Siemens Canada Ltd.
RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches
Hardware Models: M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RS900F, RS900GF, RS940GF, RSG2100F, RSG2200F, and
RSG2488F
Firmware Version: 4.2.1.F
RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server
Hardware Model: RS416F
Firmware Version: 4.2.1.F
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 0.14
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Siemens Canada Ltd. Corsec Security, Inc.
300 Applewood Crescent 13291 Park Center Road
Concord, Ontario Suite 460
L4K 5C7 Herndon, VA 20171
Canada United States of America
Phone: +1 905 856 5288 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
www.siemens.com www.corsec.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
Siemens RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches and RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server
©2017 Siemens Canada Ltd.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 References.............................................................................................................................................5
1.3 Document Organization ........................................................................................................................5
2. RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices............................................................................................................................6
2.1 RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Overview ................................................................................................6
2.2 Module Specification.......................................................................................................................... 10
2.3 Module Interfaces.............................................................................................................................. 15
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication................................................................................................... 21
2.4.1 Authorized Roles ................................................................................................................... 21
2.4.2 Operator Services.................................................................................................................. 21
2.4.3 Maintenance Mode............................................................................................................... 27
2.4.4 Additional Services................................................................................................................ 30
2.4.5 Authentication ...................................................................................................................... 30
2.5 Physical Security................................................................................................................................. 32
2.6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................... 32
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ....................................................................................................... 33
2.8 EMI / EMC........................................................................................................................................... 38
2.9 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................ 38
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests.............................................................................................................. 38
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................ 38
2.9.3 Critical Functions Self-Tests .................................................................................................. 39
2.9.4 Self-Test Error Behavior and Recovery.................................................................................. 39
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks................................................................................................................ 40
3. Secure Operation........................................................................................................................................... 41
3.1 Initial Setup ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance..................................................................................................................... 48
3.2.1 Monitoring Status.................................................................................................................. 49
3.2.2 Physical Inspection................................................................................................................ 49
3.2.3 On-Demand Self-Test Execution ........................................................................................... 49
3.2.4 CSP Zeroization...................................................................................................................... 50
3.2.5 Upgrading/Downgrading Firmware ...................................................................................... 50
3.2.6 Password Complexity............................................................................................................ 50
3.3 User Guidance.................................................................................................................................... 51
3.4 Additional Guidance and Usage Policies............................................................................................ 51
3.5 Non-FIPS-Approved Mode ................................................................................................................. 52
4. Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................... 53
5. Appendix A..................................................................................................................................................... 56
5.1 RSG2100F ........................................................................................................................................... 56
5.2 M2100F .............................................................................................................................................. 57
5.3 RSG2200F ........................................................................................................................................... 58
5.4 M2200F .............................................................................................................................................. 59
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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5.5 RSG2488F ........................................................................................................................................... 60
5.6 M969F ................................................................................................................................................ 61
5.7 RS900F................................................................................................................................................ 61
5.8 RS900GF ............................................................................................................................................. 63
5.9 RS416F................................................................................................................................................ 63
5.10 RS940GF ............................................................................................................................................. 64
List of Tables
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section...................................................................................................... 10
Table 2 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Hardware Components............................................................................. 11
Table 3 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Tested Configurations............................................................................... 12
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations............................................................................................ 13
Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithm Implementations............................................................................................... 14
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings.................................................................................................... 15
Table 7 – Module LED Descriptions......................................................................................................................... 18
Table 8 – Operational Mode Services...................................................................................................................... 22
Table 9 – Maintenance Mode Services ................................................................................................................... 27
Table 10 – Additional Services................................................................................................................................. 30
Table 11 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Modules ................................................................................ 31
Table 12 – Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs........................................................... 33
Table 13 – Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 53
Table 14 – RSG2100F Excluded Configurations....................................................................................................... 56
Table 15 – M2100F Excluded Configurations.......................................................................................................... 57
Table 16 – RSG2200F Excluded Configurations....................................................................................................... 58
Table 17 – M2200F Excluded Configurations.......................................................................................................... 59
Table 18 – RSG2488F Excluded Configurations....................................................................................................... 60
Table 19 – M969F Excluded Configurations............................................................................................................ 61
Table 20 – RS900F Excluded Configurations ........................................................................................................... 61
Table 21 – RS900GF Excluded Configurations......................................................................................................... 63
Table 22 – RS416F Excluded Configurations ........................................................................................................... 63
Table 23 – RS940GF Excluded Configurations......................................................................................................... 64
List of Figures
Figure 1 – RUGGEDCOM RS416F Serial Device Server ...............................................................................................6
Figure 2 – RUGGEDCOM M2100F Ethernet Switch....................................................................................................6
Figure 3 – RUGGEDCOM M2200F Ethernet Switch....................................................................................................7
Figure 4 – RUGGEDCOM M969F Ethernet Switch......................................................................................................7
Figure 5 – RUGGEDCOM RS900F (left) and RS900GF Ethernet Switches...................................................................8
Figure 6 – RUGGEDCOM RS940GF Ethernet Switch...................................................................................................8
Figure 7 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2100F Ethernet Switch.................................................................................................9
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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Figure 8 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2200F Ethernet Switch.................................................................................................9
Figure 9 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2488F Ethernet Switch.................................................................................................9
Figure 10 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Device Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................... 10
Figure 11 – Label Locations (M2100F, RSG2100F) .................................................................................................. 42
Figure 12 – Label Locations (M2200F, RSG2200F) .................................................................................................. 43
Figure 13 – Label Locations (RS416F)...................................................................................................................... 44
Figure 14 – Label Locations (M969F)....................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 15 – Label Locations (RS900F)...................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 16 – Label Locations (RS900GF).................................................................................................................... 46
Figure 17 – Label Locations (RS940GF).................................................................................................................... 46
Figure 18 – Label Locations (RSG2488F).................................................................................................................. 47
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches (Hardware
Models: M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RS900F, RS900GF, RS940GF, RSG2100F, RSG2200F, and RSG2488F; Firmware
Version: 4.2.1.F) and RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server (Hardware Model: RS416F; Firmware Version: 4.2.1.F)
from Siemens Canada Ltd. (Siemens). This Security Policy describes how the RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches and
RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server meet the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules.
More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the modules in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This policy
was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches and
RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server are referred to in this document as “RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices” or “modules”.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the modules in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the modules from the following sources:
 The Siemens website (www.siemens.ca) contains information on the full line of products from Siemens.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains
contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is organized into two (2) primary sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the
validated modules. This includes a general description of the modules’ capabilities and their use of cryptography
as well as a presentation of the validation level achieved in each applicable functional areas of the FIPS standard.
It also provides high-level descriptions of how the modules meet FIPS requirements in each functional area.
Section 3 documents the guidance needed for the secure use of the modules, including initial setup instructions,
management methods, and applicable usage policies.
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2. RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices
2.1 RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Overview
The RUGGEDCOM Ethernet Switches and RUGGEDCOM Serial Device Server are utility-grade, fully-managed
Ethernet devices designed to operate reliably in electrically harsh and climatically demanding environments. The
devices’ rugged hardware design, coupled with the embedded Rugged Operating System (ROS®) version 4.2.1.F,
provides improved system reliability and advanced cybersecurity and networking features. This makes them
ideally suited for creating secure Ethernet networks for mission-critical, real-time control applications.
 The RUGGEDCOM RS416F (Figure 1) is a fully-managed serial device server featuring a modular design.
The RS416F can be equipped with up to 16 serial ports, and up to 4 switched Ethernet ports.
Figure 1 – RUGGEDCOM RS416F Serial Device Server
 The RUGGEDCOM M2100F (Figure 2) and RUGGEDCOM M2200F (Figure 3) are fully-managed, modular,
MIL-STD1
hardened Ethernet switches. The M2100F can be equipped with up to 19 switched Ethernet
ports, while the M2200F can be equipped with up to 9 Gigabit Ethernet ports.
Figure 2 – RUGGEDCOM M2100F Ethernet Switch
1 MIL-STD – Military Standard
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Figure 3 – RUGGEDCOM M2200F Ethernet Switch
 The RUGGEDCOM M969F (Figure 4) is a 10-port, fully-managed Ethernet switch, providing dual fiber
optical Gigabit Ethernet ports and up to 8 Fast Ethernet copper ports in a MIL-STD 901D-rated package. It
is IP662
/IP673
-rated for protection against strong jets of water (IP66) and temporary immersion in water
(IP67).
Figure 4 – RUGGEDCOM M969F Ethernet Switch
 The RUGGEDCOM RS900F and RUGGEDCOM RS900GF (both in Figure 5) are fully-managed utility-grade
Ethernet switches. The RS900F offers 6 10/100BaseTX ports with an option for 3 additional fiber or copper
ports, while the RS900GF provides dual fiber optical Gigabit Ethernet ports and 8 Fast Ethernet copper
ports. Both switches provide a high level of immunity to electromagnetic interference and heavy electrical
surges typical of environments found on electric utility substations, plant floors, or in curbside traffic
control cabinets. An operating temperature range of –40°C to +85°C (–40°F to +185°F), together with
Hazardous Location certification (Class 1 Division 2), allows the RS900F and RS900GF to be placed in
almost any location.
2
IP66 – Ingress Protection Rating 66
3 IP67 – Ingress Protection Rating 67
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Figure 5 – RUGGEDCOM RS900F (left) and RS900GF Ethernet Switches
 The RUGGEDCOM RS940GF (Figure 6) is a fully-managed Ethernet switch, providing 6 or 8 ports of Gigabit
Ethernet. Six 10/100/1000BaseTX triple-speed copper ports are standard. An additional two Gigabit fiber
or copper ports can be added. The RS940GF provides a way of connecting a cluster of field devices to a
Gigabit Ethernet backbone. The RS940GF provides two fiber optical Gigabit Ethernet ports for creating a
fiber optical backbone with high noise immunity and long haul connectivity.
Figure 6 – RUGGEDCOM RS940GF Ethernet Switch
 The RUGGEDCOM RSG2100F (Figure 7) and RUGGEDCOM RSG2200F (Figure 8) are modular Ethernet
switches. The RSG2100F features up to 3 Gigabit Ethernet ports and up to 16 Fast Ethernet ports, while
the RSG2200F offers up to 9 Gigabit Ethernet ports. Support for front or rear mount connectors, coupled
with multiple fiber connector types (including SFP4
, GBIC5
, LC6
, and SC7
) without loss of port density, makes
the RSG2100F and RSG2200F highly versatile and suitable for any application.
4 SFP – Small Form-Factor Pluggable
5 GBIC – Gigabit Interface Converter
6
LC – Lucent Connector
7 SC – Subscriber Connector
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Figure 7 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2100F Ethernet Switch
Figure 8 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2200F Ethernet Switch
 The RUGGEDCOM RSG2488F (Figure 9) is the first utility-grade, field-upgradable, Layer 2 Ethernet switch
with hot-swappable dual redundant power supplies. The RSG2488F’s modular flexibility provides up to 28
non-blocking ports that can be configured as 10/100/1000TX copper or 100FX/1000SX fiber. With its 1U8
form factor and vertical Gigabit loading design, the RSG2488F provides users with the flexibility and field
maintenance simplicity needed to efficiently implement, maintain, and evolve a broadband local area
network.
Figure 9 – RUGGEDCOM RSG2488F Ethernet Switch
Device management can be accomplished using the following three management interfaces:
 Web Interface – An interactive web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) over HTTPS9
accessible remotely
over HTTPS via Ethernet ports and optical fiber ports
 Console Interface – An interactive menu-based GUI accessible directly via a direct RS-232 serial console
port or over SSH via Ethernet ports and optical fiber ports
8
U – Unit
9 HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
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 Console CLI10
– A full-featured command-based interface accessible after accessing the Console Interface
and pressing <CTRL+S>.
The RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices are validated at the FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC11 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices are hardware cryptographic modules with a multiple-chip standalone
embodiment. The overall security level of the modules is 2. The cryptographic modules consist of firmware and
hardware components enclosed in a secure, industrially-hardened metal case. The hardware components include
a main circuit board and power supplies, with some models being equipped with port interface boards. For all
devices, the cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis (illustrated by the red-dotted line
shown in Figure 10 below).
RUGGEDCOM Switch/Server
with ROS-F
Status Ouput
Control Input
Data Input/Output
Power
Figure 10 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Device Cryptographic Boundary
10
CLI – Command Line Interface
11 EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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Each module is primarily composed of the following components:
 Processor
 SDRAM12
 Flash memory
 Ethernet switch chip
 LEDs13
 Failsafe relay
Table 2 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Hardware Components
