Infinidat, Ltd. Infinidat Cryptographic Module Software Version: 1.1.1 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 1.1 Prepared for: Prepared by: Infinidat, Ltd. Corsec Security, Inc. 500 Totten Pond Road 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Waltham, MA, 02451 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America United States of America Phone: +1 855 900 4634 Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.infinidat.com www.corsec.com FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 57 Table of Contents 1. General.................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Overview................................................................................................................................................ 5 1.2 Security Levels........................................................................................................................................ 5 2. Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................................ 7 2.1 Description............................................................................................................................................. 7 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ......................................................... 9 2.3 Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................... 10 2.4 Modes of Operation............................................................................................................................. 10 2.5 Algorithms............................................................................................................................................ 10 2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................................... 14 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information............................................................................................................ 20 2.8 RBG and Entropy.................................................................................................................................. 21 2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................................... 21 2.10 Key Establishment................................................................................................................................ 22 2.11 Industry Protocols................................................................................................................................ 22 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces........................................................................................................... 23 3.1 Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................................................. 23 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication ....................................................................................................... 24 4.1 Authentication Methods...................................................................................................................... 24 4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................... 24 4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................... 24 4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 31 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................................... 32 5. Software/Firmware Security.................................................................................................................. 33 5.1 Integrity Techniques ............................................................................................................................ 33 5.2 Initiate on Demand .............................................................................................................................. 33 6. Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................... 34 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements............................................................................. 34 7. Physical Security .................................................................................................................................... 35 8. Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................................ 36 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management .......................................................................................... 37 9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................... 37 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.................................................................................................................. 37 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ..................................................................................................................... 37 9.4 SSPs ...................................................................................................................................................... 37 9.5 Transitions............................................................................................................................................ 42 10. Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................... 43 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests................................................................................................................... 43 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................... 43 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 57 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information............................................................................................................. 47 10.4 Error States .......................................................................................................................................... 48 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... 48 11. Life-Cycle Assurance .............................................................................................................................. 49 11.1 Startup Procedures .............................................................................................................................. 49 11.2 Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................................... 49 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................... 50 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................... 52 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................................................... 53 Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators............................................................................................ 55 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 4 of 57 List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels ............................................................................................................................................. 6 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) ................................ 9 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ............................................................... 9 Table 4: Modes List and Description ....................................................................................................................... 10 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) ......................................................... 12 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Legacy................................................................................................................... 12 Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libssl)................................................................ 12 Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ..................................................................................................................... 13 Table 9: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................................................... 13 Table 10: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms................................................................................................. 14 Table 11: Security Function Implementations......................................................................................................... 20 Table 12: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................. 23 Table 13: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................ 24 Table 14: Approved Services ................................................................................................................................... 30 Table 15: Non-Approved Services ........................................................................................................................... 32 Table 16: Storage Areas........................................................................................................................................... 37 Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods...................................................................................................................... 37 Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods......................................................................................................................... 37 Table 19: SSP Table 1............................................................................................................................................... 40 Table 20: SSP Table 2............................................................................................................................................... 42 Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests....................................................................................................................... 43 Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................. 46 Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..................................................................................................... 47 Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................................................ 48 Table 25: Error States .............................................................................................................................................. 48 Table 26: Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................... 53 List of Figures Figure 1: Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) ............................................................................ 8 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 5 of 57 1. General 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Infinidat Cryptographic Module (version: 1.1.1) from Infinidat, Ltd. (Infinidat). This Security Policy describes how the Infinidat Cryptographic Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadiaen government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140- 3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Infinidat Cryptographic Module is referred to in this document as Infinidat Cryptographic Module or the module. 1.1.1 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The Infinidat website www.infinidat.com contains information on the full line of services and solutions from Infinidat. • The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation- program/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. 1.1.2 Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. 1.2 Security Levels The Infinidat Cryptographic Module is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in the table below. Section Title Security Level 1 General 1 2 Cryptographic module specification 1 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 6 of 57 Section Title Security Level 4 Roles, services, and authentication 1 5 Software/Firmware security 1 6 Operational environment 1 7 Physical security N/A 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 1 10 Self-tests 1 11 Life-cycle assurance 1 12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A Overall Level 1 Table 1: Security Levels The module has an overall security level of 1. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 7 of 57 2. Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description 2.1.1 Purpose and Use The Infinidat Cryptographic Module is a set of cryptographic libraries that implement TLS1 , symmetric key generation and encryption/decryption, and SED2 authentication key derivation for the InfuzeOS™3 , which is the core component of the InfiniBox and InfiniBox SSA appliances. The Infinidat Cryptographic Module comes pre- installed on each InfiniBox node. 2.1.2 Module Type The Infinidat Cryptographic Module is a Software module. 2.1.3 Module Embodiment The Infinidat Cryptographic Module has a Multi-Chip Standalone embodiment. The module is designed to utilize the following processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) instruction sets for its AES and SHA implementations: • AES-NI instruction set, when executing on the InfuzeOS™ 8 operational environment The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in section 2.2.4 of this Security Policy. 2.1.4 Module Characteristics The module does not have any additional characteristics. 2.1.5 Cryptographic Boundary The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when loaded and stored in the host platform’s memory. The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code. The module’s software component comprises two shared library files and two digest files for testing integrity. All hardware and software components are contained within the host platform’s physical enclosure. 1 TLS – Transport Layer Security 2 SED – Self-Encrypting Drive 3 OS – Operating System FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 8 of 57 The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code. This comprises: • libcrypto (cryptographic primitives library file) • libssl (TLS protocol library file) • libcrypto.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libcrypto integrity checks) • libssl.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libssl integrity checks) Figure 1 below shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and its interactions with surrounding software components, as well as the module’s cryptographic boundary and Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). The module supports PAA. Thus, the diagram includes the CPU as a component within the cryptographic boundary. Ports Storage RAM CPU Operating System libcrypto Host Device Calling Application libcrypto.hmac libssl libssl.hmac KEY: Cryptographic Boundary TOEPP Data Input Data Output Control Input Control Output Status Output System Calls Figure 1: Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) The module is entirely contained within the TOEPP. 2.1.6 Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) As a software cryptographic module, the TOEPP of the cryptographic module is defined by the host platform on which the module is installed. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 9 of 57 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification 2.2.1 Tested Module Identification - Hardware This section is only applicable to hardware modules. 2.2.2 Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) The table below lists the executable code sets of the module. Package or File Name Software/ Firmware Version Features Integrity Test libcrypto.so libssl.so libcrypto.hmac libssl.hmac 1.1.1 Yes Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) The module count is one (1). 2.2.3 Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware This section is only applicable for hybrid modules. 2.2.4 Tested Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in the table below. Operating System Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host OS Version(s) InfuzeOS 8 HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11 AMD EPYC (Zen 4) Yes 1.1.1 InfuzeOS 8 HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11 AMD EPYC (Zen 4) No 1.1.1 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid The module is designed to utilize the AES-NI extended instruction set when available by the host platform’s CPU for processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) of its AES implementation. The cryptographic module maintains validation compliance when operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that the GPC uses any single-user operating system/mode specified on the validation certificate, or another compatible single-user operating system. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 10 of 57 2.2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid The vendor does not affirm any operational environments. 2.3 Excluded Components The module does not exclude any components from the requirements. 2.4 Modes of Operation 2.4.1 Modes List and Description The table below lists the modes of operation for the module. Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved Mode allows the use of cryptographic operations Approved The module implements separate indicators for approved security services and follows IG 2.3.A Example Scenario 1. However, some indicators are shared between approved security services and fall under IG 2.3.A Example Scenario 3. The *_get_service_indicator() APIs return 1 if Approved. Please refer to Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators for the specific indicators per service. Non- Approved The module alternates on a service-by- service basis between Approved and non- Approved modes of operation. The module will implicitly switch to the non-Approved mode upon execution of a non-Approved service. The module will implicitly switch back to the Approved mode upon execution of an Approved service. Non- Approved Table 4: Modes List and Description 2.5 Algorithms 2.5.1 Approved Algorithms The module employs cryptographic algorithm implementations from the following sources: • Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) 1.0 (Cert. A5477) • Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libssl) 1.0 (Cert. A5478) The module implements the Approved algorithms listed below. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 11 of 57 Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CCM A5477 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C AES-CFB1 A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CFB128 A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CFB8 A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CMAC A5477 Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38B AES-CTR A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-ECB A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38D AES-GMAC A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38D AES-KW A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38F AES-KWP A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38F AES-OFB A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 A5477 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38E Counter DRBG A5477 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes SP 800-90A Rev. 1 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5477 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) A5477 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5477 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5477 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-5 HMAC-SHA-1 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-224 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-384 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-512 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA3-224 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA3-256 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA3-384 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA3-512 A5477 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A5477 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder SP 800-56A Rev. 3 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 12 of 57 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference KDF SP800-108 A5477 KDF Mode - Counter Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096 Increment 8 SP 800-108 Rev. 1 PBKDF A5477 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-10000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1 SP 800-132 RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A5477 Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard FIPS 186-5 RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A5477 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss FIPS 186-5 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A5477 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss FIPS 186-5 SHA-1 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-224 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA3-224 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202 SHA3-256 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202 SHA3-384 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202 SHA3-512 A5477 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202 SHAKE-128 A5477 Output Length - Output Length: 16-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 202 SHAKE-256 A5477 Output Length - Output Length: 16-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 202 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) A5477 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SP 800-135 Rev. 1 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) Legacy Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A5477 L - 1024, 2048, 3072 N - 160, 224, 256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-4 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A5477 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 FIPS 186-4 TDES-CBC A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-CFB1 A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-CFB64 A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-CFB8 A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-CMAC A5477 Direction - Verification SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-ECB A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-OFB A5477 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67 Rev. 2 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Legacy Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libssl) Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) A5478 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE SP 800-135 Rev. 1 Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libssl) The Triple-DES for decryption/unwrapping, DSA for signature verification, and RSA specific to FIPS 186-4 for signature verification (ANSI X9.31 and 1024-bit modulo capabilities) algorithms are Approved for legacy usage only. These legacy algorithms can only be used on data generated before the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 13 of 57 2.5.2 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods: Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG Key Type:Asymmetric Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Section 4 Example 1 Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms 2.5.3 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module that are allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation. Name Properties Implementation Reference AES (any approved mode of AES) Use:Key Unwrap Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) IG D.G Table 9: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms 2.5.4 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation for which no security is claimed. N/A for this module. 2.5.5 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms that are not allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation. Name Use and Function AES-GCM (non-compliant with external IV) Encryption/decryption AES-OCB Authenticated encryption/decryption ANSI X9.31 RNG (with 128-bit AES core) Random number generation ARIA Encryption/decryption Blake2 Encryption/decryption Blowfish Encryption/decryption Camellia Encryption/decryption CAST Encryption/decryption CAST5 Encryption/decryption ChaCha20 Encryption/decryption DES Encryption/decryption DH Key generation, key verification, domain parameter generation, domain parameter verification, key agreement, shared secret computation DSA (non-compliant) Key generation, domain parameter generation, domain parameter verification, digital signature generation, digital signature verification ECDH (non-compliant) Key agreement, shared secret computation ECDSA (non-compliant) Key pair generation; digital signature generation; digital signature verification EdDSA Key pair generation; digital signature generation; digital signature verification FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 14 of 57 Name Use and Function IDEA Encryption/decryption Hash_DRBG (non-compliant) Random bit generation HKDF (non-compliant) Key derivation HMAC DRBG (non-compliant) Random bit generation KBKDF (non-compliant) Key derivation MD2 Message Digest MD4 Message digest MD5 Message Digest Poly1305 Message authentication code RC2 Encryption/decryption RC4 Encryption/decryption RC5 Encryption/decryption RIPEMD Message Digest RMD160 Message Digest RSA (non-compliant) Key pair generation; digital signature generation; digital signature verification; key transport SEED Encryption/decryption SM2 Message digest SM3 Message digest SM4 Encryption/decryption TDES Encryption and key wrapping TDES-CMAC MAC generation TLS v1.0/v1.1 KDF (non- compliant) Key derivation Whirlpool Message digest Table 10: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms 2.6 Security Function Implementations The table below lists the security function implementations for this module. Name Type Description Properties Algorithms AES for Symmetric Encryption/Decryption BC-UnAuthEncrypt BC-UnAuthDecrypt Block cipher unauthenticated. Publication:SP 800-38A AES-CBC: (A5477) AES-CFB1: (A5477) AES-CFB8: (A5477) AES-CFB128: (A5477) AES-CTR: (A5477) AES-ECB: (A5477) AES-OFB: (A5477) AES-CMAC for Message Authentication MAC Message authentication. Publication:SP 800-38B AES-CMAC: (A5477) AES-GMAC for Message Authentication MAC Message authentication. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-GMAC: (A5477) AES-CCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption BC-AuthEncrypt BC-AuthDecrypt Block cipher authenticated. Publication:SP 800-38C AES-CCM: (A5477) AES-ECB: (A5477) AES-GCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption BC-AuthEncrypt BC-AuthDecrypt Block cipher authenticated. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-GCM: (A5477) AES-CBC: (A5477) AES-XTS for Symmetric Encryption/Decryption BC-UnAuthEncrypt BC-UnAuthDecrypt Block cipher unauthenticated. Publication:SP 800-38E AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A5477) AES-ECB: (A5477) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 15 of 57 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms DRBG DRBG Deterministic random bit generator. Publication:SP 800-90A Rev. 1 Counter DRBG: (A5477) DSA for Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Digital signature verification. Publication:FIPS 186-4 DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5477) SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) ECDSA for Key Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Used to generate the ECDSA private key and ECDSA public key, which are used for digital signature generation and verification, respectively Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) CKG: () ECDSA for Key Verification AsymKeyPair-KeyVer Asymmetric key-pair verification. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) ECDSA for Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Uses the ECDSA private key to generate digital signatures. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) ECDSA for Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Uses the ECDSA public key to verify digital signatures. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) HMAC for Message Authentication MAC Message authentication. Publication:FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5477) SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA3-224: (A5477) SHA3-256: (A5477) SHA3-384: (A5477) SHA3-512: (A5477) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 16 of 57 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms ECDH Shared Secret Computation KAS-SSC ECDH shared secret computation. Publication:SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5477) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5477) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KTS-Wrap Any Approved mode of AES with CMAC, GMAC, or HMAC used for key wrapping/key unwrapping. Publication:Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES with CMAC, GMAC, or HMAC is an Approved key transport technique. Key Strength:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. AES-CBC: (A5477) AES-CFB1: (A5477) AES-CFB8: (A5477) AES-CFB128: (A5477) AES-CTR: (A5477) AES-ECB: (A5477) AES-OFB: (A5477) AES-CMAC: (A5477) AES-GMAC: (A5477) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5477) SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA3-224: (A5477) SHA3-256: (A5477) SHA3-384: (A5477) SHA3-512: (A5477) AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KTS-Wrap AES-CCM used for key wrapping/key unwrapping. Publication:Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-CCM is an Approved key transport technique. Key Strength:Key Strength: Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. AES-CCM: (A5477) AES-CBC: (A5477) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 17 of 57 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KTS-Wrap AES-GCM used for key wrapping/key unwrapping. Publication:Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-GCM is an Approved key transport technique Key Strength:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. AES-GCM: (A5477) AES-CBC: (A5477) AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KTS-Wrap AES-KW/KWP used for key wrapping/key unwrapping. Publication:SP 800-38F Key Strength: Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. AES-KW: (A5477) AES-KWP: (A5477) KBKDF KBKDF Key-based key derivation. Publication:SP 800-108 Rev. 1 KDF SP800-108: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) PBKDF PBKDF Password-based key derivation. Publication:SP 800-132 PBKDF: (A5477) SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA3-224: (A5477) SHA3-256: (A5477) SHA3-384: (A5477) SHA3-512: (A5477) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5477) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5477) RSA for Key Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Key generation. Publication:FIPS 186-5 RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) CKG: () FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 18 of 57 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms RSA for Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Signature generation. Publication:FIPS 186-5 RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) RSA for Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature verification. Publication:FIPS 186-5 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5477) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5477) SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA for Message Digest SHA Message digest. Publication:FIPS 180-4 SHA-1: (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) SHA3 for Message Digest SHA Message digest. Publication:FIPS 202 SHA3-224: (A5477) SHA3-256: (A5477) SHA3-384: (A5477) SHA3-512: (A5477) SHAKE for Extendable Output Function XOF Extendable output function. Publication:FIPS 202 SHAKE-128: (A5477) SHAKE-256: (A5477) TDES for Symmetric Decryption BC-UnAuth Symmetric decryption. Publication:SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-ECB: (A5477) TDES-CBC: (A5477) TDES-OFB: (A5477) TDES-CFB64: (A5477) TDES-CFB8: (A5477) TDES-CFB1: (A5477) TDES-CMAC for Message Authentication MAC Message authentication (verification). Publication:SP 800-67 Rev. 2 TDES-CMAC: (A5477) TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) KAS-Full Key agreement. Caveat:No part of the TLS v1.2 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP Key Strength:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. Publication:SP 800-56A Rev. 3 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5477) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5477) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5477) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) TLS v1.2 Authentication DigSig-SigVer ECDSA or RSA signature verification used for authentication during TLS v1.3 session negotiation. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 19 of 57 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms TLS v1.2 Data Encryption/Decryption BC-Auth BC-UnAuth MAC TLS v1.2 encryption, decryption, and authentication of TLS session packets, which are used by the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key. Publication:SP 800-38A, SP 800-38D, FIPS 198-1 AES-GCM: (A5477) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-CBC: (A5477) Key Length: 128, 256 Counter DRBG: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) TLS v1.2 Key Derivation KAS-135KDF TLS v1.2 key derivation. Caveat:No part of the TLS v1.2 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Publication:SP 800-135 Rev. 1 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) KAS-Full TLS v1.3 ECDH key agreement. Caveat:No part of the TLS v1.3 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Key Strength:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. Publication:SP 800- 56Ar3 TLS v1.3 KDF: (A5478) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5477) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5477) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) Counter DRBG: (A5477) TLS v1.3 Authentication DigSig-SigVer TLS v1.3 signature verification. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5477) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5477) SHA2-224: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-512: (A5477) TLS v1.3 Data Encryption/Decryption BC-Auth BC-UnAuth MAC TLS v1.3 encryption, decryption, and authentication of TLS session packets, which are used by the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key. Publication:SP 800-38A, SP 800-38D, FIPS 198-1 AES-GCM: (A5477) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-CBC: (A5477) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) TLS v1.3 Key Derivation KAS-135KDF TLS v1.3 key derivation. Caveat:No part of the TLS v1.3 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Publication:SP 800-135 Rev. 1 TLS v1.3 KDF: (A5478) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5477) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5477) SHA2-256: (A5477) SHA2-384: (A5477) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 20 of 57 Table 11: Security Function Implementations 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The information below provides algorithm information of references to specifications. 2.7.1 AES-GCM IV As per IG C.H Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D, AES GCM IV implements scenario 1 only. AES GCM encryption is used in the context of the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3. To meet the AES GCM (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from NIST SP 800-38D, the module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H as follows: • For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800- 52rev2. Per scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the module operator (i.e., the first party, client, or server) to trigger this handshake in accordance with RFC 5246 when this condition is encountered. • For TLS v1.3, the protocol’s implementation is contained within the boundary of the module. Per scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the AES GCM implementation meets the NIST SP 800-38E collision probability requirement, as the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 8446. The implementations of AES GCM and all underlying algorithms have been successfully tested for compliance with their respective specifications (see CAVP Cert. A5477). The generated IV is only used in the context of the AES GCM encryption executing the provisions of the TLS 1.3 protocol. • In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. 2.7.2 RSA As per FIPS 186-5 Appendix A.1, RSA KeyGen implements the method discussed in A.1.3 Generation of Random Primes that are Probably Prime. As per section C.K. of the Implementation Guidance, Infinidat Cryptographic Module (libcrypto) is complaint with FIPS 186-5, as the FIPS 186-4 CAVP test for RSA SigVer is mathematically identical to the FIPS 186-5 CAVP test. 2.7.3 ECDSA As per FIPS 186-5 Appendix A.2, ECDSA KeyGen implements the method discussed in A.2.2 ECDSA Key Pair Generation by Rejection Sampling. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 21 of 57 2.7.4 PBKDF2 The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of NIST SP 800-132. The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the resultant key is acceptable for module operators. The minimum iteration count shall be 1000. The length of the password/passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/6220 = 7.044-35 , which is less than 2-112 . As specified in NIST SP 800-132, keys derived from passwords/passphrases may only be used in storage applications. 2.7.5 KAS-ECC-SSC Per IG D.F, KAS-ECC-SSC claims Scenario 2 path (1). KAS-ECC-SSC with TLS v1.2 RFC 7627 or TLS v1.3 KDF claims Scenario 2 path (2). The shared secret computation and the key derivation function are CAVP-tested separately. 2.8 RBG and Entropy The module does not have any entropy certificates. The calling application provides the following bits of entropy per Counter DRBG mode: • AES-128-CTR: 128 or 256 bits • AES-192-CTR: 256, 384, or 512 bits • AES-256-CTR: 256, 384, or 512 bits The calling application and its entropy source are outside the module cryptographic boundary. The calling application shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the Counter DRBG as shown in Table 3 of SP 800-90Arev1. Counter DRBG uses a derivation function. This entropy shall be supplied by means of a callback function. The callback function must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. A minimum of 256 bits of entropy is required to generate SSPs with up to 256 bits of strength. AES-256-CTR is used by default to generate random values for other security functions. 2.9 Key Generation The module supports the following key generation methods: • CKG • ECDSA KeyGen • RSA KeyGen FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 22 of 57 2.10 Key Establishment 2.10.1 Key Agreement Information The module supports the following key agreement methods: • KAS-ECC-SSC (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman) and TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 • KAS-ECC-SSC (Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman) and TLS v1.3 KDF 2.10.2 Key Transport Information The module supports the following key transport methods: • Any approved mode of AES with CMAC, GMAC, or HMAC • AES-CCM • AES-GCM • AES-KW • AES-KWP 2.11 Industry Protocols The module implements the following industry protocols: • TLS v1.2 • TLS v1.3 No parts of the TLS protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 23 of 57 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The module supports the following four logical interfaces: • Data Input • Data Output • Control Input • Status Output The module does not support a “control output” interface. As a software library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports, as it communicates only to the calling application via its well-defined API. The table below contains a mapping of the physical and logical interfaces of the module. Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes N/A Data Input Logical interface is defined as API input arguments that provide input data for processing. This includes data to be encrypted, decrypted, signed, verified, and hashed, keys to be used in cryptographic services, random seed material for the DRBG of the module, keying material used as input to key establishment services, and intermediate data required for services. N/A Data Output Logical interface is defined as API output arguments that return generated or processed data back to the caller. This includes data that has been encrypted/decrypted/verified, digital signatures, hashes, random values generated by the DRBG of the module, keys established using key establishment methods of the module, and key components/intermediate data/traffic (client and server data and messages). N/A Control Input Logical interface is defined as API input arguments that are used to initialize and control the operation of the module. This includes API commands invoking cryptographic services, modes, key sizes, etc. used with cryptographic services. N/A Status Output Logical interface is defined as API call return values. This includes status information regarding the module or invoked service/operation. Table 12: Ports and Interfaces FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 24 of 57 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods The module does not support authentication methods; operators implicitly assume an authorized role (or set of roles) based on the service selected. 4.2 Roles The module supports a Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role: • User – The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The module does not support multiple concurrent operators. The calling application that loaded the module is its only operator. The table below lists details of the supported roles. Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Role CO None User Role User None Table 13: Roles 4.3 Approved Services This module is a software library that provides cryptographic functionality to calling applications. As such, the security functions provided by the module are considered the module’s security services. Indicators for Approved services (in the case of this module, those security functions with algorithm validation certificates and all required self-tests) are provided via API return value. When invoking a security function, the calling application provides inputs via an internal structure, or “context”. Upon each service invocation, the module will determine if the invoked security function is an Approved service. To access the resulting value, the calling application must pass the finalized context to the indicator API associated with that security function (note the indicator check must be performed prior to any context cleanup is performed). The indicator API will return “1” to indicate the usage of an Approved service. Indicators for services providing non-Approved security functions (as well as for services not requiring an indicator) will have a value other than “1”, ensuring that the indicators for Approved services are unambiguous. The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation: FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 25 of 57 • G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. • R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). • W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. • E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. • Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. Please refer to the table below for descriptions of available services. Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Show Status Return Approved mode status. N/A API call parameters Current operation al status None Crypto Officer Perform self-tests on-demand Perform pre- operational and conditional self- tests. API return value Re- instantiate module; API call parameters Status None Crypto Officer FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 26 of 57 Zeroize Zeroize and de- allocate memory containing sensitive data via OpenSSL_cleans e(). N/A API call parameters None None Crypto Officer - AES Key: Z - AES CCM key: Z - AES GCM key: Z - AES XTS key: Z - AES CMAC key: Z - AES GMAC key: Z - TDES key: Z - TDES CMAC key: Z - HMAC key: Z - DSA public key: Z - ECDSA private key: Z - ECDSA public key: Z - RSA private key: Z - RSA public key: Z - ECDH private component: Z - ECDH public component : Z - Passphrase: Z - TLS pre- master secret: Z - TLS master secret: Z - TLS Session Key: Z - TLS Authenticati on Key: Z - DRBG entropy input: Z - DRBG seed: Z - DRBG ‘V’ value: Z - DRBG ‘Key’ value: Z FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 27 of 57 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Show versioning information Return module versioning information. N/A API call parameters Module name, version None Crypto Officer Perform symmetric encryption Encrypt plaintext data. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, ciphertext AES for Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on AES-XTS for Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on User - AES Key: W,E - AES XTS key: W,E Perform symmetric decryption Decrypt ciphertext data. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, ciphertext Status, plaintext AES for Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on AES-XTS for Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on TDES for Symmetric Decryption User - AES Key: W,E - AES XTS key: W,E - TDES key: W,E Generate symmetric digest Generate symmetric digest. For CMAC: CMAC_get_service_indicator() For GMAC: EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, digest AES-CMAC for Message Authentication AES-GMAC for Message Authentication User - AES CMAC key: W,E - AES GMAC key: W,E Verify symmetric digest Verify symmetric digest. For CMAC: CMAC_get_service_indicator() For GMAC: EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, digest Status AES-CMAC for Message Authentication AES-GMAC for Message Authentication TDES-CMAC for Message Authentication User - AES CMAC key: W,E - AES GMAC key: W,E - TDES CMAC key: W,E Perform authenticat ed symmetric encryption Encrypt plaintext using supplied AES GCM key with an internally generated IV or AES CCM key. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, ciphertext AES-CCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on AES-GCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on User - AES CCM key: W,E - AES GCM key: W,E Perform authenticat ed symmetric decryption Decrypt ciphertext using supplied AES GCM key with an internally generated IV or AES CCM key. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, ciphertext Status, plaintext AES-CCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on AES-GCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decrypti on User - AES CCM key: W,E - AES GCM key: W,E FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 28 of 57 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Generate random number Generate random bits using DRBG. DRBG_get_service_indicator() API call parameters Status, random bits DRBG User - DRBG entropy input: W,E - DRBG seed: G,E - DRBG ‘V’ value: G,E - DRBG ‘Key’ value: G,E Perform keyed hash operation Compute a message authentication code. HMAC_get_service_indicator() API call parameters, key, message Status, MAC HMAC for Message Authentication User - HMAC key: W,E Perform hash operation Compute a message digest. EVP_Digest_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, message Status, hash SHA for Message Digest SHA3 for Message Digest SHAKE for Extendable Output Function User Generate asymmetric key pair Generate a public/private key pair. For RSA: RSA_key_get_service_indicator () For ECDSA: EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) API call parameters Status, key pair ECDSA for Key Generation RSA for Key Generation User - ECDSA public key: G,R - ECDSA private key: G,R - RSA public key: G,R - RSA private key: G,R Verify ECDSA public key Verify an ECDSA public key. EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) API call parameters, key Status ECDSA for Key Verification User - ECDSA public key: W Generate digital signature Generate a digital signature. EVP_Digest_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, message Status, signature ECDSA for Signature Generation RSA for Signature Generation User - ECDSA private key: W,E - RSA private key: W,E Verify digital signature Verify a digital signature. EVP_Digest_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, key, signature, message Status DSA for Signature Verification ECDSA for Signature Verification RSA for Signature Verification User - DSA public key: W,E - ECDSA public key: W,E - RSA public key: W,E FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 29 of 57 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Perform key wrap Perform key wrap. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, encryption key, key Status, encrypted key AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing User - AES Key: W,E - AES CMAC key: W,E - AES GMAC key: W,E - AES CCM key: W,E - AES GCM key: W,E - HMAC key: W,E Perform key unwrap Perform key unwrap. EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, decryption key, key Status, decrypted key AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapp ing User - AES Key: W,E - AES CMAC key: W,E - AES GMAC key: W,E - AES CCM key: W,E - AES GCM key: W,E - HMAC key: W,E Compute shared secret Compute ECDH shared secret suitable for use as input to a TLS KDF. EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) API call parameters Status, shared secret ECDH Shared Secret Computation User - ECDH public component : W,E - ECDH private component: W,E - TLS pre- master secret: G Derive keys via TLS KDF Derive TLS session and integrity keys using TLS v1.2 KDF or TLS v1.3 KDF. For TLS v1.2 KDF: TLSKDF_get_service_indicator( ) For TLS v1.3 KDF: TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, TLS pre- master secret Status, TLS keys TLS v1.2 Key Derivation TLS v1.3 Key Derivation User - TLS pre- master secret: W,E - TLS master secret: G,E - TLS Session Key: G,R - TLS Authenticati on Key: G,R FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 30 of 57 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Perform key agreement functions Establish the session keys for TLS using ECDH key agreement and TLS v1.2 or v1.3 KDF. For ECDH: EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) For TLS v1.2 KDF: TLSKDF_get_service_indicator( ) For TLS v1.3 KDF: TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indica tor() API call parameters, ECDH public component, ECDH private component Status, session keys TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) User - ECDH public component : W,E - ECDH private component: W,E - TLS pre- master secret: G,E - TLS master secret: G,E - TLS Session Key: G,R - TLS Authenticati on Key: G,R Establish TLS connection Establish a TLS session. Please refer to Section 11. Non- Administrator Guidance for information about the approved cipher suites. For key exchange (ECDHE): EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) For cipher: EVP_cipher_get_service_indica tor() For message authentication: HMAC_get_service_indicator() For certificate verification (ECDSA): EC_key_get_service_indicator( ) For certificate verification (RSA): RSA_key_get_service_indicator () For TLS v1.2 KDF: TLSKDF_get_service_indicator( ) For TLS v1.3 KDF: TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() API call parameters, TLS configuratio n, TLS keys Status, TLS connectio n informati on TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.2 Authentication TLS v1.2 Data Encryption/Decrypti on TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.3 Authentication TLS v1.3 Data Encryption/Decrypti on User - ECDH public component : G,E - ECDH private component: G,E - TLS pre- master secret: G,E - TLS master secret: G,E - TLS Session Key: G,E - TLS Authenticati on Key: G,E - ECDSA public key: R,E - RSA public key: R,E Derive key via PBKDF2 Derive key via PBKDF2. PBKDF_get_service_indicator() API call parameters, password Status, key PBKDF User - Passphrase: W,E - AES Key: G,R Derive key via KBKDF Derive symmetric key from KBKDF. KBKDF_get_service_indicator() API call parameters, key Status, key KBKDF User - AES Key: G,R Table 14: Approved Services * Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.4.C, the Show Status and Show Versioning Information services do not require a service indicator. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 31 of 57 4.4 Non-Approved Services The table below lists the non-Approved services available to module operators. Name Description Algorithms Role Perform data encryption (non-compliant) Perform symmetric data encryption. ARIA Blake2 Blowfish Camellia CAST CAST5 ChaCha20 DES IDEA RC2 RC4 RC5 SEED SM4 TDES User Perform data decryption (non-compliant) Perform symmetric data decryption. ARIA Blake2 Blowfish Camellia CAST CAST5 ChaCha20 DES IDEA RC2 RC4 RC5 SEED SM4 User Perform MAC operations (non-compliant) Perform message authentication operations. Poly1305 TDES-CMAC User Perform hash operation (non-compliant) Perform hash operation. MD2 MD4 MD5 RIPEMD RMD160 SM2 SM3 SM4 Whirlpool User Perform digital signature functions (non- compliant) Perform digital signature functions. DSA (non-compliant) ECDSA (non-compliant) EdDSA RSA (non-compliant) User Perform key agreement functions (non- compliant) Perform key agreement functions. DH ECDH (non-compliant) User Perform key wrap (non-compliant) Perform key wrap functions. TDES TDES-CMAC User Perform key encapsulation (non-compliant) Perform key encapsulation functions. RSA (non-compliant) User Perform key un-encapsulation (non-compliant) Perform key un-encapsulation functions. RSA (non-compliant) User FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 32 of 57 Name Description Algorithms Role Perform key derivation functions (non-compliant) Perform key derivation functions. HKDF (non-compliant) KBKDF (non-compliant) TLS v1.0/v1.1 KDF (non- compliant) User Perform authenticated encryption/decryption (non-compliant) Perform authenticated encryption/decryption. AES-GCM (non-compliant with external IV) AES-OCB User Perform random number generation (non- compliant) Perform random number generation. ANSI X9.31 RNG (with 128-bit AES core) Hash_DRBG (non-compliant) HMAC DRBG (non-compliant) User Perform key pair generation (non-compliant) Perform key pair generation. DH DSA (non-compliant) ECDSA (non-compliant) EdDSA RSA (non-compliant) User Shared secret computation (non-compliant) Perform shared secret computation. DH ECDH (non-compliant) User Perform domain parameter generation Perform domain parameter generation. DH DSA (non-compliant) User Perform domain parameter verification Perform domain parameter verification. DH DSA (non-compliant) User Table 15: Non-Approved Services 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module does not load any external software or firmware. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 33 of 57 5. Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques All software components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using an Approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements independent HMAC SHA2-256 digest checks to test the integrity of each library file; failure of the integrity test for either library file will cause the module to enter a critical error state. The module’s integrity check is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. Infinidat Cryptographic Module is not a standalone application; it is a cryptographic toolkit intended for use with a vendor’s solution. The module will be linked to a host application, and the host application will be pre-installed onto a target platform by the vendor or installed onto target platforms by the end-user. The module requires no configuration steps to be performed by application developers or end-users, and no action is required from developers or end-users to initialize the module for operation. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) that ensures that the pre-operational tests and conditional CASTS are initiated automatically when the module is loaded. 5.2 Initiate on Demand The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 34 of 57 6. Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements The Infinidat Cryptographic Module comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a Modifiable operational environment. There are no rules, settings, or restrictions for the operational environment. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Please refer to section 2.1 of this document for a list/description of the applicable operational environments. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 35 of 57 7. Physical Security The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone software module and does not include physical security mechanisms. Therefore, per section 7.5 of the FIPS PUB 140-3 Management Manual this section is not applicable. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 36 of 57 8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques references in Annex F of ISO/IEC 19790. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 37 of 57 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type RAM SSPs stored in RAM. Dynamic Table 16: Storage Areas 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The table below lists SSP input and output methods for this module. Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type SFI or Algorithm Imported in plaintext via API parameter External RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM External Plaintext Automated Electronic Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods The table below lists the SSP zeroization method for the module. Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Zeroize service The module performs the zeroization service when the calling application invokes the OpenSSL_cleanse() function, which zeroizes SSPs. Additionally, other SSPs will be zeroized by an indirect call to OpenSSL_cleanse() via object destruction APIs. The OpenSSL_cleanse() service zeroizes SSPs instantaneously, which yields the SSPs irretrievable. The operator calls the OpenSSL_cleanse() function. The successful completion of the procedural zeroization suffices as the implicit indicator that zeroization has completed. Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in the table below. Note that all SSP imports and exports are electronic and performed within the Tested OE’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 38 of 57 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By AES Key Symmetric encryption, decryption; key transport Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KBKDF PBKDF AES for Symmetric Encryption/Decryption AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping KBKDF AES CCM key Authenticated symmetric encryption, decryption; key transport Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-CCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES GCM key Authenticated symmetric encryption, decryption; key transport Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-CCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-KW/KWP for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES-GCM for Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption AES-GCM for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES XTS key Symmetric encryption, decryption 256 or 512 bits - 128 or 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP AES-XTS for Symmetric Encryption/Decryption AES CMAC key MAC generation, verification Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits Authentication - CSP AES-CMAC for Message Authentication AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping AES GMAC key MAC generation, verification Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits Authentication - CSP AES-GMAC for Message Authentication AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping TDES key Symmetric decryption; key unwrapping 192 bits - 112 bits Symmetric Key - CSP TDES for Symmetric Decryption TDES CMAC key MAC verification 192 bits - 112 bits Symmetric Key - CSP TDES-CMAC for Message Authentication HMAC key Keyed hash Between 160 bits and 512 bits - Between 160 bits and 512 bits Authentication - CSP HMAC for Message Authentication AES+MAC for Key Wrapping/Unwrapping FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 39 of 57 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By DSA public key Used for DSA digital signature verification. Between 1024 and 3072 bits - Between 80 and 128 bits Public - PSP DSA for Signature Verification ECDSA private key Used for ECDSA digital signature generation. Between 224 and 521 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits Private - CSP ECDSA for Key Generation ECDSA for Signature Generation ECDSA public key Used for ECDSA digital signature verification. Between 224 and 521 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits Public - PSP ECDSA for Key Generation ECDSA for Signature Verification TLS v1.2 Authentication TLS v1.3 Authentication RSA private key Used for RSA digital signature generation. Between 2048 and 4096 bits - Between 112 and 150 bits Private - CSP RSA for Key Generation RSA for Signature Generation RSA public key Used for DSA digital signature verification. Between 2048 and 4096 bits - Between 112 and 150 bits Public - PSP RSA for Key Generation RSA for Signature Verification TLS v1.2 Authentication TLS v1.3 Authentication ECDH private component Used for ECDH shared secret computation. Between 224 and 521 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits Private - CSP ECDSA for Key Generation ECDH Shared Secret Computation TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) ECDH public component Used for ECDH shared secret computation. Between 224 and 521 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits Public - PSP ECDSA for Key Generation ECDH Shared Secret Computation TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS Session Key Used for the encryption and decryption of TLS session packets. 128 or 256 bits - 128 or 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP TLS v1.2 Key Derivation TLS v1.3 Key Derivation TLS v1.2 Data Encryption/Decryption TLS v1.3 Data Encryption/Decryption TLS Authentication Key Used for authentication for TLS session packets. 256 or 384 bits - 256 or 384 bits Authentication - CSP TLS v1.2 Key Derivation TLS v1.3 Key Derivation TLS v1.2 Data Encryption/Decryption TLS v1.3 Data Encryption/Decryption Passphrase Used as input for PBKDF. n/a - n/a Passphrase - CSP PBKDF FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 40 of 57 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By TLS pre-master secret Derivation of the TLS master secret. Between 224 and 521 bits - Between 224 and 521 bits Pre-master Secret - CSP ECDH Shared Secret Computation TLS v1.2 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.3 Key Agreement (ECDH) TLS v1.2 Key Derivation TLS v1.3 Key Derivation TLS master secret Derivation of the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key used for securing TLS connections. 384 bits - 384 bits Master Secret - CSP TLS v1.2 Key Derivation TLS v1.3 Key Derivation TLS v1.2 Data Encryption/Decryption TLS v1.3 Data Encryption/Decryption DRBG entropy input Entropy material for DRBG. Between 128 and 512 bits - Between 128 and 512 bits Entropy Input - CSP DRBG DRBG seed Seeding material for DRBG. Between 256 and 384 bits - Between 256 and 384 bits Seed - CSP DRBG DRBG DRBG ‘V’ value State values for DRBG. 128 bits - 128 bits State Value - CSP DRBG DRBG DRBG ‘Key’ value State values for DRBG. Between 128 and 256 bits - Between 128 and 256 bits State Value - CSP DRBG DRBG Table 19: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs AES Key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service Passphrase:Derived From AES Key:Derived From AES CCM key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service AES GCM key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service AES XTS key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service AES CMAC key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service AES GMAC key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 41 of 57 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs TDES key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TDES CMAC key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service HMAC key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TLS master secret:Derived From DSA public key Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service ECDSA private key Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service ECDSA public key:Paired With ECDSA public key Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service ECDSA private key:Paired With RSA private key Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service RSA public key:Paired With RSA public key Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service RSA private key:Paired With ECDH private component Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service ECDH public component :Paired With ECDH public component Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service ECDH private component:Paired With TLS Session Key RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TLS master secret:Derived From TLS Authentication Key RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TLS master secret:Derived From Passphrase Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 42 of 57 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs TLS pre-master secret Imported in plaintext via API parameter Exported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TLS master secret RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service TLS pre-master secret:Derived From DRBG entropy input Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service DRBG seed Imported in plaintext via API parameter RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service DRBG ‘V’ value RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service DRBG ‘Key’ value RAM:Plaintext Until the OpenSSL_cleanse() function is called. Zeroize service Table 20: SSP Table 2 9.5 Transitions NIST SP 800-131Arev2 states that “SHA-1 is acceptable for applications that do not require collision resistance.” However, SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation and is allowed for legacy use only for digital signature verification. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 43 of 57 10. Self-Tests The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions. 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following pre-operational self-tests: Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details HMAC-SHA2- 256 #1 SHA2-256 Software Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity Internal flag; subsequent requests return failure indicator Test for libcrypto. Performed automatically without operator action HMAC-SHA2- 256 #2 SHA2-256 Software Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity Internal flag; subsequent requests return failure indicator Test for libssl. Performed automatically without operator action Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The module performs the following conditional self-tests: Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-ECB #1 128-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Encrypt After successful software integrity test AES-ECB #2 128-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Decrypt After successful software integrity test AES-CCM #1 192-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Encrypt After successful software integrity test AES-CCM #2 192-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Decrypt After successful software integrity test FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 44 of 57 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-GCM #1 128-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Encrypt After successful software integrity test AES-GCM #2 128-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Decrypt After successful software integrity test AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 #1 128-bit; 256- bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Encrypt After successful software integrity test AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 #2 128-bit; 256- bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Decrypt After successful software integrity test AES-CMAC CBC mode, 128-bit; 192- bit; 256-bit KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Generate After successful software integrity test TDES-ECB 3-key KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Decrypt After successful software integrity test TDES-CMAC CBC mode; 3- Key KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Verify After successful software integrity test Counter DRBG AES, 256-bit, with derivation function KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Instantiate/Generate/Reseed After successful software integrity test DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) 2048-bit; SHA2-256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Verify After successful software integrity test ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) P-224; SHA2- 256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Sign After successful software integrity test ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) P-224; SHA2- 256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Verify After successful software integrity test FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 45 of 57 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) 2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Sign After successful software integrity test RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) 2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Verify After successful software integrity test HMAC-SHA- 1 SHA-1 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hashed Message Authentication After instantiation and before software integrity test HMAC- SHA2-224 SHA2-224 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hashed Message Authentication After instantiation and before software integrity test HMAC- SHA2-256 SHA2-256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hashed Message Authentication After instantiation and before software integrity test HMAC- SHA2-384 SHA2-384 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hashed Message Authentication After instantiation and before software integrity test HMAC- SHA2-512 SHA2-512 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hashed Message Authentication After instantiation and before software integrity test KDF SP800- 108 HMAC-SHA2- 256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Derive After successful software integrity test SHA-1 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test SHA2-224 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test SHA2-256 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 46 of 57 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions SHA2-384 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test SHA2-512 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test SHA3-256 - KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Hash After instantiation and before software integrity test KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 P-224 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Shared Secret “Z” Computation After successful software integrity test PBKDF SHA2-256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Derive After successful software integrity test TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 SHA2-256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Derive After successful software integrity test TLS v1.3 KDF SHA2-256 KAT CAST An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call Derive After successful software integrity test ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) - PCT PCT An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Sign/Verify When the requested service requires the generation of an ECDSA key pair. RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) - PCT PCT An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Sign/Verify When the requested service requires the generation of an RSA key pair. Other (ECDH) - PCT PCT An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Key Generation When the requested service requires the generation of an ECDH key pair. AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Duplicate Key Critical Function An integer value indicating success (1) or failure (0) of the self-test procedure call. Duplicate Key Test Executed upon initialization of AES XTS cipher with key data Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 47 of 57 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information The module does not perform self-tests periodically, but the operator may conduct self-tests on demand via the methods listed in Section 10.5 below. The tables below provide information regarding the pre-operational self- tests and conditional self-tests, respectively, that the operator can perform on demand: Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method HMAC-SHA2-256 #1 Software Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2-256 #2 Software Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-ECB #1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-ECB #2 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-CCM #1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-CCM #2 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-GCM #1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-GCM #2 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 #1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 #2 KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-CMAC KAT CAST On Demand Manually TDES-ECB KAT CAST On Demand Manually TDES-CMAC KAT CAST On Demand Manually Counter DRBG KAT CAST On Demand Manually DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT CAST On Demand Manually ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) KAT CAST On Demand Manually ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) KAT CAST On Demand Manually RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT CAST On Demand Manually RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT CAST On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2-224 KAT CAST On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT CAST On Demand Manually HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT CAST On Demand Manually KDF SP800-108 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA-1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-224 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-256 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-384 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-512 KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA3-256 KAT CAST On Demand Manually KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT CAST On Demand Manually PBKDF KAT CAST On Demand Manually TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT CAST On Demand Manually TLS v1.3 KDF KAT CAST On Demand Manually ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) PCT PCT On Demand Manually RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) PCT PCT On Demand Manually FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 48 of 57 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Other (ECDH) PCT PCT On Demand Manually AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 Duplicate Key Critical Function On Demand Manually Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States The table below describes the error states and status indicators of the module. Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator Critical Error Module immediately terminates the calling application. Module disables access to all cryptographic functions, SSPs, and data output services. If the module fails pre-operational integrity tests, the SHA/HMAC pre- operational KATs (SHA, HMAC), or the conditional CASTs (DRBG, AES-ECB, AES- CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CMAC, DSA Verify, ECDSA Sign/Verify, RSA Sign/Verify, KAS-ECC Shared Secret “Z” Computation, KBKDF, PBKDF, TLS v1.2 KDF, TLS v1.3 KDF). The module must be re- instantiated by the calling application. The module operator should contact Infinidat if errors persist after re- instantiation. Returns error code and sets an internal flag. Subsequent requests return failure indicator. Soft Error The module enters this state upon the failure of a PCT or self-test. The module transitions back to normal operation where the service requiring the self-test can be re-run or a new service can be performed. If the module fails ECDSA/RSA/ECDH PCTs or the AES-XTS duplicate key test. Module records the error and resumes normal operation. Returns error code Table 25: Error States 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests The operator may initiate self-tests on demand by re-instantiating the module or by issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 49 of 57 11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following: • Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module • Maintenance requirements • Administrator and non-Administrator guidance Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy. 11.1 Startup Procedures 11.1.1 Secure Installation The module is distributed to the operator as part of the InfuzeOS when procuring the Infinibox product. No specific installation is necessary. 11.1.2 Initialization This module is designed to support third-party vendor applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialize the module. 11.1.3 Startup No startup steps are required to be performed by end-users. 11.2 Administrator Guidance There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. If any irregular activity is observed, or if the module is consistently reporting errors, then Infinidat Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional guidance for the CO: • The fips_post_status() API can be used to determine the module’s operational status. If the module is in a normal operational state, fips_post_status() will return 1. If the module is in the Critical Error state, fips_post_status() will return 0. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 50 of 57 • The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests and conditional CASTs on demand for periodic testing of the module by re-instantiating the module, rebooting/power-cycling the host device, or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. • The OpenSSL_version() API can be used to obtain the module’s versioning information. This information will include the module name and version, which can be correlated with the module’s validation record. • The operator must install all module binaries in the same directory. 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance The following list provides additional policies for the User role: • The cryptographic module’s services are designed to be provided to a calling application. Excluding the use of the NIST-defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other assurances from FIPS PUB 186-5 (including those required of the intended signatory and the signature verifier) are outside the scope of the module and are the responsibility of the calling application. • The module performs assurances for its key agreement schemes as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Arev3: o Section 5.5.2 (for assurances of domain parameter validity) o Section 5.6.2.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of ephemeral public key validity specified in section 5.6.2.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Invocation of the proper module services to validate another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application. • The calling application is responsible for ensuring that CSPs are not shared between Approved and non- Approved services and modes of operation. • The “Establish TLS connection” Approved Service invokes multiple sub-services for TLS connection establishment. The calling application is responsible for calling the service indicators used in the negotiated cipher suite to verify each sub-service uses Approved algorithms. For example, the client and server agree upon the following cipher suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. During the TLS handshake and session, the calling application must invoke: o EC_key_get_service_indicator() for the shared secret computation component of the key exchange algorithm. o TLSKDF_get_service_indicator() for the key derivation function used to derive the TLS session and authentication keys. o EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator() for the signature verification of the server certificate. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 51 of 57 o EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator() for the cipher algorithm used during the TLS session for encryption and decryption. o HMAC_get_service_indicator() for the HMAC algorithm used during the TLS session for message authentication (unless using an AEAD, like AES-GCM). • The following cipher suites are Approved for the “Establish TLS connection” service: TLS v1.2 o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS v1.3 o TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 o TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 52 of 57 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 53 of 57 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 26 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 26: Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard – New Instructions API Application Programming Interface CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Cryptographic Officer CPU Central Processing Unit CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter CVL Component Validation List DEP Default Entry Point DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference /Electromagnetic Compatibility FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GCM Galois/Counter Mode GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code GPC General-Purpose Computer HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code KAS Key Agreement Scheme KAT Known Answer Test KTS Key Transport Scheme KW Key Wrap KWP Key Wrap with Padding FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 54 of 57 Acronym Definition NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology OS Operating System PCT Pairwise Consistency Test PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard SP Special Publication TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 55 of 57 Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators This appendix specifies the APIs that are externally accessible and return the Approved service indicators. Synopsis #include #include int EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int DSA_get_service_indicator(DSA * ptr_dsa, DSA_MODES_t mode); int RSA_key_get_service_indicator(RSA * ptr_rsa); int PBKDF_get_service_indicator(); int EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EC_key_get_service_indicator(EC_KEY *ec_key); int CMAC_get_service_indicator(CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx, CMAC_MODE_t mode); int HMAC_get_service_indicator(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int TLSKDF_get_service_indicator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *tls_ctx); int TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD *md); int TLS1_3_get_service_indicator(SSL *s); int DRBG_get_service_indicator(RAND_DRBG *drbg); int KBKDF_get_service(indicator(EVP_MD *evp_md); Description These APIs are high-level interfaces that return the Approved service indicator value based on the parameter(s) passed to them. • EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for block ciphers like AES and Triple DES. • DSA_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for the DSA algorithm and its modes. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which are specified in the DSA_MODES_t enum. • RSA_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for RSA algorithm and its modes. • PBKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for PBKDF usage. • EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for SHS algorithms like SHA-1 and SHAKE. • EC_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for elliptic curve algorithms like ECDSA and its modes. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1 February 17, 2026 Infinidat Cryptographic Module 1.1.1 ©2026 Infinidat, Ltd. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 56 of 57 • CMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for CMAC requests that use AES or Triple DES. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which are specified in the CMAC_MODE_t enum. • HMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for HMAC requests and the associated SHS algorithm. • TLSKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for TLS KDF usage excluding TLS 1.3. • TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for TLS 1.3 KDF usage. This function requires the ssl.h file and is used to call the TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() function because of the SSL struct requirement. You cannot call TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() directly unless you have the SSL struct that was used. • DRBG_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved service indicator status for DRBG usage. Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.corsec.com