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Intel® Optane™ SSD DC D4800X
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Doc Version: 1.3
Last Updated: August 6, 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.....................................................................6
1.1.1 NVMe Interface ...................................................................................................................7
1.1.2 UART Interface....................................................................................................................7
1.1.3 SMBus Interface ...................................................................................................................7
1.2 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary .......................................................................7
1.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................8
2 Cryptographic Functionality........................................................................................... 10
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Public Security Parameters (PSP) .............................................................................................. 12
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................ 13
3.1 Assumption of Roles................................................................................................................. 13
3.2 Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................... 14
3.2.1 CO and User Password/PIN Authentication Method ..................................................... 14
3.2.2 Maintenance Password Authentication Method............................................................. 15
3.3 Services ..................................................................................................................................... 15
4 Self‐Tests....................................................................................................................... 21
5 Physical Security............................................................................................................ 23
5.1 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................... 23
5.2 Applying Tamper‐Evident Seals for SSDs shipped in FIPS Non‐Approved Mode ...................... 25
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 27
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................. 28
8 Security Rules and Guidance.......................................................................................... 29
9 References and Definitions............................................................................................ 31
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations.......................................................................................... 5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements....................................................................................... 5
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions............................................................10
Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation.........................................11
Table 6 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................11
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ............................................................................................. 12
Table 8 – Public Security Parameters.......................................................................................................... 12
Table 9 – Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Roles.............................................................................................................. 14
Table 11 – Authenticated Services.............................................................................................................. 15
Table 12 – Unauthenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 16
Table 13 – CSPs and PSPs Access Rights within Services ............................................................................18
Table 14 – Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 21
Table 15 – Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 22
Table 16 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................24
Table 17 – References.................................................................................................................................31
Table 18 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 31
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Picture............................................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2 – Module Block Diagram................................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3 – Module Physical Enclosure ‐ Front............................................................................................. 23
Figure 4 – Module Physical Enclosure ‐ Isometric ......................................................................................23
Figure 5 – Module Physical Enclosure ‐ Back.............................................................................................. 24
Figure 6 – Module Physical Enclosure ‐ Bottom .........................................................................................24
Figure 7 – Applying Tamper‐Evident Seals.................................................................................................. 25
Figure 8 – Tamper‐Evident Seal Application Locations...............................................................................26
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Copyrights, Trademarks and Legal Disclaimers
Intel technologies' features and benefits depend on system configuration and may require enabled hardware, software or
service activation. Performance varies depending on system configuration. No product or component can be absolutely
secure. Check with your system manufacturer or retailer or learn more at http://intel.com/ssd
Intel, the Intel logo, and others are trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the U.S. and/or other countries.
*Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.
© Intel Corporation.
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1. Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Intel® Optane™ SSD DC D4800X module, hereafter denoted
the Module. The Module is a PCIe dual-port Gen3 x 2 NVMe SSD with industry leading Intel® Optane™
memory, delivering power-efficient performance with enterprise-ready security and remote manageability
capabilities. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2 requirements.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Modules
Hardware Part #s
and Versions
Tamper-Evident
Seals Part #s
Firmware
Version
1
Intel® Optane™
SSD DC D4800X
375 GB
SSDPD21K375GAR with J26977-100 rev 2 and
J29722-002 rev 7
K33839-001 E201EM0A
2
Intel® Optane™
SSD DC D4800X
750 GB
SSDPD21K750GAR with J26979-100 rev 2 and
J29722-002 rev 7
3
Intel® Optane™
SSD DC D4800X 1.5
TB
SSDPD21K015TAR with J26980-100 rev 2 and
J29722-002 rev 7
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated Self
Encrypting Solid State Drives. The Module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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The Module implementation is compliant with:
 NVM Express 1.2b:
o https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM_Express_1_2b_20160601-1.pdf
 TCG Opal 2.01:
o https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_Storage-
Opal_SSC_v2.01_rev1.00.pdf
 NVMe-MI 1.0a:
o https://nvmexpress.org/wp-
content/uploads/NVM_Express_Management_Interface_1_0a_2017.04.08_-_gold.pdf
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is designed to be embedded in a General Purpose Computer (host) and is connected through the
PCIe connector. The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Module Picture
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the external perimeter of the SSD enclosure represented in Figure 1 –
Module Picture.