Model Processor SDRAM Flash Ethernet Switch Chip
RS416F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz14 processor core)
32MB15 8MB 1x Marvell 88E6095F
M2100F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 2x Marvell 88E6097F
M2200F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6185
M969F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6095F
RS900F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6095F
RS900GF 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6095F
RS940GF 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6185
RSG2100F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 2x Marvell 88E6097F
RSG2200F 1x Freescale ColdFire MCF5272
(66MHz processor core)
16MB 4MB 1x Marvell 88E6185
RSG2488F 1x Freescale PowerPC MPC8308
(400MHz processor core)
256MB 32MB 1x Broadcom BCM56143
In addition to the primary components listed above, the devices feature a modular design that makes them highly
configurable. Each one is specially built according to customer specifications. Because of the modular design, the
devices have numerous combinations of interfaces and networking capabilities. However, these customer-
orderable components do not provide any additional cryptography-related services or logic. Instead, these
12 SDRAM – Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
13 LED – Light Emitting Diode
14
MHz – Megahertz
15 MB – Megabyte
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components provide options for power and flexible network connectivity. Each available slot must be filled with
a line card (or blank) in order to maintain the modules’ physical security posture. The selection and configuration
of components has no impact on the FIPS-related behavior of the modules. Validation testing was performed on
the specific configuration(s) of each device as listed in Table 3 below.
Table 3 – RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices Tested Configurations
Model Component Configuration Component Description
RS416F A03, B03, C03, D03 4 x Fiber Serial Interface (ST Connector)
A04, B04, C04, D04 4 x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B via DB9 1
A05, B05, C05, D05 4 x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B via RJ45 1
E01, F01 2 x 10/100Tx RJ45
E14 1 x IRIG-B in, BNC, 1 x IRIG-B out, BNC (Slot 5 only)
M2100F A02, B02, C02, D02, G02, H02, J02, K02 2 x 10FL - Multimode, 850nm, ST
A03, B03, C03, D03, G03, H03, J03, K03 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1310nm, ST
A05, B05, C05, D05, G05, H05, J05, K05 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
E01 2 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D
M2200F A01, B01, C01, D01 2 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D
A02, B02, C02, D02 2 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
A04, B04, C04, D04 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
A05, B05, C05, D05 2 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D, with special short jackscrews
M969F A09 2 x 1000SX Multimode, LC connectors 850nm
RS900F A09 (Port 7/Port 8) 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST connector, and 1 x 100FX - Singlemode,
Standard 20km
B03 (Port 9) 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC connector
RS900GF A04 (Port 9/Port 10) Dual 1000LX Singlemode, LC 1310nm, 25km
RS940GF A03 Dual 1000SX Multimode, LC 850nm 500m
RSG2100F A01, B01, C01, D01, G01, H01, J01, K01 2 x 10/100Tx RJ45
A02, B02, C02, D02, G02, H02, J02, K02 2 x 10FL- Multimode, 850nm, ST
A03, B03, C03, D03, G03, H03, J03, K03 2 x 100FX- Multimode, 1300nm, ST
A13, B13, C13, D13, G13, H13, J13, K13 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
A14, B14, C14, D14, G14, H14, J14, K14 2 x 10/100Tx micro-D
E01 2 x 10/100/1000Tx RJ45
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Model Component Configuration Component Description
F02 1 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
RSG2200F A01, B01, C01, D01 2 x 10/100/1000Tx RJ45
A02, B02, C02, D02 2 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
A06, B06, C06, D06 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25 km
A08, B08, C08, D08 2 x 1000SX SFP - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E20 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ
RSG2488F A01, B01, C01, D01, E01, F01 4 x 10/100/1000Tx RJ45
A04, B04, C04, D04, E04, F04 4 x 10/100/1000Tx M12 X-Coded
A05, B05, C05, D05, E05, F05 4 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
A09, B09, C09, D09, E09, F09 4 x 1000SX SFP - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
A24, B24, C24, D24, E24, F24 4 x 1000LX Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
A59 1 x Precision Time Protocol (PTP) - Module: GPS in, IRIG-B AM/TTL, IN/OUT
G61, H61 2 x 10/100/1000Tx RJ45
G64, H64 2 x 10/100/1000Tx M12 X-Coded
Appendix A specifies the non-security relevant line card components of the remaining configurations for each
device that are excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements. Each component of the line card, except the faceplate, is
excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements because they do not provide any security relevant functionality. Since
tamper evident seals are applied and necessary for physical security protection, the faceplates are security
relevant are required to meet the FIPS 140-2 requirements.
The modules implement the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4 below.
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
CAVP Certificate
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key Lengths, Curves
or Moduli
Use
PowerPC ColdFire
4030 4037 AES16
FIPS 197
NIST SP 800-38D
ECB17, CBC18, GCM19 128, 256 Encryption/
Decryption
FIPS 197 CTR20 256
2078 2072 RSA21 FIPS 186-4 - 2048, 3072 Key Generation
16 AES – Advance Encryption Standard
17 ECB – Electronic Code Book
18 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
19 GCM – Galois Counter Mode
20
CTR – Counter
21 RSA – Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
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CAVP Certificate
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key Lengths, Curves
or Moduli
Use
PowerPC ColdFire
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512
(PKCS22 #1 v1.5)
2048, 3072
Signature Generation
and Verification
SHA-256
(PSS23)
2048, 3072 Signature Verification
899 903 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 - P-256, P-384, P-521 Public Key Generation
3336 3329 SHS24 FIPS 180-4
SHA25-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- Message Digest
2631 2635 HMAC26 FIPS 198-1
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512
-
Message
Authentication
1204 1207 DRBG27 NIST SP28 800-90A CTR_based -
Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
Vendor
Affirmed
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG NIST SP 800-133 - - Key Generation
858 863 CVL29 for ECC CDH30 NIST SP 800-56A - P-521 Key Agreement
859 861
CVL for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) 1.0/1.1, 1.2 NIST SP 800-135
Rev.1
- - Key Derivation
CVL for Secure Shell (SSH)
876 862
CVL for RSA Decryption
Primitive
FIPS 186-4 - 2048 Data Decryption
Note 1: The TLS and SSH protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP31
or CMVP.
Note 2: The CVL for TLS 1.0/1.1 does not allow testing of only one version of TLS. Because of this, TLS 1.0 is listed on the CAVP certificate but is not supported
by the RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices.
Note 3: CAVP testing was performed on AES ECB mode but is not implemented in the module.
Note 4: SHA-1 shall not be used for digital signature generation with the exception as specified in SP 800-52 REV1 and SP 800-57 Part 3 REV1.
Note 5: CAVP testing was performed on HMAC with SHA-224 and SHA-512 but is not implemented in the module.
Note 6: In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed).
The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
The modules also employ the non-FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 5 below (all of which are allowed for
use in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation).
Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm Caveat Use
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key agreement; Key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength
Used for key agreement during SSH and TLS (2048-bit
keys)
22 PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standard
23 PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme
24 SHS – Secure Hash Standard
25
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
26 HMAC – (keyed-) Hashed Message Authentication Code
27 DBRG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
28 SP – Special Publication
29 CVL – Component Validation List
30
ECC CDH – Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
31 CAVP – Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
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Algorithm Caveat Use
ECDH32 Key agreement; Key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength
Used for key agreement during SSH and TLS
(supported curves of P-256, P-384, P-521)
RSA Key encapsulation; Key establishment methodology
provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength
Used for key establishment during TLS (2048-bit and
3072-bit keys)
Non-Deterministic
Random Number
Generator (NDRNG)
- Used for gathering entropy (the module generates 384
bits of entropy for key generation)
All operations requiring entropy are blocked and made
to wait until at least 4,096 bits have been collected in
the entropy pool. If 4,096 bits are present in the
entropy pool, the bits will be extracted, hashed using
SHA-384, and then the CTR_DRBG is seeded with 384
bits of entropy.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The modules’ physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
Table 6 lists the physical ports/interfaces available in the switches and also provides the mapping from the physical
ports/interfaces to logical interfaces as defined by FIPS 140-2.
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
Device Physical Port/Interface Quantity FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
RS416F
Serial port up to 16 Data Input, Data Output
Ethernet port up to 4 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
IRIG-B port (BNC connectors)* 2 or 4 Data Input, Data Output
Mode button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Port status indicator LED 20 Status Output
Display mode LED (status, duplex, and speed) 3 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
M2100F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper or fiber) up to 3 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
32 ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
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Device Physical Port/Interface Quantity FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Fast Ethernet port (copper or fiber) up to 16 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Mode button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Port status indicator LED 32 Status Output
Display mode LED (status, duplex, and speed) 3 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
M2200F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper or fiber) up to 9 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Mode button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Port status indicator LED 32 Status Output
Display mode LED (status, duplex, and speed) 3 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
M969F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Fast Ethernet port (copper) 8 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (fiber) 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Link LED 10 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
M23 power supply connector 1 Power
RS900F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Fast Ethernet port (copper) 6 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Reset button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Power LED 1 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply terminal block 1 Power
RS900GF
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Fast Ethernet port (copper) 8 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (fiber) 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
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Device Physical Port/Interface Quantity FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Power LED 1 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply terminal block 1 Power
RS940GF
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper) 6 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (fiber or copper)* 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Power LED 1 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply terminal block 1 Power
RSG2100F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Fast Ethernet port (copper or fiber) up to 16 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper or fiber) up to 3 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Mode button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Port status indicator LED 32 Status Output
Display mode LED (status, duplex, and speed) 3 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
RSG2200F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper and/or fiber) up to 9 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Mode button 1 Control Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Port status indicator LED 32 Status Output
Display mode LED (status, duplex, and speed) 3 Status Output
Power LED 2 Status Output
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
RSG2488F
Serial console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Ethernet console port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
Gigabit Ethernet port (copper and/or fiber) up to 28 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
IRIG-B port (BNC connectors)* 4 Data Input, Data Output
GPS port (BNC connectors)* 1 Data Input
Failsafe relay 1 Status Output
Power module indicator LED 4 Status Output
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Device Physical Port/Interface Quantity FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Alarm LED 1 Status Output
Speed LED 1 Status Output
Link/activity/sync LED 28 Status Output
Power supply port 2 Power
* - optional
As described above, the modules have a number of LEDs that indicate various states and conditions. The
descriptions for the LEDs are listed in Table 7 below.
Table 7 – Module LED Descriptions
Switch LED State Description
M2100F
M2200F
RSG2100F
RSG2200F
Port Status
Indicators (Status
Mode)
Green (Solid) Link detected
Green (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Port Status
Indicators (Duplex
Mode)
Green (Solid) Full duplex mode
Orange (Solid) Half-duplex mode
Off No link detected
Port Status
Indicators (Speed
Mode)
Green (Solid) The port is operating at 1000 Mbps33
Green (Blinking) The port is operating at 100 Mbps
Orange (Solid) The port is operating at 10 Mbps
Off No link detected
Display Mode
(Status)
On When Status mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate when ports are active. When Status mode is not selected
(OFF), these Port Status Indicator LEDs display either Duplex or Speed
outputs.
Off
Display Mode
(Duplex)
On When Duplex mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate when ports are operating in full or half-duplex mode. When
Duplex mode is not selected (OFF), these Port Status Indicator LEDs
display either Status or Speed outputs.
Off
Display Mode
(Speed)
On When Speed mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate the port speed. When Speed mode is not selected (OFF),
these Port Status Indicator LEDs display either Duplex or Status
outputs.
Off
Power Green (On) The power supply is installed and supplying power
Red (On) The power supply fails
Off No power supply is installed
Alarm On An alarm condition exists
Off No alarm condition exists
33 Mbps – Megabits per second
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Switch LED State Description
RS900F
RS900GF
RS940GF
Power On Power is being supplied to the device
Off No power is being supplied to the device
Alarm On An alarm condition exists
Off No alarm condition exists
M969F Link Yellow (Solid) Link detected
Yellow (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Power On Power is being supplied to the device
Off No power is being supplied to the device
Alarm Red (On) An alarm condition exists
Off No alarm condition exists
RSG2488F Power Module
Indicator (Top)
On Power is being supplied to the device
Off No power is being supplied to the device
Power Module
Indicator
(Bottom)
On Power is being received by the module
Off No power is being received by the module
Alarm On An alarm condition exists
Off No alarm condition exists
Speed (RJ45) Yellow (Solid) The port is operating at 1000 Mbps
Off The port is operating at 10 or 100 Mbps
Link/Activity
(RJ45)
Yellow (Solid) Link established
Yellow (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Link/Activity
(M12)
Green (Solid) Link established
Green (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Sync (BNC) Green (On) Signal locked
Amber/Yellow (On) Holdover
Red (On) Error
Off No signal detected
RS416F Port Status
Indicators (Status
Mode for
Ethernet ports)
Green (Solid) Link detected
Green (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Port Status
Indicators (Duplex
Mode for
Ethernet ports)
Green (Solid) Full duplex mode
Orange (Solid) Half-duplex mode
Off No link detected
Green (Solid) The port is operating at 100 Mbps
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Switch LED State Description
Port Status
Indicators (Speed
Mode for
Ethernet ports)
Orange (Solid) The port is operating at 10 Mbps
Off No link detected
Port Status
Indicators (Status
Mode for serial
ports)
Green (Blinking) Traffic detected
Off No traffic
Port Status
Indicators (Duplex
Mode for serial
ports)
Green (Solid) Full duplex mode
Orange (Solid) Half-duplex mode
Off No link detected
Port Status
Indicators (Speed
Mode for serial
ports)
Green (Solid) >19200 to <57600 bps
Green (Blinking) 57600 bps or higher
Orange (Solid) <19200 bps
Off No link detected
Display Mode
(Status)
On When Status mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate when ports are active. When Status mode is not selected
(OFF), these Port Status Indicator LEDs display either Duplex or Speed
outputs.
Off
Display Mode
(Duplex)
On When Duplex mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate when ports are operating in full or half-duplex mode. When
Duplex mode is not selected (OFF), these Port Status Indicator LEDs
display either Status or Speed outputs.
Off
Display Mode
(Speed)
On When Speed mode is selected (ON), the Port Status Indicator LEDs
indicate the port speed. When Speed mode is not selected (OFF),
these Port Status Indicator LEDs display either Duplex or Status
outputs.
Off
Power Green (On) The power supply is installed and supplying power
Red (On) The power supply fails
Off No power supply is installed
Alarm On An alarm condition exists
Off No alarm condition exists
RJ45 port (Speed) Yellow The port is operating at 1000 Mbps
Off The port is operating at 10 or 100 Mbps
RJ45 port
(Link/Activity)
Yellow (Solid) Link established
Yellow (Blinking) Link activity
Off No link detected
Serial port Green Link activity detected
Off No link detected
Off No IRIG-B signal detected
Red Errors detected in received IRIG-B signal
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Switch LED State Description
IRIG-B (BNC
connections’ Sync
LED)
Amber/Yellow Holdover (GPS lock has been achieved, but the receiver no longer
sees the minimum number of required satellites)
Green Received IRIG-B signal is good
2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The sections below describe the modules’ roles and services and define the authentication methods employed.
2.4.1 Authorized Roles
The modules support four roles that operators may assume: Crypto Officer (CO), User, Guest, and Maintenance.
 Crypto Officer – The CO role is responsible for initializing the modules for first use (including the
configuration of passwords, certificates, public and private keys, and other CSPs34
). The CO is also
responsible for the management and zeroization of all keys and CSPs. The CO is the only operator that can
configure the modules into FIPS-Approved mode of operation. (NOTE: This role designation maps to the
modules’ “Admin” account.)
The CO also has access to all User and Guest services.
 User – The User role has the privileges to change basic settings, show module statistics, show the current
status of the modules, clear statistics, and reset alarms. (NOTE: This role designation maps to the modules’
“Operator” account.)
 Guest – The Guest role has the read-only privileges and can view only a limited selection of settings.
(NOTE: This role designation maps to the modules’ “Guest” account.)
 Maintenance – The Maintenance role has access to the module’s hardware testing and diagnostics
services. Please see Section 2.4.3 below for details.
Module operators can connect to the modules remotely via secure TLS and SSH sessions, while local sessions occur
over the serial console port. The modules are capable of supporting multiple CO and multiple User/Guest operator
sessions at any given time. Each remote session is secured by the session protocol and the operating system (OS)
process and memory management functions, and is distinguished by session information. Local sessions are
secured via the direct connection over the seral console port.
2.4.2 Operator Services
Descriptions of the services available to module operators in the normal operational mode are provided in the
Table 8 below. The keys and CSPs listed in Table 8 indicate the type of access required using the following notation:
 R – Read: The CSP is read.
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
34 CSP – Critical Security Parameter
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Table 8 – Operational Mode Services
Service
Operator
Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User Guest
Manage the flash file
system

