© 2019 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar®
7K6000 TCG Enterprise HDDs
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Version: 1.11
2019-02-13
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CONTENTS
1. Cryptographic Module Overview...........................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Models .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Security Level.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................................5
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation......................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Approved Algorithms.............................................................................................................................................................................. 5
3. Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................................6
4. Identification and Authentication Policy ..............................................................................................................................6
4.1 Cryptographic Officer............................................................................................................................................................................... 6
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority .......................................................................................................................................................... 6
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority ................................................................................................................................................................. 6
4.2 User........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
4.3 Anybody ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
4.4 Maker .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
5. Access Control Policy ..............................................................................................................................................................8
5.1 Roles and Services.................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
5.2 Unauthenticated Services.......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)................................................................................................................................... 10
5.4 Definition of Public Keys........................................................................................................................................................................ 10
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations................................................................................................................................ 10
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access........................................................................................................................................................ 10
6. Operational Environment .....................................................................................................................................................12
7. Security Rules ..........................................................................................................................................................................12
7.1 Invariant Rules...................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
7.2 Initialization Rules................................................................................................................................................................................ 13
7.3 Zeroization Rules.................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
8. Physical Security Policy..........................................................................................................................................................14
8.1 Mechanisms........................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
8.2 Operator Responsibility.......................................................................................................................................................................... 15
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy......................................................................................................................................15
10. Definitions ...............................................................................................................................................................................15
11. Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................................................17
12. References................................................................................................................................................................................17
12.1 NIST Specifications .............................................................................................................................................................................. 17
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications................................................................................................................................................ 18
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards....................................................... 19
12.4 HGST Documents................................................................................................................................................................................ 21
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Tables
Table 1 - Ultrastar 7K6000 Product Models................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification ............................................................................................................................5
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms...........................................................................................................................................6
Table 4 - Ultrastar 7K6000 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................6
Table 5 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.............................................................................................7
Table 6 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths..........................................................................................................................8
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services............................................................................................................................................9
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services...............................................................................................................................................9
Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys .................................................................................................................................................10
Table 10 - Sensitive Security Parameters....................................................................................................................................10
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services...........................................................................................................12
Table 12 SCSI Commands............................................................................................................................................................21
Figures
Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary................................................................................................................................................4
Figure 2: Large Tamper-Evident Label.......................................................................................................................................14
Figure 3: Smaller Tamper-Evident Labels..................................................................................................................................14
Figure 4: Tamper Evidence on Large Tamper Label ...............................................................................................................15
Figure 5: Tamper Evidence on Metal Surface ...........................................................................................................................15
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1. Cryptographic Module Overview
Ultrastar® 7K6000 TCG Enterprise HDDs, hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar 7K600” or “the Cryptographic Module”,
are multi-chip embedded modules that comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. They also comply with the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive enclosure is the cryptographic boundary (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary
1.1 Models
The Ultrastar 7K6000 is available in several models that vary by storage capacity and block size. Table 1 - Ultrastar
7K6000 Product Models enumerates the models and characteristics and includes the hardware and firmware
versions.
