Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic
Module
NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
FIPS 140-2, LEVEL 3
Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-000148-001 Rev. F, Copyright © 2022 Thales
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Document Information
Document Part Number 002-000148-001
Release Date March 31, 2022
Revision History
Revision Date Reason
B December 1, 2021 Initial release.
C September 14, 2021 Updates to address CMVP coordination.
D December 1, 2021 Additional algorithm certificates added.
E February 9, 2022 Addressed comments from CMVP coordination.
Added new hardware part number 808-000064-006.
F March 31, 2022 Addressed comments from CMVP coordination surrounding key
strength caveats.
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2022 Thales. All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are trademarks and service marks of Thales
and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All other trademarks and service marks,
whether registered or not in specific countries, are the property of their respective owners.
Disclaimer
All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Thales and/or its
subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual
property protection in connection with such information.
Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise,
under any intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Thales’s information.
This document can be used for informational, non-commercial, internal and personal use only provided that:
 The copyright notice below, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice appear
in all copies.
 This document shall not be posted on any network computer or broadcast in any media other than on
the NIST CMVP validation list and no modification of any part of this document shall be made.
Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.
The information contained in this document is provided “AS IS” without any warranty of any kind. Unless
otherwise expressly agreed in writing, Thales makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of information
contained herein.
Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
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Thales hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein,
including all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement.
In no event shall Thales be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect, special or
consequential damages or any damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages resulting from loss
of use, data, profits, revenues, or customers, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of
information contained in this document.
Thales does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall not
incur, and disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security
standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves according
to the state of the art in security and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no circumstances,
shall Thales be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case of any successful attack against
systems or equipment incorporating Thales products. Thales disclaims any liability with respect to security
for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result from any use of its products. It is further
stressed that independent testing and verification by the person using the product is particularly encouraged,
especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or insecure functioning could result in damage to
persons or property, denial of service or loss of privacy.
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................................5
Acronyms and abbreviations............................................................................................................................5
PREFACE.............................................................................................................................8
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................9
1 Introduction....................................................................................................................10
1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................................10
1.2 Scope ............................................................................................................................................10
1.3 Validation Overview.......................................................................................................................10
1.4 Functional Overview......................................................................................................................11
2 Module Overview ...........................................................................................................12
2.1 Module Specification .....................................................................................................................12
2.2 Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................13
Trusted Path..................................................................................................................................14
SmartCard Reader ........................................................................................................................15
2.3 Roles and Services........................................................................................................................16
Roles .............................................................................................................................................16
Services.........................................................................................................................................17
2.4 Authentication................................................................................................................................27
Activation.......................................................................................................................................29
M of N............................................................................................................................................29
2.5 Physical Security...........................................................................................................................29
Environmental Failure Protection...................................................................................................29
Secure Transport Mode.................................................................................................................30
Fault Tolerance..............................................................................................................................30
2.6 Operational Environment...............................................................................................................30
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ...................................................................................................30
FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations...................................................................................30
Non-Approved Algorithm Implementations....................................................................................38
2.8 Critical Security Parameters ..........................................................................................................39
Key Generation..............................................................................................................................46
Key Import and Export...................................................................................................................46
2.9 Self Tests ......................................................................................................................................47
Power-On Self Tests .....................................................................................................................47
Conditional Self-Tests ...................................................................................................................48
3 Guidance .......................................................................................................................49
3.1 Identifying the Module Version ......................................................................................................49
3.2 Approved Mode of Operation ........................................................................................................50
Acronyms
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ACRONYMS
Acronyms and abbreviations
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BBRAM Battery Backed Random Access Memory
CO Crypto Officer
CU Crypto User
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CVL Component Validation List
DAC Device Authentication Certificate
DAK Device Authentication Key
DH Diffie Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EdDSA Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP Environment Failure Protection
EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference
EMC Electro-Magnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSC Firmware Signing Certificate
FSK Firmware Signing Key
Acronyms
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Term Definition
GSK Global Storage Key
HOC Hardware Origin Certificate
HOK Hardware Origin Key
HRNG Hardware Random Number Generator
HSM Hardware Security Module / Host Security Module
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
ICD Interface Control Document
I/O Input / Output
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation Function
KCV Key Cloning Vector
KDF Key Derivation Function
KTS Key Transport Scheme
LED Light Emitting Diode
LSC License Signing Certificate
LSK License Signing Key
MAC Message Authentication Code
MIC Manufacturer’s Integrity Certificate
MIK Manufacturer’s Integrity Key
MSK Manufacturer’s Signature Key
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PEC Password Encryption Certificate
PED PIN Entry Device
PEK Password Encryption Key
Acronyms
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Term Definition
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POST Power-On Self Test
PSK Partition Storage Key
PSO Partition Security Officer
PU Public User
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request For Comments
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMK Security Officer’s Master Key
SP Special Publication
STM Secure Transport Mode
TUK3 Token Unwrapping Key 3
TWK3 Token Wrapping Key 3
TUK4 Token Unwrapping Key 4
TWK4 Token Wrapping Key 4
USB Universal Serial Bus
USK User's Storage Key
Preface
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PREFACE
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic
Module in the technical terms of [FIPS 140-2], 'Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules', 12-03-
2002.
General information on Thales HSM alongside other Thales products is available from the following
sources:
 the Thales internet site contains information on the full line of available products at
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com
 product manuals and technical support literature is available from the Thales Customer Support Portal
at https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com/csm
 technical or sales representatives of Thales can be contacted through one of the channels listed on
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/contact-us
NOTE: You require an account to access the Customer Support Portal. To create a new
account, go to the portal and click on the REGISTER link.
References
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REFERENCES
[FIPS 140-2] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 140-2, ‘Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules’, May 25, 2001 (including change notices 12-02-2002).
[FIPS 140-2 IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program, May 1, 2021.
[FIPS 180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard
(SHS), NIST, August 2015.
[FIPS 186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, Digital Signature Standards
(DSS), NIST, July 2013.
[FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Specification for the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001.
[FIPS 198-1] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008.
[SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
– Methods and Techniques, December 2001.
[SP800-38F] NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012.
[SP800-56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Revision 3, April 2018.
[SP800-56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, Revision 2, March 2019.
[SP800-56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-
Establishment Schemes, Revision 2, August 2020.
[SP800-90Ar1] NIST Special Publication SP800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Bit Generators, Revision 1, June 2015.
[SP800-90B] NIST, SP800-90B, “Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation”, January 2018.
[SP800-108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009.
[SP800-131Ar2] NIST Special Publication 800-131A revision 2, Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019.
[SP800-132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation:
Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010.
[SP800-133] NIST Special Publication 800-133 revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, June 2020
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories, v2.1.
Introduction
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the security policies enforced by Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module.
1.2 Scope
This document applies to hardware versions 808-000064-005 and 808-000064-006 with firmware
version 7.7.1 and bootloader version 1.3.0 or 1.5.0.
Both hardware parts are functionally equivalent with the difference being limited to supply choice for one of the
non-security enforcing internal components.
The security policies described in this document apply to the Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module
only and do not include any security policy that may be enforced by the host appliance or server.
The security policies described in this document apply to the Cloning (CL) configurations with PED and
Password authentication mechanisms of the Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module.
The module is configured with support for both Password and PED based authentication by a license file
loaded at the factory. The authentication type is selected by the operator during HSM initialization.
1.3 Validation Overview
The cryptographic module meets all level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-2 as summarized in the table below:
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles and Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Machine Model 3
Physical Security 3 + EFP
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
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Security Requirements Section Level
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1.4 Functional Overview
The Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic
module in the small form factor device that connects to a computer workstation or server via USB. The
cryptographic module is contained in its own enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering.
The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure
enclosure.
A module may be explicitly configured to operate in either FIPS 140-2 Approved mode, or in a non-FIPS mode
of operation using steps outlined in section 3, ‘Guidance’ and where these are performed during initialization of
the module.
