Samsung Flash Memory Protector
Version 1.1
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.1
Last Update: 2016-05-09
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE SECURITY POLICY ...........................................................................................................................................3
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE ................................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION / COPYRIGHT .................................................................................................................................3
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION................................................................................................................. 4
2.1. DESCRIPTION OF MODULE .....................................................................................................................................................4
2.2. DESCRIPTION OF APPROVED MODE .........................................................................................................................................5
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY.....................................................................................................................................6
2.3.1. Software Block Diagram ..........................................................................................................................................6
2.3.2. Hardware Block Diagram.........................................................................................................................................6
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES................................................................................................... 9
4. ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION ................................................................................................................. 10
4.1. ROLES..............................................................................................................................................................................10
4.2. SERVICES..........................................................................................................................................................................10
4.3. OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION ...............................................................................................................................................11
4.4. MECHANISM AND STRENGTH OF AUTHENTICATION...................................................................................................................11
5. PHYSICAL SECURITY ................................................................................................................................................. 12
6. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................................................. 13
6.1. POLICY.............................................................................................................................................................................13
7. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT....................................................................................................................... 14
7.1. KEY AND CSP LIST..............................................................................................................................................................14
7.2. KEY/CSP GENERATION, ENTRY AND OUTPUT ..........................................................................................................................14
7.3. KEY/CSP STORAGE AND ZEROIZATION ...................................................................................................................................15
8. ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMI/EMC)............................................... 16
9. POWER‐UP TESTS..................................................................................................................................................... 17
9.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM TESTS ......................................................................................................................................17
9.2. INTEGRITY TESTS................................................................................................................................................................17
10. DESIGN ASSURANCE............................................................................................................................................... 18
10.1. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................................................18
10.1.1. Versioning for FMP Driver....................................................................................................................................18
10.1.2. Versioning for FMP ..............................................................................................................................................18
10.2. DELIVERY AND OPERATION ................................................................................................................................................18
11. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ........................................................................................................................... 19
12. GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................................................ 20
13. REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................................... 21
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1.Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Samsung Flash Memory
Protector V1.1 cryptographic module. It contains a specification of the rules under which the
module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS
PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1
Software-Hybrid cryptographic module. This security policy is for the revalidation of the Samsung
Flash Memory Protector module to include information about new test platform and minor code
changes for performance enhancement. The security policy from the previous validated version of
the module can be found on CMVP validation website under certificate #2507.
In this document, the terms “Samsung Flash Memory Protector”, “cryptographic module” or
“module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Samsung Flash Memory Protector.
1.1 Purpose of the Security Policy
There are three major reasons that a security policy is needed:
⚫ it is required for FIPS 140-2 validation,
⚫ it allows individuals and organizations to determine whether the cryptographic module, as
implemented, satisfies the stated security policy, and
⚫ it describes the capabilities, protection, and access rights provided by the cryptographic
module, allowing individuals and organizations to determine whether it will meet their security
requirements.
1.2 Target Audience
This document is part of the package of documents that are submitted for FIPS 140-2 conformance
validation of the module. It is intended for the following people:
⚫ Developers working on the release
⚫ FIPS 140-2 testing lab
⚫ Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
⚫ Consumers
1.3 Document Organization / Copyright
This non-proprietary security policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its
original entirety without any revision, ©2016 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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2.Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1.Description of Module
The Samsung Flash Memory Protector V1.1 is classified as a multi-chip standalone software-hybrid
module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. It is designed for the on-the-fly hardware encryption to flash
memory including Disk Encryption, File Encryption and Dual Encryption (i.e. both File and Disk
Encryption.) The logical cryptographic boundary for the module includes the cryptographic module
software backed by hardware cryptography to support hardware-based cryptographic algorithms.
The module includes the following components:
 Flash Memory Protector Driver
 Flash Memory Protector
The Flash Memory Protector Driver (FMP Driver) is the software component of the cryptographic
module running in the Linux Kernel which calls the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the
FMP hardware module for power-up self-tests, and also holds the FIPS status of the entire
cryptographic module once the power-up self-test is completed successfully. All actual
cryptographic functions are implemented within the hardware.
The Flash Memory Protector (FMP) is the hardware component of the cryptographic module which
supports AES with CBC mode and XTS-AES encryption and decryption for confidentiality on storage
devices. It resides in the Samsung Exynos Processor 8890. It is located between the external
DRAM and Flash memory Device so that it can encrypt and decrypt the data quickly and reduce
power consumption.
The hybrid cryptographic module is specified in the following table:
Component Type Version Number Parts Number / File Name
FMP Driver Software 1.2 boot.img
FMP Hardware 3.0.1 Samsung Exynos Processor 8890
Table 1: Components of the Hybrid Cryptographic Module
The module has been tested on the following platforms:
Device Processor O/S & Ver.
Samsung Galaxy S7 edge ARMv8 Android Marshmallow 6.0.1
Table 2: Tested Platforms
The module is intended to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1 Overall. The table
below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the
validation:
FIPS 140-2 Sections Security Level
N/A 1 2 3 4
Cryptographic Module Specification X
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces X
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Roles, Services and Authentication X
Finite State Model X
Physical Security X
Operational Environment X
Cryptographic Key Management X
EMI/EMC X
Self Tests X
Design Assurance X
Mitigation of Other Attacks X
Table 3: Security Levels
2.2.Description of Approved Mode
The module supports only FIPS mode.
When the module is initialized during the kernel boot-up, the power-up self-test (including both
software and hardware components) is executed automatically without any operator intervention.
The module enters FIPS mode automatically if the power-up self-test completes successfully.
If any of self-tests fail during power-up, the module sets a global flag to FMP_FIPS_ERR_STATE and
goes into Error state. All cryptographic services are prohibited in error state.
The status of the module can be determined using the following Linux command:
adb shell cat /sys/devices/fips_fmp/fips-fmp/fips_fmp_status
If the module is in FIPS mode, the above command returns the string "passed" to indicate that the
power-up self-tests completed successfully. If the module is in an Error state, the above command
returns the string "failed".
The module provides the following CAVP validated algorithms implemented in the FMP hardware
module and FMP Driver:
Components Algorithms Standards CAVS Certs #
FMP AES CBC mode encryption and decryption
with 128 and 256 bits key
FIPS 197 #3839
FMP XTS-AES encryption and decryption with 128
and 256 bits key
SP 800-38E #3839
FMP Driver SHA-256 FIPS 180-4 #3163
FMP Driver HMAC-SHA-256 FIPS 198-1 #2490
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Note: According to SP 800-38E, the XTS-AES mode was designed only for the cryptographic
protection of data on storage devices. This mode is only approved for storage application. The
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module also checks the XTS-AES key (i.e., concatenation of two AES keys: Key_1 and Key_2) to
ensure Key_1 is different than Key_2.
2.3.Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the device that contains the
module. Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic
module.
2.3.1.Software Block Diagram
In the following diagram, the bidirectional arrows depict the flow of the status, control and data.
The operations within the logical cryptographic boundary (the blue dotted region) use the cipher
from the hardware that is included in the logical boundary.
Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary
2.3.2.Hardware Block Diagram
The following figure illustrates the various data, status and control paths through the
cryptographic module. Inside, the physical boundary of the module, the mobile device consists of
standard integrated circuits, including processors and memory. These do not include any security-
relevant, semi- or custom integrated circuits or other active electronic circuit elements.
Device Physical Boundary
OS
Kernel
Application
Application
(dm-crypt,
eCryptfs)
logical cryptographic
boundary
FMP Driver
UFS
Driver
FMP
(Resides in
Samsung
Exynos
Processor)
LDFW
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Figure 2: Device Physical Boundary
Figure 3: Samsung Exynos Processor 8890
CSP storage
Data in Command in
Data out Status Output
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In the following diagram, the bidirectional arrows depict the flow of the status, control and data.
The CSPs and settings are passed via memory and processed by the FMP hardware module.
Figure 4: FMP Hardware Block Diagram
Power in
Data in
Data out
Command In
Status Out
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3.Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
FIPS Interface API Interface Physical Interface
Data Input API input parameters DMA, FIFO
Data Output API output parameters DMA, FIFO
Control Input API function calls DMA, CTRL
Status Output
API return codes, kernel log
messages,
/sys/devices/fips_fmp/fips-
fmp/fips_fmp_status
DMA, CTRL
Power Input Physical power connector Outside of the FMP
Table 5: Ports and Interfaces
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4.Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1.Roles
Role Description
User
Perform general security services, including cryptographic operations
and other Approved security functions.
Crypto Officer (CO) Perform initialization of Module.
Table 6: Roles
The module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both
User and Crypto Officer roles. The module does not allow concurrent operators.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the module. No further authentication is required. The Crypto Officer can initialize
the module.
4.2.Services
The module does not support bypass capability. The DW3 field in the DMA descriptor stores the
flag for mode and algorithm that will be used for Disk Encryption and/or File Encryption in the FMP.
When security functions are requested from the FMP (i.e. the flags are set to b01 or b10), all
plaintext entered in the FMP will be encrypted. When the flag is set to b00 for both Disk Encryption
and File Encryption, no security function is requested from the FMP and no plaintext enters within
the module boundary.
The following table describes the services available in FIPS-Approved mode:
Service Roles Keys/CSPs Access
(Read “R”,
Write “W”,
Execute “X”)
User
CO
AES encryption and decryption with CBC mode
for File Encryption
Input: DMA descriptor
Output: Return success or fail
  128 and 256 bit keys R, W, X
XTS-AES encryption and decryption for File
Encryption
Input: DMA descriptor
Output: Return success or fail
  128 and 256 bit keys R, W, X
XTS-AES encryption and decryption for Disk
Encryption
Input: DMA descriptor
Output: Return success or fail
  128 and 256 bit keys R, W, X
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Service Roles Keys/CSPs Access
(Read “R”,
Write “W”,
Execute “X”)
User
CO
Self-Test
(Self-test is executed automatically
when device is booted or restarted)
  HMAC key for Integrity
Test, 128 and 256 bit
AES keys for Known-
Answer Test
R, X
Check Status/Get State   N/A R
Zeroization   AES 128 or 256 bits key R, W, X
Module Initialization  N/A N/A
Table 7: Approved Services
Note: The SHA and HMAC implementations in the module are only used for Integrity Test of the
module during power-on. They should not be used for any other purpose.
4.3.Operator Authentication
There is no operator authentication; assumption of role is implicit by action.
4.4.Mechanism and Strength of Authentication
No authentication is required at security level 1; authentication is implicit by assumption of the
role.
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5.Physical Security
The Samsung Flash Memory Protector is a software-hybrid module that operates on a multi-chip
standalone platform which conforms to the Level 1 requirements for physical security. The
hardware portion of the cryptographic module is a production grade component. The
cryptographic module must be used in a commercial off the shelf (COTS) mobile device. The
mobile device shall be comprised of production grade components with standard passivation (a
sealing coat applied over the chip circuitry to protect it against environmental and other physical
damage) and a production grade enclosure that completely surrounds the cryptographic module.
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6.Operational Environment
The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation. The procurement,
build and configuring procedure are controlled. The module is installed into a commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) mobile device by the customer. Therefore the operational environment is considered
non-modifiable.
6.1.Policy
The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent
operators are explicitly excluded). The external application that makes calls to the cryptographic
module is the single user of the cryptographic module, even when the application is serving
multiple clients.
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7.Cryptographic Key Management
7.1.Key and CSP List
The CSPs are provided in a DMA descriptor that is setup by the third party applications. The DMA
descriptor includes the following information: the address for the data blocks, data length, key
length, mode, algorithm, Disk Encryption IV, File Encryption IV, File Encryption Key and File Tweak
Key. The Flash Memory Controller (FMC) reads the information in the DMA descriptor and passes it
into the FMP module. The Disk Encryption Key is stored in a loadable firmware (LDFW) where the
LDFW is out of the module boundary, and loaded into a register for FMP when Disk Encryption
services are requested.
The following table lists the Keys and CSPs in the module:
Name Size Entry/
Output
Storage Zeroization
AES CBC key for
File Encryption
128 or
256 bits
The FMC sends
the CSPs to the
FMP module at the
hardware level.
Third party applications store
the keys in the DMA
descriptor.
Call the zeroization
API to clear out the
sensitive information
in the DMA
descriptor.
XTS-AES key for
File Encryption
XTS-AES key for
Disk Encryption
128 or
256 bits
The LDFW loads
the key to the
register for the
FMP module to
read.
The key is stored in a
firmware that is outside of
the module. The third party
applications load the key in
the register before
requesting the cryptographic
operations provided by the
FMP.
Call the zeroization
API to clear out the
sensitive information
in the DMA
descriptor and the
Disk Encryption Key
in firmware.
Note: The following keys are not a CSP according to IG 7.4 as they are only used for integrity test
and known-answer tests during power-up of the module.
HMAC key for
Integrity Test
344 bits N/A Stored as plaintext within
the binary.
Key zeroization is not
subject for these
keys according to IG
7.4.
AES keys for
Known-Answer
Test
128 or
256 bits
N/A
Table 8: Keys and CSPs
7.2.Key/CSP Generation, Entry and Output
The module does not provide any key generation service or perform key generation for any of its
Approved algorithms. The keys are provided by the third party applications and stored in a DMA
descriptor located in the memory.
The cryptographic module does not provide any asymmetrical algorithms or key establishment
methods. Manual key entry or key output capabilities are not provided. All CSPs can only be
exchanged in the memory via a DMA descriptor which occurs within the physical boundary of the
device and therefore may be passed to the module in plaintext.
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7.3.Key/CSP Storage and Zeroization
As all CSPs are stored in a DMA descriptor located in the memory, it is the user’s responsibility to
destroy the sensitive information in the DMA descriptor using FIPS Pub 140-2 compliant
procedures. The cryptographic module itself does not destroy externally stored keys and secrets
since it does not own these CSPs. The zeroization API function is provided by the module to clear
out the sensitive information stored in PRD table for DMA descriptor with 0s. No CSP is passed in
the FMP Driver and no CSP is stored within the cryptographic module boundary.
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8.Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMI/EMC)
The module is a software-hybrid module that has been tested on the test platform listed in section
2.1. The Samsung FMP hardware component cannot be certified by the FCC as it is not a
standalone device. The test platform is accepted by the FCC with the following information:
Test Firm: PCTEST Engineering Laboratory, Inc.
Test Firm Registration Number: #159966
The test platform which runs the module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B
(i.e., for home use).
FCC ID: A3LSMG935F
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9.Power-Up Tests
Power-Up tests consist of software integrity tests and known-answer tests (KAT) of algorithm
implementations. The power-up self-tests are automatically performed without any operator
intervention during loading of the module. If any of the power-up self-tests fail, the module will
returns the error codes to the calling application, print the specific error message in the kernel log,
set the global variable fmp_fips_state to FMP_FIPS_ERR_STATE and set the global variable
fips_fmp_result to 0 which the status Linux command listed in section 2.2 will return the string
“failed” to indicate the module is in error state. Data output is prohibited and no further
cryptographic operation is allowed in the error state. To recover from the error state, re-
initialization is possible by doing a reboot to set the module to the power-on state.
If the power-up self-tests are completed successfully, the module will set the global variable
fmp_fips_state to FMP_FIPS_SUCCESS_STATE and set the global variable fips_fmp_result to 1 which
the status Linux command will return the string “passed” to indicate the module is in FIPS mode.
FIPS 140-2 explicitly allows that the on-demand test can be fulfilled with a power cycle of the
module. Hence, a power cycle and its associated power-on self-test is the methodology used to
perform the "on-demand" tests.
9.1.Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Algorithm Test
AES with CBC mode KAT – Encryption and Decryption are tested separately
XTS-AES KAT – Encryption and Decryption are tested separately
SHA-256 KAT
HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
Table 9: Power-Up Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
9.2.Integrity Tests
At build time, the HMAC-SHA-256 values of only the module code (available in .text, .rodata and
.init.text sections of kernel image) are calculated based on different offset values which the offset
values define the kernel position at boot. Then, these HMAC-SHA-256 values of the module code with
their associated offset values are updated in the kernel image itself as a read-only data.
At run time, the module calculates the HMAC-SHA-256 value of only the module code (.text,
.init.text and .rodata sections of running kernel). Then, the module retrieves the build time HMAC-
SHA-256 value of the module based on the offset value in the current kernel position and
compares the build time HMAC-SHA-256 value with the calculated run-time HMAC-SHA-256 value.
If this calculated run-time HMAC-SHA-256 value is the same as the build time HMAC-SHA-256
value, Integrity test is considered passed. If calculated and stored values do not match, set error
state, FMP_FIPS_ERR_STATE.
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10.Design Assurance
10.1.Configuration Management
10.1.1.Versioning for FMP Driver
Perforce is used as the repository for both source code and documents for the FMP Driver. All
source code and documents are maintained in an internal server. Release is based on the
Changelist number, which is auto-generated. Every check-in process creates a new Changelist
number.
Versions of controlled items include information about each version. For documentation, revision
history inside the document provides the current version of the document. Version control
maintains the all the previous versions and the version control system automatically numbers
revisions. For source code, unique information is associated with each version such that source
code versions can be associated with binary versions of the final product. The source code of the
module available in the Samsung internal Perforce repository is used to build the target binary.
10.1.2.Versioning for FMP
IMS IP configuration management system is a Samsung in-house management system used to
maintain documentation for the FMP and the delivery of different versions of the FMP hardware
design to the chip development team. Each version of IMS is composed as {Module
Category}_{Module Name}_{Version Number}.
The individual design files of the FMP hardware are maintained by Perforce in an internal server.
Every check-in process creates a new Changelist number, which is auto-generated, to keep track
of the changes of the individual design files of the FMP hardware.
10.2.Delivery and Operation
The cryptographic module is never released as source code. The module sources are stored and
maintained at a secure development facility with controlled access.
The FMP Driver is a built-in kernel module within the device Linux kernel image. A product that
does not need a FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic module may decide to change the build flag
CONFIG_FIPS_FMP in Kernel config. The development team and the manufacturing factory share a
secured internal server for exchanging binary software images. The factory is also a secure site
with strict access control to the manufacturing facilities. The module binary is installed on the
mobile devices (phone and tablets) using direct binary image installation at the factory. The
mobile devices are then delivered to mobile service operators. Users cannot install or modify the
module. The developer also has the capability to deliver software updates to service operators
who in turn can update end-user phones and tablets using Over-The-Air (OTA) updates.
Alternatively, the users may bring their mobile devices to service stations where authorized
operators may use developer-supplied tools to install software updates on the phone. The
developer vets all service providers and establishes secure communication with them for delivery
of tools and software updates. If the binary is modified by an unauthorized entity, the device has a
feature to detect the change and thus not accept the binary modified by the unauthorized entity.
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11.Mitigation of Other Attacks
No other attacks are mitigated.
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12.Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DMA Direct Memory Access
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FMC Flash Memory Controller
FMP Flash Memory Protector
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IV Initial Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
LDFW Loadable Firmware
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
O/S Operating System
OTA Over-The-Air
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing
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13.References
[1] FIPS 140-2 Standard,
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[2] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance,
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[3] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements,
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[4] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[5] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[6] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[7] SP 800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html