View information
about files in flash;
defragment the
flash file system
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
View product
information
  
View information
about the device
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
View CPU diagnostics   
View CPU diagnostic
information
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
View power supply
status
  
View the current
status of the power
supplies
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Restore factory
defaults

Restore the module
to its original
factory default
settings
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – W
User Password – W
Guest Password – W
Manage SSL35
certificates

Manage SSL
certificates
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
CA Public Key – R/W
TLS RSA Public Key – R/W
TLS RSA Private Key – W
Manage SSH host key
pairs

Add or update SSH
host keys
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
SSH RSA Public Key – R/W
SSH RSA Private Key – R/W
Manage SSH public
keys

Add, view, update,
or delete SSH public
keys
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
SSH Public Key – R/W
Upload/download
files

Transfer files
between the
module and a host
computer using
XMODEM via serial
console
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage logs 
View, clear,
configure, and
manage local logs
and logging
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage Ethernet
ports
 
View and clear
Ethernet port status
and statistics;
configure, and reset
Ethernet ports
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage IP Interfaces 
Configure the
Management or
Switch IP interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
35 SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User Guest
Manage IP gateways 
View, add, and
delete IP gateways
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Configure IP services 
Configure the
Management or
Switch IP interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage remote
monitoring

Collect and view
historical statistics
related to the
performance and
operation of
Ethernet ports
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Reboot/Reset
module
 
