L3Harris Technologies, Inc.
Harris AES Load Module
Firmware Version: R06A02
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.5
Prepared for: Prepared by:
L3Harris Technologies, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
221 Jefferson Ridge Parkway
Lynchburg, VA 24501
United States of America
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 22033
United States of America
Phone: +1 434 316-7181 Phone: +1 703 267-6050
http://www.l3harris.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Policy, Version 0.5 February 28, 2022
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................3
2 HALM OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................4
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................7
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................8
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role.................................................................................................................................................8
2.4.2 User Role...................................................................................................................................................................9
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................10
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................10
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................10
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................13
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................13
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................14
3.1 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................14
3.1.1 Initialization...........................................................................................................................................................14
3.1.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................................14
3.1.3 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................14
3.2 USER GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................14
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................15
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – LOGICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ...........................................................................................................6
FIGURE 2 – PHYSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ..........................................................................................................7
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES........................................................................................................................8
TABLE 3 – CRYPTO-OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES.....................................................................................................................8
TABLE 4 – USER ROLE’S SERVICES ...........................................................................................................................................9
TABLE 5 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 10
TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CSPS ..................................................................................................... 11
TABLE 7 – LIST OF POWER-UP SELF-TESTS......................................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 8 – ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 15
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Harris AES Load Module from
L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (also referred to as L3Harris in this document). This Security Policy describes
how the Harris AES Load Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is
available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website
(https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program).
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Harris AES Load
Module is referred to in this document as the HALM, the crypto module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information about the products incorporating the
module is available from the following sources:
 The L3Harris website (http://www.l3harris.com) contains information on the full line of products
from L3Harris.
 The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-
validation-program/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact
information for technical or sales-related questions about the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model document
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to L3Harris. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-
2 Submission Package is proprietary to L3Harris and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact L3Harris.
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2 HALM Overview
2.1 Overview
L3Harris Technologies, Inc. is a leading supplier of systems and equipment for public safety, federal,
utility, commercial, and transportation markets. Their products range from the most advanced IP1
voice
and data networks, to industry-leading multiband/multimode radios, and even public safety-grade
broadband video and data solutions. Their comprehensive line of software-defined radio products and
systems support the critical missions of countless public and private agencies, federal and state agencies,
and government, defense, and peacekeeping organizations throughout the world. This Security Policy
documents the security features of the Harris AES Load Module (HALM), which is incorporated into
terminal products provided by L3Harris, such as the XL family of radios, in order to provide FIPS-
Approved security functions.
The Harris AES Load Module provides support to secure voice and data communications by providing
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm encryption/decryption as specified in FIPS 197. The
HALM ensures data integrity using a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) algorithm as
specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38B. The HALM interacts with a Digital Signal Processor
(DSP) application executing on the L3Harris XL family of radios and other terminal products in order to
provide its services to those terminals.
The Harris AES Load Module is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC2
1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The Harris AES Load Module is a Level 1 firmware module with a multiple-chip standalone physical
embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary of the HALM is the outer chassis of the terminal in
which it is stored and executed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Harris AES Load Module is
defined by a single executable (HALM.bin; Firmware Version: R06A02).
1
IP – Internet Protocol
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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The L3Harris terminals do not employ an operating system. Rather, L3Harris terminals rely on the Harris
BIOS3
Kernel v1 to act as the module’s “operating system”. While not a true operating system kernel, the
Harris BIOS Kernel provides the low-level interface to the underlying hardware. The Harris BIOS Kernel
also executes on the Blackfin DSP. This constitutes a non-modifiable operational environment.
The module was tested and validated on the L3Harris XL-95P and XL-200P radios running Harris BIOS
Kernel v1 with a Blackfin BF707 DSP (including a Blackfin+ core embedded processor) from Analog
Devices, Inc. As allowed per FIPS Implementation Guidance section G.5, the vendor affirms the module’s
continued validation compliance when operating on any of the following platforms:
 XL-185P
 XL-400P
 XL-200M
 XL-185M
The cryptographic module maintains validation compliance when ported to any other radio platform
employing the same operational environment. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of
the module when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.
