BVH-SP-701
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Engage Communication, Inc.
BlackVault HSM
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Security Policy
Version: 1.15
Date: June 13, 2018
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Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................4
1.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary ..................................................................................................7
1.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................8
2 Cryptographic Functionality...........................................................................................9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................................................13
2.2 Public Keys..................................................................................................................................15
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 16
3.1 Assumption of Roles...................................................................................................................16
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................16
3.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................17
4 Self-tests ..................................................................................................................... 24
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 26
6 Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 26
7 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 26
List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations..........................................................................................4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................4
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................6
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions..............................................................9
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................11
Table 6 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode..................................................................................................11
Table 7 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only ...................................12
Table 8 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) .............................................................................................13
Table 9 – Public Keys...................................................................................................................................15
Table 10 – Roles Description.......................................................................................................................16
Table 11 – Authentication Description .......................................................................................................16
Table 12 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................17
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services .........................................................................................................18
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................19
Table 15 – Power Up Self-tests...................................................................................................................24
Table 16 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................25
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests ...............................................................................................................25
Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................26
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Table 19 – References.................................................................................................................................26
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Top..................................................................................................................................5
Figure 2 - Module Bottom.............................................................................................................................5
Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram.................................................................................................................7
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Introduction
This document specifies the Security Policy for the Engage Communication BlackVault Hardware Security
Module (HSM) module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is an embedded Ethernet attached
HSM that combines a cryptographically advanced HSM with a smart card reader, integrated touch
screen display and USB port. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 3 requirements.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Module HW P/N and Version FW Version OE (if applicable)
1 BlackVault HSM 007-BVES-01 7.0.10.2 N/A
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2
validated cryptographic products. The Module is a multi-chip embodiment; the cryptographic boundary
is the outer perimeter of the printed circuit board (PCB) with all components outside of the metal
enclosure being excluded. The metal enclosure protects the security area containing the processor,
memory, CPLD and other components.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the Module is depicted in the figures below; the red outline depicts the security
region, which is contained within a metal enclosure, but the physical boundary is defined as the outer
perimeter of the PCB. Figures 1 and 2 are photos top and bottom of the multi-chip embodiment with a
red outline indicating the security region. The Module relies on physical smart card, Ethernet, USB
interfaces, and a touch screen display as input/output devices.
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Figure 1 – Module Top
Figure 2 - Module Bottom
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Smart Card Interface Communicates with smart
cards. Authentication for
Crypto Officer and User. Holds
split key shares for key
backup/restore and smart card
database export/import.
Data in | Data out
USB Host Interface for key
backup/restore and smart card
database export/import.
Data in | Data out
Ethernet Main interface providing
module services
Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
Touch Screen Display
Interface
HSM management interface for
connecting an external touch
screen display
Control in | Status out
LEDS Provides operational status Status out
Power Power Input Power in
Serial Connector Bootloader Firmware load
status
Status out
External Sensor Cover removal tamper detect Control in
Serial Interface 2, USB1
Peripheral, Keypad, SD
Memory Card, SPI3,
and USB LAN PHY
Disabled Disabled
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1.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 3 depicts the Module’s operational environment.
Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram
The Module includes a processor with external NAND Flash and DDR memory.
The firmware components are signed and stored persistently in NAND Flash. Internal ROM securely
boots the Bootloader firmware with authentication utilizing an RSA public key stored in the OTP
memory.
The Bootloader firmware securely boots the HSM Firmware with authentication utilizing an RSA public
key embedded in the Second Level Boot firmware code. The HSM Firmware is loaded and run from the
DDR memory.
The DDR Encryption Block encrypts data in the external DDR. It is referred to in this document as the
Universal Cryptographic Interface or UCI.
There are active Ethernet, Touch Screen Display, Smart Card, and USB interfaces.
User Critical Security Parameters (CSP) are kept persistently in the NAND flash. While in use they are
kept in the DDR and encrypted by the DDR Encryption Block. The Master Key protects the User CSPs in
NAND Flash. It is battery backed and zeroized on a tamper event. The NVSRAM is also battery backed
and holds system CSPs.
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1.3 Modes of Operation
The module has an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The module is configured to
operate in one of these two modes during initialization and requires re-initialization to change modes.