The module only supports a single approved mode of operation as set out in FIPS IG 1.7 ‘Multiple Approved
Modes of Operation’ and any configuration changes to settings defining the ‘Approved Mode of Operation’ will
trigger a zeroization of all partition CSP and require the full reset and re-initialization of the module.
A module is accessed directly (i.e., electrically) over the USB communications interface. It also has a LCD
touch screen for displaying system status.
A module provides secure key storage for symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs and does not provide any
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services other than transferring keys to and from the host HSM
device. Access to key material services for users and user application software is provided through the PKCS
#11 programming API, which is implemented over the module’s proprietary command interface (ICD).
A module may host multiple ‘user partitions’ that are cryptographically separated and are presented as ‘virtual
tokens’ to user applications. A single ‘admin partition’ exists that is dedicated to the HSM Security Officer and
Administrator role. Each partition must be separately authenticated in order to make it available for uses.
A SmartCard interface is present at the cryptographic module physical boundary but is unused in the certified
configuration of the device as Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module.
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2 Module Overview
2.1 Module Specification
The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone hardware module in the small form factor device. The
cryptographic boundary of the module is shown below:
Cryptographic Boundary
Top side view
Top view
Bottom side view
SafeNet Luna Backup HSM
Smart Card reader
Power supply USB port
LCD touch screen
Figure 1: Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module and cryptographic boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined to encompass all components inside the enclosure, but excluding the
following:
 LCD screen, ribbon cable and connector – this is currently only used to display status information;
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 Internal Backup Battery – this is used to power the module real-time clock;
 SmartCard connector – this is un-used in the certified version of cryptographic module.
2.2 Ports and Interfaces
The module supports the following physical ports and interfaces:
 USB port
 LCD touch screen
 SmartCard reader
 Power supply
Table 2: Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Interfaces to Physical and Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Interface Physical Interface Logical Interface
Data Input USB Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED –
remote connection)
Bootloader command protocol
SmartCard reader N/A - deactivated in certified firmware
configuration and with the physical
connector excluded from the
cryptographic module boundary.
LCD touch screen Touch events
Data Output USB Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED –
remote connection)
Bootloader command protocol
SmartCard reader N/A - deactivated in certified firmware
configuration and with the physical
connector excluded from the
cryptographic module boundary.
Control Input USB Data I/O
Luna ICD
Status Output USB Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED –
remote connection)
Bootloader command protocol
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FIPS 140-2 Interface Physical Interface Logical Interface
LCD touch screen System status
Power 5V - generated from an
external 12V power
supply module or USB
port on the host machine
N/A
3.6V battery N/A
Trusted Path
If configured, the module can use a Thales Luna PED as the external data input/output devices. The Thales
Luna PED connects to the module remotely over a secure network connection. The Thales Luna PED is used to
pass authentication data and CSPs to and from the cryptographic module. In cases of the Luna PED, CSP’s
and authentication data are stored in an iKey connected to the Luna PED.
Any iKey, once data has been written to it, is an Identification and Authentication device and must be
safeguarded accordingly by the administrative or operations staff responsible for the operation of the module
within the customer’s environment.
The following types of iKey1
are used with the Luna PED:
 Orange (RPV) Key – for the storage of the Remote PED Vector (RPV);
 Blue (Security Officer) Key – for the storage of HSM Security Officer, Partition Security Officer and
Administrator authentication data2
;
 Black (Crypto Officer) Key – for the storage of Crypto Officer authentication data;
 Grey (Crypto User) Key – for the storage of Crypto User authentication data;
 Red (Cloning Domain) Key – for the storage of the cloning domain data, used to control the ability to clone
to another cryptographic module or to a backup module; and
 White (Auditor) Key – for the storage of Auditor authentication data.
1
Separate iKe are used when M of N token splitting is used to share responsibilities for this role between different
operators.
2
Separate iKey can be used when these roles are assigned to different operators
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Figure 2: Thales Luna PED and iKey
When configured, the user connects the Thales Luna PED to a USB port on a management workstation.
Remote PED operation use a secure protocol that authenticates both the Remote PED and the module and
establishes an encrypted and authenticated communications channel between the module and the Remote
PED.
The logical path between the cryptographic module and the Remote PED is secured in the manner described
below:
 Thales Luna PED and cryptographic module will use the C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) scheme from [SP800-56Ar3]
to establish a CSP Wrapping Key (CWK) and MAC key (DMK) for encrypting the session and
authenticating each other.
 Encryption of messages between the Luna PED and cryptographic module uses AES-256 in CTR Mode and
with each encrypted message additionally protects it using a HMAC-256 MAC. This is compliant with
requirements from [SP800-38F] for key transport.
Sensitive data in transition between a Luna PED and an HSM is end-to-end encrypted: plaintext PED data is
never exposed beyond the HSM and the Luna PED boundaries at any time. Inherent security of the PED/HSM
connection and associated protocols allows the usage of otherwise unprotected communications all the way
through the data path between the devices.
SmartCard Reader
The Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module does have a physical SmartCard reader to support a
SmartCard authentication mechanism. The firmware configuration in this Security Policy does not activate the
SmartCard authentication mechanism so the SmartCard reader is not used.
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2.3 Roles and Services
Roles
The module supports the following roles:
Table 3: Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module Roles
Role Responsibilities
HSM Security Officer (HSM SO) Module-level role.
Initializes and configures the module for operation.
Creates user partitions.
Performs key management tasks for the admin partition.
Performs cryptographic operations for the admin partition.
Configures HSM level policies.
Updates module firmware.
Manages Administrator role3
.
Administrator Optional admin partition-level Crypto Officer like role.
Performs key management tasks for the admin partition.
Performs cryptographic operations for the admin partition.
Auditor (AU) Module-level role.
Initializes, configures, and manages the secure audit logging feature.
Partition Security Officer (PSO) User partition-level role.
Configures container policies for user partition.
Manages the CO Role3
.
Partition Crypto Officer (CO) User partition-level role.
Generates partition cryptographic keys for use by cryptographic services
accessing the partition.
Uses container keys4
in order to support cryptographic services.
Manages the CU Role3
.
Partition Crypto User (CU) User partition-level role.
Uses partition cryptographic keys.
Public User (PU) Zeroizes HSM from local interfaces via command.
Retrieval of status information.
Collects module utilization statistics.
Power cycle.
3
Role is responsible for managing another role using the services (Initialize Role, Reset Role Authentication Data)
defined in Table 5.
4
Asymmetric Key Pairs (general partition) and Symmetric Keys (general partition).
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The mapping of the cryptographic module’s roles to the roles defined in [FIPS 140-2] can be found in the table
below:
Table 4: Mapping of [FIPS 140-2] Roles to Module Roles
FIPS 140-2 Role Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic
Module
Role Scope
Crypto Officer HSM Security Officer Module
Auditor Module
Partition Security Officer User Partition
User Administrator Admin Partition
Partition Crypto Officer User Partition
Partition Crypto User User Partition
Unauthenticated
User
Public User Module/Partition
Services
All services listed in the table below can be accessed.
For a complete description of CSP referenced from the table please see Table 10: Summary of CSPs.
Table 5: Roles and Access Rights by Service
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
HSM Factory Reset. Erased (for ALL
partition):
PSK, USK, DRBG
Internal State, KCV,
SMK, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general
partition), Symmetric
Keys (general
partition).
In addition, the
following HSM level
keys are erased: SALK,
CWKHSM, CWKPED,
DEKHSM, DMKHSM,
DEKPED, DMKPED.
x x x x x x x Does not require user login.
Factory reset deletes all roles
(including HSM SO), all users
and objects and sets all HSM
settings and policies to default
values.
Can be performed by any role
as equivalent to destroying the
HSM through other means if
physical access to the HSM is
possible.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the HSM
(operation resets the
admin partition,
deletes all user
partitions (if present),
initializes the HSM
SO role and creates /
selects cloning
domain secret
(KCV)).
Erased:
For ALL partition if
present – USK, PSK,
SMK, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general
partition), Symmetric
Keys (general
partition).
