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RapidIdentity FIPS Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version: 1.1 Date: 07/07/20
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Logical and Physical Cryptographic Boundaries...................................................... 5
1.1.1 Logical Cryptographic Boundary ........................................................................ 5
1.1.2 Physical Boundary ............................................................................................. 7
1.2 Modes of Operation .............................................................................................. 10
2 Cryptographic Functionality......................................................................................... 10
2.1 Critical Security Parameters .................................................................................... 15
2.2 Public Keys.............................................................................................................. 16
3 Roles, Authentication and Services............................................................................. 17
3.1 Assumption of Roles................................................................................................ 17
3.2 Services................................................................................................................... 17
4 Self-tests ........................................................................................................................ 21
5 Physical Security Policy ............................................................................................... 22
6 Operational Environment.............................................................................................. 23
6.1 Use of External RNG ............................................................................................... 23
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................ 23
8 Security Rules and Guidance ....................................................................................... 24
8.1 Basic Enforcement................................................................................................... 24
8.2 Basic Guidance........................................................................................................ 24
8.3 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs ................................................................ 24
8.4 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF .................................. 25
9 References and Definitions........................................................................................... 26
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Tested Environments ......................................................... 4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements ............................................................... 5
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................. 9
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ................................... 10
Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation .................... 12
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions .......................................... 13
Table 7 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only. ........... 13
Table 8 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ................................................................... 14
Table 9 – Public Keys ......................................................................................................... 15
Table 10 – Roles Description .............................................................................................. 16
Table 11 – Authenticated Services ..................................................................................... 17
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services ................................................................... 19
Table 13 – Power Up Self-tests ........................................................................................... 20
Table 14 – Conditional Self-tests ........................................................................................ 21
Table 15 – References ........................................................................................................ 25
Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions .................................................................................. 26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Block Diagram of the Software for the Module. .................................................... 6
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of the Physical Components of a typical GPC. ............................. 8
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Identity Automation RapidIdentity FIPS
Cryptographic Module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module is a cryptographic
library. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 requirements. The SW version is 1.0.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environment on the
general purpose computer (GPC) platforms detailed in Table 1.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Tested Environments
Operational Environments
Hardware
Platform
Processor
Operating System
.NET Framework
Version
CLR
Version
Google Pixel 3 Qualcomm
Snapdragon 845
Chipset
Android 10 .NET 4.5.2 CLR 4
Dell
PowerEdge
T630
Intel Xeon E5-
2630
Windows Server 2016
Standard on VMware ESXi 6.5
.NET 4.5.2 CLR 4
iPhone 11 Apple A13 Bionic
processor
iOS 13 Xamarin.iOS 13 CLR 4
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require a
FIPS 140-2 validated Cryptographic Library. The Module is a software-only embodiment; the
cryptographic boundary is the Windows Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file, bc-fips-1.0.1.dll.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are given in Table 2 as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and
Interfaces
1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
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Security Requirement Security Level
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
1.1 Logical and Physical Cryptographic Boundaries
1.1.1 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The executable for the RapidIdentity FIPS Cryptographic Module is: bc-fips-1.0.1.dll. This
module is the only software component within the Logical Cryptographic Boundary and the
only software component that carries out cryptographic functions covered by FIPS 140-2.
Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software
and hardware components of the computer. The BC classes are executed on the .NET
Framework Common Language Runtime (CLR) using the classes of the Framework Class
Library (FCL) . The CLR is the interface to the computer’s Operating System (OS) that is
the interface to the various physical components of the computer.
The physical components of the computer are discussed further in Section 6. Abbreviations
introduced in Figure 1 that describe physical components are: Central Processing Unit
(CPU), Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) and Input Output (I/O).
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Figure 1 – Block Diagram of the Software for the Module.
1.1.2 Physical Boundary
The RapidIdentity FIPS Cryptographic Module runs on a General Purpose Computer
(GPC). The Physical Cryptographic Boundary for the module is the case of that computer.
Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the physical components of a typical GPC and the ports
or interfaces across the Physical Cryptographic Boundary. All the physical components are
standard electronic components; there are not any custom integrated circuits or
components dedicated to FIPS 140-2 related functions.
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Abbreviations introduced in Figure 2 are: Basic I/O System (BIOS), Integrated Device
Electronics (IDE), Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA), Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), Universal Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and Universal Serial Bus (USB). Input or output ports are
designated by arrows with single heads, while I/O ports are indicated by bidirectional
arrows.
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of the Physical Components of a typical GPC.
For FIPS 140-2 purposes, the RapidIdentity FIPS Cryptographic Module is defined as a
“multi-chip standalone module”, therefore, the module’s physical ports or interfaces are
defined as those for the hardware of the GPC. These physical ports are separated into the
logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as shown in Table 3.
