FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: AWS Key Management Service HSM
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
AWS Key Management Service HSM
(Hardware version 3.0, firmware version 1.7.100, 1.7.102 and 1.7.103)
Document Version 1.14
May 9th, 2023
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: AWS Key Management Service HSM
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 About FIPS 140...................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 About this Document............................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.3 External Resources................................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.4 Notices.................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.5 Acronyms.............................................................................................................................................................................. 5
2 AWS Key Management Service HSM ..........................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification...................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail....................................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................................. 9
2.1.3 Non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms........................................................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Module Interfaces............................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication..................................................................................................................................... 12
2.3.1 Strength of Authentication .............................................................................................................................................................. 12
2.3.2 Cryptographic Services and Descriptions......................................................................................................................................... 13
2.3.3 Configuration Services and Descriptions.......................................................................................................................................... 20
2.3.4 Audit Log Services and Descriptions ................................................................................................................................................ 28
2.3.5 Show Status..................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
2.3.6 Zeroization....................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
2.4 Physical Security.................................................................................................................................................................. 29
2.5 Operational Environment.................................................................................................................................................... 29
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management......................................................................................................................................... 30
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters............................................................................................................................................................. 30
2.6.2 Public Keys....................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
2.7 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................................................. 35
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................................................ 35
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................................................... 36
2.7.3 Critical Function Tests...................................................................................................................................................................... 36
2.7.4 On-Demand Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................................................... 36
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................................................ 36
3 Guidance and Secure Operation...............................................................................................................................................37
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance...................................................................................................................................................... 37
3.1.1 Module Inspection........................................................................................................................................................................... 37
3.1.2 Initial Configuration......................................................................................................................................................................... 37
3.2 User Guidance..................................................................................................................................................................... 37
3.2.1 General Guidance............................................................................................................................................................................ 37
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms...................................................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................................................................8
Table 3 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms and Certificate Numbers..................................................................................................................10
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation ........................................................................................10
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms..............................................................................................................11
Table 6 – Interface Descriptions ...............................................................................................................................................................11
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping..........................................................................................................................11
Table 8 – Roles and Authentication ..........................................................................................................................................................12
Table 9 - Cryptographic Services and Descriptions....................................................................................................................................20
Table 10 - Configuration Services and Descriptions ..................................................................................................................................28
Table 11 – Audit Log Services and Descriptions ........................................................................................................................................28
Table 12 - Status Services and Descriptions ..............................................................................................................................................28
Table 13 – Module Keys/CSPs...................................................................................................................................................................34
Table 14 – Public Keys...............................................................................................................................................................................35
Table 15 – Power-On Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................................................35
Table 16 – Conditional Self-Tests..............................................................................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary (Front)....................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - Cryptographic Module Boundary (Back) .....................................................................................................................................7
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-2 program. The National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program (NVLAP) accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-2 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting
FIPS 140-2 requirements. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-2
criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the AWS Key Management Service (KMS) Hardware
Security Module (HSM) from Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides an overview of the HSM and a high-level description
of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on the module’s cryptographic
keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the
module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
AWS Key Management Service HSM may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
The AWS Key Management Service HSM is used exclusively by AWS as a component of the AWS Key Management
Service (KMS). The module is not directly accessible to customers of KMS. The cryptographic functions of the module are
used to fulfill requests under specific public AWS KMS APIs.
1.3 External Resources
The AWS website (http://aws.amazon.com/kms/) contains information on AWS services that utilizes the module. The list
of public AWS KMS APIs is found on the AWS documentation website:
(http://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html).
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and AWS contact
information.
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1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
1.5 Acronyms
Table 1 defines acronyms found in this document:
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
AWS Amazon Web Services
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDK Customer Data Key
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMK Customer Master Key
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CRK Customer Replication Key
CSK Customer Supplied Key
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
DH Diffie-Hellman
DK Domain Key
DKEK Domain Key Encryption Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
EC Elliptic Curve
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ENT Entropy Source
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
HBK HSM Backing Key
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HOSK HSM-to-Operator Session Key
HSK HSM Signature Key Pair
HSKEK HSM Session Key Encryption Key
HSM Hardware Security Module
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IPMI Intelligent Platform Management Interface
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDA Key Derivation Algorithm
KDF Key Derivation Function
KMS Key Management Service
KTS Key Transport Scheme
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD Message Digest
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMI Non-Maskable Interrupt
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
QCDEK Customer Data Encryption Public Key
QOEAK Operator Ephemeral Agreement Public Key
QOS Operator Signature Public Key
RAK Replication Agreement Key
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
RSK Replication Signing Key
RWK Replication Wrapping Key
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms
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2 AWS Key Management Service HSM
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
AWS customers can use the AWS Key Management Service to generate and manage cryptographic keys and operate as a
cryptographic service provider for protecting data within AWS. The AWS Key Management Service HSM provides
dedicated cryptographic functions for the AWS Key Management Service.
The module runs firmware versions 1.7.100, 1.7.102 and/or 1.7.103 on hardware version 3.0 and is classified as a multi-
chip standalone cryptographic module. The physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the module case, and the
module runs on a non-modifiable operating environment.
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary (Front)
Figure 2 - Cryptographic Module Boundary (Back)
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2.1.1 Validation Level Detail
Table 2 lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
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2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP). Although additional modes and key lengths were included in the
CAVP algorithm testing, the table below represents the actual modes and key lengths used by the services of the
module.