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, USK,
PSK, KCV, Stored
User Password Hash.
Used: DRBG Internal
State, PSK, USK,
GSK, User Password,
PED Authentication
Data, Password.
x x x x x x x Operation must be performed
by the HSM SO unless the
HSM has been factory reset
first.
If performed without the factory
reset, the HSM SO, AU and
KCV for the Admin Partition are
maintained through
initialisation.
If factory reset has been
performed prior to initialising
the HSM SO, any role with the
ability to access the LunaCM
Command Line Interface (CLI)
can perform initialization.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Create a user
partition.
Use: DRBG Internal
State.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, KCV.
x - - - - - - None.
Delete a user
partition.
Erased (for partition
instance of key
object):
DRBG Internal State,
PSK, USK, KCV, SMK,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition).
x - - - - - - Deleting a partition erases all
partition object and roles.
Query HSM status. None. x x x x x x x None.
Query partition
status.
None. x x x x x x x None.
Query HSM
configuration.
None. x x x x x x x None.
Query partition
configuration.
None. x x x x x x x None.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Set HSM Level Policy
(General).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
For all partitions:
DRBG Internal State,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition),
USK, PSK, KCV, SMK.
x - - - - - - None.
Set Partition Level
Policy (Admin
Partition).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition),
SMK.
x - - - - - - None.
Set Partition Level
Policy (User
Partition).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition),
SMK.
- - - x - - - None.
Update Firmware. Used: Root Certificate,
Firmware Signing
Certificate.
x - - - - - - None.
Trigger HSM
zeroization.
Erase: As per Factory
Reset above but with
the following
omissions: CSP
associated with the
Audit partition and AU
role are not zeroized
and persist. RPV
persists.
x x x x x x x Can be performed by any role.
Equivalent to destroying the
HSM through other means if
physical access to the HSM is
possible.
Trigger user partition
zeroize.
Erased: USK, PSK,
KCV, SMK,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition).
x x x x x x x This command is currently
supported by the Luna ICD
command library but isn’t
currently made available using
any of the customer facing API
(such as the Cryptoki API).
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Load Configuration
Update File (CUF).
Used: Root Certificate
and License Signing
Certificate.
x - - - - - - None.
Query the audit log
status.
None. x x x x x x x None.
Submit external
messages for entry
into secure audit log.
Used: SALK, Secure
Audit AppID-HMAC
Key.
x x x x x x x None.
Configure the audit
logging level and
destination for
offload.
None. - - x - - - - None.
Export/import audit
log secret key.
Used: RDK.
Read: SALK.
- - x - - - - None.
Set time on HSM
Real Time Clock
(RTC).
None. - - x - - - - The RTC is used for time-
stamps on logs and separately
for enforcing
CKA_START_DATE and
CKA_END_DATE object
attributes when Partition
Policy (39) Allow Start/End
Date Attributes is enabled.
Validate the audit log. Used: SALK. - - x - - - - None.
Clone SMK between
Partitions.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, Root Certificate,
MIC, HOC, TWK3 and
TWC3 (CPV1) and
TUK4, TWK4 (CPV3),
KEVs (CPV1 only),
KEVt, KCV and Cloning
Transfer Key.
Read/Write: DRBG
Internal State, SMK.
x - - - x - - Used to underpin partition
backup/restore operations
to/from Luna Backup HSM.
HSM SO is able to clone (or
receive) the SMK from/to the
Admin Partition.
Partition CO is able to clone (or
receive) the SMK from/to the
user partition.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Clone partition
objects between
Partitions.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, Root Certificate,
MIC, HOC, TWK3 and
TWC3 (CPV1) and
TUK4, TWK4 (CPV3),
KEVs (CPV1 only),
KEVt, KCV and Cloning
Transfer Key.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general
partition), Symmetric
Keys (general
partition).
x x - - x x - Used to underpin partition
backup/restore operations
to/from Luna Backup HSM.
Partition CU is able to clone
public key objects only.
Store Partition Data
Object.
None. x x x - x - x Used to underpin partition
backup/restore operations
to/from Luna Backup HSM.
Used to store Scalable Key
Storage (SKS) key blobs
extracted from other HSM as
data objects.
When stored on Luna Backup
HSM – the SKS key blobs are
not decrypted and the HSM is
used for external storage
exclusively.
Read Partition Data
Object.
None. x x x - x - x Used to underpin partition
backup/restore operations
to/from Luna Backup HSM.
Enable/disable STM. Use: DRBG Internal
State, STM Nonce.
Write: DRBG Internal
State.
x x x x x x x Command can be executed un-
authenticated if HSM is in
zeroized state otherwise
requires HSM SO role.
Request HSM self-
test operation.
None. x x x x x x x None.
Query Role Status. None. x x x x x x x None.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the
Administrator.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, USK, PSK, PEK.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
x - - - - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the AU. Use: DRBG Internal
State, USK, PSK, PEK.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
x x x x x x x AU can be initialized from a
public session to the Admin
partition of the HSM, hence is
accessible to all roles.
PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the Partition
SO.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, USK, PSK, PEK.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
x x x x x x x PEK is only used if the
authentication data is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the Partition
CO.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, USK, PSK, PEK.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
- - - x - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the Partition
CU.
Use: DRBG Internal
State, USK, PSK, PEK.
Write: DRBG Internal
State, PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
- - - - x - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change HSM SO
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User
Password Hash.
Write: USK.
x - - - - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Change AU
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: USK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
Write: USK.
- - x - - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change
authentication data
for Administrator /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: PEK (if password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
Write: USK.
x x - - - - - Only possible for HSM SO if
HSM Policy (15) Enable SO
reset of partition PIN is
enabled.
If the service is performed by
the HSM SO, this is considered
as unlock operation after
Administrator role is locked out.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change Partition SO
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User
Password Hash.
Write: USK.
- - - x - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Change
authentication data
for Partition CO /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: PEK (if password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
Write: USK.
- - - x - - - Only possible if HSM Policy
(15) Enable SO reset of
partition PIN is enabled.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change
authentication data
for Partition CU /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: PEK (if password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User Password
Hash.
Write: USK.
- - - - x x - If the service is performed by
the Partition CO, this is
considered as an unlock
operation after the Partition
CU role is locked out.
Login to
Access/Session as
role.
Use: PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password,
Stored User
Password Hash.
Write: recovered
USK, PSK, KCV,
GSK, SMK (if
configured) (on
successful
presentation of
correct login
credentials).
x x x x x x - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Close authenticated
sessions.
Erase: USK, PSK,
KCV, GSK, SMK (if
configured),
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(session keys).
x x x x x x x CA_CloseApplicationID
or
CA_CloseApplicationIDF
orContainer can be
executed un-authenticated and
can be used to close all
sessions and/or access.
USK, PSK, KCV, GSK, SMK
only erased if no open sessions
remain for a given Access.
Initialize Remote
PED Vector (RPV).
Use: GSK.
Write: RPV, RPV-C,
RPV-K, PED-SKA-C
and PED-SKA-K.
x - - - - - - None.
Setup Remote PED
Session.
Use: ECC MIC,
ECC-HOCPED, PAC,
RPV-C, PED-SKA-C,
PED-EKA-C, HSM-
EKA-C, HSM-EKA-K,
HSM-EKA-C, PED
Master Shared
Secret, DEKHSM,
DEKPED, DMKHSM,
CWKHSM, CWKPED.
W: DEKHSM, DEKPED,
DMKHSM, CWKHSM,
CWKPED.
x x x x x x x This service is used to derive a
number of shared keys
between the module and a
remote Thales Luna PED.
Read non-sensitive
key attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE =
false for a given
key object.
None. x x x x x x x Only possible for partition
objects cloned into the Backup
HSM using CPV1 or CPV3.
This is not possible for objects
backed up as encrypted blobs
where these were extracted
from other HSM using SKS but
are stored as data objects on
Luna backup HSM.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Read non-sensitive
key attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE =
true for a given key
object.