Reboot/reset the
module via CLI
(zeroizes keys/CSPs
stored in SDRAM
and performs self-
tests)
Command
Command
response/
Status output
All keys and CSPs stored in
SDRAM – W
Clear data 
Clear banner file,
system log, and
configuration data
and zeroize
keys/CSPs in flash
Command
Command
response/
Status output
All keys and CSPs stored in flash
and SDRAM (except the
Firmware Load Authentication
Key, CA36 Public Key, and SSH
Public Key) – W
Configure system
information

Configure basic
information used to
identify the device,
its location, and its
owner
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Customize login
screen

Set a custom
welcome message
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage users 
Configure the three
pre-defined user
accounts
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
CO Password – R/W/X
User Password – R/W/X
Guest Password – R/W/X
Change password 
Modify existing
passwords
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
CO Password – R/W
User Password – R/W
Guest Password – R/W
Enable/disable the
web interface

Enable/disable the
web interface
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage alarms  
Set up, view, and
reset device alarms
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage
configuration file

Download, store,
and update device
configuration file
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User Guest
Configure DHCP
Relay Agent

Set the DHCP server
address and client
ports
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage VLANs37  
View, configure, and
manage VLANs
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage Spanning
Tree Protocol (STP)
 
Configure STP; view
and clear STP
statistics; manage
multiple STP
instances
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage Classes of
Service (CoS)

Configure CoS
mappings
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage Media
Access Control (MAC)
addresses
 
View MAC
addresses;
configure address
learning and
flooding options;
manage static MAC
addresses; purge
dynamic MAC
addresses
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage time
services

Manage time
services
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage network
discovery
 
Configure LLDP38;
enable/disable
RCDP39; view LLDP
statistics
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage multicast
filtering
 
View multicast
groups; configure
IGMP 40and
GMRP41; view, add,
and delete static
multicast groups
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Manage port security  
View authorized
MAC address list;
configure port
security
parameters;
configure IEEE
parameters
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
37 VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network
38 LLDP – Link Layer Discovery Protocol
39 RCDP – RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol
40
IGMP – Internet Group Management Protocol
41 GMRP – Generic Attribute Registration Protocol (GARP) Multicast Registration Protocol
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User Guest
Manage link
aggregation
 
View, add, and
delete port trunks
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
Status output
None
Enter maintenance
mode (zeroize)

Reboot into the
modules’
maintenance mode
(also zeroizes all
keys and CSPs in
flash and SDRAM
except the
Firmware Load
Authentication Key,
CA Public Key, and
SSH Public Key)
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
All keys and CSPs stored in flash
and SDRAM (except the
Firmware Load Authentication
Key, CA Public Key, and SSH
Public Key) – W
Upgrade/downgrade
firmware

Load new firmware
and perform an
integrity test using
an RSA digital
signature
Command
Command
response/
Status output
Firmware Load Authentication
Key – R/X
Perform self-tests
on-demand

Perform self-tests
on-demand via CLI
(zeroizes keys/CSPs
stored in SDRAM)
Command
Command
response/
Status output
All keys and CSPs stored in
SDRAM – W
Show FIPS
operational mode
  
Show the
operational mode of
module via LEDs or
remote terminal
window
None None None
Show settings/status   
Show the system
status, Ethernet
status, alarms,
system
identification and
configuration
settings of the
module
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
Terminate sessions   
Terminate an
operator’s own user
session
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
Run
commands/scripts

Run commands or
script files (text files
containing a list of
CLI commands to
execute in
sequence)
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
Perform network
diagnostics
  
Monitor
connections,
Ethernet ports, STP,
and VLANs
Command
Command
response/
Status output
None
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Service
Operator
Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User Guest
Establish TLS session   
Establish web
session using TLS
and perform any of
the services listed
above
Command
Command
response/ Status
output
CO Password – X
User Password – X
Guest Password – X
CA Public Key – R/X
TLS RSA Public Key – R/W/X
TLS RSA Private Key – W/X
TLS DH Public Key – R/W/X
TLS DH Private Key – W/X
TLS ECDH Public Key – R/W/X
TLS ECDH Private Key – W/X
TLS Session Key – R/W/X
TLS ECDSA Public Key – R/W/X
TLS Authentication Key – R/W/X
DRBG Key – R/W/X
DRBG ‘V’ Value – R/W/X
DRBG Seed – R/W/X
Entropy Input String – R/W/X
Establish SSH session   
Establish remote
session using SSH
protocol and
perform any of the
services listed
above
Command
Command
response/ Status
output
CO Password – X
User Password – X
Guest Password – X
SSH Public Key – R/X
SSH Authentication Key – R/W/X
SSH Session Key – R/W/X
SSH RSA Public Key – R/W/X
SSH RSA Private Key – W/X
SSH DH Public Key – R/W/X
SSH DH Private Key – W/X
SSH ECDH Public Key – R/W/X
SSH ECDH Private Key – W/X
SSH ECDSA Public Key – R/W/X
DRBG Key – R/W/X
DRBG ‘V’ Value – R/W/X
DRBG Seed – R/W/X
Entropy Input String – R/W/X
Perform encryption/
decryption service
  
Encrypt or decrypt
user data, keys, or
management traffic
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
TLS Session Key – X
SSH Session Key – X
IV – R/W
DRBG Key – R/W/X
DRBG ‘V’ Value – R/W/X
DRBG Seed – R/W/X
Entropy Input String – R/W/X
Authenticate data
traffic
  
