

Apple Inc.



Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2/PHY3]

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2/PHY3] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 2 module with Physical Security at Security Level 3.

This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140Br1.

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic module specification	2
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	2
4	Roles, services, and authentication	2
5	Software/Firmware security	2
6	Operational environment	N/A
7	Physical security	3
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	2
10	Self-tests	2
11	Life-cycle assurance	2
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	2

Table 1: Security Levels

1.3 Additional Information

In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing. The vendor reviewed the intermediate and final Security Policy and approved all of its content.

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2/PHY3] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) consists of both firmware and hardware components. The Secure Key Store (SKS) application is the module’s firmware which operates within the sepOS execution environment which is separate from the Device OS’ (iOS 18, iPadOS 18, tvOS 18, macOS 15, visionOS 2) execution environment. The firmware interface is defined as the API offered by the module’s mailbox interface to callers from the Device OS execution environment. SKS has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported services and therefore the supported cryptographic algorithms. In addition, the module provides Inter-Process Communication (IPC) interfaces to other applications executing within the sepOS execution environment. The sepOS execution environment is driven by its own CPU and operates from a dedicated region of the device’s memory. Both the Device’s and sepOS’ execution environments are physically separated on the SoC and thus execute independently of each other.

Module Type: Hardware

Module Embodiment: Single Chip

Module Characteristics: SubChip

Cryptographic Boundary:

The module cryptographic boundary is delineated by the dotted blue rectangle in the Figure 1. The cryptographic module boundary includes the following hardware components:

- Hardware Random Number Generator composed of a SP800-90A Approved CTR_DRBG and a physical entropy source compliant to SP800-90B.
- Hardware AES implementing AES-ECB and AES-CBC encryption and decryption.
- Hardware Public Key Accelerator (PKA) used for generating asymmetric key pairs.
- A shared memory segment (called Mailbox) that can be accessed by both SKS and the Device OS’s XNU kernel, supported with an interrupt system and used by XNU to request services of the SKS module.
- A volatile RAM for storing runtime SSPs.
- A non-volatile Flash for storing an encrypted Class D key.

The physical perimeter is represented by the exterior-most red line in the block diagram below.




Figure 1: Block Diagram

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The photograph of each hardware module is shown below:


 Figure 2: Apple A Series A13 Bionic	 Figure 3: Apple A Series A14 Bionic	 Figure 4: Apple A Series A15 Bionic
 Figure 5: Apple A Series A16 Bionic	 Figure 6: Apple A Series A17 Pro	 Figure 7: Apple M Series M1
 Figure 8: Apple M Series M1 Pro	 Figure 9: Apple M Series M1 Max	 Figure 10: Apple M Series M1 Ultra
 Figure 11: Apple M Series M2	 Figure 12: Apple M Series M2 Pro	 Figure 13: Apple M Series M2 Max

		
Figure 14: Apple M Series M2 Ultra	Figure 15: Apple M Series M3	Figure 16: Apple M Series M3 Pro
		
Figure 17: Apple M Series M3 Max	Figure 18: Apple M Series M4	Figure 19: Apple M Series M4 Pro
		
Figure 20: Apple M Series M4 Max	Figure 21: Apple S Series S9 / Apple S Series S10	

Note: Apple S Series S9 and Apple S Series S10 share the same SoC

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
SKS on A13 Bionic embedded in iPad (9th generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A14 Bionic embedded in iPad Air (4th generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A15 Bionic embedded in iPad mini (6th generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A17 Pro embedded in iPad mini (7th generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A17 Pro	N/A

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
SKS on M1 embedded in iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M1	N/A
SKS on M2 embedded in iPad Pro 11-inch (4th generation) running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2	N/A
SKS on M4 embedded in iPad Pro 11-inch M4 running sepOS distributed with iPadOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M4	N/A
SKS on A13 Bionic embedded in iPhone 11 Pro running sepOS distributed with iOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A14 Bionic embedded in iPhone 12 running sepOS distributed with iOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A15 Bionic embedded in iPhone 13 Pro Max running sepOS distributed with iOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A16 Bionic embedded in iPhone 14 Pro Max running sepOS distributed with iOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A16 Bionic	N/A
SKS on A17 Pro embedded in iPhone 15 Pro Max running sepOS distributed with iOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A17 Pro	N/A
SKS on A15 Bionic embedded in Apple TV 4K (3rd generation) running sepOS distributed with tvOS 18	2.0	18.3	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	N/A
SKS on S9 embedded in Apple Watch Series S9, Ultra 2 running sepOS distributed with watchOS 11	2.0	18.3	Apple S Series S9	N/A
SKS on S10 embedded in Apple Watch Series S10, Ultra 2 running sepOS distributed with watchOS 11	2.0	18.3	Apple S Series S10	N/A
SKS on M1 embedded in MacBook Air running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M1	N/A
SKS on M1 Pro embedded in MacBook Pro 14-inch (2021) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M1 Pro	N/A
SKS on M1 Max embedded in MacBook Pro 16-inch (2021) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M1 Max	N/A
SKS on M1 Ultra embedded in Mac Studio (2022) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M1 Ultra	N/A