The physical ports and logical interfaces are identified in Table 3 below:
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Interfaces Description Logical Interface Type
PCIe
connector
NVMe NVMe interface Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
UART Maintenance interface Data in | Data out | Control in | Status out
SMBus Management interface Control in | Status out
Power Power interface Power
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1.1.1 NVMe Interface
The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the Module. Most services provided by the
Module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user data,
retrieving FIPS capability support, and retrieving FIPS status reporting.
1.1.2 UART Interface
The UART interface provides the ability to perform device firmware update, maintenance and retrieve debug
logs from the device. This port is available for the Maintenance Role. The UART interface is only exposed
outside of the device after successful power on self-tests have been completed.
1.1.3 SMBus Interface
The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data).
1.2 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is composed of the following components:
1. P4800X Controller – The controller ASIC. This component is responsible for terminating PCIe/NVMe
commands, reading or writing data to the Host platform, encrypting or decrypting data from the Host
platform, and storing or retrieving data to Intel® Optane™ Memory non-volatile memory.
2. AL5 – The PCIe dual-port bridge ASIC. This component is responsible for bridging two PCIe Gen3x2
interfaces into a single PCIe Gen3x4 interface on the storage controller ASIC.
3. DDR – Dynamic RAM. These components are used by the AL5 bridge for temporary storage of data
and/or parameters that are needed by the AL5 controller during execution.
4. 3D-XPoint® – non-volatile memory. These components comprise the non-volatile media of the
storage device. These components store encrypted user data, firmware for the P4800X controller, and
other non-volatile configuration data needed by the P4800X controller during execution.
5. UART Interface – Maintenance interface.
6. PIC – SMBus controller
The Module relies on the PCIe/NVMe interface as input/output devices.
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Figure 2 depicts the Module block diagram:
Physical Security Boundary
D4800X
PCIe
Connector
(2x2)
AL5
PIC
UART
P4800X Controller
Intel® Optane™
Memory
PCIe/NVMe Port2
Gen3x2
PCIe/NVMe Port1
Gen3x2
SMBUS
SMBUS
Intel® Optane™
Memory
Intel® Optane™
Memory
PCIe/NVMe Gen3x4
DDR
Figure 2 – Module Block Diagram
The PCIe Host is attached to the Module via two PCIe Gen3x2 interfaces supporting 2 lanes each which are
bridged by the AL5 ASIC into a single PCIe Gen3x4 interface on the P4800X controller ASIC. The dual PCIe
interfaces provide the data input, data output, control and status interface. The NVMe layer handles NVMe
1.2b commands. Some of the NVMe 1.2b commands may be handled by firmware running in the P4800X
controller via interrupts to the P4800X controller.
Firmware is located in AL5 and P4800X controller components. AL5 contains neither security relevant
implementation, CSPs, nor Public parameters with the exception of the plaintext password that is passed
through the AL5 to be processed by the P4800X controller.
1.3 Modes of Operation
The Module ships from the manufacturing facility with either the FIPS Approved firmware identified in Table
1 or a firmware which was not validated.
To determine if a Module is using a FIPS Approved firmware version, the FIPS Compliance Descriptor will be
retrieved via the Read FIPS Compliance service and the following information will be verified:
1. Related Standard indicates FIPS 140-2 (2) on byte 13
2. Overall Security Level indicates Level 2 (2) on byte 14
3. Compliance Descriptor Hardware Version (byte 16) matches the HW P/N and Version column of a
configuration in Table 1
4. Compliance Descriptor Version (byte 144) matches the FW Version column of a configuration in Table
1
5. Compliance Descriptor Module Name (byte 272) matches the Module column of a configuration in Table
1
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When the FIPS firmware is installed, the Module is received in an FIPS uninitialized mode, the user
authentication is not enabled and the access to the disk is not set.