None. x x - - x x x Only possible for partition
objects cloned into the Backup
HSM using CPV1 or CPV3.
This is not possible for objects
backed up as encrypted blobs
where these were extracted
from other HSM using SKS but
are stored as data objects on
Luna backup HSM.
Re-seed partition
random number
generator (RNG).
Use: DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State.
Write: DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State.
x x x x x x x None.
Request complete
erase of the HSM
firmware image and
key stores (excludes
erase of bootloader).
Erase: Results in the
complete erase of all
module CSP with the
exception of the Root
Certificate.
x x x x x x x Only used to recover from
corrupt firmware as performed
as a factory operation.
Following erase, card needs to
repeat manufacturing process
including loading factory signed
keys before it can be
operational again.
Read Vital Product
Data (VPD)
programmed at
Manufacture.
None. x x x x x x x Includes the hardware part
number.
Request
authentication and
execution of main
firmware.
Use: Root Certificate
and Firmware Signing
Certificate.
x x x x x x x None.
2.4 Authentication
All roles except for the Public User must authenticate to the module by providing their authentication data.
Table 6: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication and Table 7: Strengths of Authentication
Mechanisms, explain the type and strength of the authentication data supported for each role.
If configured to use the Thales Luna PED for authentication, all roles must authenticate using an iKey and
where, when a role is initialized, a module generates the authentication data as a 48-byte random value and
writes it to the iKey. Optionally, the Crypto-Officer and Crypto-User roles can be configured to use two-factor
authentication by in additional also assigning a password to the role.
If configured with Password, all roles must authenticate using a password. When a role is initialized under this
configuration, the operator enters the initial password for the role.
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Regardless of configuration (PED or Password), the password is delivered to the module encrypted with the
module’s Password Encryption Key (PEC) using KTS-OAEP: Key-Transport using RSA-OAEP from [SP800-
56Br2].
Table 6: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
Password Configuration PED Configuration
HSM Security
Officer
Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey)
Auditor Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey)
Partition
Security
Officer
Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey)
Crypto Officer Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey), plus
optional password
Crypto User Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey), plus
optional password
Administrator Identity-based Password Authentication token (iKey)
Public User Not Required N/A N/A
Table 7: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
PED Key 48 byte random authentication data generated when a role is
initialized and stored on PED key. The probability of guessing the
authentication data in a single attempt is 1 in 2384
. With a maximum
of 6000 failed login attempts per minute5
, the thresholds required by
[FIPS 140-2] can never be reached (1.52e-112
).
Password User provided byte array (minimum 7 bytes). The probability of
guessing the challenge secret in a single attempt is 1 in 256
. With a
maximum of 6000 failed login attempts per minute5
, the thresholds
required by [FIPS 140-2] can never be reached (8.33e-14
).
When using the password authentication mechanism, the module encrypts a known check-word under a key
derived using PBKDF from [SP800-132] and option 1a from section 5.4, ‘Using the Derived Master Key to
Protect Data’. During a login attempt, the module generates a key from the supplied password, and attempts to
decrypt a known check-word. Successful login is achieved if the decrypted check-word matches the expected
value. If successful, the PBKDF derived key is used to remove a layer of encryption from the module stored
User Storage Key (USK)6
.
The length of the password used as input to the PBKDF function is consistent with the password length
selected by the authenticating user which is required to be between 7 and 255 characters long. Where
passwords are randomly generated, the probability of successfully guessing the password and deriving the
5
This is based on testing and the bandwidth limitation of authentication (e.g., 100 attempts per second, or 6000
attempts per minute). So, it represents an actual result of testing.
6
When ‘decommission’ is enabled as a module capability, the USK is independently encrypted in storage under USK
which is independently also encrypted under the module generated KEK.
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storage key for a minimum password length of 7 characters is 1 in 256
. This probability is significantly reduced if
random passwords are not used.
Guidance in Appendix A, ‘Security Considerations’ of [SP800-132] should be consulted when picking an
appropriate password length in situations where encryption layers derived from the user password are required
to protect the confidentiality of module protected user keys.
Activation
If PED authentication is configured, the Crypto-Officer and Crypto-User roles can be configured to use a two-
step authentication process. The first stage is termed “Activation” and is performed using a PED key. Once
activated, access to key material and cryptographic services is not allowed until the second stage of
authentication, ‘User Login’, has been performed using the role’s password.
Once activated, a role stays activated until the role is explicitly deactivated, deleted or the module is reset7
.
M of N
If the PED based authentication is configured, the cryptographic module supports the use of an M of N (up to
N=16) secret sharing authentication scheme for each of the modules roles. M of N authentication provides the
capability to enforce multi-person control over the functions associated with each role.
The M of N capability uses Shamir’s threshold scheme. The cryptographic module splits the randomly-
generated authentication data into “N” pieces, known as splits, and stores each split on an iKey. Any “M” of
these “N” splits must be transmitted to the cryptographic module by inserting the corresponding iKeys into the
Thales Luna PED in order to reconstruct the original secret.
2.5 Physical Security
The Thales Luna Backup HSM Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip standalone module as defined by [FIPS
140-2], section 4.5.
The whole module enclosed in a plastic casing that provides tamper-evidence. Any tampering that might
compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual inspection of the physical integrity of a module. The
HSM SO should perform a visual inspection of the module at regular intervals.
Within the plastic enclosure, a hard opaque epoxy covers the circuitry of the cryptographic module. Attempts to
remove this epoxy will cause sufficient damage to the cryptographic module so that it is rendered inoperable.
The module’s enclosure is opaque to resist visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the
device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device.
Environmental Failure Protection
The module is designed to sense and respond to out-of-range temperature conditions as well as out-of-range
voltage conditions. The temperature and voltage conditions are monitored in the power on state.
In the event that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or over voltage, the module will reset itself,
clear all working memory and log the event.
7
A module is reset in response to EFP violations, loss of power or a request from a host application.
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Secure Transport Mode
Secure Transport Mode (STM) is a feature that allows the integrity of the module to be verified when the module
is shipped from one location to another or placed in storage.
When a module is placed in to STM, a random string and a fingerprint of the internal state of the module is
output from the module. The fingerprint is a SHA2-256 digest of the random string, module CSPs, firmware,
module configuration information and non-volatile memory.
While in STM, the module is in a reduced mode of operation which only allows the module to be taken out of
STM. If the module has been initialized, only the HSM SO can put the module into STM and take it out of STM.
If the HSM is in a zeroized state, only the public user can put the module into STM and take it out of STM.
The module can be taken out of STM by entering the random user string. The module will recalculate and
output the fingerprint. It is the operator’s responsibility to verify that the fingerprint output matches the
fingerprint initially output when the module was put in to STM.
Fault Tolerance
If power is lost to a module for whatever reason, the module shall, at a minimum, maintain itself in a state that it
can be placed back into operation when power is restored without compromise of its functionality or
permanently stored data.
A module shall maintain its secure state8
in the event of data input / output failures. When data input / output
capability is restored the module will resume operation in the state it was prior to the input / output failure.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module uses a non-modifiable operational environment. The requirements for a modifiable operating
environment do not apply.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
The FIPS-Approved algorithms implemented by the module are listed in the table below:
8
A secure state is one in which either the cryptographic module is operational and its security policy
enforcement is functioning correctly, or it is not operational and all sensitive material is stored in a
cryptographically protected form.
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Table 8: FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementation
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
C2020 Algorithm: AES
Standards: [FIPS
197], [SP800-38A] and
[SP800-38F].
Mode: CBC, KWP.
Key Size: 256-bits.
Used to support the following services:
 Initializing authentication data and
roles (Initialize the HSM, Initialize
the Administrator, Initialize the AU,
Initialize the Partition SO, Initialize
the Partition CO, Initialize the
Partition CU);
 Changing authentication data for
roles (Change HSM SO
authentication data, Change
authentication data for Administrator
/ unlock role, Change AU
authentication data, Change
Partition SO authentication data,
Change authentication data for
Partition CO / unlock role, Change
authentication data for Partition CU /
unlock role);
 Key Retrieval and Storage (all
services using CSP listed in Table
5: Roles and Access Rights by
Service).