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
SKS on M2 embedded in MacBook Pro 13-inch (2022) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2	N/A
SKS on M2 Pro embedded in Mac mini running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2 Pro	N/A
SKS on M2 Max embedded in Mac Studio (2023) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2 Max	N/A
SKS on M2 Ultra embedded in Mac Pro running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2 Ultra	N/A
SKS on M3 embedded in MacBook Air 13-inch (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M3	N/A
SKS on M3 Pro embedded in Macbook Pro 14-inch (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M3 Pro	N/A
SKS on M3 Max embedded in Macbook Pro 16-inch (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M3 Max	N/A
SKS on M4 embedded in Mac mini (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M4	N/A
SKS on M4 Pro embedded in Macbook Pro 16-inch (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M4 Pro	N/A
SKS on M4 Max embedded in Macbook Pro 16-inch (2024) running sepOS distributed with macOS 15	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M4 Max	N/A
SKS on M2 embedded in Apple Vision Pro running sepOS distributed with visionOS 2	2.0	18.3	Apple M Series M2	N/A

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware

2.3 Excluded Components

None for this module

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved mode	Automatically entered whenever an approved service is requested	Approved	The return of a '0' from fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher functions and fips_allowed() for all other services indicates the executed cryptographic algorithm was approved
Non-approved mode	Automatically entered whenever a non-approved service is requested	Non-Approved	The return of any non-zero value from fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher functions and fips_allowed() for all other services indicates the executed cryptographic algorithm was non-approved

Table 3: Modes List and Description

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A1469	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A2863	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A3496	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A510	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6547	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6554	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6555	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6556	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6557	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A1362	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A1469	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A2863	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A2864	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A3490	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256	SP 800-38A

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-ECB	A3496	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A501	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A510	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6547	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6548	Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6554	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6555	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6557	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6559	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-KW	A6555	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KW	A6557	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KW	A6558	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
Counter DRBG	A1362	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Counter DRBG	A2864	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Counter DRBG	A3490	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Counter DRBG	A501	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Counter DRBG	A6548	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1	A6557	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA-1	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A6557	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6557	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6561	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6557	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6557	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512/256	A6560	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A6557	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA-1	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A6557	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6548	Message Length - Message Length: 768-1792 Increment 512	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6557	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6561	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6557	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6557	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256	A6560	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 4: Approved Algorithms

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Symmetric AES key:Key Length/ Key Strength: 256	N/A	Symmetric Key Generation (CKG using method in Section 4 example 1 [SP 800-133Rev2])

Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

Name	Use and Function
Ed25519 Key generation	EdDSA signature scheme
Curve 25519 key generation	key generation
Curve 25519 shared secret generation	shared secret generation
ECDH Key Pair Generation	Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) Key Generation
ECDH Shared Secret Computation	Shared secret computation using P curves.
ANSI X9.63 KDF	Hash based KDF
AES-GCM	Encryption and Decryption
HKDF RFC5869	HMAC based Key Derivation Function
PBKDF	Key Derivation
ECDSA implemented in FW	Key generation as part of Ref key generation service and validation, Signature generation and verification using Ref-key as part of Device keybag service
ECDSA implemented in HW PKA	Key generation as part of Ref key generation service Signature generation primitive
ECDH implemented in FW	Shared secret computation using Ref-key
ECDH implemented in HW PKA	Shared secret computation using Ref-key
AES KW	Key wrapping and unwrapping using class D key, keys from Device keybag, keys from iCloud keybag, keys from Escrow keybag, keys from any keybag used with Class B Curve 25519 encrypt/decrypt, keys from

Name	Use and Function
	Backup keybag used for wrapping Ed25519 keys, or NVM storage controller key

Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	BC-UnAuth	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	AES-CBC:Key Length / Key Strength:128, 192, 256 AES-ECB:Key Length / Key Strength:256	AES-CBC: (A1469, A2863, A3496, A510, A6547, A6554, A6555, A6556, A6557) AES-ECB: (A1362, A1469, A2863, A2864, A3490, A3496, A501, A510, A6547, A6548, A6554, A6555, A6557, A6559)
Key Wrapping	BC-Auth	Key Wrapping	AES-KW:Key Length / Key Strength:128, 192, 256	AES-KW: (A6555, A6557, A6558)
Random Number Generation	DRBG	Random Number Generation	Counter DRBG:AES-256; No Derivation Function; Prediction Resistance Enabled; Key Length / Key Strength: 256	Counter DRBG: (A1362, A2864, A3490, A501, A6548)
Keyed Hash	MAC	Keyed Hash	HMAC-SHA-1:112 bits or greater HMAC-SHA2-224:112 bits or greater HMAC-SHA2-256:112 bits or greater HMAC-SHA2-384:112 bits or greater HMAC-SHA2-512:112 bits or greater	HMAC-SHA-1: (A6557, A6560) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A6557, A6560) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6557, A6560, A6561) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6557, A6560) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A6557,

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			512:112 bits or greater HMAC-SHA2-512/256:112 bits or greater	A6560) HMAC-SHA2-512/256: (A6560)
Message Digest	SHA	Message Digest	SHA-1:N/A SHA2-224:N/A SHA2-256:N/A SHA2-384:N/A SHA2-512:N/A SHA2-512/256:N/A	SHA-1: (A6557, A6560) SHA2-224: (A6557, A6560) SHA2-256: (A6548, A6557, A6560, A6561) SHA2-384: (A6557, A6560) SHA2-512: (A6557, A6560) SHA2-512/256: (A6560)
Symmetric Key Generation	CKG	AES Key	CKG [SP800-133Rev2]:Key Length/ Key Strength: 256	CKG: ()

Table 7: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

KTS

The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.

SHA-1:

SHA-1 is only approved when used in approved mode for message digest. The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E113	Apple Inc.

Table 8: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Apple corecrypto physical entropy source	Physical	See Tested Module Identification - Hardware Table	256 bit	256 bit	SHA-256 [ACVP cert. #C1223]

Table 9: Entropy Sources

Entropy sources : The module implements a single entropy source in the form of a physical entropy source validated under ESV Certificate #E113. The entropy source follows IG 9.3.A scenario 1.(a) i.e. the module is a hardware module with an entropy generating source inside the module's cryptographic boundary. The Entropy Sources Table above states the minimum number of bits of entropy generated by the module for use in SSP generation.

DRBGs: The NIST [SP 800-90ARev1] approved deterministic random bit generators (DRBG) used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 without derivation function and with prediction resistance.

The module performs DRBG health tests according to [SP800-90ARev1 section 11.3].

The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by the physical noise source.

DRBG Output: The output of hardware entropy source provides 256-bits of full entropy which enables the CTR_DRBG to generate keys and SSPs with up to 256-bits of security strength.

2.9 Key Generation

See vendor affirmed algorithms (CKG) in section 2.5.

2.10 Key Establishment

The Module implements AES key wrapping and unwrapping as part of KTS in accordance with IG D.G method 2 and SP800-38F.

2.11 Industry Protocols

None for this module

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

The cryptographic interfaces of the module are provided through the mailbox interface that is used between the module and the Device OS kernel, and the IPC channel used between the module and other sepOS applications.

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Mailbox Memory, IPC channel	Data Input Data Output	Data inputs/outputs are provided through the API offered by the module's mailbox interface to callers from the Device OS' kernel and through the IPC
Mailbox Memory, IPC channel	Control Input	Control input which controls the module's operation is provided through the mailbox by the Device OS' kernel and to applications located within the sepOS execution environment through IPC.
Mailbox Memory, IPC channel	Status Output	Status output is provided in return codes and through messages returned via the mailbox or the IPC. Documentation for each service invocation lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs within the module is provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are also documented in the API documentation.

Table 10: Ports and Interfaces

The module's logical interfaces used for input data and control information are logically disconnected from the logical paths used for the output of data and status information by virtue of the module's API. The module's API distinguishes all output data from SSP information.

The module does not implement a Control Output Logical Interface

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
AES-KW	Unwrapping function	key wrapping / key unwrapping	256-bits	$60,000,000 * 1 / 2^{256}$
Implicit	Implicit role assumption for non-crypto services	None	N/A	N/A

Table 11: Authentication Methods

Within the constraints of FIPS 140-3 level 2, the module implements a role-based authentication mechanism for authentication of the user role.

The module implements authenticated encryption-based mechanism in the following way: to request an authenticated service from the module the user must provide the credential and a reference to the class C or A keys of the user keybag that is stored encrypted under SP800-38F AES Key Wrapping (AES-KW) within the module. The module performs obfuscation on the Operator provided credential. The resulting value -called REK (Root Encryption Key)- is used as the 256-bit AES key. Using this key, the module decrypts all the class C or A keys in the referenced user keybag with SP800-38F AES Key Unwrapping function (i.e., AES-KW-AD). As AES-KW is an authentication cipher, the decryption operation will only succeed if there is no authentication error. If the user keybag can be successfully decrypted, the user is authenticated to the module and the requested crypto service will then be proceeded with the decrypted user key. The failure of decrypting the user keybag is also a user authentication failure and the Operator will be denied access to the module.

The User keybags are configured in the module during factory install. Each User keybag consists of set of class C, A and D keys. Specifically, class C keys include C key, CK key, CKU keys and the class A keys include A key, AK key, AKU key and APKU key. Only the class A or C keys are considered as approved. Any use of class D keys is considered as non-approved. The module maintains authenticated session from the time the User keybags are unwrapped until the power off. Upon power off, the unwrapped User keybags are zeroized and at the next power on the User credential needs to be provided again in order to unwrap the User keybag. All authentication data is provided electronically from the calling application/service and hence is not in visible form.

The AES-KW 256-bit key unwrapping function provides 256 bits of strength. Therefore, the strength of the authentication mechanism in use is $1 / 2^{256}$. Even using a rate of $1\mu s$ per failed authentication, which would allow 60,000,000 consecutive attempts per minute (60s / 0.000001s), only provides a probability of successfully authenticating that is less than or equal to $60,000,000 * 1 / 2^{256}$.

The module does not support concurrent operators.

The module does not support concurrent operators.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
User	Role	Authenticated	AES-KW
Crypto Officer	Role	Non-authenticated	Implicit

Table 12: Roles

4.3 Approved Services

The module has an approved and non-approved mode of operation. The approved mode of operation is assumed automatically without any specific configuration. If the device starts up successfully then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the approved mode. Any calls to the non-approved security functions listed in the Non-Approved Services Table will cause the module to assume the non-approved mode of operation.

The module implements a dedicated API function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security function. The approved service indicator was observed to utilize one of two functions (`fips_allowed` and `fips_allowed_mode`) depending on the service in question. Calling `fips_allowed_mode` with AES-ECB, AES-CBC or AES-KW will returned a zero to indicate it was an approved algorithm. Similarly, calling `fips_allowed` with any other approved algorithm returned zero. Calling either of these with an algorithm not listed in the Approved Algorithms Table returned a non-zero value, and as such indicated a non-approved service.

The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation by authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer Roles. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation:

The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:

G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.

R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).

W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.

E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.

Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.

N/A = The service does not access any SSP during its operation

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
User Keybag Services via Mailbox	Step 1: The module receives User credential and the reference to the	Success returned from API	User credential, reference to	status (success/error)	Symmetric Encryption and Decrypt	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	class C or A key from the User keybag; Step 2. Obfuscation is performed on the User provided credential resulting into a value called REK.; Step 3. REK is used as a key for the AES KW operation to unwrap the referenced class A or C keys in the user keybag stored in the module; Step 4. Status of unwrapping operation of class keys is returned via mailbox interface and the REK is zeroized.	listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	class C/A key from the user keybag		ion Key Wrapping	AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): W,E - REK: W,E - Authentication Credential : W,E
General Authentication service	The module invokes the User Keybag Services via Mailbox (i.e. #1 above)	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	User credential, reference to class C/A key from the user keybag	status (success/error)	Key Wrapping	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): W,E - REK: W,E - Authentication

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Credential : W,E
Generation of Data Encryption Key (DEK)	Step 1: The module receives the reference to the class C or A key from the user keybag; Step 2: The module generates a new DEK using the DRBG; Step 3: Referenced class C or A key is used to wrap the DEK using AES-KW; Step 4: Wrapped DEK is sent out of the module	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	reference to class C/A key from the User keybag	wrapped DEK	Key Wrapping Random Number Generation Symmetric Key Generation	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): W,E - Entropy input string: W,E - DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material: W,E - Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key): G,W,E
Keychain DEK service using AK/AKU/AKPU/CK/CKU class key	Step 1. The module receives wrapped DEK (that was sent as part of service 3 above) and the pointer to class key AK/AKU/AKPU/CK/CKU from the	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary	pointer to AK/AKU/AKPU/CK/CKU class key,	unwrapped DEK	Key Wrapping	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	user keybag; Step 2. Using the referenced class key, the module unwraps the DEK using AES-KW. If the class key is not available, an error is returned; Step 3. plaintext DEK is sent out to the User.	any guidance document	wrapped DEK			Keybag (AES keys): W,E - Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key): R,E
Backup keybag generation	The module generates new set of back up keybags using the DRBG	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	N/A	status (success/error)	Random Number Generation Symmetric Key Generation	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup Keybag (AES keys): G,E - Entropy input string: W,E - DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material: W,E
Backup keybag service	Step 1. The module receives wrapped DEK and the class key reference for C and A from the user keybag; 2.	Success returned from API listed in the	wrapped DEK, reference to class C or A key	wrapped DEK	Key Wrapping	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK,

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	Using the referenced class key, the module unwraps the DEK using AES-KW. If the class key is not available, an error is returned; 3. The module generates a set of back up keybag using DRBG; 4. Unwrapped DEK is re-wrapped with back up keybag using AES-KW; 5. Wrapped DEK is sent out.	custom proprietary guidance document	from the user keybag			Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): W,E - Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key): W,E - Entropy input string: W,E - DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material: W,E - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup Keybag (AES keys): G,W,E
Escrow keybag creation	The module generates new set of escrow keybag using the DRBG	Success returned from API listed in the custom	N/A	status (success/error)	Random Number Generation Symmetric Key	User - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
		er proprietary guidance document			Generation	CKU in Escrow Keybag (AES keys): G,E - Entropy input string: W,E - DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material: W,E
Export Keybag	Step 1. The module receives reference to a keybag; Step 2: A HMAC key is taken as input based on the hardware specific data for the SKS; Step 3: HMAC value is calculated on the entire referenced keybag that includes encrypted keys; Step 4: HMAC is appended at the end of the keybag; Step 5: keybag with the appended HMAC is output to the User	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	reference to a keybag to be exported	keybag with HMAC tag	Keyed Hash Message Digest	User - HMAC key: W,E - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): R,E - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup Keybag (AES keys): R,E - Class A,

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Escrow Keybag (AES keys): R,E
Device Wipe	Erase all content (Factory Reset)	Success returned from API listed in the customer proprietary guidance document	N/A	N/A	None	Crypto Officer - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys): Z - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup Keybag (AES keys): Z - Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Escrow

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Keybag (AES keys): Z - Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key): Z - Entropy input string: Z - DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material: Z - HMAC key: Z - Authentication Credential: Z - REK: Z
Perform self test	Initiate pre-operational self-test and CASTs by powering off/on	N/A	module power-off/on	results of self-test	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Key Wrapping Random Number Generation Keyed Hash Message	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					e Digest	
Show Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	status	None	Crypto Officer
Show Module Version Information	N/A	N/A	N/A	Module name and version	None	Crypto Officer

Table 13: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
Class D key File System Services to wrap or unwrap DEK	Wrapping of provided plaintext DEK or unwrapping of provided wrapped DEK using class D key from Backup keybag or Flash in SEP	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Class D key service to encrypt or decrypt data	Encryption of provided plaintext or decryption of provided ciphertext using class D key from Device or iCloud Keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Class DK/DKU File System Services to wrap or unwrap keychain	Wrapping of provided plaintext keychain or unwrapping of provided wrapped keychain using class DK/DKU key from Backup keybag or User keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Class DK/DKU key service for data encrypt or decrypt	Encryption of provided plaintext or decryption of provided ciphertext using DK/DKU key from Device or iCloud keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Generate Ref-Key	Key Generation	ECDSA implemented in FW ECDSA implemented in HW PKA	Crypto Officer
Sign and verify using Ref-key	Signature Generation and Verification	ECDSA implemented in FW	Crypto Officer
Encryption and decryption using Ref-key	shared secret is generated using user provided key and existing ref key followed by HKDF is applied to derived a key which is used to encrypt the provided plaintext or decrypt the provided ciphertext	Curve 25519 shared secret generation ECDH Shared Secret Computation	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
		AES-GCM HKDF RFC5869 AES KW	
Generate Shared Secret using Ref-key	Shared secret generation	ECDH implemented in FW ECDH implemented in HW PKA	Crypto Officer
Device Keybag service for data encrypt or decrypt	Encryption of provided plaintext or decryption of provided ciphertext using any key from Device Keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
iCloud Keybag service for data encrypt or decrypt	Encryption of provided plaintext or decryption of provided ciphertext using any key from iCloud Keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Escrow keybag service for key wrapping and unwrapping	Wrapping of provided plaintext key or unwrapping of provided wrapped key using any key from Escrow Keybag	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Encrypt or Decrypt service using Class B Curve 22519 key from any keybag	shared secret is computed by generating new ephemeral keypair and existing Curve25519 key followed by HKDF is applied to derived a key which is used doe data encryption or decryption. During encryption operations, the wrapped key and the ephemeral public key is sent to the user	Curve 25519 key generation Curve 25519 shared secret generation HKDF RFC5869 AES KW	Crypto Officer
Wrap or unwrap service for DEK or keychain using any Curve 22519 key from asymmetric keybag	shared secret is computed by generating new ephemeral keypair and existing Curve25519 key followed by HKDF is applied to derived a key which is used to wrap and unwrap DEK or keychain. During wrapping operation, the wrapped key and the ephemeral public key is sent to the user	Curve 25519 key generation Curve 25519 shared secret generation HKDF RFC5869 AES KW	Crypto Officer
Wrap or unwrap service for keychain using DK/DKU/CK/CKU/AK/AKU/AKPU Ed25519 key from asymmetric keybag	Pointer to DK/DKU/CK/CKU/AK/AKU/AKPU key from asymmetric keybag, plaintext keychain during wrapping operation or wrapped keychain during unwrapping operation	Ed25519 Key generation HKDF RFC5869 AES KW	Crypto Officer
Asymmetric (Ed25519) backup keybag wrap and unwrap	shared secret is computed by generating new ephemeral keypair and existing Curve25519 key followed by HKDF is applied to derived a key which is used to wrap and unwrap. The wrapped key and	Ed25519 Key generation HKDF RFC5869 AES KW	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
	the ephemeral public key is sent to the user		
NVM Storage Controller Key Service	wrapping DEK using NVM storage controller key	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) Encryption	Encryption	ECDH Key Pair Generation ANSI X9.63 KDF AES-GCM	Crypto Officer
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) Decryption	Decryption	ECDH Key Pair Generation ANSI X9.63 KDF AES-GCM	Crypto Officer
PBKDF Key Derivation	Hash-based Key Derivation	PBKDF	Crypto Officer
File system DEK service	Unwrap the DEK using referenced class key and re-wrap using NVM storage controller key	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Generation of DEK via IPC using class D key	Requesting generate DEK service via IPC Channel using class D keys	AES KW	Crypto Officer
Requesting backup keybag service via IPC using class D key	Requesting backup keybag service via IPC Channel using class D keys	AES KW	Crypto Officer

Table 14: Non-Approved Services

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

N/A

5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

A firmware integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as the approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e. the module is not operational.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

The module's integrity test can be performed on demand by powering-off and reloading the module. The integrity test on demand is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests, automatically executed at power-on.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions

The module operates within the sepOS execution environment which is separate from the Device OS execution environment. The SEP operating system provides memory isolation between all applications executing on it. The Device OS is unable to access the module's memory or observe the module's operation.

7 Physical Security

The defined physical boundary of the Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2/PHY3] is the entire System-on-Chip (SoC) listed in the Tested Module Identification – Hardware table. Consequently, the physical embodiment of each SoC is considered to be that of a single-chip cryptographic module.

The hardware module conforms to the Level 3 requirements for physical security. The physical components that comprise the module are of production grade components with industry standard passivation applied. The module is covered with tamper-evident coating that deter direct observation, probing, or manipulation of the single-chip as detailed in the Physical Security Mechanisms and Actions Required table. The hardness of the coated material was tested in the module's intended temperature range of operation (Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges Table). The module correctly implements the Environmental Failure Protection (EFP) features as detailed in the EFP/EFT Information Table.

7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

Mechanism	Inspection Frequency	Inspection Guidance
Production Grade Components that include standard passivation	No operator-performed testing is recommended	N/A
Tamper-Evident Coating or black hard coated material or metal coating, SoC is soldered in logic board from the Ball Grid Array (BGA) or SIP is embedded in hardened resin. The components listed above are opaque within the visible spectrum.	No operator-performed testing is recommended	N/A

Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required

7.2 EFP/EFT Information

Temp/Voltage Type	Temperature or Voltage	EFP or EFT	Result
LowTemperature	Values found in Apple proprietary document	EFP	Shutdown
HighTemperature	Values found in Apple proprietary document	EFP	Shutdown
LowVoltage	Values found in Apple proprietary document	EFP	Shutdown
HighVoltage	Values found in Apple proprietary document	EFP	Shutdown

Table 16: EFP/EFT Information

7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges

Temperature Type	Temperature
LowTemperature	-50 C
HighTemperature	+120 C

Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures

8 Non-Invasive Security

8.1 Mitigation Techniques

Per IG 12.A, until the requirements of NIST SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms fall under ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks.

The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
Flash	Preloaded at factory	Static
RAM	Volatile memory	Dynamic

Table 18: Storage Areas

During runtime operation, the Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2/PHY3] module stores keys/SSPs in volatile memory, except for the user keybag that is stored in Flash. The module protects all keys/SSPs through the memory separation and protection mechanisms provided by the operating system while the Flash component only provides exclusive access to the module. No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its process memory or Flash component.

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Mailbox Input	User	RAM	Plaintext	N/A	N/A	
Export DEK	RAM	User	Plaintext	N/A	N/A	
Export Key or Keybag from Flash	Flash	User	Encrypted	N/A	N/A	Key Wrapping
Export Key or Keybag from RAM	RAM	User	Encrypted	N/A	N/A	Key Wrapping

Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods

Per the definition in IG 2.3.B, "*Transferring SSPs including the entropy input between a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem and an intervening functional subsystem for Security Levels 1 and 2 on the same single chip is considered as not having Sensitive Security Parameter Establishment crossing the HMI*". As such, the import or export Keys/SSP as defined in Table 1 of IG 9.5.A do not apply.

Within the TOEPP, keys and SSPs can either be entered, or output from the Apple Secure Key Store Cryptographic Module to/from intervening functional subsystems in plaintext .

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Keys and SSPs (including temporary SSPs) are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed by overwriting the entire context object with all zeros. The zeroization occurs at the end of an API function that uses the CSPs or when the system is powered down or when the "Device Wipe" service is invoked. Data output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed.

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Context object destruction	SSPs are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed. The module provides an implicit indication that the zeroisation has successfully completed by returning access to the User.	Zeroization when structure is deallocated	Operator can initiate context object destruction
Power Down	SSPs are zeroised when the system is powered down. The module provides an implicit indication that the zeroisation has successfully completed by returning access to the User.	Powering down forces context object destruction	Operator can initiate a power down
Device Wipe	Erase all content (factory reset). The module provides an implicit indication that the zeroisation has successfully completed by returning access to the User. This performs end of life of the device.	Factory reset zeroizes all SSPs, including those stored in Flash	Operator can initiate a device wipe

Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods

Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroization is performed. Zeroization is immediate and uninterruptible, preventing the retrieval and reuse of the zeroized values. The module provides an implicit indication that the zeroization has successfully completed by returning access to the User, ready to service the next request.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys)	AES keys in user keybag	256-bits - 256-bits	Symmetric - CSP			Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Key Wrapping
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup	AES keys in backup keybag	256-bits - 256-bits	Symmetric - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation		Key Wrapping

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Keybag (AES keys)						
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Escrow Keybag (AES keys)	AES keys in escrow keybag	256-bits - 256-bits	Symmetric - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation		Key Wrapping
Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key)	AES keys in user keybag	256-bits - 256-bits	Symmetric - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation		Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
Entropy input string	Entropy input string	256-bits - 256-bits	Entropy - CSP			Random Number Generation
DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material	Internal state values associated with CTR_DRBG	256-bits - 256-bits	DRBG - CSP	Random Number Generation		Random Number Generation
HMAC key	HMAC key	112-bits - 112-bits	Message Authentication Key - CSP			Keyed Hash
Authentication Credential	User-provided credentials	N/A - N/A	User-generated - CSP			Key Wrapping
REK	Root Encryption Key	256-bits - 256-bits	Symmetric - CSP			Key Wrapping

Table 21: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU,	Export Key or Keyba	Flash:Encrypted	From factory install to	Device Wipe	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Class CK, Class CKU in User Keybag (AES keys)	g from Flash		device-wipe		
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Backup Keybag (AES keys)	Export Key or Keybag from RAM	RAM:Encrypted	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	
Class A, Class C, Class AK, Class AKU, Class CK, Class CKU in Escrow Keybag (AES keys)	Export Key or Keybag from RAM	RAM:Encrypted	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	
Data Encryption Key (DEK) (AES key)	Export DEK Export Key or Keybag from RAM	RAM:Obfuscated	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material:Derived From
Entropy input string		RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material:Used With
DRBG internal state: V value, key, and seed material		RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	Entropy input string:Derived From
HMAC key	Mailbox Input	RAM:Encrypted	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Authentication Credential	Mailbox Input	RAM:Obfuscated	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	REK:Derives
REK	Mailbox Input	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Context object destruction Power Down	Authentication Credential:Obfuscation from

Table 22: SSP Table 2

9.5 Transitions

SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation. When used for digital signature verification, SHA-1 is allowed for legacy use. The use of SHA-1 is deprecated through December 31, 2030, for applying protection in non-digital signature applications and disallowed thereafter. The use of SHA-1 is acceptable for processing already-protected information through December 31, 2030, and allowed for legacy use thereafter.

10 Self-Tests

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs a pre-operational firmware integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A firmware integrity test is performed on the firmware component of the module. The module's HMAC-SHA256 is used as an approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) KAT is performed on the HMAC algorithm.

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6557)	112-bit key	Message Authentication	SW/FW Integrity	If the test fails, then the module enters an Error State.	The HMAC value is pre-computed at build time and stored in the module. The HMAC value is recalculated during runtime and compared with the stored value.

Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
Counter DRBG	128-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Compliant with SP 800-90Ar1	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512/256 (A6560)	SHA2-512/256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC	128-bit key encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric operation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB	128-bit key decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric operation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-KW Wrap	wrap	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric operation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-KW Unwrap	unwrap	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric operation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ESV-RCT Startup	Startup test with 1024 8-bit samples	fault-detection test	CAST	successful seeding of SP 800-90A DRBG	SP 800-90B 4.4.1 Repetition Count Test	upon seeding or reseeding SP 800-90A DRBG
ESV-RCT Continuous	Continuous test; Cutoff value = 31	fault-detection test	CAST	successful seeding of SP 800-90A DRBG	SP 800-90B 4.4.1 Repetition Count Test	upon seeding or reseeding SP 800-90A DRBG
ESV-APT Startup	Startup test with 1024 8-bit samples	fault-detection test	CAST	successful seeding of SP 800-90A DRBG	SP 800-90B 4.4.2 Adaptive Proportion Test	upon seeding or reseeding SP 800-90A DRBG
ESV-APT Continuous	Continuous test; Cutoff value = 325	fault-detection test	CAST	successful seeding of SP 800-90A DRBG	SP 800-90B 4.4.2 Adaptive Proportion Test	upon seeding or reseeding SP 800-90A DRBG

Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6557)	Message Authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Whenever module is powered on	Upon every power-on

Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
Counter DRBG	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512/256 (A6560)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-CBC	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-ECB	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-KW Wrap	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-KW Unwrap	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
ESV-RCT Startup	fault-detection test	CAST	On demand	Manually
ESV-RCT Continuous	fault-detection test	CAST	On demand	Manually
ESV-APT Startup	fault-detection test	CAST	On demand	Manually
ESV-APT Continuous	fault-detection test	CAST	On demand	Manually

Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error state	No cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited	Integrity test failure; CAST failure; The SP 800-90B continuous health test or startup health test failure	Power off/on	for Integrity: print statement "FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity" to stdout; for CAST: sprint statement "FAILED:<event>" to stdout (<event> refers to any of the cryptographic functions listed in the Conditional Self-test Table) for ESV health tests: RCT returns repcnt_fail while APT returns aprop_fail

Table 27: Error States

10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by reloading the module.

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Startup Procedures: As the module is delivered built with the Device OS, there is no standalone delivery of the module.

Installation Process and Authentication Mechanisms: The vendor's internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into Host Device OS.

This digital signature-based integrity protection used during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self- tests.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The biometric authentication option provided by the underlying test platform shall be disabled in order to run the module in the FIPS validated manner.

The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

The module maintains separate contexts for each cryptographic operation, and there can be no CSPs used in the Non-Approved Mode of operation.

The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for physical entropy source is:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-validations/certificate/113>

Apple Platform Certifications guide [platform certifications] and Apple Platform Security guide [SEC] are provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system's assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

The User role is authenticated with the mechanism described in [section 4](#). The User role can access the module via mailbox interface using the Device OS's XNU kernel. The User role can perform subset of services from Table - Approved Algorithms.

As stated in the Administrator Guidance section above, the Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services. This transition cannot be made by the User directly, as all non-approved services require an implicit transition into the Crypto-Officer role. Any calling of such services is therefore implicitly performed by the Crypto Officer.

11.4 End of Life

The Device Wipe service erases the module content. When performing a Device Wipe service to erase all content of the module, the procedure must be performed under the control of the Operator.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.