Authenticate user
data or
management traffic
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
TLS Authentication Key – X
SSH Authentication Key – X
All services listed in Table 8 above require the operator to assume an authorized role, and the operator must
authenticate to the module prior to being granted access to any of these services. For a full listing of module
services, please refer to the Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS-F v4.2.1.F User Guide available online and upon request
from Siemens Customer Service.
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2.4.3 Maintenance Mode
The modules support a maintenance mode, which can only be accessed via the Console CLI shell. Maintenance
mode consists of hardware testing and diagnostics services. The modules automatically boot into maintenance
mode as a result of experiencing a critical error (see Section 2.9.4).
As part of the transition to maintenance mode, all configuration files, server certificates, and SSH host key pairs
stored in flash are automatically zeroized. The module then performs a reboot into maintenance mode,
automatically zeroizing all keys (excluding the SSH Public Key and CA Public Key) and CSPs stored in SDRAM.
Further, all networking ports are placed in loopback, inhibiting all Ethernet traffic. The Web Interface will not
respond, and remote logging will no longer occur.
Table 9 lists the services available while in the maintenance mode.
Table 9 – Maintenance Mode Services
Service Description Input
Device
Output
CSP and
Type of
Access
M2100F
M2200F
M969F
RS900F
RS900GF
RS940GF
RSG2100F
RSG2200F
RSG2488F
RS416F
Test hardware
Run the built in hardware
self-tests; verify all
previously read hardware
IDs remain the same
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Clear device
data
Clear the user data and
logs (system and crash
logs) from the device
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Clear screen Clear the screen Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
View file
directory
Print a list of the file
directories to the screen
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Ethernet
management
Manipulates Ethernet port
PHY and forwarding
capabilities; start a
loopback test on the
specified Ethernet port(s)
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Terminate
session
Terminate this command
line session
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Flash files
Flash file system
commands
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Help
information
Print a list of all commands
and their information
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Test crypto
Execute cryptographic
algorithm self-tests
Command 
Command response/
Status output
None
Test BCM
BCM diagnostic shell
commands
Command 
Command response/
Status output
None
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Service Description Input
Device
Output
CSP and
Type of
Access
M2100F
M2200F
M969F
RS900F
RS900GF
RS940GF
RSG2100F
RSG2200F
RSG2488F
RS416F
Monitor BCM
Monitor BCM statistic
counters
Command 
Command response/
Status output
None
Test FPGA
Timesync FPGA debug
interface; test Timesync
FPGA
Command 
Command response/
Status output
None
Test JTAG chain
Invoke self-tests on jtag
chain; programs the PFGA
Command     
Command response/
Status output
None
Test Marvell
switch
Marvell Ethernet Switch
register diagnostics
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Display SFP
information
Displays SFP device data Command  
Command response/
Status output
None
Test SPI
Run self-tests on SPI Flash
device; read/write via SPI
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Show user
spurious
interrupt count
Display user spurious
interrupt count
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Read file
Display the contents of a
text file
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Show version Print software versions Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Test watchdog
Provides the ability to test
watchdog(s)
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Test clock
Run clock synthesizer
diagnostics; execute clock
synthesizer self-test; run
Real-Time Clock (RTC)
register diagnostics and
test the RTC memory
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Test memory
Run EEPROM42 diagnostics;
execute EEPROM self-test;
execute memory
read/write tests; execute
flash device self-test
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Test
temperature
sensors
Execute temperature
sensor self-test
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
42 EEPROM – Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
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Service Description Input
Device
Output
CSP and
Type of
Access
M2100F
M2200F
M969F
RS900F
RS900GF
RS940GF
RSG2100F
RSG2200F
RSG2488F
RS416F
Test power
supply
Execute power supply self-
tests; clear data log in
power supply board; run
power supply sequencer
register diagnostics;
execute power supply
sequencer self-test
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Test LEDs
Execute LED self-tests; read
and display LED Panel
control registers
Command      
Command response/
Status output
None
Test I2C43 Execute I2C self-tests;
read/write via I2C
Command      
Command response/
Status output
None
Test I/O44 pins Execute I/O self-tests Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
Test SMI45
Use the SMI interface
diagnostics; test SMI
interface by writing and
reading SMI device
registers
Command         
Command response/
Status output
None
Reset switch
Perform a hard reset of the
module
Command          
Command response/
Status output
None
As none of the available services modify, substitute, or disclose keys and CSPs, module operators assume a
maintenance role implicitly when transitioning to the maintenance mode. However, the Crypto Officer can also
directly access the maintenance mode. Direct access to this mode requires the use of the Crypto Officer’s
username and password, and is accomplished by doing the following:
1. Connect to the device via the Console Interface.
2. Log in to the device as a CO via the Console Interface.
3. Press <CTRL+S> to access the Console CLI shell.
4. At the Console CLI prompt, enter “factory”.
5. When prompted, answer “yes” and enter the CO password.
6. At the Console CLI prompt, enter “maintenance”.
To exit from the maintenance mode, the module must be reset/rebooted normally, and the CO must re-
commission the module to bring it back to a normal operational state.
43 I2C – Inter-Integrated Circuit
44
I/O – Input/Output
45 SMI – Serial Management Interface
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2.4.4 Additional Services
The modules provide a limited number of services for which the operator is not required to assume an authorized
role. Table 10 lists the services for which the operator is not required to assume an authorized role. None of the
services listed in the table modify, disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys and CSPs or otherwise affect the
security of the modules.
Table 10 – Additional Services
Service Description Input Output Key/CSP and Type of Access
Authenticate
operator
Log into the module Command Status output
CO Password – R/X
User Password – R/X
Guest Password – R/X
Reboot module
Reboot the module
(zeroizes keys/CSPs
stored in SDRAM and
performs self-tests on
demand)
Power cycle the module using power
connectors or reset/mode button
(where available)
Status output
All keys and CSPs stored in
SDRAM – W
2.4.5 Authentication
The modules support role-based authentication. Role assumption is explicit, and is based on the authentication
credential employed. Module operators must authenticate to the module to assume an authorized role and access
module services. When changing roles, the operator must first log out of their current role, and then re-
authenticate to the module to assume the new role.
All operators authenticate to the module using a username and password. The password has a configurable
minimum length that must be set to 8 (see Section 3.1 below ), and may contain any combination of letters
(uppercase and lowercase), digits (0 – 9), and special characters (“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, “~”,
“`”, “-”, “_”, “=”, “+”, “\”, “|”, “]”, “}”, “ [”, “{”, “ ‘”, “””, “;”, “:”, “/”, “?”, “.”, “>”, “,”, and “<”), allowing for a total
character space of 94 characters.
The modules enforce protection mechanisms against brute force attacks. For each operator interface (TLS, SSH,
and serial), the modules allow 10 password authentication failures in a period of 5 minutes (the first
authentication attempt starts a 5-minute timer). Every authentication attempt on that interface from the 11th
onward is rejected for the lockout period of 60 minutes, even if the password is correct. The failure counter resets
to 0 once the timer expires. Thus, an operator can make a maximum of 30 total authentication attempts in 5
minutes. If all 30 attempts fail, then the operator account is locked out across all interfaces.
Operators can also authenticate to the module using RSA public keys when connecting via SSH or TLS. This key can
be 2048 or 3072 bits in length. Table 11 provides the strength of the authentication mechanisms used by the
modules.
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Table 11 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Modules
Authentication Type Strength
Password Once properly configured, the minimum length of the password is 8 characters, with 94
different case-sensitive alphanumeric characters and symbols possible for usage.
Assuming a minimum password length of 8 characters, the chance of a random attempt
falsely succeeding is:
1: (948), or
1: 6,095,689,385,410,816
Which is less than 1:1,000,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
In a 5-minute window, the module limits the number of failed authentication attempts
to 30 (10 per interface) before locking the account across all interfaces for 60 minutes.
Thus, assuming all 30 attempts are made in one minute, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1: (948 / 30), or
1: 203,189,646,180,360
Which is less than 1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Public Key The RSA public key used for public key authentication can be 2048 or 3072 bits, yielding
an equivalent 112 or 128 bits of strength (respectively). Assuming the minimum key size,
the chance of a random authentication attempt falsely succeeding is:
1: (2112), or
1: 5.1922968585348276285304963292201e+33
Which is less than 1:1,000,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
The number of authentication attempts per minute is limited by the bandwidth available
over the serial connection, which is a maximum of 115,200 bits per second (or 6,912,000
bits per minute). For a 112-bit key, this results in no more than 61,714 authentication
attempts per minute. Thus, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1: (2112 / 61,714), or
1: 84,134,829,350,468,736,891,637,170,321
Which is less than 1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
The feedback of authentication data to a module operator is obscured during authentication. The modules provide
feedback by displaying a “rounded dot” (●) symbol when an operator is entering his password via the Web GUI,
and an “x” symbol when using the Console Interface or Console CLI over a serial port. No feedback is provided
when authenticating via the Console Interface or Console CLI over an SSH connection.
The modules provide the ability for an operator to change roles and require re-authentication of an operator to
assume a new role. In order to change roles, an operator is required to first log out and then log in with an account
with appropriate permissions for the desired role.
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The modules do not allow the disclosure, modification, or substitution of authentication data to unauthorized
operators. Only an authenticated CO can modify operator authentication credentials.
2.5 Physical Security
Each of the RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices consists of production-grade components that include standard
passivation techniques. Each device is encased in a hard metal enclosure (the M969F and RSG2488F enclosures
are cast aluminum, while the remaining switch/server enclosures are galvanized steel).
There are only a limited set of ventilation holes provided in the module enclosures. Internal baffles cover the
ventilation holes, which makes it impossible to view internal components of the module. Tamper-evident seals
are applied to the enclosures to provide physical evidence of unauthorized attempts to open the enclosure or
remove module components. The tamper-evident seals must be inspected periodically for signs of tampering. The
placement of the tamper-evident seals can be found in the Secure Operation section of this document.
Note that no additional labels are provided upon receipt. Further additional labels cannot be ordered from
Siemens. Thus, if any evidence of tampering is observed on the module enclosures or tamper-evident seals, the
modules shall be considered to be in a non-compliant state. Upon such discovery, the CO shall immediately take
the module out of operation and return to Siemens.
2.6 Operational Environment
The modules employ a non-modifiable operating environment. Only the modules’ ROS-F firmware is executed by
their processors. The modules do not provide a general-purpose operating system to module operators.
Only the modules’ firmware image can be executed. A method to update the firmware with a new digitally-signed
image is provided. Prior to installing the new image, its associated 2048-bit RSA signature is checked. If the
signature check is failed, the new firmware is ignored and the current firmware remains loaded. If the signature
check is passed, the new image will be installed and executed after the device is reset. Any firmware loaded into
this module that is not listed in this document is out of the scope of this validation and will mean that the module
is not operating in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
Table 12 below describes the keys and CSPs supported by the modules.
Table 12 – Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Initialization Vector
(IV)46
128-bit value For encryption:
Generated internally
(using an Approved
DRBG with a
cryptographically-
strong entropy source)
For encryption: exits
the module in
encrypted form
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used with AES-CTR for
encrypting or
decrypting payload
data between an
authorized external
entity and the module
For decryption:
Generated externally
and enters the module
in encrypted form
For decryption: never
exits the module
SSH Public Key 2048, 3072-bit RSA key Public key of an
external entity: Enters
the module in plaintext
Never exits the module Stored in a file on the
flash memory in
plaintext form
Command via CLI or
when updated with a
new one
Used for public key-
based authentication
SSH Session Key 128, 256-bit AES key Generated internally
via DH or ECDH key
agreement
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for encryption or
decryption of SSH
session packets
SSH Authentication Key 160-bit HMAC key Generated internally
via DH or ECDH key
agreement
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for authentication
of SSH session packets
TLS Session Key 128, 256-bit AES key Generated internally
via FIPS-Approved
DRBG or entered into
the module in
encrypted form during
TLS session negotiation
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for encryption or
decryption of TLS
session packets
46 Generation of the IV follows technique #1 described in FIPS Implementation Guidance A.5.