 Cloning Operations (Clone partition
objects between Partitions and
Clone SMK between Partitions);
 Export/import audit log secret key;
and
 Login to Access/Session as role.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
Hashing
C2020 Algorithm: SHA
Standards: [FIPS
186-4].
Methods: SHA1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
Used to support the following services:
 Cloning operations (Clone SMK
between Partitions and Clone
partition objects between Partitions)
- signatures and object integrity.
 Create a user partition;
 Load Configuration Update File;
 Login to Access/Session as role;
 Setup Remote PED Session;
 Request HSM self-test operation;
 Update Firmware;
 Submit external messages for entry
into secure audit log;
 Validate the audit log; and
 Read non-sensitive key attribute
where CKA_PRIVATE = true for a
given key object (this is the only
service using SHA1 where it’s used
to generate the output when reading
the legacy object attribute CKA_
FINGERPRINT_SHA1).
C2022 Algorithm: SHA
Standards: [FIPS
186-4].
Methods: SHA1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384 (Byte Only).
Used to support the following services:
 Request authentication and
execution of main firmware.
Message Authentication Code
C2020 Algorithm: HMAC
Standard: [FIPS 198-
1].
Methods: HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-512.
Used to support the following services:
 Submit external messages for entry
into secure audit log;
 Validate the audit log; and
 Setup Remote PED Session.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
Asymmetric
C2020,
C2021
Algorithm: RSA
Standard: [FIPS 186-
4].
Methods: Key Generation.
Modulus length: 2048-bit.
Generation Method: B.3.6.
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (when using CPV1 –
import only) – generated keys are
used with the RSA CVL to encrypt
the KEVt and KEVs used during
CPV1.
A674,
A675
Algorithm: RSA
Standard: [FIPS 186-
4].
Methods: Key Generation,
Signature Generation, Signature
Verification.
Modulus length: 4096-bit.
Signature Type: PKCS#1 v1.5.
Generation Method: B.3.6.
Hash: SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (when using CPV3);
 Clone SMK between Partitions
(when using CPV3);
 Update Firmware;
 Load Configuration Update File;
 Request HSM self-test operation.
C2022 Algorithm: RSA
Standard: [FIPS 186-
4].
Methods: Signature Verification.
Modulus Length: 4096-bits
Signature Type: PKCS#1 v1.5.
Hash: SHA2-384.
Used to support the following services:
 Request authentication and
execution of main firmware.
C2020 Algorithm: ECDSA
Standard: [FIPS 186-
4].
Methods: Key Generation,
Signature Generation, Signature
Verification.
Curves: P-521.
Used to support the following services:
 Setup Remote PED Session.
C2020,
C2021
Algorithm: RSA
(CVL)
Standards: [PKCS
#1], section 5.1.2.
Methods: Decryption Primitive. Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (CPV1 – import only).
Key Agreement Scheme
A2125 Algorithm: KAS.
Standards: [SP800-
56Ar3] and [SP800-
56Cr2].
Scheme: Full Unified Model
C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH)
Methods: Full Validation, Key
Pair Generation.
Supported curves: P-521.
KDF methods: One Step,
Supported hash: SHA2-512.
Key confirmation: HMAC-
SHA2-512 with 256-bit key.
Used to support the following services:
 Setup Remote PED Session.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
A2125 Algorithm: KAS-RSA
Standards: [SP800-
56Br2] and [SP800-
56Cr2].
Method: KAS1-Basic.
Modulus length - 4096 bits, key
generation method – rsakpg1-
prime-factor, KDF method –
One-Step Key Derivation from
SP800-56Cr2 using SHA2-512,
fixed public exponent – 65537.
Caveat: Cert. #A2125; key
establishment methodology
provides 150 bits of encryption
strength
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (CPV3); and
 Clone SMK between Partitions
(CPV3).
Key Transport
C2020 Algorithm: KTS (AES
Certs. #C2020)
Standards: [FIPS 197]
and [SP800-38F].
Modes: KWP.
Key size: 256-bits.
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (CPV3);
 Clone SMK between Partitions
(CPV3);
 Setup Remote PED Session.
A2125 Algorithm: KTS-RSA
Standards: [SP800-
56Br2].
Method: KTS-OAEP-Basic
Modulus Length: 4096.
Hash: SHA2-512.
Key Length: 256.
Caveat: Cert. #A2125; key
establishment methodology
provides 150 bits of encryption
strength
Used to support the following services:
 Login to Access/Session as role –
used to decrypt password using the
PEC protocol.
Key Derivation Function
C2020 Algorithm: Key-Based
Key Derivation
Function (KBKDF)
Standards: [SP800-
108]
Key-Based Key Derivation
Function (KBKDF)
KDF Mode: Counter.
MAC Mode: HMAC-SHA2-512.
Used to support the following services:
 Login to Access/Session as role –
used to derive the USK encryption
key used to decrypt the USK and
known check-word during
authentication attempts when
module configured for PED
authentication.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
A2125 Algorithm: KDA
Standards: [SP800-
56Cr2]
KDA (Cert. #A2125)
One-Step Key Derivation using
SHA2-512.
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (CPV3);
 Clone SMK between Partitions
(CPV3);
 Setup Remote PED Session; and
 Clone partition objects between
Partitions (CPV1 – import only).
A2125 Algorithm: PBKDF9
Standards: [SP800-
132]
Methods: SHA2-512
Derived Key Length: 256-bits
Password Length: 128-bits
Salt Length: 256-bits
Used to support the following services:
 Login to Access/Session as role –
used to derive the known check-
word used to validate authentication
attempts when module configured
for password authentication.
9
Used internal to the cryptographic module to derive the storage encryption key used to encrypt the check-word used
during password based authentication. The derived key is separately used to encrypt for storage the USK which is
independently also encrypted under the module generated KEK. The module uses method 1a from [SP800-132]
where the derived Master Key (MK) is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
Random Number Generation
C2020 Algorithm:
HASH_DRBG
Standard: [SP800-
90Ar1]
Mode: SHA2-256.
Security strength: 256-bits
Used to support the following services
that consume entropy:
 Initializing services when using PED
authentication (Initialize the HSM,
Initialize the Administrator, Initialize
the AU, Initialize the Partition SO,
Initialize the Partition CO, Initialize
the Partition CU);
 Changing authentication data for
PED authenticated roles (Change
HSM SO authentication data,
Change authentication data for
Administrator / unlock role, Change
AU authentication data, Change
Partition SO authentication data,
Change authentication data for
Partition CO / unlock role, Change
authentication data for Partition CU /
unlock role);
 Generating keys during cloning
(Clone partition objects between
Partitions and Clone SMK between
Partitions);
 Setup Remote PED Session;
 Create a user partition;
 Enable/disable STM (used to
generate the STM Nonce when
enabling STM); and
 Re-seed partition random number
generator.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method /Strength Use / Function
Vendor
affirmed,
using
[FIPS
140-2 IG],
D.12.
Algorithm: CKG
Standard: [SP800-
133]
CKG10
Used to support the following services
that generate keys:
 Initialize the HSM;
 Generating keys during cloning
(Clone partition objects between
Partitions and Clone SMK between
Partitions);
 Setup Remote PED Session; and
 Create a user partition.
Table 9: Allowed Security Function for the Firmware Implementation
Allowed Security Functions Use / Function
Key Transport
AES (key unwrapping; key establishment
methodology provides 256 bits of encryption
strength)
(based on AES Cert. #C2020 and using allowances
in [FIPS 140-2 IG], D.9).
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between Partitions (CPV1 –
import only).
RSA (CVL Certs. #C2020 and #C2021, key
unwrapping; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption
strength)11
Modulus length – 2048.
Used to support the following services:
 Clone partition objects between Partitions (CPV1 –
import only).