When the FIPS firmware is not installed, the user will have to perform the following operations to configure
the Module in a FIPS uninitialized mode:
1. Update the firmware with the firmware download verification service to the FIPS approved firmware
2. Reset the Module
3. Enable/Activate Opal
4. Perform an AdminSP Revert method on the AdminSP
5. Apply the tamper-evident seals as shown in Section 5.2.
The Module must be placed into the FIPS approved mode of operation (Initialized) through the following
initialization procedure:
1. Taking ownership of Opal by setting the AdminSP SID credential to something other than MSID
2. Activating the LockingSP
3. Setting the WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column within the Locking Table of all ranges
containing sensitive user data
The CO role is responsible for configuration of other CO roles and User roles as well as enabling
locking/unlocking on any of the CO or User role controlled areas (locking ranges). The User roles are
responsible for enabling locking/unlocking of the assigned locking ranges as well as performing
locking/unlocking of their assigned locking range. In FIPS Approved mode (Initialized), both the CO and User
Roles require authentication and unlock prior to allowing access to data, whereas the uninitialized mode does
not. The Module will be in non-Approved mode of operation if not initialized.
To discover that a Module is in the FIPS Approved mode of operation (Initialized), the following must be
verified:
1. The LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1
2. The ReadLockEnabled column of the Locking Table is set to the True state for all ranges covering
sensitive user data
It is possible to switch from the FIPS Approved Initialized mode to uninitialized mode by performing the
AdminSP Revert method. However, the Module shall be initialized to be in a FIPS mode of operation.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in
the tables below. The terms FIPS Approved and Non-Approved cryptographic functions are defined by FIPS
140-2 specifications.
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38F]
Functions: underlying cryptographic algorithm of KW (Cert. #C857)
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
C31
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38F]
Functions: Key wrapping and unwrapping
Modes: KW
Key sizes: 256 bits
C857
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38E]
Functions: underlying cryptographic algorithm of AES XTS (Cert. #1431)
Modes1: ECB
Key sizes1: 256 bits
617
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38E]
Functions: Encryption and Decryption of the data
Modes: XTS
Key sizes1: 256 bits
1431
DRBG
[SP 800-90A]
Functions: HMAC DRBG
Hash: SHA-256 (Cert. #C31)
Security Strengths: 256 bits
C214
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Verification of Firmware on Boot (integrity test)
SHA sizes: SHA-256 (Cert. #665)
C32
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation (Firmware Download)
SHA sizes: SHA-256 (Cert. #665)
C858
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
Functions: HMAC-DRBG random number generation
SHA sizes: SHA-256 (Cert. #C31)
C31
1 The Module implements only the modes, data size, and key sizes mentioned in the Approved algorithm table.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
RSA
[FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Digital Signature Verification (Firmware Download)
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Hash: SHA-256 (Cert. #C31)
C857
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Maintenance Role Password Hash, Digital Signature Generation
(Firmware Download), Firmware Integrity test using HMAC
SHA sizes1: SHA-256
665
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Verification (Firmware Download), HMAC DRBG
SHA sizes: SHA-256
C31
Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
CKG
[SP 800-133]
Section 7.1: Direct symmetric key generation using unmodified DRBG output
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.12
Password Based KDF
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-256 (Cert. #C 31)
Used as part of authentication of User and Cryptographic Officer roles
Note: the keys derived from passwords are only used for storage applications.
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.6
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
NDRNG
[Annex C]
Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG. The NDRNG provides a seed with a minimum entropy of 256
bits to the FIPS Approved DRBG.
Password Based KDF
(no security claimed)
[SP 800-132]
HMAC-based KDF with SHA-256. The difference between this algorithm and the Password Based
KDF listed in Table 5 is that this version is used for PSID verification only.
Key Based KDF
(no security claimed)
[SP800-108]
Derivation of the keys used to verify the Firmware Integrity.
AES KW
(no security claimed)
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38F]
Key storage encryption with a non-Approved AES KW.
The Module does not implement Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode.
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including all
CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 3.3.