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The RapidIdentity FIPS Cryptographic Module is a software module only, and, therefore,
control of the physical ports is outside of the module’s scope. The module does provides a
set of logical interfaces which are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. When the module
performs self-tests or is in an error state, the module prevents all output on the logical data
output interface. Activities in the module are single-threaded, and when in an error state, the
module does not return any output data, only an error value.
The mapping of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces to the module is described in table 3.
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Interface Module Equivalent
Data Input API input parameters – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Data Output API output parameters and return values – plaintext and/or
ciphertext data.
Control Input API method calls – method calls, or input parameters, that
specify commands and/or control data used to control the
operation of the module.
Status Output API output parameters and return/error codes that provide
status information used to indicate the state of the module.
Power Startup/Shutdown of a process containing the module.
1.2 Modes of Operation
There will be two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in
FIPS-approved mode when the appropriate factory is called. To verify that a module is in the
Approved Mode of operation, the user can call a FIPS status method
(CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode()). If the module is configured to allow
approved and non-approved mode operation, a call to
CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the current thread of user
control into approved mode.
In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore,
exceptions will be called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved
Mode.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic
functions listed in Table 4 to Table 6, below.
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, and
Addendum to SP 800-38A (Oct 2010) ]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR,
CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
C1580,
C1581
CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
C1580,
C1581
CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits and Triple-
DES with 2-key1
,2
, 3-key
C1580,
C1581
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits
C1580,
C1581
DSA3
[FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key
Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only for
SigVer)
C1580,
C1581
1
2^20 block limit enforced by module.
2
In approved mode of operation, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than
verification purposes is non-compliant.
3
DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Signature Generation Component, Public
Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification, Public Key Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-1924
, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521, K-1634
, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-1634
, B-
233, B-283, B-409, B-571
C1580,
C1581
GCM/GMAC5
[SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
C1580,
C1581
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
C1580,
C1581
KAS6
[SP 800-56A] without key confirmation.
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE
C1580,
C1581
KAS
Component
[All of SP 800-56A EXCEPT KDF]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE
[SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE
C1580,
C1581
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific7
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, X9.63
KDF.
C1580,
C1581
Key Wrapping
Using Block
Ciphers8
[SP 800-38F]
Modes: AES KW, KWP
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (provides between 128
and 256 bits of strength)
C1580,
C1581
[SP 800-38F]
Mode: Triple-DES TKW
Key size: 3-key (provides 112 bits of strength)
C1580,
C1581
4
In approved mode of operation, the use of this curve for anything other than signature verification is non-
compliant.
5
Internal IV generation with an approved DRBG as outlined in Section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D, see section
8.2 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5.
6
EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256
bits of encryption strength; anything less than 112 bits of encryption strength is non-compliant). Keys are not
directly established into the module using EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman.
7
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
8
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
RSA [FIPS 186-4, FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998 and
PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS and PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature Verification, RSADP
Component Test
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only
for SigVer)
C1580,
C1581
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital
Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature
Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
C1580,
C1581
SHA-3,
SHAKE
[FIPS 202]
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512,
SHAKE128, SHAKE256
C1580,
C1581
Triple-DES
(Triple-DES)
[SP 800-67]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB, TCBC, TCFB64, TCFB8, TOFB, CTR
Key sizes: 2-key9
, 3-key
C1580,
C1581
Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
KAS using
SHA-512/224 or
SHA-512/256
[SP 800-56A-rev2] without key confirmation.
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE10
Keys are not established directly into the module using
ECCDH.
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.3
KAS
Components
using SHA-
512/224 or
SHA-512/256
[All of SP 800-56A-rev2 EXCEPT KDF Component]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE11
Keys are not established directly into the module using
ECCDH.
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.3
KAS
Component
ECCDH
Primitive
[All of SP 800-56A-rev2 EXCEPT KDF Component]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE
Keys are not established directly into the module using
ECCDH.
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.1
9
2^20 block limit is enforced by the module, encryption disabled.
10
Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with parameter set EE.
11
Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with parameter set EE.
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Algorithm Description IG Ref.
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a only.
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.6
Key Transport
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B] without key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Keys are not directly established into the module using RSA.
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.4
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Non SP 800-56A-
rev2 compliant
ECCDH12
[IG D.8] Scenario 6 – non-Approved (not compliant with SP
800-56A) Primitive only, a partial ECCDH Key agreement
scheme is allowed in an Approved FIPS Mode of operation.
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE
Keys are not established Into the module using ECCDH.
Non SP 800-56B
compliant RSA13
Key Transport
[IG D.9] RSA May be used by a calling application as part of a
key encapsulation scheme.
Key sizes: 2048 and 3072 bits
Keys are not established into the module using RSA.
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2]
Table 7 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only.
AES (non-compliant)
ARC4 (RC4)
Camellia
ChaCha
DSA (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
ElGamal
OpenSSL PBKDF
PKCS#12 PBKDF
Poly1305
RSA (non-compliant)
SEED
Serpent
SPHINCS-256
12
EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength; anything less than 112 bits of encryption strength is non-compliant).
13
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; anything
less than 112 bits of encryption strength is non-compliant).
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NewHope
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section in Table 8. All usage of these
CSPs by the Module (including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed
in Section 3.2.
Table 8 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-
38A (Oct 2010) ] AES (128/192/256) encrypt key14
AES Decryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-
38A (Oct 2010)] AES (128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DRBG(CTR AES)
V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input
(length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(CTR Triple-DES)
V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192 bits), entropy input
(length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(Hash)
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length
dependent on security strength)
DRBG(HMAC)
V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512
bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072 bits) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves)
private key agreement key
EC Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >=
224 bits) signature generation key.
HMAC Authentication
Key
[FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size
determined by security strength required (>= 112 bits).
RSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (2048/3072 bits) signature generation key
14
The AES-GCM key is generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is also generated
randomly and at least 96 bits. In the event of power loss the AES-GCM key will be lost and the consuming
application must ensure that new AES-GCM keys for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
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CSP Description / Usage
RSA Key Transport Key
[SP 800-56B] RSA (2048/3072 bits) key transport
(decryption) key
TLS KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-
Hash key for the specified TLS PRF.
Triple-DES
Authentication Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) CMAC key
Triple-DES
Encryption Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192 bits) encryption key
Triple-DES
Decryption Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) decryption key
Triple-DES
Wrapping Key
[SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping
key, (128 unwrapping only).
X9.63 KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of input for
the specified X9.63 PRF.
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
[SP 800-56A-rev2] Secret value used in construction of key
for underlying PRF.
2.2 Public Keys
Table 9 – Public Keys
CSP Description / Usage
DSA Verification
Key
[FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves)
public key agreement key
EC Verification Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves)
signature verification key
RSA Key Transport
Key
[SP 800-56B] RSA (2048/3072) key transport (encryption)
key.
RSA Verification
Key
[FIPS 186-4] RSA (1024/1536/2048/3072) signature
verification key
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The
cryptographic module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the
owner of the thread that instantiates the Module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is
allowed.
Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the Module. The Module does not support a
maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The Module leverages the CLR to allow multiple
threads (concurrent operations), and the operating system and CLR manage separate
memory for each thread. In addition, there is high level thread management implemented by
the module. The module does not support authentication.
Table 10 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type
CO Cryptographic Officer –
Initialize the module.
N/A – Authentication not
required for Level 1
User User – use of the
complete API.
N/A – Authentication not
required for Level 1
3.2 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 and Table 12 below. Each
service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.
Table 11 lists the services. The second column provides a description of each service and
availability to the Cryptographic Officer and User, in columns 3 and 4, respectively. All
services available to the User are also available to the Cryptographic Officer. Only one role
may be active at a time and the module does not allow concurrent operators, although an
operator may perform more than one task concurrently.
Authentication of the Cryptographic Officer and/or User is not supported by the module but
is a task performed by the host environment.
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Table 11 – Services
Service Description
C
O
U
Initialize Module and
Run Self-Tests on
Demand
The CLR will call the static constructor for self-tests
on module initialization. X
Show Status A user can call CryptoStatus.IsReady() at any time to
determine if the module is ready.
IsInApprovedOnlyMode() can be called to determine
the FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the CLR garbage collector on
thread termination when objects are reclaimed.
X
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Authentication Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures. X
DRBG (SP800-90A)
output
Used for random number and IV generation.
X
Key Generation – Based
on DRBG (SP800-90A)
Used for key generation.
X
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3
message digest, SHAKE output.
X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a
value suitable to be used for a master secret in TLS
from a pre-master secret and additional input.
X
X9.63 Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a
value suitable to be used for a secret key from a
input secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-56A-rev2
Concatenation
Derivation Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a
value suitable to be used for a secret key from a
input secret and additional input.
X
Password-Based Key
Derivation Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a
key using an encoding of a password and an
additional function such as a message hash.
X
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Service Description
C
O
U
Key Agreement
Schemes
Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-
56A-rev2).
X
Key Wrapping Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-
DES)
X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-
DES)
X
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-
provided function
X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access
CSPs
X
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the DLL. The ability of a thread
to invoke unapproved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module
as approved mode only. In approved only mode no unapproved services are accessible.
Table 12 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module
services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before
the uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after
a CSP is imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the
module overwrites an existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
AES
Keys
EC
CDH
Keys
DRBG
Keys
DSA
Keys
ECDSA
Keys
HMAC
Keys
KDF
Secret
Values
RSA
Keys
Triple-DES
Keys
Initialize Module and Run Self-Tests
on Demand
Show Status
Zeroize/Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption R R
Data Decryption R R
MAC Calculation R R
Signature Calculation R R R
Signature Verification R R R
DRBG (SP800-90A) Output R
Key Generation – Based on
DRBG (SP800-90A)
G G G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message Hashing R
TLS Key Derivation Function R
X9.63 Derivation Function R
SP 800-56A-rev2 Concatenation
Derivation Function
R
Password-Based Key Derivation
Function
G,R
Key Agreement Schemes R
Key Wrapping (RSA, AES, Triple-
DES)
R R R R
Key Unwrapping (RSA, AES, Triple-
DES)
R R R R
NDRNG Callback G
Utility
Note: keys are not established directly into the module using derivation functions or
unwrapping schemes.
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4 Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate
correctly, and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available
on demand by power cycling the Module.
On power-up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 13
below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by
the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The
module will output a detailed error message when CryptoStatus.IsReady() is called. The
error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and calling CryptoStatus.IsReady()
again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.
Table 13 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Software
Integrity
HMAC-SHA512
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
SP 800-56A-
rev2 Primitive Z
KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
EC Curve: P-256
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
KAS KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation and KDF
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EB
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB,
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Test Target Description
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-
CMAC
KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
Extendable-
Output
functions (XOF)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs:SHAKE128, SHAKE256
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
MD5 KAT performed to verify operation of MD5 digest used in TLS 1.0
KDF.
KDF,
Password-
Based
KATs: None during SP 800-132 vendor affirmation period per IG D.6
Key Transport
Using RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 14 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the NDRNG.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested
from the DRBG (on approved and unapproved DRBG).
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair
generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key pair
generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair
generation.
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally on approved and unapproved DRBG, per SP
800-90A Section 11.3.
SP 800-56A
Assurances
Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A-rev2 Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2,
and/or 5.6.3. Required per IG 9.6.
5 Physical Security Policy
The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.
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6 Operational Environment
The Module is as a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The Module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved
operational environment list. Each approved operating system manages processes and
threads in a logically separated manner. The Module’s user is considered the calling
application that instantiates the Module within the process space of the CLR. When the
Module is not otherwise configured, it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.
6.1 Use of External RNG
The module makes use of the .NET class RNGCryptoServiceProvider to provide entropy
when required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and
seeding configuration for the DRBG that is using it. In approved mode the minimum amount
of entropy that would be requested is 112 bits with a larger minimum being set if the security
strength of the operation requires it. The module will wait until the
RNGCryptoServiceProvider returns the requested amount of entropy.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against
its internal implementations. There are two countermeasures used.
The first is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by
strictly avoiding “fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to
compare a MAC, signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison
passes or fails.
The second is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both
protect the RSA algorithm.
Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a
random input into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is
produced. The random input makes it impossible for a third party observing the private key
operation to attempt a timing attack on the operation as they do not have knowledge of the
random input and consequently the time taken for the operation tells them nothing about the
private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or
signature verification operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before
the result of the decryption or signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect
against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the correctness the private key calculations
involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected errors in the use of RSA
private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the private value of
the RSA key.
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8 Security Rules and Guidance
8.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the
security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements
of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.
1. The module shall provide two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-
tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error
states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
10.The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical
boundary.
11.The module does not output intermediate key values.
8.2 Basic Guidance
Functionality in the module is provided via distinct classes that provide access to the FIPS
approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module.
When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing
implementations of algorithms which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly
disabled.
8.3 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly, where an IV is not generated randomly the
module supports the importing of GCM IVs.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of
an approved DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In approved mode, users of the module must not use GCM with an externally generated IV
unless the source of the IV is also FIPS approved for GCM IV generation.
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Per IG A.5, section 2.1 of this security policy also states that in the event module power is
lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for
encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
8.4 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF
must only be used for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-
compliant.
In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14
bytes (112 bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count
associated with the PBKDF should be as large as practical.
As the module is a general purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the
levels of use for the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a
password should at least contain enough entropy to be unguessable and also contain
enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for the key being generated. In the
event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII a 14 byte password is unlikely to
contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, “Security
Considerations” of SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count
selection.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 15 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31
X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for
the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program, January 11, 2016.
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
SP 800-38A
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
SP 800-56A-rev2
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography Revision 2.
SP 800-56B
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
SP 800-67
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions
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Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BC Bouncy Castle
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CLR Common Language Runtime
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DLL Dynamic Link Library
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Authority
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCL Framework Class Library
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG See References
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
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Acronym Definition
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Non Applicable
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PRF Pseudorandom Function
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XOF Extendable-Output Function