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Juniper Networks MX204 3D Universal Edge Router and
EX9251 Ethernet Switch
Firmware: Junos OS 19.2R1
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Document Version: 1.0
Date: April 27, 2020
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Contents
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary ..........................................................................6
1.2 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................7
1.2.1 FIPS ApprovedMode....................................................................................................................7
1.2.2 Non-ApprovedMode ...................................................................................................................7
1.3 Zeroization ..........................................................................................................................................8
2 CryptographicFunctionality..................................................................................................................9
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols......................................................................................................9
2.2 DisallowedAlgorithms and Protocols................................................................................................11
2.3 Critical Security Parameters ..............................................................................................................12
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .....................................................................................................14
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles................................................................................14
3.2 Authentication Methods .............................................................................................................14
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services..................................................................................................15
3.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................16
4 Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................18
5 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................................20
6 Security Rules and Guidance...............................................................................................................21
6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance .................................................................................................22
6.1.1 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation.............................................................................23
6.1.2 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation..............................................24
6.2 User Guidance.............................................................................................................................24
7 References and Definitions .................................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations ......................................................................4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements....................................................................................5
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................6
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................9
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................9
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................9
Table 7 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................................11
Table 8 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode...............................................................................................11
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)...........................................................................................12
Table 10 – Public Keys................................................................................................................................12
Table 11 – Authenticated Services.............................................................................................................15
Table 12 – Unauthenticated Services ........................................................................................................15
Table 13 – CSP Access Rights within Services ............................................................................................16
Table 14 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services....................................................................................17
Table 15 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services................................................................................17
Table 16 – References................................................................................................................................25
Table 17 – Acronyms and Definitions ........................................................................................................25
Table 18 – Datasheets................................................................................................................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX204)..................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (EX9251).................................................................................6
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks MX204 3D
Universal Edge Router and EX9251 Ethernet Switch. The MX series provides dedicated high-
performance processing for flows and sessions and integrates advanced security capabilities that
protect the network infrastructure as well as user data. The Juniper Networks EX series of compact,
programmable, and scalable Ethernet switches is ideal for aggregating access switches and deployed
in campus wiring closets and in on-premises data centers.
This FIPS 140-2 validation includes the MX204 router and the EX9251 switch. The FIPS validated
version of firmware is Junos OS 19.2R1.
The cryptographic boundary for these modules is defined as follows for the validation:
• the outer edge of the chassis includes the Routing Engine (RE):
o For MX204: 1 built-in RE (RE-S-1600x8).
o For EX9251: 1 built-in RE (EX9251-RE).
• excluding the power distribution module on the rear of the device.
The cryptographic modules provide for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management
station and the module. All other data input to or output from the modules are considered plaintext for
this FIPS 140-2 validation.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute Junos OS
19.2R1 firmware on the Juniper Networks MX204 3D Universal Edge Router and the Juniper Networks
EX9251 Series Switch as listed in Table 1 below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations
Chassis PN Power PN RE PN
MX204
JPSU-650W-AC-AO
JPSU-650W-DC-AFO
Built-in Routing
Engine
(RE-S-1600x8)
EX9251 JPSU-650W-AC-AO
JPSU-650W-DC-AFO
Built-in Routing
Engine (EX9251-RE)
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The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2- Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3
Roles, Services, and
Authentication
3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. AnyfirmwareversionsotherthanJunosOS19.2R1,
loadedinto themodulesareoutofthescopeofthisvalidationandrequireaseparateFIPS140-2validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary
The cryptographic modules’ operational environment is a limited operational environment.
The images below depict the physical boundary of the modules which is the outer edge of the chassis and
includes the Routing Engine. The modules exclude the power supplies from the requirements of FIPS 140-
2. The power supplies do not contain any security relevant components and cannot affect the security of
the module.