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
DRBG-EI 2048-bit DRBG entropy input
DRBG-State HMAC_DRBG internal state (V and C)
AdminSPKREK AdminSP Key Ring Encryption Key, AES-256 key
AdminSPPassword AdminSP passwords used to authenticate the CO
ASPPKey AdminSP Key derived from the CO passwords, AES-256 key
MEK Media Encryption Keys, AES-256 keys
MKEK Media Key Encryption Keys, AES-256 keys
KREK Key Ring Encryption Key, AES-256 key
U-Password Passwords used to authenticate the CO and User
UPKey Key derived from the CO and User passwords with PBKDF2, AES-256 keys
M-Password Password used to authenticate the Maintenance role.
REK Reset Ephemeral Key, AES-256 key
2.2 Public Security Parameters (PSP)
Table 8 – Public Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
FW_Pub 2048-bit RSA public Key used to verify the signature of the firmware
PSID 32 bytes value used to call the TCG Revert service
MSID 32 bytes value used to initialize the Module (first authentication)
Salt PBKDF2 Salt, 20-byte value
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The Module supports three distinct operator roles: User, Cryptographic Officer (CO) and Maintenance roles.
The cryptographic Module enforces the separation of roles using a credential (named password or PIN) that is
provisioned for the administrator (CO) and User roles as part of taking ownership and personalization of the
Opal security subsystem. The credential is verified as part of authentication as the specific role during session
startup to the Opal Security Subsystem. Access control over configuration mechanisms under control of the
administrator is enforced by the Module firmware.
The Maintenance role is entered via authentication of a credential (password). This role grants maintenance
and recovery capabilities to the cryptographic Module implementer.
Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
The Module does not support concurrent operators. If multiple successful authentications occur in an active
session to the Opal security subsystem to multiple roles, modifications are possible to the Opal security
subsystem under both roles simultaneously, however, it is assumed that the separation is performed by the
human operators and not by the cryptographic Module or the software that is the session owner. Neither the
administrator credential nor user credential are discoverable/readable through the Opal Security Subsystem,
regardless of the active authentication state in the session.
Table 9 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
CO
Cryptographic Officer –
‐ Opal Locking SP Admin Authorities (4)
‐ Opal AdminSP Admin and SID Authorities (2)
‐ Ability to configure start addresses and
encryption within the Module (locking ranges)
‐ Ability to provide user roles with the ability to
enable/disable locking on a locking range
‐ Ability to enable/disable locking on a locking
range
‐ Ability to cryptographically erase a locking
range
‐ Ability to move from FIPS Approved Initialized
Mode to FIPS Approved Uninitialized mode
through AdminSP Revert
Role-based
14-byte to 32-byte
password (U-Password)
5 attempts are possible
before requiring a power
on reset of the storage
device
User
User –
‐ Opal Locking SP User Authorities (8)
‐ Ability to enable/disable locking on a locking
range
‐ Ability to cryptographically erase a locking
range
Role-based
14-byte to 32-byte
password (U-Password)
5 attempts are possible
before requiring a power
on reset of the storage
device
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Role ID Role Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
Maintenance
Maintenance role
‐ Ability to recover debug logs
‐ Ability to bring device to healthy state when
otherwise non-functional
‐ Ability to load authenticated firmware into the
Module
Role-based
14-byte to 32-byte
password (M-password)
5 attempts are possible
before requiring a power
on reset of the storage
device.
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Roles
Role ID Role Description
Public Authentication Data
(if present)
PSID
PSID role –
‐ PSID Authority
‐ Ability to move from FIPS Approved Initialized Mode to FIPS
Approved Uninitialized mode through AdminSP Revert
which also causes Zeroization of all CSPs
32-byte value (written on the Module)
5 attempts are possible before requiring a
power on reset of the storage device
Anybody
User –
‐ Ability to read MSID
‐ Ability to read all configuration data in AdminSP and
LockingSP tables (except for PIN values)
N/A
3.2 Authentication Methods
3.2.1 CO and User Password/PIN Authentication Method
The Module supports a maximum of 4 admin users (CO) and 9 individual users (8 locking ranges plus one global
range as defined by [TCG-OPAL]. Each user may insert a unique password/PIN in order to authenticate to the
Module and act on the Module in that role. The password/PIN length must be at least 14 bytes, see Security Rules
and Guidance.