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Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
TLS Authentication Key 160, 256, 384-bit
HMAC key
Generated internally
via FIPS-Approved
DRBG or entered into
the module in
encrypted form during
TLS session negotiation
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for authentication
of TLS session packets
CA Public Key 2048, 3072-bit RSA key Enters the module in
plaintext
Never exits the module Stored in a file on the
flash memory in
plaintext form
When updated with a
new one
Used to provide the
chain of authority and
authenticity for
enabling SSL
communications
TLS RSA Public Key 2048, 3072-bit key The module’s public
key is generated
internally or enters the
module encrypted
through an SFTP
transfer; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Stored in a file on the
flash memory in
plaintext form
Command via CLI;
when updated with a
new one; on factory
reset
Used for TLS key
negotiation; TLS
authentication,
signature verification,
and certificate
generation
TLS RSA Private Key 2048, 3072-bit key Internally generated
using DRBG, entered
into the module in
encrypted form
Never exits the module Stored in a file on flash
memory with write-
only permissions
Command via CLI or
when updated with a
new one; on factory
reset
Used for TLS key
negotiation; TLS
authentication,
signature and
certificate generation
SSH RSA Public Key 2048, 3072-bit key The module’s public
key is generated
internally or enters the
module encrypted
through an SFTP
transfer; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Stored in a file on the
flash memory in
plaintext form
Command via CLI;
when updated with a
new one
Used for SSH and SFTP
key negotiation; SSH
authentication,
signature verification,
and certificate
generation
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Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SSH RSA Private Key 2048, 3072-bit key Internally generated
using DRBG, entered
into the module in
encrypted form
Never exits the module Stored in a file on flash
memory with write-
only permissions
Command via CLI or
when updated with a
new one
Used for SSH and SFTP
key negotiation; SSH
authentication,
signature and
certificate generation
TLS DH Public Key 2048-bit key The module’s public
key is generated
internally; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
TLS Session and
Authentication keys
TLS DH Private Key 2048-bit key Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
TLS Session and
Authentication keys
SSH DH Public Key 2048-bit key The module’s public
key is generated
internally; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination
Used for generation of
SSH Session and
Authentication keys
SSH DH Private Key 2048-bit key Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination
Used for generation of
SSH Session and
Authentication keys
TLS ECDH Public Key Public key of ECDH
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
The module’s public
key is generated
internally; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
TLS Session and
Authentication keys
TLS ECDH Private Key Private key of ECDH
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
TLS Session and
Authentication keys
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Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
TLS ECDSA Public Key Public key of ECDSA
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
The module’s public key
is generated internally;
public key of an
external entity enters
the module in plaintext
The module’s public key
exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity never
exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
TLS Session and
Authentication keys
SSH ECDH Public Key Public key of ECDH
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
The module’s public
key is generated
internally; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination
Used for generation of
SSH Session and
Authentication keys
SSH ECDH Private Key Private key of ECDH
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
Generated internally Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination
Used for generation of
SSH Session and
Authentication keys
SSH ECDSA Public Key Public key of ECDSA
protocol (supported
curves of P-256, P-384,
P-521)
The module’s public
key is generated
internally; public key of
an external entity
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s public
key exits the module in
plaintext; public key of
an external entity
never exits the module
Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
SSH Session and
Authentication keys
DRBG Seed 384-bit value Generated internally
using entropy input
string
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
random numbers
Entropy Input String 256-bit value Continually polled from
various system
resources to accrue
entropy by NDRNG
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot or session
termination; on factory
reset
Used for generation of
random numbers
DRBG Key 256-bit AES key Generated internally
during DRBG
instantiation
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot; on factory
reset
Internal state value
used with the
CTR_DRBG
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Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DRBG ‘V’ Value 128-bit internal state
value
Generated internally
during DRBG
instantiation
Never exits the module Plaintext in SDRAM Reboot; on factory
reset
Internal state value
used with the
CTR_DRBG
CO Password String of 8 – 19
characters
(alphanumeric and
special characters)
Initial password are
hardcoded into the
module; password
changes entered into
module via console,
SSH, or TLS
Initially hardcoded
password never exits
the module; changed
password never exits
the module
Plaintext (hashed47) in
flash memory and in
SDRAM
Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one;
changed password
zeroized on factory
reset
Used for authentication
of the Crypto Officer
User Password String of 8 – 19
characters
(alphanumeric and
special characters)
Initial password are
hardcoded into the
module; password
changes entered into
module via console,
SSH, or TLS
Initially hardcoded
password never exits
the module; changed
password never exits
the module
Plaintext (hashed) in
flash memory and in
SDRAM
Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one;
changed password
zeroized on factory
reset
Used for authenticating
the User
Guest Password String of 8 – 19
characters
(alphanumeric and
special characters)
Initial password are
hardcoded into the
module; password
changes entered into
module via console,
SSH, or TLS
Initially hardcoded
password never exits
the module; changed
password never exits
the module
Plaintext (hashed) in
flash memory and in
SDRAM
Zeroized when the
password is updated
with a new one;
changed password
zeroized on factory
reset
Used for authenticating
the Guest
Firmware Load
Authentication Key
Hardcoded RSA 2048-
bit public key with SHA-
256
Hardcoded in release
image
Never exits the module Image in flash memory The Flash location is
write-protected in
hardware at the factory
(i.e., not writeable by
end user) and is not
zeroized.
Used for verification of
RSA signature of
firmware image digest
47 Passwords are hashed and stored in the Flash memory. They are temporarily loaded into the memory in hashed form for comparison during a login.
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2.8 EMI / EMC
The RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices were tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by
47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.9 Self-Tests
Cryptographic self-tests are performed automatically (without operator intervention) by each module during the
boot sequence (at power-up, upon hot reboots, and after power cycles) and during runtime as certain conditions
exist. While the module is in a self-test condition, all data output via the module’s data output interfaces is
inhibited.
The following sections list the self-tests performed by the modules, their expected error status, and error state
recovery.
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices perform the following self-tests at power-up:
 Firmware integrity check with an Error Detection Code (SHA-256 hash)
 Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o AES-CBC encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM decrypt KAT
o AES-CTR encrypt KAT
o AES-CTR decrypt KAT
o SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 KAT
o HMAC (with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) KAT
o Counter DRBG KAT
o RSA signature generation/verification KAT
o Primitive “Z” computation KAT
As tests pass, a success message is written to the system log file (syslog.txt).
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The modules perform the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous RNG test for NDRNG
 Continuous RNG test for DRBG
 RSA pairwise consistency test
 Firmware load test using RSA signature verification
 ECDH public key assurance test
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2.9.3 Critical Functions Self-Tests
The DRBG Instantiate, Generate, Reseed, and Uninstantiate tests (described in Section 11.3 of NIST SP 800-90A)
are performed by the modules at start-up or anytime the DRBG is instantiated.
In addition, the modules perform a series of entropy tests against their NDRBG to verify the correct operation of
the entropy collection mechanism during module operation. This test suite consists of the following tests
(performed at the frequency indicated):
 Repetition Count Test (at power-up, conditionally, and on-demand)
 Adaptive Proportion Test (at power-up and on-demand)
 Arithmetic Mean Value Test (at power-up and on-demand)
 Entropy Value Test (at power-up and on-demand)
 “Stuck-at-constant-failure” Test (conditionally, when seeding or reseeding the DRBG)
2.9.4 Self-Test Error Behavior and Recovery
If one of the power-up self-test fails, the module will enter a soft error state, and the following will occur:
 An error message appears.
 A failure message is written to the system log.
 An alarm indicator LED (if equipped) will blink 5 times.
 The device is automatically rebooted, clearing all keys and CSPs in SDRAM.
If the conditional firmware load test fails, the device will ignore the new image and continue operating with the
currently-loaded image.
If one of the other conditional self-test fails, the module will enter a soft error state, and the following will occur:
 A failure message is written to the system log.
 An alarm indicator LED (if equipped) will blink 5 times.
 All open files are closed.
 The database is closed.
 The device is automatically rebooted, clearing all keys and CSPs in SDRAM.
Upon reboot, all power-up self-tests will be executed. If the failed self-test is not one of the power-up self-tests,
the device will automatically perform the failed conditional self-test as well. Successful execution of the failed self-
test will clear the soft error state, and the module will return to normal operation. Another self-test failure will
trigger another reboot and recovery attempt.
The module will perform a maximum of 10 attempts at recovery. If no resolution is found after 10 attempts, the
modules will reboot into a critical error state, where all cryptographic operations are halted and none of the
modules’ data output services are available for use. Additionally, the module is reset to the factory default
configuration. Upon reset, the following data is zeroized:
 all configuration files
 server certificates and SSH host key pairs stored in flash
 keys and CSPs stored in SDRAM
However, if the module runs for an hour without experiencing an error or is power-cycled, the failure counter is
reset to zero.
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To clear the critical error state, the Crypto Officer must access the module via the local Console Interface. At this
point, the CO can only view system logs or run hardware tests in an attempt to determine the cause of the self-
test failure. If the CO cannot determine the cause of the critical error condition, they must contact Siemens
Customer Support to resolve the issue and return the module to a normal operational state.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 2
requirements for this validation.
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3. Secure Operation
The RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices meet Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to
place and keep the modules in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The modules are delivered in an operational state, but require initialization steps to be placed in the FIPS-
Approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for inspection, initialization, and security-relevant
configuration and management activities for each module. To configure the modules for their FIPS-Approved
mode of operation, the CO must:
1. Inspect all physical security mechanisms
2. Ensure insecure protocols are disabled
3. Replace the default passwords for all operator types
4. Provision SSH public key(s)
5. Replace the default SSH host key pair
6. Provision an SSL server certificate
7. Reboot the device
Detailed guidance for performing these configuration tasks can be found in the Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS-F
v4.2.1.F User Guide and in this FIPS 140-2 Security Policy. To initialize each module, follow the steps below to
complete the initial setup.
 Inspect all physical security mechanisms – The modules are delivered with all physical security
mechanisms pre-installed. The CO shall ensure that the number of labels applied to each module is as
follows:
o M2100F/RSG2100F: 10
o M2200F/RSG2200F: 8
o RS416F: 6
o M969F: 1
o RS900F: 5
o RS900GF: 5
o RS940GF: 5
o RSG2488F: 8
The CO shall inspect the modules to ensure that the proper number of mechanisms is in place and show no signs
of tampering. Figure 11 through Figure 18 below show the label locations for each module.
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Front
Side Side
Top
Bottom
Back
9
1
10
8
3
4
5
6
7
2
Figure 11 – Label Locations (M2100F, RSG2100F)
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Front
Side Side
Top
Bottom
Back
6
5
8
8
7
3
2
1
4
5
Figure 12 – Label Locations (M2200F, RSG2200F)
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Front
Side Side
Top
Bottom
Back
4
3
6
6
5
2
3
1
Figure 13 – Label Locations (RS416F)
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Front Side
1
Figure 14 – Label Locations (M969F)
Front Bottom
Back
2
1
3 5
5
3
4
Figure 15 – Label Locations (RS900F)
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Front Bottom
Back
2
3
1 4
4
1
5
Figure 16 – Label Locations (RS900GF)
Front Bottom
Back
1
4
4
1
2
5
3
Figure 17 – Label Locations (RS940GF)
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2 2
4
3
3
5 6 4
1
1
7
8
Figure 18 – Label Locations (RSG2488F)
 Ensure insecure protocols are disabled – The following insecure protocols are disabled by default:
o RADIUS48
o TACACS+49
o RSH50
o Telnet
o FTP51
o ModBus management
o Remote Syslog
o SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv3
The RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol (RCDP) is not disabled by default and must be disabled manually.
The CO shall disabled RCDP using the following steps:
1. Navigate to Network Discovery » RuggedCom Discovery Protocol » Configure RCDP Parameters.
The RCDP Parameters form appears.
2. Select Disabled to disable RCDP.
3. Click Apply.
The CO shall ensure that these protocols are set to “disabled" while operating in the FIPS-Approved mode.
 Replace the default passwords for all operator types – The modules allow for up to three operator types
to be configured locally on the device. The modules are delivered with default passwords pre-configured
for each operator type. Prior to commissioning the modules, the CO shall replace the default passwords
using the following steps:
1. Log on to the device as the CO.
48 RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
49 TACACS+ – Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus
50
RSH – Remote Shell
51 FTP – File Transfer Protocol
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2. Navigate to Administration » Configure Passwords. The Configure Passwords form appears.
3. For “Auth Type”, select “local”.
4. Enter the username and password for the “Guest”, “Operator”, and “Admin” accounts (see
Section 3.2.5 below for password complexity policies).
5. For “Clear Private Data Option”, select “Enabled”.
6. For “Password Minimum Length”, enter the value “8”.
7. For “Max Failed Attempts”, enter the value “10”.
8. For “Lockout Time”, enter the value “60 min”.
9. For “Failed Attempts Window”, enter the value “5 min”.
10. Click Apply.
 Provision SSH public key(s) – The modules can perform public key user authentication to establish secure
remote sessions via SSH. SSH user public key entries are stored in a flash file called sshpub.keys. For FIPS
mode, the CO shall create a public key file locally via a host computer and upload it directly to the
sshpub.keys file, which will replace the content in flash with the uploaded content. Alternatively, the CO
can upload the locally-created file to the sshaddpub.keys file, which will keep any existing entries in the
sshpub.keys file and append the new entries.
The public key file shall be uploaded to the module using SFTP or Xmodem. To verify that the upload was
successful, the CO can log into the CLI and check the system log.
Note that RUGGEDCOM ROS-F v4.2.1.F allows up to 16 key entries to be stored.
 Replace the default SSH host key pair – The modules are delivered with a pre-configured SSH host key pair
stored in a flash file called ssh.keys. The CO shall replace the default key pair by (1) creating a valid key
pair locally and uploading it to the ssh.keys file or (2) generating a new key pair.
To generate a new SSH host key pair using the following steps:
1. Log on to the device (using the Console Interface) as the CO.
2. Press <CTRL+S> to access the Console CLI shell.
3. At the Console CLI prompt, enter “sshkeygen rsa N”, where N is the number of bits in length (2048
or 3072).
 Provision an SSL server certificate – The modules use public key cryptography to provide secure Web
access via TLS. For FIPS mode, the CO shall provision a CA certificate into the device trust store
(sslpub.certs). Then, the CO shall create a unique SSL certificate and upload it to the modules. The SSL
certificate must be signed by either a trusted third-party Certificate Authority (CA) or by an organization's
own CA.
After these changes are complete, the CO shall reboot the device so the changes will go into effect. Once rebooted,
the devices are properly configured for their FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance
The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that the modules are operating in their FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. When configured according to the Crypto Officer guidance in this Security Policy, the modules only run
in their FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
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The Crypto Officer shall configure the modules via the Web GUI or Console Interface as prescribed in this Security
Policy. Please refer to the Security Recommendations section of the Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS-F v4.2.1.F User
Guide for further details regarding this and other security-related guidance.
3.2.1 Monitoring Status
The CO shall be responsible for regularly monitoring the modules’ status for FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
When configured according to the Crypto Officer’s guidance, the modules only operate in the FIPS-Approved
mode.
The module’s operational status is indicated with LEDs as described in Table 7 above. A CO logged in via the Web
Interface or Console Interface can view the operational status on the remote terminal window.
3.2.2 Physical Inspection
For the modules to operate in their FIPS-Approved mode of operation, the pre-installed tamper-evident labels
must be in place as specified in Section 3.1. Upon receipt, the CO shall inspect the module to ensure labels have
been properly installed. Per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance (IG) 14.4, the CO is also responsible for the
following:
 Securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper-evident labels
 Direct control and observation of any changes to the module where the tamper-evident labels are
removed or applied to ensure that the security of the module is maintained during such changes and that
the module is returned to its Approved state
The CO is also required to periodically inspect the modules for evidence of tampering at intervals specified per
end-user policy. The CO must visually inspect the tamper-evident seals for tears, rips, dissolved adhesive, and
other signs of tampering. If evidence of tampering is found during periodic inspection, the CO must zeroize the
keys and contact Siemens Customer Service for guidance.
3.2.3 On-Demand Self-Test Execution
Although power-up self-tests are performed automatically during module power up, they can also be manually
launched on demand. Self-tests can be executed by power-cycling the modules, using the reset button (on devices
so equipped), or executing any of the device reboot/reset commands. If one of the power-up self-tests fails, the
devices will exhibit the behavior described in Section 2.9.1 above.
Additionally, the cryptographic algorithm self-tests can be launched directly by performing the following steps:
1. Log in to the device as a CO via the Console Interface.
2. Press <CTRL+S> to access the Console CLI shell.
3. At the Console CLI prompt, enter “factory”.
4. When prompted, answer “yes” and enter the CO password.
5. At the Console CLI prompt, enter “cryptest”.
Each cryptographic algorithm self-test will be run in sequence. If all tests pass, the following message will appear:
“Cryptographic algorithm self tests passed”
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3.2.4 CSP Zeroization
To zeroize keys/CSPs in SDRAM, Crypto Officers and Users can perform the reset/reboot service by performing
the following steps:
1. Log on to the device via the Web GUI.
2. Navigate to Diagnostics » Reset Device. The Reset Device form appears.
3. Click Confirm.
In order to zeroize all plaintext secret and private keys/CSPs in both flash and SDRAM, the CO shall access the
modules using the maintenance mode (refer to Section 2.4.3 above for more details). Entering the “maintenance”
CLI command will automatically zeroize all server certificates (ssl.crt), SSH host key pairs (ssh.keys), and device
configuration (config.csv) files stored in flash. Upon completion of the deletion process, the module will perform
an automatic reboot into maintenance mode, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs stored in SDRAM.
Once the “maintenance” command is invoked, the effect is immediate and will not allow sufficient time to
compromise any stored plaintext CSPs.
3.2.5 Upgrading/Downgrading Firmware
The CO shall be responsible for upgrading or downgrading the modules’ firmware as necessary. The RUGGEDCOM
ROS-F Devices only accept firmware that has been digitally-signed by Siemens. Note the following policies:
 After the new firmware has been uploaded and passed the digital signature test, the CO shall reset the
device to complete the installation.
 To verify the correct firmware version was installed, the CO shall access the Console CLI and enter “version”
at the Console CLI prompt.
 When downgrading, the CO shall not downgrade the ROS-F firmware to a version prior to 4.2.1.F when
encryption is enabled.
 Before downgrading, the CO shall restore the device to factory defaults.
The modules’ operational status is indicated with LEDs as described in Table 7 above. A CO logged in via the Web
Interface or Console Interface can view the operational status on the remote terminal window.
3.2.6 Password Complexity
Crypto Officers shall follow the password complexity policy below.
 The password must be between 8 and 19 characters in length.
 The password may contain any combination uppercase and lowercase letters, digits, and special
characters, allowing for a total of 94 possible characters.
 A password must have:
o At least one digit
o At least one lower-case letter
o At least one upper-case letter
o At least one special character
 The password must not include the username or any four continuous characters found in the username.
For example, if the username is “Subnet25”, the password may not be “subnet25admin”, “subnetadmin”
or “net25admin”. However, “net-25admin” and “Sub25admin” are permitted.
 The password must not have more than three continuously incrementing or decrementing numbers. For
example, “Sub123” and “Sub19826” are permitted, but “Sub12345” is not.
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3.3 User Guidance
While the CO is responsible for ensuring that the modules’ physical security mechanisms are in place and that the
devices are running in their FIPS-Approved mode of operation, Users should also monitor device status. Any
changes in the status of the devices should immediately be reported to the Crypto Officer.
3.4 Additional Guidance and Usage Policies
The notes below provide additional guidance and policies that must be followed by module operators:
 Use of insecure protocols – The following insecure protocols are disabled by default: RADIUS52
, TACACS+53
,
RSH54
, Telnet, FTP55
, ModBus management, Remote Syslog, SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv3. To maintain
compliance with FIPS requirements, these protocols shall not be enabled.
 Line card replacement – As noted earlier, the RUGGEDCOM ROS-F Devices are modular by design. While
most device configurations are fixed once they leave the factory, the RUGGEDCOM RSG2488F Ethernet
Switch comes equipped with line cards that are field-replaceable. Operators in the field can order the
desired line card(s) directly from Siemens Customer Support using the appropriate part numbers.
Because these line cards play a role in maintaining the module’s physical security, they are secured in
place using tamper-evident labels. Thus, replacing a line card necessitates the replacement of any tamper-
evident label affixed to the line card as well. When an operator orders a line card, it will be delivered with
the number of tamper-evident labels required for proper installation. Module operators must follow the
guidance below to ensure continued compliance with FIPS requirements.
1. Zeroize all keys and CSPs on the module.
2. Remove power from the module.
3. Remove the line card to be replaced.
4. Remove any remaining bits of the now-broken tamper-evident label from the module chassis.
5. Install the replacement line card in the open slot.
6. Using isopropyl alcohol, clean the chassis surface in the area where the replacement tamper-
evident label will be placed.
7. Affix the replacement tamper-evident label to the chassis (refer to Figure 18 above for label
locations). Allow 24 hours for the seal to fully cure.
8. Apply power to the module.
For more detailed line card removal and installation instructions, please refer to the Siemens
RUGGEDCOM RSG2488F Hardware Installation Guide.
52 RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
53 TACACS+ – Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus
54
RSH – Remote Shell
55 FTP – File Transfer Protocol
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3.5 Non-FIPS-Approved Mode
When configured according to the Crypto Officer guidance in this Security Policy, the modules do not support a
non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
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4. Acronyms
Table 13 provides definitions for the acronyms used in this document.
Table 13 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption System
°C Celsius
CA Certificate Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CoS Class of Service
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
°F Fahrenheit
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Gigabytes
GBIC Gigabit Interface Converter
GCM Galois Counter Method
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
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Acronym Definition
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
I/O Input/Output
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP Internet Protocol
IP66 Ingress Protection Rating 66
IP67 Ingress Protection Rating 67
IRIG Inter-Range Instrumentation Group
KAT Known Answer Test
LC Lucent Connector
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Media Access Control
MB Megabytes
Mbps Megabits per second
MHz Megahertz
MIL-STD Military Standard
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RCDP RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol
ROS Rugged Operating System
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
RSH Remote Shell
SC Subscriber Connector
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SFP Small Form-Factor Pluggable
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SMI Serial Management Interface
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SP Special Publication
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Acronym Definition
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
STP Spanning Tree Protocol
TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus
TLS Transport Layer Security
U Unit
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
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5. Appendix A
This section lists the specific configurations for each device that were not tested as part of this validation. The
following sections specify the non-security relevant line card components and the configurations of each device.
Note that these components, except the faceplates, are excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements.
5.1 RSG2100F
Table 14 below lists RSG2100F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 14 – RSG2100F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A04, B04, C04, D04, G04, H04, J04, K04 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC
A05, B05, C05, D05, G05, H05, J05, K05 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC
A06, B06, C06, D06, G06, H06, J06, K06 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ
A07, B07, C07, D07, G07, H07, J07, K07 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
A08, B08, C08, D08, G08, H08, J08, K08 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 20km
A09, B09, C09, D09, G09, H09, J09, K09 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 20km
A10, B10, C10, D10, G10, H10, J10, K10 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 50km
A11, B11, C11, D11, G11, H11, J11, K11 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 50km
A12, B12, C12, D12, G12, H12, J12, K12 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 90km
E02 2 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E03 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 10km
E04 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
E05 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 25km
E06 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
E07 2 x 1000LX SFP - Blank