NDRNG Used to support the following services:
 Internal service used to generate the seed used to
instantiate the module DRBG; and
 Re-seed partition random number generator.
10
Symmetric keys and seeds used for asymmetric key generation are an unmodified output from the approved DRBG
(Cert. #C2020)
11
Only permitted for use under [FIPS 140-2 IG], D.9 and is not permitted for use after December 31, 2023. This entry
covers the use of RSA encryption/decryption using PKCS#1-v1.5 padding which is used with CPV1 (modulus length -
2048) for transport of exchanged nonce.
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Non-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Non-FIPS Approved security functions are not available for use when the module has been configured to
operate in FIPS-approved mode (see section 3, ‘Guidance’ for further details on configuring the approved mode
of operation).
 Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
 DES
 Triple-DES
 RC2
 RC4
 RC5
 CAST3
 CAST5
 SEED
 ARIA
 SM4
 Hashing
 MD2
 HAS-160
 SM3
 KECCAK
 Message Authentication Code
 AES MAC
 DES-MAC
 RC2-MAC
 RC5-MAC
 CAST3-MAC
 CAST5-MAC
 SEED-MAC
 ARIA-MAC
 SSL3-MD5-MAC
 SSL3-SHA1-MAC
 HMAC (non-compliant for any configuration providing less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 TUAK
 MILENAGE
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 COMP128
 Asymmetric
 KCDSA
 RSA X-509
 RSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 DSA
 ECDSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 EdDSA
 SM2
 EdDSA PH
 Key Generation
 DES
 RC2
 RC4
 RC5
 CAST3
 CAST5
 SEED
 ARIA
 GENERIC-SECRET
 SSL PRE-MASTER
 BIP32
 Key Agreement
 ECC (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology)
 Key Transport
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology; non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption
strength)
2.8 Critical Security Parameters
The following table lists Critical Security Parameters (CSP) used to perform approved security function
supported by the cryptographic module:
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Table 10: Summary of CSPs
Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Root Certificate
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Certificate output in
plaintext.
Loading during
manufacture as
part of the module
bootloader.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Root Key. It is self-
signed with its private key controlled by
Thales. Used in verifying Manufacturing
Integrity Certificate (MIC) and firmware and
capability updates.
Root Private
RSA-4096
private key
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
N/A - Stored
outside the module
on Thales managed
“Root” HSM
The root key used in the Thales controlled
certificate hierarchy used by HSM to
authenticate firmware/capability updates and
peer HSMs in secure protocols.
Firmware Signing Key
RSA-4096
private key
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
N/A - Stored
outside the module
on Thales managed
“Root” HSM
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM firmware updates.
Firmware Signing
Certificate
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Input with Firmware
Update Image
which is considered
plaintext.
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM firmware updates.
License Signing Key
RSA-4096
private key
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
N/A - Stored
outside the module
on Thales managed
“Root” HSM
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM capability updates.
License Signing
Certificate
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
Input with
Capability Update
File.
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM capability updates.
Manufacturer’s Integrity
Certificate (MIC)
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
Loaded during
manufacture.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Manufacturing Integrity
Key (MIK) controlled by Thales. It is signed
by the Root Key. Used in verifying all key
material certified by Hardware Origin
Certificates (HOCs).
Manufacturer’s Integrity
Key
RSA-4096
private key
N/A –
generated
outside the
module.
N/A - Stored
outside the module
on Thales managed
“Root” HSM
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM Hardware Origin Keys.
Hardware Origin Key
(HOK)
RSA 4096 bit
private key
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used to sign
certificates for other device key pairs, such
as the TWC4 used with CPV3. It is
generated at the time the device is
manufactured.
Hardware Origin
Certificate (HOC)
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
Loaded during
manufacture.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the HOK. It is signed by the
Manufacturer’s Integrity Key (MIK) at the time
the device is manufactured. Used in verifying
all key material signed by the HOK.
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key (TUK3)
RSA-2048 bit
private key
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 2048-bit RSA private key used with the
Cloning Protocol Version 1 supported for key
import only. It is following initial request for
the key.
Token or Module
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC3)
RSA-2048 public
key certificate
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the TUK4. It is signed by
the HOK. Used in exchange of nonce (KEVs
and KEVt) as part of the handshake during
the cloning protocol version 1 supported for
key import only.
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key (TUK4)
RSA-4096 bit
private key
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used in the key
cloning protocol. It is generated each time
the module initializes from power up or reset.
Token or Module
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC4)
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the TUK4. It is signed by
the HOK. Used in exchange of nonce (KEVs
and KEVt) as part of the handshake during
the cloning protocol.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Cloning Key Encryption
Vector – source (KEVs)
384 bit nonce.
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Exchanged during
CPV1 and CPV3
protocol (see
section 2.8.2 for
further details).
384 bit nonce used with the cloning protocol
and generated on the source HSM.
Cloning Key Encryption
Vector – target (KEVt)
384 bit nonce.
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Exchanged during
CPV1 protocol (see
section 2.8.2 for
further details).
384 bit nonce used with the cloning protocol
and generated on the target HSM.
Cloning Transfer Key AES-256
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
256 bit AES key derived during the cloning
protocol and used to transfer key objects
between source and target partitions using
the cloning protocol.
Token or Module
Variable Key (TVK)
AES-256
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
It is used to encrypt authentication data
stored for auto-activation purposes.
STM Nonce
992-bit random
number
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
Random value used to create module
fingerprint that is used to verify the module’s
integrity as part of the Secure Transport
Mode feature.
DRBG Seed 384 bits
Output from
Hardware
Noise Source
(NDRNG).
Not Input or Output.
Random seed data drawn from the Hardware
RBG and used to seed an implementation of
the HASH_DRBG [SP800-90Ar1].
Seed is zeroized immediately following use.
DRBG Internal State (V,
C and reseed counter)
Hash-DRBG
State
Stored from
Initialize
operation of
DRBG.
Not Input or Output.
Secret state of the approved DRBG. The
value is generated using the methods
described in [SP800-90Ar1] for DRBG
Instantiation and using the DRBG Seed taken
from internal hardware noise source.
Global Storage Key
(GSK)
AES-256
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
32-byte AES key that is the same for all
users on a specific Luna cryptographic
module. It is used to encrypt permanent
parameters within the non-volatile memory
area reserved for use by the module.
Role Domain Key (RDK)
48-byte random
value (PED
configuration)
Or
7 - 255
character data
string (Password
configuration).
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256 for PED
configuration.
N/A for
Password
configuration.
Input / Output via
direct connection to
PED.
For PED configurations, this is a 48-byte
value, the first 32-bytes of which are used as
an AES-KWP 256-bit key that is used to
wrap/unwrap the SALK when it is exported /
imported from / to the module.
It is either generated by the module or
imprinted onto the module at the time Audit
role is initialized. The value is output from the
original module onto a PED key to enable
initializing the Auditor role on additional
modules into the same domain.
For password configurations, this value is
supplied by the user during configuration of
the secure audit capability.
Secure Audit Logging
Key (SALK)
256 bit HMAC
key
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Input / Output
encrypted under
the RDK and using
AES-256 in KWP
mode.
A 256-bit key used to verify data integrity and
authentication of the log messages. Saved in
the parameter area of Flash memory.
Secure Audit AppID-
HMAC Key
256 bit HMAC
key
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
A 256-bit key used to create an HMAC of the
AppID to be used in the Secure Audit logs, to
prevent against the theft of the actual AppID.
A new key will be generated at every module
power-on or firmware reset.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
User Password (if PED
configuration and
optionally selected)
7 - 64 character
data string
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and encrypted
under the PEC and
using KTS-OAEP-
basic from SP800-
56Br2.
User provided password input by the
operator as a second factor of authentication
data.
PED Authentication
Data (if PED
configuration)
48-byte random
value
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Input / Output via
direct connection to
PED.
All messages sent
to the local PED
are encrypted using
A 48-byte random value that is generated by
the module when a role is created and is
written out to the Thales Luna PED key via
the Trusted Path.