Thus, the probability of guessing a password/PIN in a single attempt is 1/2^112(=2^14 * 8) when the password is
randomly chosen which is smaller than 1/10^6.
The Module enforces a count based access protection mechanism that supports at most 5 password authentication
attempts per second. After 5 consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the Module
requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The reset time required in performing a reset
to the Module is one second. Therefore, 5 * 30 = 150 password attempts may be executed in one minute where
the overall search space is 2^112 leaving a false acceptance probability in one minute of 150/2^112, which is
smaller than 1/10^5 as required for FIPS 140-2.
The password/PIN is received in plaintext by the Module and the Module passes the password through the
PBKDF2 algorithm with 20 bytes of salt in order to derive the CO and the User CSPs to access the media.
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3.2.2 Maintenance Password Authentication Method
This authentication method is used to verify the maintenance role as part of the maintenance unlock mechanism.
The user must insert a password in order to authenticate as the maintenance role.
The Maintenance role password length is at least 14 bytes, see Security Rules and Guidance.
Thus, the probability of guessing a password in a single attempt is 1/2^112 which is smaller than
1/10^6.
The Module enforces a count based access protection mechanism that supports at most 5 password authentication
attempts per second. After 5 consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the Module
requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The reset time required in performing a reset
to the Module is one second. Therefore, 150(=30 * 5) password attempts may be executed in one minute where
the overall search space is 2^112 leaving a false acceptance probability in one minute of 150/2^112, which is
smaller than 1/10^5 as required for FIPS 140-2.
The password is received in plaintext by the Module.
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 11 and Table 12 below. Each service description also
describes all usage of CSPs by the service. The service names highlighted in bold in Table 11 and Table 12 can be
called in the uninitialized mode.
Note:
 CO = Cryptographic Officer Role
 U = User Role
 FM = Maintenance Role
Table 11 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U FM
Take Ownership Sets the SID credential to something other than MSID X
Data Encryption/Decryption
Protects access to the Media Encryption Keys stored in the
Module in ciphertext form. The cryptographic officer or user
password is used to generate an intermediate key (Pkey) which is
used to unwrap a Key Ring Encryption Key which is then used to
unwrap the Media Key Encryption Key which is then used to
unwrap the Media Encryption Key.
X X
Enable/Disable of Opal (FIPS
Approved, Initialized Mode)
Enable through TCG Activate/Disable Opal through AdminSP or
LockingSP Revert
X
Change admin password Change any password in AdminSP X
Zeroize/AdminSP Revert Destroy user data (TCG Revert) X
Disable authorities
Disable authorities to make them invalid and no longer able to
authenticate to the drive.
X
Configure Locking Ranges Configure locking ranges in the CM. X
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Service Description CO U FM
Configure MBR Shadow
Configure/Enable MBR Shadow and write data into the MBR
shadow area
X
Set MBR Shadow Write data into the MBR Shadow area X
Change any password in
Admin/Locking SP
Change any password in Locking SP X
Format
NVM/Sanitize/GenKey
Destroy any data (changing key)
X
TCG RevertSP and keep data
Revert and keep data. Reset all configuration data in the locking
SP but do not destroy user data in the Global Range.
X
Set data store Set data store – write data into the Opal data store tables. X
Configure Access Control
Change which entity can manage/lock/unlock an encryption
range.
X
Lock, unlock ranges
Lock, unlock ranges from access to read/writes on the data
input/output interface X X
Set common name – Locking
SP if allowed by Locking SP
Admin
If the Locking SP Administrator allows, change the common
name to reflect different text in the Locking SP
X
Set data store if allowed by
Locking SP Admin
If Locking SP Administrator allows, change data in the data store
tables
X
FW Maintenance
Retrieve FW Maintenance Logs, recover device from non-
functional state
X
Maintenance FW update
The Module allows the firmware to be updated through a vendor
unique command in the event of a firmware failure. This
authentication mechanism is used to verify the firmware using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 signature verification with SHA256 and an
internal public key.