The HALM is stored in flash memory while the host terminal is powered off. When power is supplied to
the radio, the terminal’s Freescale Vybrid VF5xx GPP4
transfers the HALM from flash memory to the
SRAM5
of the DSP. Figure 1 shows the module executing in SRAM memory. The module is entirely
encapsulated by the logical cryptographic boundary, shown in Figure 1 below. The logical cryptographic
boundary of the module is shown with a red-colored dotted line.
3
BIOS – Basic Input/Output System
4
GPP – General Purpose Processor
5
SRAM – Static Random Access Memory
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Figure 1 – Logical Cryptographic Boundary
As a firmware cryptographic module, the Harris AES Load Module has a physical cryptographic boundary
in addition to its logical cryptographic boundary. The L3Harris terminal hardware that uses the HALM is
designed around the Freescale VF5xx GPP. The enclosure of the terminal is considered to be the physical
cryptographic boundary of the module as shown with a red-colored dotted line in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary
2.3 Module Interfaces
The HALM implements a single module interface in its firmware design. This interface is the module’s
logical interface and is provided by a single Application Programming Interface (API). The API is
accessed by an application running on the DSP. Physically, the module ports and interfaces are considered
to be those of the L3Harris terminals on which the firmware executes. Both the API and the physical ports
and interfaces can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
Table 2 maps the FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces to the physical interfaces of the terminal and the logical
interface of the module.
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Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Terminal Physical
Port/Interface
Harris AES Load Module Interface
Data Input Interface  Antenna
 Microphone
Arguments for an API to be used or
processed by the module
Data Output Interface  Antenna
 Speaker
Arguments for an API call that specify
where the result of the API call is stored
Control Input Interface  Antenna
 Keypad
 Knobs: Voice Group
Selection Knob, Power
On-Off/Volume Knob
 PTT6 Button
API call and accompanying arguments used
to control the operation of the module
Status Output Interface  Antenna Port
 Serial Port (DB9)
 Speaker
Return values for API calls
2.4 Roles and Services
There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: a Crypto-Officer
(CO) role and a User role. The operator implicitly assumes one of these roles when selecting each
command documented in this section.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The CO role is responsible for initializing the module, self-test execution, and status monitoring.
Descriptions of the services available to the CO are provided in Table 3 below. Please note that the keys
and CSPs listed in the table indicate the type of access required:
 R – Read access: The Critical Security Parameter (CSP) may be read.
 W – Write access: The CSP may be established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
 X – Execute access: The CSP may be used within an Approved security function.
Table 3 – Crypto-Officer Role’s Services
Service Description CSP and Type of Access
HALM_INITIALIZE Performs self-tests on
demand
None
HALM_SEND_STATUS The status of the last
function called from the
HALM_API is returned
None
HALM_WRAP_KEY Wraps a key AES Key Wrap Key – X
AES Unwrapped Key – R
HALM_UNWRAP_KEY Unwraps a key AES Key Wrap Key – X
AES Wrapped Key – R
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Service Description CSP and Type of Access
ZEROIZE Zeroizes keys in volatile
memory via power cycle
AES-256 Cipher Key – W
AES-128 Cipher Key – W
AES CMAC Key – W
AES Key Wrap Key – W
2.4.2 User Role
The User role has the ability to perform the module’s cipher operation, and data encryption/decryption
services. Descriptions of the services available to the role are provided in Table 4 below. Type of access is
defined in section 2.4.1 of this document.
Table 4 – User Role’s Services
Service Description CSP and Type of Access
HALM_GEN_KEYSTREAM Generates key stream data AES-256 Cipher Key – X
HALM_GEN_PRIVATE_MI Generates a Message Indicator
(MI) from the Initialization
Vector (IV) value specified in
the data input buffer
AES-256 Cipher Key – X
HALM_P25_XOR Performs logical Exclusive OR
(XOR) operation
None
HALM_LOAD_KEY Loads key into the module AES-256 Cipher Key – R
AES-128 Cipher Key – R
AES Key Wrap Key – R
AES CMAC Key – R
HALM_AES_OFB AES OFB7 Encryption
operation
AES-256 Cipher Key – X
HALM_AES_OFB_PASSTHRU AES OFB Encrypt/Decrypt AES-256 Cipher Key – X
HALM_AES_ECB AES ECB Encryption operation AES-256 Cipher Key – X
AES-128 Cipher Key – X
HALM_AES_ECB_DECRYPT AES ECB Decryption operation AES-256 Cipher Key – X
AES-128 Cipher Key – X
HALM_AES_CBC AES CBC Encryption operation AES-256 Cipher Key – X
HALM_MAC_GENERATION Generates a Message
Authentication Code (MAC)
for verification
AES CMAC Key – X
HALM_AES_CMAC AES CMAC operation AES CMAC Key – X
7
OFB – Output Feedback
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2.5 Physical Security
The firmware module relies on the physical embodiment of the radios, which store the module within their
enclosure. The radios meet Level 1 physical security requirements, and are made of production grade
material, opaque within the visible spectrum.
2.6 Operational Environment
Per FIPS Implementation Guidance Section G.3, the operational environment requirements do not apply to
the Harris AES Load Module. The cryptographic boundary of the module includes the entire Harris AES
Load Module image (HALM.bin). The firmware image runs on a non-modifiable operational environment,
the Harris BIOS Kernel v1. The kernel does not allow the loading of any new applications. Hence, the
operational environment of the module is a non-modifiable operational environment.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 5.
Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Cert # Algorithm Standard Modes / Methods
Key Lengths /
Curves /
Moduli
Use
3338 AES8 FIPS PUB9 197
NIST SP 800-38A
CBC10, OFB11 256 Encryption/decryption
FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
ECB12 128, 256 Encryption/decryption
NIST SP 800-38B CMAC13 256 Generation/verification
NIST SP 800-38F KW14 256 Key wrapping
3338 KTS15 FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38B
AES with CMAC16 256 Key transport (encryption
with message authentication)
FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38F
AES KW 256 Key transport (key wrapping)
8
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
9
PUB – Publication
10
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
11
OFB – Output Feedback
12
ECB – Electronic Code Book
13
CMAC – Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
14
KW – Key Wrap
15
KTS – Key Transport Scheme
16
Per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance D.9, AES with CMAC is an Approved key transport technique.
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The Harris AES Load Module is not responsible for the permanent storage of any cryptographic keys. Keys that enter the module are stored temporarily in
volatile memory. Zeroization of keying material in volatile memory occurs at shutdown or reboot of the radio hosting the module. Keys are either passed into
the module in plaintext or wrapped with an AES key. The AES-128 and AES-256 Cipher Keys, the AES CMAC Key, and the AES Key Wrap Key are passed
into the module in plaintext are used for encryption, decryption, CMAC, wrapping, and unwrapping services. These keys are generated externally and are stored
in a key store external to the module (See Figure 1). The AES Wrapped Key is passed into the module encrypted or wrapped by an AES key wrap key. The key
is unwrapped by the AES Key Wrap Key and then sent to the logical Data Output Interface in plaintext. This newly unwrapped key will be a new AES-128 or
AES-256 Cipher Key. The AES Unwrapped Key is passed into the module in plaintext in order to be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap Key. The newly wrapped
key then exits the module encrypted in order to be transmitted by the radio.
The module supports the critical security parameters listed in Table 6.
Table 6 – List of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES-256 Cipher Key 256-bit AES Key Generated externally;
Input electronically in
plaintext via GPC17
INT18 Path
Never exits the
module
The key resides in
plaintext in volatile
memory while in use
by the module; The
key is not actively
stored by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
Used as input into the
ECB, CBC, and OFB
cipher operations
AES-128 Cipher Key 128-bit AES Key Generated externally;
Input electronically in
plaintext via GPC INT
Path
Never exits the
module
The key resides in
plaintext in volatile
memory while in use
by the module; The
key is not actively
stored by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
Used as input into the
ECB cipher operation
AES CMAC Key 256-bit AES Key Generated externally;
Input electronically in
plaintext via GPC INT
Path
Never exits the
module
The key resides in
plaintext in volatile
memory while in use
by the module; The
key is not actively
stored by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
Used as input into the
CMAC operation
17 GPC – General Purpose Computer
18 INT – Internal
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Key/CSP Key/CSP Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES Key Wrap Key 256-bit AES Key Generated externally;
Input electronically in
plaintext via GPC INT
Path
Never exits the
module
The key resides in
plaintext in volatile
memory while in use
by the module; The
key is not actively
stored by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
Used as input into the
key wrapping and
unwrapping operations
AES Wrapped Key 128- or 256-bit AES
Key
Generated externally;
Input electronically in
ciphertext via GPC
INT Path
Exits the module in
plaintext via GPC INT
Path
The key is not stored
by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
The key is passed in to
the module to be
unwrapped by the
module and passed back
to the terminal
AES Unwrapped Key 128- or 256-bit AES
Key
Generated externally;
Input electronically in
plaintext via GPC INT
Path
Exits the module in
ciphertext via GPC
INT Path
The key is not stored
by the module
Power cycle zeroizes
volatile memory
The key is passed in to
the module to be
wrapped by the module
and passed back to the
terminal
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2.8 Self-Tests
Self-tests are performed by the module at power-up after the module is loaded into SRAM memory. The
module checks its integrity using a CMAC and ensures the correct performance of the AES cryptographic
algorithm by performing a Known Answer Test. The Harris AES Load Module performs the self-tests
listed in Table 7 at power-up.
Table 7 – List of Power-Up Self-Tests
Start-Up Test Description
Firmware Integrity Test The module checks the integrity of the binary (using a 256-bit AES-CMAC
checksum value) at the start-up. If the MAC verifies correctly (i.e., the newly
computed MAC is the same as the stored MAC value), the test passes.
Otherwise, it fails.
AES Known Answer Test (KAT) The AES KAT (128-bit ECB mode) takes a known key and encrypts a known
plaintext value. The encrypted value is compared to the expected ciphertext
value. If the values differ, the test is failed. The AES KAT then reverses this
process by taking the ciphertext value and key; performing decryption; and
comparing the result to the known plaintext value. If the values differ, the test is
failed. If they are the same, the test is passed.
The module is not required to perform any conditional self-tests.
The module enters an error state if it fails either power-up self-test listed above. To attempt to clear the
error state, an operator may restart the terminal (thereby restarting the module and re-running the power-up
self-tests). If the self-tests fail upon restart, the operator must obtain a new module install package from
L3Harris or return the terminal containing the module to L3Harris for repair or reinstallation.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks in an approved
FIPS mode of operation.
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3 Secure Operation
The Harris AES Load Module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe
how to place and keep the module in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Secure Management
The Harris AES Load Module is provided to the Crypto-Officer preloaded in the L3Harris terminals. The
module can also be distributed as a “crypto load module” install package. However, the mechanism by
which terminal users can install the package is provided by the terminal’s application firmware and is
outside the module boundary. The CO does not have to perform any action in order to configure the
module in the terminals. The HALM, once it is installed, always operates in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. In order to operate the module, the CO shall turn on the L3Harris terminal.
3.1.1 Initialization
The Harris AES Load Module is initialized by the DSP when the host terminal is powered on. The DSP
uses the HALM’s initialization routines to load the HALM into memory, allocate memory for operation,
and start the module’s power-up self-test. Until the module’s power-up self-tests have been performed, the
module is not operational. The services listed in Section 2.4 (Roles and Services) of this document are not
available until the module performs and passes its power-up self-test. Operator intervention is not required
in order to initialize the module.
3.1.2 Management
The Crypto-Officer should monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed or the
module is consistently reporting errors, then L3Harris customer support should be contacted. The operator
can determine that the module is operating in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation when the module
returns the HALM_INITIALIZE_OK status. This status is passed to the operator after the module passes all
of its power-up self-tests. The operator can also determine the status of the module by performing the
“HALM_SEND_STATUS” service.
3.1.3 Zeroization
The module does not store any keys or CSPs within its logical boundary. All ephemeral keys that are used
by the module are zeroized upon shutdown or reboot of the host terminal.
3.2 User Guidance
Users can only access the module’s cryptographic functionalities that are available to them. The User
should report to the Crypto-Officer if any irregular activity is noticed.
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4 Acronyms
This section defines the acronyms used in this document.
Table 8 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DSP Digital Signal Processor
ECB Electronic Code Book
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPP General Purpose Processor
HALM Harris AES Load Module
INT Internal
IP Internet Protocol
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KW Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
MI Message Indicator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PTT Push-To-Talk
PUB Publication
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
XOR Exclusive OR
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America
Phone: +1 703 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com