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX204)
Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (EX9251)
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
MX204: (13:
Management port (1);
QSFP28/QSFP+ (4);
SFP+(8)
EX9251: (13:
Management port (1);
QSFP28/QSFP+ (4);
SFP+(8)
LAN
Communications/Remote
management
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Serial
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1)
Console serial port
Control in, Data in, Data out
Status out
USB MX204 (1), EX9251 (1) USB port - load Junos image Control in, Data in
Power MX204 (2), EX9251 (2) Power connector Power
LEDs MX204 (5), EX9251 (5) Status indicator lighting Status out
Online
Indicator
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1)
Status indicator lighting Status out
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Offline Button
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1) to power on or power off
the module
Control in
Reset Button
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1)
Reset Control in
BITS
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1) Connects the module to
external clocking devices
Control in
1PPS and 10
MHz GPS
MX204 (4), EX9251 (4) connect the module to
external clock signal
sources
Control in
Time of day
(ToD) port
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1) connects the module to
external timing signal
sources
Control in
PTP
grandmaster
clock
(GM/PTP) port
MX204 (1), EX9251 (1)
Disabled Control in
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports one FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The
module must always be zeroized when switching between the FIPS Approved mode of operation and the
non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.
1.2.1 FIPS Approved Mode
The hardware versions contained in Table 1, with Junos OS 19.2R1 installed, contain one FIPS-Approved
mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Junos OS 19.2R1 firmware image must
be installed on the device. The module is configured during initialization to operate in the approved
mode or the non-approved mode.
The Crypto-Officer places the module in the Approved mode of operation by following the instructions in
cryptographic officer guidance (section 6.1).
The Crypto-Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in the Approved mode by observing
the console prompt and running the “show version” command. When operating in FIPS mode, the
prompt will read “<user>@<device name>:fips#” (e.g. crypto-officer@mx204:fips#). The “show
version” command will allow the Crypto-Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is
running on the module. The Crypto-Officer can also use the “show system fips” command to
determine if the module is operating in FIPS mode.
1.2.2 Non-Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports the algorithms identified in Section 2.2 as well as the
algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation.
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The Crypto-Officer can place the module into a non-approved mode of operation by following the
instructions in the cryptographic officer guidance (section 6.1).
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, or vice-versa, the cryptographic officer shall
zeroize all keys and CSPs.
Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the Router/Switch. The Crypto Officer
initiates the zeroization process by entering the “request vmhost zeroize” (FIPS) operational command
from the CLI after enabling FIPS mode. Use of this command is restricted to the Crypto Officer. (To
zeroize the system before enabling FIPS mode, use the “request vmhost zeroize” command.)
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer. The cryptographic officer shall
perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation:To prepare the device for operation in the FIPS approved mode by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation in the FIPS
approved mode..
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
CAUTION: Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process is complete, no data is left
on the Routing Engine. The device is returned to the factory default state, without any configured users
or configuration files.
To zeroize the device:
1. From the CLI, enter
Crypto-officer@device> request vmhost zeroize
warning: System will be rebooted and may not boot without configuration
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
2. To initiate the zeroization process, type yes at the prompt:
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
yes
3. When the system finishes rebooting the system will be in a factory default state.
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 below. Table 8 summarizes the high-level protocol algorithm support. There are
some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes,
and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this/these table(s).
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C865 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
C865 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128, 256
C865 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C866 HMAC
PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 128, 256
C866 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
C867 AES1
PUB 197-38A
CBC, CTR,
ECB
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A2
CKG SSH-PUB 133
Section 6.1
Section 6.2
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
1
The AES-ECB mode was used for testing the AES-CTR mode.
2
Vendor Affirmed
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Section 7.3
Derivation of
symmetric keys
N/A3
KAS-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
ECC DH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
Key Agreement
Scheme - Key
Agreement Scheme
Shared Secret
Computation (KAS-
SSC) per SP 800-
56Arev3, Key
Derivation per SP
800-135 (CVL Cert.
#C867 SSH KDF))
C867 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384, 512 Key Derivation
C867 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Number
Generation
C867 ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen,
SigVer, PKV
C867 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 160
Message
Authentication
SHA-224 Key size: 224 bits, λ = 192
SHA-512 Key size: 512 bits, λ = 512
SHA-256
Key size: 256, bits, λ =
256
Message
Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
N/A KTS
AES Cert. # C867 and HMAC Cert. # C867
key establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. # C867 and HMAC Cert.