Model Number
(Hardware Version)
Firmware Version
Capacity
(GB)
Block Size
(bytes)
Description
HUS726020AL4215 (0001)
R519, R7J0, R907, R910,
R930, RD05, RD9H,
RDW0, RDY0
2,000 4K Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726020AL5215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 2,000 512 emulation SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726020ALS215 (0001) R7J7, R907, RD05 2,000 512 Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726030AL4215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 3,000 4K Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726030AL5215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 3,000 512 emulation SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726030ALS215 (0001) R7J7, R907, RD05 3,000 512 Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726040AL4215 (0001)
R519, R7J0, R907, R910,
R930, RD05, RD9H,
RDQ0, RDR0, RDW0,
RDY0
4,000 4K Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726040AL5215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 4,000 512 emulation SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726040ALS215 (0001)
R7J7, R907, R9E0,
RD05, RD9H, RDD5,
RDW0
4,000 512 Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
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Model Number
(Hardware Version)
Firmware Version
Capacity
(GB)
Block Size
(bytes)
Description
HUS726050AL4215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 5,000 4K Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726050AL5215 (0001) R519, R7J0, R907, RD05 5,000 512 emulation SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726060AL4215 (0001)
R519, R7J0, R907, R9E0,
R910, R9L0, RD05,
RD9H, RDD5, RDQ0,
RDR0, RDW0
6,000 4K Native SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
HUS726060AL5215 (0001)
R519, R7J0, R907, R9E0,
RD05, RDD5
6,000 512 emulation SAS 12 Gb/s, 7,200 RPM, 3.5in
Table 1 - Ultrastar 7K6000 Product Models
1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section
FIPS 140-2 Security Level
Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation that is entered after successful
completion of the Initialize Cryptographic Module service. Once configured to run in FIPS Approved mode, the
Cryptographic Module will always run in FIPS-Approved mode as long as all of the self-tests complete successfully.
A FIPS mode indicator is available from the Get FIPS Mode service. A value of “1” is returned when the
Cryptographic Module is in FIPS mode. If the module is not configured correctly, the module will run in the Non-
FIPS Approved mode of operation. The Get FIPS Mode service will return a value of”0”.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths are in
compliance with NIST SP 800-131A.
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FIPS Approved Algorithm CAVP Certificate
SP800-90A CTR-DRBG 302
Hardware AES ECB-128,256, XTS-128, 256
Encryption and Decryption
* Note: The length of data unit for XTS-AES does not exceed 2^20 blocks.
2067
AES ECB-256
Encryption, Decryption and Key Wrap
2365
RSA 2048 PSS Verify 1220
SHA-256 2037
HMAC-SHA-256
Used in SP 800-132 KDF
1468
SP800-132 KDF Vendor Affirmed
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithm:
• Hardware NDRNG for seeding the Approved SP800-90A DRBG
3. Ports and Interfaces
Table 4 below identifies its ports and interfaces of the Cryptographic Module. A maintenance access interface is not
provided.
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Ports
Power Power connector [SAS]
Control Input SAS connector [SAS]
Status Output SAS connector [SAS]
Data Input SAS connector [SAS]
Data Output SAS connector [SAS]
Table 4 - Ultrastar 7K6000 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator roles.
4.1 Cryptographic Officer
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority
This TCG authority initializes the Cryptographic Module. TCG SSC: Enterprise Section 11.3.1 defines this role.
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority
This TCG authority zeroizes the Cryptographic Module. TCG SSC: Enterprise Section 11.4.1 defines this role. It
may also disable User roles and erase LBA bands (user data regions).
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4.2 User
User roles correspond to BandMaster Authorities; they are defined in TCG SSC: Enterprise Section 11.4.1. They are
authorized to lock/unlock and configure LBA bands (user data regions) and to issue read/write commands to the
SED. The TCG EraseMaster authority can disable Users.
4.3 Anybody
Services are provided that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not disclose, modify, or
substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the security of the
Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output from an
instance of the SP800-90A DRBG.
4.4 Maker
Out of scope services are provided for the vendor to configure and perform failure analysis within the vendor’s
facilities. Maker authentication data shall not leave the vendor’s facilities. Maker is disabled when the Cryptographic
Officer invokes the Initialize Cryptographic Module service.
The following table maps TCG authorities to FIPS140-2 roles.
TCG Authority Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID Authority
A Cryptographic Officer role, which has
the authority to initialize the
Cryptographic Module and a authorize
Firmware download.
Identity-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (TCG
SID Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
A Cryptographic Officer role, which
zeroizes Media Encryption, keys and
disables Users.
Identity-based
CO Identity (TCG
EraseMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG EraseMaster
PIN)
BandMasterN
(N = 0 to 5)
A User role, which has authority to
controls read/write access to LBA
Bands.