X
Table 12 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Module Reset
(Self-test)
Reset the Module by power cycle, or PERST#. Performs self-tests,
firmware integrity check.
Warm Reset Reset the Module by performing an NVMe Subsystem Reset.
Hot Reset Reset one of the ports of the Module by performing a PCIe Hot Reset.
Read of configuration (show status)
Opening a session as Anybody does not require authentication. During an
active session in this state, the CM will provide Status/Level 0 Discovery
information, the version number, and Opal security configuration. This
will be invoked during the FIPS Approved Mode check.
Read of FIPS Compliance Read FIPS 140 compliance descriptor as defined in [SFSC]
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Service Description
NVMe Firmware download verification
The Module allows the firmware to be updated through the NVMe
Firmware Download and Commit commands. This authentication
mechanism is used to verify the firmware using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5
signature verification with SHA256 and FW_Pub.
Zeroization/PSID Revert Destroys all CSPs after PSID verification
NVMe-MI Basic Management Command
Retrieves drive status (status flags, SMART warnings, temperature, VID,
serial number, etc.)
User/Admin Authentication (start session) Authenticates a user using a TCG credential
FW Maintenance unlock
The Module authenticates the maintenance role using a password that is
input in plaintext and upon successful authentication, maintenance
capabilities are unlocked.
Random Generate a random number and return it to the caller of the method.
Recovery
Reinitialize the Module if a non-recoverable error occurs. The Module will
transition to uninitialized state.
Telemetry
The Module allows the collection of debugging information through
NVMe log pages – host initiated telemetry log page and controller initiated
log page.
The purpose of the telemetry log data is to provide information required to
debug firmware issues remotely.
Table 13 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different Module services. The modes of access
shown in the table are defined as:
 G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
 G’ = Generate: The Module generates the CSP – unless the CSP is the Global Range MEK, in which case
it is not destroyed, but preserved through the service.
 R = Read: The Module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the Module uses the
CSP.
 E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The Module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported
into the Module, when the Module generates a CSP, or when the Module overwrites an existing CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes plaintext and ciphertext CSPs.
 Z’ = Plaintext Zeroize: The Module zeroizes all plaintext instances of the CSP from memory, if present
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Table 13 – CSPs and PSPs Access Rights within Services
Services
CSPs PSPs
DRBG-EI
DRBG-State
AdminSPKREK
AdminSPPassword
ASPPKey
MEK
MKEK
KREK
U-Password
UPKey
M-Password
REK
FW_Pub
PSID
MSID
Salt
Unauthenticated
Module Reset Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Z/
G
-- -- -- Z
Warm Reset Z Z -- Z Z -- -- -- Z Z Z
R/
E
-- -- -- --
Hot Reset -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Read of configuration (Show
status)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Read of FIPS Compliance -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
NVMe Firmware download
verification
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
R/
E
-- -- --
Zeroization/PSID Revert -- -- Z -- -- Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- R -- Z
NVMe-MI Basic Management
Command
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
User/Admin Authentication
(start session)
-- --
R/
E
R/
E/
Z
G/
E
/Z
R/
E
R/
E
R/
E
R/
E/
Z
G/
E
/Z
--
R/
E
-- -- --
R/
E
FW Maintenance unlock Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’ Z’
E/
Z’
Z’ -- -- -- --
Random
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Recovery
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
Z -- -- Z Z Z -- -- -- Z -- R -- Z
Telemetry -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Authenticated
Take Ownership
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
G/
E/
W
R/
E
/Z
R/
E
-- --
G/
E/
W
R/
E
/Z
R/
E
-- -- -- --
R/
E
G/
E/
W
Data Encryption/Decryption -- -- -- -- --
R/
E
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Enable/Disable of Opal
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
R/
E
--
G/
E
-- --
R/
E
--
G/
E
-- -- -- -- --
G/
R/
E/
W
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Services
CSPs PSPs
DRBG-EI
DRBG-State
AdminSPKREK
AdminSPPassword
ASPPKey
MEK
MKEK
KREK
U-Password
UPKey
M-Password
REK
FW_Pub
PSID
MSID
Salt
Change admin password
G
RE
W
RE
W
RE RE GE -- --
RE
W
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- GE
Zeroize/AdminSP Revert
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
Z --
G/
E
Z Z Z --
G/
E
-- -- -- -- -- Z
Disable authorities -- --
G
W
-- -- -- --
G
W