# C867
key establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
C867 RSA PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 512)
n=4096 (SHA 256, 512)
KeyGen, SigGen,
SigVer4
C867 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest
Generation,
3
Vendor Affirmed per IG D.1rev3 (per IG D.8 Scenario X1)
4
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance, because RSA
2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
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SHA-384
SHA-512
KDF Primitive
SHA-224
Message Digest
Generation
C867 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 7 Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG IG 7.14 Scenario
1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
Table 8 Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
SSHv25
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-521
RSA 2048,4096
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The SSH
algorithm allows independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In
Table 8 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used in any
viable combination.
2.2 Disallowed Algorithms and Protocols
These algorithms and protocols are non-Approved algorithms and protocols that are disabled
when the module is operated in the Approved mode of operation. The algorithms are available as
part of the SSH connect service when the module is operated in the non-Approved mode.
Algorithms
• RSA with key size less than 2048
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• AES-GCM
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
5
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
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• UMAC
Protocols
• Finger
• ftp
• rlogin
• telnet
• tftp
• xnm-clear-text
2.3 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 9 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State Values V and Key which comprise the HMAC_DRBG state
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
ECDH Shared
Secret
The Diffie-Hellman shared secret used in EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. Created per
the EC Diffie-Hellman protocol. Provides between 128-256 bits of security.
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256.
RSA2048
Used to identify the host.
SSH ECDH Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. ECDH P-256, P-384, or P-521
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256); SSH
Session Integrity Key: HMAC.
HMAC Key The LibMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
User Password Passwords used to authenticate Users to the module.
CO Password Passwords used to authenticate COs to the module.
Table 10 Public Keys
Name D Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256. RSA 2048, 4096.
SSH-ECDH-
PUB
Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. ECDH P-256, P-384, or
P-521
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-
384, P-521 or RSA 2048, 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-384,
P-521 or RSA 2048, 4096
Root CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
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Package CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at software load
and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The User role cannot change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and ECDSA or RSA public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters. Thus,
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming
0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-
second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous
(e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-
second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best
approachfor the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be
spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per
hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
9/(9610
), which is less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384,
and P-521), which has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of either 2^128 , 2^192
or 2^256 depending on the curve. Thus, the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/ (2^128),
which is less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection establishment rate limits the number of
connection attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in a one-minute period to a maximum of
15,000 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period
is 15,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000.
RSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports RSA (2048, 4096), which
has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of 2^112 (2048). Thus, the probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/ (2^112), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection
establishment rate limits the number of connection attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in
a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple
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consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 15,000/ (2^112), which is less than 1/100,000.
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 13 lists the access to
CSPs by each service.
Table 11 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on demand. x
Load Image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 12 - Unauthenticated Services
Service D Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure security E E E GWR GWR -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
SSH connect -- E -- E E GE GE -- E E
Console access -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote reset GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z -- -- --
Load Image -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Local reset GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z -- -- --
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module (persistent
storage) Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in
Section 2.2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 8.
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Table 14 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant)
(non-compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Status
(non-compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access
(non-compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on
demand
x
Load Image
(non-compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 15 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services
Service D Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly,
and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by
power cycling the module (Remote reset service).
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module in the FIPS Approved
Mode of operation. If any one of the Routing Engine KATs fails, the module enters the Error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
Routing Engine (RE)
• Firmware Integrity check: using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o ECDH P-256 KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o KAS -ECC KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1
o HMAC SHA-256
o SHA-512
• Critical Function Test
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o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment,
and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG in the OpenSSL library.
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG.
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification).
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5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is composed of production grade materials. The module is
completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and
brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that
would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic
boundary.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term shall in this context
specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all
other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead
to a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting
plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer shall verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a FIPS
validated image. If any non-validated firmware image is loaded the module will no longer be a
FIPS validated module.
12. The cryptographic officer shall retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. The operator shall ensure that the number of 64-bit blocks encrypted by the same key does not
exceed 2^20 with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the encryption algorithm for SSH.
14. Virtual Chassis is not supported in FIPS mode and shall not be configured on the modules.
15. RSA key generated shall only be 2048 bits or greater.
16. The module shall not be configured to use a radius server and the radius server capability shall be
disabled.