Password
(Authentication Data if
Password configuration)
7 - 255
character data
string
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and encrypted
under the PEC and
using KTS-OAEP-
basic from SP800-
56Br2.
User provided password input by the
operator as authentication data.
Stored User Password
Hash
256-bits
[FIPS 186-4]
SHA2-512
Not Input or Output.
Hashed user password with 256-bit random
salt. CSP is compared with salted hash of
passwords supplied by the end-user as part
of login when using PED authentication with
optional memorized secret.
User Storage Key (USK) AES-256
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
This key is used to encrypt all sensitive
attributes of all private objects owned by the
User.
Partition Storage Key
(PSK)
AES-256
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Not Input or Output.
This key is unique per-partition and used to
encrypt all CSP that are shared by all roles of
a given partition.
SKS Master Key (SMK) AES-256
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Input / Output using
CPV3.
Input for key
migration purposes
using CPV1.
A randomly generated 256-bit secret used as
the master key for deriving all SKS key blob
encryption keys.
USK encryption key AES-256
PBKDF
[SP800-132]
when module
is configured
for Password
based
authentication.
KBKDF
[SP800-108]
when module
is configured
for PED
authentication.
Not Input or Output.
Recovered during login attempts to the
module and used to decrypt (AES-256 in
KWP mode) a known check-word used
during authentication attempts alongside the
USK.
Derivation method for the key varies
depending on the authentication method
configured for the module.
Key Cloning Domain
Vector (KCV)
48-byte random
value (PED
configuration)
Or
7 - 255
character data
string (Password
configuration).
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256 for PED
configuration.
N/A for
Password
configuration.
Input / Output via
direct connection to
Thales PED.
Value that controls a partition’s ability to
participate in the cloning protocol.
In the case of PED configurations, it is
generated by the module or imprinted onto
the module at partition initialization time.
For password configurations, this value is
supplied by the user during partition
initialization.
For PED configurations, the value is output
from the original partition in the domain to a
PED key to enable initializing additional
modules into the domain.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Remote PED Vector
(RPV) (if PED
configuration)
256-bit secret
value
[SP800-90Ar1]
HASH_DRBG
using SHA2-
256.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
A randomly generated 256-bit secret, which
must be shared between a Remote PED and
a cryptographic module in order to establish
a secure communication channel between
them.
PED Authentication
Certificate (PAC)
ECC public key
certificate with
curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC public key certificate used to verify
certificates for local or remote connection
with a Luna PED.
PED Authentication Key
(PAK)
ECC private key
on curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
An ECC private key used to sign certificates
used for local or remote connection with the
Thales Luna PED.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Certificate
for Remote Connections
(HSM-SKA-CREMOTE)
ECC public key
certificate with
curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the PED to authenticate the remote
HSM to connect to and to extract the HSM’s
static ECC public key for:
 C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-
agreement for remote connection
with PED.
 C(1e,1s, ECC CDH) DLC Key
Transport for CSP migration
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Private Key
for Remote Connections
(HSM-SKA-KREMOTE)
ECC private key
on curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
Used by the remote HSM as the static private
key for:
 C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-
agreement agreement for remote
connection with PED.
HSM Ephemeral Key-
Agreement Certificate
(HSM-EKA-C)
ECC public key
certificate with
curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the Luna PED to authenticate the
remote HSM to connect to and to extract the
HSM’s ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s,
ECC CDH) key-agreement agreement for
remote connection with a Thales Luna PED.
HSM Ephemeral Key-
Agreement Private Key
(HSM-EKA-K)
ECC private key
on curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output
Used by the Luna PED to authenticate the
remote HSM and to extract the HSM’s
ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH)
key-agreement agreement for remote
connection with a Luna PED.
Remote PED Vector
Certificate (RPV-C)
ECC public key
certificate with
curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC public key certificate used by the
HSM device to verify PED-SKA-C, PED-EKA-
C.
Remote PED Vector
Private Key (RPV-K)
ECC private key
on curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC private key used by the HSM to sign
PED-SKA-C, and by the Luna PED to sign
PED-EKA-C.
PED Static Key-
Agreement Certificate
for Remote Connections
(PED-SKA-C)
ECC public key
certificate with
curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the HSM to authenticate and extract
the Thales Luna PED’s ECC ephemeral
public key for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-
agreement.
Uniquely generated for each use.
PED Static Key-
Agreement Private Key
(PED-SKA-K)
ECC private key
on curve P-521.
[FIPS 186-4],
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the Luna PED for Remote
connections. Act as An ECC static private
key for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-agreement.
Key isn’t used by the HSM as a CSP but is
generated by it for use by the Luna PED.
PED Master Shared
Secret
256-bit
ECDH from
[SP800-56Ar3]
and using
C(2e,2s, ECC
CDH) with
curve P-521.
Not Input or Output.
Intermediate key value used during setup of
the Local and Remote PED channel.
Key is the output of the ECDH function and
used to generate HSM and PED CSP
Wrapping Key, MAC key, IV and Data
Encryption Key. Keys are generated using
OneStep KDF from [SP800-56Cr2] with
SHA2-512.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
HSM CSP Wrapping
Key (CWKHSM)
AES-256
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Local and Remote PED
Channel for wrapping exchanged CSPs.
PED CSP Wrapping Key
CWKPED
AES-256
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Local and Remote PED
Channel for wrapping exchanged CSPs.
HSM Data Encryption
Key (DEKHSM)
AES-256
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
HSM-to-PED).
HSM MAC Key
(DMKHSM)
256 bits
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from HSM-to-PED).
HSM Initialization Vector
(IVHSM)
256 bits
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from HSM-to-
PED).
PED Data Encryption
Key (DEKPED)
AES-256
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
PED-to-HSM).
PED MAC Key (DMKPED) 256 bits
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from PED-to-HSM).
PED Initialization Vector
(IVPED)
256 bits
OneStep KDF
from [SP800-
56Cr2] and
using SHA2-
512 [FIPS
180-4] as the
PRF.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from PED-to-
HSM).
Password Encryption
Key (PEK)
RSA 4096 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used to decrypt
user passwords that are provided to the
module. It is generated the first time it is
required.
Password Encryption
Certificate (PEC)
RSA-4096 public
key certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the PEK. It is created and
signed by the HOK the first it is required.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition)
RSA, DSA,
ECC, DH
N/A
When imported
using CPV1–
encrypted under
the Cloning
Transfer Key.
When
imported/exported
using CPV3 –
encrypted under
the Cloning
Transfer Key.
Refer to Section
2.8.2 for additional
details.
Asymmetric key
pairs that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module for storage.
Keys cannot be used whilst stored on the
cryptographic module.
Symmetric Keys
(general partition)
AES or Triple-
DES, MAC,
KDF.
N/A
When imported
using CPV1–
encrypted under
the Cloning
Transfer Key.
When
imported/exported
using CPV3 –
encrypted under
the Cloning
Transfer Key.
Refer to Section
2.8.2 for additional
details.
Symmetric keys that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module for storage.
Keys cannot be used whilst stored on the
cryptographic module.
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Key Generation
Symmetric cryptographic keys are generated by the direct unmodified output of the module’s DRBG. The DRBG
output is also used to provide seeds for asymmetric key generation.
Keys which are generated outside the module and input during the manufacturing process include: Root
Certificate and MIC.
The HOC is created outside the module during manufacture based on public keys generated by the module and
exported as part of the manufacturing process. Once signed by corresponding externally managed keys, these
are re-loaded onto the module for subsequent validation and storage.
User passwords for authentication of roles are generated by the operator.
The DRBG (Hash-DRBG using SHA2-256) [SP800-90Ar1] is seeded using 384-bits or raw entropy taken from
the module NDRNG. Based on calculated min-entropy values (H=0.943429) for the platform raw noise source
and factors outlined in [SP800-90B], the 384-bit input used to seed the DRBG is considered to have 362-bits of
entropy.