To verify the module is in the Approved mode of operation, the touch screen interface indicates which
mode the module is operating in. The sole difference between the Approved mode and the non-
Approved mode is that some Non-Approved cryptographic functions are allowed in the non-Approved
mode (see Section 2 for a list). All CSPs are automatically zeroized when switching between modes of
operation.
Module initialization consists of creating a Crypto Officer card set and a User Card Set. In general, the
Crypto Officer creates and destroys Users, while the User has access to the cryptographic functions of
the module. A set of cards is created with n (up to 20) being the number of cards and m being the
number of cards out of the set required to authenticate. The role is assumed and ready for services
under that role only when m of n cards are authenticated.
Initialization consists of creating the Crypto Officer card set, the User card set, and determining whether
the module will operate in FIPS mode. Once initialization is completed, the module is in the operational
state.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the tables below.
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Employed Cert #
Hardware
MEMC-
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
Yes AES #2767
Firmware
AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB1, CFB8, CFB128,
CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
Yes AES #2768
CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits
Yes AES #2768
CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
No. Tested but not
used.
AES #2768
GCM [SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
For TLS, IV is generated in compliance with
SP800-52 and is compatible with TLS1.2.
Otherwise, the IV is randomly generated
internally using the Approved SP800-90A DRBG
in accordance with IG A.5, Scenario #2.
If power is lost and then restored, a new key
for use with AES GCM is established.
Yes AES #2768
XTS-AES
mode
[SP 800-38E]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 256 bits
No. Tested but not
used.
AES #2768
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Hardware
GP-AES
[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: OFB
Key sizes: 256 bits
Yes AES #2801
KTS [SP 800-38F]
Functions: KW
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
Yes AES #4038
CVL [SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive]
Parameter sets/Key sizes: P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Yes CVL #295
KDF [SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, ANSI
X9.63 (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
Yes, TLS v1.2 only. TLS
v1.0/1.1 are not used.
CVL #864, 1200
RSADP [SP 800-56B Section 7.1.2]
Functions: RSA Decryption
Key size: 2048
Yes CVL #865
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR
DRBG, which provides 256 bits of encryption
strength
Yes, CTR DRBG only DRBG #468
DSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification,
Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024 SigVer Only, 2048, 3072 bits
Yes. SigGen with SHA-
1 affirmed for use
with protocols only
but not used.
DSA #1093
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature Verification, Public Key
Generation, Public Key Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-192 SigVer Only, P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521, K-163 SigVer Only, K-233, K-
283, K-409, K-571, B-163 SigVer Only, B-233, B-
283, B-409, B-571
Yes. SigGen with SHA-
1 affirmed for use
with protocols only
but not used.
ECDSA #904
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
Yes HMAC #1732
RSA [FIPS 186-4, ANSI X9.31-1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 Yes. SigGen with SHA-
1 affirmed for use
RSA #2073
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(PSS and PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024 and 1536 Legacy Use SigVer
Only, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits
with protocols only
but not used.
UCL RSA [FIPS 186-4, ANSI X9.31-1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1
PSS
Functions: Signature Verification
Key size: 2048 bits
Yes RSA #2366
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital
Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature
Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
Yes SHS #2327
UCL
SHA256
[FIPS 180-4]
Function: Digital Signature Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256
Yes SHS #3606
Hardware
GP-
SHA256
[FIPS 180-4]
Function: Digital Signature Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256
Yes SHS #3607
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
EC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement, key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits
of encryption strength; CVL Cert. #295.
EC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement, key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits
of encryption strength
MD5 MD5 usage within the TLS key derivation function
NDRNG [Annex C]
Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG. The NDRNG output is used to seed the FIPS
Approved DRBG and provides 256 bits of security strength.
Non-SP800-56B
Compliant RSA
Key Transport
Key Wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength
Table 6 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
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Protocol Description
TLS 1.2 AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256
AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
Note: The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Table 7 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only
Algorithm Description
DSA Functions: PQG Generation, Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation with SHA-1
and SHA-2, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024 bits
ECDSA Functions: Signature Generation Component, Key Pair Generation, Signature
Generation with SHA-1 and SHA-2
Curves/Key sizes: P-192, K-163, B-163
MD5 Message Digest
RSA Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation with SHA-1 and SHA-2
Key sizes: 1024, 1536
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 8 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
Km Master Key. Protects user keys Ku. AES 256 OFB. Generated internally. Stored in
battery backed processor memory. Never input or output. Destroyed via the Zeroize
service.