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Configure Locking Ranges -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Configure MBR Shadow -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Set MBR Shadow -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Change any password in
Admin/Locking SP
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
G/
E/
W
R/
E
/Z
G/
E
-- --
G/
E/
W
R/
E
/Z
G/
E
-- -- -- -- --
G/
R/
E/
W
Format
NVM/Sanitize/GenKey
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
-- -- --
G/
W
R/
E
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TCG RevertSP and keep data
G/
R/
E/
W
R/
E/
W
-- -- --
G’/
Z
G’/
Z
Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z
Set data store -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Configure Access Control -- --
R/
E
-- -- --
R/
W
R/
E
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Lock, unlock ranges -- --
R/
E
--
G/
E
R
R/
E
R/
E
--
G/
E
-- -- -- -- -- --
Set common name – Locking
SP if allowed by Locking SP
Admin
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Set data store if allowed by
Locking SP Admin
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
FW Maintenance -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Maintenance FW update -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
R/
E
-- -- --
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4 Self-Tests
Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that
sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 14 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module
enters an internal error state if the failure is during the ROM boot stage of the device. If the device has exited
the ROM boot stage, the Module enters a soft error state requiring reset of the Module.
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity
HMAC-SHA256 (Cert. #C32) (used to verify all firmware upon boot from internal media on the
P4800X controller).
32-bit modular sum (used to verify all firmware upon boot from internal media on the AL5 ASIC)
AES-KW
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: KW
Key sizes: 256 bits
AES-XTS
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 256 bits
AES-ECB (Cert. #617)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption as part of AES-XTS KAT
Key sizes: 256 bits
AES-ECB (Cert.
#C31)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption as part of AES-KW KAT
Key sizes: 256 bits
DRBG
KATs: HMAC DRBG (inclusive of instantiate, generate and reseed)
Mode: HMAC SHA-256
Security Strengths: 256 bits
HMAC (Cert. #C32)
KATs: Verification as part of Firmware Integrity test
SHA sizes: SHA-256
HMAC (Cert. #C31)
KATs: Generation as part of DRBG KAT
SHA sizes: SHA-256
HMAC (Cert. #C858)
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256
RSA (Cert. #C857)
KATs: Signature Verification with SHA-256 (Cert. #C31)
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA (Cert. #665) KATs: SHA-256 as part of HMAC KAT (Cert. #C858) and Firmware Integrity
SHA (Cert. #C31) KATs: SHA-256 as part of RSA KAT
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Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
Firmware load test Firmware signature verification based on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 and 2048-bit key
If a self-test failed, the Module will indicate the following information:
 Firmware integrity: the SSD will not enumerate
 KAT: the SSD NVMe Identify service will return 1 at offset 4010
 Firmware upload: the SSD will return Invalid Image
 NDRNG: the SSD NVMe Identify service will return 1 at offset 4010
During the Initialization period, the Module can send to the host the NVMe SSD driver to allow the host to
communicate with the SSD after the POST.
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5 Physical Security
5.1 Physical Security Policy
The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in the cryptographic Module:
 The Module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which
is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure contains two parts: a top and bottom part that
affix together through the use of a hinge on the back side of the Module and two screws that affix the
top to the bottom near the PCIe edge connector.
 Two (2) tamper-evident seals (one large and one small) are affixed to the front of the Module such that
if the Module top and bottom are separated, exposing the internals of the Module, that the tamper-
evident seals will be broken in the process. The position of the two tamper-evident seals is indicated in
Figure 3. The two tamper-evident seals are captured as part of one part number that is listed in Table 1.
Figure 3 – Module Physical Enclosure - Front
Figure 4 – Module Physical Enclosure - Isometric
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Figure 5 – Module Physical Enclosure - Back
Figure 6 – Module Physical Enclosure - Bottom
The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to ensure that
physical security is maintained:
Table 16 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Production grade cases
On initial receipt of the device and
when feasible afterwards.
Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks,
gouges, lack of enclosure, bent clips, and
other signs of tampering. Remove from
service if tampering found.
Tamper-evident Sealing Labels
Inspect the sealing labels for scratches,
gouges, cuts and other signs of tampering.
Remove from service if tampering found.
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5.2 Applying Tamper‐Evident Seals for SSDs shipped in FIPS Non‐Approved Mode
Modules shipped in FIPS Non-Approved mode may not include the required tamper-evident seals. The tamper-
evident seals must be installed for the Module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
In such a case, follow the procedure below to apply the provided seals/labels to the Module:
1. Clean surface where tamper-evident seals are to be placed:
a. Use isopropyl alcohol of equivalent solution to remove any contaminants from the enclosure seam
seal/label location.
b. Handle drive and seal/label with gloves.
2. There are two different size seals with a designated location for each seal. The larger seal is applied to
the right front of the Module; the smaller seal on the left front (see Figure 3).
3. Use tweezers to lift seal/label from liner and place in designated area of enclosure seam, as shown in
Figure 8.
4. Apply finger pressure to seal/label pressing out any air or lifted edges.
Figure 7 – Applying Tamper-Evident Seals
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Figure 8 – Tamper-Evident Seal Application Locations
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6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The Module will not load or execute
firmware which is not signed with Intel 2048-bit RSA private key. The mechanisms available to perform a
firmware load are the following:
1. Through NVMe using NVMe Firmware Download and Commit operations
2. Through UART/NVMe after entering the Maintenance role
New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP.
Any other firmware loaded into this Module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
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7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The cryptographic Module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-
2.
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8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security
rules enforced by the cryptographic Module to implement the security requirements of this
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Module.
1. The Module shall provide three distinct operator roles: Maintenance, User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module shall provide role-based authentication.
3. The Module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle.
4. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any
cryptographic services.
5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling
power or resetting the Module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the
Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support manual key entry.
12. The Module does have external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
15. The Module does not support a bypass capability service.
16. The Module does not support the update of the logical serial number or vendor ID.
This section documents the security rules imposed by the vendor.
1. The operator is capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or
resetting the Module.
2. The shipping container protecting the Module or set of Modules in transit should be verified for evidence
of tampering.
3. If the Module is shipped from the factory with the FIPS firmware installed and uninitialized (TCG Opal is
in a manufactured inactive state), the following step will have to be followed. On receipt of the Module,
the CO should examine the product to ensure it has not been tampered with during shipping according to
the procedures outlined in Section 5. Upon verification that the Module has not been tampered, the user
should initialize the Module as described in Section 1.3.
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4. If the Module is shipped with the FIPS firmware not installed, labels will need to be applied as described in
Section 5 and then the Module must be initialized as described in Section 1.3.
5. The Module CSPs may be zeroized by calling the Revert method on the AdminSP in the Opal interface of
the cryptographic Module.
6. The Module shall be zeroized through “Module Reset” prior to performing a Maintenance operation.
7. The Module shall be zeroized using the service: “Module Reset” and “Zeroize/Destroy User Data through
TCG Revert” after performing a Maintenance operation. The operator shall follow the procedure contained
in “Intel_Optane_SSD_DC_D4800X_Procedure_To_Exit_Maintenance_Mode.pdf” - Version 1.0 to exit the
maintenance mode."
8. The password length must be greater than 14 bytes.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 17 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131Arev1] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths,
November 2015
[TCG-OPAL] Storage Work Group Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Version 2.01 Final, Revision 1.00
[SFSC] Information technology – Security Features for SCSI Commands (SFSC)
Table 18 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chain mode of AES encryption/decryption
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameters
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book mode of AES encryption/decryption
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDF Key Derivation Function
MSID Manufactured SID, Public value that is used as default password
NVMe Non-Volatile Memory express
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect express
POST Power On Self-Test
PSID Physical SID, a public unique value for each drive
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SID Secure ID
TCG Trusted Computing Group
XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing