This non-proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung Copyright 2021
Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs
PM1633a LC Series
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Revision: 1.1
HW Version: MZILS920HEHP-000H9, MZILS1T9HEJH-000H9,
MZILS3T8HMLH-000H9,
FW Version: 3P00 and 3P01
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Revision History
Author(s) Version Updates
Seungjae Lee 1.0 Initial Version
Seungjae Lee 1.1 Minor changes as updated module version
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................... 5
1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary......................................................................... 6
2. Acronym............................................................................................................................................... 7
3. Security Level Specification ................................................................................................................. 8
4. Cryptographic Functionality................................................................................................................. 9
4.1. Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................. 9
4.2. Non-Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................... 10
4.3. Critical Security Parameters..................................................................................................... 10
4.4. Public Security Parameters ...................................................................................................... 11
5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces................................................................................................. 12
6. Roles, Services and Authentication ................................................................................................... 13
6.1. Roles......................................................................................................................................... 13
6.2. Authentication.......................................................................................................................... 13
6.3. Services..................................................................................................................................... 14
6.3.1. Authenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 14
6.3.2. Unauthenticated Services..................................................................................................... 15
7. Physical Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 16
8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)....................................... 18
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy..................................................................................................... 19
10. Security rules .................................................................................................................................... 20
10.1. Secure Installation ................................................................................................................ 20
10.2. Operational description of Module ...................................................................................... 21
10.3. Power-on Self-tests............................................................................................................... 21
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1. Introduction
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung”) SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1633a LC Series,
herein after referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module”, SSD (Solid State Drive), satisfies all
applicable FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements, supporting TCG Enterprise SSC based SED (Self-
Encrypting Drive) features, designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND
Flash memories. The built-in AES HW engines in the cryptographic module’s controller provide on-the-
fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED’s nature also
provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase.
Module Name Hardware Version
Firmware
Version
Drive
Capacity
Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC
SED PM1633a LC Series
MZILS920HEHP-000H9
3P00
3P01
920GB
MZILS1T9HEJH-000H9 1.9TB
MZILS3T8HMLH-000H9 3.8TB
Exhibit 1 – Versions of Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SED PM1633a LC Series.
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1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The following photographs show the cryptographic module’s top and bottom views. The multiple-
chip standalone cryptographic module consists of hardware and firmware components that are all
enclosed in two aluminum alloy cases, which serve as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The
top and bottom cases are assembled by screws and the tamper-evident labels are applied for the
detection of any opening of the cases. No security relevant component can be seen within the visible
spectrum through the opaque enclosure.
New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2
CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
Exhibit 2 – Specification of the Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1633a LC Series
Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom, side).
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1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The PM1633a series use a single chip controller with a SAS interface on the system side and
Samsung NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational environment.
Exhibit 3 – Block Diagram for Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1633a LC Series.
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2. Acronym
Acronym Description
CTRL REX Controller (SAMSUNG TREX SAS 12G TLC/MLC SSD Controller)
Sub-CTRL Falconet Controller (SAMSUNG Sub-Controller)
SAS I/F Serial Attached SCSI Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit (ARM-based)
DRAM I/F Dynamic Random Access Memory Interface
ECC Error Correcting Code
NAND I/F NAND Flash Interface
PMIC Power Management Integrated Circuit
ROM Read-only Memory
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
NAND NAND Flash Memory
LBA Logical Block Address
MEK Media Encryption Key
MSID Manufactured SID(Security Identifier)
Exhibit 4 – Acronym and Descriptions for Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1633a
LC Series.
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3. Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Area Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Exhibit 5 – Security Level Table.
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4. Cryptographic Functionality
4.1. Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage:
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode /
Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or Moduli
Use
617 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
ECB 256-bit Data Encryption /
Decryption.*Note2
3213 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38E
XTS 256-bit Data Encryption /
Decryption*Note3
121 DRBG SP 800-90A
Revision 1
CTR_ DRBG AES-256 Deterministic Random Bit
Generation*Note5
932 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SigVer P-224 Digital Signature Verification
3382 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 Message Digest
Exhibit 6 - Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SED PM1633a LC Series Approved Algorithms.
NOTE 1: The cryptographic module implements LSI Corporation’s LSI-CS DRBG in its original entirety without
alteration. (I.e. there have been no changes to the cryptographic algorithm boundary whatsoever). Testing was
carried out by LSI in a Synopsys VCS simulation environment; additional algorithm validation testing in not
required as per FIPS 140-2 IG G.11
NOTE 2: AES-ECB is only utilized as the pre-requisite for DRBG #121; no other modes or key sizes are used and it is
not otherwise exposed in this implementation whatsoever
NOTE 3: AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-XTS; AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module
in FIPS Mode.
NOTE 4: This module supports AES-XTS which is only approved for storage applications.
NOTE 5: The additional 128 and 192 bit AES in the DRBG #121 is latent functionality and is not utilized in the
Samsung PM1633a cryptographic module whatsoever.
NOTE 6: AES-128 and AES-192 key sizes are not used and not otherwise exposed in this implementation
whatsoever.
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4.2. Non-Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithms:
Algorithm Use
NDRNG Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (only used for generating
seed materials for the Approved DRBG)
Exhibit 7 - Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SED PM1633a LC Series Non-Approved but allowed
algorithms.
4.3. Critical Security Parameters
The cryptographic module contains the following Keys and CSPs:
CSPs Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods
DRBG Internal State*Note7 Generation: via SP800-90A CTR_DRBG
Storage: N/A
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service and “Zeroize” service
DRBG Seed Generation: via NDRNG
Storage: N/A
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service and “Zeroize” service
DRBG Entropy Input String Generation: via NDRNG
Storage: N/A
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service and “Zeroize” service
CO Password Generation: N/A
Storage: Plaintext in DRAM and Flash
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service and “Zeroize” service
User Password Generation: N/A
Storage: Plaintext in DRAM and Flash
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service, “Erase an LBA Range’s
Password/MEK” service and “Zeroize” service
MEK Generation: via SP800-90A CTR_DRBG; As per SP 800-133 Section
7.1, key generation is performed as per the “Direct Generation: of
Symmetric Keys” which is an Approved key generation method.
Key Type: AES-XTS 256
Storage: Plaintext in Flash
Zeroization: via “Initialization” service, “Erase an LBA Range’s
Password/MEK” service and “Zeroize” service
Exhibit 8 – CSPs and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods.
NOTE 7: The values of V and Key are the “secret values” of the internal state.
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NOTE 8: In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) as per SP 800-133 (Vendor Affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric key is the unmodified
output from SP 800-90A DRBG.
4.4. Public Security Parameters
The cryptographic module contains the following Public Key:
Public Keys Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods
FW Verification Key
(ECDSA Public Key)
Generation: N/A
Storage: Plaintext in Flash
Zeroization: N/A
Exhibit 9 – Public Keys and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods
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5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface
SAS Connector
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Power Connector Power Input
Exhibit 10 – Specification of the Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SED PM1633a LC Series
Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces.
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6. Roles, Services and Authentication
6.1. Roles
The following table defines the roles, type of authentication, and associated authenticated data
types supported by the cryptographic module:
Role Authentication Data
CO Role Password
User Role Password
FW Loader ECDSA
Exhibit 11 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication (FIPS 140-2 Table C1).
6.2. Authentication
• Password Authentication
The authentication mechanism allows 6-byte length or longer Password, where each byte can be any
of 0x00 to 0xFF, for every Cryptographic Officer and User role supported by the module, which means
a single random attempt can succeed with the probability of 1/248 or lower.
Each authentication attempt takes at least 133ms and the number of attempts is limited to TryLimit,
which is set to 5 in manufacturing time. Since the module takes at least 2 seconds to be ready after
power-on and 5 authentication failures require a power-cycle, it takes 2665ms for every 5th
authentication attempt. Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one
minute is 115 / 248, which is much less than the FIPS 140-2 requirement 1/100,000.
• ECDSA Signature Verification
The authentication mechanism for FW Loader role is ECDSA P-224 with SHA256 digital signature
verification, which means a single random attempt, can succeed with the probability of 1/2112.
Each authentication attempt takes at least 2 seconds, which enforces the maximum number of
attempts to be no more than (60*1000)/2000 in one minute. Therefore, the probability of multiple
random attempts to succeed in one minute is {(60*1000)/2000}/2112, which is much less than the FIPS
140-2 requirement 1/100,000.
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Password (Min: 6 bytes, Max:
32 bytes) Authentication
- Probability of 1/248 in a single random
attempt
- Probability of 115/248 in multiple random
attempts in a minute
ECDSA Signature Verification - Probability of 1/2112 in a single random
attempt
- Probability of {(60*1000)/2000}/2112 in
multiple random attempts in a minute
Exhibit 12 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms (FIPS 140-2 Table C2).
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6.3. Services
6.3.1. Authenticated Services
The following table lists roles, services, cryptographic keys, CSPs and Public Keys and the types of
access that are available to each of the authorized roles via the corresponding services:
* R: READ; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROIZE
Role Service
Cryptographic Keys,
CSPs and Public Keys
Security
Function
Type(s) of
Access
Cryptographic
Officer
Initialization
DRBG Internal State
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
CO Password
MEK
Hash_ DRBG
(SHA-256)
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Z, W
Z, G
Enable/Disable FW
Download Service
N/A N/A N/A
Drive Extended Status N/A N/A N/A
Erase an LBA Range’s
Password/MEK
DRBG Internal State
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
MEK
User Password
Hash_ DRBG
(SHA-256)
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Z, G
Z, W
Zeroize
DRBG Internal State
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
CO Password
User Password
MEK
Hash_ DRBG
(SHA-256)
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
User
Unlock an LBA Range
MEK AES-XTS R
User Password N/A R
Set User Password User Password N/A W
Lock an LBA Range MEK N/A Z
Configure an LBA Range N/A N/A N/A
Write Data MEK AES-XTS R
Read Data MEK AES-XTS R
FW Loader Update the firmware FW Verification Key
ECDSA SigVer,
P-224
R
Exhibit 13 – Services Authorized for Roles, Access Rights within Services (FIPS 140-2 Table C3, Table
C4).
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6.3.2. Unauthenticated Services
The following table lists the unauthenticated services:
* R: READ; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROIZE
Role
Unauthenticated
Service
Cryptographic Keys & CSPs
Security
Function
Type(s) of
Access
Cryptographic
Officer, User and FW
Loader
Zeroize
DRBG Internal State
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
User Password
CO Password
MEK
Hash_
DRBG
(SHA-256)
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Cryptographic
Officer, User and FW
Loader
Get Random Number
DRBG Internal State
DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
Hash_
DRBG
(SHA-256)
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Z, G, R
Cryptographic
Officer, User and FW
Loader
Get MSID N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer, User and FW
Loader
Show Status N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer, User and FW
Loader
Self-test N/A N/A N/A
Exhibit 14 – Unauthenticated Service, Cryptographic Keys & CSPs and Type(s) of Access.
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7. Physical Security Policy
The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module:
• The Module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure,
which is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of the enclosure can be removed by
unscrewing screws. However, the module is sealed with tamper-evident labels in accordance with
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Physical Security requirements so that tampering is easily detected when the top
and bottom cases are detached.
• 2 tamper-evident labels are applied over both top and bottom cases of the module at the
factory. The tamper-evident labels are not removed and reapplied without tamper evidence.
The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to ensure
that physical security is maintained:
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Production grade
cases
As often as feasible
Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks,
gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of
tampering. Remove from service if
tampering found.
Tamper-evident
Sealing Labels
Inspect the sealing labels for scratches,
gouges, cuts and other signs of tampering.
Remove from service if tampering found.
Exhibit 15 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms (FIPS 140-2 Table C5)
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Exhibit 16 – Signs of Tamper
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8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The cryptographic module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.
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9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope
of FIPS 140-2.
Other
Attacks
Mitigation
Mechanism
Specific
Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
Exhibit 17 - Mitigation of Other Attacks (FIPS 140-2 Table C6)
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10.Security rules
The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate in
accordance with FIPS 140-2:
• The cryptographic module operates always in FIPS Mode once shipped from the vendor's
manufacturing site.
• The steps necessary for the secure installation, initialization and start-up of the cryptographic
module as per FIPS 140-2 VE10.03.01 are as follows:
10.1. Secure Installation
• [Step 1] User should examine the tamper evidence
- Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of
tampering including the tamper evident sealing label.
- If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung.
• [Step 2] Identify the firmware version in the device
- Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via
SCSI Inquiry command
• [Step 3] Take the drive’s ownership
- Change SID’s PIN by setting a new PIN
- Change EraseMaster’s PIN by setting a new PIN
- Erase Method on each LBA Range to rekey the encryption key
- Change BandMaster0~7’s PIN by setting new PINs
- Configure the LBA Range(s) by setting ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled columns to
True
- Don’t change LockOnReset column in Locking Table so that the drive always gets locked
after a power cycle
• [Step 4] Configure FW download and Diagnostic features
- Disable Makers Class using SID Authority to disable FW download and Diagnostic features
- Enable Makers Class only when FW download and Diagnostic features are needed
• [Step 5] Periodically examine the tamper evidence
- If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid a potential security hazard
or information leakage.
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10.2. Operational description of Module
• The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control
input, status output, and power.
• The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form.
• The cryptographic module shall use the Approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys.
• The cryptographic module shall enforce role-based authentication for security relevant
services.
• The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure
firmware load test using ECDSA P-224 with SHA-256.
• The cryptographic module shall provide a production-grade, opaque, and tamper-evident
cryptographic boundary.
• The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self-tests. All commands from
the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected
in the error state and the cryptographic module returns an error code (0x91) via the status
output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state.
• The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 (i.e. key_1 ≠ key_2)
• The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.
10.3. Power-on Self-tests
Algorithm Test
AES Encrypt KAT and Decrypt KAT for AES-256-XTS at power-on
SHS KAT for SHA-256 at power-on
DRBG KAT for CTR_DRBG at power-on
ECDSA KAT for ECDSA P-224 SHA-256 signature verification at power-
on
Exhibit 18 – Power-on Self-tests.
• F/W integrity check
- F/W integrity check is performed by using 212-bit error detection code at power-on
• Conditional Self-test
- Pairwise consistency: N/A
- Bypass Test: N/A
- Manual key entry test: N/A
- F/W load test: F/W load test is performed by using ECDSA algorithm with P-224 and SHA-
256
- Continuous random number generator test on Approved DRBG
- Continuous random number generator test on NDRNG