Kuci UCI Key. Protects DDR using the DDR Encryption Block. AES 128 ECB. Generated
internally. Stored in NVSRAM. Never input or output. Destroyed via the Zeroize
service.
Kursapr RSA Private User Key. Generated internally. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km.
Protected by Kuci in DDR. Input and output in encrypted format during Wrap/Unwrap
and Backup/Restore services. Zeroized via the Zeroize RSA Key service.
Kudsapr DSA Private User Key. Generated internally. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km.
Protected by Kuci in DDR. Input and output in encrypted format during Wrap/Unwrap
and Backup/Restore services. Zeroized via the Zeroize DSA Key service.
Kuecdsapr ECDSA Private User Key. Generated internally. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km.
Protected by Kuci in DDR. Input and output in encrypted format during Wrap/Unwrap
and Backup/Restore services. Zeroized via the Zeroize EC Key service.
Kuaes AES User Key. Modes ECB, CFB8, CFB128, OFB, CBC, and GCM. Generated internally.
Kept in NAND flash protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR. Input and output in
encrypted format during Wrap/Unwrap and Backup/Restore services. Zeroized via the
Zeroize AES Key service.
Kugeneric User Generic Key. Generated explicitly or the result of shared secret output from a
Derive Key operation. Used in HMAC only. Generated internally. Kept in NAND flash
protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR. Input and output in encrypted format
during Wrap/Unwrap and Backup/Restore services. Zeroized via the Zeroize Generic
Key service.
Kwmac Key Wrapping MAC Key. Used to generate CMAC for wrapped key MAC. Generated
internally. Never input. Output in encrypted format during the Wrap/Unwrap service.
Protected by Kuci in DDR. Zeroized after use and by power cycle.
Sdrbg System DRBG CTR state. Used in generation of User Keys. State CSPs V (128 bits) and
Key (AES 256). Entropy input from NDRNG. Generated internally on Module Reset.
Protected by Kuci in DDR. Never input or output. Zeroized upon power cycle.
Udrbg User DRBG CTR state. User Service Random Number Generation. State CSPs V (128
bits) and Key (AES 256). Entropy input from NDRNG. Generated internally on Module
Reset. Protected by Kuci in DDR. Never input or output. Zeroized upon power cycle.
Kmbk Master Backup Key. Encrypts Backup Key and Export Key before splitting shares on
Smart Cards using AES 256 OFB. Installed during manufacturing. Protected by Km in
NVSRAM. Never input or output. Volatile copy of the key is zeroized via power cycle.
Kbk Backup Key. AES 256 CBC key encrypts User Keys for Backup service. Generated
internally. Input and output in encrypted format and split using Shamir’s Algorithm on
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CSP Description / Usage
Smart Card shares. Zeroized after use.
Kex Export Key. AES 256 CBC key encrypts smart card database for Export service.
Generated internally. Input and output in encrypted format and split using Shamir’s
Algorithm on Smart Card shares. Zeroized after use.
Ktlspr TLS private key. RSA 2048. Used for Module TLS certificate. Generated internally. Kept
in NAND flash protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR. Never input or output.
Destroyed via the Zeroize service.
Ktlss TLS session key. Established during the TLS handshake. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
Never input or output. Zeroized after session termination.
Ktlsi TLS integrity key. Established during the TLS handshake. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
Never input or output. Zeroized after session termination.
Ktlsp TLS RSA pre-master secret. Established during the TLS handshake. Protected by Kuci in
DDR. Input in encrypted format during the TLS handshake. Never output. Zeroized
after use.
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2.2 Public Keys
Table 9 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
Kblver Bootloader Verification Key. Stored in the OTP, used to verify the Bootloader code
stored in NAND Flash on hardware boot. 2048 bit RSA.
Kfver HSM Firmware Verification Key. Embedded in the bootloader code. Verifies the HSM
Firmware loaded by the Bootloader. 2048 bit RSA.
Kaco Crypto Officer Authentication Key. Authenticates Crypto Officer. 2048 bit RSA.
Kau User Authentication Key. Authenticates User. 2048 bit RSA.
Kabkex Backup Export Authentication Key. Authenticates Smart Card shares used in Backup,
Restore, Export, and Import services. 2048 bit RSA.
Kursapu RSA Public User Key. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
Kudsapu DSA Public User Key. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
Kuecdsapu ECDSA Public User Key. Kept in NAND flash protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
Ktlspu TLS public key. RSA 2048. Used for Module TLS certificate. Kept in NAND flash
protected by Km. Protected by Kuci in DDR.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Crypto Officer (CO). The cryptographic
module enforces the separation of roles using a separate RSA public key for each operator.
Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support a maintenance
role or bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Authentication is not
persistent across a power cycle.
A role is authenticated by smart cards. At module initialization time, N cards are created with M cards
required for authentication. M can be a subset of N.
Table 10 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
CO Crypto Officer – Creates User. Identity-based Digital Signature Verification
User User – Has access to module
cryptographic services.
Identity-based Digital Signature Verification
3.2 Authentication Methods
2048-bit RSA Signature Verification
The authentication method is 2048 bit RSA signature verification. The security strength of an RSA 2048
bit key is 112 bits. The authentication process takes no less than 5 seconds. This allows 12 incorrect
authentication attempts in one minute. The probability of incorrect authentication attempts succeeding
in one minute is 12/2^112 or 2.31 x 10^-33.
Table 11 – Authentication Description
Authentication Method Probability Justification
RSA Signature Verification 1/2^112 2.31 x 10^-33
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also
describes all usage of CSPs by the service. Both the Approved and non-Approved modes of operation
have access to all services listed in this section; the only distinction is that the Approved mode restricts
access to non-Approved algorithms and non-Approved key sizes, whereas the non-Approved mode can
employ both Approved and non-Approved algorithms and key sizes.
Table 12 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U
Zeroize Destroys Km (Master Key); the Km is used to encrypt all
persistently stored operator keys. This service will also
destroy the Crypto Officer role and User role and
requires reinitialization of the module.
X
Module Reset
(Power Up Self-Test)
Reset the Module via Touch Screen Display. X X
Firmware Upgrade Upgrades Firmware. X
Settings Set date and time, network configuration, and
Manufacturing/User firmware selection.
X
Export Logs Plaintext HSM logs are moved to USB drive. X
Shut Down Unit is shut down (but not restarted) via Touch Screen
Display.
X X
Export/Import Encrypted smart card database is exported or imported. X
Backup/Restore Encrypted User Keys are backed up or restored from
backup.
X
Info: Date/Time, Network View date, time, and network configuration on Touch
Screen Display.
X X
Info: Firmware View firmware version on Touch Screen Display. X X
Info: List Keys List Keys and view copyrights on Touch Screen Display. X
Generate RSA Key Key Generate ANSI 9.31 RSA key pairs with key size 2048,
3072, 4096 bits.
X
Generate DSA Key Key Generate DSA key pairs with key size 2048, 3072 bits. X
Generate ECDSA KEY Key Generate ECDSA key pairs P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-
571.
X
Generate Generic Key Key Generate Generic keys. 128, 192, and 256 bit keys. X
Generate AES Key Key Generate AES 128, 192, and 256 bit keys. X
Zeroize RSA Key Zeroize RSA key pairs. X
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Service Description CO U
Zeroize DSA Key Zeroize DSA key pairs. X
Zeroize ECDSA KEY Zeroize ECDSA key pairs. X
Zeroize Generic Key Zeroize Generic keys. X
Zeroize AES Key Zeroize AES keys. X
Encrypt/Decrypt AES AES encrypt/decrypt with modes ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB1,
CFB8, CFB128, and GCM.
X
Encrypt/Decrypt RSA RSA Encrypt/Decrypt for key transport. X
RSA Sign/Verify RSA signature generation/verification ANSI X9.31, PSS,
and PKCS1.5. Signature generation 2048, 3072 and 4096,
no SHA-1. Signature verification 1024, 2048, 3072 and
4096.
X
DSA Sign/Verify DSA signature generation/verification. Signature
generation 2048 and 3072, no SHA-1. Signature
verification 1024, 2048, and 3072.
X
ECDSA Sign/Verify ECDSA signature generation/verification. Signature
generation no SHA-1 (SHA-1 verification allowed).
X
HMAC Sign/Verify HMAC generation/verification with Generic Key. X
CMAC Sign/Verify CMAC signature generation/verification with AES key. X
Derive Key Produces Generic Key or AES key X
Message Digest SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. X
Wrap/Unwrap Key Key Import/Export with AES or RSA key wrap. X
Copy Key Makes a copy of a key within the HSM X
Random Retrieve random bytes from User DRBG X
Logout After Logout, only Unauthenticated Services are allowed X X
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Module Initialize Master Key Km is generated. Crypto Officer and User cards sets are created. Kaco
and Kau are input from the Smart Card Interface. TLS certificate is created, Ktlspr
and Ktlspu keys are generated. Can be done only if module is in the Uninitialized
state.
Authenticate Crypto
Officer
Authenticates the Crypto Officer. Services allowed to the Crypto Officer are
available.
Authenticate User Authenticates User. User allowed Services are available.
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Service Description
Show Status View FIPS mode of operation and Module State on Touch Screen Display .
Module Reset
(Power Up Self-Test)
Reset the Module by power cycle.
Table 14 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes
of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module exports the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module imports the CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Km
Kuci
Kursapr
Kudsapr
Kuecdsapr
Kuaes
Kugeneric
Kwmac
Sdrbg
Udrbg
Kmbk
Kbk
Kex
Ktlspr
Ktlss
Ktlsi
Ktlsp
Zeroize Z Z
Module
Reset
(Self-test)
E
Z
G
E
G
E
G G
Firmware
Upgrade,
Settings,
Export Log,
Clear Error
State,
Shut Down,
Info,
Logout,
Show Status
E
Import E E E E
W
Export E E G
E
R
Backup E R R R R R E E G
E
R
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Km
Kuci
Kursapr
Kudsapr
Kuecdsapr
Kuaes
Kugeneric
Kwmac
Sdrbg
Udrbg
Kmbk
Kbk
Kex
Ktlspr
Ktlss
Ktlsi
Ktlsp
Restore E E W W W W W E W
E
Generate
RSA Key
E E G E E E E E
Destroy RSA
Key
E Z E E E E
Generate
DSA Key
E E G E E E E E
Destroy DSA
Key
E Z E E E E
Generate
ECDSA Key
E E G E E E E E
Destroy
ECDSA Key
E Z E E E E
Generate
Generic Key
E E G E E E E E
Destroy
Generic Key
E Z E E E E
Generate AES
Key
E E G E E E E E
Destroy AES
Key
E Z E E E E
Encrypt
Decrypt AES
E E E E E E
Encrypt
Decrypt RSA
E E E E E E
RSA
Sign/Verify
E E E E E E
DSA
Sign/Verify
E E E E E E
ECDSA
Sign/Verify
E E E E E E
HMAC
Sign/Verify
E E E E E E
CMAC
Sign/Verify
E E E E E E
Derive Key E E E G G E E E E
Message
Digest
E E E E E
Wrap Key E R R R R
E
R G
E
R
E E E E
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 21 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Km
Kuci
Kursapr
Kudsapr
Kuecdsapr
Kuaes
Kugeneric
Kwmac
Sdrbg
Udrbg
Kmbk
Kbk
Kex
Ktlspr
Ktlss
Ktlsi
Ktlsp
Unwrap Key E E W
E
W W W
E
W E E E E
Copy Key E E E E E E
Random E E E E E E
Module
Initialize
G
E
G
E
G
Authenticate
Crypto
Officer
E
Authenticate
User
E E E E E
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 22 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Table 14 continued – CSP Access Rights within Services Public Keys
Kblver
Kfver
Kaco
Kau
Kabkex
Kursapu
Kudsapu
Kuecdsapu
Ktlspu
Zeroize
Module
Reset
(Self-test)
E E
Firmware
Upgrade,
Settings,
Export Log,
Clear Error
State,
Shut Down,
Info,
Logout,
Show Status
Import W
E
Export W
E
Backup W
E
R R R
Restore W
E
W W W
Generate
RSA Key
G E
Destroy RSA
Key
Z E
Generate
DSA Key
G E
Destroy DSA
Key
Z E
Generate
ECDSA Key
G E
Destroy
ECDSA Key
Z E
Generate
Generic Key
E
Destroy
Generic Key
E
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 23 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Kblver
Kfver
Kaco
Kau
Kabkex
Kursapu
Kudsapu
Kuecdsapu
Ktlspu
Generate
AES Key
E
Destroy AES
Key
E
Encrypt
Decrypt AES
E
Encrypt
Decrypt RSA
E E
RSA
Sign/Verify
E E
DSA
Sign/Verify
E E
ECDSA
Sign/Verify
E E
HMAC
Sign/Verify
E
CMAC
Sign/Verify
E
Derive Key E E
Message
Digest
E
Wrap Key R
W
E
R R E
Unwrap Key W W W E
Copy Key E
Random E
Module
Initialize
R R G
Authenticate
Crypto
Officer
E
Authenticate
User
E E
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 24 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
4 Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module. The self-tests do not require operator action. Success is indicated by the Module
remaining in the Operational state.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 15 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails,
the Module enters the Error state.
While in operation, the Module performs the conditional tests described in Table 16. If any of the
conditional tests fails, the Module enters the Error state. If the firmware load tests fail, the Module will
fail to boot.
The critical functions tests executed on power up or reset are listed in Table 17. If a critical function test
fails the Module enters the Error State.
Table 15 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
AES
(Cert. #2768)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
GP-AES
(Cert. #2801)
KATS: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: OFB
Key sizes: 256
UCI AES
(Cert. #2767)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
DRBG
(Cert. #468)
KATs: HASH DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA
(Cert. #1093)
PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Modes: SHA-384
Key sizes: 2048 bits
GCM
(Cert. #2768)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 256 bits
AES CMAC
(Cert. #2768)
KATS: Generation, Verification
Modes: CBC
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
HMAC
(Cert. #1732)
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
RSA
(Cert. #2073)
KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Modes: SHA-256, PSS
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA
(Cert. #904)
PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Modes: SHA-512
Keys sizes: P-224, K233
ECC CDH
(Cert. #295)
KATS: Shared Secret Calculation
Key sizes: P-224
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 25 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Test Target Description
SHA
(Cert. #2327)
KATs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
AES-KW
(Cert. #4038)
KATs: Wrap, Unwrap
Key Sizes: AES 256
AES CCM
(Cert. #2768)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key Sizes: AES 192 CCM
AES XTS
(Cert. #2768)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key Sizes: AES 128 and 256 XTS
GP-SHA256
(Cert. #3607)
KAT: SHA256
UCL SHA256
(Cert. #3606)
KAT: SHA256
UCL RSA
(Cert. #2366)
KAT: Signature Verification
Modes: SHA-256, PSS
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 16 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when the DRBG requests seed material
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key pair generation.
Firmware Boot
Loader Load
RSA 2048 signature verification performed when firmware boot loader is loaded using
Kblver.
Manufacturing
Image Firmware
Load
RSA 2048 signature verification performed when manufacturing image firmware is
loaded using Kfver.
User Image
Firmware Load
RSA 2048 signature verification performed when user image firmware is loaded.
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally per SP 800-90 Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests
Test Target Description
Policy Manager Tests matrix of roles and services for allowed services given role.
State Manager Consistency test for setting and retrieval of BlackVault State and FIPS Mode state.
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 26 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
5 Physical Security Policy
The BlackVault is tamper responsive. A Tamper event may be caused by lifting of the security region’s
metal enclosure or separation of the top or bottom parts of the security region metal enclosure. When
a Tamper event occurs, the unit is zeroized and cannot be returned to an operational state. The rivets
used to fasten the metal enclosure are non-reusable, and their removal must be considered as evidence
of tamper.
Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Physical Damage Visual inspection every three
months.
The operator shall inspect the module
for signs of tamper. Which may
include scratches, scrapes, drill holes,
chips in the plastic molding, etc.
6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The
Module includes a Firmware Upgrade service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions
within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware
loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2
validation.
7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 19 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
CAVP NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program.
CSP Critical Security Parameter.
GP General purpose hardware cryptography engine.
OTP One Time Programming.
UCI Universal Cryptographic Interface, the DDR encryption block.
UCL Universal Cryptographic Library.
BVH-SP-701
Copyright Engage Communication, Inc., 2018 Version 1.15 Page 27 of 27
May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].