E08 2 x 1000SX SFP, Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E09 2 x 1000LX SFP, Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 10km
E10 2 x 1000LX SFP, Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
E11 2 x 1000LX SFP, Singlemode, 1550nm, LC, 70km
E12 2 x 1000LX GBIC
E13 2 x 1000LX GBIC, Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 10km
E14 2 x 1000LX GBIC, Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
E15 2 x 1000LX GBIC, Singlemode, 1550nm, SC, 70km
E16 2 x 10/100/1000TX micro-D
E17 2 x 1000TX, SFP, RJ45
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Component Configuration Component Description
F01 1 x 10/100/1000Tx RJ45
F03 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1300 nm, SC connectors, 10km
F04 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1300 nm, LC connectors, 10km
F05 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1300 nm, SC connectors, 25km
F06 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1300 nm, LC connectors, 25km
F07 1 x 1000LX SFP - Blank
F08 1 x 1000LX SFP - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
F09 1 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC,10km
F10 1 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
F11 1 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1550nm, LC, 70km
F12 1 x 1000LX GBIC - Blank
F13 1 x 1000LX GBIC - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 10km
F14 1 x 1000LX GBIC - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
F15 1 x 1000LX GBIC - Singlemode, 1550nm, SC, 70km
F16 1 x 10/100/1000TX micro-D
5.2 M2100F
Table 15 below lists M2100F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 15 – M2100F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01, B01, C01, D01, G01, H01, J01, K01 2 x 10/100Tx Micro-D
A04, B04, C04, D04, G04, H04, J04, K04 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1310nm, LC
A06, B06, C06, D06, G06, H06, J06, K06 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 20km
A07, B07, C07, D07, G07, H07, J07, K07 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 50km
A08, B08, C08, D08, G08, H08, J08, K08 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
E02 2 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E03 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
E04 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
F01 1 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D
F02 1 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
F03 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
F04 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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Page 58 of 65
5.3 RSG2200F
Table 16 below lists RSG2200F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 16 – RSG2200F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A03, B03, C03, D03 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 10 km
A04, B04, C04, D04 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10 km
A05, B05, C05, D05 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 25 km
A07, B07, C07, D07 2 x 1000LX SFP - Blank
A09, B09, C09, D09 2 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 10km
A10, B10, C10, D10 2 x 1000LX SFP- Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
A11, B11, C11, D11 2 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1550nm, LC, 70km(2)
A12, B12, C12, D12 2 x 1000LX GBIC- Blank,
A13, B13, C13, D13 2 x 1000LX GBIC- Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 10km
A14, B14, C14, D14 2 x 1000LX GBIC - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
A15, B15, C15, D15 2 x 1000LX GBIC - Singlemode, 1550nm, SC, 70km(2)
A16, B16, C16, D16 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST
A17, B17, C17, D17 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC
A18, B18, C18, D18 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC
A19, B19, C19, D19 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ
A20, B20, C20, D20 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
A21, B21, C21, D21 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 20km
A22, B22, C22, D22 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 20km
A23, B23, C23, D23 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 50km
A24, B24, C24, D24 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 50km
A25, B25, C25, D25 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 90km
A26, B26, C26, D26 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
A27, B27, C27, D27 2 x 1000TX, SFP, RJ45
E01 1 x 10/100/1000 Tx RJ45
E02 1 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E03 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 10km
E04 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
E05 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connectors, 25km
E06 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
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Component Configuration Component Description
E07 1 x 1000LX SFP - Blank
E08 1 x 1000SX SFP -Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E09 1 x 1000LX SFP -Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 10km
E10 1 x 1000LX SFP -Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
E11 1 x 1000LX SFP -Singlemode, 1550nm, LC, 70km
E13 1 x 1000LX GBIC - Blank
E14 1 x 1000LX GBIC -Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 10km
E15 1 x 1000LX GBIC -Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
E16 1 x 1000LX GBIC -Singlemode, 1550nm, SC, 70km
E17 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST
E18 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC
E19 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC
E21 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
E22 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 20km
E23 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 20km
E24 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 50km
E25 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 50km
E26 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 90km
E27 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
5.4 M2200F
Table 17 below lists M2200F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 17 – M2200F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A03, B03, C03, D03 2 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
E01 1 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D
E02 1 x 1000SX - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
E03 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 10km
E04 1 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connectors, 25km
E05 1 x 10/100/1000Tx, Micro-D, with special short jackscrews
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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5.5 RSG2488F
Table 18 below lists RSG2488F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 18 – RSG2488F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A02, B02, C02, D02, E02, F02 4 x 10/100/1000Tx FastConnect
A03, B03, C03, D03, E03, F03 4 x 10/100/1000Tx M12 A-Coded
A06, B06, C06, D06, E06, F06 4 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC , 10km
A07, B07, C07, D07, E07, F07 4 x 1000LX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC , 10km
A08, B08, C08, D08, E08, F08 4 x Blank SFP
A10, B10, C10, D10, E10, F10 4 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 10km
A11, B11, C11, D11, E11, F11 4 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1300nm, LC, 25km
A12, B12, C12, D12, E12, F12 4 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1550nm, LC, 70km
A13, B13, C13, D13, E13, F13 4 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST, 2 km
A14, B14, C14, D14, E14, F14 4 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC, 2km
A15, B15, C15, D15, E15, F15 4 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
A16, B16, C16, D16, E16, F16 4 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 20km
A17, B17, C17, D17, E17, F17 4 x 100FX Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 20km
A18, B18, C18, D18, E18, F18 4 x 100FX Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 50km
A19, B19, C19, D19, E19, F19 4 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC, 2km
A20, B20, C20, D20, E20, F20 4 x 100FX Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 50km
A21, B21, C21, D21, E21, F21 4 x 100FX Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 90km
A22, B22, C22, D22, E22, F22 4 x 100FX Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
A23, B23, C23, D23, E23, F23 4 x 1000LX Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
G62, H62 2 x 10/100/1000Tx FastConnect
G63, H63 2 x 10/100/1000Tx M12 A-Coded
G65, H65 2 x Blank SFP
G67, H67 2 x 1000SX SFP - Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
G68, H68 2 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 10km
G69, H69 2 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
G70, H70 2 x 1000LX SFP - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 70km
G71, H71 2 X 100FX SFP - Multimode, 1310nm, LC 2km
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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5.6 M969F
Table 19 below lists M969F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 19 – M969F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01 1x100FX Multimode, LC connectors 1300nm - no ports
A02 1x1000SX Multi Mode, LC connectors 850nm -no ports
A03 1x100FX Single Mode, LC connectors 20km -no ports
A04 2x100FX Multimode, LC connectors 1300nm
A05 1x100FX Singlemode, LC connectors 90km -no ports
A06 1x100FX Singlemode LC connectors 50km -no ports
A07 1x1000LX Singlemode, LC connectors 10km -no ports
A08 1x1000LX Singlemode, LC connectors 25km -no ports
A10 2x100FX Singlemode, LC connectors 90km
A11 2x100FX Singlemode, LC connectors 20km
A12 2x100FX Singlemode, LC connectors 50km
A13 2x1000LX Singlemode, LC connectors 10km
A14 2x1000LX Singlemode, LC connectors 25km
5.7 RS900F
Table 20 below lists RS900F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 20 – RS900F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01 2 x 10/100TX,
A02 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ connector, and 1x no port
A03 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ connector
A04 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC connector, and 1x no port
A05 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC connector
A06
1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC connector, and 1 x 100FX - Singlemode,
Standard 20km
A07 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST connector, and 1x no port
A08 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST connector
A10
1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST connector, and 1 x 100FX - Singlemode,
Standard 20km
A11 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC connector, and 1x no port
A12 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC connector
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Component Configuration Component Description
A13
1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC connector, and 1 x 100FX - Singlemode,
Standard 20km
A14
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST connector, Standard 20km, and 1x no
port
A15 2 x 100FX - Singlemode,1310nm, ST connector, Standard 20km
A16
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Standard 20km, and 1x no
port
A17 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Standard 20km
A18
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Standard 20km, and
Intermediate Reach 50km
A19
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Standard 20km, and Long
Reach 90km
A20
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km,
and 1x no port
A21 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km
A22
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Long Reach 90km, and 1x no
port
A23 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Long Reach 90km
A24
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Standard 20km, and 1x no
port
A25 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Standard 20km
A26
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Standard 20km, and
Intermediate Reach 50km
A27
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Standard 20km, and Long
Reach 90km
A28
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km,
and 1x no port
A29 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km
A30
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km,
and Long Reach 90km
A31
1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Long Reach 90km, and 1x no
port
A32 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Long Reach 90km
B01 1 x 10/100TX
B02 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ connector
B04 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST connector
B05 1 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC connector
B06 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, ST connector, Standard 20km
B07 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Standard 20km
B08 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km
B09 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, LC connector, Long Reach 90km
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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Component Configuration Component Description
B10 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Standard 20km
B11 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Intermediate Reach 50km
B12 1 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1310nm, SC connector, Long Reach 90km
5.8 RS900GF
Table 21 below lists RS900GF Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 21 – RS900GF Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01 Dual 1000X SFP
A02 Dual 1000SX Multimode, LC 850nm, 500m
A03 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, LC 1310nm, 10km
A05 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, SC 1310nm, 10km
A06 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, SC 1310nm, 25km
5.9 RS416F
Table 22 below lists RS416F Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 22 – RS416F Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01, B01, C01, D01, 4 x RS232/RS422/RS485, via DB9
A02, B02, C02, D02 4 x RS232/RS422/RS485, via RJ45
E02, F02 2 x 10FL - Multimode, 850nm, ST
E03, F03 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, ST
E04, F04 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, SC
E05, F05 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, LC
E06, F06 2 x 100FX - Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ
E07, F07 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, ST, 20km
E08, F08 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, SC, 20km
E09, F09 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, LC, 20km
E10, F10 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, SC, 50km
E11, F11 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, LC, 50km
E12, F12 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, SC, 90km
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.14 August 16, 2017
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Component Configuration Component Description
E13, F13 2 x 100FX - Singlemode, 1300nm, LC, 90km
5.10 RS940GF
Table 23 below lists RS940GF Module’s excluded configurations.
Table 23 – RS940GF Excluded Configurations
Component Configuration Component Description
A01 Dual 10/100/1000TX RJ45
A02 Dual 1000X SFP, (Mini-GBIC). Order SFP Optics Separately
A04 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, LC 1310nm, 10km
A05 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, LC 1310nm, 25km
A06 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, SC 1310nm, 10km
A07 Dual 1000LX Singlemode, SC 1310nm, 25km
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