Key Import and Export
Import and Export of CSP is supported over the following interface:
 Physical Trusted Path (remote PED); or
 Luna ICD, logical interface.
For details of specific mapping of CSP to interfaces and associated methods of encryption of specific CSP refer
to the Input / Output column of Table 10: Summary of CSPs.
The following methods of key import and export for ‘Asymmetric Key Pairs (general partition keys)’ and
‘Symmetric Keys (general partition keys)’ are available as a service:
 Key Wrap / Unwrap using Cloning Protocol Version 3 (CPV3)
Cloning is a product feature where KAS1-Basic from [SP800-56Br2] is used to negotiate a shared secret
used to transfer partition objects between a source and destination partition and where these can be on the
same or different cryptographic module. The protocol uses the following options with KAS1-Basic:
 RSASVE for transfer of shared secrets uses the public key from the TWC4 certificate which has a
modulus length of 4096 bits;
 Shared keys are derived using One-Step KDF from [SP800-56Cr2] using SHA2-512. Inputs to the
KDF include the exchanged shared secret from the RSASVE transfer, alongside the pre-shared
256 bit secret key (KCV or RDK) and additional HSM related shared information; and
 Encryption of the SMK during the transfer uses AES-256 in KWP mode and a single-use key and IV
derived from the output of the KDF.
 Key Wrap / Unwrap using Cloning Protocol Version 1 (CPV1)
CPV1 is supported to enable the import/export of keys from existing Thales HSM with firmware version prior
to 7.7.0 to the cryptographic module.
CPV1 operates in the following way:
 256-bit nonce (KEVt and KEVs) are transferred using RSA with PKCSv1.5 encryption and the public key
from the TWC3 certificate (of source and destination partitions) with modulus length of 2048 bits.
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 Shared keys are derived using One-Step KDF from SP800-56Cr2 using SHA2-512 and with the source
and destination nonce (KEVt and KEVs) alongside KCV (or RDK) as inputs. KCV (or RDK) are
transferred out of band of the protocol to source and destination partitions either as a pre-shared
password or on the red PED key presented using the Luna PED.
 Encryption of the partitions object during transfer uses AES-256 in CBC mode alongside having an
independent SHA2-256 hash for integrity protection.
2.9 Self Tests
Power-On Self Tests
The module performs Power-On Self Tests (POST) upon power-up to confirm the firmware integrity, and to
check the random number generator and each of the implemented cryptographic algorithms. While the module
is running POST, all interfaces are disabled until the successful completion of the self-tests. If any POST fails
an error message is output, the module halts, and data output is inhibited.
These self-tests can also be initiated as an operator service but do not require operator input to initiate at power
on.
Table 11: Power-On Self-Tests (Bootloader) – Module Integrity
Test When Performed Indicator
SHA KAT (SHA1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384). Power-on Error output and module
halt
RSA KAT (Signature Verification) Power-on Error output and module
halt
Boot loader performs an RSA 4096-bit SHA2-384 signature
verification of itself
Power-on Error output and module
halt
Boot loader performs an RSA 4096-bit SHA2-384 signature
verification of the firmware prior to firmware start
Power-
on/Request12
Error output and module
halt
Table 12: Power-On Self-Tests (Firmware) – Cryptographic Implementations
Test When Performed Indicator
DRBG Self-Test (Instantiate Function Known Answer Test,
Generate Function KAT, Reseed Function KAT)
Power-on Error output and module
halt
SHA KAT (SHA1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512). Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512). Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
RSA KAT (Signature Generation, Signature Verification) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
12
Request indicates triggering a POST via a command
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Test When Performed Indicator
AES KAT (CBC and KWP modes) covering 256 bit keys.
Encrypt and decrypt operation performed for each mode.
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
ECDH KAT (Derive) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
ECDSA KAT (Signature Generation, Signature Verification) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
KDF KAT (Derive using HMAC-SHA2-512 as PRF). Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
Conditional Self-Tests
The module automatically performs conditional self-tests based on the module operation. These self-tests do
not require operator input to initiate.
Table 13: Conditional Self-Tests
Test When
Performed
Where
Performed
Indicator
NDRNG conditional tests13
Continuous Firmware /
Hardware
Error output and module halt
RSA – Pair-wise consistency test
(asymmetric key pairs)
On
generation
Firmware Error output
ECDSA – Pair-wise consistency
test (asymmetric key pairs)
On
generation
Firmware Error output
Firmware load test (4096-bit RSA
Signature Verification)
On firmware
update load
Firmware Error output – module will
continue with existing firmware
13
CRNGT, as described in Section 4.9.2 of [FIPS 140-2], is only performed for the NDRNG and is not performed for
the DRBG as permitted by [FIPS 140-2 IG], 9.8 for modules implementing an approved DRBG from [SP800-90Ar1].
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3 Guidance
3.1 Identifying the Module Version
Ahead of putting the module into its approved mode of operation, it is important to identify the hardware,
firmware and bootloader versions of the target module and to check these correspond to those listed in section
1.2, ‘Scope’. The following sections provide guidance on checking each element.
Any module displaying hardware, firmware and bootloader versions not listed in this security policy is
out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
In order to check the bootloader, hardware and firmware version the LunaCM14
client tool is used with the hsm
showinfo command.
Expected output from the command with example bootloader, hardware and firmware versions highlighted for
convenience in red is shown below:
lunacm:>hsm showinfo
Slot Id -> 108
Partition Label -> myG7Pwd
Partition Serial Number -> 132525
Partition Model -> Luna G7
Partition Manufacturer -> Safenet, Inc.
Partition Status -> L3 Device, OK
Session State -> CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION
Role Status -> none logged in
RPV Initialized -> No
Partition Cloning Version -> 1
Partition FM Status -> FM Disabled
Partition SMK OUIDs:
SMK-FW4: Not Initialized
SMK-FW6: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-FM: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-Rollover: Not Initialized
SMK-FW7-Primary: Not Initialized
Partition Storage:
Total Storage Space: 655360
Used Storage Space: 0
Free Storage Space: 655360
Object Count: 0
Overhead: 24224
HSM Storage:
Total Storage Space: 33816576
14
LunaCM maps to the Luna ICD logical interface at the cryptographic module boundary.
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Used Storage Space: 962968
Free Storage Space: 32853608
Allowed Partitions: 100
Number of Partitions: 3
HSM Part Number -> 808-000064-005
Environmental:
System Temperature : 46 deg. C
Firmware Version -> 7.7.1
Bootloader Version -> 1.3.0
Rollback Firmware Version -> 7.3.2
License Count:
1. 621000121-000 G7 BU 32M Base CUF December 7 2018
*** The HSM is in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode. ***
Command Result : No Error
Figure 3: Example output of hsm show command from LunaCM.
To be in a FIPS compliant mode of operation, the versions output by the tool must correspond to the hardware
identifier options, bootloader and firmware versions covered in section 1.2, ‘Scope’.
3.2 Approved Mode of Operation
To place the module in FIPS 140-2 Approved mode, the HSM Security Officer must check and, if necessary, set
the following HSM level policies:
 HSM Policy (55), “Enable Restricted Restore” – this is disabled by default and shall be enabled.
If the HSM Security Officer attempts to enable or disable these policies, a warning is displayed and the HSM
Security Officer is prompted to confirm the selection. If this policy is left (or put) in the “disabled” state, the
module will be operating in the non-Approved mode.
As a confirmation and secondary step - The HSM Security Officer can independently confirm that the
cryptographic module is in FIPS 140-2 Approved mode by executing the status commands covered in the prior
section. Confirmation of FIPS mode status is provided on the line highlighted in green on Figure 3.
Where the modules configuration has not met the above requirements the following alternative statement will be
found in the output of these comments:
The HSM is not in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode.
Following entry into the Approved mode of operation, any changes to HSM Policy (55) (going from Approved to
non-Approved mode) will trigger an automatic zeroization of the HSM erasing all roles and partition stored key
objects.