Identity-based
User Identity (TCG
BandMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
A role that does not require
authentication.
Unauthenticated N/A
Maker
(Disabled)
A TCG Authority which is not available
upon completion of the Initialize
Cryptographic Module service
Identity-based
User Identity (TCG Maker
Authority) and PIN (HGST
Maker PIN)
Table 5 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
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The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN).
Authentication Mechanism Mechanism Strength
TCG Credential (PIN) TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides 2256 possible
values. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1
chance in 2256 (approximately (8.64 x 10-78) which is significantly
less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur
sequentially (one at a time) and only when the failed
authentication Tries count value does not exceed the associated
TriesLimit value. Any authentication attempt consumes at least
approximately 750 microseconds. Hence, at most,
approximately 80,000 authentication attempts are possible in one
minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs a
one minute interval is approximately 6.91 x 10-73 which is
significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Table 6 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths
5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Service Description Role(s)
Initialize Cryptographic
Module
Cryptographic Officer provisions the Cryptographic
Module from organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
Authenticate
Input a TCG Credential for authentication CO, Users,
Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download service CO
(SID Authority)
Firmware Download
Load and verify by RSA2048 an entire firmware image.
If the new self-tests complete successfully, the SED
executes the new code. The Firmware Download
Control shall be unlocked before Firmware can be
downloaded.
CO
(SID Authority)
Disable Zeroize
Disable TCG Revert method CO
(SID Authority)
Set
Write data structures; access control enforcement occurs
per data structure field. PINs can be changed using this
service.
CO, Users,
Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
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Service Description Role(s)
Set TCG Credential
Inputs authentication data and replaces stored hashed
PIN data.
CO, Users
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster),
(BandMasters)
Set LBA Band
Set the starting location, size, and attributes of a set of
contiguous Logical Blocks
Users
(BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band Users
(BandMasters)
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data to ciphertext and write in
a LBA band
Users
(BandMasters)
Read Data
Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output user
plaintext data
Users
(BandMasters)
Set Data Store
Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage Users
(BandMasters)
Erase LBA Band
Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA band
encryption keys to new values. When the EraseMaster
erases a LBA band, the TCG Credential is set to the
default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
Set Vendor Data
A Non-Approved service that is unavailable after the
Initialize Cryptographic Module service completes
Maker
Table 7 - Authenticated CM Services
5.2 Unauthenticated Services
The Cryptographic Module provides these unauthenticated services:
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Get FIPS Mode
TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic
Module.
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
Zeroize
TCG Revert method to return the Cryptographic Module to its original
manufactured state; authentication data (PSID) is printed on the external label
SCSI
[SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage
device. See Table 12 SCSI Commands.
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services
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5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the following CSPs:
Key Name Type Description
PIN - TCG Credential (8 total)
256-bit authentication
data
Authenticates the Cryptographic Officer and
User roles
MEK - Media Encryption Key
(6 total - 1 per LBA band)
XTS-AES-256
(512 bits)
Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. This key
is only associated with one key scope.
KEK – Key Encrypting Key
(6 total)
SP 800-132 PBKDF
(256 bits)
Keys derived from BandMaster PINs, which
wrap the MEKs. Keys protected by this SP
800-132 PBKDF derived key shall not leave
the module.
NDRNG Entropy output Entropy source for DRBG
DRBG
Internal CTR_DRBG
state
All properties and state associated with the
SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit
Generator
Table 9 - CSPs and Private Keys
5.4 Definition of Public Keys
The Cryptographic Module contains the following public key:
Key Name Type Description
RSAFW RSA 2048 public key Verify firmware download
Table 10 - Sensitive Security Parameters
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Key Derivation Function (KDF).
• The KEKs (SP800-132 Master Keys) are derived from the User PINs (SP800-132 Password) with SP800-
132 Option 1a.
• The length of the operator PIN is 256 bits and the stored hashed with SHA-256, the security strength being
128 bits.
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing the User PIN is 2-128.
• The difficulty of guessing the User PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
• The KEKs (SP800-132 Master Keys) are only used to wrap the Media Encryption Keys (MEKs).
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 11 defines the relationship between access to Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and the different
Cryptographic Module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the SP800-90A DRBG, derives a CSP
with the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
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• W = Write: The Cryptographic Module writes a CSP. The write access is performed after the
Cryptographic Module generates a CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP.
Service CSPs and Keys
Type of
CSP Access
Initialize Cryptographic Module
CO PIN and
User PIN and
DRBG and
KEK and
MEK
E,W
E,W
E
G
G,W
Authenticate
CO PIN or
User PIN
E
E
Lock/Unlock Firmware Download Control CO PIN E
Firmware Download
CO PIN and
RSAFW
E
E
Disable Zeroize CO PIN E
Set
CO PIN or
User PIN or
Maker PIN
E
E
E
Set TCG Credential
CO PIN or
User PIN
W
W
Set LBA Band User PIN E
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
User PIN and
KEK and
MEK
E
G
E
Write Data
User PIN and
MEK
E
E
Read Data
User PIN and
MEK
E
E
Set Data Store User PIN E
Erase LBA Band
CO PIN and
KEK and
MEK
E
G
Z,G,W
Self-Test
NDRNG and
DRBG
E
W
Reset Module None
Status Output None
Get FIPS mode None
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Service CSPs and Keys
Type of
CSP Access
Start Session None
End Session None
Generate Random DRBG E
Get Data Store None
Set Vendor Data None
Zeroize
PSID and
CO PIN and
User PIN and
DRBG and
KEK and
MEK
E
W
W
G
G
Z,G,W
SCSI None
Table 11 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
6. Operational Environment
When the Cryptographic Module is operational, the environment cannot be modified. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2
operational environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the code working set
cannot be added, deleted or modified; however, firmware can be upgraded (replaced in entirety) with an
authenticated download service. If the download operation is successfully authorized and verified, then the
Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set.
7. Security Rules
Ultrastar 7K6000 enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents the security
rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Cryptographic Officer and User. The
module also supports an additional role, the Maker role, which is disabled during initialization.
2. Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
3. When the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed self-tests and has been initialized, it is in FIPS mode,
and the FIPS mode indicator is set to 1.
4. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access to any
cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
5. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests
A. Power up Self-Tests
1) Firmware Integrity 16-bit CRC
2) Hardware AES Encrypt KAT (Known Answer Test)
3) Hardware AES Decrypt KAT
4) Firmware AES Encrypt KAT
5) Firmware AES Decrypt KAT
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6) RSA 2048 Verify KAT
7) SHA-256 KAT
8) DRBG KAT
9) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
B. Conditional Tests
1) Continuous Random Number Generator test is performed on the DRBG and the hardware NDRNG
entropy source.
2) Firmware Download Check
6. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the
device.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the Cryptographic
Module.
10. There are no restrictions on which plaintext keys or CSPs the zeroization service delete.
11. The Cryptographic Module does not support a maintenance interface or maintenance role.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
17. The End Session service deletes the current operator authentication. The Cryptographic Module requires
operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Cryptographic Officer shall follow the instructions in the Delivery & Operation (Cryptographic Officer) Manual
for acceptance and end of life procedures. Acceptance instructions include:
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities replacing the default PIN values.
• Establish the LBA Bands, which causes the Cryptographic Module to generate Media Encryption Keys
• Disable Maker Authority
• Lock the Firmware Download service control
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Cryptographic Officer utilizes the TCG Revert Method to zeroize. Revert includes zeroization of all Critical
Security Parameters:
• Operator authentication data
• Media Encryption Keys
• NDRNG state
• DRBG state
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8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Tamper-evident security labels are applied by HGST during manufacturing.
• The tamper-evident security labels cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering.
• The tamper evident security labels cannot be easily replicated.
Figure 2: Large Tamper-Evident Label
Figure 3: Smaller Tamper-Evident Labels
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8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Cryptographic Officer and/or User shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering
a minimum of once a year.
Figure 4: Tamper Evidence on Large Tamper
Label
Figure 5: Tamper Evidence on Metal Surface
If signs of tamper are detected, the module should be returned to HGST, Inc.
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Cryptographic Module is not designed to mitigate any attacks beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy-use. [SP800-131A] for terms
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for a role that is not authenticated. [TCG Core]
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the cryptographic module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized
parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data that is used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic
keys, and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can
compromise the security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds
of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that an implement Approved
security functions and is contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
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• Cryptographic Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions.
[FIPS140]
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media where the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Integrity: A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized
and undetected manner.
• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the cryptographic
module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters (e.g., authentication data) during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
• Method: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique, default value that vendors assign to each SED during
manufacturing; it is typically printed on an external label and is readable with the TCG protocol; it is the
initial and default value for all TCG credentials. [TCG Core]
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets that is used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Data that is not encrypted.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for physical signals. [FIPS140]
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information whose modification can compromise the security
of the cryptographic module (e.g., a public key of a key pair).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Security Identifier (SID): A TCG authority used by the Cryptographic Officer. [TCG Core]
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services.
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
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• User Data: Data that is transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI
Block]
• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• CO: Cryptographic Office [FIPS140]
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
• HDD: Hard Disk Drive
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID (Manufactured Security Identifier): a public, drive-unique value that is created during
manufacturing and is used as default PIN credential values
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator that is the source of entropy for the DRBG
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): a SED unique value that is printed on the Cryptographic Module’s
label and is used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SED: Self encrypting Drive
• SID: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• XTS: A mode of AES
12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, 2001, November
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, 2013, July
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2002 December
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, 2007 June
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• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-3, NIST, 2007 June
• [SP800-38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, 2010 January
• [SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
2012 December
• [SP800-57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 3), NIST, 2012 July
• [SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators, NIST, 2012 Jan
• [SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, NIST, 2011 Jan
• [SP800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, 2010 December
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 2.00 (December
21, 2009)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version
1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
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12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee
Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 15 (SPC-4)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2)
Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h
INQUIRY 12h
LOG SELECT 4Ch
LOG SENSE 4Dh
MODE SELECT 15h
MODE SELECT 55h
MODE SENSE 1Ah
MODE SENSE 5Ah
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h
READ (6) 08h
READ (10) 28h
READ (12) A8h
READ (16) 88h
READ (32) 7Fh/09h
READ BUFFER 3Ch
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h
READ DEFECT DATA 37h
READ DEFECT DATA B7h
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h
READ LONG 3Eh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h
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Description Code
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS 1Ch
RELEASE 17h
RELEASE 57h
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h
REPORT LUNS A0h
REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION CODES A3h/0Ch
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK MANAGEMENT
FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h
RESERVE 16h
RESERVE 56h
REZERO UNIT 01h
SANITIZE 48h
SEEK (6) 0Bh
SEEK (10) 2Bh
SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
START STOP UNIT 1Bh
SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
TEST UNIT READY 00h
UNMAP 42h
VERIFY (10) 2Fh
VERIFY (12) AFh
VERIFY (16) 8Fh
VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
WRITE (6) 0Ah
WRITE (10) 2Ah
WRITE (12) AAh
WRITE (16) 8Ah
WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
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Description Code
WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
WRITE SAME (10) 41h
WRITE SAME (16) 93h
WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
Table 12 SCSI Commands
12.4 HGST Documents
• [Product Specification] HGST Ultrastar 7K6000 Hard Disk Drive specification, Version 1.6 (May 23, 2016)
• [D&O] Delivery & Operation (Cryptographic Officer) Manual, Version: 0.5 (January 31, 2014)