17. 3-key Triple-DES has been implemented in the module and is FIPS approved until December 31,
2023. Should the CMVP disallow the usage of Triple-DES post December 31, 2023, then users must
not configure Triple-DES.
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6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance
The cryptographic officer must check to verify the firmware image on the Router/Switch is the FIPS
140-2 validated image and must ensure that the fips-mode and jpfe-fips packages required for enabling
FIPS mode have been installed. If the image is the FIPS 140-2 validated image and if the
aforementioned packages have been installed, then proceed to section 6.1.2.6.1.1 Installing the FIPS-
Approved firmware image.
Download the validated firmware image from the
https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks
authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by
Juniper Networks representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download the firmware image
to a local host or to an internal software distribution site.
Connect to the console port on the device from your management device and log in to the Junos OS
CLI. Copy the firmware package to the deviceto the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the new package on the
device:
user@device> request vmhost software add /var/tmp/package.tgz.
NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the
installation and then issue the request system software delete package.tgz command, where
package.tgz is, for example, junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-19.2R1.8.tgz. This is your last chance to
stop the installation.
Reboot the device to load the installation and start the new firmware image:
user@device> request vmhost reboot
After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new
version of the firmware is successfully installed.
Also install the fips-mode package and jpfe-fips packages needed for enabling FIPS mode and running
KATS respectively. The following are the commands used for installing these packages:
user@device >request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz
user@device >request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz
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6.1.1 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation
The cryptographic officer is responsible for initializing the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The FIPS-Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The cryptographic
officer shall place the module in the FIPS-Approved mode by first zeroizing the device to delete all keys
and CSPs. The zeroizing instructions are in section 1.3 of this document. Next, the cryptographic officer
shall follow the steps found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX204 and EX9251
Devices, Release 19.2R1 document Chapters 3 & 7 to place the module into a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The steps from the aforementioned document are repeated below:
The FIPS Approved Mode of operation is not automatically enabled once the firmware image is
installed on the platform. These steps are for putting the module into the FIPS Approved Mode.
To enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the device:
1. Zeroize the device as explained in Section 1.3. Once device comes up in amnesiac mode post
zeroize, connect to device using console port with username “root” and configure crypto-
officer credentials.
2. Login to the device with crypto-officer credentials and enter configuration mode:
crypto-officer@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
crypto-officer@device#
3. Enable FIPS mode on the device by setting the FIPS level to 1, and verify the level:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # show system fips
chassis level 1;
4. Commit the configuration
[edit ]
crypto-officer@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key
Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key
Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key
[edit]
'system'
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reboot is required to transition to FIPS level 1
commit complete
5. Reboot the device:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device# run request vmhost reboot
Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes
During the reboot, the device runs Known Answer Tests (KATS). It returns a login
prompt.
6. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the “show version” command to verify the
firmware version is the validated version.
crypto-officer@device:fips> show version
6.1.2 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation
As cryptographic officer, the operator needs to disable the FIPS-Approved mode of operation on the
device to return it to a non-Approved mode of operation. To disable FIPS-Approved mode on the
device, the Router/Switch must be zeroized. Follow the steps found in section 1.3 to zeroize the
Router/Switch.
6.2 User Guidance
The user should verify that the module is operating in the desired mode of operation (FIPS-Approved
mode or non-Approved mode) by observing the command prompt when logged into the device. If the
string “:fips” is present, then the switch is operating in a FIPS-Approved mode. Otherwise it is operating
in a non-Approved mode.
All FIPS users, including the Crypto Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.
All FIPS users must:
• Keep all passwords confidential.
• Store devices and documentation in a secure area.
• Deploy devices in secure areas.
• Check audit files periodically.
• Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
• Follow these guidelines:
• Users are trusted.
• Users abide by all security guidelines.
• Users do not deliberately compromise security.
• Users behave responsibly at all times.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 16 - References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendationfor Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 17- Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
MD5 Message Digest 5
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SCB Switch Control Board
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 18 - Datasheets
Model Title URL
MX204 MX Series 5G Universal Routing
Platforms
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000597-en.pdf
EX9251
EX9250 Ethernet Switch https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000632-en.pdf