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key
Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
AWS Key Management Service Cryptographic Algorithm Library
A1908 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-
38A
ECB, CBC, CTR 128, 256 Encryption, Decryption
A1908 GCM/GMAC1
SP 800- AES 128, 256 Generation, Authentication,
38D Encryption, Decryption
A1908 KTS SP800-
38F IG
D.9
AES
KWP
AES
GCM
256 Key Transport using AES KWP, Key
Transport using
AES GCM
A1908 DRBG SP 800-
90A
CTR DRBG 256 Random Bit Generation
A1908 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SigGen P-256, P-384, P- Signature Generation Component,
SigGen Component 521 Signature Verification Component,
KeyGen Key Pair Generation, Signature
SigVer Generation, Signature Verification,
SigVer Component
KeyVer
Public Key
Validation
A1908 HMAC FIPS 198-1 SHS 160, 224, 256,
384 and
512 bits
Generation, Authentication
A1908 RSA FIPS 186-4 PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS 2048, 3072 and
40962
bits
Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature Verification,
Component Test
A1908 SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512
-- Digital Signature Generation, Digital
Signature Verification, non- Digital
Signature Applications
A1908 CVL FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigGen Component P-256, P-384, P-
521
Signature Generation Component
RSA Signature Primitive - Component Test
1
The AES GCM IV is generated internally in the cryptographic module using the module's Approved NIST SP 800-90A DRBG and the IV length used
is at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D and IG A.5 Scenario 2).
2
RSA 4096 was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per IG A.14, because RSA SigGen / SigVer were tested in accordance with
FIPS 186-4 for the 2048 and 3072 bit modulus sizes, and testing for modulus sizes higher than 3072 is not available under CAVS.
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CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli Use
AWS Key Management Service Cryptographic Algorithm Library
A1908 KTS SP 800-56B [SP 800-56B]
RSA-OAEP with, and without key
confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072, and 4096
bits
Hybrid Key-Transport scheme
incorporating KTS-OAEP and SP
800-38F
Key Sizes: 2048,
3072 and 4096
bits
Key Transport,
Optional RSA encapsulation
schemes for protecting keys
that customers import into
AWS KMS.
A1908 KAS SP 800-56A [SP 800-56Arev3]
(Cofactor) Ephemeral Unified and
(Cofactor) One-Pass Diffie-Hellman
schemes without key confirmation
ECDH Curve:
P384
Key Agreement
A1908 KDA SP 800-56C One-step key derivation
SHA-256, SHA-384
256 bits, 384
bits
Key Derivation
AWS Key Management Service Key Derivation Function Library
A1910 KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions
SP 800-108 Counter Mode
HMAC-based KDF with SHA-256
256 bits Key Derivation
Intel DRNG
N/A ENT (P) SP 800-90B Entropy source compliant with SP
800-90B, IG 7.14 Scenario 1A, IG
7.18 and 7.19
384 bits Provides seeding material
for the DRBG
A1791 Conditioning
Components
SP 800-90B AES-ECB
AES-CBC-MAC
Counter DRBG
128 bits Provides seeding material
for the DRBG
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms and Certificate Numbers
The following Approved cryptographic algorithms were tested with vendor affirmation.
Algorithm IG Reference Use
CKG Vendor Affirmed IG
D.12
[SP 800-133rev2, Section 5]
Seeding for asymmetric key generation uses unmodified DRBG output
[SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.1]
Symmetric key generation uses unmodified DRBG output
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
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2.1.3 Non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in the Approved
mode of operation.
Algorithm Use
RSA Key Transport with PKCS #1
v1.5
[IG D.9]
Optional RSA encapsulation scheme for protecting keys that customers import into AWS
KMS.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits (key wrapping; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
ECDSA secp256k1 [IG A.2]
Curves: secp256k1; ECDSA (signature generation and verification; provides 128 bits of
security strength)
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
2.2 Module Interfaces
Table 6 describes the main interfaces of the module:
Physical Interface Description / Use
25 Gigabit Ethernet Port Main session interface for cryptographic services
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port Provides power on / off, and query status
Power Interface Accept and provide power to the module
Table 6 – Interface Descriptions
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by
the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status
output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are provided in the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Module Physical Interface
Data Input 25 Gigabit Ethernet Port
Data Output 25 Gigabit Ethernet Port
Control Input 25 Gigabit Ethernet Port
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port
Status Output 25 Gigabit Ethernet Port
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port
Power Power Interface
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
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2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
Operators of the module may assume the following three roles:
Roles Description Authentication
KMS Front End Role
(KMS-FE)
The KMS front end hosts perform actions on behalf of customers of
AWS KMS.
RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
KMS Coordinator
Role (KMS-C)
Non-public facing KMS hosts perform actions on behalf of KMS
administrators in the Administrator Role.
RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
Administrator Role
(Admin)
Employees of AWS who are authorized to manage the module. RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
Table 8 – Roles and Authentication
For FIPS purposes, the KMS Coordinator and Administrator roles serve as the Cryptographic Officer role per FIPS 140-2
requirements. The KMS-Front End role serves as the User role per FIPS 140-2 requirements.
The module supports identity-based authentication, and the respective services for each role are described in the
following sections. The module does not support a Maintenance role.
Services supported by the module may also be referred to as APIs in this document.
The module supports authentication using RSA with 2048 and 4096 bit keys, and ECDSA with P-384. Operators of the
module are identified by unique Operator Signature Public Key (QOS). The list of operator keys and the role of each
operator are configured using either the Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain service. Operators interact with the
module by submitting digitally-signed commands to the module. The module authenticates operators by verifying the
digitally-signed commands submitted to the module.
The list of services supported by the module are listed in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. Unless otherwise specified,
access to services can be configured to require one or more members of one or more roles listed in Table 8. These
services are used only by components of KMS to fulfill requests under specific public AWS KMS APIs and cannot be used
directly by KMS customers. See http://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html for a list of the
current public AWS KMS APIs.
All unauthenticated services listed do not affect the security of the information protected by the module and are
allowed per IG 3.1.
2.3.1 Strength of Authentication
Authentication to the module requires RSA (2048- or 4096-bit) or ECDSA (P-384) signature verification. These
authentication methods are cryptographically strong and provide between 112 to 192 bits of security. The possibility of
a single random authentication attempt succeeding is 2-112
which is far less than the required minimum of less than
1/1,000,000.
The possibility of a random authentication succeeding within a one-minute period is 2-80
which is significantly less than
1/100,000. The cryptographic strengths of the digital signatures used for authentication create such difficulty in
achieving a successful random authentication attempt that even the theoretical maximum bandwidth of the 25
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Gb/second Ethernet port, assuming a rate of 232
attempts per minute, is not significant enough to allow a random
attempt to succeed within a one-minute period.
2.3.2 Cryptographic Services and Descriptions
For all cryptographic services in this section, all key/CSP input and output are encrypted using the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) using 256-bit AES GCM. The use of the HOSK provides transport security between the HSM and other
KMS Operators (as defined in Section 2.3 above).
HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Create KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generates and encrypts either an HSM Backing Key (HBK) or an Import Wrapping Key
(IWK) private key.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: The Create API returns either:
• A HSM Backing Key encrypted with the active Domain Key (DKn), or
• An Import Wrapping Key (IWK) key pair:
a. The IWK private key is encrypted with the active Domain Key (DKn).
b. The IWK public key.
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Backing Key
• IWK public and private keys
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active Domain Key (DKn)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Create API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
ImportKey KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts a Customer Supplied Key (CSK) and re-encrypts it with the active Domain Key
(DKn)
Key/CSP Input:
• The private key of an Import Wrapping Key Pair (IWK) encrypted with the active or
a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Customer Supplied Key (CSK), encrypted with the public key of the Import
Wrapping Key. This may use the wrapping methods as defined in SP 800-56B, using
the ephemeral Import Wrapping Envelope Key (IWEK).
Key/CSP Output: The Customer Supplied Key, encrypted with the current active domain
key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1) used to encrypt the IWK
private key
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The ImportKey API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
RefreshKey KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Re-encrypts an HSM Backing Key (HBK) key or Customer Supplied Key (CSK) encrypted
with a recent iteration of the domain key (DKn-1) with the active domain key (DKn).
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with a recent iteration of a Domain Key (DKn-1)
Key/CSP Output: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The RefreshKey API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Encrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Encrypt an arbitrary set of bytes using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or CSK.
Key/CSP Input: A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of domain
key (DKn or DKn-1)
Key/CSP Output: N/A (encrypted ciphertext)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Additional Information: The Encrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Decrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts ciphertext using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or CSK. Optionally
encrypts the plaintext result using the provided QCDEK.
Key/CSP Input:
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with a Domain Key (DKn)
• Ciphertext or encrypted Customer Data Key (CDK)
• (optional) Customer Data Encryption Public Key (QCDEK)
Key/CSP Output:
• Arbitrary data or CDK encrypted using the HOSK
• (optional) Arbitrary data or CDK encrypted using the Customer Data Envelope Key
(CDEnK) and QCDEK if QCDEK is provided
Key/CSP Generated: (optional) Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) if QCDEK is
provided
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Decrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
ReEncrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts ciphertext using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or CSK, then re-
encrypts the resulting plaintext under the DEK from a separately provided HBK or CSK.
This operation does not expose the plaintext.
Key/CSP Input:
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of domain key
(DKn or DKn-1) used to decrypt the provided ciphertext
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of domain key
(DKn or DKn-1) used to encrypt the resulting plaintext
• Ciphertext or encrypted Customer Data Key (CDK)
Key/CSP Output: N/A (encrypted ciphertext)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Additional Information: The ReEncrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Sign KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Performs an ECDSA or RSA sign operation, or HMAC operation using the provided HBK
or CSK
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Sign API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Verify KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Performs an ECDSA or RSA verify, or HMAC operation using the provided HBK or CSK
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Verify API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
EncryptRand
omBytes
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a number of random bytes and encrypt it using the DEK derived from the
specified HBK or CSK. The random bytes may be used as cryptographic key material as
Customer Data Keys (CDK).
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output: A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys
(CDK) encrypted by the HBK or CSK.
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The EncryptRandomBytes API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
GenerateAnd
EncryptRand
omBytes
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a number of random bytes for use and encrypt it using the DEK derived from
the specified HBK or CSK. The random bytes may be used as cryptographic key material
as Customer Data Keys (CDK). Note that the GenerateAndEncryptRandomBytes API will
return encrypted versions of the random bytes in 3 forms.
Key/CSP Input:
• HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
• Customer Data Encryption Public Key (QCDEK)
Key/CSP Output:
• A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys (CDK)
encrypted by the HOSK
• A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys (CDK)
encrypted by the HBK or CSK.
• A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys (CDK)
encrypted using the Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) and QCDEK
Key/CSP Generated: Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GenerateAndEncryptRandomBytes API validates the HSM-
to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
GenerateDat
aKeyPair
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate an asymmetric key pair and encrypt it with the specified HBK or CSK. The
asymmetric key pair will be used as cryptographic key material as Customer Data Keys
(CDK). Note that the GenerateDataKeyPair API will return encrypted versions of the CDK
in 3 forms.
Key/CSP Input:
• HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
• (optional) Customer Data Encryption Public Key (QCDEK)
Key/CSP Output:
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HOSK
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HBK or CSK
• (optional) An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted using the
Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) and QCDEK
Key/CSP Generated: (optional) Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) if QCDEK is
provided
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GenerateDataKeyPair API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
GenerateDat
aKeyPairWith
outPlaintext
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate an asymmetric key pair and encrypt it with the specified HBK or CSK. The
asymmetric key pair will be used as cryptographic key material as Customer Data Keys
(CDK).
Key/CSP Input:
• HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output:
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HBK or
CSK
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutPlaintext API validates the
HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
Generate KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a specified number of random bytes, up to 1024 bytes. The random bytes can
be optionally encrypted with the Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) and Customer
Data Encryption Public Key (QCDEK).
Key/CSP Input: (optional) Customer Data Encryption Public Key (QCDEK)
Key/CSP Output: None (random bytes optionally encrypted using CDEnK and QCDEK)
Key/CSP Generated: (optional) Customer Data Envelope Key (CDEnK) if QCDEK is
provided
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Generate API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The HOSK is
also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
GetParamete
rsForReplicat
ion
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API generates a new Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK1, QRAK1). The Private
Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) is encrypted with the domain key (DKn).
Key/CSP Input: None
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Key/CSP Output:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1)
• Private Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) encrypted by the active domain key
(DKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK1, QRAK1)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of a Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or dRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The GetParametersForReplication API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
The API also signs all output with the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or dRSKn-1).
WrapKeyFor
Replication
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API takes an input a public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1) generated from an
HSM, and generates a new Replication Agreement Key pair (dRAK2, QRAK2). QRAK1 and
dRAK2 are combined using the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange to produce a shared secret
and derive a symmetric secret key (the Replication Wrapping Key, RWK). The RWK is
then used to encrypt an HBK, resulting in a Customer Replicated Key (CRK).
Key/CSP Input:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1)
• HBK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK2, QRAK2)
Key/CSP Output:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK2)
• Customer Replicated Key (CRK) encrypted by the Replication Wrapping Key (RWK)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or dRSKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Public Replication Singing Key (QRSKn or QRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The WrapKeyForReplication API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
The API also verifies input using the Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn or QRSKn-1),
and signs all output with the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or dRSKn-1).
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
ImportReplic
atedKey
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API combines two Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1 and QRAK2) using the Diffie-
Hellmann key exchange to produce a shared secret and derive a Replication Wrapping
Key (RWK). The RWK is used to decrypt the Customer Replicated Key (CRK), obtaining an
HBK, which is then re-encrypted using the Domain Key (DKn).
Key/CSP Input:
• Private Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) encrypted by the active domain key
(DKn)
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK2)
• Customer Supplied Key (CSK) encrypted by the Replication Wrapping Key (RWK)
Key/CSP Output:
• HBK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Public Replication Singing Key (QRSKn or QRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The ImportReplicatedKey API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
The API also validates input using the Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn or QRSKn-1).
Table 9 - Cryptographic Services and Descriptions
2.3.3 Configuration Services and Descriptions
HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
CreateDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Creates a new domain token for a new domain, but does not join the HSM to the
domain yet.
Key/CSP Input:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Replication Signing Key (dRSK0, QRSK0)
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
• Encrypted Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSK0)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSK0)
Key/CSP Read Access: None
IngestDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Joins a domain or receive an updated domain token.
Key/CSP Input: A Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Generated: None
Key/CSP Output: The unmodified input Domain Token
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Signature Public Key (QHSK) of a known member of the domain
• HSM Agreement Private Key (dHAK)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Write Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Additional Information: When using the IngestDomain API to set up the first domain
member, the operator(s) must meet the quorum configuration in the to-be-ingested
domain. When using the IngestDomain API to ingest subsequent domains, the
operator(s) must meet the quorum configuration in both the first domain, and in the to-
be-ingested domain.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
ForgetDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Deletes domain information as it pertains to a particular domain on the module
including all Domain Keys (DKn, DKn-1), effectively leaving the domain.
Key/CSP Input: A Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Output: The unmodified input Domain Token
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP De-Referenced:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
GetDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Retrieves the current version of the domain token for a specified domain.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
ChangeDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Modifies the current state of an operational domain.
Key/CSP Input:
• A Domain Token containing:
o List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
o List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
o List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the
domain
o Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
o Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
o Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
o Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) and HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of
the domain members to be added (optional)
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS) (optional)
• List of Public Replication Signing Keys (QRSKm, …, QRSKn) (optional)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Domain Key Encrypting Key (DKEK)
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key (dE, QE)
Key/CSP Output: An updated Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access: Domain Key (DKn), HSM Agreement Key (HAK), HSM Signature
Key (HSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Initialize All /
unauthenticated
Initializes the HSM by generating the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key and
configuring the HSM’s operator and access control using a domain token from another
HSM.
The Initialize API is only used during the module setup and initialization process. If the
HSM is already initialized by a call to either the Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain
API, the Initialize API will return an error as the HSM cannot be Initialized again without
a reboot.
Key/CSP Input: One or more Domain Tokens. Each Domain Token contains:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Additional Information: The Initialize API is unauthenticated. Initialize will fail if the
HSM is already initialized by a call to either the Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain
API.
InitializeAndCre
ateDomain
All /
unauthenticated
Initializes the HSM by generating the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key,
configuring the list of operators, roles and the quorum-based access control ruleset for
all services / APIs.
The InitializeAndCreateDomain API is only used during the module setup and
initialization process. If the HSM is already initialized by a call to either the Initialize or
InitializeAndCreateDomain API, the InitializeAndCreateDomain API will return an error
as the HSM cannot be Initialized again without a reboot.
Key/CSP Input:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• Initial Domain Key (DK0)
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Additional Information: The InitializeAndCreateDomain API is unauthenticated. The
InitializeAndCreateDomain API will fail if the HSM is already initialized by a call to either
the Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain API.
Attest KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The Attest API is used by operators to attest an initialized HSM to ensure that the
system is running the correct software, and to obtain an authentic copy of its
credentials prior to being added to a domain.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output:
• HSM Signature Public Key (QHSK)
• HSM Agreement Public Key (QHAK)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (dHSK, QHSK)
• Host Agreement Public Key (QHAK)
• Operator Signature Public Key(s) (QOS)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: If an optional attestation challenge is included in the request,
the Attest API requires the use of the HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to encrypt
all input and output parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
GetAttestationC
hallenge
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The GetAttestationChallenge API is used by operators to retrieve a token that can be
used to validate the identity of another HSM.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None.
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GetAttestationChallenge API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
GetAttestationI
dentity
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The GetAttestationIdentity API is used by operators to retrieve information to attest the
identity of the HSM.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GetAttestationIdentity API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Wipe All /
unauthenticated
The Wipe API will delete the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key from volatile
memory. The Wipe API will fail unless all previously created domains in the module
have been deleted using the ForgetDomain API.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP De-Referenced:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
GetInitialDomai
nName
All /
unauthenticated
Retrieves the initial domain name from an initialized HSM that is used as part of the
domain creation bootstrap process.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: No access to Keys/CSPs.
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
DeactivateAndR
eboot
(This service
also performs
theself-tests to
run after the
module is
rebooted)
All /
unauthenticated
The DeactivateAndReboot API returns the HSM to the factory state and reboots after
verifying the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key have been deleted by the
Wipe API.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: No access to Keys/CSPs.
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
NegotiateSessio
nKey
One member from
any role
Uses a set of identity keys to securely negotiate a session key that can be used between
a KMS host and any HSM in the domain. The NegotiateSessionKey API will return
encrypted versions of the HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) in 2 forms.
Key/CSP Input:
• Operator Ephemeral Agreement Public Key (QOEAK)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key Pair (dE, QE)
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Key/CSP Output:
• Encrypted HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) encrypted with the Domain Key (DK)
or HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) encrypted with a 256 bit key derived from the
shared secret established using elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange (NIST-
P384) using the HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key (QE) and the Operator Ephemeral
Agreement Public Key (QOEAK).
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Public Key (QE)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
• HSM Signature Key (dHSK)
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
UpdateHostCon
figuration
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Allows updates of non-security-relevant host configuration.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
Table 10 - Configuration Services and Descriptions
2.3.4 Audit Log Services and Descriptions
Service (API) Role Description
ListLogs KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Returns a list of audit log file names.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
GetLog KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Retrieves specified audit log files
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
DeleteLog KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Deletes specified audit log file
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
Table 11 – Audit Log Services and Descriptions
2.3.5 Show Status
The module supports the following APIs to return status information.
Status Service
(API)
Description
Ping Returns “healthy” if the module is initialized and has ingested a domain
Returns “failure” otherwise
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
Fips Returns “healthy” if the module is operating in FIPS mode
Returns “failure” if the module is not operating in FIPS mode
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
Table 12 - Status Services and Descriptions
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In addition, an operator with access to the serial console can obtain hardware status information such as temperature,
fan speed, etc.
2.3.6 Zeroization
Zeroization is accomplished by powering off the module.
2.4 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone module and conforms to Level 3 requirements for physical security. The
module’s production-grade enclosure is made of a hard metal with no removable cover. Attempts at removal or
penetration of the enclosure will have a high probability of causing serious damage to the module (i.e. the module will
not function). The baffles installed by AWS satisfy FIPS 140-2 requirements for module opacity.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment.
The module meets Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) requirements for home use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B.
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2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters
Table 13 provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module. All keys and CSPs are zeroized
by powering off the module.
Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
HSM
Backing
Key (HBK)
HSM Backing Keys (HBK) can be
of two different forms –
symmetric or asymmetric keys.
The first form is a 256-bit
master key, from which
specific-use keys may be
derived using the SP800-108
CTR key derivation function.
The HBK or keys derived from
the HBK are used to encrypt
CDKs.
The second form is an
asymmetric private key.
The HBK maps to the Customer
Master Key construct exposed
in the public AWS KMS API.
AES GCM 256
bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or 4096
bits
ECDSA:
curves P-256,
P-384, P-521,
or secp256k1
Internally
usingDRBG, or
imported from
another
member of a
Domain
Input: Encrypted with the Domain
Key using AES GCM.
Output: Encrypted with the
Domain Key using AES GCM.
Volatile
memory
only
Customer
Data Key
(CDK)
Customer data keys are
exported by the
EncryptRandomBytes,
GenerateAndEncryptRandomB
ytes, GenerateDataKeyPair,
and
GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutP
laintext APIs.
Customer Data Keys (CDK) can
be of two different forms –
symmetric and asymmetric
keys.
The use of CDKs are unknown
to the module. The customer
may obtain the CDK by sending
the encrypted CDK to KMS to
decrypt under an
authenticated and authorized
request.
For
symmetric
keys, random
bits length
specified by
customer (in
the range of
8 bits to
65536 bits).
For RSA:
2048, 3072,
or 4096 bits
For ECDSA:
curves P-256,
P-384, P-521,
or secp256k1
Internally
using DRBG or
imported from
another
member of a
Domain
Input: Encrypted using AES GCM
with the DEK derived from an HBK
or CSK.
Output: Encrypted in 2 forms by
the
GenerateAndEncryptRandomBytes
and GenerateDataKeyPair APIs:
• Encrypted with the DEK
derived from an HBK or CSK;
and
• Encrypted with the HOSK to
provide secure transport to
the requesting service
operator/role.
EncryptRandomBytes and
GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutPlain
text APIs export the CDK
encrypted with the DEK from an
HBK or CSK.
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Data
Encryption
Key (DEK)
A DEK is a per-message key
derived from an HBK or CSK
using the SP 800-108 KDF in
counter mode using HMAC
with SHA256.
AES GCM 256
bits
Derived
internally
using SP 800-
108 CTR KDF
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Domain
Key (DK)
A Domain Key is shared among
all the members of a Domain
and is used to encrypt HBKs,
CSKs HOSKs
AES GCM 256
bits
Internally
usingDRBG, or
imported from
another
member of a
Domain
Input: DK encrypted with the DKEK
may be imported to other
members of a Domain
Output: DK encrypted with the
DKEK may be exported to other
members of a Domain
Volatile
memory
only
Domain
Key
Encryption
Key (DKEK)
A Domain Key Encryption Key is
generated on a Host and is
used for encrypting the current
set of domain keys when
sharing of the domain state
between HSM hosts.
AES GCM 256
bits
Internally
usingDRBG or
externally by
another
member of a
Domain
Input: The DKEK is encrypted with
the shared secret generated from
the HSM’s Key Agreement Key
(QHAK) and another HSM’s
Ephemeral Key Agreement Key
(dE).
Output: The DKEK is encrypted
with the shared secret generated
from the HSM’s Key Agreement
Key (dHAK) and another HSM’s
Ephemeral Key Agreement Key
(QE).
Volatile
memory
only
HSM
Agreement
Key Pair
(dHAK,
QHAK)
Every initialized HSM has a
locally generated Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman agreement key
pair used to encrypt/decrypt
DKEKs between HSMs.
Elliptic Curve
Diffie-
Hellman
agreement
key pair on
the curve
secp384r1
(NIST-P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QHAK) is
exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM
Ephemeral
Agreement
Key Pair
(dE, QE)
These keys are generated in
two cases: (i) to establish a
HSM-to-HSM encryption key to
transport DKEKs in domain
tokens; (ii) to establish HSM-to-
operator session keys to
protect sensitive HSM-operator
communications.
Elliptic curve
Diffie-
Hellman keys
on the curve
secp384r1
(NIST-P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QE) is
exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM
Session Key
Encryption
Key
(HSKEK)
Encrypts the HSM-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) for the
following operations: Initialize,
InitializeAndCreateDomain,
Attest, GetAttestationIdentity,
and Wipe.
AES GCM 256
bits
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
HSM
Signature
Key Pair
(dHSK,
QHSK)
Every initiated HSM has a
locally generated Elliptic Curve
Signature key pair used to sign
data created on the HSM.
Elliptic Curve
Signaturekey
pair on the
curve
secp384r1
(NIST-P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QHSK) is
exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM-
Operator
Session Key
(HOSK)
Operator services establish an
AES-256-GCM session key with
the HSM to protect
communication between
operator services and HSMs in
the same domain.
AES GCM 256
bits.
Internally
usingDRBG, or
imported from
an HSM that is
a member of
the same
domain
Input: The HOSK is encrypted with
the domain key (DK).
Output: The HOSK is encrypted in
two forms. The first form is
encrypted with either the domain
key (DK) or the HSM Session Key
Encryption Key (HSKEK) using AES
GCM. The second form is
encrypted using AES GCM with a
256 bit key derived from the
shared secret established using
elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key
exchange (NIST-P384) using the
HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key
(dE,QE) and the Operator
Ephemeral Agreement Public Key
(dOEAK, QOEAK).
Volatile
memory
only
Import
Wrapping
Key (dIWK,
QIWK)
The public key is used by
customers of KMS to wrap
their CSK for import via the
public AWS KMS API.
RSA 2048,
3072, and
4096 bits
Internally
using DRBG or
imported from
another
member of a
Domain
Input: The private key (dIWK) is
encrypted with the Domain Key
(DK) using AES-GCM.
Output: the private key (dIWK) is
encrypted with the Domain Key
(DK) using AES-GCM. The public
key (QIWK) is exported in
plaintext.
Volatile
memory
only
Import
Wrapping
Envelope
Key (IWEK)
Key generated by a customer
of KMS outside the AWS KMS
system.
Ephemeral key-wrapping-key
used to encrypt CSKs for the
ImportKey API when AES-KWP
is used per SP 800-56B.
AES KWP 256
bits
Externally by
AWS KMS
customers
Input: IWEK is encrypted using
Import Wrapping Key (QIWK)
when used with the ImportKey API
when the customer imports a CSK
into the AWS KMS system.
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Customer
Supplied
Key (CSK)
Key generated by a customer
of KMS outside the AWS KMS
system.
Customer Supplied Keys (CSK)
can be of two different forms –
symmetric and asymmetric
keys.
The first form is a 256-bit
master key, from which
specific-use DEKs may be
derived using the SP800-108
CTR key derivation function.
The CSK or DEKs derived from
the CSK are used to encrypt
CDKs.
The second form is an
asymmetric private key.
The CSK maps to the Customer
Master Key construct exposed
in the public AWS KMS API.
AES GCM:
256 bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or 4096
bits
ECDSA:
curves P-256,
P-384, P-521,
or
secp256k1.
Externally by
AWS KMS
customers
Input: CSK is encrypted using
Import Wrapping Key (QIWK) (and,
optionally, the ephemeral
ImportWrapping Envelope Key
(IWEK)) when used with the
ImportKey API when the customer
imports the key into the AWS KMS
system. After import, the CSK is
encrypted with the Domain Key
using AES GCM.
Output: CSK encrypted by a
Domain Key (DK).
Volatile
memory
only
DRBG (CTR
AES)
Entropy input (length
dependent on security
strength)
SP800-90A
CTR DRBG
V (128 bits)
AES key (
256)
Internally by
ENT
Input: Directly from the internal
ENT
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Replication
Signing Key
Pair (dRSKn,
QRSKn)
The private key (dRSKn) is used
to sign the outputs of
GetParametersForReplication
and WrapKeyForReplication
APIs.
The public key (QRSKn) is used
to verify the input of
WrapKeyForReplication and
ImportReplicatedKey APIs.
ECDSA on
curve P-384
Internally
usingDRBG, or
imported from
another
member of a
Domain
Input: dRSKn encrypted with the
DKEK may be imported to other
members of a Domain; QRSKn may
be imported by an operator
Output: dRKSn encrypted with the
DKEK may be exported to other
members of a Domain; QRSKn may
be exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
Replication
Agreement
Key (dRAKk,
QRAKk)
Key used for key agreement to
derive a Replication Wrapping
Key (RWK)
ECDH on
curveP-384
Internally
usingDRBG, or
imported from
a member of a
different
Domain
Input: QRAKk may be obtained in
plaintext from another HSM;
dRAKk may be obtained encrypted
with the domain key (DKn) from
another HSM
Output: QRAKk may be exported in
plaintext; dRAKk may be exported
encrypted with the domain key
(DKn)
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Replication
Wrapping
Key (RWK)
Key used to encrypt an HBK AES GCM:
256 bits
Internally
derived from a
Public
Replication
Agreement
Key (QRAK1)
and a Private
Replication
Agreement
Key (dRAK2)
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Customer
Replication
Key (CRK)
Customer key that is being
transmitted between two
HSMs.
Customer Replication Keys
(CRK) may be of two types:
symmetric or asymmetric.
CRKs are encrypted with
Replication Wrapping Keys
(RWK).
AES GCM:
256 bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or 4096
bits
ECDSA:
curves P-256,
P-384, P-521,
or secp256k1
Internally from
an HBK
encrypted
with a domain
key (DKn)
Input: CRK may be obtained by
decrypting an HBK using a domain
key (DKn) and re-encrypting it
using a Replication Wrapping Key
(RWK)
Output: CRK is exported encrypted
with a Replication Wrapping Key
(RAK)
Volatile
memory
only
Customer
Data
Envelope
Key
(CDEnK)
Ephemeral key used to encrypt
plaintext data
AESCBC and
GCM: 256
bits
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: CDEnK is encrypted using
Customer Data Encryption Public
Key (QCDEK) when used with the
Generate,GenerateAndEncryptRan
domBytes, GenerateDataKeyPair,
and Decrypt APIs.
Volatile
memory
only
Table 13 – Module Keys/CSPs
2.6.2 Public Keys
Table 14 shows the list of Public Keys used within the module with associated private keys that only exist outside of the
module. All Public Keys are generated outside of the module.
Public Key Key Description Algorithm and Key
Size
Input / Output Method Storage
Operator
Ephemeral
Agreement
Public Key
(QOEAK)
Operators establish a
session key (HSM-
Operator Session Keys)
using an Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman key
exchange on the curve
secp384r1 (NIST-P384).
Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (EC
DH) ephemeral key
agreement on the
curve secp384r1
(NIST-P384)
Input: When an operator calls the
NegotiateSessionKey service.
Output: N/A
Volatile memory
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Public Key Key Description Algorithm and Key
Size
Input / Output Method Storage
Operator
Signature
Public Key
(QOS)
Both service operators
and human operators
have an identity signing
key used to authenticate
to the HSM.
Elliptic Curve
Signature (EC DSA)
on the curve
secp384r1 (NIST-
P384), RSA 2048,
or RSA 4096 bits
Input: The public key (QOS) is imported in
plaintext when an administrator calls
InitializeAndCreateDomain,
CreateDomain, and ChangeDomain. They
are also imported by APIs that accepts a
Domain Token.
Output: The public keys are exported
from the HSM in plaintext by APIs that
exports a Domain Token.
Volatile memory
Customer
Data
Encryption
Public Key
(QCDEK)
A public key provided by
an operator or customer
for the module to encrypt
plaintext data.
RSA 2048, 3072, or
4096 bits
Input: The public key (QCDEK) is optionally
provided when an operator calls
Generate,GenerateAndEncryptRandomByt
es, GenerateDataKeyPair, and Decrypt.
Output: N/A
Volatile memory
Table 14 – Public Keys
2.7 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the
cryptographic functionality at start up. Some functions require conditional tests during normal operation of the module.
All of these tests are listed and described in this section. In the event of a self-test error, the module will log the error
and enter the error state. Once in the error state, all CSPs are zeroized and the module becomes unusable.
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator intervention to run. If any
of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed by
the operator. The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Type Test
Integrity Check • 256 bit error detection code (EDC) on all module components
Known Answer
Tests
• AES (Encryption and decryption in ECB mode. Key size: 128 bit)
• AES GCM / GMAC (Generation and verification. Key size: 128 bit)
• ECC KAS (ECDH) (Primitive Z test. Parameter set: EC P-256)
• ECDSA (signature generation and verification. Curve: P-256)
• RSA (Signature generation and verification, key transport SP800-56B per IG D.9. Key size: 2048
bits)
• HMAC (Generation and verification with SHA-256, SHA-512)
• SHS (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512)
• SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG
• SP 800-108 CTR KDF (HMAC-SHA-256)
• KDA (OneStep KDF) (SHA-256)
Other tests • Vendor defined health tests, per SP 800-90B Section 4.5 (run over 65,536 consecutive samples)
Table 15 – Power-On Self-Tests
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Each module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on self-tests must
be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can be run on demand by
rebooting the module in FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation.
With the exception of the Integrity Check, the failure of any power-on self-test will cause the module to an error state
where the module will restart. If the Integrity Check fails, the module will enter into an alternate error state where the
module will power off.
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are tests that run during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the module will enter
an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can be re-initialized to clear the error
and resume the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Each module performs the following conditional self-tests:
Type Description
Pair-wise Consistency Tests • RSA key pair generation
• ECDSA / ECDH key pair generation
SP 800‐56A
Assurances
• Performed per SP 800‐56Arev3 Sections 5.5.2 and 5.6.2
Continuous RNG Tests • Performed on output of entropy source
DRBG Health Tests • Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3.
SP 800-90B Health Tests • Vendor defined health tests
Table 16 – Conditional Self-Tests
The module does not perform a firmware load test because no additional firmware can be loaded in the module while
operating in FIPS-approved mode. Please see Section 3 for guidance on configuring and maintaining FIPS mode.
2.7.3 Critical Function Tests
Known answer tests as described in Table 15 are automatically executed by the module every 24 hours. If any of the
tests fail, the module will enter into an error state and no services can be accessed by the operator.
2.7.4 On-Demand Self-Tests
On-demand self-tests can be performed by rebooting the module which will perform the power-on self-tests as
described in Section 2.7.1.
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate other attacks.
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3 Guidance and Secure Operation
The module only supports FIPS-mode of operation. Beyond initial setup, no specific technical steps are required to
configure FIPS-mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
Only authorized AWS employees may assume the Administrator (Crypto Officer) role.
The following section provides a high-level overview to configure the HSM. Members of the Administrator role (Crypto
Officer) must follow the AWS internal guidance published in the Operation Guidance for the AWS Key Management
Service.
3.1.1 Module Inspection
The module must be inspected to verify that no attempts have been made to open the module. The module must be
inspected upon initial delivery and after the module reboots due to unscheduled/unexpected power events.
If evidence of a tamper is discovered, the module shall be removed from operation immediately.
3.1.2 Initial Configuration
When setting up the first HSM member of a new domain, call the InitializeAndCreateDomain service with the list of
operators’ Operator Signature Public Keys, their respective roles and the access policy for each service (API) in
accordance with AWS internal guidance and procedures.
Services / APIs that modify an HSM’s domain membership or configuration must be configured to require a quorum of
two Crypto Officers except when adding an HSM that was previously a member of the domain.
When setting up subsequent members of an existing domain, the administrator first retrieves domain information from
an existing domain member using the GetDomain service. The Initialize service can then be used to initialize the new
HSM with the configuration of the existing domain.
Ensure each HSM is operating in FIPS mode by calling the Fips status API.
3.2 User Guidance
3.2.1 General Guidance
No additional guidance is required to maintain FIPS mode of operation. The only users of the HSM are the front-end
hosts of the AWS Key Management Service.