 Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
USB 1 2 Data Input
Data Output
Audio 4 8 Data Input
Data Output
Serial 4 8 Data Input
Data Output
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Physical Port/Interface
Quantity
FIPS 140-2 Interface
RoIP
M3-SE
GPIO 6 12 Data Input
Data Output
Antenna Connector 2 2 Data Input
Data Output
SIM Card Slot 1 - Control Input
LEDs 1 1 Status Output
Reset Button 1 1 Control Input
Power 1 1 Power Input
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The sections below describe the module’s roles and services and define any authentication methods employed.
2.4.1 Authorized Roles
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances support explicit role-based authentication. There are two roles (as required by
FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume:
• Crypto Officer (CO) – The CO role performs administrative services on the module, such as initialization,
configuration, and monitoring of the module. The CO has access to all Vocality Gateway Suite
“Administrator” and “Read-Write” privileges. Read-Write privileges are the same as Administrator except
that the User menu is not accessible.
• User – Users can view the current status of the module and employ the services of the module (including
IPsec, TLS, SRTP, and SNMPv3 services). Users have access to Vocality Gateway Suite “Read-Only”
privileges.
2.4.2 Operator Services
Descriptions of the services available to the CO role and User role are provided in Table 11 below. Please note that
the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the
following notation:
• R – Read: The CSP is read, sent, or input.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, or modified.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
• Z – The CSP is zeroized.
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Table 11 – Mapping of Module Services to Roles, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service
Operator
Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Perform initial
configuration
✓
Define the node name,
type, and license.
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
View platform
information
✓ ✓
View platform
information including
status, statistics, and
processes
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Switch to backup
image
✓
Switch to node backup
image (this results in an
automatic reboot)
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
All ephemeral keys/CSPs – Z
Restart ✓ Restart the node Command
Command
response
All ephemeral keys/CSPs – Z
Upgrade
distribution image
✓
Upgrade distribution
image firmware
Command
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
Distribution Upgrade Authentication Key – X
PBKDF2 Backup Password – R/X
Distribution Upgrade Decryption Key – W/X
All keys/CSPs – Z
Backup ✓ ✓
Backup configuration
files
Command
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
SNMPv3 Passphrase – W
Restore ✓
Restore configuration
files
Command
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
SNMPv3 Passphrase – W
Factory reset ✓
Reset system
configuration and
zeroize all keys/CSPs
Command
Command
response;
Status output
All keys/CSPs – Z
Configure platform
settings
✓
Configure NTP66, logging,
and HTTPS settings;
export audit logs;
manage registry client
settings
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
TLS Public Key – W
Configure network
settings
✓
Set networking mode;
manage IPv4/IPv6
settings; manage LAN
and WAN ports;
configure routing;
configure rate/QoS67
settings; Manage links
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Perform
diagnostics
✓ ✓
Perform ping and
traceroute commands
for node
Command
Command
response;
Status output
None
66
NTP – Network Time Protocol
67 QoS – Quality of Service
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Manage licenses ✓ Upload license files
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Manage users ✓
Manage users and
change their passwords
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
User Password – R/W
CO Password – R/W
Change password ✓ ✓ Change own password
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
User Password – R/W
CO Password – R/W
Manage Audio and
Talk-Group
settings
✓
Manage audio ports and
talk groups; configure
radio gateway TLS and
SRTP settings; add SIP
accounts; configure
voice data bypass mode
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Manage Secure
Tunnel settings
✓
Configure tunnel
settings; manage IPsec
certificates and keys;
configure IP data bypass
mode
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
IKE Private Key – W
IKE Public Key – W
IKE Pre-Shared Key (PSK) – W
IKE CA68 Root Public Key – W
Manage Failover
settings
✓
Set Multi-bearer policies
(including selection
mode, priority, and
revert settings) and
manage multi-bearer
availability
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Manage Registry
settings
✓
Configure registry server
settings
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Manage Dispatch
settings
✓
View unassigned ports,
create new talk groups
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Manage Serial
settings
✓
Configure serial port
information
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
None
Configure SNMP ✓
Configure SNMP settings
and SNMP user
information
Commands
and
parameters
Command
response;
Status output
SNMPv3 Passphrase – R/W/X
SNMPv3 Privacy Key – W
SNMPv3 Authentication Key – W
68 CA – Certificate Authority
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Establish IPsec
connection
✓
Establish an IPsec
session
Command Status output
IKE Public Key – R
IKE PSK – X
IKE CA Root Public Key – X
IKE Session Key – X
IKE Authentication Key – X
IPsec Session Key – X
IPsec Authentication Key – X
DRBG Seed – R/W/X
DRBG Entropy – R/X
DRBG ‘V’ Value – R/W/X
DRBG ‘Key’ Value – R/W/X
Establish TLS
session
✓ Establish a TLS session Command Status output
TLS Public Key – R
TLS Private Key – R/X
TLS Peer Public Key – R/X
DH/ECDH Private Key Component – W/X
DH/ECDH Public Key Component – R/W
DH/ECDH Peer Public Key Component – R/X
TLS Premaster Secret – R/W/X
TLS Master Secret – W/X
TLS Session Key – W/X
TLS Authentication Key – W/X
AES GCM IV69 – W/X
DRBG Seed – R/W/X
DRBG Entropy – R/X
DRBG ‘V’ Value – R/W/X
DRBG ‘Key’ Value – R/W/X
Establish SRTP
session
✓ Establish SRTP session Command Status output
SRTP Master Key – W/X
SRTP Session Key – W/X
SRTP Authentication Key – W/X
Show status ✓ ✓ Show the system status Command Status output None
2.4.3 Additional Services
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances provide a limited number of services for which the operator is not required to
assume an authorized role. Table 12 lists these unauthenticated services. None of these services disclose or
substitute cryptographic keys and CSPs or otherwise affect the security of the module.
Table 12 – Additional Services
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Zeroize
Zeroize ephemeral keys
and CSPs
Power cycle Status output All ephemeral keys/CSPs – Z
Perform On-Demand Self-Tests
Perform self-tests on
demand
Power cycle Status output All ephemeral keys/CSPs – Z
69 IV – Initialization Vector
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Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Reset
Resets module to
factory mode
Reset button Status output All keys/CSPs – Z
Authenticate operators
Authenticate operators
to the module
Command and
parameters
Status output
User Password – X
CO Password – X
2.4.4 Authentication
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances support role-based authentication. Role assumption is explicit and based on the
authentication credential employed. Module operators must authenticate to the module to assume an authorized
role and access module services. When changing roles, the operator must first log out of their current role, and
then re-authenticate to the module to assume the new role.
All operators authenticate to the RoIP and M3-SE appliances using a username and password (see Section 3.2.1
below for the password complexity rules). Table 13 provides the strength of the authentication mechanism used
by the module.
Table 13 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Module
Authentication Type Strength
Password By design, operator passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters, with 69 characters
(52 case-sensitive letters, 10 digits, and 7 special characters) possible for usage as
described in section 3.2.1.
The chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is at minimum:
1:202,087,559,770,880
which is less than 1:1,000,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
This calculation is the result of taking all possible combinations (698) and subtracting
the invalid combinations as the password requires at least one digit and one special
character. Therefore, (698) - possible combinations without a digit (598) - possible
combinations without a special character (628) + combinations without either a digit
or a special character (528), since these are double-counted by the previous two terms
= 202,087,559,770,880 possible combinations.
The authentication mechanism includes a one-second delay for each authentication
attempt, and after three consecutive login failures, the module locks out further login
attempts for 15 seconds. Assuming that no time is taken for each attempt, three
attempts would require 3 seconds (accounting for the one-second delay). This allows
for a maximum of 12 password attempts in a one-minute window.
The probability that a random attempt will succeed in one minute is:
1:202,087,559,770,880 / (12 passwords per minute), or
1:16,840,629,980,907
which is less than 1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
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The feedback of authentication data to an operator is obscured during authentication to the Node UI. The module
does not allow the disclosure, modification, or substitution of authentication data to unauthorized operators.
2.5 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module. The enclosures of each appliance
consist of hard, production-grade, metal components. These components are opaque within the visible spectrum.
The module includes only standard, production-quality integrated circuits, designed to meet typical production-
grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock/vibration, etc. The integrated circuits used in the
module are coated with commercial standard passivation.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances contain tamper-evident seals which are pre-applied at the factory before delivery.
The tamper-evident seals are placed over at least two screws securing the lid to the enclosure.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment of the module does not provide the module operator with access to a general-
purpose OS. The RoIP and M3-SE appliances employ a non-modifiable operating environment. The module’s
firmware (Firmware version: 5.0.1) is executed by an Intel Atom E3805 processor. The module runs the Yocto 2.5
(Sumo) OS, kernel version 4.15.
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 14. In compliance with IG 7.14, the module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by
available entropy.
Table 14 – Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES GCM IV 96-bit IV [Radio GW TLS]
Generated internally via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
with RBG construction
per Section 8.2.2 of NIST
SP 800-38D
[HTTPS]
Generated internally via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
with RBG construction
per Section 8.2.2 of NIST
SP 800-38D
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle IV for AES GCM
DH Private Key
Component
[Radio GW TLS]
256-bit DH private key
[HTTPS]
256-bit DH private key
[IKE]
256-bit DH private key
Generated internally via
Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Generation of TLS and IKE
shared secrets
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DH Public Key
Component
[Radio GW TLS]
2048-bit DH public key
[HTTPS]
2048-bit DH public key
[IKE]
2048, 3072, 4096, 6144,
8192-bit DH public key
[for the module]
Generated internally via
Approved DRBG
[for a peer]
Input in plaintext form
[for the module] Exits
the module in plaintext
form
[for a peer]
Never exits the module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Generation of TLS and IKE
shared secrets
ECDH Private Key
Component
Private component of ECDH
protocol
Generated internally via
Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Generation of TLS shared
secrets
ECDH Public Key
Component
Public component of ECDH
protocol
[for the module]
Generated internally via
Approved DRBG
[for a peer]
Input in plaintext form
[for the module] Exits
the module in plaintext
form
[for a peer]
Never exits the module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Generation of TLS shared
secrets
TLS Public Key [Radio GW70 TLS]
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096-bit
RSA public key
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521 ECDSA public key
[HTTPS]
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096-bit
RSA public key
1024, 2048, 3072-bit DSA
public key
All NIST-recommended
ECDSA curves
[for the module]
Generated externally,
imported in encrypted
form via TLS session
[for a peer]
Input in plaintext form as
part of TLS session
negotiation
[for the module]
Exits the module in
plaintext form
[for a peer]
Never exits the module
[for the module]
Plaintext in eMMC71 flash
[for a peer]
Plaintext in volatile
memory
Factory reset TLS authentication
1024-bit RSA public keys and
P-192, B-163, and K-163
ECDSA curves are used for
signature verification only
70 GW – Gateway
71 eMMC – embedded Multi-Media Controller
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
TLS Private Key [Radio GW TLS]
2048, 3072, 4096-bit RSA
private key
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
ECDSA private key
[HTTPS]
2048, 3072, 4096-bit RSA
private key
2048, 3072-bit DSA private
key
All NIST-recommended
ECDSA curves
Generated externally,
imported in encrypted
form via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset TLS authentication
TLS Pre-Master Secret DH/ECDH shared secret Derived internally via
DH/ECDH shared secret
computation
for DH/ECDH cipher
suites] Never exits the
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
upon completion of TLS
Master Secret
computation
Derivation of the TLS Master
Secret
TLS Master Secret 384-bit shared secret Derived internally using
the TLS Pre-Master
Secret via TLS KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Derivation of the TLS Session
Key and TLS Authentication
Key
TLS Session Key 128/256-bit AES key
128/256-bit AES GCM key
Derived internally using
the TLS Master Secret via
TLS KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Encryption and decryption of
TLS session packets
TLS Authentication Key [Radio GW TLS]
160/256/384-bit HMAC key
[HTTPS]
160/256/384-bit HMAC key
Derived internally using
the TLS Master Secret via
the TLS KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Authentication of TLS
session packets
SRTP Master Key 128/256-bit shared secret Generated internally
using FIPS approved CTR
DRBG
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Keying material used in
derivation of the SRTP
session and authentication
keys
SRTP Session Key 128/256-bit AES-CTR key Derived internally using
SRTP Master Key
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Encryption or decryption
during SRTP session
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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Page 27 of 46
CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SRTP Authentication
Key
160-bit HMAC key Derived internally using
SRTP Master Key
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Authentication of SRTP
session packets
SNMPv3 Passphrase Minimum of eight (8)
characters
Input in encrypted form
via TLS session
Exits the module in
encrypted form via TLS
session as part of config
backup file
Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Derivation of SNMPv3
privacy and authentication
keys
SNMPv3 Privacy Key 128-bit AES CFB key Derived internally using
the SNMPv3 passphrase
via SNMP KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Encrypting SNMPv3 packets
SNMPv3 Authentication
Key
160-bit HMAC key Derived internally using
the SNMPv3 passphrase
via SNMP KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Authenticating SNMPv3
packets
IKE Public Key 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096-bit
RSA public key
All NIST-recommended
ECDSA curves
[for the module]
Generated externally,
imported in encrypted
form via TLS session
[for a peer]
Input in plaintext form as
part of IKE/IPsec session
negotiation
[for the module]
Exits the module in
plaintext form
[for a peer]
Never exits the module
Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication during IKE
key exchange
1024-bit RSA public keys
and P-192, B-163, and K-163
ECDSA curves are used for
signature verification only
IKE Private Key 2048, 3072, 4096-bit
RSA private key
All NIST-recommended
ECDSA curves
Generated externally,
imported in encrypted
form via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication during IKE
key exchange
IKE CA Root Public Key 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096-bit
RSA public key
All NIST-recommended
ECDSA curves
Generated externally,
imported in encrypted
form via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication during IKE
key exchange
1024-bit RSA public keys
and P-192, B-163, and K-163
ECDSA curves are used for
signature verification only
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
IKE PSK 8-64 character string Input in encrypted form
via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication during IKE
key exchange
[for IKEv1 only] Keying
material used in derivation
of the IPsec/IKE session keys
and authentication keys
IKE Shared Secret Shared secret Derived internally via DH
shared secret
computation
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Keying material used in
derivation of the IKE/IPsec
session keys and
authentication keys
IKE Session Key 128/192/256-bit AES key Derived internally via IKE
KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Encryption and decryption of
IKE session packets
IKE Authentication Key 160/256/384/512-bit
HMAC key
Derived internally via IKE
KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Authentication of IKE session
packets
IPsec Session Key 128/192/256-bit AES key Derived internally via IKE
KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Encryption and decryption of
IPsec session packets
IPsec Authentication
Key
160/256/384/512-bit
HMAC key
Derived internally via IKE
KDF
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle;
session termination
Authentication of IPsec
session packets
User Password 8-32-character string Input in encrypted form
via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication to the
module
CO Password 8-32-character string Input in encrypted form
via TLS session
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Factory reset Authentication to the
module
DRBG Seed [for CTR DRBG]
384-bit value
[for HMAC DRBG]
440 bits (SHA1, SHA-256)
888 bits (SHA-384, SHA-512)
Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Seed material for SP 800-
90A DRBGs
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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CSP CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DRBG Entropy [for CTR DRBG]
Minimum 256-bit value
[for HMAC DRBG]
Minimum 128-bit value
(SHA-1)
Minimum 256-bit value
(SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512)
Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Entropy material for SP 800-
90A DRBGs
DRBG ‘V’ Value Internal state value Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Used for SP 800-90A HMAC
DRBG and CTR DRBG
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Internal state value Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Used for SP 800-90A HMAC
DRBG and CTR DRBG
Distribution Upgrade
Authentication Key
P-384 ECDSA public key Generated externally,
input at factory
Never exits the module Plaintext in eMMC flash Not applicable –
hardcoded public key
Used to verify signature on
distribution firmware image
upgrades
PBKDF2 Backup
Password
52-character string Input electronically in
encrypted form via TLS
session
Never output from
module
Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Deriving Distribution
Upgrade Decryption Key
Distribution Upgrade
Decryption Key
256-bit AES CBC key Derived internally using
PBKDF2 Backup
Password per NIST SP
800-132
Never exits the module Plaintext in volatile
memory
Reboot; power-cycle Used to decrypt firmware
images during distribution
firmware image upgrades
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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2.8 EMI / EMC
The base RoIP appliance was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (home use).
Additionally, three of the five remaining RoIP variants employ LTE modules from Quectel Wireless Solutions Co.,
Ltd. that are designed for operation in North America. These LTE modules were tested and awarded FCC IDs as
shown in Table 15 below.
Table 15 – Vocality RoIP Variant FCC IDs
RoIP Device LTE Module Model FCC ID FCC Test Lab
Vocality RoIP LTE(NA)
Retail Pack 1 Port
Quectel EC25-A XMR201605EC25A TA Technology (Shanghai)
Co., Ltd.
Vocality RoIP LTE(NAFD)
Retail Pack 1 Port
Quectel EC25-AF XMR201808EC25AF TA Technology (Shanghai)
Co., Ltd.
Vocality RoIP LTE(NAV)
Retail Pack 1 Port
Quectel EC25-V XMR201607EC25V TA Technology (Shanghai)
Co., Ltd.
The M3-SE appliance was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.9 Self-Tests
Cryptographic self-tests are performed by the module when the module is first powered up and conditionally
during run-time. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status,
and the error resolutions.
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances perform the power-up self-tests automatically when power is provided to the
module. Additionally, an operator can also perform the power-up self-tests on demand by rebooting the module
or power-cycling the appliance. Successful completion of the power-up self-tests is indicated by the module
successfully booting and a success message is written to /var/log/fips.log.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances perform the following self-tests at power-up:
• Firmware integrity check (HMAC SHA-256)
• Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o Cubic OpenSSL Cryptographic Library 1.0
▪ AES CTR mode encrypt KAT
▪ AES CTR mode decrypt KAT
▪ AES GCM encrypt KAT
▪ AES GCM decrypt KAT
▪ RSA signature generation KAT
▪ RSA signature verification KAT
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▪ DSA PCT72
▪ ECDSA PCT
▪ SHA KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ HMAC KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ DH Primitive “Z” computation test
▪ ECDH Primitive “Z” computation test
o Cubic MbedTLS Cryptographic Library 1.0
▪ AES CTR mode encrypt KAT
▪ AES CTR mode decrypt KAT
▪ AES GCM encrypt KAT
▪ AES GCM decrypt KAT
▪ AES CCM encrypt KAT
▪ AES CCM decrypt KAT
▪ RSA sign/verify KAT
▪ ECDSA PCT
▪ SHA KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ HMAC KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ DH Primitive “Z” computation test
▪ ECDH Primitive “Z” computation test
o Cubic Kernel Cryptographic Library 1.0
▪ AES CTR mode encrypt KAT
▪ AES CTR mode decrypt KAT
▪ SHA KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ HMAC KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
▪ CTR DRBG KAT
▪ HMAC DRBG KAT
o Cubic Libgcrypt Cryptographic Library 1.0
▪ AES CFB encrypt KAT
▪ AES CFB decrypt KAT
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are performed by the RoIP and M3-SE appliances whenever a new random number is
generated, the module returns from a bypass state (see section 3.2.5 for additional information on cryptographic
bypass), and when the module receives new firmware to be installed. Public-Key Validation of DH and ECDH key
pairs is also performed. Successful completion of the conditional self-test is indicated by the successful execution
of the service that required the test and is also recorded in /var/log/fips.log.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances perform the following conditional self-tests:
• Firmware update/load test using ECDSA signature verification
• Bypass tests
o IPSec tunnel bypass test
o Radio talk group bypass test
72 PCT – Pairwise Consistency Test
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• CRNGT73
for NDRNG
2.9.3 Critical Function Self-Test
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances implement the SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG and CTR DRBG random number
generators. The SP 800-90A specification requires that certain critical functions be tested to ensure the security
of the DRBGs. These critical functions are instantiation, generation, and reseed. Each of these critical functions
are tested by the module during the module’s power-up self-tests. Successful completion of the critical function
self-test is indicated by the module successfully booting and is recorded to /var/log/fips.log.
2.9.4 Self-Test Failures
The module immediately transitions to the “Critical Error” state in the event of a power-up self-test failure, CRNGT
for the NDRNG conditional self-test failure, or critical functions test failure. In the “Critical Error” state the module
logs the error to /var/log/fips.log, and automatically reboots the appliance (effectively inhibiting all data output
via the data output interfaces) to clear the error state. If the self-tests continue to fail, the CO should contact Cubic
support for assistance.
Failure of the Firmware Update/Load Test and the Bypass Test results in the module transitioning to the “Soft
Error” state. The failure of the Firmware Update/Load Test results in the module discarding the new firmware
image and continuing with the current image. In the event of a Bypass Test failure for an IPsec tunnel, an error is
logged, and the tunnel disabled. For a Bypass Test failure for a Radio talk group, an error is logged, and the talk
group is disabled.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The RoIP and M3-SE appliances do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS
140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation.
73 CRNGT – Continuous Random Number Generator Test
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3. Secure Operation
The sections below describe how to place and keep the Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway
Appliances in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Operating the module without following the guidance
herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the
scope of this Security Policy.
3.1 Setup and Configuration
The CO shall receive the module from Cubic via trusted couriers (e.g. United Parcel Service, Federal Express, etc.).
On receipt, the CO must check the package for any irregular tears or openings. If any such damage exists, the CO
shall contact Cubic immediately for instructions. The CO shall also retain the packing list, making sure all the items
on the list are present.
The RoIP and M3-SE appliances are shipped to the customer in a non-configured state. The CO is responsible for
inspecting, initializing, and configuring the module to run in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
To configure the module for the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, the CO must:
1. Inspect all tamper-evident seals
2. Perform setup and initialization steps
3. Configure network access
4. Upload licenses
5. Set up IPsec tunnels
6. Set up secure radio talk groups
To accomplish these tasks, the CO must follow the procedures detailed in the sections below (for more
information, please see the Vocality RoIP User Manual and the Vocality Gateway Suite User Manual.
3.1.1 Tamper-Evident Seal Inspection and End-User Application
The Vocality RoIP appliance has three tamper-evident seals applied to the device by the vendor during
manufacturing. Five tamper-evident seals are applied to the M3-SE appliance by the vendor during manufacturing.
Upon receipt of the modules, the CO shall visually inspect the factory-applied seals to ensure they are in the proper
locations and that they have not already been tampered.
On the Vocality RoIP appliance, three factory-applied seals cover a screw head on the bottom right of the front
cover and a screw head on each side of the device (for screws that secure the device cover). The label on the left
side of the device is placed on the screw head closest to the front of the device. The label on the right side of the
device is placed on the screw head farthest from the front of the device. Figure 8 below shows the factory-applied
seal locations for the Vocality RoIP appliance.
On the M3-SE-appliance, two factory-applied seals cover the screw heads on the bottom of the appliance that
secure the device cover as shown in Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11. Three additional seals are applied at the
factory to cover the screw heads on the M3-SE appliance fan cover (two seals) and radio module access cover
(one seal) as shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13. Figure 12 shows the placement of the two seals to cover the screw
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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Page 34 of 46
heads on the fan cover. Figure 13 shows the placement of the one seal to cover one of the screw heads on the
radio module access cover.
The CO is required to periodically inspect the appliance for evidence of tampering at intervals specified per end-
user policy. The CO must visually inspect the tamper-evident seals for tears, rips, dissolved adhesive, and other
signs of attempted tampering. If evidence of tampering is found during periodic inspection, the CO must take the
device out of operation and contact Cubic.
Seal 1 of 3
Seal 2 of 3
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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Figure 8 – Vocality RoIP Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals
Figure 9 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Straight View
Seal 1 of 5
Seal 2 of 5
Seal 3 of 3
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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Figure 10 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Angled View
Figure 11 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory-Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Bottom Side View
Seal 1 of 5
Seal 2 of 5
Seal 1 of 5
Seal 2 of 5
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
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Figure 12 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory Applied Tamper-Evident Seals – Fan Cover (Top and Angled Views)
Figure 13 – M3-SE-MFGW Factory Applied Tamper-Evident Seal – Radio Access Cover
3.1.2 Initialization
First time access to the RoIP and M3-SE appliances requires the CO to connect locally to each appliance’s Node UI
and perform the initialization steps via the Initial Configuration Wizard.
To complete the initial configuration, the CO shall perform the following steps:
Seal 3 of 5 Seal 4 of 5
Seal 3 of 5
Seal 4 of 5
Seal 4 of 5 Seal 3 of 5
Seal 5 of 5
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Page 38 of 46
1. Fit the external antennas to the SMA74
female ports of the appliance.
2. Connect the appliance to an IP network using the WAN (ETH1) Ethernet port.
3. Connect power.
4. Connect radios to audio and serial connectors, as required.
5. Ensure that the PC is connected to the ETH2 port and set to automatically acquire an IP address via DHCP75
.
6. Open your desktop web browser and type http://192.168.0.199 (default IP address for the unit).
7. The Initial Configuration Wizard will start.
8. Check Accept box and click Next.
9. Create the initial administrator user account by entering username and password and repeating password
in the configuration wizard box.
10. Click Next.
11. Select Enable to enable the WAN port and then click Finish.
3.1.3 Configure Secure Network Access
Each appliance has two Ethernet ports: one WAN port (ETH1) and one LAN port (ETH2). By default, all WAN access
to the appliance is disabled, and the LAN port is assigned to the default known IP address (refer to Section 3.1.2)
to perform the initialization steps.
After initialization, the CO must replace the known IP address for the LAN port, enable access to the WAN port,
and set up HTTPS access to the Node UI, the module’s Web-based management interface. After ensuring that the
WAN port is connected to an IP network and the LAN port is connected to Customer Premises Equipment (CPE),
the CO shall perform the following steps via the Node UI:
1. Login to Vocality RoIP using the administrator account created in Section 3.1.2.
2. If the customer wants to change the default LAN and WAN ports, navigate to Network > LAN Port and
Network > WAN Port and set up the IP address and network settings for each Ethernet port.
3. If the customer wants to change the default certificate, navigate to Tunnels > Certificate & Key
Management and upload a public HTTPS certificate and private key to be used by the appliance. This
certificate should be issued by a trusted CA.
4. If a certificate was loaded, navigate to Platform > Access and select the uploaded HTTPS certificate from
step 3.
5. Select the Minimum TLS Version (TLS V1.0, TLS V1.1, or TLSV 1.2).
For more information, refer to the Vocality RoIP User Manual and the Vocality Gateway Suite User Manual.
3.1.4 Upload Licenses
Certain Vocality Gateway Suite features are locked and must be activated by uploading pre-purchased licenses.
Once purchased, Vocality Support provides the CO with a single license file containing all feature licenses. The CO
shall upload the license file using the Licence menu of the Node
1. Select Upload new license file and browse.
2. Select the license file and click open.
3. Click Upload.
74 SMA – SubMiniature version A
75 DHCP – Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
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4. A pop-up window “Upload Licence” appears. Click continue.
5. At this point, it takes about five minutes while the unit restores factory defaults and reboots. Upon the
reboot, FIPS self-tests are performed.
6. Repeat steps 7-11 in section 3.1.2 (recreating the initial administrator account) and all the steps in section
3.1.3.
The following Vocality Gateway Suite features require licenses:
• Secure
• Failover
• Dispatch
• Radio (first radio port is licensed by default)
After the license file has been uploaded, the Licence page will display the current status of all licenses in use.
3.1.5 Set up IPsec Tunnels
If the Secure License Tunnel feature has been purchased, the CO shall set up IPsec tunnels to secure all IP traffic
communication between the module and peer nodes. To set up IPsec tunnels, the CO shall follow these steps:
1. If the customer wants to change the default public IKE certificate and private key, navigate to Tunnels >
Certificate & Key Management and upload a public IKE certificate and private key to be used by the
appliance. This certificate should be issued by a trusted CA.
2. If the customer want to change the defaults, upload the CA root certificate of the peer node, and the peer
node certificate ID76
.
3. Navigate to Tunnels > Summary > Add Tunnel > Launch Wizard to start the Tunnel Configuration Wizard.
4. Follow the steps in the Vocality RoIP Application Note 010 V1.1- IPsec Configuration to configure the IPsec
tunnel. Clicking in the question marks next to each field in the wizard also provides helpful information.
5. After reviewing configuration, click the Finish button. The tunnel will appear as Disabled by default on
the Tunnels > Summary page.
6. Configure the peer node with the same tunnel type and encryption parameters as the source node.
7. Using the Node UI for each node, navigate to Tunnels > Summary and select Enabled for the configured
tunnel. Click Continue on Enable Tunnel window.
For more information, refer to the “Define tunnels” and “Set up IPsec” sections of the Vocality Gateway Suite
User Manual. All the application notes referred to above may be found here:
https://support.vocality.com/hc/en-us/sections/360002860840-Application-Notes
3.1.6 Set up Secure Radio Talk Groups
The CO shall configure SRTP or TLS to secure radio talk group communication. To configure SRTP or TLS for radio
talk groups, the CO shall follow these steps:
1. First, configure radio audio ports by following the instructions in the Vocality RoIP Application Note 001
V1.0 - Audio Port Configuration Wizard.
2. Navigate to Modules → Radio > Talk Groups > Add Talk Group to open the Radio Talk Group Wizard.
3. Configure TLS by following the instructions in the Vocality RoIP Application Note 003 V1.0 -TLS Radio Talk
Group Wizard. Note that Radio Security must be licensed for TLS setup.
76 ID – Identifier
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4. Configure SRTP by following the instructions in the Vocality RoIP Application Note 007 V1.0 - Secure SIP.
For more information, refer to the “Set up Radio Talk Groups” section of the Vocality Gateway Suite User Manual.
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance
The CO is responsible for ensuring that the module is operating in its FIPS-Approved mode of operation. When
configured according to section 3.1 in this Security Policy, the module only runs in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation.
3.2.1 Password Complexity
Passwords have a 69-character password space (26 uppercase letters, 26 lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 7 special
characters). COs shall follow the password complexity policy below for creating the CO and User password:
• Passwords must contain at least eight characters
• Passwords must contain at least one digit (0 – 9)
• Passwords must contain one of the following special characters: !, £, $, %, ^, &, *
3.2.2 Monitoring Status
The CO shall be responsible for regularly monitoring the module’s status for FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
When configured according to the CO guidance in this security policy, the module only operates in the FIPS-
Approved mode.
The module’s operational status is indicated with LEDs (refer to the “LED meanings” section of the Vocality RoIP
User Manual for more information). The CO can also view the operational status by navigating to Platform > Status
via the Node UI, which displays general information about the appliance.
Navigating to License will show that a FIPS license is being used and indicates that all the FIPS self-tests have
passed.
3.2.3 Firmware Loading
The module’s firmware can be updated using the Node UI. After the CO uploads a new firmware image, the RoIP
performs the Firmware update/load test using ECDSA P-384 signature verification. If the test is passed, the CO is
notified of the success and the module automatically reboots to load the new firmware image. If the test is failed,
the module transitions to the “Soft Error” state and the module discards the new image.
Please note that, in order to maintain the modules’ validation status, only FIPS-validated firmware shall be loaded.
Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of the scope of this
Security Policy and will require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
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3.2.4 Zeroization
In order to zeroize all plaintext non-ephemeral keys and CSPs (except for hardcoded keys), the module must be
returned to the factory state. Zeroization can be accomplished in the following ways:
• Press the reset button on the appliance for more than five seconds
• Navigate to Platform > Config Files and click the Reset button via the Node UI
Once invoked, the effect of the zeroization process is immediate and will not allow sufficient time to compromise
any stored plaintext CSPs. After zeroization, the module will need to be rebooted and reinitialized to return to
operation.
3.2.5 Cryptographic Bypass Modes
While operating in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, radio talk group and IP network communications may
operate in a bypass mode, wherein voice and/or IP data is transmitted and received by the module as plaintext.
The module requires multiple independent actions in order to be placed into a bypass mode.
IPsec tunnels are configured and enabled as part of the initial configuration steps in section 3.1.5. To set the
exclusive bypass mode to bypass encryption for IP network connections, a CO must disable/delete the configured
IPsec tunnels or replace the IPsec tunnels with GRE or IP-in-IP tunnels (or IPsec with AH mode enabled). To do this,
the CO must follow one of these set of steps:
Option 1 (disable or delete all IPsec tunnels):
1. Navigate to Tunnels > Summary.
2. For each configured IPsec tunnel, select Disabled from the drop-down menu or click the Delete icon next
to the IPsec tunnel. A prompt will appear asking to confirm.
3. Click Continue to confirm changes.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 for the peer node.
Option 2 (replace IPsec tunnels with GRE or IP-in-IP tunnels):
1. Navigate to Tunnels > Summary.
2. For each configured IPsec tunnel, click the adjacent Edit icon.
3. Change the Tunnel Type field to IP-in-IP or GRE to send IP network data in plaintext or configure the IPsec
tunnel to use AH mode.
4. Configure all applicable parameters and review changes. Click Finish.
5. Repeat steps 1-4 for the peer node.
Radio talk groups are configured to use SRTP or TLS as part of the initial configuration steps in section 3.1.6. To
set the exclusive bypass mode to bypass encryption for radio talk group communication, a CO must set the secure
protocol to “none”. To do this, the CO must follow these steps:
1. Navigate to Radio > Talk Groups > Edit to open the Radio Talk Group Wizard.
2. Click the Next button to view the Secure Configuration page.
3. Under Secure Configuration, change the Type field to None. Configure all other relevant parameters.
4. Review the configuration and click the Finish button.
5. The customer must ensure that the remote server supports an unencrypted connection.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
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To determine if the connections are operating in a bypass mode, the CO can navigate to Tunnels > Summary to
check if IP network traffic is secured using IPsec tunnels, or to Radio > Talk Groups to check if radio talk group
traffic is secured using SRTP or TLS. If the SRTP or TLS protocols are not configured, or if one or more IP tunnels
are not configured to use IPsec (excluding AH mode), the module is operating in a bypass mode.
When returning from the bypass mode back to the non-bypass mode, the module performs the Cryptographic
Bypass Test to ensure correct encryption functionality.
For more information, refer to the “Define tunnels”, “Set up IPsec”, and “Set up Radio Talk Groups” sections of
the Vocality Gateway Suite User Manual.
3.3 User Guidance
While the CO is responsible for ensuring that the module’s physical security mechanisms are in place and that the
appliances are running in their FIPS-Approved mode of operation, Users should also monitor appliance status. Any
changes in the status of the appliances should immediately be reported to the CO. Additionally, when changing
their own password, Users should follow the password complexity rules listed in Section 3.2.1.
3.4 Additional Guidance and Usage Policies
This section notes additional guidance and policies that must be followed by module operators.
• Module operators shall ensure that only those algorithms and key sizes mentioned in Section 2.7
(Cryptographic Key Management) of this document are in use to remain in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation.
• After initial configuration and setup is complete, module operators shall ensure that all access to the Node
UI occurs over HTTPS to remain in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
• If power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, then any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or
decryption must be re-distributed.
• SNMPv3 mode must be configured, not SNMPv2C.
• When selecting DH groups for IKE, only the following groups shall be selected: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144,
and 8192-bit DH public keys.
• PoE is not recommended to be used.
• DTLS shall not be configured for Radio talk groups.
3.5 Non-FIPS-Approved Mode
When configured according to the CO guidance in this Security Policy, the module does not support a non-FIPS-
Approved mode of operation.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 43 of 46
4. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Table 16 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document.
Table 16 – Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
4G Fourth Generation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CA Certificate Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDH Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMS Cubic Mission Solutions
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CODEC Compression/Decompression
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DH Diffie-Hellman
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
eMMC embedded Multi-Media Controller
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
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Acronym Definition
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FOM FIPS Object Module
Gbps Gigabits per second
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GPIO General Purpose Input/Output
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
GW Gateway
HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
ID Identifier
IKE Internet Key Exchange
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAS-SSC Key Agreement Scheme - Shared Secret Computation
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
LMR Land Mobile Radio
LTE Long Term Evolution
M3 Micro, Mobile, Modular
MCU Microcontroller Unit
MFGW Multi-Function Gateway
N/A Not Applicable
NAT Network Address Translation
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PoE Power over Ethernet
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.7 July 8, 2022
Cubic Vocality RoIP and DTECH M3-SE Multi-Function Gateway Appliances
©2022 Cubic Corporation
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 45 of 46
Acronym Definition
PSK Pre-shared Key
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PTT Push-to-talk
PUB Publication
QoS Quality of Service
RoIP Radio over Internet Protocol
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory
SE Single Enclave
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMPv3 Simple Network Management Protocol version 3
SMA SubMiniature version A
SP Special Publication
SRTCP Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol
SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
UI User Interface
U.S. United States
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wireless Area Network
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com